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Results: 76 - 90 of 1263
View Sylvie Bérubé Profile
BQ (QC)
My next question is for all of you.
Do you have any recommendations for improving the ability of government institutions and indigenous organizations to identify potential victims and locations of human trafficking?
Michelle Van De Bogart
View Michelle Van De Bogart Profile
Michelle Van De Bogart
2021-06-01 12:55
One of the things I want to speak to you about is one of the pillars of the national strategy, specifically about building capacity and working with our partnerships.
We're working in collaboration with federal, provincial and territorial partners. I work with my colleagues in other departments to strengthen, to share ideas and to inform. Part of that is consultation and conversations with grassroots organizations, elders, indigenous leaders and indigenous organizations to try to find ways that we can respond and offer support.
The voices of those who are survivors and those who have been impacted by human trafficking are important in order for us to build, to strengthen and to continue to grow in offering support through Public Safety.
Sam Jaroudi
View Sam Jaroudi Profile
Sam Jaroudi
2021-06-01 12:57
For the RCMP, I would say that building trust with communities is the most important thing in tackling this issue.
As mentioned earlier, victims and witnesses and their families are very reluctant to come to law enforcement. However, we've built a lot of networks and relationships and we participate in a lot of community events and discussions on human trafficking to have that exposure between police and the public, and hopefully that plays out over time.
We recognize that it's not something that can be achieved overnight, but we're working hard on that aspect. We're also supporting that approach by training our police officers and employees in general on being culturally sensitive, as well as utilizing trauma-informed approaches.
View Caroline Desbiens Profile
BQ (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I would love to be a permanent member of this committee. Our very interesting discussions make me hungry for more.
I'll address Mr. Sullivan.
We've been thinking a lot and I've been taking notes. Transparency, community economy and market economy are important. The market economy is a resource and we need to maintain the market.
What are your proposals?
Could we set up an oversight committee that some of you could serve on? Could that be a way to brainstorm and monitor the situation more closely?
Keith Sullivan
View Keith Sullivan Profile
Keith Sullivan
2021-05-31 16:39
The short answer is yes. I think it's just a matter of some more resources here, and it's not....
The inshore fishery can operate very well on its own. It's a very healthy environment. Young people can get in and pay a fair market value and get a fair return on investment. It's just that the proposition for fish companies to go in there and get access to the supply is a bit of a different value proposition, and that's all leaving.
We really need DFO to follow up on what they say they're going to do, the investigations. When they find these people who are in violation, sometimes there are significant licences and there can be penalties associated with this. With what we've seen in the past, when they were outside the regulation and basically in violation of the owner-operator and the fleet separation policy, they were given a chance to fix it. The policy was there because they wanted people to come into compliance.
That wasn't what it was supposed to be. In the past, DFO got very lenient and I think were very sympathetic to some of the larger companies, but now we need them to really dig in. There have to be consequences. I think that's the biggest thing that we see. If people are fined or lose access to licences that are worth millions of dollars, soon that will become too risky of a proposition for any company to take. Just make sure that we're doing what we can to keep those licences in generally the local areas, with the harvesters in those communities.
Christian Leuprecht
View Christian Leuprecht Profile
Christian Leuprecht
2021-05-31 15:34
Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me today to discuss this very important topic. I would be happy to answer your questions in either official language.
I've provided my text in English, so I will follow it.
Violent extremism in Canada is a marginal phenomenon, and situations arising out of ideologically motivated violent extremism garner a lot of public attention. That's followed by political commitments or opportunities, such as the hearings that we're having today, to move on certain policies.
Detecting domestic IMVE and disrupting it is costly, and costs are disproportionate to the benefit. There are many other threats, such as cyber-threats, foreign interference and foreign espionage, that are far more consequential for Canada's security, prosperity and democracy, but they're difficult to quantify publicly in the absence of human casualties. If done better and more systematically, rebalancing Canada's national security and policing posture, with a greater emphasis on cyber, organized crime, money laundering and protecting Canadians from foreign malign actors, would have a far greater benefit for public safety and for depriving IMVE of resources and enablers than the current approach, whose track record seems neither particularly efficient, nor particularly effective.
Who is likely to sympathize with, provide material support for or actually engage in violent extremism and why has become one of the more pressing security questions of our time. That question is made more difficult by the very small number of those in this category, on the one hand, and the vast majority of people in comparable circumstances who are very resilient to radicalization. I provide some numbers that I will skip over, but I'll simply point out that, as shown in testimony before this committee, terrorist attacks and incidents, although extremely tragic, are very rare compared with many other incidents of violence and violence related to ideology.
We need to distinguish between ideologically motivated violent extremism and ideologically motivated extremist violence. One concerns the narrative; the other concerns action. We can lay this out in two pyramids: the narrative pyramid and the action pyramid. These two pyramids are distinct from one another. In the action pyramid, we have terrorists at the apex, then radicals and, below them, activist sympathizers. You got a similar description from Tim Hahlweg of CSIS, with passive engagement, active engagement and mobilizing to violence.
The relationship between thought and action isn't clear. It's not a conveyor belt, and it's not causal. This raises a host of questions. How do individuals end up in one of those three radical action categories? Are there three different kinds of people who end up in these different categories? What are the drivers of the transition between these categories? What motivates an individual to cross boundaries, passing from non-radical to radical or from radical to terrorist? What are the barriers to these transitions? Why do so few people become radicalized, and is there anything special about these few? Do the categories of action and the transitions between different categories depend on the particular cause being espoused, or do all movements and issues exhibit commonalities in the structure of radicalization?
From the perspective of intelligence and law enforcement, we might also ask, is it possible to tell which category of action an individual will move toward by examining an individual’s attitudes? More generally, can current attitudes predict the future political trajectory of a particular individual?
It turns out that the relationship between narrative and action is indeterminate. Few in the narrative pyramid ever move to action, and action is not necessarily motivated by belief in a narrative. I've sketched 12 mechanisms—at the micro, meso and macro levels—that we've identified. It turns out that ideology is one of those 12, and in quite a few cases ideology is not present at all. People engage in violence for a host of reasons that have nothing to do with ideology, so it's neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for violence.
When ideology is present, more often than not ideology becomes the justification and the rationale for the violence rather than the cause of the violence per se.
For policy purposes, we need to treat the problem of narrative and the problem of action as distinct problems. We see this as such in Canada, the problem of mass radicalization—that is to say, entire communities that are radicalized—is not really a problem. What we see is individuals who are radicalized. This is a question about those individuals who are sympathetic to violence.
I would say that in terms of those investigations—I explained this in my brief—we don't have a particularly great track record in terms of the RCMP and success of the RCMP.
Democracy is on a slippery slope when we merely hold political beliefs that, however objectionable they may be, end up being equated with criminal behaviour. With the exception of a few offences such as incitement and hate speech that cross into the criminal realm, the hallmark of democracy is to police criminal action, not opinions.
Generally speaking, radicalization per se—a shift in beliefs, feelings and actions towards increased support for one side or the other—is not a problem. The challenge and test for democracy always comes at the margins.
I would conclude by saying that overplaying and politicizing the threat of IMVE by going after a needle in a haystack.... A better approach would be for the government to improve how Canada is postured to detect, disrupt, contain and deter against the full spectrum of national security threats in the first place. To that effect, we can focus on federal police reform to make federal police more functional, with a foreign human intelligence service and a dedicated criminal intelligence service.
There are many far greater threat vectors to public safety that Canadian communities confront day in and day out. They are from non-conventional threats by state and non-state actors such as cyber, and conventional threats such as organized crime, money laundering and the like, on which a government concerned about national security could take concerted action that would have far more direct and immediate impacts on public safety than IMVE.
View Shannon Stubbs Profile
CPC (AB)
View Shannon Stubbs Profile
2021-05-31 15:54
To your point about protecting public safety through preventing and creating consequences for criminal activity, do you have any comments to expand on in terms of reforms or changes or concrete solutions for federal policing or other intelligence services?
Christian Leuprecht
View Christian Leuprecht Profile
Christian Leuprecht
2021-05-31 15:54
I would say that the much-vaunted risk reduction measures that CSIS was granted, commonly known as “disruption”—the ones that do not require warrants—have proven quite effective and successful at reducing risk.
I would also say that we have a federal police force that spends 85% of its time and resources doing provincial contract policing, which detracts from its federal mandate. I cite at least one case, the Victoria Parliament plot, which was extremely unsuccessful, given the resources that were invested into this case, where the RCMP was chastised by the judge for its entrapment practices.
I think we need to be better postured in terms of federal policing. We need to have a separate criminal intelligence service and likely move that out of the RCMP to make that a separate stand-alone entity. We need to have a better sense of the foreign influences here that may be illegal or criminal under Canadian law. To that effect, we need a foreign human intelligence service, because CSIS, for reasons that go beyond our time here, cannot currently engage in that mandate effectively.
View Tako Van Popta Profile
CPC (BC)
You're not going to be able to answer this in 30 seconds, but you said that perhaps empowering CSIS would be a good tool for Canadian public safety. Could you expand on that for a few seconds?
Christian Leuprecht
View Christian Leuprecht Profile
Christian Leuprecht
2021-05-31 16:29
I think in general we have a relatively homeopathic approach in this country towards all matters of national security. If we improved the overall capabilities, capacities and skill sets of our national security agencies—both the criminal intelligence and security intelligence—it would have ancillary benefits for the whole spectrum of public security threats, including ideologically motivated violent extremism. This, of course, is critical in a highly diverse society where we cannot have people trying to antagonize one another by virtue of differing views, opinions or backgrounds.
View Blaine Calkins Profile
CPC (AB)
You fail to make the point that you have an enforcement issue. I'm a former conservation officer. I'm a former national park warden. I understand fully the idea of leaving things marked so that they are easily accessible for law enforcement. You've told me that you've had a whopping two out of 41 cases, on average. If it's not a case of conservation concern—and it clearly is not, because size does not matter when it comes to prawns for conservation, as has already been admitted here—so there must be a reason for doing this that meets some type of conservation rationale or some other type of rationale for enforcement.
I've heard that it's a whopping two cases out of 41 charges that are laid on average every year. Then I've heard some startling things coming out of the mouths of some of the people here, saying that the regulatory changes were made to meet the needs of enforcement. I thought perhaps maybe we would just meet the needs of the fishermen to the best of our ability and let them carry on with their lives and their livelihoods.
I guess the question I have is this: Do the fishers refuse or remain non-compliant when they're asked to thaw a tub?
Rebecca Reid
View Rebecca Reid Profile
Rebecca Reid
2021-05-26 16:54
There have been no regulatory changes made. These regulations have been in place since 1993. When inspection of their product is requested, the fishermen are compliant. Nicole can speak to that more specifically.
This isn't a question about whether people are resisting the enforcement or the inspection. It's about how to produce the product in a way—
View Serge Cormier Profile
Lib. (NB)
Okay, so you mean that for only two size violations, you want to change fishing that was going on for many, many years in a matter of, I think, two months.
I'm not sure if you know this, but my father was a fisherman all his life. Changing the way you fish doesn't happen overnight. You need time to organize yourself. You need time to prepare your gear and everything. For example, here on the east coast we're fishing lobster. If there is a size violation, we fine those people and take some of them to court. We don't change the way we measure lobster the year afterward.
Why, if there were only two violations like that, do you want to change a process that's been going on for years? It seems there is no conservation issue whatsoever. Why are you changing the rules all of a sudden, giving the industry no time to prepare themselves? It would be like asking them to mow their lawn with a snow blower during the summer. It would take time to adapt, right?
Rebecca Reid
View Rebecca Reid Profile
Rebecca Reid
2021-05-26 16:59
If I can respond to that, the answer is that we're not asking for a change. What we've said is that this is the practice that's been in place, the expectation that's been in place all along, so we don't see a change. What's changed is the increased use of tubbing. That means we need to make sure we reflect on how to properly inspect those products. We're not asking for a change in fishing. We've come up with a protocol to allow for the use of tubbing. We continue to want to enforce the size limits as an important part of conservation. That hasn't changed. None of that has changed.
View Serge Cormier Profile
Lib. (NB)
You have inspected those prawns for many years. You still want to change the way that they use tubbing, if I may say so.
Results: 76 - 90 of 1263 | Page: 6 of 85

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