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Results: 271 - 300 of 370
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.
I'm interested in the numbers in and of themselves, and far be it from me to question them. It's just the multipliers that you apply can at times appear to be random, and it isn't just a question as to whether a donation is voluntary or not. Obviously involuntary donation, whether it's one or a million, is unacceptable and should be called out.
I'm simply interested in trying to figure out how you can assess the progression, or at least if there is any improvement in the way the Chinese state is behaving. How can you document that if arbitrary numbers and multipliers are applied? Certainly when you see the numbers, you start to scratch your head as to whether they can be accurate. One would indicate a much higher execution rate, for example, if this were the case, than is publicized, and then in other cases there's the cause. As well, David, you mentioned that it didn't have so much to do with the black market, but attributed it to Falun Gong, house Christians, and so forth.
I'm just trying to get to the bottom of all this and figure out how you address some of the criticisms of the numbers and the black market implementation capacity issues that are often thrown back at you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
The next question is about the black market and implementation issues that may be thrown back as a counterweight to say that it doesn't exclusively address the Falun Gong and other religious minorities or practitioners.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a final small question. What is your capacity to verify whether there has been any incremental change since December 2014 and the beginning of 2015?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Halvorssen, I truly appreciate the emphasis in your advocacy. I think it moves forward a point that we are trying to study, at least when we break it down.
With great respect, where I do see quite a large disservice in your advocacy is the tendency to mix up the issues with the facts at hand. We are studying a legislative scheme. It's FACFOA and SEMA, which deal with the sanctions Canada may impose on states or actors at the request of states, and the potential holes, which you identified specifically in the area of gross human rights violations and in corruption.
What I tend to hear from advocates such as you and others, for which you are obviously not responsible, is a tendency to commit this confusion of proceeds of crime with the opposite of ill-gotten assets, assets that are not tainted by criminality, and say that there is a hole somehow in Canadian legislation.
I don't like doing this, but let me read from the Criminal Code, which states quite clearly that, in Canada:
Every one commits an offence who uses, transfers the possession of, sends or delivers to any person or place, transports, transmits, alters, disposes of or otherwise deals with, in any manner and by any means, any property or any proceeds of any property with intent to conceal or convert that property or those proceeds, knowing or believing that all or a part of that property or of those proceeds was obtained or derived directly or indirectly as a result of(a) the commission in Canada of a designated offence; or(b) an act or omission anywhere that, if it had occurred in Canada, would have constituted a designated offence.
Clearly, this, along with our well-documented money-laundering legislation, provides a pretty important net to catch people who are trying to hide assets in Canada that are derived from or are the proceeds of crime.
You may have legitimate arguments about the ability to seize assets. We have our own questions with respect to our own officials. You may have legitimate arguments with respect to people elsewhere who have committed gross human rights violations—quite disgusting ones, and we've heard a lot of evidence of that—but when it comes to ill-gotten gains, Canada has quite a tight regime. When it comes to SEMA and threats against international peace, it is quite a tight regime. It's the same thing with FACFOA, although the hole you identified was designated by the nature of the legislative scheme.
I think that when you are trying to address a very important point, there is a very important disservice done by mixing apples and oranges.
Obviously, you are cognizant of the fact that we are a pluralistic democratic country. We are often dealing with state actors or non-state actors who live under a regime that isn't the same as ours. We don't necessarily have the same tools at our disposal that a so-called kleptocracy may have, and we do have to follow the rule of law. What are your concerns with people or institutions that we may consider putting on lists, freezing their assets, which may have been gotten by legitimate means in Canada, and their ability to use our judicial system to abide by a very important rule in Canada, which they have in the United States as well, and in Britain, which is the rule of law and due process?
Thank you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
I represent part of a city that has the most Syrians in Canada. They contact me and my fellow members of Parliament almost daily to express their concern. I want to underscore the fact that they obviously took politics here as well as from their home country, and they don't necessarily support one side over another. There are strong sympathies for various factions, including the government. However, not one of them has said that there is any justification for what's going on in Aleppo. They raise the concern of the humanitarian situation and the violation, especially by the Syrian government but on all sides, in what's going on in Aleppo. It's indeed a tragedy.
We rarely get the chance to hear someone on the ground speak about this. I'd like to give more opportunity to Mr. Al Saleh to speak specifically of the humanitarian challenges he's seeing in east Aleppo. Those would obviously be focused on the targeting of civilians and on the restriction of aid, food, and medical access, in his eyes and in the actions his group are facing on a daily basis.
Could you expand on that a little more, Mr. Al Saleh?
Thank you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thanks for the testimony today. I'll match your “callow” professor with a number of callow politicians around this table any day.
In your 1994 book on sanctions, which focused on Canadian and Australian foreign policy, you noted that Canada in particular lacked the economic capability to “give the sanctions of major powers their bite”, thus essentially saying that the sanctions were symbolic.
If we go back to what my colleague MP Kent was saying with respect to a sanctions regime that would condemn or seize assets of gross human rights violators, the initial act of seizing the assets has some beauty to it, because it is smart, at least at first glance, in the sense that you're grabbing an asset on Canadian territory of a person who has manifestly committed these gross human rights violations, but the unintended consequence is what I'd like to focus on, or at least a countermeasure that could be enacted against Canada and could have on Canadians perverse consequences that were never intended in the first place.
It seems to me that there's a distinction to draw between the easiness of freezing an asset that belongs to someone if it's properly identified and then focusing on the countermeasure, which may have perverse consequences, vis-à-vis a broader regime that simply doesn't work because Canada lacks the heft to put bite into its actions. I do think we need to examine at what point our actions have consequences for other Canadians that weren't intended in the first place. The initial ability to freeze those assets, if you can actually do it, is interesting as a policy measure and, properly, to send a message to the person who has committed those acts that they can't hide their assets in Canada.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Goldman, perhaps you could speak more at length on the actions of the Russian government. Essentially, we're talking about state actors or quasi-state actors, and it is immediately perceived as an act against the state. Whether you freeze a person's assets or just say you're freezing that person's assets, they were acting on behalf of the state in question, so it's immediately perceived as such.
Perhaps you could speak to what happened in the Magnitsky case.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
At the very end of your testimony today, Mr. Goldman, you mentioned that sanctions, whether they were effective or ineffective, were still a very interesting and important tool. I was hoping you could develop that a bit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you both for your testimony.
We have just started a vast study that could be even more vast. Unfortunately, in a humanitarian situation, the right to life is the basic right at stake.
I would like to focus the discussion on the right to practice one’s religion and religious freedom. Groups like the Yezidis are more specifically affected by Daesh’s genocidal discourse.
To what extent will that discourse influence what is going to happen later, after Daesh is eliminated? Will the situation get worse because of religion and distinctions based on religious practices or because of the fact that people are simply united against Daesh?
I know that that question could take half an hour to answer. Perhaps you could answer concisely by focusing specifically on religious freedom.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Ms. Lilly and gentlemen, thank you for appearing and thank you for taking what is a broad approach to this panel and the examination at hand. What has become evident in a number of the appearances of witnesses before us with respect to the legislation and its operationalization is that we started out thinking about where the holes are in this legislation and where we can fill them and how it can be put in place in the most desirable way as part of Canadian policy and effective enforcement of these legislative tools, and quickly we've gotten into a few observations that are rather surprising. One is the inability to impose them in an effective way, and another is the potentially perverse effects that imposing them has, absent a broad multilateral approach.
I'm glad you've raised that point, because as we look at potentially putting in place something that would address gross violations of human rights, the issues you raise today are particularly important in making sure that this legislative tool, if deemed desirable by Parliament, actually works.
The current legislation, which is supposed to deal with something equally if not more grave, you've said either doesn't work, is very difficult to put into place, or creates disincentives or perverse effects on Canadian business, as Mr. Boscariol stated. It's particularly intriguing—and it won't be part of my intervention, but as we start to engage more with Iran—that what you've seemed to suggest is that Canadian business is at a disadvantage compared with partners who can react more quickly.
The question I have is with respect to gross violations of human rights and what we need to do; with where you see an opportunity for Canada to act, and—any one of you can answer this—with a focus on the potential countermeasures facing a country that is much more powerful than us both on an economic level and a political level and potentially a partner, whether acting unilaterally for a country like ours.... One, is such an approach desirable from a legal and political perspective? Two, would it actually work? Three, one of you gentlemen raised the rule of law—condemning people essentially before they're judged—but also the perverse effect that it can have on Canadian citizens as a result.
I know that's a long statement, but go at it as you see fit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
Thank you for your testimony.
You've heard today that we're examining potential holes in the current legislative scheme, including what may be missing, what's desirable, and what's needed to fix it. There has been some focus on human rights violations. It sounds as though in the legislative scheme you operate under there isn't a hole and that it's just a question of being able to do your job.
The issue I want to focus on—and it has to do with what Mr. Levitt brought up—is precisely the ability to do your job and to effectively capture an item, a good, or a person that would otherwise get out or get in, particularly in the area of dual-use equipment. Just walk me through—I have a very simplistic approach to this—the difference between a washing machine and a centrifuge that might end up, depending on how it's used, being used for cleaning clothes or for refining something.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
My understanding is that a lack of resources is really the biggest impediment to you being able to do your job, and I think you said that was also what the 2016 audit showed. Is there anything else that poses an impediment from an operational perspective?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
All right. I guess, from your perspective, your job is done once you've stopped whatever it is from going in or coming out, but I guess you're saying is there's frustration with then not seeing anything happen.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Van Der Klaauw, one of the accusations you hear as a recurring theme from the Burundi government is that the UN agency's foreign powers are just perpetuating foreign interests, supporting an insurgency movement. It seems to be a repeated theme throughout and it falls quickly into a colonialist discourse, probably too quickly but for opportunistic reasons. How do you respond to that on the ground and what is your relationship with the Burundian government, if any?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
We often get caught in a bit of a circle when we talk too quickly about prosecuting people, bringing people to justice, and often then neglect something that is almost equally, if not more important, which is preventing the degeneration of hostilities, preventing these situations in the first place, which is a much more difficult issue to address. What do you recommend to a country like Canada that has very little involvement with Burundi economically, politically? I think our representation is run out of Kenya.
What do you recommend to countries in our situation that are willing and wanting to act as to how we would work in a multilateral situation, whether it's more money, aid? Really, the question is yours.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Gentlemen.
As Bob alluded to earlier, we're beginning an extensive review of these two legislative regimes and their connected acts. Part of the exercise is to figure out, actually, what they do and what they don't do, what they should do, and what is desirable for this committee to recommend if there are holes. They are complicated; they're intertwined. Obviously what has been on the top of our minds, in light of the testimony that's been given in prior meetings of this committee, is the topic of gross violation of human rights, regardless of the country or officials perpetrating them.
The question really is, when you examine the legal regimes that exist in Canada, is there anything that addresses the ability of the government to freeze assets in the presence of a gross violation of human rights by a foreign official or a foreign person in the absence of terrorism? They would not fall under section 83 of the Criminal Code, the proceeds not being from that of crime. Literally, it's assets of a person in Canada, and then in the manifest presence of gross violation of international human rights, as assessed by some standard, which we don't need to go into at this point, that does not rise to a violation or a grave concern for international peace and security.
That sort of scenario takes us out of SEMA, and out of a requesting country under the FACFOA. In my mind, there's a void there, but you're the experts, and I would like you to speak to that.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Is there anything that prevents the government from just doing it, with respect to foreign nationals and their assets situated in Canada, other than investment treaty protections?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
As a final question or observation, I would say far be it from Canada to act in a unilateral way in such a sensitive situation. The situation I'm describing is really one in which a large part of the international community could readily ascertain that, as you mentioned or at least alluded to earlier, you would prefer to act in concert in imposing sanctions.
So, if there's a hole of the nature I described that needs to be filled, what are the pitfalls internationally with respect to countermeasures that a country that may be stronger than ours or weaker than ours may enact against our nationals, which would obviously be foreign to them? What measures could be taken on a trade level against Canada should it choose a path that would be truly unilateral as opposed to working with its multilateral partners?
I'd be glad if you would like to comment on that. If it's outside the ambit of your presentation, that fine.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a quick comment about what my colleague raised about the success of SEMA. It seems to me, as I've read SEMA, that the success of the legislative regime doesn't necessarily depend on how many prosecutions there are. I think the role that you play is one of prevention and enforcing the fact that there may be export and import restrictions that are imposed upon a country. A lot of that has to do with information sharing and the work at the border in preventing stuff from going to the place where it shouldn't be going and then in turn coming in as part of enforcing the regime. It's surprising there is one prosecution only and one successful conviction.
When we're talking about assets, they may be ill-gotten or they may be “properly gotten”, or whatever the expression is.
The thing that interests me with you is the life cycle of what you do in freezing an asset. In my mind that's freezing a bank account, seizing a house, freezing a security, or preventing an export. How difficult are any of those four things to do once you get the green light, and how long does it take, typically, once you have the green light?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
In any of the legislative regimes that you have authority to act under, how difficult is it? What is the life cycle of a simple thing like freezing a bank account?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
When the threat exists, obviously this has to be done in a somewhat confidential situation to prevent the person from moving the money, in a very fluid transactional world, out of the country, or in some other fashion of obscuring the asset, in an effort to avoid detection and freezing, I guess. If there's a frustration related to the time period, that's a real hole in the implementation of the legislation, in my mind.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Professor Touzé, for your testimony.
I want to give you the opportunity to continue your explanations because I think this is very important.
Many experts have asked the United Nations to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which is a weapon, a very serious tool. We're talking about military intervention here.
Before moving on to that step, what else can be done internationally? You spoke about co-operation, but there isn't any. You used the words “total denial”. What instruments, what tools do the United Nations have to multilaterally strengthen what we've seen, obviously, in all the reports and interventions with the state of Burundi so that we can avoid resorting to Chapter VII? We have reached a point where we need to make a decision without the approval of Russia, China and, above all, the neighbouring African states. What else do you think is left to do?
Results: 271 - 300 of 370 | Page: 10 of 13

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