House of Commons Procedure and Practice
Edited by Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit
2000 Edition — More information …
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1. Parliamentary Institutions

[101] 
M. Ollivier, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences from 1887 to 1939, Volume III, Ottawa: The Queen’s Printer, 1954, pp. 147-8, 249-50.
[102] 
In 1931, the Statute of Westminster gave legal effect to the principle that Great Britain and the dominions of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa were autonomous communities within the British Empire, equal in status, and in no way subordinate to one another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, although united by a common allegiance to the Crown and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. See McMenemy, pp. 288-9, and Canadian Encyclopaedia, pp. 131, 375.
[103]
Letters patent are statutory instruments which give some power to act or to confer some right.
[104] 
R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 31.
[105] 
Although the authority to appoint Canadian representatives abroad was transferred to the Governor General in the 1947 Letters Patent, that power was not exercised before 1977. Evidently, there was no particular reason why the change was made in 1977; it was merely part of an ongoing process of transference of practice from the Sovereign to the Governor General. The change was announced in a news release issued by the Prime Minister’s Office on December 30, 1977, and a question about the change was asked subsequently in the House (Debates, January 23, 1978, p. 2088).
[106] 
The Governor General is kept fully informed of Cabinet business and public affairs and receives minutes of all Cabinet meetings. It is very rare that a Governor General has gone against the advice of a Prime Minister. In 1896, Governor General Lord Aberdeen refused to agree to a number of senatorial and judicial appointments made by the defeated government of Sir Charles Tupper. Again, in 1926, Governor General Lord Byng refused to grant Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s request for a dissolution and asked the Conservative Leader Arthur Meighen to form a government (see McMenemy, p. 151).
[107] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 54. These are legislative initiatives (typically bills) that will require a disbursement from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. Appropriations set aside, or “appropriate” from the fund, the amount that Parliament has authorized the government to spend. A proposal to spend public money may only be initiated by the Crown (see also Chapter 18, “Financial Procedures”).
[108] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 55, 56 and 57. Under the Act, Governors General were given the power to refuse or delay the Royal Assent until the British Parliament approved of or disallowed the bill. By the same token, provincial Lieutenant Governors were empowered to reserve a bill for the pleasure of the Governor in Council (i.e., the Governor General acting with the advice of the federal cabinet). Since 1926, it has been unconstitutional for the British government to interfere in Canadian legislation rendering the Governor General’s power to reserve effectively moot. However, the disallowance power in section 56 remains unchanged (see Hogg, pp. 48 and 120). Federal powers to disallow provincial legislation also remain, although proposals for constitutional amendments have included their abolition (McMenemy, pp. 260-1). The Governor General has never refused assent for a government bill (as opposed to reserving) and convention dictates a Governor General will always give assent to a bill which has passed both Houses of Parliament. Refusals clearly would be in competition with the principles of responsible government. It is less clear whether the powers of disallowance have been nullified by convention (see Hogg, p. 253, and Mallory, p. 23).
[109] 
Financial Administration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-11, s. 30; S.C. 1997, c. 5, s.1.
[110] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 24, 26.
[111] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 34.
[112] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 38.
[113] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 50. See also Chapter 8, “The Parliamentary Cycle”.
[114] 
The Privy Council is the formal body, provided for under section 11 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to advise the Crown.
[115] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 96.
[116] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 15.
[117] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 58. Lieutenant Governors are not subordinate to the Governor General and the federal government but are as much the representative of Her Majesty for all purposes of the provincial government as the Governor General is for all purposes of the federal government (see Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, pp. 180-1).
[118] 
Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, 1947, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 31, Arts. IV and V.
[119] 
Letters Patent Constituting the Office of Governor General of Canada, 1947, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 31, Arts. XI, XII and XIII. Under the provisions of the Letters Patent, 1947, the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy was delegated to the Governor General. However, while this remains a personal decision on the Governor General’s part, the prerogative is exercised only upon the advice of the Solicitor General.
[120] 
See Hogg, pp. 256-63.
[121] 
See Forsey, pp. 4-5. See also Chapter 2, “Parliaments and Ministries”.
[122] 
As Governor General, Lord Aberdeen was twice placed in the position of having to select a Prime Minister. The first occasion followed the sudden death of Sir John Thompson in 1894, when several cabinet ministers were considered qualified to be successors (Sir Mackenzie Bowell was invited and accepted to become Prime Minister). The second occurred when Bowell resigned in 1896; Lord Aberdeen chose Sir Charles Tupper as his successor (Dawson’s The Government of Canada, pp. 183-4).
Ostensibly, the Governor General also has the power to dismiss the Prime Minister.  However, no Canadian Governor General has ever done so.  When the Australian Governor General dismissed the Prime Minister in 1975, his power to do so under the Australian constitution was upheld (see House of Representatives Practice, 3rd ed.,  pp. 5-6).
[123] 
This happened in 1926 when Governor General Lord Byng refused Prime Minister Mackenzie King’s request for a dissolution and asked Opposition Leader Arthur Meighen to form a government (see McMenemy, p. 151, and Mallory, pp. 52-7).
[124] 
Constitution Act, 1867,R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 18.
[125] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 53. See also Chapter 18, “Financial Procedures”.
[126] 
Constitution Act, 1867,R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 34.
[127] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 44.
[128] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 53. “Financial legislation” refers to any bill proposing government spending or imposing taxes. See also Chapter 18, “Financial Procedures”.
[129] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5,s. 23.
[130] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 23. Although Quebec now has more than 24 electoral districts or ridings, Quebec Senators are still appointed from the original 24 electoral divisions of Lower Canada as set out in the Constitution Act, 1867.
[131] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 30. In December 1997, the Senate suspended Senator Andrew Thompson’s use of Senate resources, including his telecommunication expense allowance and his travel allowance (except that required for travel between his Ontario residence and the Senate in Ottawa), and ordered him to appear in his place when the Senate resumed sitting after the Christmas recess (Seventh Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Internal Economy, Budgets and Administration, Senate Journals, December 9, 1997, pp. 305-6; December 12, 1997, pp. 358-9; December 15, 1997, p. 369; and December 16, 1997, pp. 378-81). When the Senator did not obey the order, the Senate passed another motion requiring him to appear before the Standing Committee on Privileges, Standing Rules and Orders (Senate Journals, February 11, 1998, pp. 426-8). On February 19, 1998, the Senate concurred in the committee’s Second Report, which found the Senator in contempt, and suspended him for the remainder of the session (Senate Journals, February 19, 1998, pp. 457-8). On March 23, 1998, Senator Thompson resigned.
[132] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 31. The last time a Senator’s seat was declared vacant pursuant to section 31, occurred in 1915 (see Senate Journals, April 13, 1915, pp. 224-5).
[133] 
Until 1965, the term of the appointment was for life (Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 29). The Constitution Act, 1965, provided that Senators would henceforth be required to retire at age 75. Senators appointed prior to the coming into force of the Act would retain the right to remain in office past age 75, should they so choose (Constitution Act, 1965, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 39, s. 1).
[134] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 21, 22.
[135] 
An Act to amend the Nunavut Act and the Constitution Act, 1867, S.C. 1998, c. 15, ss. 43(3), 45.
[136] 
An Act to amend the Nunavut Act and the Constitution Act, 1867, S.C. 1998, c. 15, s. 43(1).
[137] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 26. The only time this provision has been used was in 1990. Prime Minister Brian Mulroney invoked sections 26 through 28 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to recommend the appointment of eight additional Senators to ensure passage of government legislation implementing a Goods and Services Tax.
[138] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 27.
[139] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 28, and An Act to amend the Nunavut Act and the Constitution Act, 1867, S.C. 1998, c. 15, s. 43(2).
[140] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 37, 51; Representation Act, S.C. 1986, c. 8, s. 2; An Act to amend the Nunavut Act and the Constitution Act, 1867, S.C. 1998, c. 15, s. 30. For more information on representation, see Chapter 4, “The House of Commons and Its Members”.
[141] 
Dawson’s The Government of Canada, pp. 198-9; Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 12, 13.
[142] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, ss. 9, 12, 13; McMenemy, pp. 124-5. Cabinet comprises the Prime Minister and Ministers and constitutes the government of the day. Ministers are individuals chosen by the Prime Minister to provide policy advice, as well as administrative leadership for the various government departments and agencies (McMenemy, pp. 17 and 178-9). At the time Britain acquired the Canadian colonies, the Monarch ruled at the head of an autonomous executive–a select group of Privy Councillors in whom the Crown placed its trust. In Parliament, the Lords represented the great landed interests and the Commons the interests of the propertied middle and commercial classes. Under this system, the Crown was presumed to operate as a check on the power of the legislature and Parliament on the power of the Crown. Over time, as more and more of the Sovereign’s executive powers shifted to the Ministers (now chosen increasingly from among the influential Members of Parliament), the contemporary model of Cabinet government began to emerge. In effect, the Crown’s business was carried out by Ministers who retained office by virtue of their ability to control and manage the House of Commons. From this emerged the modern notion of a Cabinet which fuses executive powers with those of the legislature to produce a government continuously responsive to the elected House (Mallory, pp. 8-11).
[143] 
Constitution Act, 1867, R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5, s. 11. Originally, the Privy Council was a more or less permanent executive body of nobles chosen by the Sovereign as counsellors. The Council was separate from the legislative body, or Parliament, of which the Sovereign was a constituent part. When the Council became too large for the practical purpose of consultation, the Sovereign selected from among its members his or her most trusted and intimate counsellors. The practice of forming from the larger group of Privy Councillors a small, specialized committee to advise the Crown has continued to this day (Wilding and Laundy, pp. 66, 602-4).
[144]
The Table of Titles for Use in Canada, approved by Queen Victoria in 1868, conferred the title of “Honourable” on Privy Councillors for life.
[145]
The term “at pleasure” means at the will, desire or discretion. A Privy Councillor serves at the pleasure of, and may be removed at the discretion of, the Crown or Governor General.
[146] 
Until 1968, Canadian Prime Ministers, with the exception of Alexander Mackenzie, John Abbott, Mackenzie Bowell and Charles Tupper, were made Members of the Privy Council of Great Britain, which carried with it the lifetime title of “Right Honourable”. In 1967, and again in 1968, the Table of Titles for Use in Canada was revised, with the result that Canadian Governors General, Prime Ministers and Supreme Court Chief Justices now all acquire the title of “Right Honourable” for life. Lester Pearson was the last Canadian Prime Minister to be a member of the British Privy Council (Library of Parliament, The Origin of the Title “The Right Honourable”, 1989).
[147] 
Originally, Ministry was the term applied to Ministers holding office at the pleasure of the Crown while the Cabinet was a place, provided by the Prime Minister, in which the Ministry met (Privy Council Office, Responsibility in the Constitution, Supply and Services Canada, Ottawa, 1993, p. 26). The Ministry and the Cabinet are not always identical; not all Ministers are members of Cabinet. For a large part of Canadian history, the Cabinet and the Ministry have been the same (Dawson’s The Government of Canada, p. 196).
[148] 
For more information on the Privy Council, see Dawson’s The Government of Canada, Chapters 10 and 11.
[149] 
There are two main categories of Privy Councillor: one group includes current and former Cabinet Ministers; the other includes those appointed as an honour but who have never been Cabinet Ministers. Among those in the second group have been leaders of opposition parties, Chief Justices anddistinguished Canadians. Certain exceptions have been made: during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, New Democratic Party leader Audrey McLaughlin was sworn in as a Privy Councillor so that she could be given highly secret information; members of the Security Intelligence Review Committee must, by statute, be Privy Councillors, and several have been appointed solely for that reason (Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-23, s. 34(1)).
[150] 
Forsey, pp. 35-6. In the past, there have been Senators who were appointed to the Cabinet as Ministers of departments (for example, Robert de Cotret was Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce in the Twenty-First Ministry) and ministers without portfolio (for example, Andrew Olson was Minister of State for Economic Development in the Twenty-Second Ministry). It is exceptional for a Minister who is head of a department to be in the Senate, and typically the only Senator in the Cabinet is the Leader of the Government in the Senate.

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