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View Marc Garneau Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
It is a pleasure to be with you today, Mr. Chair.
China’s increasing authoritarianism and coercive diplomacy are challenges for democracies around the world. All countries are reassessing and realigning their engagement with China, and Canada is no exception.
We are all trying to decide how we can reconcile our trade objectives, our security objectives and our human rights objectives. Given the circumstances, our approach to China is constantly evolving. It is firmly guided by our principles, values and interests, while acknowledging the complexity of our relationship.
China is rapidly becoming a global influence with which all countries must learn to coexist. That means that we must recognize situations in which it is necessary to cooperate with China, for example on global problems like climate change. However, it also means that we are competing with China when it comes to trade and to promoting our values.
It also implies challenging China when human rights are violated or Canadian citizens and interests are jeopardized.
We must continue to work with our partners around the world to protect the rules-based international order and defend human rights and freedoms. Those are fundamental Canadian values that underpin our foreign policy.
Let me be clear. A path to any kind of long-term relationship with China implies the safe return of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor to Canada. Mr. Kovrig and Mr. Spavor have been unlawfully detained for more than 900 days. Bringing them home is and must remain our top priority in our dealings with China, period. Both men received regular visits two weeks ago from consular officials, who remarked on their impressive strength and resilience. We continue to call for their release while pressing China to allow consular access to other Canadian citizens held in that country, namely Mr. Huseyin Celil, so that we can confirm his well-being. We also seek clemency for Robert Schellenberg and for all Canadians facing the death penalty.
Alongside international partners, we continue to call out China for its bad behaviour. We have called on China to put an end to the systematic campaign of repression against Uighurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities in light of mounting evidence of forced labour, political re-education, torture and forced sterilization. We announced sanctions against four officials and one entity for their involvement.
We are also working with allies at the G7 Quad and Five Eyes to condemn China's growing militarization in the East China Sea and the South China Sea, where China claims vast areas, which fuels regional tensions.
China's economic might has emboldened its ambitions and interests beyond the Asia-Pacific region, where it has enjoyed enormous clout for centuries, to span the entire globe, including here in Canada. Growing competition with China and the pervasive use of digital technology forces us to work with other governments, businesses and universities to protect intellectual property and digital infrastructure and even to shield our democratic institutions from foreign interference and election meddling.
Hostile activities by state actors pose strategic long-term threats to Canada. They can undermine our nation's economic, industrial, military and technological advantages. Researchers and innovators, for example, are vulnerable to espionage and hacking.
Last September, the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry launched the new portal called Safeguarding Your Research, which provides tools and advice to Canadians on how best to protect their intellectual property.
In March, the ministers of Public Safety and Innovation, Science and Industry announced the development of specific risk guidelines to integrate national security considerations into the evaluation and funding of research partnerships.
We are also working with other G7 countries to counter foreign interference, notably through the Canadian initiative called “rapid response mechanism”, which strengthens coordination across the G7 in identifying, preventing and responding to threats to G7 democracies through disinformation.
Unfortunately, we are currently seeing a resurgence in anti-Asian hate, since the beginning of the pandemic, in Canada and around the world.
Canadians of Chinese and Asian heritage are our neighbours, our colleagues, our friends and our family members. They should never feel that they are in danger or threatened because of their origin.
View John Williamson Profile
CPC (NB)
Thank you.
That was very strong testimony.
Professor Ong, you've been very patient. I, for one, would love to hear your recommendations, because I liked how you opened up your remarks about the balance between civil rights in this country versus the security threat.
I have five minutes. I'll give you a couple of minutes and then I'm hoping for a little dialogue.
I'd love to hear your recommendations. I will cut you off after three and a half or four minutes, but it's over to you until then.
Lynette H. Ong
View Lynette H. Ong Profile
Lynette H. Ong
2021-05-03 19:07
Thank you for that opportunity and the question.
For number one, I would recommend that we boost our immunity by educating relevant government agencies on the risk of foreign interference and espionage. As someone who knows and understands China, I am also quite alarmed by some of the very basic things that we could have avoided, such as working with Chinese police agencies. I think the chain may be very long, but if someone had done the work of investigating who actually owns VFS, I think we could avoided that problem earlier.
My number two recommendation is that official discussion on espionage and foreign interference should adopt country-agnostic language. That is in light of the skyrocketing anti-Asian hate crimes that have been going on since the onset of the pandemic.
For number three, I would recommend an increase in funding of Chinese language media and outreach programs to grassroots Chinese communities in order to reduce their reliance, as I mentioned, on foreign media sources for news and information coming from China.
Number four is to recognize the enormous diversity of the Asian or Chinese community in Canada. Their allegiance to either the Chinese government or the Chinese Communist Party should not be presumed.
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