| — April 28, 2026 — — Second reading and reference to the of Bill . |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , and — April 28, 2026 |
| — May 4, 2026 — — Second reading and reference to the of Bill . |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , and — May 5, 2026 |
| and — May 6, 2026 |
| M-1 — May 27, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the right of peoples to self-determination is enshrined in legally-binding treaties to which Canada is party, including the United Nations Charter, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, |
| (ii) Canada's official foreign policy states that Canada recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and supports the creation of a sovereign, independent, viable, democratic, and territorially contiguous Palestinian state, as part of a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace settlement, |
| (iii) the State of Palestine is recognized by 147 (75%) of 193 UN member states, |
| (iv) the State of Palestine meets all the requirements of statehood according to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, |
| (v) while resolving the current crisis requires not only a ceasefire, but a fair, viable, and lasting peace settlement negotiated between Palestinian and Israeli parties, the right of the Palestinian people to statehood, being a globally recognized right in the nature of a peremptory norm of international law, derogation from which is not permitted and which is of erga omnes character, is not legally susceptible to being made subject to negotiation; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should officially recognize the State of Palestine. |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| , , , and — May 28, 2025 |
| , and — May 29, 2025 |
| — June 5, 2025 |
| — June 12, 2025 |
| M-2 — May 29, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) dismantling end-of-life marine vessels (“shipbreaking”) presents potential opportunities for Canada in relation to economic development and the transition to a circular economy, |
| (ii) there are significant risks to workers and the environment associated with shipbreaking due to the presence of a wide variety of hazardous materials in end-of-life marine vessels, |
| (iii) unlike other jurisdictions, Canada lacks standards on shipbreaking and unregulated shipbreaking activities which are putting our oceans, coastal communities and workers at risk, |
| (iv) the lack of domestic oversight of shipbreaking and disposal of end-of-life marine vessels frustrates Canada’s ability to ensure compliance with its international obligations under the Basel Convention; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) develop enforceable federal standards to reduce the negative environmental and social impacts of shipbreaking that meet or exceed those set out in the EU Ship Recycling Regulation, |
| (ii) provide assistance through loans or grants to long-term, reputable shipbreaking companies to facilitate implementation of new federal standards into their operations, |
| (iii) develop a strategy for recycling end-of-life federally owned marine vessels. |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| — May 30, 2025 |
| M-4 — May 30, 2025 — — That, in the opinion of the House, the government should: |
| (a) create a new Crown corporation called Renewable Canada to accelerate job creation for the economic recovery as well as the necessary transition to renewable energy, by building new geothermal, solar, wind, and tidal power projects, prioritizing projects in Northeast British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Newfoundland and Labrador, where new transitional jobs are most needed and where the energy worker skill base already exists; and |
| (b) fund this corporation from the savings gained from ending fossil fuel subsidies. |
| M-5 — May 30, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Canada’s greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions remain incompatible with what science and justice demand to secure a livable future, |
| (ii) mobilization for climate action at the scale required must be a grand societal undertaking, |
| (iii) thousands of young people across Canada understand that we face a climate emergency and are eager to serve as we, as a country, seek to drive down GHG emissions and prepare for climate disasters, |
| (iv) a Youth Climate Corps could train hundreds of thousands of youth for careers in the well-paying green jobs of the future, and help ensure Canada has a skilled workforce for a sustainable economy, |
| (v) an ambitious Youth Climate Corps would be a transformative public program, signaling to young people and society at large that we are genuinely in climate emergency mode, |
| (vi) a Youth Climate Corps could also help Canada address many of our other gravest challenges, including inequality, youth mental health, reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, the housing crisis, shortages of skilled labour and lack of opportunities for young people; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) implement a Youth Climate Corps to lead the mass-mobilization required to train and employ thousands of young adults, aged 17 to 35, to assist in emergency responses required during extreme weather events, such as wildfires, heat domes, and flooding, |
| (ii) strengthen community and environmental resilience to climate change, such as helping to make forests more resilient to fires, enhancing natural ecosystems, improving local infrastructure, and strengthening community supports in anticipation of extreme weather events, |
| (iii) build infrastructure that drives down GHG emissions, for example through installing renewable energy systems, such as solar, wind, and heat pumps, improving building energy efficiency, building sustainable and affordable public transportation systems, and many other initiatives, |
| (iv) achieve the goals laid out in (b)(i) to (b)(iii) through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with Indigenous Peoples, frontline and vulnerable communities, labour unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups, academia, and businesses, by implementing a whole of government approach to the creation and implementation of the Youth Climate Corps and by involving appropriate government departments, such as Environment and Climate Change Canada, Natural Resources Canada, Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Indigenous Services Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, Employment and Social Development Canada, Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Department of Finance Canada, and others, |
| (v) consider establishing a new Youth Climate Corps crown corporation to lead this effort, deploying funds and youth to work on community projects that maximize the reduction of greenhouse gases and swiftly enhance community and ecological resilience to climate change. |
| M-6 — May 30, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Canada is in the midst of an urgent national housing crisis due to the repeated failures of Conservative and Liberal governments to address housing; under the Conservatives, the cost of buying a home increased by 77% and under this Liberal Government it has increased by another $300,000; the average national rent is now nearly $2,000 monthly for a one-bedroom unit, vacancy rates are at record-lows, and more than 235,000 people are homeless, |
| (ii) the Auditor General of Canada has said the government will not meet their own targets to reduce chronic homelessness, |
| (iii) the financialization of housing has worsened the crisis by treating housing like a stock market, despite housing being enshrined in the law as a basic human right, |
| (iv) financialized landlords, such as real estate investment trusts (REIT), have profited from Canada’s urgent housing crisis by purchasing affordable housing stock and reno-evicting tenants to jack-up rents, |
| (v) real estate investment trusts enjoy preferential tax treatment and the seven largest REITs alone have saved a combined $1.5 billion through federal tax loopholes, and on April 3, 2023, the Parliamentary Budget Officer estimated that the federal government would collect $285.8 million in additional tax revenues from 2023 to 2027, |
| (vi) over the last 30 years, Canada has lost 500,000 units of affordable housing due to the government’s cancellation of the affordable housing strategy in 1993, |
| (vii) between 2011 and 2016, Canada lost 322,600 affordable rental units in the private market; for every unit of affordable housing created by government, 15 were lost; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) adopt a human-rights based approach to housing, as enshrined under the National Housing Strategy Act, |
| (ii) place a moratorium on the acquisition of affordable homes by financialized landlords, including REITs and corporate firms who are making massive profits while driving up costs, |
| (iii) change the federal tax code to end the preferential tax treatment of REITs in Canada by applying the corporate tax rate, and invest that money into affordable housing, |
| (iv) create a federal non-profit acquisition fund to allow non-profit, co-op, or land trust organizations to purchase at-risk rental buildings when they come on the market to protect and expand Canada’s affordable housing supply, |
| (v) tie Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation backed financing, funding, or insurance to private landlords to specific criteria, including below-market affordability thresholds, ensuring affordability remains in perpetuity, no displacement guarantees, and minimum maintenance and energy efficiency standards, |
| (vi) require progressively larger down payments for buyers purchasing multiple properties, to disincentivize the treatment of housing as a stock-market, |
| (vii) mandate landlords to disclose property ownership and work with the provinces and territories to establish a national rental registry. |
| M-7 — May 30, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Vancouver’s historic Chinatown – Canada’s largest Chinatown – has intangible value as a monument to the Chinese community’s integral role in shaping Vancouver, |
| (ii) the unique cultural, historical and architectural significance of Vancouver’s Chinatown serves as a living testament to the resilience and contributions of Chinese immigrants and their descendants in Canada, |
| (iii) in 2011, the federal government designated Vancouver's Chinatown as a national historic site, |
| (iv) the community seeks to revitalize Chinatown in a way that preserves, protects, and reinvigorates the integrity of Vancouver’s historic Chinatown and cultural heritage, |
| (v) in 2018, the province of British Columbia and the City of Vancouver jointly signed a memorandum of understanding in support of having Vancouver's Chinatown designated as a United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Heritage Site because of its outstanding universal value and further noted that it will serve as a permanent reminder of the racism, discrimination and hardships faced by Chinese Canadian pioneers, who helped build the province and nation, |
| (vi) the successful UNESCO designation of Vancouver's Chinatown would ensure its preservation as a living heritage site for future generations, stimulate economic development, promote tourism, and provide international recognition for Vancouver, British Columbia and Canada; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should now add Vancouver’s historic Chinatown to Canada’s tentative list for consideration of UNESCO World Heritage Sites designation in 2028. |
| M-8 — June 5, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the transboundary movement of hazardous wastes, and other wastes including electronic wastes, household wastes and plastic wastes, can be a means to avoid proper waste management at the expense of weaker economies, their people and their environment, |
| (ii) the Basel Convention to which Canada is an active Party, has made strides over the years to prevent and control unjust and unsustainable trade in wastes, |
| (iii) so far, Canada has failed to ratify Article 4a of the Basel Convention, also known as the Ban Amendment, which forbids the export of hazardous wastes to developing countries, and Canada is not compelled to abide by the Ban Amendment until it has ratified it, |
| (iv) Canada has not forbidden the export of Basel-controlled plastic wastes to developing countries, unlike counterparts in comparable jurisdictions such as the European Union, |
| (v) Canada has entered an arrangement with the United States meant to circumvent necessary transparency and control on plastic waste trade moving across the U.S./Canadian border, allowing Canadian operators to use non-Party U.S. operators to avoid Basel controls when exporting plastic waste to developing countries, |
| (vi) the lack of proper transparency, controls, and prohibitions facilitate very linear waste trafficking, externalize real costs and harm to weaker economies, and benefit unscrupulous waste traders at the expense of human health and the environment; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) promote the immediate ratification of the Ban Amendment and include in its national implementation both Annex VIII and Annex II listings, including the plastic waste listing Y48 and the upcoming e-waste listing Y49, |
| (ii) rescind the 2020 Canada-USA Arrangement created to ignore the Basel Plastics Amendments adopted in 2019 for controlling trade in hazardous, mixed and contaminated plastic wastes between the two countries, |
| (iii) negotiate for policies within the new plastics treaty in the fourth session of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee meeting and beyond, which will effectively reduce the amount of plastic that is produced globally starting with the most hazardous and inappropriate plastics first. |
| M-9 — June 5, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) according to the 2023 Exports of Military Goods and Technology report, in 2023 Canada exported military goods and technology valued at $2.143 billion to destinations other than the United States, |
| (ii) exports of military goods to the United States remain largely unregulated and therefore off the public record, |
| (iii) every year, by value, the vast majority of Canada’s non-US exports of military goods and technology is destined to countries with records of human rights abuses, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Israel, India, and Colombia, |
| (iv) Canadian-made detonators sent to Kyrgyzstan are alleged to have been diverted to Russia for use in the illegal war in Ukraine, |
| (v) the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development recommended, in its 2024 report on Canada’s sanctions regime, that the Government of Canada publish comprehensive data annually on Canadian exports of dual-use goods, as it does for military goods, including the value of those exports, descriptions of the goods, and their authorized end users, and that the Government of Canada, in collaboration with international partners and working closely with other relevant law enforcement agencies, develop a strategy to address sanctions violations, including actors exploiting offshore export havens and engaging in jurisdiction shopping, while increasing the enforcement of existing controls, |
| (vi) Global Affairs Canada continues to use the problematically high bar of “credible evidence” when communicating its findings on the risk associated with individual arms exports, when the Canadian legal standard is “substantial risk”, |
| (vii) Canadians expect a higher standard from their government when it comes to protecting human rights abroad, |
| (viii) there is a need for Canadians, through Parliament, to oversee current and future arms transfers; |
| (b) Standing Order 104(2) be amended by adding, after paragraph (b), the following: “(c) Arms Exports and Brokering Review”; |
| (c) Standing Order 108(3) be amended by adding the following: “(j) Arms Exports and Brokering Review shall include, among other matters, the review of and report on (i) Canada’s arms export permits regime, (ii) proposed international export and brokering authorizations, (iii) annual government reports regarding arms transfers, (iv) the use of these weapons systems and technology and information on their alleged misuse abroad, (v) all matters and broader trends regarding Canada’s current and future arms exports.”; |
| (d) the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs prepare and report to the House within five sitting days of the adoption of this order a list of Members to compose the new standing committee created by this order; and |
| (e) that the Clerk be authorized to make any required editorial and consequential amendments to the Standing Orders. |
| M-11 — June 18, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the housing affordability crisis has reached such alarming levels that most available rental housing across Canada is unaffordable for households ranging from the lowest income category to those with median incomes, |
| (ii) the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation’s (CMHC) current definition of housing affordability states housing costs do not exceed 30% of a household's before-tax income, |
| (iii) the CMHC uses widely differing affordability criteria to qualify for affordable housing funding across its programs, including 80% of the median market rent and 30% of the median total income of all households for a particular geographical area, |
| (iv) these criteria are not in line with the CMHC’s own definition of housing affordability, |
| (v) the use of inconsistent affordability criteria significantly hinders the monitoring of program outcomes against targets, which is essential for implementing an evidence-based approach to addressing the housing crisis, |
| (vi) as a result, only a fraction of affordable housing dollars is designated to units that meet the CMHC’s own definition of affordability for the lowest-income Canadians, |
| (vii) for example, just 3.6% of units created or under construction in the $55 billion Rental Construction Financing Initiative, renamed the Apartment Construction Loan Program, meet the CMHC’s own definition of affordability; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) adopt uniform deeply affordable housing funding criteria that apply to very low and low-income households earning between 0% and 50% of area median household income, and that, |
| (A) meet the current agreed-upon definition of affordable housing, where housing costs do not exceed 30% of a household's before-tax income, |
| (B) are based on the income levels of very low- and low-income renters rather than local market rents or local median incomes, |
| (C) consider regional variations in cost of living and income disparities, |
| (ii) adopt uniform affordable housing funding criteria that apply to moderate and median-income households earning between 51% and 120% of area median household income, and that, |
| (A) meet the current agreed-upon definition of affordable housing, where housing costs do not exceed 30% of a household's before-tax income, |
| (B) are based on the income levels of moderate- to median-income renters rather than local market rents or local median incomes, |
| (C) consider regional variations in cost of living and income disparities, |
| (iii) implement these new criteria for every unit funded through all unilateral and bilateral federal affordable housing funding programs, prioritizing direct and indirect subsidies for deeply affordable housing, |
| (iv) ensure the feasibility of combining sources of funding from different levels of government, |
| (v) report back to Parliament within 12 months on the progress made and its impact on federal housing policies and programs. |
| M-12 — June 18, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Canada has around 3,200 fire departments of which approximately 80% rely solely on volunteer firefighters, |
| (ii) the scale and complexity of events Canadian fire services are expected to respond to have increased dramatically in recent years and that trend is anticipated to continue, |
| (iii) all levels of government in Canada are involved in aspects of fire and emergency management, |
| (iv) collaboration and strategic coordination are necessary to prepare for major emergencies and ensure efficient use of resources, |
| (v) there is a need to integrate a fire and emergency management perspective into policy and decision making for other issues, including, but not limited to, housing, green technology, transportation, tariffs, first responder mental health, and defense; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should work in collaboration with the country’s fire chiefs to establish the Office of the National Fire Administration located within Public Safety Canada. |
| M-13 — September 11, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Jimmy Lai stands for many of the values championed by Canadians, most importantly media freedom, respect for the rule of law, and doing what is right, |
| (ii) Mr. Lai, now 77 years-old and diabetic, remains imprisoned in torturous conditions for championing these shared democratic values, and faces the possibility of life behind bars under Hong Kong’s repressive National Security Law, the provisions of which are inconsistent with international human rights law, |
| (iii) the House, on December 12, 2023, and the Senate, on December 15, 2023, by unanimous consent, resolved to “call upon the Hong Kong authorities to release Jimmy Lai and cease prosecuting him and others charged under the National Security Law”, |
| (iv) the Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development held two meetings in February 2024 to examine Mr. Lai’s case, issuing a news release on March 20, 2024, to “call for the release of Jimmy Lai, and express their solidarity with everyone advocating for freedom and justice in Hong Kong” echoing that Jimmy Lai “stood up for truth and for his fellow Hong Kongers, and now we must stand up for him.”, |
| (v) Mr. Lai has strong and deep connections to Canada, through his immediate Canadian family, through his own major investments and long-standing commitment to the Canadian tourism economy in local communities, and the over 1,500 Canadians he employs, |
| (vi) Parliament has a proud history of global leadership in standing up for those like Mr. Lai who embody such values and exhibit such strong affinity with our country and ethos, including Russian dissident and pro-democracy leader Vladimir Kara-Murza, who was granted honorary Canadian citizenship by unanimous consent in June 2023; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should proclaim Jimmy Lai an honorary citizen of Canada. |
| M-18 — September 25, 2025 — — That, in the opinion of the House, the government should introduce a bill on human rights in North Korea that would: |
| (a) create the position of Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea, whose mandate would include: |
| (i) monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea), including the situation of political prison camps called Kwan-li-so, |
| (ii) monitoring and reporting on the situation of North Korean defectors, |
| (iii) supporting international efforts to protect the people of North Korea from crimes against humanity and to promote human rights and political freedoms in North Korea, including through dialogue with international organizations and foreign governments, |
| (iv) recommending ways for Canada to help protect the people of North Korea from crimes against humanity and to promote human rights and political freedoms in North Korea, |
| (v) recommending ways for Canada to assist North Korean defectors in China and elsewhere; |
| (b) provide for funding and support for non-governmental organizations that promote freedom, human rights, democracy and the rule of law in North Korea; |
| (c) provide for funding and support for non-governmental organizations that provide humanitarian assistance to North Korean defectors in China and elsewhere; |
| (d) require the Minister of Foreign Affairs to table regular reports in Parliament on: |
| (i) the situation of human rights in North Korea, including the situation of political prison camps Kwan-li-so, |
| (ii) the situation of North Korean defectors in China and elsewhere, including their ability to access services provided by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and by diplomatic missions, |
| (iii) Canadian policy regarding North Korean defectors, including North Korean refugee claimants, both within and outside Canada; and |
| (e) facilitate applications by North Korean defectors for refugee status in Canada. |
| M-20 — October 8, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the threat of wildfires, floods, and other natural disasters is on the rise as a result of climate change, |
| (ii) mass casualty events, including the 2018 Fredericton shooting and the Lac-Mégantic rail disaster, leave scars on their communities for years afterward, |
| (iii) evacuations, property loss, grief, and uncertainty resulting from emergencies have been shown to have lasting impacts on mental health, and can exacerbate mental illnesses, |
| (iv) Indigenous communities make up approximately 40% of Canadian wildfire evacuations, |
| (v) the theme of World Mental Health Day 2025 is “mental health in humanitarian emergencies”, |
| (vi) Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have introduced federal frameworks for addressing mental health following large-scale emergencies, |
| (vii) the federal government is involved in emergency management, often in collaboration with provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should work with the provinces and territories, Indigenous peoples, labour unions, and other stakeholders to develop and implement a national strategy for addressing the mental health impacts of emergencies, including natural disasters and mass casualty events. |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| — October 30, 2025 |
| M-22 — November 21, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) beekeepers are an essential part of the Canadian agriculture sector, with an estimated added annual value of $7 billion through pollination and an additional $214 million in annual honey production, |
| (ii) honey bees provide an essential ecosystem service, contributing benefits through food and feed security and enhanced biodiversity, |
| (iii) there are no honey bees native to Canada, and honey bee importation is necessary to maintain honey bee populations, |
| (iv) overwinter bee colony loss is an acute and urgent problem for beekeepers in Canada, |
| (v) currently, as a result of decisions by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), beekeepers can only import bee colonies from limited countries in the Southern Hemisphere or Europe, |
| (vi) the majority (80%) of packaged bees are imported from the Southern Hemisphere, which is not an effective or sustainable solution to repopulate Canadian hives, as these bees are of poor quality and are at the end of their life cycle when the Canadian beekeepers need them, in addition to the high cost of shipping and bee losses occurring during transportation, |
| (vii) in 2024 and 2025, beekeepers received packages from Australia and New Zealand containing Varroa mite exceeding the limits set by the CFIA, often by more than seven times, devastating the Canadian industry, |
| (viii) concern with the proximity of the Tropilaelaps mite has significantly increased the risk of importing bees from both Europe and Australia, since the Tropilaelaps mite is devastating honey bee colonies in Asia and northwest Europe and moving toward Australia and Italy, |
| (ix) currently, packaged bee importation, with the exception of queens, from the United States is banned due to outdated or incorrect concerns over pest infestations in Canadian bee populations, |
| (x) permitting honey bee package importation from the United States will result in shorter, cheaper, more environmentally friendly shipping, and California bees are in their prime following the almond pollination in February, |
| (xi) there are effective pest management products available to American honey producers which are not yet available in Canada; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) restore free trade for honey bee package imports from regional safe zones in the United States, such as Northern California, |
| (ii) instruct the CFIA to work with industry to develop a clear, consistent methodology for the assessments and ensure there is a method for a diverse range of industry professionals to provide input on measures proposed by the CFIA, |
| (iii) instruct the CFIA to work with industry (beekeepers) and review and update the National Bee Farm-Level Biosecurity Standard, |
| (iv) instruct the CFIA to work with Animal Health Canada to develop an emergency response plan for Tropilaelaps mite, |
| (v) instruct the Pest Management Regulatory Agency to improve and expedite the approval process of pest management tools to help Canadian beekeepers fight pests such as Varroa mites. |
| M-23 — December 3, 2025 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) the federal government owns three parcels of land located in Brossard—Saint-Lambert, specifically two in the Seaway Park in Saint-Lambert and one in the Leon-Gravel Park in Brossard, |
| (ii) these parcels were acquired by transfer, expropriation, or relinquishment between 1954 and 1965 as part of the construction of the St. Lawrence Seaway, |
| (iii) these parcels are currently being used as municipal parks, |
| (iv) the municipalities do not own these parcels, and thus, municipal investments are limited to the bare minimum, |
| (v) there is considerable public support to ensure these parcels remain public lands; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) call on Transport Canada (the custodian of these lands) to expedite the transfer of these parcels to the municipalities of Brossard and Saint-Lambert, |
| (ii) ensure that these parcels of land remain green spaces and that they are not used for commercial development, |
| (iii) ensure fair market value for the acquisition of these lands upon confirmation that they will remain public parks. |
| M-26 — February 25, 2026 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) there is an urgent need to improve safety of all travellers and reliability along the Trans Canada Highway 11, a critical corridor for the movement of goods, services, and people across provincial boundaries, |
| (ii) the safety and reliability of the Trans Canada Highway 11 is essential to support Canada’s economic stability, supply chain resilience, national security, and regional development; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) designate the Trans-Canada Highway 11 as a project of national interest under the Building Canada Act to complete the work started under the Trans-Canada Highway Act of 1949, |
| (ii) prioritize planning to ensure that the Trans-Canada Highway 11 can safely and efficiently accommodate current and future transportation demands, minimize delays and strengthen interprovincial connectivity and national security, |
| (iii) adopt a coordinated strategy to ensure timely and effective delivery by establishing a joint task force between Infrastructure Canada, Transport Canada, and the affected provinces to align standards, funding, and timelines, |
| (iv) implement the strategy referred to in subparagraph (b)(iii) to transform the Trans-Canada Highway 11 into a safer, more resilient, and more efficient national corridor that strengthens interprovincial trade and supports Canada’s long-term economic competitiveness. |
| M-28 — March 24, 2026 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) over 700,000 Israeli settlers live in illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, including East Jerusalem, |
| (ii) in its Advisory Opinion of July 19, 2024, the International Court of Justice concluded that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is unlawful, the State of Israel is under an obligation to bring to an end its unlawful presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory as rapidly as possible, the State of Israel is under an obligation to cease immediately all new settlement activities, and to evacuate all settlers from the Occupied Palestinian Territory, and all states are under an obligation not to recognize as legal the situation arising from the unlawful presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by the continued presence of the State of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, |
| (iii) Canada has recognized the State of Palestine in the whole of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, |
| (iv) Canada’s official foreign policy opposes illegal settlements and their expansion, including in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, |
| (v) Canada has imposed sanctions against two Israeli ministers and some individuals who have engaged directly or indirectly in violence and violent acts against Palestinian civilians and their property, |
| (vi) attacks by extremist Israeli settlers on Palestinians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem have escalated in recent months, resulting in the killing and maiming of Palestinians, destruction and theft of private property, allegations of sexual violence and torture of Palestinians, and forced displacement of Palestinians, |
| (vii) Israeli NGO Yesh Din has stated that since 2005, only 3% of investigation files opened into these crimes led to full or partial convictions, |
| (viii) senior Israeli officials have said the expansion of settlements in the West Bank are designed to “bury the idea of a Palestinian state”, |
| (ix) in 2025, the Israeli government approved and funded new illegal settlements including the E1 settlement, long considered a “red line” by the international community, |
| (x) in March 2026, Israel invaded South Lebanon and began demolishing homes, as extremist Israeli politicians advocated annexation of Lebanese territory, while UN experts and Human Rights Watch warned these acts could amount to war crimes; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) immediately impose sanctions on Israeli government officials tied to the settler movement, |
| (ii) publicly warn that any person or entity involved in Israeli settlements or their expansion will face targeted economic sanctions, |
| (iii) cancel the Canada-Israel Free Trade Agreement as it treats the Occupied Palestinian Territory as part of Israel, which amounts to a violation of relevant international law, |
| (iv) ban all forms of economic activity with illegal settlements, |
| (v) suspend all arms transfers to Israel, including through the United States. |
| M-29 — March 25, 2026 — — That a special joint committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons be appointed to conduct the reviews required by section 34 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act and section 168 of the National Security Act, 2017, and to report to each House of Parliament the results of its reviews, as required by the acts and from time to time, as it sees fit, provided that: |
| (a) the committee be composed of seven members of the Senate and 15 members of the House of Commons, including seven members of the House of Commons from the government party, seven members of the House of Commons from the Official Opposition and one member of the House of Commons from the Bloc Québécois; |
| (b) the joint chair of the committee on the part of the Senate shall be as determined by the Senate and the joint chair of the committee on the part of the House of Commons shall be a member representing the Official Opposition; |
| (c) in addition to the joint chairs, the committee shall elect such deputy chairs from the Senate as determined by the Senate and two vice-chairs from the House of Commons, of whom the first vice-chair shall be a member representing the government party and the second vice-chair shall be the member representing the Bloc Québécois; |
| (d) the House of Commons members be named by their respective whips by depositing with the Clerk of the House the lists of their members to serve on the committee within one calendar week of the House’s adoption of this motion; |
| (e) the quorum of the committee be 12 members whenever a vote, resolution or other decision is taken, so long as both Houses, including one member of the government party in the House of Commons and one from the opposition in the House of Commons, are represented, and that the joint chairs be authorized to hold meetings to receive evidence and authorize the printing thereof, whenever five members are present, so long as both Houses, including one member of the government party in the House of Commons and one member from the opposition in the House of Commons, are represented; |
| (f) changes to the membership of the committee, on the part of the House of Commons, be effective immediately after notification by the relevant whip has been filed with the Clerk of the House; |
| (g) membership substitutions, on the part of the House of Commons, be permitted, if required, in the manner provided for in Standing Order 114(2); and |
| (h) the committee have the power to: |
| (i) sit during sittings and adjournments of the House, |
| (ii) report from time to time, |
| (iii) send for persons, papers and records, |
| (iv) print such papers and evidence as may be ordered by the committee, |
| (v) retain the services of expert, professional, technical and clerical staff, including legal counsel, |
| (vi) appoint, from among its members such subcommittees as may be deemed appropriate and to delegate to such subcommittees, all or any of its powers, except the power to report to the Senate and House of Commons, |
| (vii) authorize video and audio broadcasting of any or all of its public proceedings and that they be made available to the public via the Parliament of Canada’s websites; and |
| that a message be sent to the Senate requesting Their Honours to unite with this House for the above purpose and to select, if the Senate deems advisable, members to act on the proposed special joint committee. |
| Pursuant to Standing Order 86(3), jointly seconded by: |
| — May 5, 2026 |
| M-31 — April 27, 2026 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Canada is experiencing a mental health and substance use crisis, |
| (ii) too many Canadians are unable to access mental health or substance use supports in a timely manner, |
| (iii) lack of access to community-based mental health and substance use services increases demands on hospital emergency rooms and primary care providers, |
| (iv) untreated or inadequately treated mental illness carries significant social and economic costs, |
| (v) the percentage of health care spending directed to mental health services is significantly lower in Canada compared to peer countries such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, the government should, |
| (i) adopt a target of health care spending directed to mental health, addictions and substance use health services that is at least 12% of total health care spending in Canada, |
| (ii) work with the provinces and territories to establish a plan and timeline to meet this target, |
| (iii) report to Parliament annually on progress towards achieving this target. |
| M-32 — May 4, 2026 — — That: |
| (a) the House recognize that, |
| (i) Chinese Canadians have made historical and ongoing contributions in building Canada and shaping our nation, from early labour in railway construction and mining to leadership in business, public service, and community life, |
| (ii) on June 22, 2006, the Government of Canada delivered an official apology and redress for the Chinese head tax, |
| (iii) June 22, 2026, marks the twentieth anniversary of that apology; and |
| (b) in the opinion of the House, to honour these contributions, the government should, |
| (i) designate June 22, every year, as National Chinese Canadian Contributions Day, |
| (ii) designate the month of June, every year, as Chinese Canadian Contributions Month. |