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Results: 31 - 45 of 139
View David McGuinty Profile
Lib. (ON)
For each of the five topics that we covered in the report, we tried to provide, at the end of a chapter, an analysis of what has happened since the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact on the five areas.
In that analysis, we know there has been a decrease in mass gatherings. We know there has been a closure of public spaces and limits on travel. These things may have had a bearing on driving activity further online.
This is something the RCMP is examining. They believe it could result in people looking for advice or information over the Internet and accessing what we call extremist echo chambers. We believe that COVID-19, more social isolation and more financial hardship during the restrictions have likely put more of this type of IMVE and incel activity online.
View Greg Fergus Profile
Lib. (QC)
I'd like to thank the witnesses for being with us.
As I'm sure you've noticed, this is a very thorny issue that deeply affects all members of Parliament who have participated in these meetings. Before I put my question to the two ministers, I'd like to raise a few points.
Mr. Lametti, you said that we have a very powerful law, but that a few things need to be strengthened to better reflect the international nature of cybercrime, if I can use that term, because the actions of MindGeek and Pornhub are indeed criminal. The problem is the location of their computer servers.
I can also note that despite the fact that a willingness to act seems to transcend partisanship, the official opposition voted against increased funding for the RCMP to combat the scourge of online child pornography. That said, I know that the members here are acting in good faith and that they want to do the right thing now.
Mr. Lametti and Mr. Blair, what do you need, both in terms of resources and improvements to the legislative framework, to address these crimes in a way that takes into account their international nature due to the nature of the Internet?
What other tools and funding are needed to properly prosecute these people and bring justice to the victims of these crimes?
View Bill Blair Profile
Lib. (ON)
Thank you very much, Mr. Fergus, for what is a very important question.
As you've already indicated, we do supply funding to the RCMP to run the National Child Exploitation Crime Centre, which has a number of significant responsibilities, including the investigation of these predators to gather the evidence to bring them to court and to prosecute them. It also has the purpose of identifying and rescuing victims on the international front.
Because of the nature of online harms generally, and certainly of this most terrible crime, there is a very significant international component. That's why, in the five-country ministerial meetings that I have attended for each the last three years, the focus in each of those meetings has been on online child sexual [Technical difficulty—Editor] and implementation of principles to guide industry efforts to combat online crimes and child sexual exploitation.
In addition, we are part of an initiative called the WePROTECT Global Alliance, which is a movement dedicated to national and global action to end sexual exploitation of children online. It includes like-minded states, NGOs and civil society organizations.
Finally, Mr. Fergus, I would point out that the RCMP actually chairs a group called the Virtual Global Taskforce on child exploitation. This is an international law enforcement alliance that is engaged in intelligence sharing, data sharing and dealing with this issue globally. I think it is a demonstration of both Canada's commitment and the RCMP's global leadership on this critically important issue.
View David Lametti Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Fergus, I would just add that we're working with other countries on mutual legal assistance treaties to facilitate the exchange of information between our police forces, multilateral conventions on cybercrime, as well as bilateral agreements with countries such as the United States, for example, to facilitate the exchange of information in a context where it needs to be done quickly.
View Shannon Stubbs Profile
CPC (AB)
View Shannon Stubbs Profile
2021-04-12 12:15
Thanks, Chair.
I have some questions for you, Commissioner Lucki. I have been looking at the website for the various child sexual exploitation units in the RCMP. I would also just note the recent reporting by the director of Cybertip, who says that in 2020 his [Technical difficulty—Editor] spike over April, May and June [Technical difficulty—Editor] youth who had been sexually exploited and reports of people trying to sexually abuse children.
I wonder if you could confirm that cases of child sexual exploitation online have increased during the past year. In that context, could you also shed some light on exactly what the support and resources were that the public safety minister says he offered when he reached out to the RCMP after members of Parliament and victims spoke out on this travesty last year?
Brenda Lucki
View Brenda Lucki Profile
Brenda Lucki
2021-04-12 12:16
Thank you so much for that question.
COVID-19 especially has had a heightened risk to children, as offenders have taken advantage of the fact that children are spending more time online and are often unsupervised. Since the onset of the pandemic, the centre has seen increased online activity related to online child sexual exploitation. From March to May 2020, the centre has recorded an approximately 36% increase in reports of suspected online child exploitation, attributed in part to the increase in viral media and a tangible increase in self-exploitation cases.
We also anticipate more reporting of child exploitation offences, both online and off-line, when the pandemic-related restrictions are slowly lifted and the children have access to trusted adults once again—their teachers, caregivers and community support services. It was largely limited at the onset of the pandemic, likely preventing children from reporting abuse to trusted adults outside of their homes, which is such a crucial part.
In terms of your question with regard to Minister Blair reaching out to the RCMP, whenever a huge...for example, when this arose about the increase in child exploitation, we're always having a conversation about the things we can do to prevent them. Obviously, we're looking at legislation and we're looking at the mandatory reporting act. We spoke about resources. We spoke about technology. We've talked about things within the acts and how that could improve law enforcement and how we could better reach out to law enforcement.
View Bill Blair Profile
Lib. (ON)
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I'll accept your remarks with respect to charm, but I'm afraid, with respect to looks, it's contrary to the evidence before us.
I'd like to thank the committee for the invitation today, and I'm pleased to present the 2021 supplementary estimates (C) and the 2021-22 main estimates for the public safety portfolio.
I'm very ably joined today by a number of my colleagues. Respectfully, in the interest of time, I will not introduce them, but I'd like to take the opportunity to acknowledge that, during these incredibly difficult and challenging times over the past year, they've all stepped up to the plate. They've been working diligently to keep our borders, communities and correctional institutions safe as well as to protect our national security.
Today, Mr. Chair, I believe these estimates reflect that work.
I'll go through the supplementary estimates (C) for 2021 in order to present these items chronologically. The approval of these estimates will result in funding approvals of $11.1 billion for the public safety portfolio, and that represents an increase of 3.3% over total authorities provided to date. I will briefly share some of the highlights here as they relate to how we manage our critical services during the pandemic.
The first is $135.8 million for the Correctional Service of Canada for critical operating requirements related to COVID-19.
The second is $35 million for Public Safety Canada, to support the urgent relief efforts of the Canadian Red Cross during the pandemic. Mr. Chair, as you know, the many volunteers and staff of the Canadian Red Cross have been there to support Canadians from the outset of this pandemic, including at long-term care homes right across the country.
I would ask this committee to join me in thanking them for all their service and for providing help where it was needed most. I’ll also note that this funding is in addition to the $35 million of vote 5 funding to Public Safety from Health Canada to support rapid response capacity testing being deployed to fill gaps in surge and targeted activities, including remote and isolated communities.
Included in these supplementary estimates is funding to enhance the integrity of our borders and asylum system while also modernizing the agency’s security screening system. This funding will ensure that security screening results are made available at the earliest opportunity under a reformed system.
I'd like to take this opportunity to highlight that CBSA employees have done a remarkable job in keeping our borders safe in response to COVID-19. I'd like to take the opportunity as well to thank them for their continued hard work in keeping Canadians safe.
We're also working through these supplementary estimates to increase funding to end violence against indigenous women and girls and to provide essential mental health services.
For the RCMP, we are investing significant funds through both the supplementary and main estimates to support improvements to the federal policing investigative capacity by bolstering its capability with additional policing professionals, investigators and scientists. This will be used to deal with federal policing initiatives, which include responding to money laundering, cybercrime such as child sexual exploitation, and national security such as responding to terrorism and foreign-influenced hostile activities.
Mr. Chair, if I may, I'll turn to the 2021-22 main estimates. The public safety portfolio, as a whole, is requesting a total of approximately $10 billion for this fiscal year. As I’ve previously noted, the portfolio funding has remained stable over the last few years. I will endeavour to break down the numbers by organization.
Public Safety Canada is seeking a total of $1.1 billion in the main estimates. This represents an increase of $329.9 million, or 45.5%, over the previous year. The bulk of this increase is due to the grants and contributions regarding the disaster financial assistance arrangements program, or DFAA. It’s an increase in funding based upon forecasts from provinces and territories for expected disbursements under the DFAA for this fiscal year. This represents a critical part of my portfolio as minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness.
In these main estimates, increases also include $15 million for incremental funding to take action against gun and gang violence. As this committee knows, I introduced Bill C-21 in the House not very long ago, a bill designed to protect Canadians from firearm violence and to fulfill our promise of strengthening gun control.
Mr. Chair, I know that this committee will have the chance to review that legislation at some future date, and I look forward to discussing it with them at that time.
I want to focus on a number of ongoing issues and our responses to them, starting with Correctional Service of Canada, which is seeking $2.8 billion this fiscal year, which represents an increase of $239.8 million or 9.4% over the previous year. This net increase is primarily due to a net increase in operating funding, which includes an increase for transforming federal corrections as a result of the passage of the former Bill C-83, which introduced the new structured intervention unit model.
That bill represents a major change in the way our correctional institutions operate, and recent reports have been clear that more work must be done. Funding is just one part of the solution. With the creation of data teams, efforts to replicate best practices nationally and enhanced support from independent, external decision-makers, I am confident we will deliver on this transformational promise.
I want to again acknowledge the troubling findings that were made in the Bastarache report, which I know this committee has examined and reviewed with concern. We are seeking funds to establish the independent centre for harassment resolution. This will be responsible for implementing the full resolution process, including conflict management, investigations and decision-making.
Mr. Chair, we know more work needs to be done. I'd like to conclude by noting the importance of our oversight agencies. You will see in the main estimates that we are seeking to increase funding for the Office of the Correctional Investigator, the CRCC and the ERC, the latter by close to 100%.
With that, Mr. Chair, I thank you and the members of the committee for your patience as I delivered my opening remarks. I'm happy to answer questions that members may have about these estimates and the collective work of our portfolio.
View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
How many officers do you have in Canada dedicated to online crime?
Brenda Lucki
View Brenda Lucki Profile
Brenda Lucki
2021-03-11 18:42
In national security in total, we have 600 resources, and that covers the entire gamut of the types of investigations we do. Of course, each and every one of those investigations touches on the cyber portion of the investigations, but they aren't specific to cybercrime specifically.
View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Lucki, in March 2020, you mentioned in your report that you did not have enough resources for terrorism, foreign interference and cybercrime.
If we set terrorism aside, do you have the same problem with foreign interference and cybercrime a year later?
Brenda Lucki
View Brenda Lucki Profile
Brenda Lucki
2021-02-25 20:00
Yes, we are constantly working on foreign interference. It's one of our priorities.
In the national security programme, we have the primary responsibility for investigations of that nature, and obviously we work with our domestic and international partners to investigate those illegal activities where such foreign interference is suspected. We also work with our security and intelligence partners to detect and disrupt the interference activity of these foreign actors. This type of activity can manifest itself in different ways.
View Pierre Paul-Hus Profile
CPC (QC)
Resources were a problem for you. Have you obtained additional resources, or are you at the same point as in 2020?
Brenda Lucki
View Brenda Lucki Profile
Brenda Lucki
2021-02-25 20:00
We have not increased our resources in this area.
Brenda Lucki
View Brenda Lucki Profile
Brenda Lucki
2021-02-25 20:00
But in the federal policing program we have the flexibility that if such a file raises itself.... For example, when we had the terrorist file in Kingston, we were able—and that's the beauty of the RCMP—to move the experts into the area from across Canada and get those specialized resources into that area to investigate those files.
Scott Jones
View Scott Jones Profile
Scott Jones
2020-12-09 15:32
Thank you very much for that, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, committee members.
Thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss cybersecurity and specifically the “National Cyber Threat Assessment 2020” report released on November 18.
As the head of the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security at the Communications Security Establishment, I am very pleased to be here. CSE is Canada's foreign intelligence agency and lead technical and operational agency for cybersecurity. As was mentioned, I have appeared here a few times before.
Created in 2018, the cyber centre is a unified source of expert advice, guidance and support on cybersecurity operational matters. We work closely with other government agencies, industry partners and the public to improve cybersecurity for Canadians and to make Canada more resilient against cyber-threats.
Our goal with the national cyber-threat assessment is not to frighten Canadians or to be downers, but rather to inform all of us about the threats we will be facing in the coming years. I hope it spurs many of us to take simple actions to protect ourselves. We have seen that easy, simple actions can greatly increase our individual security.
Canada is one of the most connected countries in the world, which the NCTA highlights, and the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated our reliance on the Internet to meet basic needs. We are increasingly leading our lives online, and at the same time threat actors continue to pursue new ways to use the Internet for malicious purposes. While this assessment does not provide specific mitigation advice, more guidance and best practices can be found on the cyber centre's website and through our “Get Cyber Safe” public awareness campaign. As I've said before, by taking even a single action, all Canadians can help shape and sustain our nation's cyber-resilience.
For those Canadians who would like to learn more, we have also published an updated “An Introduction to the Cyber Threat Environment”, which I will confess I may slip and call the “cyber primer”, in which we explain many of the terms and techniques used in cybersecurity.
The assessment analyzes cyber-trends since 2018 and draws upon the cyber centre's unique view of the cyber-threat environment to forecast those trends to around 2022. The assessment also highlights the most relevant cyber-threats to Canadian individuals and organizations.
Before I discuss those threats further, though, I would note that the assessment's findings are based on reporting from multiple classified and unclassified sources, including those related to CSE's foreign intelligence mandate. While the cyber centre must protect classified sources and methods, we have tried to provide readers with as much information as possible, including footnotes.
I'll now provide a brief breakdown of the cyber centre's key findings regarding the cyber-threat landscape. Broadly, these can be grouped into three key observations for our discussion today.
The NCTA 2020 highlights several key observations.
First, cybercrime is the threat most likely to impact Canadians now and in the years ahead, and cybercriminals often succeed because they exploit human and social behaviours.
Second, ransomware directed against Canada will almost certainly continue to target large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers.
Finally, while cybercrime is the main threat, state-sponsored cyber-programs of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran pose a strategic threat to Canada.
First, we assessed that cybercrime remains the threat most likely to impact Canadians. Now and in the years ahead Canadian individuals and organizations will continue to face online fraud and attempts to steal personal, financial and corporate information. Cybercriminals often succeed because they exploit deeply rooted human behaviours and social patterns as well as technological vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, as a result of this reality, Canadians are more at risk for cybercrime than ever. This has only increased during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Malicious cyber-actors are able to take advantage of people's heightened levels of fear to lure and encourage victims to visit fake websites, open email attachments and click on links that contain malware. These website emails and links frequently impersonate health organizations or the Government of Canada. Defending Canadians against these threats requires addressing both the technical and social elements of cyber-threat activity.
Second, the ongoing safety of Canadians depends on critical infrastructure as well as consumer and medical goods, many of which are increasingly being connected to the Internet by their manufacturers. However, once connected, these infrastructures and goods are susceptible to cyber-threats, and maintaining their security requires investments over time from manufacturers and owners that can be difficult to sustain.
We have assessed that ransomware directed at Canada will continue to target those large enterprises and critical infrastructure providers. As these entities cannot tolerate sustained disruptions, they are often willing to pay up to millions of dollars to quickly restore their operations. Many Canadian victims will likely continue to give in to ransom demands due to the severe costs of losing business and rebuilding their networks and the potential consequences of refusing payment. The protection of these organizations and networks is crucial to the productivity and competitiveness of Canadian companies, and vital for Canada's national defence.
Finally, state-sponsored actors are very likely attempting to develop cyber-capabilities to disrupt Canadian critical infrastructure to further their goals. However, we judge that it is very unlikely that cyber-threat actors will intentionally seek to disrupt critical infrastructure and cause major damage or loss of life in the absence of international hostilities. Nevertheless, cyber-threat actors may target Canadian critical organizations to collect information, pre-position for future activities, or as a form of intimidation.
While cybercrime is the most likely threat to impact the average Canadian, state-sponsored cyber-programs of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran pose the greatest strategic threat to Canada. We have assessed that state-sponsored actors will almost certainly continue to attempt to steal Canadian intellectual property, proprietary information and, in today's context, information specifically related to COVID-19.
We have also assessed that online foreign influence campaigns are no longer limited to key political events such as election periods. They are now the new normal. Adversaries now look to sustain their influence campaigns across all levels of discourse deemed to be of strategic value. While Canadians are often lower-priority targets for online foreign influence activity, our media ecosystem is closely intertwined with that of the United States and other allies, which means that when their populations are targeted, Canadians become exposed to online influence as well.
I want to reassure you that CSE and the cyber centre are working hard to mitigate many of these threats and protect Canadians and their interests through targeted advice and guidance. CSE continues to leverage all aspects of its mandate to help ensure that Canada is protected against threats. Not only is the “National Cyber Threat Assessment” meant to inform Canadians, but it is also setting the priorities for action by the cyber centre on what actions we can take, often with partners in the private sector who are willing to stand up and assist in directly addressing these threats facing each of us.
A key example of this type of partnership is the Canadian Shield initiative from the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, CIRA. CIRA Canadian Shield is a free, protected DNS service that prevents you from connecting to malicious websites that might affect your device or steal your personal information. The service is provided by the Canadian Internet Registration Authority, a not-for-profit agency that manages the “.ca” Internet domain. The service uses threat intelligence from the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security. In simple terms, if someone who is using Canadian Shield clicks on a link that is known to be malicious, they will be stopped from going to that bad site.
CIRA has seen a number of Canadians pick up the use of this tool, although we would certainly like to see it accelerated more. We are just past the six-month mark. We do recommend that all Canadians take advantage of this free service built by Canadians for Canadians and designed to protect Canadians' privacy.
Through targeted advice and guidance, the cyber centre is helping to protect Canadians' cybersecurity interests. We are dedicated to advancing cybersecurity and increasing the confidence of Canadians in the systems they rely on. We hope this report will help raise the bar in terms of awareness of today's cyber-threats. I encourage Canadians who are looking for easy-to-follow tips on cybersecurity, such as our holiday gift guide, to visit our website, GetCyberSafe.gc.ca.
For businesses and large organizations, or if you would like to read more of the publications of the cyber centre, we can be found at cyber.gc.ca.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you virtually today. I'll be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
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