Committee
Consult the user guide
For assistance, please contact us
Consult the user guide
For assistance, please contact us
Add search criteria
Results: 1 - 15 of 46
Doug Forsyth
View Doug Forsyth Profile
Doug Forsyth
2021-06-11 13:03
Thank you, Madam Chair and honourable members. Thank you for the invitation to appear before the Standing Committee on International Trade on its review of Bill C-216.
The bill amends the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act so that the Government of Canada cannot make any commitment in an international treaty that would have the effect of increasing tariff rate quota volumes or reducing over-quota tariff rates for dairy products, poultry or eggs.
The intent of the bill is consistent with the long-standing Government of Canada policy to defend the integrity of Canada's supply management system.
I'd like to share with you some considerations regarding this proposed amendment to the departmental act.
First, by introducing specific policy objectives, proposed amendments would fundamentally change the nature of the departmental act. The act is an organizational statute that sets out, in general terms, the powers, duties and functions of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of International Trade and the Minister of International Development.
It does not prescribe specific policy objectives. This way, the act sets up a framework that provides flexibility to the government of the day to implement its particular foreign, international trade and development policy without having to change the underlying legislation; thus, it accommodates the policy perspectives that different governments may bring to the management of foreign affairs over time.
As an example, in terms of international trade negotiations, paragraph 10.2(c) of the act provides that the Minister of Foreign Affairs is to conduct and manage international negotiations as they relate to Canada. Section 13 of the act elaborates on the specific duties of the Minister of International Trade, which include improving the access of Canadian products and services to external markets through trade negotiations.
Second, specific foreign international trade and development policy objectives, including how to address sectoral interests or specific constituent concerns, are generally established elsewhere. For international trade negotiations, negotiating objectives and how to accommodate specific sectoral interests are set in the negotiating mandates that are approved by cabinet. This allows the government of the day to develop specific policy objectives in response to evolving international circumstances.
Third, Parliament has the final say over the outcome of any international trade negotiations. Parliament ultimately decides whether or not to pass the legislation necessary to implement any free trade agreement. Additionally, moving forward, trade agreements will be subject to even more parliamentary oversight. The updated policy on tabling of treaties strengthens transparency of trade negotiations and provides additional opportunities for members of Parliament to review the objectives and economic merits of new free trade agreements. The new policy includes the tabling of a notice of intent to enter into negotiations towards a new FTA, objectives for negotiations and, finally, an economic impact assessment.
Fourth, amendment of the departmental act in the way in which Bill C-216 proposes carries risks. By limiting Canada's ability to engage on these issues, this amendment would invite negotiating partners to narrow the scope of their own potential commitments, taking issues off the table from the outset of negotiations, likely in the areas of commercial interest to Canada. This narrows possible outcomes, precludes certain compromises and makes it harder to reach an agreement.
Addressing the interest of any specific sector in the act would set a precedent that could lead to demands for additional amendments to reflect other foreign and trade policy objectives, including sectoral interests, further constraining the government's ability to negotiate and sign international trade agreements and, more generally, to manage Canada's international relations.
Lastly, maintaining the nature of the departmental act unchanged does not affect the government's policy to defend the integrity of Canada's supply management system, nor the ability of negotiators to defend this position at the negotiating table.
The government has made public commitments not to make further concessions on supply-managed products in future trade negotiations. In fact, Canada has been able to successfully conclude 15 trade agreements that cover 51 countries while preserving Canada's supply management system, including its three pillars: production control, pricing mechanisms and import controls.
Most recently, the Canada-United Kingdom Trade Continuity Agreement fully protects Canada's dairy, poultry and egg sectors and provides no new incremental market access for cheese or any other supply-managed product. Where new market access has been provided, specifically and exclusively in the Canada-European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, CETA; the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP; and the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement, CUSMA, the access was deemed necessary to include an agreement that was in Canada's interest.
While new access was provided in those agreements, the supply management system and its three pillars were maintained. These outcomes were part of the overall balance of concessions through which Canada maintained preferential market access to the United States and secured new access to the European Union, Japan, Vietnam and other key markets.
In conclusion, while the spirit of Bill C-216 is consistent with the government's policy of defending the integrity of Canada's supply management system, amending the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act as proposed by the bill would change its nature and create risks.
Along with my colleagues here today, I welcome your questions. Thank you very much.
Arun Alexander
View Arun Alexander Profile
Arun Alexander
2021-06-04 14:18
Madam Chair, as the minister noted, the softwood lumber dispute with the United States has been going on since probably the early 1980s, and I think the honourable member did hit at the crux of the dispute, which is a difference in forest management practices.
The majority of forest land in Canada is Crown-owned land, publicly owned land, while the majority of forest land in the United States is privately owned. The U.S. Lumber Coalition, which is the main driver in the United States industry for this dispute, contends that the difference in stumpage fees between what is charged in Canada for harvesting on public land and what is charged in the United States for harvesting on private land is a subsidy. We do not agree with this whatsoever, so I think that is the crux of the issue.
Colin Barker
View Colin Barker Profile
Colin Barker
2021-06-04 14:20
No, I don't have that off the top of my head either, but I can say that the comparator that the U.S. Department of Commerce chooses to use in this instance, as my colleague mentioned, is what we feel is inappropriate, because there are different market conditions, different species in each province and different local markets for those species, so that really does impact the stumpage price in those provinces.
Michael Owen
View Michael Owen Profile
Michael Owen
2021-06-04 14:21
If I may add something, it's important to recognize that markets for stumpage or standing timber are inherently local. Standing timber, like a lot of natural resources, is inherently a residual value good. To give you a very practical simple example, a tree that's 200 kilometres away from a mill is going to be worth less than the exact same tree if it's 50 kilometres away from a mill, and that's because hauling costs are going to be less expensive because the distance is shorter.
Other dynamics play into this, as my colleague Mr. Barker touched on. Certain species are worth more than other species. If you have a stand that has a lot of western red cedar, for example, which is a high-value product, that stand is going to be worth more than stands with other species, and local demand....
I think one of the very important things to know is that stumpage markets in each province.... Even within British Columbia, for example, you have a coastal market and you have an interior market, and even within the interior market, you have a lot of sub-markets, so the pricing is very idiosyncratic and dependent on the local circumstances. That's a position that we've taken and tried to explain, frankly, to the U.S. Department of Commerce.
Rosaline Kwan
View Rosaline Kwan Profile
Rosaline Kwan
2021-06-04 14:37
Thank you, Arun, and thank you, Madam Chair and honourable member.
Of course, as part of the trade diversification strategy, the trade commissioner service works very hard to help Canadian companies, including those in the forest industry who are so vital to our economy, to be able to look at markets—whether in the U.S. or around the world—to bring all the opportunities that they could tap into and link them up with these opportunities.
In that regard, of course, we have the established traditional products. As you may have heard, we also help the Canadian forest industry companies tap into the innovative side of bio-based and wood-based products for markets around the world, including in Europe, Asia and the United States.
Stephen de Boer
View Stephen de Boer Profile
H.E. Stephen de Boer
2021-05-28 14:35
I'm sorry. I thought you controlled my sound, not I.
In fact, Canada has not changed its position overall. We have never been opposed to the waiver. What has perhaps changed somewhat is that we have more clearly articulated that we're very much ready to engage with the proponents on the proposal, but we have never been opposed to the TRIPS waiver itself.
Rosaline Kwan
View Rosaline Kwan Profile
Rosaline Kwan
2021-05-14 13:59
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon. I'm Rosaline Kwan, director general of the trade sectors bureau of the trade commissioner service at Global Affairs Canada. It's my pleasure to be here with you today. As a representative of Global Affairs Canada, please allow me to say a few words about the trade commissioner service, the TCS for short.
The TCS is a network of international business professionals who help Canadian businesses grow through international sales, commercial partnerships and investment. The TCS has over a thousand trade representatives working in over 160 cities around the world, including in offices across Canada, to help Canadian firms succeed in entering or expanding in international markets. Over a hundred of these trade commissioners have responsibilities that include supporting Canadian clean-technology firms.
Within the federal clean-tech ecosystem, the TCS is just one player in the wider ecosystem of clean-growth partners that includes colleagues who are with us here today: NRCan, ISED, ECCC, SDTC and our international trade portfolio partners EDC, BDC, CCC and Invest in Canada. We all work closely together to help start-ups and scale-ups of clean-tech firms. Witnesses here today are all part of the clean growth hub, a unique whole-of-government focal point for clean technology, dedicated to supporting Canadian companies to navigate federal programs and services.
As this committee has heard through the input of industry witnesses, domestic efforts to scale and finance clean-tech companies are key to increasing clean-tech exports, and we collaborate closely on this effort.
ISED supports Canadian clean-tech businesses through a number of programs and initiatives, including the strategic innovation fund and the recently announced net-zero accelerator. The strategic innovation fund has been a critical tool to growing Canada's economy while advancing Canada's green industrial strategy and transforming the economy for long-term, cleaner growth. The strategic innovation fund has invested over a billion dollars in large projects with a significant clean-tech component, and the net-zero accelerator will further drive investment to large emission-reducing and job-creating projects across every region of Canada.
Budget 2021 includes funding of $1 billion over five years to leverage private investment towards large, transformative clean-technology projects. This initiative will eliminate risk from decarbonization projects for traditional lenders, bring down the cost of capital and make many of these large-scale projects more economically feasible while decarbonizing the Canadian economy and creating new jobs.
Other partners I've mentioned include SDTC, which supports small businesses and start-ups in their commercialization efforts. As of March 2020, SDTC has provided $1.28 billion in funding to 447 projects. SDTC-supported companies have generated $2.7 billion in annual revenues, created more than 14,000 jobs and brought 126 new technologies to market, reducing greenhouse gas emissions by an estimated 19.3 megatonnes annually.
BDC has the only dedicated pan-Canadian clean-tech financing team, with Canada's largest clean-tech fund of $600 million. Through this team, BDC offers clean-tech entrepreneurs equity and financing solutions to support and accelerate their growth and operations. As of March 2021, $370 million has been committed.
NRCan helps Canadian companies develop new, innovative technologies and products to transition to a low-carbon future. The department also assists Canada's natural resources sectors, helping them to improve their efficiency, adopt clean technologies and develop our resources sustainably. NRCan has several clean-tech support programs and initiatives to support resource industries and value chains.
ECCC has policies, regulations and funding that spur the development and scale-up of our clean technologies domestically and abroad. ECCC helps Canadian exporters of environmental and clean-tech goods and services expand into foreign markets by leveraging ECCC's international environmental co-operation networks with foreign governments and stakeholders, and through its multilateral and bilateral initiatives, including environmental co-operation agreements or environment chapters of free trade agreements.
Canada's export credit agency, EDC, plays an important role in supporting Canadian exporters through the provision of innovative financial solutions. EDC is the largest provider of financial solutions for Canadian clean-tech companies looking to expand their businesses internationally. In 2020, EDC served 288 clean-tech companies and facilitated $4.6 billion in trade in the clean-tech space and close to $14 billion since 2012.
Canadian firms are leading the way in the development of the clean technologies the world is seeking. The environmental and clean-tech sector contributed $70.5 billion to GDP in 2019, provided more than 341,000 well-paying jobs and is growing faster than the rest of the economy.
The sector exported $13.5 billion of environmental and clean technology products in 2019, accounting for 1.8% of total Canadian exports. Three-quarters of these exports were destined for the United States. Europe, with $1.7 billion, and Asia, with $1.2 billion, were the other important markets for Canadian environmental and clean-tech products and services.
Canada's modern free trade agreements provide Canadian clean-tech companies advantages by eliminating tariffs, creating an equal playing field for service providers, improving labour mobility provisions, and expanding access to government procurement opportunities when applicable, among others.
For the trade commissioner service, promoting clean tech in global markets is a key priority, as you've heard from many of the witnesses through the sessions you've had, a priority supported by our clean-tech international business development strategy. This strategy was first announced in budget 2017 and renewed through budget 2021. It has proven successful at helping Canadian clean-tech firms tap into export opportunities and the rapidly growing pools of global climate finance. Since 2017, this strategy has helped generate more than $83 million in commercial successes by Canadian clean-tech firms, helping them to scale internationally.
Our trade commissioner service programming and services have supported hundreds of Canadian clean-tech firms across Canada to secure international research and development partnerships and diversify into global markets. Through our CanExport programs, we have provided $10 million to support over 260 clean-tech projects. Since 2019, our Canadian technology accelerator programs have supported over 85 of Canada's most promising clean-tech firms to improve their access to global markets.
The clean-tech sector represents significant opportunities for Canadian companies and the economy as a whole. The collaborative efforts of the TCS and all our partners in promoting clean technologies position Canadian workers and businesses to be among the leaders in the increasingly low-carbon global economy.
Thank you for the opportunity to join you today. We look forward to your questions.
Doug Forsyth
View Doug Forsyth Profile
Doug Forsyth
2021-05-14 14:23
Sure, thanks, Jeanne. I'm happy to add to your comments.
Good afternoon. Thank you for the question, Madam Chair.
Yes, as Jeanne said, this is an evolving policy space. It's very topical, no question about it. There is a lot of interest from around the world. I think a lot of that is being driven by the European Union. They announced that they have been conducting a number of studies and analyses, and I understand they will be in a position to release, as part of their broader environmental package, a CBAM, a carbon border adjustment mechanism. There will be details on that in mid-July. We are following this very closely, obviously, as Canadian exports to the European marketplace could be impacted.
As to whether it is WTO-consistent, well, we don't know. I think this is the challenge with respect to carbon border adjustment mechanisms. There have been a great number of studies over the years and no one has yet implemented one that is WTO-consistent, so we're watching carefully. As Jeanne noted, Canada is currently analyzing whether that policy is appropriate for Canada. We'll continue that analysis, and the consultations will follow later this year.
Stephen de Boer
View Stephen de Boer Profile
H.E. Stephen de Boer
2021-04-30 13:11
Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
You have my apologies. I did all the right things and of course my system crashed, so here we are.
I welcome this opportunity to address this committee. I am joined today by two Global Affairs Canada officials. They are Steve Verheul, assistant deputy minister for trade policy and negotiations and chief trade negotiator, and Loris Mirella, director of intellectual property in the trade policy division.
I will first address the discussions at the WTO with respect to global vaccine production and distribution, followed by how Canada's trade agreements may be used to ensure that Canada's vaccine advance purchase contracts are respected.
Madam Chair, the pandemic continues to affect the world, from the third wave in Canada to the surges we are seeing now in large countries like India and Brazil. As the promise of vaccination offers a light at the end of the tunnel, Canada and the entire international community are looking at ways to better develop, produce and distribute vaccines. Canada shares our international partners' call for greater international coordination towards ending the pandemic. No one is safe until everyone is safe, which is why Canada strongly supports global solutions towards equitable vaccine distribution.
Over the course of the pandemic, Canada has invested in and contributed to global programs—namely, the access to COVID-19 tools accelerator and the COVAX facility—in addition to leading discussions here at the WTO on trade and health, specifically the barriers to vaccine trade. Vaccine production is highly complex. It relies heavily on access to raw inputs as well as the co-operative transfer of know-how, skills and human expertise from researchers to manufacturers. The distribution of vaccines is also complex due to differing export regimes, regulatory hurdles, highly sophisticated supply chains and significant logistical and technological requirements to ensure that vaccines can get to where they need to be.
Canada has engaged actively in WTO discussions on these issues. We are open to considering all proposals on how best to increase production and equitable distribution of safe and effective COVID-19 vaccines. Our goal and our hope is that interventions are targeted at addressing real bottlenecks and production issues. In these discussions, some are pointing at intellectual property, while others, such as vaccine manufacturers, including those in developing countries, are pointing to an array of trade and supply chain related challenges, as I mentioned before.
As committee members will be aware, in October last year a group of WTO members, led by India and South Africa, tabled a proposal for a COVID-19-related waiver from certain sections of the TRIPS agreement. This proposal has since been cosponsored by a number of developing and least-developed members, including the African group.
I want to be clear that Canada has never opposed this proposal. In fact, we are continuing to engage with the proponents to identify concrete issues related to or arising from the TRIPS agreement or that WTO members could not address through the agreement's existing public health flexibilities.
For example, late last year we submitted, as did Australia, Chile and Mexico, a set of questions aimed at enabling all members to better understand the nature of any barriers experienced in any member's responses to COVID-19 relating to or arising from the TRIPS agreement. However, thus far the conversation has focused on a number of historical, general or hypothetical concerns regarding IP. There has been much mention of unused or underused production capacity, but there has not yet been evidence presented of large amounts of COVID-19 vaccine manufacturing capacity that would be unused due to IP issues. Our understanding is that vaccine manufacturers, including those in developing countries, so far do not substantiate this perspective.
I am sure that many find it challenging to reconcile the perspective of proponents that IP is a key challenge and that partnerships are optional, while the vaccine manufacturers that have spoken up have indicated that IP is not a key challenge and that partnerships are essential. Canada continues to encourage the proponents to share information on where any unused or underutilized capacity is located so that we can assess why this is the case. We will continue to engage with WTO members, industry and civil society stakeholders to better understand the global situation and the challenges to equitable vaccine distribution.
Meanwhile, Canada is playing a leadership role in promoting rules-based trade and open supply chains to address COVID-19-related challenges including, at the WTO, through the trade and health initiative advanced by Canada and the Ottawa Group. This initiative encourages WTO members to implement trade-facilitating measures in the areas of customs, technical regulations and services; exercise restraint in the imposition of export restrictions; temporarily remove or reduce tariffs on essential medical goods, including vaccines and their inputs; and improve transparency of trade measures.
Canada also supports the third way approach advanced by the WTO director-general, which is enhancing the WTO's role in global dialogue with the pharmaceutical sector towards accelerating the production and equitable distribution of effective, safe and affordable COVID-19 vaccines and related medical products.
I will now move on to how Canada's trade agreements may be used to ensure Canada's vaccine advance purchase contracts are respected.
To recall, on January 29, 2021, the EU brought into force what they refer to as a transparency and authorization mechanism for exports of COVID-19 vaccines. The mechanism was originally set to expire on March 13, but on the same day, the EU extended it until June 30.
On April 9, the EU member states added two criteria to the mechanism. First was reciprocity aimed at vaccine-producing countries. Second was proportionality based on vaccination rates and the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic in the export country. These two additional criteria will remain in effect until May 6; however, they may also be extended.
Since Canada was first notified of the measure on January 29, the Government of Canada has vigorously pursued the EU and its member states at every opportunity to advocate for Canadian interests. While Canada remains concerned with the measure, we continue to receive assurances from the European Commission and EU member states that Canada is not the intended target.
In addition, the EU's recent acquisition of 250 million doses from Pfizer for the second quarter of 2021, may decrease the likelihood that the measure will be extended or applied to exports of vaccines destined for Canada. Canadian officials remain in close contact with counterparts in Brussels and Spain to ensure the smooth delivery of vaccines destined for Canada.
Both CETA and WTO rules permit export restrictions, as long as a restriction is temporary, necessary to prevent or relieve critical shortages, and the good—vaccines, in this case—is deemed essential to the implementing party. However, both CETA and WTO provide mechanisms to support transparency and dialogue on such measures. From the outset, Canada sought to be placed on the list of countries exempted by the EU from the mechanism. The EU did not agree to do so. In fact, on March 24, it removed 17 countries from the exemption list.
The EU is a trusted trading partner for Canada and CETA provides Canada with a direct and well-established channel to continue advocating for Canadian interests with the EU. Canada continues to impress upon the EU that this mechanism must not affect vaccine shipments to Canada, that it runs counter to Canada and the EU's call for global co-operation and that the EU must fully comply with the transparency undertakings that Canada and the EU are advocating for at the WTO.
Thanks in part to this privileged relationship and advocacy efforts, Canada has not been negatively affected by the mechanism, and the EU has streamlined its export process for vaccine shipments to Canada. Nevertheless, Canada has called on the EU to end this measure as soon as possible.
Meanwhile, we are actively monitoring and protecting the supply channels for Canada's vaccines from around the world and will continue to do so with Canadian interests in mind.
Madam Chair, this concludes my brief introduction. I would be happy to take any questions from committee members.
Thank you.
Steve Verheul
View Steve Verheul Profile
Steve Verheul
2021-04-30 13:23
Yes, I'm in the same position as Mr. de Boer. I don't have any information on the actual contracts either.
Sara Wilshaw
View Sara Wilshaw Profile
Sara Wilshaw
2021-04-26 12:03
Yes, I'm happy to tackle that one, although I wouldn't want to speak to the resources that Steve and his team would still require for the work they do and will continue to do, which is really important, both at the WTO and on the bilateral regional trade discussions that continue.
In terms of the FTA promotion, though, I think this is where perhaps we can talk about some of the investments that have been made. In the fall economic statement of 2018, there was a significant investment made in FTA promotion that rolled out—
Eric Walsh
View Eric Walsh Profile
Eric Walsh
2021-04-26 12:24
I can take this for the group.
I'm representing both the foreign affairs and international trade side of Canada-U.S. relations, and we have communications with our colleagues at CBSA.
Steve Verheul
View Steve Verheul Profile
Steve Verheul
2021-03-12 14:02
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Good afternoon, everyone. I am pleased to be here today to provide an overview of the government’s engagement on WTO reform, including Canada’s leadership of the Ottawa Group. In particular, I’d like to highlight some significant developments that have come out of the Ottawa Group since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
I am joined today by my colleague from Global Affairs Canada, Kendal Hembroff, director general of the trade negotiations bureau.
As mentioned, Kendal last spoke to you on WTO reform a year ago in March, days before things shifted to the new realities we find ourselves in today. However, the important work continues and, in fact, has intensified.
First let me provide some context. Canada is a founding member of the WTO, which was created in 1995. The WTO is critical for Canada, as it governs trade between 164 members. Its framework of rules provides the necessary stability and predictability for an open Canadian economy to thrive. It is also the cornerstone from which all our free trade agreements are built.
Even prior to the pandemic, the multilateral trading system was facing an increasingly challenging environment, characterized by the rise of protectionism and use of unilateral trade measures. This led to difficulties in a number of areas: first, a stalemate in negotiations; second, a lack of consensus on how to treat developing countries; and, third, an impasse in appointments to the WTO’s appeal mechanism.
The pandemic has served to intensify many of these challenges. Against this backdrop, it has become apparent that we need a collective recommitment to the rules-based trading system and, in particular, to finding multilateral approaches to managing the global economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Ottawa Group has been a key vehicle for Canada to exercise leadership on WTO reform. As a small group of like-minded WTO members, created in 2018 with the sole objective of supporting WTO reform efforts, the group has been an effective sounding board on WTO reform issues and has positioned Canada to play a leading role in advocating on behalf of Canadian interests.
Most recently, the Ottawa Group has delivered excellent results in its response to the pandemic. Since the onset of the pandemic, the Ottawa Group has met twice at the ministerial level and four times at the vice-ministerial level. A key achievement of the past year was the endorsement of the June 2020 joint statement, “Focusing Action on Covid-19”, in which Ottawa Group members committed to a six-point work plan with concrete action items.
A direct outcome from this statement was the endorsement of a communication on trade and health during the November 23 Ottawa Group ministerial meeting. The communication calls on WTO members to avoid further disruptions in the supply chains of essential goods and proposes the launch of a multilateral WTO initiative on trade and health. This communication was presented to the WTO’s General Council on December 16, and has set the stage for a busy work plan through 2021 leading up to the 12th WTO ministerial conference, which is now scheduled to take place in November of this year in Geneva.
Ottawa Group members have also collaborated on a Singapore-led initiative against export restrictions on purchases of humanitarian food aid by the World Food Programme.
Canada has also not lost sight of the ongoing WTO reform work, and we are advancing discussions within the Ottawa Group. A key priority for Canada and other members is to address the current impasse in appointments to the WTO's appeal mechanism, also known as the Appellate Body. Driven by concerns about its functioning, the United States has blocked new appointments to the Appellate Body since 2017. The last Appellate Body member's term expired in December 2020, which means that the proceedings simply freeze if a party files an appeal.
For a mid-sized country like Canada, this loss of recourse to binding dispute settlement has serious implications. We are among the top users of the WTO dispute settlement system and have been a disputing party in a total of 63 disputes—40 as a complainant, 23 as a respondent— since 1995. For example, our overwhelming win on softwood lumber at the WTO from 2019 remains in suspended animation because of the lack of an appellate body. Nevertheless, we can and do use the strong legal arguments endorsed by the WTO report in our continuing advocacy and legal work on behalf of our softwood lumber industry and workers.
This situation provoked some creative problem-solving on the part of Canada and the EU to develop a bilateral interim appeal arbitration arrangement in July of 2019. That ensures the continued enforceability of WTO decisions and provides for those decisions to be reviewed by an experienced group of arbitrators.
This arrangement inspired the establishment of the multi-party interim appeal arbitration arrangement, also known as the MPIA. This arrangement has 25 participants covering 51 countries, including the EU and China, and will apply between participating members until the Appellate Body is functional again. In the meantime, Canada's priority remains finding a permanent solution to the Appellate Body impasse. Until that occurs, this interim arrangement safeguards our rights to binding two-stage dispute settlement with willing WTO members.
Canada is also playing an active role in a number of ongoing WTO negotiations, including negotiations to limit harmful fisheries subsidies. Fundamentally, this negotiation is about helping to preserve the sustainability of global fish stocks for future generations. Members had committed to concluding negotiations by the end of 2020 in order to meet a UN sustainable development goal. However, due to continuing divergences in members' positions and logistical challenges caused by COVID-19, the negotiations are still continuing. Canada has made a number of important contributions in these negotiations, including a proposal to discipline subsidies contributing to overfishing and overcapacity.
Challenges to the multilateral approach to negotiations have also led members to pursue negotiations through plurilateral approaches involving subsets of the overall membership. For example, willing members have launched plurilateral initiatives, also known as joint statement initiatives, in such areas as e-commerce, investment facilitation for development, domestic regulation for services, and micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises. These negotiations have the potential to deliver significant benefits for Canadian businesses of all sizes. Canada is actively participating in each of these.
Canada is also keen to see work launched in such new but important areas as trade and environment and industrial subsidies, as well as to continue to advance Canadian interests regarding the elimination of trade- and production-distorting agricultural subsidies.
On the organizational side, we recently welcomed the appointment of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the new director general. We are pleased that for the first time the WTO has a director general who is female and who is from an African country. We look forward to engaging the new director general on WTO reform and the important work on the response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the global economic recovery. To this end, we have invited her to attend the next ministerial meeting of the Ottawa Group on March 22.
We also look forward to engaging with the U.S. on WTO reform. While early signals from the new Biden administration have shown a willingness to engage more constructively at the WTO, we should not necessarily expect that U.S. positions on a number of issues will have drastically changed. Bilaterally, and through its leadership in the Ottawa Group, Canada will seek to find areas of alignment with the U.S. to advance key WTO reform priorities.
With that, Madam Chair, I would like to return it to you for questions.
Thank you very much.
Results: 1 - 15 of 46 | Page: 1 of 4

1
2
3
4
>
>|
Export As: XML CSV RSS

For more data options, please see Open Data