PROC Committee Meeting

     I call this meeting to order.

    Welcome to meeting number 38 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.

     Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3), the committee is meeting for its update on the implementation of the foreign influence transparency registry.

    Today's meeting is taking place in public in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. Members are attending in person in the room and remotely using the Zoom application.

    Before I continue, I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, especially our interpreters.

     I'd like to remind the witness—although you are a frequent flyer here—that committee members may ask questions in either English or French. If you need interpretation, please take a moment to prepare your earpiece and select the listening channel you need in advance, in order to take full advantage of the time allotted for questions and answers.

    I have a few comments for the benefit of members.

    I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” feature. The clerk and I will manage in this regard.

    Before we go to today's witness.... There was a supplementary budget request sent out.

    Is there any opposition to that? Is it agreed to?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: Okay.

    I'd like to welcome our witness for today's meeting.

    From the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, we have Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère, assistant deputy minister, national and cybersecurity branch.

    You have five minutes to deliver your opening remarks.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act received royal assent in June 2024. It establishes an independent commissioner, their office and a public registry of foreign influence activities. It's designed to strengthen transparency and protect Canada's democratic institutions from malign foreign influence.

    Under the FITAA framework, individuals or entities entering into an arrangement with foreign principals and undertaking activities intended to influence governmental or political processes at any level of government in Canada will be required to register these activities.

     In order for the act to be brought into force, three items must be ready. The commissioner must be appointed and their office established. The regulations to support the implementation of the act must be in place. The IT components—notably, the registration form and the public registry, must be ready. We have made significant progress on all three components.

    Anton Boegman has been selected as the commissioner-in-waiting. Mr. Boegman brings deep knowledge of electoral principles, legislation and operations from his time as the chief electoral officer of British Columbia from 2018 to 2025, and through senior roles at Elections BC.

    While Mr. Boegman has been selected by Parliament, he cannot be formally appointed until the act comes into force. In the interim, he works as an executive adviser. We're working with him on operational readiness activities to support a smooth stand-up of the office once the regime comes into force. Public Safety is supporting the staffing of the office in consultation with the commissioner-in-waiting. All essential positions required to support the coming into force of the act have been staffed, or staffing is near completion, and staff training is in full swing to support operational readiness.

    The regulations necessary to implement the regime are being finalized. The proposed regulations were published in the Canada Gazette, part I, in January. We received a lot of feedback that is informing our revisions to these regulations. Comments on the proposed regulations were published in the Canada Gazette for public review in April. The regulations will specify what information is collected and published, how an administrative monetary penalties regime will work and the information-sharing authorities, among other things.

    We've received 154 individual comments on the proposed regulations. A repeated concern was the original lower range of the AMP regime, which was set at $50. That was deemed to be too low. We've received feedback that even the upper limit of the penalty range, set at $1 million, is not a strong enough deterrent for wealthy entities. We've also received feedback that the regulations proposed collect too much information via the registration.

    I note that a lot of the comments did not pertain to the regulations but rather sought clarity on the purpose of the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, as well as key terms. For instance, several commentators wanted clarity on what constitutes an arrangement with a foreign principal. This feedback is informing revisions to the regulations as well as the reference documents that will be made public.

    The development of the IT infrastructure and website are well under way. We are in the process of completing the work to support the registration and the registry as such. We are also finalizing communications materials. In addition, we are engaging stakeholders to raise public awareness of the upcoming registry and registration obligations.

     In simple terms, we are extremely close to the finish line. The final steps for establishing the regime will be publication of the final regulations in the Canada Gazette, part II, an order in council to bring the FITAA into force and the order in council to appoint the commissioner formally. However, the committee will understand that I'm not in the position to provide specific timelines for these decisions, as they remain cabinet confidence.

    Thank you.

    Thank you so much.

    We'll now go to questions and comments.

    We'll start with Mr. Cooper for six minutes, please.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you to the assistant deputy minister.

    You noted that a commissioner, Anton Boegman, has been named, but his appointment has not taken effect to date. Before Mr. Boegman's appointment can take effect, that would require an order in council by the cabinet, and that order in council has not been issued. Is that correct?

     That is correct.

    The regulations setting out how the registry will operate have not been finalized. Have they...?

    Not yet.

    A secure IT solution to support the registry is a core part of the effective operation and administration of the registry. Is that fair?

    It is.

     The secure IT solution is not yet up and running. Is that correct?

     It's almost done.

     It's not done, though. No permanent staff for the registry have been hired to date. Is that correct?

     No, most of the staff have been hired.

     When you say most of the staff, what does that look like?

     There are going to be a number of functions within the office. There are going to be the individuals administering the enforcement regime. They are individuals who will be receiving the registration, doing the analysis, getting in contact with registrants and posting. We have the legal counsel, so most of the positions for operational readiness have been staffed.

    How many staff have been hired?

     I think it's close to 20.

    How many positions need to be filled?

    Overall, at steady state, we'll probably get to about 27. For operational readiness, 20 were deemed as a first step because it's going to be an incremental position—

     Thank you for that.

    I know you indicated at the end of your testimony that you can't provide a specific timeline, but can you give us a ballpark as to when the registry will be up and running? You appeared before this committee in December; your testimony then sounded a lot like your testimony today, and we still don't have a registry in place. Do you have a ballpark?

    The only thing I can say is that we're very close to the finish line.

     It's been two years since Bill C-70 was passed, which was in June 2024. That would have established the registry. The Liberals promised that it would be up and running in June 2025. Then it was December 2025. Then it was the spring. Now it's almost the summer, and we still don't have a registry in place. There has been no timeline and no transparency from the minister as to when that is going to happen.

    How often are you in contact with the Minister of Public Safety regarding setting up the registry?

     We brief the minister's office on a weekly basis.

     What was your last communication with the minister?

     I can't recall. We mainly brief the minister's office.

     What about the minister?

    I spoke to the minister yesterday, socially, but we discussed—

    On this matter....

    On this issue.... I can't remember exactly.

     You can't remember.

    No.

    Is it not often?

     Well, it's mostly with the minister's office that transactions are made.

    Who in the minister's office...?

     Details of that transaction... It is the chief of staff, key personnel.

    With respect to the status of regulations, the consultation process ended in February.

     Is the commissioner-in-waiting, Mr. Boegman, involved in the work towards finalizing those regulations?

     The main function of Mr. Boegman at this point is to help with the overall operational readiness of the office, because Mr. Boegman used to run a fairly large office that had, I would say, like functions in B.C. We're working with him on staffing issues, operational procedures and guidance documents, as well as on all matters relating to the operationalization of the office.

    Is he involved in the hiring of staff? Is that within his function?

     Well, he is not.... The department is, but we're supported by him in the vetting of personnel and allowing.... He's involved in the decision-making and providing advice on staffing.

     You can't provide a ballpark with respect to when the registry will be up and running, but it's been four months since the consultation period ended with respect to regulations. Can you provide a timeline for when we can expect those to be finalized?

    We received extensive comments on the regulations, and this required us to revise certain substantial portions of the regulations. That process takes time. We're close to the finish line—very close, as a matter of fact. It takes time to do it right and have the proper consultations.

    What does close mean? Is it two weeks, a month, six months, a year? It's been two years.

    Sorry, I'm not in a position to provide specific timelines, as you would understand. What I can say is that such regimes in other countries took over two years to implement, so by international standards, we're—

    You're right at six minutes, Mr. Cooper.

    We'll go to Mr. Jeneroux, please.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    To the witness, thank you for being here today.

    In a similar vein of questions in terms of the timeline. I heard you mention a number of things that are waiting: a website; public awareness; Canada Gazette, part II; and two orders in council.

    Now that the commissioner-in-waiting.... Could you elaborate on some of the other work that's under way so we get a bit of a cleaner timeline of what's required?

    The regime is constructed in such a way that for the regime to be operational and the law to be in force, we need to have essentially a functioning office. We need proper regulations. We need an IT system to intake the information from the public, which wants the registration. We need a public registry, and we need a website with information and educational material. We need a full office that is able to enforce the act. We need proper protocols and procedures. Internally, we need the full staffing complement.

    We basically need to create the full regime beforehand and have the commissioner in place as approved by Parliament. This process was done three months ago. All this needs to be in place before we can have the law come into force and then the commissioner be formally appointed once the law comes into force.

    How much of this is happening right now behind the scenes? The timeline is something you can't speak about in terms of specifics, but do we have a comfort level that the website, the staffing and the IT are being worked on?

    Oh, it's beyond being worked on. I'm saying that we are in the very last miles of completion. It's more details. The website is already ready to go. Everything is set up in its final.... We're really in the very last miles on all elements.

     Sure. I appreciate that.

    A question period note dated June 9, 2025, states that establishing an independent office takes time and that allies like Australia and the United Kingdom took over two years to implement their systems. By your judgment, is it a similar timeline that you're working with?

     Exactly. Similar offices in like countries took over two years to implement. I think this is a reasonable time to create a new regulatory regime, especially something as sensitive as this one. It needs to be done right. There are complexities to doing it. We are within these reasonable timelines for implementation.

    Did you connect with Australia and the United Kingdom when doing it?

     We did so extensively, yes. First, before we drafted the legislation, we engaged quite significantly with the U.S., with the U.K. and with Australia, learning from their experience. We learned valuable insights. Once the legislation was in place, we had follow-up conversations to talk about operationalization, regulations and other similar items of that nature.

    What were some of the learnings from there that might be helpful in terms of setting up?

     Some of the key lessons were around the credibility of enforcement relating to the regime. One key lesson was the obligation to have a broader range of compliance mechanisms so that the commissioner would have more flexibility and proportionality in responding to different kinds of situations rather than having just one blunt instrument. That's how the regime was designed.

     We also had many conversations on the nature of exemptions and what this means, as well as on the necessity to do good outreach and give information to the public before we go live.

    Can we assume, then, that at the end of the day our system will be very similar to that of other G7 or Five Eyes alliance countries, such as Australia and the United Kingdom?

     It will be similar in its essence. By this I mean that the purpose of the regime will be to create transparency in public affairs and to counter malign foreign influence. There will be some differences. For example, in Canada we'll have an independent commissioner. In the U.S., U.K. and Australia, they report to government officials. There are certain differences such as this that adapt to the realities of how the lobbying regimes in these countries are established, but in essence we're talking about similar regimes.

    Presumably, they'd be similar based just on specific elements within our country versus the other countries.

     Mr. Chair, I'm essentially done. Thanks.

     Thank you so much.

    Mr. Barsalou‑Duval, you have the floor for six minutes.

    Welcome to the committee.

    Thank you to the members of the committee for having me.

    Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère, thank you for taking part in the committee meeting today.

    If I'm not mistaken, the committee had invited Commissioner Boegman and Minister Anandasangaree to appear today. Unfortunately, it's just you. I am not downplaying your importance as a person. However, generally speaking, it's not the role of a deputy minister to speak publicly on behalf of the government. Rather, you're there to provide policy advice.

    Do you feel that appearing by yourself is a bit like being thrown to the wolves?

    No, not at all. I'm sorry to disappoint you, but I am the person responsible for the implementation of the regime. Therefore, I'm the right person to be here today.

    You don't disappoint me. It's obviously the absence of the other two people that disappoints me. They may have very good reasons; that's up to them. However, it's still very disappointing because this is an important topic, I think, and we would have hoped to hear from all the people who make the decisions or who will hold positions so that they could answer questions.

    Is it customary for Minister Anandasangaree, who was summoned, to be absent and replaced by a deputy minister? In any of the committees I've sat on in the past, I've never seen ministers not show up and send staff instead. I'm wondering if, in his case, this is the norm or if it's actually an exception today.

    I wouldn't be able to tell you if it's the norm, but it's not the first time I've seen it. It's not abnormal.

    Okay.

    Is there any indication that the Minister of Public Safety may appear on another date? Were proposals made for the minister to appear before the committee? You may have more information than I do.

    I really don't know. I'm sorry, but I don't have that information.

    Okay.

    You'll understand that, if the minister hasn't made a proposal, it almost seems like a refusal to appear. That's why I asked whether he had proposed other dates. Since you have a closer connection with him than he has with us, I thought you might be able to tell us whether that is the case or not.

    No, I'm really not in a position to answer your question. Perhaps you could refer to the chair of the committee.

    Okay.

    I would like to talk about Commissioner Boegman's absence. I understood that he had been appointed by the government but had not yet taken office. Would it be necessary for him to take office in order to be at the table today, or is it not necessarily connected?

    The Countering Foreign Interference Act provided that the appointment of the commissioner had to be subject to consultation with the opposition parties, which was done, and also that it had to be the subject of a resolution in the House of Commons and the Senate, which was done.

    The commissioner is a commissioner in waiting. However, until the act comes into force, there is no enabling legislation to create his position. In the meantime, Mr. Boegman is a senior adviser to the department. He has already appeared as part of the resolution process—

    Okay. Then nothing would prevent him from appearing.

    Nothing is preventing him.

    Do we know if any appearance dates have been provided or proposed to the committee?

    Perhaps you should refer to the chair of the committee. Mr. Boegman had good reasons not to be here today.

     I'm not involved in the question and answer portion. If you can't answer, you can't answer.

    It's just that I find it odd that we're conducting a study where we don't have the main stakeholders around the table, Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère. I don't mean to downplay your importance, but I think it's a bit of a waste of the committee's time today.

    I might have a question for you. It has been noted that the act that puts in place the commissioner to oversee the registry to monitor foreign agents received royal assent on June 20, 2024. That is very close to two years ago. Why is it that, two years later, it's still not in place?

    As I said, similar regimes in allied countries took over two years to implement.

    We're not outside the standards for implementing this kind of regime, which is complex. It's a new regulatory entity. Therefore, implementing it is complex. We are still making good progress. There is no significant delay and we are very close to the finish line. In my opinion, the implementation should be completely consistent with international standards.

    If I understand correctly, a commissioner has been appointed, but he isn't in office. You were telling me that he currently plays an advisory role with the government. Therefore, he is active.

    You also mentioned that you had recruited 20 or so people who will subsequently take up their duties. What is the role of these 20 people when, if I understand correctly, the system is still not in operation and the act is still not in force?

    Those 20 people are floating around a bit. How are people recruited when no one knows when they will start working? If I were an employee of a company that said it was hiring me but didn't know when I was going to start, I would be asking myself some questions. How is that managed?

     There's time for a very quick answer, please.

    I need to clarify some things. These people are full-time employees and work on the implementation of the regime. They're not waiting for anything.

    We have a group called the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner's Office, or FITCO. These people create the regulations and implement the administrative processes and protocols. They are in the process of setting up the office itself. They are working full time to operationalize the regime. What will change is that, once the act is implemented, they will fall under the authority of a commissioner and—

     I'll have to cut it off there. We're well over time.

    Monsieur Barsalou-Duval, I know you're subbing in for Madame Normandin, but Minister Anandasangaree was here before this committee back in February. It was on the study of foreign interference, but that's just to give you that context.

    We'll now go to Mr. Van Popta for five minutes, please.

    Thank you, Chair.

    Thank you, Mr. Assistant Deputy Minister, for being here with us.

    I too am disappointed that the minister couldn't be here, and likewise Mr. Boegman.

    That said, you are more than welcome at our committee. Thank you for taking our questions.

    I too will lodge my concern about the apparent delays in getting this foreign influence transparency registry set up. Mr. Jeneroux noted in an earlier line of questions that it's been two years. You've said, and we've read elsewhere, that two years isn't unusual, but I would point out that it is two years and we're still not set up.

    The concerns around delays go back further than that. I'm reading from the report of Justice Hogue from the Hogue commission, which she submitted about a year and a half ago. She'd been working on it for several years. This is on page 4 of her report. She noted that, “trust in Canada's democratic institutions has been shaken, and it is imperative to restore it.” I'm sure you agree with that. The government agreed with it at the time.

    Our concern isn't whether the government is concerned but whether the government is acting swiftly enough.

    I say that in the context of something else that the commissioner noted. I'm reading at the bottom of page 3 of her report:

    She goes on, at the top of page 4:

     She goes on to say:

    At a third bullet she states:

    This is what Justice Hogue said a year and a half ago. She was reflecting on evidence that she had received over the previous two years.

    This has been going on for at least four years. You can see why there's a concern among some parliamentarians that there appear to be further delays.

    What can you tell us and what can you tell Canadians to assure us that the government is not only taking this seriously but is also acting on it as promptly as is reasonably possible?

    There is a broader set of efforts that have been made to improve Canada's response to foreign interference, whether it is the sharing of intelligence or how we're structured internally. Different mechanisms in the new legislation of Bill C-70 have been put in place.

    The FITAA is one element in a broader ecosystem of measures that have been implemented to improve our response.

    What I can say is that FITAA is a new regulatory regime that needs to be constructed. We worked as fast as we could. We are very close to the finish line. The implementation will be done, from my perspective, within international norms in terms of the speed of delivery.

    It also needs to be done carefully. The commissioner will have powers that have an impact on privacy and public life, so it needs to be established in a proper setting. We need to do it with proper consultation, reasonable efforts and due diligence in doing so.

    I don't think we are late or delayed in any step by any means.

     Thank you.

     Canada is not the first country to set up a foreign influence transparency registry.

     What lessons have you and your department learned from Australia and the United Kingdom—there may be others, but those two in particular—who are close allies of ours with similar legal structures and similar political structures? What lessons have we learned from them that could have sped things up a bit for us?

    That's a tough question, but give a very brief answer. We are over time.

     Similar to my response to Mr. Jeneroux, we've learned quite a lot. I think it was helpful in shaping the legislation itself.

    Things that we've learned include the credibility of enforcement measures; flexibility in the compliance regime so that you have many tools at your disposal to be proportional and flexible; the necessity of doing a lot of outreach to educate the non-Canadians; and shaping what type of exemptions we have done.

    It was really helpful in doing the right thing from the get-go. It doesn't take away the necessity of doing due diligence as we construct and implement the regime in Canada.

     We're well over time. I'm going to have to cut you off. My apologies.

    We'll go to Ms. Fancy, please, for five minutes.

     Thank you very much.

    I would like to welcome the assistant deputy minister.

    I'd like to follow this line of questioning from a different slant.

    As a former educator who's done a lot of policy development and program development, I'm looking at a lot of what we've done here with the registry in preparation for today. There's a thing on the education side of programs and policy development called backwards design, where you look at your co-created criteria with goals. What's our goal? How do we assess those goals? What are those regulations, or, in this case, the registry, as we call it, the lesson plan? What's the plan? Then you roll back to how to staff for that plan, how to create those regulations and how to follow the policy. In this case, our first step was appointing that commissioner.

    Based on where we are and what I'd call the backwards design plan, we Canadians want confidence that decisions affecting our communities are being made openly in Canada's interest. As this registry is implemented, how do you measure success? What are those indicators that will demonstrate we're improving transparency and public trust in our democratic institutions?

    That's a big question.

    The key element of this regime is transparency in public affairs. It's not a regime of prohibition; it's a regime of transparency. Influence is a natural component of democratic life. What's problematic is when certain individuals conduct influence activities on behalf of foreign states and they fail to say that they are working for a foreign entity. It's to bring transparency to public affairs.

    The key measure of success would be the capacity to highlight the transparency of these arrangements with foreign powers. Another key success would be that the public is really clear about what the obligations are to register and that there's minimal confusion around the regulatory obligations and the system is easy to use. Then, though I do not wish it, one measure of success would be the capacity of the regime to identify individuals who do not wish to be compliant and make sure that adequate measures are taken against these entities.

     Thank you very much. I appreciate that answer.

    Now I'd like to look at this through a community lens. I am from a riding that's quite rural and a coastal community. We rely heavily on things like agriculture, fisheries, aquaculture, natural resources and transportation.

    How will this registry help deter foreign interference in targeted sectors like those in my riding?

    The law creates an obligation to register for influence activities, informing public decisions and public policy decisions at all levels of government.

    That means when entities in Canada are doing influence work on behalf of foreign powers, there's transparency around these arrangements and these links so that there's more clarity for the individuals, whether it's the civil servants, the politicians or any sort of public officials, and understanding about who is really speaking on this issue. There is more clarity, more transparency and more information available for decision-makers at all levels. That includes your constituents and individuals who are making decisions around economic investments or just policy-making in general.

    I think I have time for one last question.

    As a former educator, I know that transparency is only effective if people understand it. What public education efforts are being planned to help Canadians distinguish legitimate advocacy from foreign interference activities that should be disclosed? Has that been part of the backwards design program plan?

    Yes, but to be clear, all arrangements with a foreign power to conduct influence activities need to be registered, so even arrangements from a national security perspective would not be considered as problematic. The idea is that all arrangements with foreign powers for influence activities need to be registered.

    In that sense, it creates a level playing field in terms of transparency. It also creates a deterrent against malign influence, and for those who do not wish to be compliant, there's going to be consequences. It creates the capacity for the state to intervene.

     Thank you so much.

    Mr. Barsalou‑Duval, you have the floor for two and a half minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère, a number of the cases of foreign influence that have been discussed publicly seem to come from India and China. It even seems that the Chinese Communist Party has developed an argument that creating a foreign agent registry would be an attack on the Chinese community in Canada.

    Prior to a recent visit to China, the Canadian government recalled Liberal MPs who were visiting Taiwan. We see that Chinese influence seems to be taken into account in government actions. We also see that there is a long delay before the registry will be put in place. To what extent do activities or pressures from China have an impact on your activities?

    First, I don't necessarily agree with your premise that there are long delays. The time frame for implementing the regime is in line with international standards.

    Second, I can assure you that there is no influence by the Chinese government in the implementation of the regime. We're talking about implementing a regulatory regime with a new commissioner—

    I'm glad to hear that. It reassures me. I didn't assume anything like that, but it still makes people wonder when the government seems to comply quite often with China's threats.

     I personally find that worrisome. I feel that our national security should take precedence over our desire to develop ties with dictatorships around the world. That doesn't mean we shouldn't have a dialogue with them.

    That leads me to my next question for you.

    It seems that in Australia, issues have been raised about the effectiveness of the regime that was put in place. It's as if they were just catching people who registered, meaning people who were clearly foreign agents, such as ambassadors and consular staff, who were pretty much already known to be agents.

    How, then, do we ensure that people register proactively and sufficiently, given the flaws and weaknesses we have seen abroad? Also, how are we going to catch people who won't comply in the future?

    I don't want to comment on the regime of my Australian colleagues. That would be inappropriate on my part. However, they clearly indicated the lessons they learned from the implementation of their regime, which dates back to 2018 and predates ours by a few years. They were kind of pioneers in this area.

    We took those lessons into account to create our own regime and the powers of the compliance measures. What's also important is that we are setting up information-sharing relationships with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and other security agencies.

    That way, the information gathered by the commissioner can be shared, under certain conditions, with security agencies. The sharing will go the other way as well. Cases of non-compliance sometimes stem from information provided by intelligence and security agencies, which is a huge benefit.

    As you say, cases of non-compliance will definitely be quite hard to find, but we can count on the support of Canada's security and intelligence agencies.

     Thank you so much.

    Thank you, Monsieur Barsalou-Duval.

    I gave the Bloc an extra minute, so I will give an extra minute to the Conservatives and the Liberals.

    Mr. Cooper, you have six minutes.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mark Carney's so-called strategic partnership with the Beijing dictatorship includes an agreement on law enforcement between the RCMP and Beijing's Ministry of Public Security.

    This agreement has set off alarm bells, particularly amongst diaspora communities, given that the Beijing regime does not respect the rule of law and uses law enforcement as a tool of the state to advance the interests of the Chinese Communist Party. It has an atrocious human rights record and is the most active perpetrator of foreign interference in Canada. Indeed, this law enforcement co-operation agreement is with the very Beijing ministry that has been responsible for operating illegal police stations on Canadian soil.

    Given these very serious concerns, why has the Carney government kept this law enforcement agreement secret?

     I have no specific insights on the matter.

     You are the national counter foreign interference coordinator. This is a big enough issue that it clearly falls, in broad terms, within your purview and areas of responsibility.

    I would note that 10 Hong Kong diaspora organizations have sent an open letter to Mark Carney expressing deep fear and anxiety about this agreement. In essence, they are concerned that Beijing will use this agreement to target political opponents of the regime in Canada under the guise of law enforcement.

    What assurances are there? What safeguards are in place to ensure that won't happen and to ensure that the sharing of information on Canadian citizens and PRs will not be passed on to the Beijing dictatorship?

    Canada's position on transnational repression, the protection of people in Canada and national security has not changed at all. We will continue to defend the rights of Canadians to express their views and opinions and to be protected against transnational repression.

     I asked you what measures and safeguards are in place under the agreement.

     I'm not in a position to discuss the agreement.

     Are there any measures or safeguards in place to ensure that the agreement does not in any way facilitate the Beijing regime and their well-documented and extensive transnational repression activities in Canada?

     I'm not in a position to comment on the agreement itself. It's not in my purview.

    What I can say is that nothing has changed in regard to Canada's position in terms of protecting people in Canada against transnational repression, and that—

    We know that the Beijing regime operates illegal police stations to harass and intimidate Chinese Canadians, including even forced repatriation.

    According to a recent report of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, Chinese police have gone so far as to pay agents to locate and track Canadians critical of the Beijing dictatorship. This is happening in Canada, and you can't identify any safeguards with respect to this law enforcement co-operation agreement with a regime that the Prime Minister only a year ago quite correctly called Canada's biggest security threat.

    Beijing violated a previous MOU between the Canadian government and Beijing on law enforcement co-operation. That included coercing 25 Canadians to return to the PRC as part of Operation Fox Hunt.

    Given Beijing's track record, on what basis should Canadians have any confidence that Beijing will not abuse this latest law enforcement co-operation agreement?

     As I said, nothing has changed in terms of Canada's position and stance towards protecting Canadians against transnational repression.

     Something has changed. A secret law enforcement agreement has been entered into with Beijing's Ministry of Public Security, which is the very same ministry responsible for transnational repression activities and operating illegal police stations in Canada. That agreement has been kept hidden from Canadians, so yes, something has changed. Something big has changed.

     I have no specific insights to provide.

    Why is there this lack of transparency?

     It's not within my purview to respond to this.

    We all know the reason for the lack of transparency. The Beijing dictatorship told the Prime Minister not to make the agreement public. Isn't that right?

     I have no specific insights on this matter.

     Mr. Chair, given the extensive track record of the Beijing regime to engage in foreign interference and transnational repression activities, it's completely unacceptable that we see this lack of transparency. On top of that, two years after a foreign influence registry received royal assent, we don't have a commissioner in place, don't have regulations in place, don't have an office fully open, don't have staff fully hired, and we have no timeline for when it is going to be up and running.

    What we see time and again from these Liberals is that they simply don't take foreign interference seriously, particularly when it emanates from the Beijing dictatorship, with which the Prime Minister has so proudly heralded Canada's having a new strategic partnership—

    I'm going to have to cut you off, Mr. Cooper. We're over six minutes.

    We will turn to Madam Brière.

    You have the floor for six minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Aubertin‑Giguère, thank you for being with us today.

    Since we've talked about a lot of timeline-related issues, I'd like to ask you a first question about exemptions.

    The Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act has a limited number of exemptions, but it's not an exhaustive list. The act also lacks specifics on what should be included in the foreign agent registry. The act also provides that amendments can be made by regulation. What is the advantage of proceeding in this way, through regulations?

    The exemptions that were really very clear from the outset were, for example, foreign diplomats and the arrangements to which the Crown is a party. There were already very well-established exemptions that we could include in the act.

    However, adding exemptions through regulations makes more sense. It allows us to evolve more quickly. It allows us to adapt to a changing situation. It's easier to make a regulatory change than a legislative change. This is also true when it comes to the information that must be given to the commissioner and that will be made public by the registry. It's more flexible to specify it by regulation than in the act.

    Then people are expected to consult the website and the registry to always be up to date on the exemptions granted and the details for agents of influence.

    Yes, of course, but any new exemptions will have to be in the regulations. I won't say it's slow, but I would say that the regulatory process is very procedural. There's no doubt about that.

    In addition, the website will be constantly updated to indicate what the regulatory changes are. Interpretation bulletins and reference and education materials will also be found on the website. It will constantly be updated, also depending on the questions we receive and the questions the public has about the registry or the regime in general.

    Now, there are offences that are prosecuted by two types of penalty: by indictment and by summary conviction. Do you know which violations will be prosecuted by indictment and which ones will be prosecuted by summary conviction?

    To be a bit more technical, there are four types of offences defined in the act: not registering an arrangement, not updating an arrangement, hiding information and obstruction.

    Administrative monetary penalties can be imposed for the first three types, but for obstruction, it just becomes an offence. However, a criminal offence can be established for all four types. In that instance, the case is referred to the RCMP and it will be up to the prosecutor and the police to determine exactly whether the offence will be punishable by summary conviction or otherwise. It will be up to the Crown and the police to define it at that stage.

    The same is true for administrative monetary penalties as opposed to prison sentences.

    The commissioner will have the discretion to determine, depending on the nature of the facts related to the offence, whether it is preferable to impose administrative monetary penalties or to refer the matter to the RCMP, because there can be slightly more serious misconduct and offences. It will be defined based on the facts of the case.

    The factors taken into account by the commissioner in establishing the administrative monetary penalties will appear in the regulations that will be released shortly.

    Do you think it will be possible to get paid?

    Yes. The government has procedures in place to get paid administrative monetary penalties.

    My colleague Ms. Fancy asked you how you measure success, but do you think the implementation of the registry will earn public trust, and if so, to what extent?

    I believe so.

    First of all, we will have a regime in place that will have an influence or be able to monitor an area that is a bit vague in the Canadian political space. There will be more clarity. We also have a commissioner who has a great deal of credibility, who will be able to speak properly to the public and who has a great deal of experience in these matters.

    In my opinion, yes, it will increase Canadians' trust in institutions.

     Thank you so much.

    Thank you, Madam Brière.

    I would like to thank our witness for being here.

    Using the chair's prerogative before we adjourn, I want to take a moment on behalf of all the members to say a word of thanks. As most of you in the room know, this is Christine's last meeting with us as clerk. I've been an MP for many years, and this is my first year as a chair. It has been incredibly smooth, and that is only because of Christine and her work. If things have run smoothly in this committee, it is because of her. If things have not run smoothly, it is because of me.

     She agrees. Yes. It is agreed and so ordered.

    I want to say thank you. This has been a much easier experience. They did the wide shot. I like this. She's hating all of this, but I want to say thank you. This has been an incredible opportunity, and you have done incredible work for this committee. Dealing with this many members of Parliament is never easy, and I appreciate you herding the cats for this year. On behalf of everyone—it will probably be the only time I get to speak on behalf of everyone—I thank you and wish you all the best in whatever comes next.

    Some hon. members: Hear, hear!

    The Chair: Thank you so much.

    Thank you very much.

     Thank you.

    We are adjourned.