Interventions in Committee
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View Julie Dabrusin Profile
Lib. (ON)
Over the past few exchanges, we've heard a little bit about Bill C-59 and the other forms of oversight or review that might be put in place. In respect of the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, NSIRA, how would you see the complementarity between the review agency and yourself?
View Ralph Goodale Profile
Lib. (SK)
The legislation is in the process of being drafted, and we intend to present it at the earliest opportunity. The functions of the CBSA that touch on national security are covered by Bill C-59, just as any other department or agency of the Government of Canada that deals with security or intelligence issues is covered by C-59.
However, where you're dealing with individual officer complaints or concerns about specific functions or situations, you will need a separate instrument. That's what we're drafting now, and we will present it as rapidly as we can. It's very much in progress.
View Matthew Dubé Profile
I have a minute left, Minister.
One of my colleagues, Ms. Dabrusin, asked about CBSA oversight. It feels like it's been three years now that Mr. Goodale has been telling us over and over that it's coming, so maybe we'll get a bill that we can adopt before the election.
Glibness aside, I do want to address this issue. I don't know if you could comment on this, or if this is for Minister Goodale. He did mention that the new review body created in Bill C-59 would look into issues relating to national security. However, many of the issues that have come forward, especially in the media, that such a body could look at—in particular, allegations of harassment in the workplace and things of that nature, or even some of the security issues that have been raised—could be looked at by a more specific mechanism that doesn't necessarily fall under....
There's some debate about whether everything the CBSA does, as a national security body, falls under that committee. Can you comment on that specifically? What's being done to address some of those issues in the workplace and some of those security screening issues, for example, that oversight and review could help us address?
View Harjit S. Sajjan Profile
Lib. (BC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I've actually had a little bit of de déjà vu this morning, given that I was at the defence committee and I see most of the same people here. It's nice to see everyone again.
I'd like to start by thanking all of you for the tremendous work that you have done in studying Bill C-59. These discussions and the experts you have talked to have helped inform the development of this important legislation, so thank you for all of your efforts.
I am accompanied today by Greta Bossenmaier, the Chief of the Communications Security Establishment; Shelly Bruce, the Associate Chief of CSE; and senior officials from CSE, National Defence, and the Canadian Armed Forces. It's our pleasure to be here today as you continue your review of the National Security Act, 2017.
This legislation demonstrates our government's recognition that the pursuit of national security involves two inseparable objectives: the protection of Canadians and the defence of our rights and freedoms. This commitment is apparent in part 3 of Bill C-59, which would establish stand-alone legislation for the Communications Security Establishment.
Last November, I had the opportunity in the House to speak to CSE's proud history of serving Canadians. For over 70 years, CSE has been Canada's foreign signals intelligence agency and the lead federal authority for information technology security in the Government of Canada. Over that long history, CSE has successfully adapted to remarkable change, including very rapid technological advancements and evolutions in the global threat landscape. However, what is needed now are modernized authorities to ensure that CSE is able to continue to adapt in this ever-changing environment both today and into the next 70 years.
In my remarks this morning, I'd like to underscore the importance of this legislation to ensuring that our security and intelligence agencies can keep pace with security threats, while at the same time enhancing accountability and transparency.
First, the CSE act would modernize the foreign intelligence aspect of CSE's mandate by allowing CSE to use new techniques to acquire intelligence through the global information infrastructure. CSE's foreign signals intelligence program is essential to keeping the government informed on matters of national security, national defence, and international affairs. These proposed changes will ensure that CSE is able to continue to collect this vital intelligence.
Second, as Canada's centre of excellence for cyber-operations, CSE operates at the forefront of changes in technology. The act would strengthen the cybersecurity and information-assurance aspect of CSE's mandate. Notably, the act would improve CSE's ability to defend important non-Government of Canada networks and to share cyber-threat information and mitigation advice. Taken altogether, the CSE act will strengthen Canada's cyber-defences by better protecting Canadians' most sensitive information and important cyber-networks from compromise.
Third, and of particular interest to National Defence, the technical and operational-assistance aspect of CSE's mandate would clarify that CSE is allowed to provide assistance to the Canadian Armed Forces and the Department of National Defence. This will enable CSE to better support Canada's military missions and the brave women and men of the Canadian Armed Forces serving in theatre.
Of course, CSE already provides important intelligence to the forces under the foreign intelligence aspects of CSE's mandate. This legislation would allow CSE to do more to help them to, among other things, conduct active cyber-operations in support of government-authorized military missions. Bill C-59 will enable CSE and the Canadian Armed Forces to better co-operate to ensure the best use of tools and capabilities to meet mission objectives.
The Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces look forward to the opportunity to work more closely with CSE to leverage its capabilities and expertise, as outlined in Canada's new defence policy “Strong, Secure, Engaged”.
I also want to discuss a crucial element of the proposed CSE act: foreign cyber-operations. I know that in her appearance before committee last month, the associate chief of CSE, Shelly Bruce, spoke to you about the active cyber-operations and exactly what they would look like in practice. Today I want to reiterate why these operations are important and why they are needed to protect the security of Canadians.
CSE's foreign cyber-operations mandate will provide Canada with the cyber-means to respond to serious foreign threats or international crises as part of a broader strategic approach.
For example, CSE would use active cyber-operations to prevent a terrorist's mobile phone from detonating a car bomb, or CSE could impede the ability of terrorists to communicate by obstructing their communications infrastructure.
CSE's active and defensive cyber-operations would be carefully targeted, by law, to the activities of foreign individuals, states, organizations, or terrorist groups that have implications for Canada's international affairs, defence, and security. Foreign cyber-operations would be subject to strict statutory prohibitions against directing these operations at Canadians, any person in Canada, or the global information infrastructure in Canada, and would require a robust approval process.
This brings me to my final point. This bill will considerably enhance oversight and review of Canada's national security and intelligence community, which includes CSE, the Department of National Defence, and the Canadian Armed Forces.
The oversight and review positions in the national security act demonstrate our government's commitment to enhancing lawfulness and transparency. I look forward to working with the proposed new bodies, including the national security and intelligence review agency and the intelligence commissioner.
By updating, clarifying, and clearly outlining in legislation what CSE is permitted to do, this legislation will empower Canadians to better understand what CSE does to protect Canada and Canadian interests. By adding new oversight and accountability measures, the national security act should also give you and all Canadians confidence that the measures are in place to ensure that CSE will continue to abide by the law and protect the privacy of Canadians.
To the members of the committee, I'm very proud of Bill C-59. This is very important legislation that will deliver on our government's promise to protect Canadians and their rights and freedoms.
Thank you.
View Matthew Dubé Profile
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Minister, thank you for being here today, and thank you to the folks around the table as well.
My question—and you mentioned this in your comments—is about the capability sharing that's happening between CSE and the armed forces, in particular with regard to active cyber-operations. There have been concerns raised about the evolving landscape that was alluded to and what exactly that means for a civilian organization when you're talking about, in particular, foreign-state actors that might be involved in some of the activities that those active cyber-operations are being used against. It feels as if there might be a slippery slope there in terms of international law, as to what is military action and what is not.
I'm wondering if you could comment on that and perhaps explain how those capabilities go together and in what way we're making sure we don't have CSE as a civilian organization engaged in what other states might perceive as military attacks, especially with the concept of sovereignty being very nebulous in this digital age in terms of international law.
View Harjit S. Sajjan Profile
Lib. (BC)
I'll let Greta speak to the technical side of things. However, I think I need to be very clear on this. We, in Canada, are leveraging a repository of phenomenal excellence that resides in CSE. With regard to the expertise that's here, we as a government, and previous governments, have kept it there for that reason, to make sure we stay at the cutting edge.
The Canadian Armed Forces, with the new legislation, will be able to allow us to leverage that technology. Any type of military action that's taken, as with any other military operation, will be conducted with the proper targeting procedures, the proper rules of engagement, and in accordance with international law and, more importantly, our laws as well.
View Matthew Dubé Profile
Before I get to the technical side for a more precise aspect, the bill calls for authorization by you, in consultation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, for any active cyber-operation. Let's say there's a foreign state actor involved in the activity that requires that active cyber-operation. Can you walk us through the process of how you make the decision as to whether the Armed Forces should be intervening with their cyber-capability or whether it's CSE as a civilian organization?
View Harjit S. Sajjan Profile
Lib. (BC)
Let's make a distinction in terms of whether it's a military operation that's providing.... For example, we're in Iraq right now. We have to look at the threats that are there. If a threat was developing capability in terms of creating a new type of IED, CSE will have the ability to support them on how to defeat that type of technology, and they will come out with that. But when it comes to active cyber-operations, it could be strictly, for example, that we as a government have to take some type of action to protect Canadians. That is a separate piece that CSE would be looking at. We have to separate the two. That will go through an appropriate process, as outlined in the legislation here, that will look at the proportionality, making sure that all the laws are respected, and a decision will be made.
Greta, do you want to add to that?
Greta Bossenmaier
View Greta Bossenmaier Profile
Greta Bossenmaier
2018-03-22 11:27
Sure. Thank you, Minister.
When the National Defence Act was amended some 17 years ago to recognize the role of CSE, at that point CSE was actually part of the Department of National Defence. We've always had an assistance mandate, the so-called part (c) of our mandate, that allows us, upon request from another organization such as a federal law enforcement organization, to request whether CSE could be supportive of their work under their lawful mandate. Again, given that we were part the Department of National Defence, assistance to National Defence or CAF wasn't explicitly spelled out because we were part of that department.
About six years ago, to give a bit of history here, we separated from the Department of National Defence and became a stand-alone agency, the Communications Security Establishment, albeit still reporting to the Minister of National Defence. Therefore, this proposed legislation adds the Canadian Armed Forces and National Defence as an organization that could request our capability, request our support, as the minister explained, on one of their lawful missions. We would be in a support operation to the Canadian Armed Forces.
We also have representation here this morning from the Canadian Armed Forces. They may also want to speak to their operations.
Daniel Therrien
View Daniel Therrien Profile
Daniel Therrien
2018-02-28 17:19
It is not what our office is doing. You're perfectly right. Our role is to look at the sharing or disclosure of information and whether it was done lawfully. I think the new review agencies created under Bill C-59 will help, because they will look not only at questions of legality but at effectiveness of the programs. Your question as to whether tips are acted upon or information is acted upon has more to do with the effectiveness of the way in which the various agencies perform their mandates, so that may be.... I would need to look at the mandate of NSIRA. That may be part of its job, but the committee of parliamentarians, certainly, would have a mandate to look at questions of effectiveness of the agencies.
Michael Day
View Michael Day Profile
Michael Day
2018-02-15 10:59
Thank you very much, ladies and gentlemen. I appreciate the opportunity to speak in front of this committee.
First, let me say how encouraged I am that Canada, in the space of just a handful of years, has had two bills on national security. Content notwithstanding, the actual debate we're having helps improve...including the choices that we will be deliberately making as a country to either diminish or enhance our security, and I accept that there's a trade-off.
I come at this issue not just from my time in uniform in our special forces community, but also having been the senior uniformed officer responsible for international security in the Department of National Defence as well as being the chief strategic planner. Subsequent to my retirement, I have remained involved in this area, specifically working in the high-tech sector as well as in academia.
As part of the broader issue, I would wish to have my opening comments focused on three specific challenges. First of all is the trade-off between privacy and security, between the charter and the reasonable measures to protect Canadians. This is not, from my perspective obviously, a binary issue, or one that should be looked at as absolutes, but rather a dynamic relationship that should remain constantly under review. We should embrace that tension as opposed to pretending it doesn't exist, with a conversation being seen to have value in and of itself.
Second, there are the unavoidable challenges that are presented with dealing with intelligence and admissible evidence, quality information. This includes the provision of a coherent picture to policy makers. No policy or law will be able to solve this conundrum, however, better processes and deliberate case-by-case choices can be made to better inform our way ahead. I believe those are lacking. I believe this starts with a more coherent, joined up, centrally directed intelligence construct, which is mirrored in other countries, but quite frankly, not fully realized here in Canada. I'll address this a little later. Although this will be debated by many, the gap can be simply defined by the lack of one accountable minister—who is not the Prime Minister—in one department, responsible for the synthesis of a national perspective. The current construct through PCO lacks both authority and reach but most certainly process. The consequences are that we have government officials, both elected and unelected, who are not privy to a complete whole-of-government intelligence assessment, and vulnerabilities ensue as a consequence.
Lastly, we have a cultural blindness as a consequence of the quality of life that we all enjoy. To be sure, that's a double-edged sword, but the willingness to think of others, that they might share our values, our practices, essentially our way of life, is foolhardy. I vacillate, of course, between despair and admiration at this ability to ignore the realities of the world as I've experienced it. I won't be proposing any solution to that issue.
In this first instance, I would want to see a process that is able to flex and contract on a case-by-case basis. I do recognize there are embedded processes within the Government of Canada machinery. I believe them to be inadequate. This space should be defined by a non-political entity, likely expanding on the current judicial processes we have at the moment. In particular, I believe this must be informed by certain rules that trade off the automaticity of an action being appropriate or not with a deliberate set of decisions. Although there are some basic constructs that allow for warrants for certain actions, I don't believe this receives the attention or the expertise that is warranted in a holistic sense. We have a great judiciary, we have a great rule of law, and I believe the solution is in this space.
Lastly, in this area I consider it to be the requirement for whatever process adopted to remain in camera so as to protect that information, which leads me to my second point. By necessity, there's an overlap between various members of the security and intelligence community here in the machinery of government. We need better coordination, not merely information. Too often, even post-Maher, there remain gaps between how information and intelligence are manned in this domain. As an aside, I think it is tremendously important to distinguish between the two—information and intelligence. Although various individuals claim we are addressing this, I would remind this committee, as I'm sure you know, that this claim has been repeated by various officials in various governments for decades now. No good solutions have been reached, in my opinion.
When making this body of knowledge prosecutable, we need to do better. Although recognizing the hue and cry that will result, in some instances, it may mean, or continue to mean, a court process that is not transparent to the general public. These are the types of trade-offs that I believe are necessary. It's not a good solution. In fact, it may be a bad solution, but it's not the worst solution. In fact, it may be the best of a number of bad solutions. We are living in the worst solution, which is that we don't appear to address it at all. Implementation of independent monitors, etc., or any additional process may be considered as part of that solutions space.
With regard to electronic surveillance and security, I admit to an incredulity at either the inability or naïveté of Canadians in general, and quite frankly, the government in particular, accepting that there must be rules and policies surrounding these activities. It has shocked me. Over the last four or five years, I've worked a lot in the cyber domain. It's shocking to me how little effect successive governments have had in addressing the cyber-threats that this country faces on a daily basis. The vulnerability of our energy grid, the financial sector, among others, and the lack of a government-wide set of policies and legislation to enforce compliance leads me to believe that we are living in a country that is now fully compromised by foreign actors at the state and non-state level.
A voluntary system will not work, as a vulnerability by one is a vulnerability to all, in fact. The CSE legal mandate is a good and useful step, but it's only part of the picture. I am a strong believer that mass surveillance metadata, not individual surveillance or collecting individual information, and the power of directed and non-directed machine learning are critical to embrace and to better understand the space in which we are working. Lacking this, we will fall further behind.
Turning briefly to accountability and functionality in the government, I would cite the most recent report by the U.S. director of national intelligence, which is a significantly different role than the proposed commissioner of the intelligence, whose mandate falls well outside of my area of expertise and understanding, although it does appear to me to be a very good step. Although the current intelligent assessment secretariat fulfills some of the functionality of DNI, it falls short. Focused on the provision of intelligence to the Prime Minister and given its position in the Privy Council Office, it lacks the appropriate authorities to direct, as well as the degree of ministerial accountability needed. We have no minister responsible for this and no such equivalent director of intelligence. There is no mandate and therefore, the function is not served.
It seems to me that much of the public debate on the bill in question, C-59, is about legal mandates, compliance, oversight, and governance. I don't wish to imply that this isn't needed, let alone value added, but rather suggest that the necessity of this conversation should not be mistaken for sufficiency. By itself, the debate on those issues is insufficient.
In a rapidly changing world, an equal amount of discussion should be given to the efficacy of the security and intelligence agencies and supporting departments, how well they work together, how rapidly they are able to, not just respond in the moment, but adjust to changing threats, etc.
As a criticism, I could argue that one would say the jealous safeguarding of mandates authorities—or more crudely put, turf battles—will be argued by any number of officials who will come in front of this committee. I would posit that you would be fooling yourself to believe that those turf battles aren't actively fought on a daily basis and therefore, inhibit a fuller, broader understanding of the threats that we face and the actions that we can take in response. However, I was strongly and tremendously encouraged to see Ms. Rennie Marcoux appointed as the executive director of the committee proposed. She is a true intelligence professional, but this is a separate function, and I do not mislead myself into believing that replaces the proposed DNI, which I would support. This is a gap that needs attention.
Furthermore, not being in government at the moment, I do remain uninformed about how the interaction between that commission and PCO, the assistant secretary of security intelligence, and the national security advisor will all work together, reminding ourselves that the PCO answers only to the PMO and there's no accountable minister, let alone mandate, and therefore, no real authority besides that which is practised, but not enforced.
In addressing the oversight committee I believe I noted with concern that in some instances the committee—and I stand to be corrected on this—would not have access to certain intelligence. I think I've read that in some of the critiques. To be very clear, for lack of a better term, I believe that to be admittedly stupid. The committee should have access to any and all documentation seen and used by the intelligence committee regardless of the originator controls. Anything less makes a mockery of oversight. Decisions will be made. Actions will be initiated based on that foreign-based intelligence.
There is a need to continue to force the interaction most especially between the intelligence and security agencies and associated departments. I'm convinced that Bill C-59 is a good step forward, but it needs to be enlarged in processes and interactions, and an accountable minister appointed.
I'd be more than happy to talk about threats and other processes during our Q and A.
Thank you very much.
Guy Bujold
View Guy Bujold Profile
Guy Bujold
2018-02-15 12:05
Thank you.
Mr. Chair, honourable members, thank you for inviting me here today to speak to you about Bill  C-59, An Act respecting national security matters. As you said, Mr. McKay, I am accompanied by Ms. Joanne Gibb, Director of the Research, Policy and Strategic Investigations Unit of the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
I will focus my comments today on part 1 of the bill, which seeks to establish the national security and intelligence review agency, thereby transferring certain powers, duties, and functions from the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP to this new agency.
As the head of the commission, I strongly believe in the importance of civilian oversight and review, whether it is related to national security or, for that matter, related to law enforcement more generally. Independent review fosters positive change and makes organizations better, and I think that's an objective we shouldn't lose sight of when we're talking about these changes. Consequently, the commission supports all of the efforts to enhance the national security review framework.
The trust that Canadians have in their public safety and national security agencies is predicated on accountability and transparency, to the degree possible. Independent review, whether it is by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or by expert civilian bodies such as the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission, the Security Intelligence Review Committee, or the Office of the CSE Commissioner, contributes to the overall accountability framework of the organizations entrusted with keeping Canada safe and secure.
As the government seeks to further strengthen that framework by creating the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the commission welcomes the opportunity to work collaboratively with the new review body to ensure that RCMP activities are independently examined.
Created in 1988, the commission has significant experience and expertise in managing complaints and conducting reviews of the RCMP, whether it is into the RCMP’s actions in relation to the G8 or G20 summits, the RCMP seizure of firearms in High River, or policing in northern B.C., to name a few subjects.
The Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP, as it is known now, has long been a key element of the RCMP’s accountability structure. By independently reviewing complaints, and where necessary making findings and remedial recommendations, the commission strives to bring about constructive change in the RCMP.
Currently, the commission is undertaking a review of the RCMP's implementation of Justice O'Connor's recommendations in relation to the Maher Arar affair. That investigation is ongoing at this time and is expected to be completed before the end of the fiscal year. The commission will then prepare a report outlining any findings and recommendations pertaining to the six sectors examined by Justice O'Connor.
It is my hope that any findings or recommendations made by the commission would guide the new review agency in its future work in relation to the RCMP's national security activities.
In his 2006 report, Justice O’Connor stressed the importance of a review body being able to “follow the thread”. Through Bill C-59, the new national security and intelligence review agency will have the mandate to do just that, providing a more holistic approach to national security review. Justice O’Connor also stressed the need to eliminate silos and for expert review bodies to work more collaboratively. We're hopeful that this will be an outcome of the new legislation and new oversight structures.
Since the mandate of the RCMP is much broader than just national security, I am pleased that Bill C-59 permits the national security and intelligence review agency to provide the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission with information it has obtained from the RCMP if such information relates to the fulfilment of our own mandate. I believe that this is critical to the overall effectiveness of the expert review bodies.
For example, if in the course of a national security review the national security and intelligence review agency becomes aware of a policy issue unrelated to national security, that issue could be flagged to the CRCC for further examination. This is the reality of the world we're living in.
To further illustrate the importance of collaboration and co-operation, I would suggest that if a public complaint was received by the commission that pertained to national security, but also contained allegations related to RCMP member conduct, the two review bodies should be able to collaborate, within their respective statutory mandates, to deal with the complaint. That is the only way that the Canadians who had made a complaint would receive an appropriate response to all their complaints.
Although the legislation requires the complaint to be referred to the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the CRCC, as the expert review body in relation to policing and police conduct, could deal with the allegation related to member conduct. This would ensure a consistent approach in reviewing complaints of RCMP on-duty conduct.
In terms of changes to the commission's mandate relative to Bill C-59, certain elements in the legislation might benefit from further clarification, and that the members of this committee may wish to consider further. Proposed amendments to the RCMP Act require that the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission refuse to deal with a complaint concerning an activity that is closely related to national security and refer any such complaint to the national security and intelligence review agency. That means the CRCC will continue to receive all public complaints related to the RCMP, and thus will remain the point of intake for public complaints. The onus will then be on the CRCC to determine whether the complaint is, in the words of the legislation, “closely related to national security” before deciding on how it will dispose of it.
Absent a definition of national security, however, the commission must make a determination on whether to refer the complaint to the national security and intelligence review agency. Once referred to the national security and intelligence review agency, that agency must receive and investigate the complaint in accordance with section 19 of the new legislation. There is currently no authority, however, for a referral back to the CRCC if the national security and intelligence review agency were to deem, after it had examined a complaint, that it was not a matter closely related to national security. This is a matter that the committee may want to consider further.
Also, while Bill  C-59 prohibits the commission from dealing with or investigating complaints closely related to national security, as well as RCMP activity related to national security, there is no prohibition on the commission's chairperson from initiating a complaint related to national security. Further to the RCMP Act, if the chairperson is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to investigate the conduct of an RCMP member in the performance of any duty or function, the chairperson may initiate a complaint in relation to that conduct. Bill  C-59 does not amend subsection 45.59(1) of the RCMP Act and, as a result, the chairperson could initiate a complaint closely related to national security. I respectfully suggest that the committee may wish to consider whether this is consistent with the intent of the legislation.
As I indicated at the beginning of my remarks, I believe in the importance of civilian oversight of law enforcement, and we at the Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the RCMP are fully committed to working with the new national security and intelligence review agency.
In closing, I'd like to thank the committee for allowing me to share my views on the important role of the independent civilian review. I welcome your questions.
View Sven Spengemann Profile
Lib. (ON)
Okay, that's very helpful, thank you.
I have a second technical question and a couple of broader ones within the remaining five minutes. Are there any budgetary or personnel pressures that you see resulting from the proposed changes to accountability and oversight as stipulated in Bill C-59, from the perspective of the commission?
Guy Bujold
View Guy Bujold Profile
Guy Bujold
2018-02-15 12:17
No, certainly not with regard to the commission itself, because, in our case, we're having some work removed from us and, as I say, the amount of work is fairly small.
I think where there's more of a resource implication for us is if we did one of these systemic reviews like the ones I mentioned in my remarks. Those can be quite time consuming and fairly expensive, but again, we are being taken out of that field with regard to security, so it wouldn't....
You may have had testimony to this effect from others. The resource pressures associated with creating the new agency will be something that will require some careful attention. Depending on the model that is put in place—the CRCC can be, we believe, a useful example to use as a guide for the creation of the new agency—the examination of the model will lead to the consideration of the resource implications, and those should be funded adequately, absolutely.
View Matthew Dubé Profile
I am pleased to hear that I have 14 minutes.
Thank you for being here today. I have a number of questions and I would like them to pertain to the bill, but certain issues relate to your organization and the RCMP, broadly speaking, and to the topic under consideration.
My first question relates to the lack of consistency across Canada. There are a lot of questions about the way police action is investigated, in Ontario and Quebec in particular, which have provincial police services. We have even heard that the police services in Toronto, Montreal, and other cities have significant involvement in all kinds of anti-terrorism work. Could the lack of consistency in evaluating police work and handling complaints, in both legal and practical terms, be problematic for these national investigations?
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