Question No. 629--
Mr. Gord Johns:
With regard to the federal investments and the communities that comprise the federal electoral district of Courtenay—Alberni, between the 2018-19 and current fiscal year: (a) what are the federal infrastructure investments, including direct transfers to the municipalities and First Nations, for the communities of (i) Tofino, (ii) Ucluelet, (iii) Port Alberni, (iv) Parksville, (v) Qualicum Beach, (vi) Cumberland, (vii) Courtenay, (viii) Deep Bay, (ix) Dashwood, (x) Royston, (xi) French Creek, (xii) Errington, (xiii) Coombs, (xiv) Nanoose Bay, (xv) Cherry Creek, (xvi) China Creek, (xvii) Bamfield, (xviii) Beaver Creek, (xix) Beaufort Range, (xx) Millstream, (xxi) Mt. Washington Ski Resort, broken down by (A) fiscal year, (B) total expenditure, (C) project, (D) total expenditure by fiscal year; (b) what are the federal infrastructure investments transferred to the (i) Comox Valley Regional District, (ii) Nanaimo Regional District, (iii) Alberni-Clayoquot Regional District, (iv) Powell River Regional District, broken down by (A) fiscal year, (B) total expenditure, (C) project, (D) total expenditure by fiscal year; (c) what are the federal infrastructure investments transferred to the Island Trusts of (i) Hornby Island, (ii) Denman Island, (iii) Lasqueti Island, broken down by (A) fiscal year, (B) total expenditure, (C) project, (D) total expenditure by fiscal year; (d) what are the federal infrastructure investments transferred to the (i) Ahousaht First Nation, (ii) Hesquiaht First Nation, (iii) Huu-ay-aht First Nation, (iv) Hupacasath First Nation, (v) Tla-o-qui-aht First Nation, (vi) Toquaht First Nation, (vii) Tseshaht First Nation, (viii) Uchucklesaht First Nation, (ix) Ucluelet First Nation, (x) K'omoks First Nation, broken down by (A) fiscal year, (B) total expenditure, (C) projects, (D) total expenditure by fiscal year; (e) what are the federal infrastructure investments directed towards the Pacific Rim National Park, broken down by (i) fiscal year, (ii) total expenditure, (iii) project, (iv) total expenditure by year; and (f) what are the federal infrastructure contributions to highways, including but not limited to, (i) Highway 4, (ii) Highway 19, (iii) Highway 19a, (iv) Bamfield Road, broken down by (A) fiscal year, (B) total expenditure, (C) total expenditure by fiscal year?
Response
Mr. Andy Fillmore (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Infrastructure and Communities, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to the federal investments and the communities that comprise the federal electoral district of Courtenay—Alberni, Infrastructure Canada does not track information by federal electoral district.
For information on projects funded under Infrastructure Canada’s contribution programs, members can visit http://www.infrastructure.gc.ca/map-carte/index-eng.html.
Question No. 630--
Mr. Xavier Barsalou-Duval:
With regard to Canada’s constitutional system: has the government produced, since January 1, 2015, any documents, studies, opinion polls, memos or scenarios exploring the possibility of a fundamental change to Canada’s constitutional system, including the abolition of the monarchy, and, if so, what are the (i) nature of the constitutional changes being considered, (ii) anticipated timeline for such a change, (iii) steps that might be taken to bring about such a change, (iv) concerns of the government with respect to the constitutional demands of the provinces?
Response
Mr. Kevin Lamoureux (Parliamentary Secretary to the President of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada and to the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, the government has not produced documents exploring in detail the possibility of a fundamental change to Canada’s constitutional system since January 1, 2015.
Question No. 631--
Mr. Philip Lawrence:
With regard to the government's advance-purchase agreements for COVID-19 vaccines, signed with COVID-19 vaccine manufacturers, and broken down by agreement: (a) what is the date on which each agreement was signed with (i) Pfizer Biotech, (ii) AstraZeneca, (iii) Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline, (iv) Covavax, (v) Medicago, (vi) Verity Pharmaceuticals Inc. & Serum Institute of India, (vii) Moderna, (viii) Johnson & Johnson; (b) did the government secure (i) an upfront guarantee on pricing, (ii) distribution via funding, (iii) purchasing contracts; (c) what was the coming into force date; and (d) what is the agreement's end date?
Response
Mr. Steven MacKinnon (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Services and Procurement, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, with regard to part (a) to date, the Government of Canada has signed nine agreements with vaccine suppliers, which include the following: i) an advance purchase agreement, APA, with Pfizer-BioNTech, which will supply up to 76 million doses of its mRNA-based vaccine, BNY162. The agreement in principle was signed on August 1, 2020; ii) an APA with AstraZeneca, which will supply 20 million doses of its viral vector vaccine candidate, AZD1222. The agreement in principle was signed on September 24, 2020; iii) an APA with Sanofi and GlaxoSmithKline, which will supply up to 72 million of doses of their protein subunit vaccine candidate and AS03 adjuvant. The agreements were signed on September 11, 2020, and September 18, 2020, respectively; iv) an APA with AstraZeneca for the supply of Canada’s COVAX allocation of the AstraZeneca vaccine. This APA was signed on March 2, 2021; v) an APA with Medicago, which will supply up to 76 million doses of its virus-like particle vaccine candidate. The agreement in principle was signed on October 22, 2020; vi) a contract with Verity Pharmaceuticals Inc. and Serum Institute of India, which will supply up to two million doses of its viral vector vaccine candidate, COVISHIELD. The contract was signed February 24, 2021; vii) an APA with Moderna, which will supply 44 million doses of its mRNA-based vaccine, mRNA-1273. The agreement was signed on July 24, 2020; viii) an APA with Johnson & Johnson, which will supply up to 38 million doses of its viral vector vaccine candidate, Ad26.COV2.S. The agreement in principle was signed on August 21, 2020; and ix) an APA with Novavax, which will supply up to 76 million doses of its protein subunit vaccine candidate, NVX-CoV2373. The agreement in principle was signed on August 27, 2020.
With regard to parts (b), (c) and (d), PSPC cannot disclose details of specific vaccine agreements unilaterally, in order to respect confidentiality agreements with suppliers and protect our negotiating position. We continue to have discussions with suppliers about opportunities to share information publicly.
Question No. 633--
Mr. Philip Lawrence:
With regard to the government's rentals of warehouses in or near Shanghai, China, since January 1, 2020: what are the details of each contract, including the (i) date signed, (ii) vendor or firm, (iii) contract value, (iv) purpose of the contract or reason for needing warehouse?
Response
Mr. Robert Oliphant (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, the following reflects a consolidated response approved on behalf of Global Affairs Canada ministers.
Global Affairs Canada has issued two contracts for moving and storage services in or near Shanghai since January 1, 2020. Global Affairs Canada contracts over $10,000 are proactively disclosed. The two contracts have been proactively disclosed at:
https://search.open.canada.ca/en/ct/id/dfatd-maecd,C-2020-2021-Q1-00195 and https://search.open.canada.ca/en/ct/id/dfatd-maecd,C-2020-2021-Q1-00198.
Question No. 636--
Mr. Arnold Viersen:
With regard to the Canadian Passport Order, since November 4, 2015, in order to prevent the commission of any act or omission referred to in subsection 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code: how many passports has the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship (i) refused, (ii) revoked, (iii) cancelled, broken down by month?
Response
Hon. Marco Mendicino (Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, since 2015, in order to prevent the commission of any act or omission referred to in subsection 7(4.1) of the Criminal Code, there have been, in response to (i), eight refusals to issue a passport in accordance with subsection 9(2) of the Canadian Passport Order; and, in response to (ii) and (iii), 13 revocations/cancellations in accordance with subsection 9(2), subsection 10(1) and paragraph 11.1(1)(a) of the Canadian Passport Order.
Question No. 638--
Mrs. Cathay Wagantall:
With regard to fraudulent or suspected fraud cases related to the COVID-19 relief programs discovered by the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and concerns that these cases are not being referred to the RCMP: (a) excluding instances where spouses share bank accounts, how many instances is the CRA aware of where the same bank account number has been used in applications from multiple individuals, or fraudsters claiming to be multiple individuals; (b) in how many instances in (a) did the CRA (i) stop the payment, (ii) make the payment without verifying the authenticity of the application and knowing it was suspicious, (iii) verify the authenticity of the application; (c) how many cases is the CRA aware where the same bank account has been used for more than (i) five, (ii) 10, (iii) 25, (iv) 50, (v) 100 applications; (d) who at the CRA is responsible for ensuring that this type of suspected fraud is reported to the RCMP for investigation; and (e) how many fraudulent or suspected fraud cases related to COVID-19 relief programs has the CRA referred to the RCMP, since March 1, 2020, broken down by month and by program?
Response
Hon. Diane Lebouthillier (Minister of National Revenue, Lib.):
Mr. Speaker, in considering this question, it is important to note that there may be legitimate reasons why multiple individuals may have used one bank account on their emergency benefit applications. This criteria in and of itself does not demonstrate suspicious nor fraudulent activity. While the CRA cannot disclose specific bank account verification procedures, a bank account is deemed acceptable to receive payments only if it meets specific validation criteria.
The CRA routinely monitors accounts for suspicious activity to detect, prevent and address potential instances of fraud, unauthorized use of stolen CRA user IDs and passwords, and unauthorized access to taxpayers’ accounts. The CRA combines advanced data analytics and business intelligence gathered from many sources, including law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and leads, to support these efforts.
As soon as the CRA becomes aware of an alleged incident of identity fraud or suspects an account could be the target of a fraudster, it takes immediate precautionary measures on the client’s account such as locking it to prevent transactions, conducting in-depth reviews and contacting the potential victims.
Where appropriate, the CRA works with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre, CAFC, financial institutions and local police to investigate the incident. In some cases, the CRA will also provide the taxpayer with credit protection and monitoring services.
The CRA has robust systems and tools in place to monitor, detect and investigate potential threats, and to mitigate threats when they occur. Throughout the lifespan of the COVID-19 relief programs, the CRA has adapted and has introduced new measures and controls to address suspicious activity. Safeguards are embedded within the application processes to verify an applicant’s eligibility. The CRA has implemented additional controls requiring closer scrutiny of certain applications before they are processed.
With regard to part (a), the breadth of data to be analyzed to answer this question and the evolving nature over time of taxpayer direct deposit bank accounts would require extensive analysis that would not be possible to complete within the prescribed time frames under Standing Order 39(5)(a) and may yield inaccurate results; therefore, the CRA is unable to respond in the manner requested. The CRA can confirm that, once a specific bank account is confirmed as being used for suspicious or fraudulent activities, a block is put in place to prevent future payments from being emitted to that account.
With regard to part (b)(i), establishing fraud is the outcome of investigative work and analysis. Each case must be reviewed and the investigative work concludes with a confirmation of the presence of unauthorized use of taxpayer information, fraud, or the case is determined not to be founded. As the CRA’s investigative work is still ongoing, it would be premature to confirm or comment on the number of fraud cases related to the COVID-19 economic relief measures or any amounts associated to them at this time.
With regard to part (b)(ii) and (iii), the CRA has controls to block suspicious applications meeting high-risk indicators from processing. Safeguards are embedded within the suite of COVID-19 relief programs application processes to stop the processing of questionable or suspicious applications until such time that the applicant has provided supporting documents to prove their identity and eligibility to prevent the issuance of unwarranted payments and to validate high-risk applications.
The CRA does not release specific information related to its review strategies, as releasing this information could jeopardize its compliance activities and the integrity of Canada’s tax system.
With regard to part (c), the breadth of data to be analyzed to answer this question and the evolving nature over time of taxpayer direct deposit bank accounts would require extensive analysis that would not be possible to complete within the prescribed time frames under Standing Order 39(5)(a) and may yield inaccurate results; therefore, the CRA is unable to respond in the manner requested.
With regard to part (d), the criminal investigations program of the CRA is responsible for referring suspected fraud cases related to the COVID-19 relief programs to the RCMP.
With regard to part (e), in order to ensure the integrity of ongoing investigations, the CRA does not comment on or provide details on ongoing investigations or referrals tied to investigations.