:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number eight of the Standing Committee on Science and Research. Pursuant to the motion of the House on June 18, 2025, the committee is meeting to study antimicrobial resistance.
Today’s meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.
Before we continue, I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on the cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents, and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. You will also notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.
I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses as well as all the members. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic. Please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation—floor, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.
All comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.
I would like to welcome our witnesses today. For the first panel, we are joined by Dr. Victor Leung, physician, by video conference; Dr. Allison McGeer, a professor at the department of laboratory medicine and pathobiology at the University of Toronto; and Dr. Simon Otto, an associate professor at the University of Alberta, by video conference.
Each witness will have five minutes for their opening remarks. We will start with Dr. Leung.
Go ahead, Dr. Leung. You have five minutes.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
My name is Victor Leung. I practise as an infectious diseases physician and microbiologist in Vancouver, and I've been in practice since 2011.
On a daily basis, I treat infections, and what's becoming increasingly clear is that infections that we commonly encounter in hospital are becoming resistant to antimicrobials that we have available in Canada.
As you've heard from other witnesses so far, we need urgently to examine the barriers that are preventing access to antimicrobials in the Canadian market and change that process.
When it comes to access to antimicrobials, we know that Canada, compared to other G7 countries, is falling behind. We don't have thoughtful programs that are well designed or examples that have been piloted in other G7 countries. What we need are programs that ensure patients get the drugs when they need them, at the right time, while maintaining those stewardship practices.
In Canada, when we encounter a difficult-to-treat pathogen, we often rely on Health Canada's special access program, but from my experience working with the special access program, there is excessive administrative burden and paperwork that needs to be modernized. The whole system within special access needs to be revamped so that patients can get the antimicrobials when they need them.
I think a solution that needs to be implemented has to be coordinated between the federal and provincial governments. One example would be the hub-and-spoke model that has been discussed previously. We have high-value antimicrobials available in centres, similar to how we deal with some antimicrobials for treating malaria. The federal government has to play a central role in guaranteeing that these drugs become available to the market while also having accountable systems to ensure that these antimicrobials are not overused.
In Canada, among the different provinces that are involved, there needs to be equal access because of mobility. Antimicrobial resistance will not stay local, and changes can happen rapidly. Unlike with other drugs, depending on the condition—if individuals present with sepsis or septic shock—timely access is key.
In addition to access, which is really about controlling infections, we have to do a lot more in preventing infections. Antimicrobial resistance can and needs to be prevented using the tools that we have, but this needs to be done in a different way.
Two examples that I'd like to bring up are surveillance systems in Canada for antimicrobial resistance. Although we have multiple surveillance systems throughout Canada that are used, the problem is that the information is fragmented. It's not utilizing the information that's available from all different settings to be aggregated in a way that's timely.
A perfect example of that would be for some of the infections that we have surveillance for in hospitals. If we look at the Canadian nosocomial infection surveillance program, the data reports that are provided are out of date. They're not timely and accessible and don't enable us to plan and develop programs to prevent these infections and monitor the effectiveness of these programs for accountability.
A second example for prevention is looking at how we develop processes that are innovative. In Canada, we have solutions for that. Drawing upon our success previously with controlling HIV and the treatment-as-prevention approach, we can see that when treatment as prevention is implemented as a program to address different syndemics, like homelessness, opioid use and antimicrobial resistance, that can have an impact on targeted disease elimination and health care sustainability.
We need to focus not only on control through drug access but also on prevention of antimicrobial resistance through modernizing the surveillance systems and modernizing and expanding proven Canadian interventions that have been shown to work.
Those need to be implemented more broadly for communicable diseases, and they also can be applicable to non-communicable diseases.
Thank you.
:
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to testify.
My name is Allison McGeer, and I'm an infectious disease physician and epidemiologist in Toronto.
Before I start, let me declare my conflicts of interest. My research in infection prevention and antimicrobial resistance involves a fair amount of work on vaccines. I have both research funding and personal honoraria from many of the companies that market vaccines in Canada.
I'm here today to ask you for help specifically with two areas in antimicrobial resistance. The first is the issue of what our current AMR trajectory is. As people pointed out yesterday, we've been relatively spared from the burden of AMR in Canada, in part because of the hard work of a lot of people across the One Health continuum in Canada. Nonetheless, it's very clear, as Victor has just pointed out to you, that this work is not enough. We have not greatly coordinated, but good surveillance systems across the country show that for every pathogen, AMR is increasing. We are losing ground, and AMR is accelerating. It's now harming patients.
Before the COVID pandemic, our biggest problem in Canada tended to be that you had to think a little more carefully about getting a broader-spectrum antibiotic, to make sure a patient with risk factors for resistance was covered. All of us in infectious diseases now have seen patients who have become septic because they got the wrong initial antibiotic, not because people were incompetent but because there were too many conflicting choices and you couldn't do the antibiotic choice right.
My best analogy for what's going on with AMR is what's happening with climate change. I've been watching the wildfires and heat events for the last two years, and it's clear to me that despite a lot of work on trying to mitigate climate change, it's been too little, too late. AMR is obviously a different order of magnitude, but it is exactly parallel. A decade from now, I don't want your families and mine to be watching antimicrobials fail in hospitals and be thinking the same thing, that we did too little, too late. We have a narrow window where we can take substantial, additional action on AMR that will fix things. We have evidence for lots of things that we're not doing and need to move on now.
Your first question, of course, is what we are not doing, and Victor has just pointed that out to us. Think about the COVID pandemic for a moment. We didn't get out of the COVID pandemic because we had treatment. We got out of the COVID pandemic because we have vaccines and public health information. Getting out of the AMR pandemic, and it is a pandemic, even if it's not the same as COVID, has to involve prevention. It's not to say that antibiotic access, the development of new antimicrobials and antimicrobial stewardship are not critical interventions. They are. We need them, and we need more of them, but in and of themselves, they're never going to be enough. We need to broaden our efforts to prevent infection, and we need to be looking at our federal action plan now and asking where the gaps in prevention are and what we can do to move forward on them.
There are two particularly important areas in human health that I want to touch on. I want to do it because, honestly, the veterinarians and agriculture and environmental health people are ahead of us. They've been doing better than we have been doing in human health on AMR.
The first thing I want to talk about is vaccines. We need a national vaccine strategy against AMR in the same way that we have one against pandemic pathogens, one that covers vaccine development and manufacturing within Canada but also one that ensures that we deliver publicly funded vaccines to Canadians. At the moment our vaccine delivery system across the country is badly broken. It needs to be fixed, and it needs to be fixed now. If you want to ask me a question about what the WHO thinks the benefit will be from fixing it now, I'd be happy to tell you.
The second thing I want to point out is that we also have a very significant problem with the transmission of antimicrobial-resistant organisms within our health care facilities. People have told you, and they were right, that we use more antimicrobials in animals than humans and more antimicrobials in humans in the community than in humans in hospitals, but we use our most powerful antibiotics in hospitals—we use them for our most vulnerable patients—so hospitals are a crucible for antimicrobial resistance.
Not all, but many of the pathogens that we're in increasing trouble with are pathogens where the antimicrobial resistance is arising and growing in hospitals. We have evidence from both Canadian studies and outside studies that we don't have to tolerate that, but we have not put that evidence into practice.
We urgently need a national conversation—I think it has to come nationally, despite the fact that much of what we do in hospitals is provincial—to talk about why we haven't implemented this program, whether we need to be implementing this or something different, and what we can do—
:
Good afternoon. Thank you, Madam Chair and the committee, for the opportunity to testify today.
I'm Dr. Simon Otto. I'm a practising veterinarian, an epidemiologist and a faculty member at the University of Alberta. My research focuses on “one health”, the aspect of how AMR is a one health concern and how it moves between and impacts the health of humans, animals and their environments.
I will speak to you about three key points, which echo those of my colleagues.
The first is that tackling AMR requires a holistic, one health approach that includes prevention of infections and stewardship of drug use.
Next, we cannot manage what we do not measure.
Last, resources are urgently required to tackle this silent pandemic.
I want to reinforce that while drug discovery and development are important, they will not solve the AMR problem, as Dr. McGeer has said. AMR is a natural phenomenon of microbes that is exacerbated by antimicrobial use. Mitigating AMR requires an approach that prevents infections and emphasizes antimicrobial stewardship.
Preventing infections will reduce the need to use antimicrobial drugs. We will never prevent them all, but we can reduce the transmission of infectious diseases in humans, food animals and companion animals through management strategies. Vaccinations, as we've heard, are one important strategy. They reduce the severity and transmission of disease, thereby reducing the number of infections and the need to treat them with antimicrobials.
Prevention goes beyond vaccinations. We rely heavily on water treatment, sanitation, hygiene and food safety to prevent human infections. Likewise, we rely on management strategies to prevent infections in intensively raised food animals, the companion animals that are part of our families, backyard farm animals, wildlife, and zoo and other animals.
Infections are inevitable, however. As veterinarians, we have an ethical obligation to treat infections in all animals under our care. This is where antimicrobial stewardship is pivotal: It's using these drugs in a way to minimize the selection for AMR.
Antimicrobial stewardship should be viewed as a continuous improvement strategy. AMR is inevitable, therefore there is no specific threshold of stewardship above which we can say we have done enough. Stewardship should focus on reducing unnecessary and improper use, such as in areas where we revert to drug use in the place of making management changes that could reduce infections.
This is where measurement comes in. Canada has a world-renowned AMR and antimicrobial use surveillance system that we've already heard about. However, the federal programs still have large gaps and important limitations. The Canadian integrated program for AMR surveillance relies on a relatively small number of farms and the food-animal commodities that are included in the program, which is incomplete. There's almost no animal pathogen surveillance, and there's no AMR surveillance in companion animals.
The human surveillance system that we've heard about covers hospital infections, but beyond new pilot projects, it still suffers from large gaps in community medicine, long-term care facilities and remote, northern and indigenous communities.
While food-animal production uses quantities of antimicrobials that exceed those of human medicine, we still do not have a clear picture of the true impact of animal antimicrobial use on AMR in animal or human health. It's clear that most resistance in humans comes from human use, just like most resistance in animals comes from animal use, with some limited examples of movement between them, which are important.
Put plainly, we cannot manage what we do not measure. To truly support stewardship decisions by human health care practitioners, veterinarians and food-animal producers, we must have a more comprehensive surveillance program that builds on the strong foundation we currently have.
The environment, such as water, soil and crops, is also an important area for surveillance that's lacking. It's a large but poorly understood reservoir of AMR that receives effluent of resistant microbes and drug residues from human and animal settings.
All of this points to the need for a substantial resource investment in money, expertise and infrastructure. While drug development is an important piece, so too are the investments in research to identify management strategies for animal and human health, vaccines and diagnostic testing, and for social science to understand how to effectively implement these strategies in a reluctant human population. All of these strategies must keep animal, human and environmental health in mind in a one health context. The needs of each sector will be unique but will impact one another.
We must have a comprehensive, one health strategy for Canada and the globe. The time is now as this silent pandemic pushes us toward the post-antibiotic era.
Thank you to the committee for making AMR one of your priorities and for the opportunity to discuss this today.
:
To clarify, I mentioned that our access systems need to be improved. Our surveillance systems also have room for improvement in terms of timeliness and ensuring that there's no redundancy in the surveillance systems we have.
At the hospital level, the way the antimicrobial resistance affects my colleagues in nursing, as well as physicians and other health care providers, is in how we have to practise, what things we need to change in a daily practice to minimize the chance of transmitting infections to our patients, and also through patient-to-patient transmissions within the health care facility.
Because of how health care is delivered in acute care facilities, infections that are antimicrobial-resistant or even hospital-acquired are, at some level, invisible, because one provider working with an individual doesn't have that whole continuum of interaction to see their health care journey. If a person acquires an antimicrobial-resistant infection seven days into their hospitalization, the health care providers interacting with them at the time may no longer be following them throughout their hospital journey. When a new team or new provider comes on, often it's just recorded in the chart as an infection. It's not obvious to the health care providers that this is a hospital-acquired infection.
That's why we have hospital infection prevention and control teams as one group that helps with surveillance. I'm suggesting that the surveillance data that's acquired and ascertained by the team needs to be acted upon, and there needs to be accountability within the system, not only at the local level but also captured at a provincial and a federal level so that we can increase awareness of the impact of these hospital-acquired infections on individuals and not continue to deal with them in the way we are now. From the health care provider's perspective, unless they are dealing with an acute case in which someone is dying in front of them, that sense of urgency and problems with antimicrobial resistance are often invisible.
:
The challenge with monitoring waste water for antimicrobial resistance is that antimicrobial resistance concentrates in waste water—honestly, for reasons that I don't think we understand. We looked at waste water in Toronto, for instance. In 2014, right at the beginning of seeing patients with resistant organisms that we call carbapenamase-producing organisms.... It doesn't matter what they are. They're just bad. They're called CPE. We were seeing very few patients in hospitals, but we were already seeing consistent detectable concentrations in our waste-water treatment plants. That's been seen everywhere around the world. That's a function of this real concentration in waste-water treatment plants.
Now, you could see geographic differences between where patients are coming from. In Toronto there's a very large South Asian population, and a particular type of CPE is endemic in much of South Asia, so you could see some differences. In terms of actually looking for broadly resistant, gram-negative E. coli organisms in waste water, we actually don't know how to do it. We don't know how to interpret it or how to do it well. In our last study, when we looked at organisms, we could see the same genes, but very different organisms were carrying them. The genes come from humans, through the hospital waste-water system primarily, into our general waste-water system. Then in our general waste-water system, the genes actually get transferred to other organisms whose home is waste-water systems. I think that's difficult.
The second thing about waste water, unrelated to surveillance, is that waste-water treatment plants are to reduce bacterial concentrations, but they don't preferentially reduce antimicrobial resistance. If antimicrobial-resistant organisms from hospitals go into your waste-water treatment plants, antimicrobial-resistant organisms will leave the waste-water treatment. They'll be in a much diluted form, but they'll still leave.
One of the interesting things about looking at waste-water treatment plants, which people are still working on, is that there are some waste-water treatment plants where you do seem to get some preferential reduction in antimicrobial resistance. There are others that look pretty similar, admittedly to the uninitiated, where you do get substantial reductions. I think in addition to working on our surveillance systems for waste water, which we need, we also need to be looking at whether, in waste-water treatment plants, we can have technology that will preferentially reduce antimicrobial resistance so that we're not contaminating the environment from what's happening in our hospitals.
:
I think there are three things. The first is that, yes, there's been a substantial impact, but we're still doing pretty well with vaccines. Under the Ontario vaccine program for RSV—which, you would have thought, in the middle of COVID, flu and general catastrophe, would have been really difficult and was started way too late—we vaccinated 70% of residents in long-term care facilities. That we can do that is an amazing testament to the people who work in long-term care and the families of people in long-term care. Yes, we need to be worried about vaccines, but we don't need to be panicking about the state of vaccines.
The second thing about vaccines is that, partly because they're prevention.... You know how hard it is to value prevention. I've spent my life in infection prevention, and do you know what a really good day in infection prevention is? It's a day when nothing happens. Pitching that to my CEO is really hard, so vaccines are hard, because they're part of prevention.
They're also hard because of the neuroscience, of thinking about taking risks for future benefit. A piece of this is that we will never get away from vaccine hesitancy and misinformation. It's been with us since the 1700s, when Jenner first started. It will be with us 400 years from now unless we get past vaccines in some fundamental way.
A piece of it is that we just need to keep working at it, but you're absolutely right that what we need now, particularly with what's going on south of us, is a real focus on what we can do to protect people from disinformation, in particular younger people, who don't have the faith in vaccines that we older folks have, and who also consume much more of the social media in which disinformation is spreading. It's a very significant issue that we need to focus on.
:
Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the committee.
My name is Jenna Sauve. I'm a clinical pharmacist specializing in antimicrobial stewardship. I practise in a large academic hospital in Toronto, where my work centres on optimizing antimicrobial prescribing for hospitalized patients. I have also led research on antimicrobial resistance and stewardship education in Canadian pharmacy programs and developed a curriculum framework to enhance the teaching of this content. I thank you very much for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Antimicrobials are critical tools in modern medicine, required by most Canadians at least once in their lifetime. However, rising rates of antimicrobial resistance, or AMR, threaten their effectiveness and in turn the health of Canadians. The World Health Organization has declared AMR as a silent pandemic and one of the top 10 global public health threats. Projections from the Council of Canadian Academies suggest that by 2050, nearly 14,000 deaths annually in Canada will be directly attributable to AMR, which translates to the loss of approximately 38 Canadian lives every day.
The clinical and economic impact of AMR is felt across Canada's health care system. One in four infections is now resistant to first-line antibiotics. For patients, this can mean delays in receiving effective treatment, exposure to more toxic second- and third-line therapies, and increased risk of complications or harm. For the health system, this comes with a financial burden resulting from longer hospital stays, management of drug-related side effects, and the use of more costly antibiotics of last resort.
While resistance occurs naturally, it's accelerated by the misuse and overuse of antimicrobials across the different sectors. Antimicrobial stewardship, which has coordinated efforts to promote and evaluate judicious antimicrobial use, is a key strategy in preserving the effectiveness of these drugs. While many hospitals have established antimicrobial stewardship programs, there remains a significant gap in community-based initiatives despite the fact that the majority of antibiotics are prescribed in these settings. An estimated 15% to 25% of antibiotic prescriptions in Canada are considered unnecessary. Addressing this issue requires investment in improved methods of diagnosing infection and funding for stewardship initiatives that incorporate behaviour change strategies to reduce inappropriate prescribing.
Successful stewardship initiatives also require a well-trained and empowered workforce to implement them, highlighting the need for coordinated educational curricula for health professionals and identification of AMR as a priority by accreditation and licensing bodies.
The issue of AMR in Canada is further compounded by limited access to critical antibiotics. The Auditor General's 2022 report highlighted that Canadians lacked market access to 19 of the 29 antibiotics classified by the World Health Organization as antibiotics of last resort. Furthermore, of the 13 what would be considered novel antibiotics that had become available since 2010, only two were available in the Canadian market, a number that was staggeringly low compared to other high-income countries. This lack of access results in extensive resource utilization to import these drugs from other countries and causes delays in initiating life-saving care for patients. Better incentives are required to encourage pharmaceutical companies to bring these critical antibiotics to market in Canada.
In summary, AMR is not a distant or abstract threat; it's an issue that affects all Canadians. Without the ability to reliably prevent and treat infections, life-saving treatments like major surgery, organ transplant and cancer chemotherapy become far more dangerous, if not impossible. While there is progress being made through the Public Health Agency of Canada's pan-Canadian action plan, there is still more work to be done to deliver the comprehensive and coordinated response that's needed. Funding of stewardship initiatives, particularly in community settings, along with enhanced training of health professionals in this field, will help to promote appropriate use of our currently limited arsenal of antibiotics. In addition, Canada must not just invest in the development of new antimicrobials, diagnostic tests and preventative strategies but also act now to ensure that Canadians have timely access to these new drugs and technologies once they become available.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thanks for the invitation.
I deal with AMR in animals and at the human-animal interface, ranging from the individual animal to the population, locally and globally. That's how I'm presenting some of my thoughts and comments.
Really, my theme is that it's a complex problem. I want to emphasize the complexity of the problem, the oversimplification of the problem, the lack of action-based approaches, and the need to consider animal and human health as integrated but separate issues.
You've heard about “one health”, probably repeatedly. It's a one health problem. It's good that we're talking about one health, but we have to remember that one health isn't human health and everything else. One health is human health, animal health and environmental health under a one health umbrella.
Some things are definitely one health. Many things with AMR are strictly animal health or strictly human health. Sometimes we focus too much on one health, not knowing what to do, and it's a barrier to our action, so we need to think about where we can get synergies with the one health approach but not fixate on the one health approach.
As I think Simon said, we don't know the contribution of antibiotic use in animals to antibiotic resistance in humans. It's probably a very small proportion, but if it's a very small proportion of a very big problem, it's still something we need to address, so we have to do it. At the same time, we have to remember that there's an animal health component, and we have to think about animal health, animal welfare, the economics of food production and the food security issues that come along with this.
The World Organisation for Animal Health has estimated that by 2050, if AMR is unchecked, food animal production losses will be equivalent to the food needs of 750 million to two billion people. That's a staggering number. A very small percentage of that impact would be in Canada, but a small percentage of a staggering number is still something we need to pay attention to, so we have to think about the breadth of the issue and about action. Even that doesn't show the issue as completely in animals. We have companion animals, and there are untold impacts on them. We are losing animals to resistant infections.
Just before this session, I spent time doing two emails about two pet animals with life-threatening, multidrug-resistant infections. That impacts the animals' health and welfare and has an emotional impact on their owners and family members.
We need to address AMR in humans and animals. We have to realize that the issues are different. There are a lot of similarities, but there are some massive differences.
A variety of innovation needs were stated in the standing order for this committee. Among them were drug development and surveillance, which are obviously incredibly important issues in human medicine; in veterinary medicine, not as much. I don't want new drugs for our food animals. I want to make sure we can keep using the drugs we have. I have a limited need for new drugs dealing with companion animals, and I want to use them as little as possible.
We have diagnostic testing needs, yes, but all those are too late—we're addressing the end result. We can't address the AMR problem by addressing AMR. We have to address the impact of AMR, but we have to address why we have AMR, and that's because we have antimicrobial use. Why do we have that? It's because we have health problems, or perceptions of health problems. We need to address AMR itself, but we have to address the underlying causes; otherwise, we're trying to keep up with a problem that's much more nimble than we are.
I think that nicely describes antimicrobial resistance.
For animal health, we need innovation, but that's not necessarily new drugs, new tech, new technology, new toys. It's innovation that targets health, better animal management, better nutrition, better vaccines, better access to vaccines and alternatives, better ways to raise animals, better access to veterinary care, changing human behaviour—which is very difficult to do—and getting social science involved. We need things that will improve animal health and human health.
These aren't often considered innovation, though, especially when you're trying to get funding or attention. Raising animals better, making their lives better, rearing them better, and providing better access to care don't come across as innovation very often. It's not tech. It's not toys. It's not sexy, but it's the foundation, and it's what we need to do.
Dr. Otto directly addressed this too—surveillance. We need better information. We need actionable information. Surveillance itself tells us what the problem is, but it has to direct us to a solution. If we have very crude, very patchwork surveillance programs, we don't have the action step. That's probably part of the issue right now. We have surveillance at a very high level in animals, but it doesn't direct what we do. Crude numbers are good for sound bites, but they're not good for action.
We have multisectoral interest, motivation and a foundation for better action or surveillance, but we need sustained funding and, to be honest, the political will to come along with that.
We need to—and we can—markedly improve antibiotic use in animals. We know we need to do that, but we also have to recognize there's a role for them in care. As a veterinarian, my obligation is to take care of animals. Part of that is using antimicrobials. A lot of that is making sure they don't need them.
We have to accept that we're going to use the antimicrobials, but we don't have to accept the status quo, which is using them unnecessarily and not addressing health. Use as little as possible but as much as needed, really, is the approach that we have to think about.
My final point, if I have another 30 seconds, is that it's complicated. This is not something we can solve with a simple, single solution or a single sector. It's everyone doing little things. We need support for sustained and aspirational action. We can't do it with little piecework activities.
The other issue is that this is something that has to be done spanning decades and generations. It doesn't span granting cycles for an agency. It doesn't span election cycles—single cycles. This is something we have to be gearing up for decades, and we don't do that very well. We don't aspirationally plan efforts that are going to impact for years upon years, even though that's what we need to do.
Canada has had a very strong brand with AMR internationally, and that's been slipping. We still have very strong people.
:
It's concerning. It's great that you brought up the lack of funding. This report has been collecting dust over the years, and the lack of action is quite disappointing.
I mean, there's only a little over $1 billion of health research funding, which is quite precious if you think of all the vanity projects that the Liberal government has undertaken. We spend well over $60 billion just to service the debt. If you think about it, there's just a bit over $1 billion for health research, while they used research funding for things like we discussed last week. They spent $75,000 to study German children's books. That's research money that's going into that, not even...and that's taken from the funding.
I want to go back to a committee member from the last session, on Monday. We were talking about AMR. Apparently, he alleges, there's a rhetoric, a skepticism, I suppose—I'm paraphrasing—about countries working together. Apparently, there's this rhetoric that they don't want their work being involved in cross-border research and, apparently, “being ready for pandemics is a terrible thing”. I'm quoting here. Apparently that is leading, according to him, to a lack of urgency and trust in science and trust in medicine.
I took some time to think about those comments that were made on Monday, and then I realized that in May 2019, under the Liberal government's watch, the Global Public Health Intelligence Network, the GPHIN—essentially a Canadian federal government agency whose job was to operate as a medical Amber alert system to gather intelligence and spot pandemics, and some of the witnesses here have described this as a “silent pandemic”—saw its resources completely redirected to other causes, which hindered our ability to be prepared for the pandemic. You saw all the chaos that ensued from the federal government's lack of preparedness and lack of action.
Does that concern you that funding is being cut? This government has announced funding cuts of 15% to the public sector. They're redirecting resources for surveillance for pandemics.
Dr. Weese, why don't you start with that? Does that concern you?
:
The standardized approach would be using successes like Quebec's as an aspiration for the rest of the country and not trying to bring everyone back to the middle. Quebec has taken the lead in those areas, as you know.
There are differences in different livestock sectors across the country, so you can't automatically replicate Quebec, but you can use that as a demonstration that, yes, you can do this in many situations if you do everything else right. I think that's the key, as it's such a broad problem.
We can use this, if there's national coordination and national motivation, as an example of where we can try to get the rest of the country to. The problem, as mentioned earlier and as you know, is that veterinary medicine, drug access and health are provincial, so it's difficult for the federal government to mandate something. However, the federal government can provide support so we can get the national networks together to use successes, Quebec being one: This is done here, so how do we get everyone else to do that?
Part of it needs to be better communication and collaboration with industry, too. This comes back to hesitancy about vaccinations, and it comes back to working with farmers. You need trust, and you need a two-way information exchange. You can't go to a farm and say, “You're going to do this because they do it in Quebec.” That probably won't go over very well. If we build trust and infrastructure and we bring in support mechanisms to let them improve their practices, that's how to do it.
That's why it's not just a matter of saying, “Here are Quebec's approaches; we need to do this everywhere else.” We need to build the foundation so that can be done and build the communication, obviously using the success in Quebec as the starting point.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.
Dr. Sauve, you said in your opening remarks that one in four infections is now resistant, and you spoke about the financial burden that places on our health care system.
We heard on Monday from Dr. Castonguay, who mentioned it cost the provincial health care systems between, I think, $1.4 billion and $1.8 billion in 2018, and this could grow to $21 billion by 2050. When you see those types of numbers, it leads to the question of how one tackles that. Just think that in the province of Ontario, they're spending $80 billion on health care, and it's projected to grow to $100 billion. Right now, the federal government is spending only $52 billion on health care for the entire country, and it's projected to spend $68 billion just on servicing our debt.
That's not money going to health care or health care research. That's not money going to the provinces so they can get additional spaces to train doctors and nurses. Even as part of the tri-council agencies, the Canadian Institutes of Health Research spends only about $1.2 billion, and now the government is asking its departments and agencies to please find efficiencies and savings of about 15% over the next three years.
In terms of how that is going to impact the health care system, does that not concern you? In a hospital setting, what do you think the impact is?
The work I have been doing is on developing a curriculum framework for pharmacy programs across Canada in order to enhance their education on antimicrobial resistance and antimicrobial stewardship, so that our next generation of pharmacists are not only aware of this issue but also have the skills and the knowledge they need to be able to impart change.
What we really know is that those of us practising in this field can't do this alone. It can't be only infectious disease specialists or pharmacists who specialize in this field. We need all health care providers to be engaged and to be working on these in their respective areas.
There is a lot of opportunity to take some of the competencies for graduating students that we've developed in the pharmacy curriculum. I know other professions have been working on this as well. It may need some minor tweaking to be able to expand these more broadly to pharmacists who are currently practising and to target education and training initiatives for practising pharmacists or other practitioners.
We also need to think about this in terms of many of the health care professionals who are trained in other countries around the world and choose to come to work in Canada. Their education in other countries on AMR or the landscape of AMR and on antimicrobial prescribing may be very different from that education here, so we also need some targeted interventions and some work with accreditation and licensing bodies to make sure that when these professionals come to work in Canada, they do have the training and support they need to contribute to this effort for antimicrobial stewardship and against resistance here.
There are a lot of opportunities there. I will say one thing that could be useful in long-term care and in the community, where stewardship has traditionally been lagging behind for pharmacies. My role as a stewardship pharmacist is almost exclusively in hospitals at the present time. If we want to have health care providers engaging in these other areas, like long-term care and the community, we do need some leaders to be in those spaces to help with training and education. Currently, we just don't have those positions that exist.
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It's difficult, and that's one of the challenges. It varies across sectors.
As we have improvements in technology and more computerization of every system on farms and in veterinary clinics, it becomes possible, or at least more possible, with support. We need, again, to look at the big picture.
Similar challenges are there in the human field: in communities, in dentistry and in everything else. We need to look at.... This is one where the one health approach—let's try to do something that can address all of the problems—would make sense as opposed to a siloed activity. That said, we have a lot of things that are different among farms, pets and different sectors.
We need to get better data, and there's not one way to do it. We get pharmaceutical-level data for animals right now, but that's largely at the tonnage level, which doesn't, frankly, tell us a lot. It gives a sound-bite number. It doesn't guide us in action, and it doesn't let us monitor response.
We have to figure out ways that we can get individual animal-level data or farm-level data. Part of that ties into the previous questions about improving trust.