Committee
Consult the user guide
For assistance, please contact us
Consult the user guide
For assistance, please contact us
Add search criteria
Results: 1 - 7 of 7
Doug Forsyth
View Doug Forsyth Profile
Doug Forsyth
2021-06-11 13:03
Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members. Thank you for the invitation to appear before the Standing Committee on International Trade on its review of Bill C-216.
The bill amends the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act so that the Government of Canada cannot make any commitment in an international treaty that would have the effect of increasing tariff rate quota volumes or reducing over-quota tariff rates for dairy products, poultry or eggs.
The intent of the bill is consistent with the long-standing Government of Canada policy to defend the integrity of Canada's supply management system.
I'd like to share with you some considerations regarding this proposed amendment to the departmental act.
First, by introducing specific policy objectives, proposed amendments would fundamentally change the nature of the departmental act. The act is an organizational statute that sets out, in general terms, the powers, duties and functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development.
It does not prescribe specific policy objectives. This way, the act sets up a framework that provides flexibility to the government of the day to implement its particular foreign, international trade and development policy without having to change the underlying legislation; thus, it accommodates the policy perspectives that different governments may bring to the management of foreign affairs over time.
As an example, in terms of international trade negotiations, paragraph 10.2(c) of the act provides that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is to conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to Canada. Section 13 of the act elaborates on the specific duties of the Minister of International Trade, which include improving the access of Canadian products and services to external markets through trade negotiations.
Second, specific foreign international trade and development policy objectives, including how to address sectoral interests or specific constituent concerns, are generally established elsewhere. For international trade negotiations, negotiating objectives and how to accommodate specific sectoral interests are set in the negotiating mandates that are approved by cabinet. This allows the government of the day to develop specific policy objectives in response to evolving international circumstances.
Third, Parliament has the final say over the outcome of any international trade negotiations. Parliament ultimately decides whether or not to pass the legislation necessary to implement any free trade agreement. Additionally, moving forward, trade agreements will be subject to even more parliamentary oversight. The updated policy on tabling of treaties strengthens transparency of trade negotiations and provides additional opportunities for members of Parliament to review the objectives and economic merits of new free trade agreements. The new policy includes the tabling of a notice of intent to enter into negotiations towards a new FTA, objectives for negotiations and, finally, an economic impact assessment.
Fourth, amendment of the departmental act in the way in which Bill C-216 proposes carries risks. By limiting Canada's ability to engage on these issues, this amendment would invite negotiating partners to narrow the scope of their own potential commitments, taking issues off the table from the outset of negotiations, likely in the areas of commercial interest to Canada. This narrows possible outcomes, precludes certain compromises and makes it harder to reach an agreement.
Addressing the interest of any specific sector in the act would set a precedent that could lead to demands for additional amendments to reflect other foreign and trade policy objectives, including sectoral interests, further constraining the government's ability to negotiate and sign international trade agreements and, more generally, to manage Canada's international relations.
Lastly, maintaining the nature of the departmental act unchanged does not affect the government's policy to defend the integrity of Canada's supply management system, nor the ability of negotiators to defend this position at the negotiating table.
The government has made public commitments not to make further concessions on supply-managed products in future trade negotiations. In fact, Canada has been able to successfully conclude 15 trade agreements that cover 51 countries while preserving Canada's supply management system, including its three pillars: production control, pricing mechanisms and import controls.
Most recently, the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement fully protects Canada's dairy, poultry and egg sectors and provides no new incremental market access for cheese or any other supply-managed product. Where new market access has been provided, specifically and exclusively in the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP; and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, CUSMA, the access was deemed necessary to include an agreement that was in Canada's interest.
While new access was provided in those agreements, the supply management system and its three pillars were maintained. These outcomes were part of the overall balance of concessions through which Canada maintained preferential market access to the United States and secured new access to the European Union, Japan, Vietnam and other key markets.
In conclusion, while the spirit of Bill C-216 is consistent with the government's policy of defending the integrity of Canada's supply management system, amending the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act as proposed by the bill would change its nature and create risks.
Along with my colleagues here today, I welcome your questions. Thank you very much.
View Daniel Blaikie Profile
NDP (MB)
That's fair enough, although I think that the concern of supply-managed producers has less to do with the feelings of government decision-makers in respect of their decision to betray them and more to do with the substantive consequences for their industry.
On that point, those three agreements were clearly failures to protect the supply-managed sector in a way that the government has indicated it would like to or that it would. It seems to me that there is a stark difference between legislation that takes making those concessions out of the purview of government and a mandate that restricts the government but that the government can change from day to day.
In your opening remarks, you said that Parliament has the ultimate say because it can pass or decline to pass the legislation that enacts these agreements, but I think you also know—and you can correct me if I'm wrong—that by the time enabling legislation comes to Parliament, the deal is already signed. If Parliament declined to pass enabling legislation for those agreements, Canada at that point would be in default of very serious international commitments already made on behalf of Canada by the government. Is that not true?
Doug Forsyth
View Doug Forsyth Profile
Doug Forsyth
2021-06-11 13:32
I would say it's mostly true, but I think it is Parliament that votes on the final text, and if Parliament deemed it necessary to make those changes, we would have to return to the negotiating table based on that, absolutely.
View Daniel Blaikie Profile
NDP (MB)
But to be clear, typically Parliament doesn't actually get to vote on the text of the agreement except in appendices to the enabling legislation, perhaps, and Parliament can't actually alter the wording of those agreements. It can change the wording of the enabling legislation, but it can't in fact alter the wording of the agreements. Is that not true?
View Louis Plamondon Profile
BQ (QC)
Thank you for your question.
As I said in my statement, the bill would limit the minister's power to concede anything in international negotiations. As I told you earlier, we've managed to keep supply management intact in the first 16 free trade agreements that Canada has signed.
Every country has its own sensitive products that it protects. We also have our sensitive products and our farming practices as well, which are unique, and we protect them.
The aim of this bill is to continue protecting in future negotiations the principle of supply management, which has been around for 50 years. What's done is done. There have been breaches, and that's unfortunate, but we can take another tack in future negotiations, such as those we're preparing to undertake with Latin America.
Here's another example. Great Britain is now independent from the European Union as a result of Brexit and is currently negotiating a free trade agreement. However, Great Britain was part of the system when we conceded 3% to the European Union. We can't allow it another piece of free trade; we can't create another breach for Great Britain. It has to demand its share from the European Union because the agreement was negotiated for the entire European Union.
Our negotiators must therefore take very firm positions. When they sit down at the bargaining table and free trade is addressed, they'll be able to respond categorically that it's illegal under Canadian legislation for them to conduct such negotiations, period. Negotiations will then focus on other issues. It's a fairly simple principle.
Patrick Taillon
View Patrick Taillon Profile
Patrick Taillon
2021-06-07 11:48
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'd like to begin by thanking the members of the committee for this invitation.
What I'd like to do is make a clear distinction between the two sides of my evidence. I'll make some comments as an individual and citizen who supports Bill C‑216, but I would also in particular like to talk about things that fall more into my field of expertise, which is constitutional law.
As an individual and a citizen, it seems clear to me that some interests need protection, because they are strategic for Quebec and Canada. The health crisis has shown us that autonomy, particularly food autonomy and local production, are more important than ever.
However, I'm here mainly as an expert in constitutional law. My message is simple and I would summarize it as follows: it is legally possible to increase the role of Parliament in these debates. That's why it's important in this debate to make a clear distinction between the fundamental question of Parliament's capacity to decide and the political expediency of doing so. The law should not be used here as a pretext.
The relationships between the executive and legislative branches are complex. Sometimes it is useful to allow the greatest possible latitude to the executive. For example, when it has to make a rapid decision, it needs some flexibility. Sometimes, it's the other way around, the executive needs less latitude, and Parliament has to set limits. In both cases, however, it is up to Parliament to determine this balance. It's up to parliamentarians to rule on certain issues with respect to which their ultimate power, or their parliamentary sovereignty, must take precedence over executive leeway.
Do the interests protected by supply management deserve added protection, more parliamentary debate, or an executive blank cheque? It's a question of political expediency. As a citizen, I would say yes, but more importantly, as a constitutional law expert, I believe that there is no doubt that procedurally, legally and constitutionally, it is possible for Parliament to frame executive action on these foreign affairs issues. It has already done so in section 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act. What Bill C‑216 is proposing is to go one step further, by adding details to the list of powers, and imposing certain limits on executive action.
Of course, it's important to remain aware of the fact that simply because Parliament would play a greater role in these decisions everything would automatically be carved in stone. Parliament remains sovereign. What I find interesting in Bill C‑216 is the democratization of debate on these matters as a result of requiring parliamentary debate if the interests associated with supply management need to be challenged. The act would require that parliamentarians have the final word on these questions. In other words, parliamentarians will always be free to review these matters, but will have at least established appropriate, useful and politically expedient limits on the work of the executive.
To conclude, Parliament can set limits on the statutory powers of the minister as provided in section 10 of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act. A move in this direction is a political decision vested in the elected members of the House.
As an expert, I am telling you that the procedural option exists. As a citizen, I believe that it's the right option.
Thank you.
Results: 1 - 7 of 7

Export As: XML CSV RSS

For more data options, please see Open Data