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Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 11:28
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is a distinct pleasure and privilege to be invited to appear before this parliamentary Special Committee on Canada-China Relations. I applaud your focus on Canada-China relations in general and today's topic of Hong Kong. [Technical difficulty—Editor] all of its manifestations, is perhaps the most consequential challenge in global affairs. For nations to respond effectively, all countries need to engage in the very kind of national conversation that your committee is promoting about how to respond to China's rise.
My comments today will reflect my perspective as both a scholar and a former senior U.S. policy-maker. I spent 25 years researching and writing about China as both an analyst at the RAND Corporation and of course as a professor at Georgetown University. For six years I served on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council under President Obama as director for China, and then as special assistant to President Obama and senior director for Asia.
In today's session, I would like to make three broad points about the tragedy that has become Hong Kong.
First, the international community should expect the situation in Hong Kong to get worse before it stabilizes. Beijing's actions in recent weeks are a leading indicator, not a lagging one, of Hong Kong's deteriorating political trajectory under Beijing's hand. On July 31 Carrie Lam announced that the September Legislative Council elections would be postponed for a year. On the same day, Hong Kong authorities issued arrest warrants for six activists based abroad, including a U.S. citizen, for “incitement to secession and collusion with foreign forces”. On August 10, just last week, Jimmy Lai and several other media executives were arrested, as was Agnes Chow, former leader of the pro-democracy organization Demosisto.
These actions clearly signal that Beijing has no interest in preserving the basic political freedoms at the heart of the joint declaration, the Basic Law and ultimately the one country, two systems model, which collectively have been so important to Hong Kong's success today. The fact that Chinese internal security and intelligence services will now be able to openly operate in Hong Kong only increases the mainland's ability to use fear, intimidation and ultimately coercion to keep opposition voices silent.
Beijing's overall approach, in my assessment, is to use the national security law to separate politics from business in Hong Kong. It wants to preserve the latter while neutering the former. In short, Beijing wants Hong Kong to remain capitalist, especially the continued functioning of vibrant financial markets, but not liberal in its politics and, therefore, beholden to the Chinese Community Party for political governance.
Ultimately, this strategy will lead to, perhaps in a decade, the diminution of Hong Kong as the centre for finance in east Asia. As the risks and constraints of operating in Hong Kong grow, global financial firms and non-financial corporations will gradually reduce their footprint in Hong Kong as they move some of their operations into mainland China and their non-China operations to elsewhere in Asia. Thus, Hong Kong will gradually become a quirky, nostalgia-laden version of a southern Chinese city, consumed by the fact that its best days are in the rear-view mirror.
My second overall point is that the fate of Hong Kong will assume greater importance in global politics, largely by dint of its impact on U.S.-China relations. China's crackdown in Hong Kong will worsen the suspicion and mistrust at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship. More pointedly, it will fuel an incipient ideological competition between the United States and China. Hong Kong will become a focal point for and symbol of the U.S.-China competition over the value of liberal ideals.
Indeed, Beijing's crackdown on Hong Kong could not have come at a worse time, as the U.S. is and will remain in the process of reassessing the nature of the China challenge and recalibrating its strategies and policies accordingly. China's treatment of Hong Kong has accentuated the differences in values between the United States and China. This has translated into a perception that China is actively trying to undermine liberal rules and norms globally, which in turn has produced a debate in the United States about whether China represents a systemic rival to the United States and other democracies.
My third and final point is that Canada, the United States and other major democracies need to stay engaged and active on the Hong Kong issue. Our countries' voices and actions matter now and going forward. While our leverage to change the situation on the ground is admittedly limited, there is much that can be done to shape the overall trajectory of Hong Kong, as well as to shape possible future actions by China.
These actions fall into several categories.
The first recommendation is that the United States and Canada should publicly and continually reassure the people of Hong Kong, as well as like-minded countries all over the world, that our governments will stand up for the protection of universal values. The Hong Kong situation will be a long-term challenge, and the international community, especially the United States and Canada, needs to be organized for the long game and not just focused on scoring points against Beijing's excesses right now. The two joint statements by the United States, Canada, the U.K. and Australia to date are important in this regard, as was the G7 foreign ministers' statement. Our countries should broaden this coalition to include others: notably Japan, South Korea and EU countries. The new international parliamentary commissions on China in the U.K., the EU and Japan offer another opportunity to send such signals.
The second recommendation is that the United States and Canada should take coordinated action to signal to China that there are costs for its crackdown. The logic of such actions is to give Beijing pause when it considers additional actions against Hong Kong. The recent decision by several countries to withdraw from or suspend their extradition treaties to Hong Kong was an important first step in this regard. One notable idea being considered is for a group of countries to follow the U.K. in opening their doors to Hong Kong residents who wish to emigrate, or related ideas to offer scholarships to young Hong Kong residents who wish to study in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia and elsewhere.
The third recommendation is that the United States and Canada should work with the international business community to find creative ways to preserve the unique attributes and identity of Hong Kong to the extent possible. Beijing must avoid actions that substantially undercut the business environment in Hong Kong, especially related to global financial institutions. Thus, it may listen to the concerns of local and business leaders about restrictions such as Internet controls and law enforcement actions that undermine business confidence about operating in Hong Kong. The business community in Hong Kong may be helpful in pushing Beijing to retain some of Hong Kong's vibrancy.
My final point is that the U.S., Canada and other governments should work in coordination to take actions that disabuse Beijing of the belief that it could extend its coercion to Taiwan. I remain very concerned that Beijing could draw the wrong conclusions about the international community's response to Hong Kong, which, over time, could lead it to extend such an approach to Taiwan.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views today. I'd be happy to answer any of your questions.
View Peter Fragiskatos Profile
Lib. (ON)
Thank you very much.
I have another question for you, and then I'll turn the same question over to Professor Ong, if I may.
We do hear about the need for multilateral approaches to be taken here. I think that's quite warranted. It's one thing to say that, though; I think the more important questions are these: What should a coalition of like-minded countries actually focus on? What areas, what specific actions, are most likely to have an impact on the Chinese regime's actions? What are they most likely to listen to? What particular tools can this coalition look to put in place?
Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 12:03
My view is that it needs to be issue-specific. You can't make an omnibus statement. That's generally not how international diplomacy works. On the Hong Kong issue, the question is this: What do you want to accomplish? Which countries' interests converge enough to put a coalition together? I mentioned the four earlier. Then, what can those four countries agree on in terms of practical steps, whether it's naming and shaming, actual sanctions, or opportunities like immigration and scholarships?
The way I see it, it's very issue-specific. It's all about what steps you can take to accomplish common goals. I think we're already seeing this on Hong Kong because of the agreement to withdraw from extradition treaties and to cut down on law enforcement co-operation. In the United States, at least, there are debates about taking steps similar to those of the U.K. on immigration. Perhaps Canada is interested in doing the same.
View Stéphane Bergeron Profile
BQ (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the witnesses for contributing to the committee's work with their most insightful comments.
I will follow up on my colleagues' questions about the international coalition.
Mr. Medeiros, you are wholeheartedly calling for a kind of solidarity among the Western democracies to influence decisions in Beijing, particularly between the United States, Canada and a number of other Western democracies.
However, under the Trump administration, we see the United States blowing hot and cold with China, sometimes showing its teeth and at other times clearing the air. John Bolton, former national security advisor to the Trump administration, even revealed recently that Donald Trump had asked the Chinese authorities to help him win the election by purchasing products in certain states that are key to the election.
Under the circumstances, is it even possible to form a coalition like that with the United States? For example, how are the Taiwanese to feel, because they may well be a bargaining chip, so to speak, in the U.S. authorities' political calculations?
Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 12:07
Thank you very much. It's an excellent question, Mr. Bergeron. I'll take it in two parts.
First, regarding U.S. policy, my view is that international coalitions are much more credible when a member of the coalition, such as the United States, acts consistently. One of my concerns about the Trump administration's foreign policy is on this question of values and democracy promotion. They've been deeply inconsistent, which undermines American credibility and ultimately reduces the ability to forge coalitions in situations like Hong Kong and then to be credible in the eyes of Beijing.
I hope that in the future, perhaps after the election and regardless of its results, America re-embraces democracy promotion, because it's only through America being credible that we can build these more consistently reliable coalitions on these kinds of issues.
Regarding your question on Taiwan, the simple fact is Taiwan cannot and should not be a bargaining chip. It's not a very effective bargaining chip, and I think ultimately we would be betraying our commitments to our values and to the 24 million people who reside on Taiwan. Ultimately, if we started treating Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the Canada-China or the U.S.-China relationship, all we really would be doing is handing a substantial amount of leverage to Beijing and letting them know that we're indifferent about the future of Taiwan, which in my view is certainly not in American interests.
I think a question for you and other members of this special committee is how you want to deal with the question of Taiwan, because I think Taiwan too often is treated and seen as a pawn in the U.S.-China relationship, when in fact Taiwan should be treated in and of itself.
Of course, America has a very special relationship with Taiwan. I understand that, and that's not necessarily applicable to your situation, but I think there are things that you can do, and perhaps should do, on the question of Taiwan, that are independent of the Canada-China relationship. That would then bolster your credibility in your dealings with the Chinese.
View Jack Harris Profile
NDP (NL)
I was concerned, Chair, about whether such characterizations and cold war references are actually helpful in building coalitions.
Professor Ong, you referred to the Chinese Communist Party in terms of the strategic interests of its leadership and the elite and how that would affect the kinds of actions that are being taken, which I see as a different thing.
You have said in the past, in talking about working together with other countries, that the United States and Canada have different interests, or that they do not always have the same interests, and that we need to chart an independent course of foreign policy with China. We have shared interests, but there are areas where policies should diverge, particularly given that Canada is a lesser power. I wonder if you could elaborate on that a little bit and perhaps describe some of those differences.
Lynette H. Ong
View Lynette H. Ong Profile
Lynette H. Ong
2020-08-17 12:16
China's relationship with the U.S. is very different from the type of relationship it has with other western liberal nations. With regard to U.S. and China relations, I think they are strategic competitors. I don't think Canada and China are necessarily strategic competitors. The U.S. sees China's rise in technological dominance and in other sectors as that of a rising competitor, whereas for Canada I think in some areas there's more scope for collaboration. In other areas, though, we should also be very mindful of the authoritarian nature of this political system and what that might do to Canadian interests.
I think the strategic calculation of being a competitor or a collaborator, and in what sectors that sort of calculation should apply, is very different when it comes to the perspective of the United States and Canada. That is why I think under the Trump administration the rhetoric is really not helping in putting together a united front and a concerted effort and push against China. If there's a change in the presidency in November, I'm more hopeful of an effective coalition against China. A western coalition without the United States is actually doable, but it's not as effective.
View Jean Yip Profile
Lib. (ON)
Is there any way that the international financial community could bring some further pressure to bear?
Lynette H. Ong
View Lynette H. Ong Profile
Lynette H. Ong
2020-08-17 12:36
In the short run, businesses tend to be directed by where their interests and profits lie, but I believe that in the medium and long term, if governments guide businesses widely—that is, if we design suitable institutional designs—this would actually guide the incentives of businesses and help to steer the businesses away from authoritarian regimes. By imposing labour qualifications and imposing certain standards on businesses that they have to meet, we can slowly guide business from authoritarian regimes.
View Stéphane Bergeron Profile
BQ (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I want to address the issue of multilateralism, since the Minister of Foreign Affairs spoke highly of it on July 3. If the COVID-19 crisis has demonstrated one thing, it's the limits of multilateralism. As soon as the national interests of states were implicated, each state simply tried to safeguard its own interests at the expense of the interests of its allies. We've even seen allies going in to get medical supplies to prevent another ally from obtaining the supplies first. Given what the coronavirus crisis has shown us, what are our chances of actually creating some type of common front against China that will stand firm once the national interests of each state become implicated when China implements retaliatory measures?
David Mulroney
View David Mulroney Profile
H.E. David Mulroney
2020-08-06 17:23
Thank you.
It's very interesting to watch various interpretations of multilateralism through the pandemic period. I was interested that Australia, for example, which has much greater exposure to China economically than we do—China is its number one partner—began, as a middle power, to convene other middle powers to say, “Let's find out what happened. Let's have an inquiry into how this virus originated. What was the role of the World Health Organization?” China didn't like it much, but Australia began to get take-up from countries that are increasingly going through some of the things we're going through. There's an appetite for that here. What we were doing at the time was our campaign for the non-permanent seat on the Security Council, which to my mind is the multilateralism of the seventies and eighties.
New Zealand offered an even more interesting example. They listened, of course, to the World Health Organization, but they had some of their epidemiologists talk to epidemiologists in Hong Kong and in China. They went through informal networks to get their own sense of what was happening on the ground in China. It's a very creative multilateralism and a modern multilateralism that I think we need to embrace.
I think we would get a good hearing in Europe, particularly in Scandinavia, but also with the U.K., with France, and with Australia and New Zealand. There are more and more countries that are feeling as we feel.
View Stéphane Bergeron Profile
BQ (QC)
I understand what you're saying. However, when you give the example of New Zealand, this doesn't seem to be an argument in favour of multilateralism. As you said, New Zealand had direct contact with Chinese epidemiologists. We saw that state interests were very selfish during the coronavirus crisis. How can we expect states, which are selfishly defending their national interests, to not break a common front against China as soon as China implements retaliatory measures?
David Mulroney
View David Mulroney Profile
H.E. David Mulroney
2020-08-06 17:25
This, of course, has been a worry. The old canard was that you shouldn't gang up on China. The result is that China, as I mentioned in my opening remarks, isolates and dominates countries one by one, with the sole exception of the United States. It has done this to Sweden. It's done it to Norway. It's done it to Japan. Australia and New Zealand have felt this. I think there is a growing appetite to talk about this.
The other thing is, just to return to that virtue of optimism that Dr. Sangay mentioned, this is a strong suit for Canada. We're very good at convening people and motivating them and getting them to share our ideas. This should be the objective of our new multilateralism as Canada.
View Stéphane Bergeron Profile
BQ (QC)
What are the chances of creating a common front consisting of middle and, presumably, small powers, given China's efforts to establish its new silk road? On the contrary, will some countries be very reluctant to join a common front to discipline China for its retaliatory measures against individual countries?
David Mulroney
View David Mulroney Profile
H.E. David Mulroney
2020-08-06 17:27
I think the example of the belt and road is an example of how not to do things. Similarly with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Europeans broke rank in the most undignified way to rush to be the first, and certainly not the last, to curry favour with Beijing, but I think there's a recognition that this is not a smart way to approach it.
What I would do is sit down with half a dozen countries—Australia and New Zealand certainly, but also Sweden—countries that have felt the same kind of people-to-people reprisals we have felt, to say, “How can we come up with common consular language when it comes to the risk you face visiting China? How can we support one another when we have one of our nationals detained?” I never believe in trying to invent a really complicated set of objectives. Why don't we start simply on common measures to protect our citizens? If we had a common travel advisory, that would get China's interest and attention very quickly.
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