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Results: 1 - 14 of 14
2021-06-14 [p.1099]
Pursuant to Standing Order 39(7), Mr. Lamoureux (Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons) presented the returns to the following questions made into orders for return:
Q-663 — Mr. Dreeshen (Red Deer—Mountain View) — With regard to the government’s response to question Q-488 on the Order Paper and the $941,140.13 provided to China for the Canada Fund for Local Initiatives project: what is the itemized breakdown of the local projects in China that money was spent on, including, for each project, the (i) amount, (ii) project description, (iii) name of the local organization that proposed and implemented the project? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-663.
2021-06-07 [p.1049]
Pursuant to Standing Order 39(7), Mr. Lamoureux (Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs and to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons) presented the returns to the following questions made into orders for return:
Q-632 — Mr. Lawrence (Northumberland—Peterborough South) — With regard to the government using Bolloré Logistics for flight services between Canada and China between March 1, 2020, and December 31, 2020: (a) how many flights did the government contract the company for; (b) what are the details of each flight, including the (i) date, (ii) origin, (iii) destination, (iv) products transported by flight or purpose of flight; and (c) what is the total value of all the contracts related to these flights? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-632.
2021-04-26 [p.823]
Q-488 — Mr. McColeman (Brantford—Brant) — With regard to Canada’s relationship with the Government of China, since October 21, 2019: (a) what is the total amount of official development assistance that has been provided to the People’s Republic of China; (b) what are the details of each project in (a), including the (i) amount, (ii) description of the project, (iii) goal of the project, (iv) rationale for funding the project; (c) what is Global Affairs Canada’s (GAC) best estimate of China’s current annual military budget; and (d) what is GAC’s best estimate of the total annual budget of China’s Belt and Road Initiative? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-488.
2021-04-26 [p.824]
Q-492 — Mr. Nater (Perth—Wellington) — With regard to the government funding of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the genocide of the Uyghurs in China: does the government know which of the projects currently funded by the AIIB and located in China are using forced Uyghur labour, and if so, which ones? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-492.
2021-04-26 [p.827]
Q-512 — Mr. Bezan (Selkirk—Interlake—Eastman) — With regard to Canada-Chinese military cooperation, since January 1, 2017: (a) how many joint exercises or training activities have occurred involving the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of the People’s Republic of China; (b) what was the date of these exercises or training activities; (c) what was the nature of these exercises or training activities; (d) what was the location of these exercises or training activities; (e) how many PLA and CAF personnel were involved; (f) what was the rank of each of the PLA personnel involved; (g) what were the costs of these exercises or training activities incurred by the Department of National Defence; and (h) who is responsible for approving these exercises or training activities? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-512.
2021-04-26 [p.830]
Q-533 — Mr. Williamson (New Brunswick Southwest) — With regard to government contracts, since October 21, 2019, broken down by department, agency, Crown corporation, or other government entity: (a) how many contracts have been awarded to companies based in China or owned by entities based in China; (b) of the contracts in (a), what are the details, including (i) the value, (ii) the vendor, (iii) the date the contract was awarded, (iv) whether or not a national security review was conducted prior to the awarding of the contract, and, if so, what was the result; and (c) what is the government’s policy regarding the awarding of contracts to (i) companies based in China, (ii) companies with ties to the Chinese Communist Party? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-533.
2021-04-26 [p.830]
Q-534 — Mr. Williamson (New Brunswick Southwest) — With regard to foreign investments, since January 1, 2016, broken down by year: (a) how many foreign takeovers of Canadian companies have occurred in accordance with the Investment Canada Act; (b) how many of the takeovers were initiated by Chinese state-owned enterprises; (c) for the takeovers in (b), what are the details, including (i) the name of the company doing the takeover, (ii) the name of the company subject to the takeover, (iii) whether a national security review was conducted, (iv) the result of the national security review, if applicable; and (d) what is the government’s policy regarding foreign takeovers initiated by Chinese state-owned enterprises? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-534.
2021-04-26 [p.834]
Q-553 — Ms. Kwan (Vancouver East) — With regard to the government’s contracting of visa application services: (a) on which dates did Public Works and Government Services Canada and Public Services and Procurement Canada each become aware that Beijing Shuangxiong is owned by the Beijing Public Security Bureau; (b) since learning of the ownership structure of Beijing Shuangxiong, what reviews have been conducted in response to this information, and when did they begin; (c) regarding the process that resulted in the awarding of the contract to VFS Global in 2018, (i) how many bids were submitted, (ii) did any other companies win the contract prior to it being awarded to VFS Global, (iii) what was assessed in the consideration of these contracts, (iv) was the Communications Security Establishment or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service involved in the vetting of the contracts; (d) is there an escape clause in this VFS Global’s contract that would allow the government to unilaterally exit the contract; and (e) the government having tasked VFS Global with the creation of digital services, what measures are being taken to ensure that the government is not providing VFS Global with a competitive advantage in future bids? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-553.
2021-01-25 [p.442]
Q-267 — Ms. Dancho (Kildonan—St. Paul) — With regard to the government's position regarding the admissibility to Canada of individuals who have faced politically motivated charges in Hong Kong or China: (a) are foreigners convicted of politically motivated charges in Hong Kong or China barred from entry into Canada as a result of the politically motivated charges; (b) what directives have been issued, or measures taken, to ensure that border and immigration officials do not reject admittance to Canada based on politically motivated charges; and (c) what is the list of offences, which would normally bar admittance to Canada, that the government will consider to be politically motivated if the charges were laid in Hong Kong or China? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-267.
2021-01-25 [p.446]
Q-292 — Ms. Rempel Garner (Calgary Nose Hill) — With regard to the Prime Minister's announcement in May 2020 of an agreement with CanSino Biologics Inc. (CanSinoBIO) in relation to the development of a potential COVID-19 vaccine: (a) what were the original details of the agreement, as understood by the government in May 2020; (b) on what date did the government first become aware that the agreement would not proceed as planned; (c) on what date did the government become aware that shipments of Ad5-nCoV were being blocked by the Chinese government; (d) what reason, if any, did the Chinese government provide to the government for blocking the shipment; (e) has the government transferred any money or any type of expenditures to CanSinoBIO since January 1, 2020, and, if so, what is the total amount sent, broken down by date of transfer; (f) what are the details of any contracts signed with CanSinoBIO since January 1, 2020, including the (i) amount, (ii) original value, (iii) final value, (iv) date the contract was signed, (v) description of goods or services, including volume; (g) was the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister advised of the terms agreement prior to the Prime Minister's announcement, and, if so, did he approve of the agreement; (h) was the Department of National Defence or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service informed of the details of the agreement prior to the Prime Minister's announcement, and, if so, did they raise any concerns with the Office of the Prime Minister or the Privy Council Office; and (i) what were the results of any security analysis conducted in relation to CanSinoBIO? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-292.
2020-11-16 [p.248]
Q-25 — Mrs. Jansen (Cloverdale—Langley City) — With regard to the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses from the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to persons, laboratories, and institutions in China: (a) who in China requested the transfer; (b) other than the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), which laboratories in China requested the transfer; (c) for the answers in (a) and (b) which are affiliated with the military of China; (d) on what date was the WIV’s request for the transfer received by the NML; (e) what scientific research was proposed, or what other scientific rationale was put forth, by the WIV or the NML scientists to justify the transfer of Ebola and Henipah viruses; (f) what materials were authorized for transfer pursuant to Transfer Authorization NML-TA-18-0480, dated October 29, 2018; (g) did the NML receive payment of $75, per its commercial invoice of March 27, 2019, for the transfer, and on what date was payment received; (h) what consideration or compensation was received from China in exchange for providing this material, broken down by amount or details of the consideration or compensation received by each recipient organization; (i) has the government requested China to destroy or return the viruses and, if not, why; (j) did Canada include, as a term of the transfer, a prohibition on the WIV further transferring the viruses with others inside or outside China, except with Canada’s consent; (k) what due diligence did the NML perform to ensure that the WIF and other institutions referred to in (b) would not make use of the transferred viruses for military research or uses; (l) what inspections or audits did the NML perform of the WIV and other institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that they were able to handle the transferred viruses safely and without diversion to military research or uses; (m) what were the findings of the inspections or audits referred to in (l), in summary; (n) after the transfer, what follow-up has Canada conducted with the institutions referred to in (b) to ensure that the only research being performed with the transferred viruses is that which was disclosed at the time of the request for the transfer; (o) what intellectual property protections did Canada set in place before sending the transferred viruses to the persons and institutions referred to in (a) and (b); (p) of the Ebola virus strains sent to the WIV, what percentages of the NML’s total Ebola collection and Ebola collection authorized for sharing is represented by the material transferred; (q) other than the study entitled “Equine-Origin Immunoglobulin Fragments Protect Nonhuman Primates from Ebola Virus Disease”, which other published or unpublished studies did the NML scientists perform with scientists affiliated with the military of China; (r) which other studies are the NML scientists currently performing with scientists affiliated with the WIV, China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences, or other parts of China’s military establishment; (s) what is the reason that Anders Leung of the NML attempted to send the transferred viruses in incorrect packaging (type PI650), and only changed its packaging to the correct standard (type PI620) after being questioned by the Chinese on February 20, 2019; (t) has the NML conducted an audit of the error of using unsafe packaging to transfer the viruses, and what in summary were its conclusions; (u) what is the reason that Allan Lau and Heidi Wood of the NML wrote on March 28, 2019, that they were “really hoping that this [the transferred viruses] goes through Vancouver” instead of Toronto on Air Canada, and “Fingers crossed!” for this specific routing; (v) what is the complete flight itinerary, including airlines and connecting airports, for the transfer; (w) were all airlines and airports on the flight itinerary informed by the NML that Ebola and Henipah viruses would be in their custody; (x) with reference to the email of Marie Gharib of the NML on March 27, 2019, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens were requested by the WIV; (y) since the date of the request for transfer, other than Ebola and Henipah viruses, which other pathogens has the NML transferred or sought to transfer to the WIV; (z) did the NML inform Canada’s security establishment, including the RCMP, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Communications Security Establishment, or other such entity, of the transfer before it occurred, and, if not, why not; (aa) what is the reason that the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) redacted the name of the transfer recipient from documents disclosed to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) under the Access to Information Act, when the PHAC later willingly disclosed that information to the CBC; (bb) does Canada have any policy prohibiting the export of risk group 3 and 4 pathogens to countries, such as China, that conduct gain-of-function experiments, and in summary what is that policy; (cc) if Canada does not have any policy referred to in (bb), why not; (dd) what is the reason that did the NML or individual employees sought and obtained no permits or authorizations under the Human Pathogens and Toxins Act, the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, the Export Control Act, or related legislation prior to the transfer; (ee) what legal controls prevent the NML or other government laboratories sending group 3 or 4 pathogens to laboratories associated with foreign militaries or laboratories that conduct gain-of-function experiments; (ff) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he writes that “no certifications [were] provided [by the WIV], they simply cite they have them”, why did the NML proceed to transfer Ebola and Henipah viruses without proof of certification to handle them safely; and (gg) with respect to the September 14, 2018, email of Matthew Gilmour, in which he asked “Are there materials that [WIV] have that we would benefit from receiving? Other VHF? High path flu?”, did the NML request these or any other materials in exchange for the transfer, and did the NML receive them? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-432-25.
2020-07-20 [p.501]
Q-428 — Mr. McCauley (Edmonton West) — With regard to meetings or briefings at the deputy minister, minister, and cabinet level for Health Canada, the Public Health Agency of Canada, Global Affairs Canada, the Privy Council Office, Public Safety Canada, and all agencies therein, between November 30, 2019, and March 31, 2020: what were the details of all meetings held referencing the Hubei province in China, the novel coronavirus, COVID-19, pandemics, and emergency preparedness measures, including (i) the department holding the meeting, (ii) the date of meeting, (iii) officials in attendance, (iv) the topic of the meeting or agenda? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-431-428.
 
2020-03-13 [p.320]
Q-256 — Mr. Seeback (Dufferin—Caledon) — With regard to government support programs for agriculture industries impacted by changes in trade with China: (a) in 2019, what is the total amount of government funding provided to the (i) soybean industry, (ii) canola industry, (iii) beef industry; (b) what is the breakdown of all funding in (a), by (i) program, (ii) province; (c) in 2020, what is the projected total amount of government funding to the (i) soybean industry, (ii) canola industry, (iii) beef industry; and (d) what is the breakdown of (c), by (i) program, (ii) province? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-431-256.
2020-01-27 [p.85]
Q-72 — Mr. Genuis (Sherwood Park—Fort Saskatchewan) — With regard to the ongoing internment and persecution of Uyghur Muslims in China: (a) what specific actions has the government taken to protect and promote the basic human rights of Uyghur Muslims in China; (b) has the government conducted any investigations or examinations into whether the People’s Republic of China is committing ethnic cleansing or genocide of Uyghur Muslims; (c) has the Office of Freedom, Human Rights, and Inclusion undertaken any projects or activities to address the internment and persecution of Uyghur Muslims in China; and (d) if the answer in (c) is yes, (i) what is the total amount spent on said activities, (ii) how many full time employees have been dedicated to said activities, (iii) what is the description of the projects or activities? — Sessional Paper No. 8555-431-72.
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