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Welcome to meeting number 68 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of June 23, 2022. Members are attending in person in the room, as well as remotely using the Zoom application.

I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of the members and witnesses.

Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mike, and please mute yourselves when you are not speaking. Interpretation for those on Zoom is at the bottom of your screen. You have a choice of floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.

Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Wednesday, September 21, 2022, the committee commences its study of Canada's sanctions regime.

It is now my great pleasure to welcome our witnesses today.

From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Alexandre Lévêque, assistant deputy minister, strategic policy; Marie-Josée Langlois, director general, strategic policy branch; and Stephen Burridge, director, sanctions policy and operations coordination.

Mr. Lévêque, I understand you'd like to go first. You have a maximum of five minutes for your remarks, after which we will proceed to questions from the members. When you are getting close to the time limit, I will hold up this sign and we'd be grateful if you could wrap it up as soon as possible.

That having been said, the floor is yours.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Honourable members, I'm pleased to appear before the committee for this review.

Given Canada's robust sanctions response to recent and ongoing global events, this is a very timely opportunity to reflect on Canada's sanctions regime.

I was pleased to speak to members of the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade last fall as part of their five-year legislative review of Canada's autonomous sanctions legislation. As you know, that committee very recently published its report and recommendations, which we are reviewing closely. We're keen to build on their work, as well as your own, to best position Canada to effectively and efficiently develop, impose, implement and enforce sanctions.

As you know, Canada has two pieces of legislation for imposing autonomous sanctions. They are the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, or JVCFOA, which is commonly known as the Magnitsky act, and the Special Economic Measures Act, or SEMA.

In the years since 2017, when the committee last studied Canada's sanctions regimes, Global Affairs Canada has introduced important measures to strengthen the administration and coherence of the regimes, such as establishing dedicated capacity for sanctions policy and operations.

This capacity has led to a number of accomplishments. In particular, it has helped to bring stronger coherence and coordination to the Government of Canada's approach to its sanctions policy, and to support Canada's commitment to its key allies.

Furthermore, it has allowed the creation of more streamlined processes for permit, delisting and certificate applications, and their evaluation.

Finally, it has helped raise the awareness of the Canadian public and private sectors regarding how to engage in international business activities in a manner consistent with Canadian sanctions.

While these have been positive developments, the global landscape has changed dramatically, and with it, the sanctions environment has undergone an unprecedented transformation. With this shift, the demands and challenges associated with implementing, enforcing and regulating Canada's sanctions regime have expanded exponentially.

In this way, I would be remiss not to talk specifically about the use of sanctions since February of last year following Russia's unjustifiable invasion of Ukraine. Since that time, Canada has imposed new sanctions on more than 1,900 Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian individuals and entities under SEMA, through more than 50 sanctions packages. Given the expected protracted nature of the conflict, we anticipate that this will continue.

Since January 2022, Canada has also imposed sanctions to respond to situations in Haiti, Iran, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. Taken together with sanctions related to Russia's war in Ukraine, since the beginning of 2022, Canada has imposed 79 rounds of autonomous sanctions, representing an overall 150% increase in the use of this foreign policy tool over the previous five years combined.

A significant new development came in June of last year, when SEMA and JVCFOA were amended to allow the government to seize, forfeit, dispose of and redistribute assets belonging to sanctioned individuals. Canada is the first—and to this day, the only—country in the world to pass this kind of legislation.

In closing, in many ways, this study could not be more timely. As you know, the events of the last 15 months have taught us a lot and given us more to think about in terms of the future of Canada's sanctions tools.

I'm grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee. I'm following your work with interest. I'm eager to learn the conclusions and, ultimately, read your report.

I look forward to answering your questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Lévêque.

We will now open the floor to questions from the members.

As I understand it, Mr. Chong, you are first.

You have six minutes.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Thank you to our witnesses for appearing in front of us today.

I'd like to build on the 2017 report of the foreign affairs committee relating to its recommendations. One of the recommendations was the need for “written guidance to the public and private sectors regarding the interpretation of sanctions regulations” in order to allow individuals and companies to comply with sanctions regulations. Where are we with that recommendation?

When we look at jurisdictions like the United States, for example, the U.S. Treasury's office of foreign assets control, OFAC, publishes detailed interpretive guidance about its sanctions, alongside fact sheets. The European Union publishes customized details through the frequently asked questions section on its websites, including stand-alone documents dealing with the application of measures against, for example, Russia's central bank and many other issues.

Where are we with GAC publishing detailed written guidance, as the Canada Revenue Agency does on interpretation of tax law?

This is indeed one of the key recommendations that came out of the 2017 report, and I would say that it has been implemented. It is a continued and ongoing effort.

Since that report was issued, Global Affairs Canada did create a stand-alone page, which is connected to the GAC Internet page, and that has detailed Q and A, and some information to help guide stakeholders, companies and private citizens. In addition, there is quite a bit of outreach that takes place, and we target the financial sector, the legal sector, the Canadian Bar Association, etc.

Having said that, it is something that we continue to strive to improve and to build upon. You cited some very good models that we have among our partners.

The other recommendation raised by the committee's report of 2017 was that the processing of permits under SEMA be transferred to the same unit within GAC that processes permits under the Export and Import Permits Act. Can you tell us whether that has been done?

No, that has not been done. These remain two separate units.

Okay.

Are there any plans to do that, or are there no plans at present?

There are no plans at the present time, the goal and the vision being to really consolidate all expertise on sanctions in one unit.

Another recommendation related to that was that there be clearer service level standards established and that applicants be made aware in a timely manner online about the status of their applications.

For example, best practice would be the Australian sanctions office, which has clear information and a portal through which applicants can see the status of their application. They endeavour to process at a service level of six to eight weeks, while the public is told to generally expect three months, and they can also check up through a portal as to what the status of the application is.

Is there any plan for GAC to do something similar with applicants who have made applications for exemptions under SEMA?

I would say there isn't a specific plan to put in place a specific service standard right now.

We, of course, always strive to turn these around in the best possible time, but I will say that the exponential explosion of permit requests we have received has forced us to prioritize those that are of higher priority and significance.

Perhaps the workload could be reduced if more of this could be put online through a portal. That would reduce the need to interact with applicants to update them on the status of their applications. Maybe that's why these other jurisdictions have done such things, in order to reduce the workload and make things more productive.

I have a final set of questions I'd like to ask. The 2017 report also recommended stronger enforcement of sanctions rules. Last year, in budget 2022, the government announced the creation of a Canada financial crimes agency. The U.K. has announced a similar measure. The U.K. has indicated that part of their new agency would be dedicated to sanctions enforcement.

Is that also the plan of the Government of Canada?

There is indeed a plan afoot on this. I would not do justice to it if I were the one to reply to this, especially given that a number of my colleagues will be here in the second hour of this committee meeting and will have the expertise required.

This is not the first time I've asked this question of Global Affairs Canada officials, so perhaps the next time we have a discussion about sanctions enforcement and the sanctions regime in Canada, officials would be able to indicate whether or not this new Canada financial crimes agency will have a unit within it for sanctions enforcement.

I'll finish there, Mr. Chair. Thanks.

Thank you, Mr. Chong.

We next go to Mr. Sarai.

You have six minutes.