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Results: 106 - 120 of 196
Steve Tsang
View Steve Tsang Profile
Steve Tsang
2020-11-09 11:41
The reality is that China exists. Xi Jinping exists. We have to engage with this government as a reality. The only way we can engage with them is to hold true to our values without being provocative unnecessarily. When the Chinese government is being unfair, when they say it's interference in Chinese domestic affairs when what we are all doing is holding the Chinese government to its international treaty obligations, as we do with other countries, then I don't think we are interfering with their domestic affairs. We should hold to that.
View Jack Harris Profile
NDP (NL)
I take it, then, that regardless of the scenario, it's a worthy thing to pursue right now as strongly as we can.
Are there any specifics you would suggest as part of that collective action?
Steve Tsang
View Steve Tsang Profile
Steve Tsang
2020-11-09 11:46
I think I will go back to the point about coordinating with all the other democracies with a significant number of the nationals in Hong Kong, because that is one thing that will really get them to take notice more than anything else. Individually, none of us will be able to persuade the Chinese government to make any change. At the moment, the Chinese government does not believe any of these governments will stand by their nationals in Hong Kong, who are mostly, in fact, dual nationals. We have to persuade the Chinese government that, yes, we really mean it, and for them to take it seriously.
Lisa Campbell
View Lisa Campbell Profile
Lisa Campbell
2020-10-29 11:15
Thank you very much.
Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you virtually. I hope that each of you and also your families are doing well.
I joined the Canadian Space Agency, or CSA, in September of this year. A lawyer by profession for almost the past three decades, I've worked in both public and private sectors. I have experience in the areas of competition enforcement, data regulation and procurement, among others.
I'm joined today by my colleagues, Luc Brûlé, vice-president, science and technology, and Mary Preville, acting vice-president, space program policy.
If you will bear with me, I'll just change the language for the interpreters.
The CSA has accomplished extraordinary things, and we believe that the space sector can contribute enormously to Canada's economic renewal during these unprecedented times.
The CSA's work focuses on three areas.
First, and perhaps most visible, are activities in space exploration. We lead Canada's participation on the International Space Station, the Canadian astronaut program, and scientific missions to explore our solar system.
Second is a growing area of investment and interest worldwide, which is the rich data from earth-observation satellites that help us understand our planet, how to manage our natural resources and more. Increasingly, we can maximize high-quality space data to serve and protect Canadians and spur innovation and economic development. The speed of commercial satellite deployment, implementation of faster communication technologies and onset of interplanetary missions are augmenting the role of data in space industries. Our RADARSAT constellation mission is part of this trend. Its three-satellite configuration provides data for climate research, security and commercial applications. Unlocking the power of this data is vital to Canada's competitiveness globally.
Third, we work to support science and technology in a multitude of areas, including optics, health, robotics, satellite communications and radar. We're growing this innovative sector in Canada and preparing for new missions.
In 2019, the government launched a new space strategy for Canada: exploration, imagination and innovation. With the brilliant CSA team, we're advancing the space program in Canada and, internationally, positioning our domestic space industry for success. The return on investment in space is massive, and it's a growth sector. In the next 20 years, the global space economy will nearly triple in size, reaching a trillion dollars. At the CSA, we're committed to positioning Canadian researchers, entrepreneurs and investors to seize their share of this new, emerging global market. We want to help them contribute to the global economic recovery, while continuing to secure socioeconomic benefits here at home.
In recent months, we've been doing extensive outreach with industry, academia and international counterparts. We've participated in international conferences of the G20 space community and the International Astronautical Congress. Like the rest of the world, we're gearing up for exciting missions to the moon and beyond.
We're proud to have secured Canada's participation in the next large-scale international space collaboration—the lunar gateway program—by contributing our Canadarm3. We're also among eight nations to sign the Artemis Accords a few weeks ago, which we believe will help create a transparent environment for space exploration, science and commercial space activities. We're continuing to support cutting-edge space-exploration technologies, such as artificial intelligence, advanced robotics, health and more, which will be demonstrated on future missions to the lunar surface.
These investments have allowed Canada to play critical roles on internationally led missions, such as OSIRIS-REx, which some of you may have seen in the news recently. We just collected a sample from the surface of an asteroid. Canada's crucial contribution was recognized worldwide, with our expertise ensuring the success of the mission.
In a country as vast as ours, observing earth from space helps us support Canadians, exercise sovereignty and manage our natural resources. Advances in machine learning, big-data analytics and data integration techniques are revolutionizing the field of earth observation at a time when there is more demand for detailed information about our planet.
We are daring to imagine a future where Canadians across the country, from any sector, have unlimited access to easy-to-use digital platforms; where data is turned into information to, for example, issue advance warning for air quality and disaster management; where cities can plan greener infrastructure projects more efficiently; where regulators or industry can detect infrastructure failures; and where farmers can visualize crop conditions and crop yields, predicting market pricing and perhaps leading to better management for anticipated transportation bottlenecks.
Today we have elements of this vision in place. Our experience with the RADARSAT program, which today is capturing 250,000 radar images of the earth, means we have a great base on which to grow. We'll equip Canada with the data and analytical tools needed for the future.
Like sectors across the planet, the space sector has been impacted by COVID-19 and the measures needed to contain the pandemic. We've reprioritized some of our activities and funding to ensure that industry and academia can continue to innovate and seize opportunities.
Since March, we've doubled short-term financial investments in our science and technology programs, representing an increase of $25 million over existing plans pre-pandemic and a total investment of $52 million over 2 years.
These efforts will benefit up to 90 projects in large, medium and small companies, as well as 12 universities from coast to coast. It will advance promising space technology, and support R and D and the development of innovative concepts, helping develop talent and positioning the sector for success.
Space exploration technologies are at the epicentre of scientific development. Among the many motivations for space exploration, advancing scientific knowledge and understanding is increasingly crucial for our society. Intrinsic value flows from it, and space science is a rich avenue because of the challenges it poses, forcing us to look up and out in completely novel ways. Increasing access to space innovation and research with the new environments and situations, the vast unknowns, that space offers stress tests our systems and beliefs.
Improvements in science inevitably lead to progress in other areas, and as we start employing them wherever science gets used, it generates public good and creates new industries.
I see the time signal. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Through space exploration, we better understand ourselves, our planet and our universe.
Thank you for your time.
View Ali Ehsassi Profile
Lib. (ON)
View Ali Ehsassi Profile
2020-10-29 11:39
Now, could I ask you about the Artemis Accords? You referenced them in your opening remarks. I was wondering if you could tell us what led to those accords. We are one of the charter signatories of the accords, so what is their significance domestically and on the global stage?
Lisa Campbell
View Lisa Campbell Profile
Lisa Campbell
2020-10-29 11:40
Yes, we announced that at the International Astronautical Congress that I participated in. We announced our signature there.
There are a common set of principles, led by the U.S., developed in consultation with Artemis Accords' partners, which are designed to guide the exploration and use of outer space in a safe and sustainable manner and in accordance with our international treaty obligations. They are a political commitment to safe and sustainable space exploration activities. However, more work is going to have to be done, as I mentioned when we signed them, within the UN structure, to ensure space exploration continues to be for the benefit and interests of all humankind.
We worked with the United States very closely on these to ensure that the Artemis Accords reinforced the principles of the core space treaties, in particular the Outer Space Treaty, and provided guidelines for safe and sustainable space exploration activities and operations.
Right now, if you look at our website, we are consulting with Canadians. We want their views. A lot of the existing treaties were developed in the sixties and seventies when much of the activities we are engaging in now couldn't even be conceived of. We hope to get their feedback as we continue to work with partners on what is the right long-term framework to shape our activities.
View John Nater Profile
CPC (ON)
Thank you for that. I think I would probably agree that we do need an updated regulatory structure in place to deal with that, because I do think that right now we're actually blocking SpaceX, for example, from coming into the Canadian marketplace, which would have benefited....
I think everyone on this call would agree that we'd all prefer to see Canadian companies taking the lead on that, but when you have an American company that's able to deliver the product that's needed by so many millions of Canadians, the fact that our regulatory environment is actually blocking that I think is unfortunate. That's not a question, just more of a comment, but I do want to go on to a question.
The lunar gateway project is obviously a major priority for the agency. It's $2.05 billion over 24 years, I believe, and is obviously a massive investment and a priority for the space agency, but, like anything, when you focus on one thing, other priorities are obviously less focused on, shall we say. Again, I want to go back to growing good nutritious food. How much is the impact of that investment forcing us to have a lesser investment on growing conditions in harsh climates? That's where where I think Canada has a great deal of expertise, but it seems to me that we're lagging in terms of focusing on that side of things while focusing on robotics and the development of the astronaut program.
I just want to get your thoughts on whether we're placing less of a priority—I don't want to say neglecting—on those issues while focusing on robotics and the lunar mission.
Lisa Campbell
View Lisa Campbell Profile
Lisa Campbell
2020-10-29 12:15
Thank you.
Actually, data is one of our priorities. We are making sure to unlock the economic potential that satellite data offers, both in areas where we traditionally think of it and in many other areas as well. I mean, there are probably applications we haven't even conceived of yet, but once we unlock the data and make it available to companies, they'll come back with solutions for us.
We do need to prioritize, though, and build on our strengths, and we know that for us in Canada it is robotics. It's artificial intelligence. It's our expertise in health care. We bring huge value to the table with our international partners, which is why they keep asking us back.
Thank you.
Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 11:28
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
It is a distinct pleasure and privilege to be invited to appear before this parliamentary Special Committee on Canada-China Relations. I applaud your focus on Canada-China relations in general and today's topic of Hong Kong. [Technical difficulty—Editor] all of its manifestations, is perhaps the most consequential challenge in global affairs. For nations to respond effectively, all countries need to engage in the very kind of national conversation that your committee is promoting about how to respond to China's rise.
My comments today will reflect my perspective as both a scholar and a former senior U.S. policy-maker. I spent 25 years researching and writing about China as both an analyst at the RAND Corporation and of course as a professor at Georgetown University. For six years I served on the staff of the U.S. National Security Council under President Obama as director for China, and then as special assistant to President Obama and senior director for Asia.
In today's session, I would like to make three broad points about the tragedy that has become Hong Kong.
First, the international community should expect the situation in Hong Kong to get worse before it stabilizes. Beijing's actions in recent weeks are a leading indicator, not a lagging one, of Hong Kong's deteriorating political trajectory under Beijing's hand. On July 31 Carrie Lam announced that the September Legislative Council elections would be postponed for a year. On the same day, Hong Kong authorities issued arrest warrants for six activists based abroad, including a U.S. citizen, for “incitement to secession and collusion with foreign forces”. On August 10, just last week, Jimmy Lai and several other media executives were arrested, as was Agnes Chow, former leader of the pro-democracy organization Demosisto.
These actions clearly signal that Beijing has no interest in preserving the basic political freedoms at the heart of the joint declaration, the Basic Law and ultimately the one country, two systems model, which collectively have been so important to Hong Kong's success today. The fact that Chinese internal security and intelligence services will now be able to openly operate in Hong Kong only increases the mainland's ability to use fear, intimidation and ultimately coercion to keep opposition voices silent.
Beijing's overall approach, in my assessment, is to use the national security law to separate politics from business in Hong Kong. It wants to preserve the latter while neutering the former. In short, Beijing wants Hong Kong to remain capitalist, especially the continued functioning of vibrant financial markets, but not liberal in its politics and, therefore, beholden to the Chinese Community Party for political governance.
Ultimately, this strategy will lead to, perhaps in a decade, the diminution of Hong Kong as the centre for finance in east Asia. As the risks and constraints of operating in Hong Kong grow, global financial firms and non-financial corporations will gradually reduce their footprint in Hong Kong as they move some of their operations into mainland China and their non-China operations to elsewhere in Asia. Thus, Hong Kong will gradually become a quirky, nostalgia-laden version of a southern Chinese city, consumed by the fact that its best days are in the rear-view mirror.
My second overall point is that the fate of Hong Kong will assume greater importance in global politics, largely by dint of its impact on U.S.-China relations. China's crackdown in Hong Kong will worsen the suspicion and mistrust at the heart of the U.S.-China relationship. More pointedly, it will fuel an incipient ideological competition between the United States and China. Hong Kong will become a focal point for and symbol of the U.S.-China competition over the value of liberal ideals.
Indeed, Beijing's crackdown on Hong Kong could not have come at a worse time, as the U.S. is and will remain in the process of reassessing the nature of the China challenge and recalibrating its strategies and policies accordingly. China's treatment of Hong Kong has accentuated the differences in values between the United States and China. This has translated into a perception that China is actively trying to undermine liberal rules and norms globally, which in turn has produced a debate in the United States about whether China represents a systemic rival to the United States and other democracies.
My third and final point is that Canada, the United States and other major democracies need to stay engaged and active on the Hong Kong issue. Our countries' voices and actions matter now and going forward. While our leverage to change the situation on the ground is admittedly limited, there is much that can be done to shape the overall trajectory of Hong Kong, as well as to shape possible future actions by China.
These actions fall into several categories.
The first recommendation is that the United States and Canada should publicly and continually reassure the people of Hong Kong, as well as like-minded countries all over the world, that our governments will stand up for the protection of universal values. The Hong Kong situation will be a long-term challenge, and the international community, especially the United States and Canada, needs to be organized for the long game and not just focused on scoring points against Beijing's excesses right now. The two joint statements by the United States, Canada, the U.K. and Australia to date are important in this regard, as was the G7 foreign ministers' statement. Our countries should broaden this coalition to include others: notably Japan, South Korea and EU countries. The new international parliamentary commissions on China in the U.K., the EU and Japan offer another opportunity to send such signals.
The second recommendation is that the United States and Canada should take coordinated action to signal to China that there are costs for its crackdown. The logic of such actions is to give Beijing pause when it considers additional actions against Hong Kong. The recent decision by several countries to withdraw from or suspend their extradition treaties to Hong Kong was an important first step in this regard. One notable idea being considered is for a group of countries to follow the U.K. in opening their doors to Hong Kong residents who wish to emigrate, or related ideas to offer scholarships to young Hong Kong residents who wish to study in the U.S., Canada, the U.K., Australia and elsewhere.
The third recommendation is that the United States and Canada should work with the international business community to find creative ways to preserve the unique attributes and identity of Hong Kong to the extent possible. Beijing must avoid actions that substantially undercut the business environment in Hong Kong, especially related to global financial institutions. Thus, it may listen to the concerns of local and business leaders about restrictions such as Internet controls and law enforcement actions that undermine business confidence about operating in Hong Kong. The business community in Hong Kong may be helpful in pushing Beijing to retain some of Hong Kong's vibrancy.
My final point is that the U.S., Canada and other governments should work in coordination to take actions that disabuse Beijing of the belief that it could extend its coercion to Taiwan. I remain very concerned that Beijing could draw the wrong conclusions about the international community's response to Hong Kong, which, over time, could lead it to extend such an approach to Taiwan.
Thank you for the opportunity to present my views today. I'd be happy to answer any of your questions.
View Peter Fragiskatos Profile
Lib. (ON)
Thank you very much.
I have another question for you, and then I'll turn the same question over to Professor Ong, if I may.
We do hear about the need for multilateral approaches to be taken here. I think that's quite warranted. It's one thing to say that, though; I think the more important questions are these: What should a coalition of like-minded countries actually focus on? What areas, what specific actions, are most likely to have an impact on the Chinese regime's actions? What are they most likely to listen to? What particular tools can this coalition look to put in place?
Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 12:03
My view is that it needs to be issue-specific. You can't make an omnibus statement. That's generally not how international diplomacy works. On the Hong Kong issue, the question is this: What do you want to accomplish? Which countries' interests converge enough to put a coalition together? I mentioned the four earlier. Then, what can those four countries agree on in terms of practical steps, whether it's naming and shaming, actual sanctions, or opportunities like immigration and scholarships?
The way I see it, it's very issue-specific. It's all about what steps you can take to accomplish common goals. I think we're already seeing this on Hong Kong because of the agreement to withdraw from extradition treaties and to cut down on law enforcement co-operation. In the United States, at least, there are debates about taking steps similar to those of the U.K. on immigration. Perhaps Canada is interested in doing the same.
View Stéphane Bergeron Profile
BQ (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I thank the witnesses for contributing to the committee's work with their most insightful comments.
I will follow up on my colleagues' questions about the international coalition.
Mr. Medeiros, you are wholeheartedly calling for a kind of solidarity among the Western democracies to influence decisions in Beijing, particularly between the United States, Canada and a number of other Western democracies.
However, under the Trump administration, we see the United States blowing hot and cold with China, sometimes showing its teeth and at other times clearing the air. John Bolton, former national security advisor to the Trump administration, even revealed recently that Donald Trump had asked the Chinese authorities to help him win the election by purchasing products in certain states that are key to the election.
Under the circumstances, is it even possible to form a coalition like that with the United States? For example, how are the Taiwanese to feel, because they may well be a bargaining chip, so to speak, in the U.S. authorities' political calculations?
Evan S. Medeiros
View Evan S. Medeiros Profile
Evan S. Medeiros
2020-08-17 12:07
Thank you very much. It's an excellent question, Mr. Bergeron. I'll take it in two parts.
First, regarding U.S. policy, my view is that international coalitions are much more credible when a member of the coalition, such as the United States, acts consistently. One of my concerns about the Trump administration's foreign policy is on this question of values and democracy promotion. They've been deeply inconsistent, which undermines American credibility and ultimately reduces the ability to forge coalitions in situations like Hong Kong and then to be credible in the eyes of Beijing.
I hope that in the future, perhaps after the election and regardless of its results, America re-embraces democracy promotion, because it's only through America being credible that we can build these more consistently reliable coalitions on these kinds of issues.
Regarding your question on Taiwan, the simple fact is Taiwan cannot and should not be a bargaining chip. It's not a very effective bargaining chip, and I think ultimately we would be betraying our commitments to our values and to the 24 million people who reside on Taiwan. Ultimately, if we started treating Taiwan as a bargaining chip in the Canada-China or the U.S.-China relationship, all we really would be doing is handing a substantial amount of leverage to Beijing and letting them know that we're indifferent about the future of Taiwan, which in my view is certainly not in American interests.
I think a question for you and other members of this special committee is how you want to deal with the question of Taiwan, because I think Taiwan too often is treated and seen as a pawn in the U.S.-China relationship, when in fact Taiwan should be treated in and of itself.
Of course, America has a very special relationship with Taiwan. I understand that, and that's not necessarily applicable to your situation, but I think there are things that you can do, and perhaps should do, on the question of Taiwan, that are independent of the Canada-China relationship. That would then bolster your credibility in your dealings with the Chinese.
View Jack Harris Profile
NDP (NL)
I was concerned, Chair, about whether such characterizations and cold war references are actually helpful in building coalitions.
Professor Ong, you referred to the Chinese Communist Party in terms of the strategic interests of its leadership and the elite and how that would affect the kinds of actions that are being taken, which I see as a different thing.
You have said in the past, in talking about working together with other countries, that the United States and Canada have different interests, or that they do not always have the same interests, and that we need to chart an independent course of foreign policy with China. We have shared interests, but there are areas where policies should diverge, particularly given that Canada is a lesser power. I wonder if you could elaborate on that a little bit and perhaps describe some of those differences.
Lynette H. Ong
View Lynette H. Ong Profile
Lynette H. Ong
2020-08-17 12:16
China's relationship with the U.S. is very different from the type of relationship it has with other western liberal nations. With regard to U.S. and China relations, I think they are strategic competitors. I don't think Canada and China are necessarily strategic competitors. The U.S. sees China's rise in technological dominance and in other sectors as that of a rising competitor, whereas for Canada I think in some areas there's more scope for collaboration. In other areas, though, we should also be very mindful of the authoritarian nature of this political system and what that might do to Canadian interests.
I think the strategic calculation of being a competitor or a collaborator, and in what sectors that sort of calculation should apply, is very different when it comes to the perspective of the United States and Canada. That is why I think under the Trump administration the rhetoric is really not helping in putting together a united front and a concerted effort and push against China. If there's a change in the presidency in November, I'm more hopeful of an effective coalition against China. A western coalition without the United States is actually doable, but it's not as effective.
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