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Results: 61 - 90 of 153
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Goldman, perhaps you could speak more at length on the actions of the Russian government. Essentially, we're talking about state actors or quasi-state actors, and it is immediately perceived as an act against the state. Whether you freeze a person's assets or just say you're freezing that person's assets, they were acting on behalf of the state in question, so it's immediately perceived as such.
Perhaps you could speak to what happened in the Magnitsky case.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
At the very end of your testimony today, Mr. Goldman, you mentioned that sanctions, whether they were effective or ineffective, were still a very interesting and important tool. I was hoping you could develop that a bit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you both for your testimony.
We have just started a vast study that could be even more vast. Unfortunately, in a humanitarian situation, the right to life is the basic right at stake.
I would like to focus the discussion on the right to practice one’s religion and religious freedom. Groups like the Yezidis are more specifically affected by Daesh’s genocidal discourse.
To what extent will that discourse influence what is going to happen later, after Daesh is eliminated? Will the situation get worse because of religion and distinctions based on religious practices or because of the fact that people are simply united against Daesh?
I know that that question could take half an hour to answer. Perhaps you could answer concisely by focusing specifically on religious freedom.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Ms. Lilly and gentlemen, thank you for appearing and thank you for taking what is a broad approach to this panel and the examination at hand. What has become evident in a number of the appearances of witnesses before us with respect to the legislation and its operationalization is that we started out thinking about where the holes are in this legislation and where we can fill them and how it can be put in place in the most desirable way as part of Canadian policy and effective enforcement of these legislative tools, and quickly we've gotten into a few observations that are rather surprising. One is the inability to impose them in an effective way, and another is the potentially perverse effects that imposing them has, absent a broad multilateral approach.
I'm glad you've raised that point, because as we look at potentially putting in place something that would address gross violations of human rights, the issues you raise today are particularly important in making sure that this legislative tool, if deemed desirable by Parliament, actually works.
The current legislation, which is supposed to deal with something equally if not more grave, you've said either doesn't work, is very difficult to put into place, or creates disincentives or perverse effects on Canadian business, as Mr. Boscariol stated. It's particularly intriguing—and it won't be part of my intervention, but as we start to engage more with Iran—that what you've seemed to suggest is that Canadian business is at a disadvantage compared with partners who can react more quickly.
The question I have is with respect to gross violations of human rights and what we need to do; with where you see an opportunity for Canada to act, and—any one of you can answer this—with a focus on the potential countermeasures facing a country that is much more powerful than us both on an economic level and a political level and potentially a partner, whether acting unilaterally for a country like ours.... One, is such an approach desirable from a legal and political perspective? Two, would it actually work? Three, one of you gentlemen raised the rule of law—condemning people essentially before they're judged—but also the perverse effect that it can have on Canadian citizens as a result.
I know that's a long statement, but go at it as you see fit.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
Thank you for your testimony.
You've heard today that we're examining potential holes in the current legislative scheme, including what may be missing, what's desirable, and what's needed to fix it. There has been some focus on human rights violations. It sounds as though in the legislative scheme you operate under there isn't a hole and that it's just a question of being able to do your job.
The issue I want to focus on—and it has to do with what Mr. Levitt brought up—is precisely the ability to do your job and to effectively capture an item, a good, or a person that would otherwise get out or get in, particularly in the area of dual-use equipment. Just walk me through—I have a very simplistic approach to this—the difference between a washing machine and a centrifuge that might end up, depending on how it's used, being used for cleaning clothes or for refining something.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you.
My understanding is that a lack of resources is really the biggest impediment to you being able to do your job, and I think you said that was also what the 2016 audit showed. Is there anything else that poses an impediment from an operational perspective?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
All right. I guess, from your perspective, your job is done once you've stopped whatever it is from going in or coming out, but I guess you're saying is there's frustration with then not seeing anything happen.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Mr. Van Der Klaauw, one of the accusations you hear as a recurring theme from the Burundi government is that the UN agency's foreign powers are just perpetuating foreign interests, supporting an insurgency movement. It seems to be a repeated theme throughout and it falls quickly into a colonialist discourse, probably too quickly but for opportunistic reasons. How do you respond to that on the ground and what is your relationship with the Burundian government, if any?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
We often get caught in a bit of a circle when we talk too quickly about prosecuting people, bringing people to justice, and often then neglect something that is almost equally, if not more important, which is preventing the degeneration of hostilities, preventing these situations in the first place, which is a much more difficult issue to address. What do you recommend to a country like Canada that has very little involvement with Burundi economically, politically? I think our representation is run out of Kenya.
What do you recommend to countries in our situation that are willing and wanting to act as to how we would work in a multilateral situation, whether it's more money, aid? Really, the question is yours.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Gentlemen.
As Bob alluded to earlier, we're beginning an extensive review of these two legislative regimes and their connected acts. Part of the exercise is to figure out, actually, what they do and what they don't do, what they should do, and what is desirable for this committee to recommend if there are holes. They are complicated; they're intertwined. Obviously what has been on the top of our minds, in light of the testimony that's been given in prior meetings of this committee, is the topic of gross violation of human rights, regardless of the country or officials perpetrating them.
The question really is, when you examine the legal regimes that exist in Canada, is there anything that addresses the ability of the government to freeze assets in the presence of a gross violation of human rights by a foreign official or a foreign person in the absence of terrorism? They would not fall under section 83 of the Criminal Code, the proceeds not being from that of crime. Literally, it's assets of a person in Canada, and then in the manifest presence of gross violation of international human rights, as assessed by some standard, which we don't need to go into at this point, that does not rise to a violation or a grave concern for international peace and security.
That sort of scenario takes us out of SEMA, and out of a requesting country under the FACFOA. In my mind, there's a void there, but you're the experts, and I would like you to speak to that.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Is there anything that prevents the government from just doing it, with respect to foreign nationals and their assets situated in Canada, other than investment treaty protections?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
As a final question or observation, I would say far be it from Canada to act in a unilateral way in such a sensitive situation. The situation I'm describing is really one in which a large part of the international community could readily ascertain that, as you mentioned or at least alluded to earlier, you would prefer to act in concert in imposing sanctions.
So, if there's a hole of the nature I described that needs to be filled, what are the pitfalls internationally with respect to countermeasures that a country that may be stronger than ours or weaker than ours may enact against our nationals, which would obviously be foreign to them? What measures could be taken on a trade level against Canada should it choose a path that would be truly unilateral as opposed to working with its multilateral partners?
I'd be glad if you would like to comment on that. If it's outside the ambit of your presentation, that fine.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I have a quick comment about what my colleague raised about the success of SEMA. It seems to me, as I've read SEMA, that the success of the legislative regime doesn't necessarily depend on how many prosecutions there are. I think the role that you play is one of prevention and enforcing the fact that there may be export and import restrictions that are imposed upon a country. A lot of that has to do with information sharing and the work at the border in preventing stuff from going to the place where it shouldn't be going and then in turn coming in as part of enforcing the regime. It's surprising there is one prosecution only and one successful conviction.
When we're talking about assets, they may be ill-gotten or they may be “properly gotten”, or whatever the expression is.
The thing that interests me with you is the life cycle of what you do in freezing an asset. In my mind that's freezing a bank account, seizing a house, freezing a security, or preventing an export. How difficult are any of those four things to do once you get the green light, and how long does it take, typically, once you have the green light?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
In any of the legislative regimes that you have authority to act under, how difficult is it? What is the life cycle of a simple thing like freezing a bank account?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
When the threat exists, obviously this has to be done in a somewhat confidential situation to prevent the person from moving the money, in a very fluid transactional world, out of the country, or in some other fashion of obscuring the asset, in an effort to avoid detection and freezing, I guess. If there's a frustration related to the time period, that's a real hole in the implementation of the legislation, in my mind.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Professor Touzé, for your testimony.
I want to give you the opportunity to continue your explanations because I think this is very important.
Many experts have asked the United Nations to invoke Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, which is a weapon, a very serious tool. We're talking about military intervention here.
Before moving on to that step, what else can be done internationally? You spoke about co-operation, but there isn't any. You used the words “total denial”. What instruments, what tools do the United Nations have to multilaterally strengthen what we've seen, obviously, in all the reports and interventions with the state of Burundi so that we can avoid resorting to Chapter VII? We have reached a point where we need to make a decision without the approval of Russia, China and, above all, the neighbouring African states. What else do you think is left to do?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Ms. Nivyabandi and Mr. Manirakiza.
First, thank you for your courage. I hope the next time you come here, it will be to share your poetry with us.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
I want to go back to what Mr. Anderson said about those responsible. Those people must be named. There are several international resolutions, commissions of inquiry, denunciations by western countries, so to speak, for lack of a better word.
Without international intervention, how interested is the government in making a change, in rectifying the situation and in following the rule of law? To that end, I would like you to name the state entities that are involved. We have talked about the ministry of the interior and the intelligence service. The youth group, which I assume has quasi-state status, is left to its own devices by political institutions. I would especially like to give you the opportunity to name the state entities that are involved.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Good afternoon. Thank you for your testimony, Ms. Tertsakian.
At the outset, you very clearly stated that Burundi has been slipping out of the media cycle despite the fact that the situation is getting worse and worse. Do you have some tangible recommendations for the Canadian government, which, of course, must act in a multilateral context, in a part of Africa where it is not very involved, according to my research.
You talked about the impunity that the world needs to know about, the current situation and especially the government's actions. In practical terms, what would you recommend to the Canadian government? What actions would you suggest to the government to show the world what is happening in Burundi?
Thank you.
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Parenteau, I appreciate the fact that you speak in both official languages. We rarely have the opportunity to hear presentations in which English and French are used equally. Continue making the effort and try to integrate this practice into the public service.
The question I want to ask you is more or less hypothetical.
Imagine the minister tells you he wants to get involved in a region of the world. Take Burundi, for example, since the study starts with that country. You are experts on the subject. What would you tell him?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Parenteau and Madam Norton, welcome to the committee.
My question is very simple. Are we headed toward a new Rwanda? If not, why not?
View Marc Miller Profile
Lib. (QC)
When we study the situation in Burundi, we see that several of the conditions needed to provoke an explosive conflict are present. First of all, there is no political will on the part of the president of Burundi and his government to allow people into the country to bear witness to the situation, which would be very important. There is also a shortage of food.
Peace missions proposed by western states have been turned down. There are a few political, socio-economic or ethnic conflicts. In that context, we wonder about Canada's role, and especially about its capacity to intervene. The fact that Burundi is a francophone state could be an advantage for us.
Mr. Parenteau, you mentioned that our presence in that country is minimal. In light of the situation and the worldwide inertia, I wonder, aside from the good words and recommendations of our minister, what we can do as a country in the face of that situation? What are you doing to keep the minister abreast of the situation and emphasize its importance?
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