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Results: 241 - 300 of 370
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
The North Korean sanctions regime, in terms of sanction regimes writ large, is probably the most closed system we have compared to any other ongoing regime. Yet, you've identified a number of holes, and principally I guess they deal with workarounds in the system.
Could you speak briefly to what you see the North Koreans doing, and where they're trending in terms of trying to work around these things?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
This may not be in your realm of expertise, but I would like to hear some of your reflections on the impact of the North Korean people. Obviously, news is sporadic and probably unreliable, but you do hear of periodic famines and crop shortages.
There's that, and if you do have time, could you touch on consular relations? Obviously Canada has none. Most countries do not have any. I believe the Swedes have an embassy, and that's pretty much about it, with a few more exceptions.
What is your view on limited openness and engagement with the North Korean people?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
Ms. Prost, I want to focus a little more intensively on the standard that you came up with. You raised concerns which we echo concerning the rule of law, due process, whatever you want to call it. As a democratic country we don't have the luxury that some other countries may have of putting people on our list and doing certain things to them that we might want to do, but we can't, because we respect the rule of law.
I may be overstating the case as well, because there is a tendency immediately to jump to a more criminal standard and burden of proof, which may not be necessary in cases.
To back up, what we're examining is the potential holes in SEMA or FACFOA or concurrent criminal legislation with respect to gross violations of human rights and the ability to put someone who may have committed these gross and indecent acts on a list and freeze their assets in Canada, whether they're ill-gotten or not.
Some of the legislative tools that we have exist in Canada already, and they're subject to the standard review, more often than not by the courts. In SEMA that may not be the case; in FACFOA it may not be the case, and you have rightly highlighted that. As well, there is the UN act that is implemented here. The standard of administrative review through administrative action, on the other hand, might be too low a threshold.
I'd like to put this kind of tension in your hands and see what you think is a proper venue for a piece of legislation that would contemplate freezing the assets of someone who, on the balance of probabilities, has in fact committed such acts and whose assets are situated in Canada, and what sort of safeguards would be desirable.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
To be clear, the freezing of assets can obviously have a chilling effect on these people, who may be at large, in their ability to perpetrate further actions that are undesirable.
On the other hand, the challenge at a domestic level is the ability of those people who, as foreign nationals, obviously don't have the same charter protections that we have as Canadian citizens, but who may have some form of protection they can use. Trying to build that in from the get-go, I believe, is a challenge. As you mentioned earlier with respect to the legislation that's in place, it's already in the Criminal Code with respect to proceeds of crime, or terrorism. There is obviously a built-in protection.
The other tension that exists has to do with the operational level. What do you present to a bank in terms of evidence or documents to have them freeze an account, or to prevent a security from being transacted?
I don't know if you have any experience with that, but I'd love to hear from you on it.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Money laundering is actually an important distinction, because what it prevents.... It's not so much the freezing but the effect of freezing, insofar as the bank that is holding the account or the security or whatever it is can't then transfer it out, because it does not have the proper assurances that it is going to the right place or is duly held by the person wanting to transfer it. I think that's an important distinction to make.
That's it for my questions. I will pass on the rest of my time.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you for coming in.
I have a quick question as to the logistics of tagging a bank account or freezing a bank account or a securities account. You're talking to a former mergers and acquisitions lawyer who knows how conservative you are and has spent many Friday afternoons wondering why funds weren't wired, so I get it, and I get that you're conservative.
I'm now wondering about the rights of your custodian of funds or securities. I'm wondering about the people who have entrusted their funds to you, and what they expect their institution to be doing, and how there can be overcompliance and you're faced with this perhaps bureaucratic or logistical nightmare.
What happens when a law enforcement official or a public administration official comes and says an account is suspicious and you should freeze it? I'm being silly, but do you ask where the warrant is or ask where the proof is? What does your legal team ask at the outset?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
There is a range of thought processes that you go through. I understand if we're talking about SEMA or FACFOA, your frustration is finding out in the first place, and then it's pretty easy to freeze, as opposed to more of a money-laundering situation.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Chair.
Dr. Sangay, welcome. I have a quick question. I'd like you to perhaps develop on the middle way and how you see that as the way forward, touching perhaps on two aspects. First, how do you perceive the reception of this approach by the Chinese government? Second, how are you able to do this given the very difficult reality that you face as an administration in exile? How do you achieve consensus and how do you know that this is the proper way to reflect what both the people in Tibet and those in exile believe? I'm just curious as to how your structure achieves this policy perspective.
I guess the first question is with respect to the Chinese government.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Just to re-centre what I had asked, how do you believe this approach, the middle approach, will be received by the Chinese government? Second, how do you achieve a consensus that reflects the wishes of your people both in Tibet and abroad, in exile?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
I want to focus a little more on evidence collection. I mean, obviously with mass graves, after the evidence that the acts have occurred, the concern is around trying to tie those acts to the perpetrators. I read only a short brief on what you've done. It seems like a very, very tall task in a very, very difficult situation.
Perhaps you could just speak a little more about trying to tie the crimes to individuals.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Another aspect that another witness raised was the fact that a lot of the crimes, however they're characterized, were perpetrated by more low-level operators, neighbours, and friends—more local players in villages. How do you address that, first, obviously, in terms of documenting that—I assume there's a huge challenge—and second, as you look at post-state governance, a process of reconciliation that wouldn't necessarily entail full prosecution whether that ability is there in the first place or not? I'm just curious as to your views on a form of reconciliation that may preclude a strict application of law.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a final question on your operating budget. The Government of Canada funded another $1.5 million. Is that sufficient, all in all? Can you give me a frank opinion, as to the contribution of member states and the people you're seeking money from, on what is your ideal world? If it's not enough, I'd be glad to hear a number.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
Mr. Adsett, previously when you met with us, we discussed the holes that may exist in the current legislation, particularly with respect to gross violations of human rights. It's a topic that flows throughout the discussion we've been having at committee.
You mentioned that there is no perfect fit, obviously, whether it's in SEMA, FACFOA, or the current legislation that exists in the Criminal Code, and there seems, again, to be some confusion as to where the holes are.
A lot of people discuss the ability to freeze assets that are the product of crime, or proceeds of crime, and that legislation exists. Then in the context of a threat against international peace, obviously, the instruments under SEMA exist. Some of the concerns that have been raised are more in the nature of law enforcement. That is probably something, unless I'm mistaking the roles, you couldn't answer.
The question, then, is on the hole that does exist with respect to freezing legitimate assets or the proceeds of crime, but let's focus on legitimate assets that may exist within Canada with respect to gross human rights violators.
There are a number of concerns with plugging that hole, namely, due process, the ability to seize those assets—again, more in the realm of law enforcement—and also the nature of unintended consequences and repercussions of the state that may be involved that is backing the people who are violating human rights in a gross fashion.
I want to focus on more of a legal question. If you can't answer it, I'll submit it to you and perhaps you could submit a written response to the committee. What prevents, right now, the minister, by order in council or otherwise, from finding that a person abroad has violated human rights in a gross indecent fashion and freezing their assets in Canada? Again, I'm not talking about a Canadian national. I'm talking about a foreign national.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Again, I can't afford your billable rate on my salary—
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
—so I'm glad you're now providing legal advice.
Let me ask how that is or is not precluded by an order in council, simply the minister deciding that this event has occurred and that action needs to be taken.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I want to continue on another related notion we're examining as part of the consideration of expanding this legislation with respect to gross human rights violations, but it isn't limited to that. It's limited to the individuals who find themselves on a list, often against their will, and it has to do with due process. It's the elements of due process that we don't necessarily think of.
Obviously, we think of the ability of a person to appear in front of a court and get proper judicial review. I'm sure you would like a lot of these people who come to Canada to stand in front of a court so that you could actually get your hands on them.
One of the things has to do with the judiciousness of imposing these sanctions on individuals in the first place. That is in the nature of reliable evidence gathering, the ability, as my colleagues mentioned, of a company, let's say, doing business somewhere, to access a list that is maybe cohesive, coherent, or up to date, and then challenging it in a court of law.
Hugh, perhaps you're the best person to answer this. What are your thoughts on that process as we look to expanding or at least reviewing the current legislative scheme?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I had not realized that Mr. Bertin was here with us.
Mr. Bertin, perhaps you are not the person I should be putting this question to, but I would like to know what measures the countries affected by this law can take against us and how effective they could be. What is the effectiveness of the measures we could take against these countries, especially when this is done unilaterally?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Ms. Kikoler, for coming in and presenting to us.
I'd like to go back to one of the things you said at the very beginning. I may have ascribed more weight to it than you intended, but you said you had found a number of groups guilty of crimes against humanity or genocide. That's one of the distinctions we've been trying to focus on in the House, and indeed we've recognized unanimously the Yazidi genocide. I'd like you to expand on how you came to the conclusions with respect to which groups had suffered crimes against humanity vis-à-vis genocide.
Some of the words that get lost in the definition of “genocide”, particularly in the political field, are the words “intent”, “to destroy”, and “as such”. The knee-jerk reaction, when something horrible has occurred—indeed, a crime against humanity—is to assume immediately that it's genocide, and it gets lost, particularly in the political narrative or even sometimes in the legal narrative. Can you just develop on what you've seen and what your study focused on?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thanks.
Again, in the last part of your address you mentioned doing a better job of early detection, but indeed, if you look back at the genocide convention, the two stated purposes are to punish, but obviously even more importantly to prevent. Obviously someone has done a bad job of detecting in this case. We all probably share responsibility.
I'd like you to develop the elements that you see as important in early detection.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
David, since you are a student of political Islam in the area, I'm curious about your thoughts about religion generally and the role it's playing in this conflict. I guess that's a broad brush stroke. If you look at the history of Iraq and Syria, particularly with the reign of the Baathist parties in both those countries, relative to the rest of the area, it's generally seen as a secular society, and now there's a tendency to divide ethnic groups neatly and tidily along religious lines, which, as you will agree, is perhaps not the case.
Let's hope we get to a post-conflict governance model, but as we look toward governance generally in both those areas in the next few years, I'm curious as to your views on how neatly things can be divided into religious buckets as opposed to simple power grabs and other interests, ethnocultural divides.
Certainly in the case of the Yazidis, the religious narrative of the Daesh's attempt to exterminate them was there, and there has been some suggestion by a number of panellists who have appeared before us that the religious or ethnocultural differences will be greater as there is a power void.
I'm curious to hear your views on this.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I just wanted to hear your thoughts, because I don't think there's much of an answer to that type of question. I'm just curious to hear your general views on it, since you're on the ground and a student of political Islam.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Finally, is it your sense that some of these differences, whether they're ethnoculturally based or religiously based, will get worse if there is a power void, or do you see things differently?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I'm interested in the numbers in and of themselves, and far be it from me to question them. It's just the multipliers that you apply can at times appear to be random, and it isn't just a question as to whether a donation is voluntary or not. Obviously involuntary donation, whether it's one or a million, is unacceptable and should be called out.
I'm simply interested in trying to figure out how you can assess the progression, or at least if there is any improvement in the way the Chinese state is behaving. How can you document that if arbitrary numbers and multipliers are applied? Certainly when you see the numbers, you start to scratch your head as to whether they can be accurate. One would indicate a much higher execution rate, for example, if this were the case, than is publicized, and then in other cases there's the cause. As well, David, you mentioned that it didn't have so much to do with the black market, but attributed it to Falun Gong, house Christians, and so forth.
I'm just trying to get to the bottom of all this and figure out how you address some of the criticisms of the numbers and the black market implementation capacity issues that are often thrown back at you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
The next question is about the black market and implementation issues that may be thrown back as a counterweight to say that it doesn't exclusively address the Falun Gong and other religious minorities or practitioners.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a final small question. What is your capacity to verify whether there has been any incremental change since December 2014 and the beginning of 2015?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Halvorssen, I truly appreciate the emphasis in your advocacy. I think it moves forward a point that we are trying to study, at least when we break it down.
With great respect, where I do see quite a large disservice in your advocacy is the tendency to mix up the issues with the facts at hand. We are studying a legislative scheme. It's FACFOA and SEMA, which deal with the sanctions Canada may impose on states or actors at the request of states, and the potential holes, which you identified specifically in the area of gross human rights violations and in corruption.
What I tend to hear from advocates such as you and others, for which you are obviously not responsible, is a tendency to commit this confusion of proceeds of crime with the opposite of ill-gotten assets, assets that are not tainted by criminality, and say that there is a hole somehow in Canadian legislation.
I don't like doing this, but let me read from the Criminal Code, which states quite clearly that, in Canada:
Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of(a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a designated offence.
Clearly, this, along with our well-documented money-laundering legislation, provides a pretty important net to catch people who are trying to hide assets in Canada that are derived from or are the proceeds of crime.
You may have legitimate arguments about the ability to seize assets. We have our own questions with respect to our own officials. You may have legitimate arguments with respect to people elsewhere who have committed gross human rights violations—quite disgusting ones, and we've heard a lot of evidence of that—but when it comes to ill-gotten gains, Canada has quite a tight regime. When it comes to SEMA and threats against international peace, it is quite a tight regime. It's the same thing with FACFOA, although the hole you identified was designated by the nature of the legislative scheme.
I think that when you are trying to address a very important point, there is a very important disservice done by mixing apples and oranges.
Obviously, you are cognizant of the fact that we are a pluralistic democratic country. We are often dealing with state actors or non-state actors who live under a regime that isn't the same as ours. We don't necessarily have the same tools at our disposal that a so-called kleptocracy may have, and we do have to follow the rule of law. What are your concerns with people or institutions that we may consider putting on lists, freezing their assets, which may have been gotten by legitimate means in Canada, and their ability to use our judicial system to abide by a very important rule in Canada, which they have in the United States as well, and in Britain, which is the rule of law and due process?
Thank you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
I represent part of a city that has the most Syrians in Canada. They contact me and my fellow members of Parliament almost daily to express their concern. I want to underscore the fact that they obviously took politics here as well as from their home country, and they don't necessarily support one side over another. There are strong sympathies for various factions, including the government. However, not one of them has said that there is any justification for what's going on in Aleppo. They raise the concern of the humanitarian situation and the violation, especially by the Syrian government but on all sides, in what's going on in Aleppo. It's indeed a tragedy.
We rarely get the chance to hear someone on the ground speak about this. I'd like to give more opportunity to Mr. Al Saleh to speak specifically of the humanitarian challenges he's seeing in east Aleppo. Those would obviously be focused on the targeting of civilians and on the restriction of aid, food, and medical access, in his eyes and in the actions his group are facing on a daily basis.
Could you expand on that a little more, Mr. Al Saleh?
Thank you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thanks for the testimony today. I'll match your “callow” professor with a number of callow politicians around this table any day.
In your 1994 book on sanctions, which focused on Canadian and Australian foreign policy, you noted that Canada in particular lacked the economic capability to “give the sanctions of major powers their bite”, thus essentially saying that the sanctions were symbolic.
If we go back to what my colleague MP Kent was saying with respect to a sanctions regime that would condemn or seize assets of gross human rights violators, the initial act of seizing the assets has some beauty to it, because it is smart, at least at first glance, in the sense that you're grabbing an asset on Canadian territory of a person who has manifestly committed these gross human rights violations, but the unintended consequence is what I'd like to focus on, or at least a countermeasure that could be enacted against Canada and could have on Canadians perverse consequences that were never intended in the first place.
It seems to me that there's a distinction to draw between the easiness of freezing an asset that belongs to someone if it's properly identified and then focusing on the countermeasure, which may have perverse consequences, vis-à-vis a broader regime that simply doesn't work because Canada lacks the heft to put bite into its actions. I do think we need to examine at what point our actions have consequences for other Canadians that weren't intended in the first place. The initial ability to freeze those assets, if you can actually do it, is interesting as a policy measure and, properly, to send a message to the person who has committed those acts that they can't hide their assets in Canada.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Goldman, perhaps you could speak more at length on the actions of the Russian government. Essentially, we're talking about state actors or quasi-state actors, and it is immediately perceived as an act against the state. Whether you freeze a person's assets or just say you're freezing that person's assets, they were acting on behalf of the state in question, so it's immediately perceived as such.
Perhaps you could speak to what happened in the Magnitsky case.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
At the very end of your testimony today, Mr. Goldman, you mentioned that sanctions, whether they were effective or ineffective, were still a very interesting and important tool. I was hoping you could develop that a bit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you both for your testimony.
We have just started a vast study that could be even more vast. Unfortunately, in a humanitarian situation, the right to life is the basic right at stake.
I would like to focus the discussion on the right to practice one’s religion and religious freedom. Groups like the Yezidis are more specifically affected by Daesh’s genocidal discourse.
To what extent will that discourse influence what is going to happen later, after Daesh is eliminated? Will the situation get worse because of religion and distinctions based on religious practices or because of the fact that people are simply united against Daesh?
I know that that question could take half an hour to answer. Perhaps you could answer concisely by focusing specifically on religious freedom.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Ms. Lilly and gentlemen, thank you for appearing and thank you for taking what is a broad approach to this panel and the examination at hand. What has become evident in a number of the appearances of witnesses before us with respect to the legislation and its operationalization is that we started out thinking about where the holes are in this legislation and where we can fill them and how it can be put in place in the most desirable way as part of Canadian policy and effective enforcement of these legislative tools, and quickly we've gotten into a few observations that are rather surprising. One is the inability to impose them in an effective way, and another is the potentially perverse effects that imposing them has, absent a broad multilateral approach.
I'm glad you've raised that point, because as we look at potentially putting in place something that would address gross violations of human rights, the issues you raise today are particularly important in making sure that this legislative tool, if deemed desirable by Parliament, actually works.
The current legislation, which is supposed to deal with something equally if not more grave, you've said either doesn't work, is very difficult to put into place, or creates disincentives or perverse effects on Canadian business, as Mr. Boscariol stated. It's particularly intriguing—and it won't be part of my intervention, but as we start to engage more with Iran—that what you've seemed to suggest is that Canadian business is at a disadvantage compared with partners who can react more quickly.
The question I have is with respect to gross violations of human rights and what we need to do; with where you see an opportunity for Canada to act, and—any one of you can answer this—with a focus on the potential countermeasures facing a country that is much more powerful than us both on an economic level and a political level and potentially a partner, whether acting unilaterally for a country like ours.... One, is such an approach desirable from a legal and political perspective? Two, would it actually work? Three, one of you gentlemen raised the rule of law—condemning people essentially before they're judged—but also the perverse effect that it can have on Canadian citizens as a result.
I know that's a long statement, but go at it as you see fit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
Thank you for your testimony.
You've heard today that we're examining potential holes in the current legislative scheme, including what may be missing, what's desirable, and what's needed to fix it. There has been some focus on human rights violations. It sounds as though in the legislative scheme you operate under there isn't a hole and that it's just a question of being able to do your job.
The issue I want to focus on—and it has to do with what Mr. Levitt brought up—is precisely the ability to do your job and to effectively capture an item, a good, or a person that would otherwise get out or get in, particularly in the area of dual-use equipment. Just walk me through—I have a very simplistic approach to this—the difference between a washing machine and a centrifuge that might end up, depending on how it's used, being used for cleaning clothes or for refining something.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
My understanding is that a lack of resources is really the biggest impediment to you being able to do your job, and I think you said that was also what the 2016 audit showed. Is there anything else that poses an impediment from an operational perspective?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
All right. I guess, from your perspective, your job is done once you've stopped whatever it is from going in or coming out, but I guess you're saying is there's frustration with then not seeing anything happen.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Van Der Klaauw, one of the accusations you hear as a recurring theme from the Burundi government is that the UN agency's foreign powers are just perpetuating foreign interests, supporting an insurgency movement. It seems to be a repeated theme throughout and it falls quickly into a colonialist discourse, probably too quickly but for opportunistic reasons. How do you respond to that on the ground and what is your relationship with the Burundian government, if any?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
We often get caught in a bit of a circle when we talk too quickly about prosecuting people, bringing people to justice, and often then neglect something that is almost equally, if not more important, which is preventing the degeneration of hostilities, preventing these situations in the first place, which is a much more difficult issue to address. What do you recommend to a country like Canada that has very little involvement with Burundi economically, politically? I think our representation is run out of Kenya.
What do you recommend to countries in our situation that are willing and wanting to act as to how we would work in a multilateral situation, whether it's more money, aid? Really, the question is yours.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Gentlemen.
As Bob alluded to earlier, we're beginning an extensive review of these two legislative regimes and their connected acts. Part of the exercise is to figure out, actually, what they do and what they don't do, what they should do, and what is desirable for this committee to recommend if there are holes. They are complicated; they're intertwined. Obviously what has been on the top of our minds, in light of the testimony that's been given in prior meetings of this committee, is the topic of gross violation of human rights, regardless of the country or officials perpetrating them.
The question really is, when you examine the legal regimes that exist in Canada, is there anything that addresses the ability of the government to freeze assets in the presence of a gross violation of human rights by a foreign official or a foreign person in the absence of terrorism? They would not fall under section 83 of the Criminal Code, the proceeds not being from that of crime. Literally, it's assets of a person in Canada, and then in the manifest presence of gross violation of international human rights, as assessed by some standard, which we don't need to go into at this point, that does not rise to a violation or a grave concern for international peace and security.
That sort of scenario takes us out of SEMA, and out of a requesting country under the FACFOA. In my mind, there's a void there, but you're the experts, and I would like you to speak to that.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Is there anything that prevents the government from just doing it, with respect to foreign nationals and their assets situated in Canada, other than investment treaty protections?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
As a final question or observation, I would say far be it from Canada to act in a unilateral way in such a sensitive situation. The situation I'm describing is really one in which a large part of the international community could readily ascertain that, as you mentioned or at least alluded to earlier, you would prefer to act in concert in imposing sanctions.
So, if there's a hole of the nature I described that needs to be filled, what are the pitfalls internationally with respect to countermeasures that a country that may be stronger than ours or weaker than ours may enact against our nationals, which would obviously be foreign to them? What measures could be taken on a trade level against Canada should it choose a path that would be truly unilateral as opposed to working with its multilateral partners?
I'd be glad if you would like to comment on that. If it's outside the ambit of your presentation, that fine.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a quick comment about what my colleague raised about the success of SEMA. It seems to me, as I've read SEMA, that the success of the legislative regime doesn't necessarily depend on how many prosecutions there are. I think the role that you play is one of prevention and enforcing the fact that there may be export and import restrictions that are imposed upon a country. A lot of that has to do with information sharing and the work at the border in preventing stuff from going to the place where it shouldn't be going and then in turn coming in as part of enforcing the regime. It's surprising there is one prosecution only and one successful conviction.
When we're talking about assets, they may be ill-gotten or they may be “properly gotten”, or whatever the expression is.
The thing that interests me with you is the life cycle of what you do in freezing an asset. In my mind that's freezing a bank account, seizing a house, freezing a security, or preventing an export. How difficult are any of those four things to do once you get the green light, and how long does it take, typically, once you have the green light?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
In any of the legislative regimes that you have authority to act under, how difficult is it? What is the life cycle of a simple thing like freezing a bank account?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
When the threat exists, obviously this has to be done in a somewhat confidential situation to prevent the person from moving the money, in a very fluid transactional world, out of the country, or in some other fashion of obscuring the asset, in an effort to avoid detection and freezing, I guess. If there's a frustration related to the time period, that's a real hole in the implementation of the legislation, in my mind.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Professor Touzé, for your testimony.
I want to give you the opportunity to continue your explanations because I think this is very important.
Many experts have asked the United Nations to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which is a weapon, a very serious tool. We're talking about military intervention here.
Before moving on to that step, what else can be done internationally? You spoke about co-operation, but there isn't any. You used the words “total denial”. What instruments, what tools do the United Nations have to multilaterally strengthen what we've seen, obviously, in all the reports and interventions with the state of Burundi so that we can avoid resorting to Chapter VII? We have reached a point where we need to make a decision without the approval of Russia, China and, above all, the neighbouring African states. What else do you think is left to do?
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