:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 32 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(3), the committee is meeting for the first time on the study of Bill , an act to amend the Canada Elections Act and to enact an act to change the names of certain electoral districts, 2026. We should probably come up with a better name than that, but I will leave that to everyone in the room.
Today's meeting is taking place in public in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders. I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on the cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio and feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, especially our interpreters.
I'll make a few comments for the benefit of members. All comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, raise your hand if you'd like to speak. I don't think anyone's on Zoom today.
Before we get to our witnesses, there is a draft budget to approve.
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: It's approved.
I'd like to welcome our first panel, who will also be here for our second panel.
We have Cathy Hawara, assistant secretary to cabinet, machinery of government and democratic institutions; and Rachel Pereira, director, democratic institutions.
I understand you'll be making a brief opening statement, and then we'll go to questions from members.
Please go ahead.
Thank you for inviting us to appear before this committee today to speak to Bill , which focuses on strong and free elections.
[English]
My name is Cathy Hawara. I'm the assistant secretary to cabinet responsible for the machinery of government and democratic institutions, and I'm pleased to be here today with Rachel Pereira, who is a director in the Privy Council Office's democratic institutions secretariat.
As the chair mentioned, the minister will be joining us at 12 this afternoon to speak to Bill . Until then, we are very pleased to answer any questions that the members of the committee might have on the bill in advance of his appearance.
Mr. Chair, we're happy to take any questions.
:
I'll walk you through for the threshold.
Third parties under the bill will only be able to use contributions from Canadians and permanent residents for regulated activities. They will need to report on those, of course. They will be able to use their own funds—those are funds not received from Canadians or permanent residents, for example, selling merchandise, their other business lines, etc.—if all those contributions do not exceed 10% of their overall revenues in the previous year, as you've noted.
If I meet that limit, if I'm a third party and I have, let's say, $1,000 in contributions and the overall funds that I have are $9,000 of my own revenue, for donations at 10% of my overall income, which was the $9,000, that $1,000 is 10%, so then I would be able to use my own funds because I meet that threshold.
I want to thank Ms. Hawara and Ms. Pereira for being here and sharing your time and your expertise.
Bill , the strong and free elections act, reflects a simple but essential principle that democracy must be both open and secure. Canada's electoral system is among the most trusted in the world, but trust is not static. It must be actively protected as threats evolve, so this bill, I believe, responds directly to recommendations from the public inquiry into foreign interference, the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Canada elections, who we'll be hearing from subsequently. It addresses real and emerging risks, foreign interference, disinformation, deepfakes, dark money, cyber-threats and physical intimidation without compromising freedom of expression, political participation or legitimate debate.
We're here in committee to discuss the scope of the bill, that it be targeted and proportional but, at the same time, preserve openness and accessibility to serious candidates, parties and voters.
Can either of you share with me some of the safeguards that the bill has that would ensure it captures only intentional, harmful conduct and not possibly a good-faith disagreement or error.
:
Thank you for the question.
There are a number of examples in the bill that highlight the kind of balance we're trying to strike between closing gaps to address threats that we know are present and need to be responded to and, at the same time, ensuring that honest mistakes are not unduly addressed.
One example is the new provision in relation to false information. We are trying to be very targeted in this measure, ensuring that we are responding to the most critical and real potential threats, such as false information about who can vote, how voting is conducted and so on, which could potentially harm the integrity of our system. The measure, however, is quite targeted. It needs to be clear about the intention that the individual has, and it's very clear that they need to know that the information is misleading.
At the same time, if we look at some of the measures we're proposing from an enforcement perspective, we're expanding the number of contraventions that can be dealt with as violations of the act under the administrative monetary penalty regime. This provides the commissioner with greater flexibility to determine whether a violation of the act that is unintentional can be dealt with through the AMP regime, through administrative investigations and through tools like compliance agreements, letters of education, etc., so that we can again better target the compliance and enforcement activities of the commissioner.
You find this throughout the act where we are trying to strike that balance between closing the gaps and addressing the threats that are real, at the same time as we ensure that the commissioner and Chief Electoral Officer are taking a proportionate approach to the administration of the act.
:
Yes, the most urgent recommendations from the public inquiry on foreign interference have been addressed, either wholly or in part. It's the same thing with regard to the recommendations made by the Chief Electoral Officer and the commissioner of Canada elections in their 2022 report.
Regarding the example that was given with respect to unauthorized use of a computer, we are expanding that particular protection so that it's not just about unauthorized use of a computer to attempt to influence the results of an election but also for attempts to disrupt the conduct of elections. That's an example with respect to that.
A number of participants also noted that some of these protections that are in place today only apply during the conduct of an election, and the recommendation was that they should apply at all times. The bill expands a number of the key safeguards so that they apply not just during the conduct of an election but at all times. This includes, for example, a ban on foreign influence of voters, and there is an application of these protections to actions that take place outside of Canada as well.
These were among the critical recommendations that were made, I would say, which were the basis of the measures you see in the bill today.
Thank you to the witnesses for being here.
Ms. Pereira, I'd like to start by asking questions about the clause of the bill that concerns the publication of reports.
Could you just summarize the changes that Bill would make?
Until now, what has been the rule regarding the publication of reports, both the report published five days before an event and the one published after an event?
What exactly does Bill C‑25 change in terms of producing the contact information of a person hosting an event, the names of attendees and so on?
:
Thank you for the question.
Three criteria were set out in the act. It isn't necessarily just that one that has to be met.
To clarify, I would say that what we're trying to do is make sure that we protect the integrity of the information in that list, in particular. At the moment, it's accessible to eligible parties that haven't necessarily yet nominated candidates who will run in the riding in question.
If the party is represented in the House of Commons before the election, or if it has nominated a candidate endorsed in that riding in at least one of the last two elections, or, indeed, if it has nominated candidates in two-thirds of the ridings in the country, it will have access to the list.
Based on our analysis, all the parties currently represented in the House would continue to have access to that list.
My other question may carry over into the second round of questions. It's about data protection.
I'm referring to a situation that occurred in Alberta a few days ago. Parties that have obtained lists can, intentionally or unintentionally, end up leaving them in the hands of others, who can then publish them.
Was this taken into considered when Bill was being drafted?
What measures already exist to protect against this?
Are any additional measures being planned? If not, should we be making recommendations, changes or amendments?
You have one minute left, but at worst, we can continue the discussion in the second round.
What happened in Alberta is still under investigation, so I won't comment on that.
What I can say to the committee is that, under the current act, there are strict limits as to who can obtain the list and how it can be used. Only registered and eligible parties, candidates and parliamentarians can obtain the list. Plus, it can only be used to communicate with voters.
Essentially, anyone who knowingly uses personal information from a voter list for any other purpose is in violation of the act and can be fined up to $10,000 or face one year in prison. Of course, the commissioner can, on their own initiative, or in response to a complaint from a member of the public, investigate any potential violation or failure to comply with the act.
Right now, the act covers this kind of situation. Even if the measures found in the bill don't apply specifically to this issue, they still strengthen the protection of personal information.
I'd like to comment that for once I think I'm agreeing with my colleague from across the way there, Mr. Cooper, in terms of his line of reasoning.
For today, though, I'd like to talk a bit about mis- and disinformation and how we can help some of our vulnerable populations in our country. I'm a former educator. I really worry about young girls that I've taught and about my own daughter, who is growing up in an environment where what she sees online might not be trustworthy. Having seen first-hand some of the mis- and disinformation throughout the election—this was my first election—I'm increasingly concerned about how quickly these technologies are evolving.
This bill does a really good job in addressing AI-generated impersonation and deepfakes. In areas with limited access to local media—where I'm from in Nova Scotia is quite rural—where residents might rely more heavily on social media, I'm asking if you feel that these provisions will be sufficient to protect voters from increasingly sophisticated digital misinformation.
:
Thank you for the question.
I think there are a number of measures in this package that will address the concerns that have been raised.
Perhaps I'll start by reminding the committee that we are also thinking about Canada's plan to protect democracy when we are thinking about this particular piece of legislation. Of course, one of the pillars of that plan is a more informed and prepared citizenry. I think that is important. Indeed, the bill proposes to expand the current prohibitions against impersonation to include impersonations through AI and deepfakes. We recognize that this is a threat, and it's a growing threat. This is something that the bill will make extremely clear: that those kinds of impersonations are unauthorized.
I think the measure that I referred to earlier around false information is also relevant in this context. It is certainly meant to address an emerging threat and a real potential harm to the integrity of the electoral system. This will address situations where an individual intends to affect the outcome of the election—the results of the election—and the conduct of the election itself. If they know that the statement they are making is false or misleading, and it is a statement about the core elements of the electoral system—who can vote, how they can vote, how to register to vote, the process for counting votes and ultimately the eventual results of the election—these are enhanced protections for our electoral system that the commissioner of Canada elections will be able to administer.
:
Thank you for the question.
The names of electoral districts are determined by the independent electoral commissions at each decennial exercise. During that process, members can propose names and put forward objections, but ultimately those decisions are made by the independent commissions.
However, members of Parliament can, between those decennial exercises, propose name changes to the ridings for Parliament's approval. In previous decennial exercises, that has been the case, whether through government bills or private members' bills. In 2014 and, before that, in 2004, there have been bills that have changed the names of ridings. That is within the purview of members of Parliament to propose and for Parliament to approve.
I'd like to get back to the question I asked earlier about the publication or use of confidential data.
What we've unfortunately learned from Alberta is that there have been cases where women who are victims of violence from partners found guilty of that violence have had to move to protect the confidentiality of their address.
Does the act already contain provisions to ensure the confidentiality of addresses?
If not, can we make amendments to allow requests for exclusion from the electoral roll on grounds that would justify such exclusion?
Under the current act, could a woman with a spouse known to be abusive, for example, request that her name not be passed on to candidates—who would legitimately be entitled to this information—to prevent it from falling into the wrong hands?
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There are also, as you know, pre-election and election-period spending limits for third parties.
What this bill would do—I'll repeat—is this: Third parties wishing to participate under the act as a registered political party could, during the election period, use funds from Canadians and permanent residents. If those funds are 10% or less of their overall revenues, they would be able to use those revenues, with reporting requirements providing transparency to Elections Canada so it knows what the source of those funds are.
For a very large third party that generates a lot of business, that would be part of their financial statements, and that might raise some questions at Elections Canada in terms of where those funds are coming from. They could be legitimate sources of funding.
I don't know if that answers your question.
Welcome, officials, to the committee today. Thank you for the work that you've done on this bill. This is a bill that has had a lot of consultation. You did provide an opportunity for all members to ask questions in the technical briefing. I really appreciate that.
I want to ask some questions around some of the current gaps in our Canada Elections Act that you think Bill is going to close and around what risk you view would remain if we don't act.
As well, based on your experience, have the recent incidents, including the Alberta case, exposed vulnerabilities in our act in how elector information is accessed or shared?
:
There are a number of important measures that are included in the bill to strengthen enforcement of compliance on the part of the commissioner of Canada elections, and this is also a response to the recommendations that she herself made in 2022.
There are a couple of examples I can point to at the moment. If she is conducting an administrative investigation, she cannot compel an individual to co-operate with her investigators by attending an interview, providing information or producing documents. If they don't co-operate, she must go to court, which, of course, is more onerous and is an inefficient way of dealing, as swiftly as possible, with the enforcement of the act. Therefore, we are proposing new authorities for the commissioner that are very much in line with authorities that are available to similarly placed commissioners.
With respect to the administrative monetary penalty, we are proposing to increase it. At the moment, the maximum penalty for individuals is $1,000, and that would go up to $25,000 and, for entities, the current maximum is $5,000, and it would go up to $100,000. Of course, the objective there is a deterrent effect, and it would be more in line with some of the regimes that we find in some provinces.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to the officials for being here and answering our questions. I'd like to pick up on the question that Mr. Jackson asked about the administrative monetary penalties.
I'm back on this committee after a nine-year gap. A decade ago, the Chief Electoral Officer was at this committee asking for additional monetary penalties. In addition to what you just outlined, the reason was that there's a really big gap between a criminal threshold and $5,000. There were a number of things that, if they were penalties, might have been pursued, but they didn't really warrant going the criminal route.
Is this also a way we can address those issues that wouldn't go before the courts but were bad enough that they should warrant a high fine?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Members of the committee, I'm very pleased to appear before you today to talk about Bill , the strong and free elections act.
As you know, the Canada Elections Act is the cornerstone of our electoral system. It ensures that elections are free, fair, independent and secure. Its strength lies in regular updates and improvements, which take into account new threats, expert recommendations and lessons learned.
[English]
Through the , the government has introduced targeted priority updates to strengthen and protect Canada's federal elections. It draws on recommendations from the Chief Electoral Officer, the commissioner of Canada elections and, in a more timely way, the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference in Federal Electoral Processes and Democratic Institutions. It is the product of consultations and collaborations with members of Parliament from all parties, because I strongly believe that changes to the regime that governs how elections are conducted should be based on consensus as much as possible.
Moreover, I am pleased to share that all of the legislative recommendations from this committee's study on unduly long ballots have been incorporated into the bill.
[Translation]
Bill comprises two parts.
The first part includes amendments to the Canada Elections Act in five key areas: safeguarding elections as well as nomination processes and leadership contests; strengthening the political financing regime; facilitating the enforcement of the act; the protection of personal information; and combatting excessively long ballots.
Part 2 of the bill provides for the renaming of 19 electoral districts, in accordance with proposals from the current members of Parliament for those districts.
I'll try to be relatively brief, but I'd still like to outline the main measures in Part 1.
First, the bill will extend the key prohibitions relating to federal elections—particularly those concerning undue foreign influence, corruption and misleading publications—so that they apply at all times. This is necessary because the threats to elections are not limited to the election period.
For the first time, the bill extends these key protections to nomination and leadership contests, among other things, which, as we all know, are important democratic processes that contribute to elections.
The protections for elections and contests will apply both within and outside Canada, in line with the recommendations of the Foreign Interference Commission.
[English]
We also know that deepfake technology and disinformation pose increasing challenges to our democracy. That is why Bill will prohibit manipulating the voice or image of trusted electoral actors with the intent to mislead voters. It will also ban the intentional spread of false information regarding voting or the voting process with the intent to affect the conduct or results of an election.
Let me be clear: These amendments will not prohibit parody or satire or statements made in good faith. They do not target personal political opinions. Instead, they will capture intentional efforts by malicious actors who spread false information to undermine trust in elections.
To increase transparency over political financing, Bill will prohibit political entities from accepting untraceable contributions such as cryptocurrencies, gift cards or money orders. This will also apply to third parties for regulated activities. The bill requires third parties to use contributions from Canadian citizens and permanent residents to pay for regulated activities while permitting those who wish to use their own funds to do so if they meet certain conditions.
[Translation]
Furthermore, this bill will enable the commissioner of Canada elections to carry out her enforcement mandate. The commissioner will be able to conduct more effective administrative investigations by using tools similar to those available to other federal commissioners to obtain the necessary information, and will be able to enter into information-sharing agreements, both within Canada and internationally. She will also have the power to impose higher administrative monetary penalties where warranted.
Bill will also strengthen privacy policy requirements for federal political parties by including new requirements, such as the obligation to implement physical, organizational and technological security measures; the obligation to take appropriate action in the event of a data breach; and a ban on selling personal information.
[English]
Finally, to address the issues caused by unduly long ballots, Bill will limit voters to signing only one nomination form, require election officials to represent only one candidate per district and prohibit false or misleading information on nomination forms, among other measures, to deter those who do not genuinely seek to represent voters in Parliament.
I would like to sincerely thank this committee for your study of the actions of the longest ballot committee in federal elections, as well as your comprehensive recommendations. I am pleased to share that the seven legislative recommendations you made are included in this bill.
As I said at the outset, I strongly believe that changes to the Canada Elections Act should be based on consensus as much as possible. In that vein, I look forward to answering all the questions this committee may have on these measures to ensure our democracy remains, as it is, one of the strongest in the world.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Minister.
The bill goes some way towards closing what are significant loopholes that currently allow foreign sources of funding to be used by registered third parties for regulated pre-election and election activities. However, the bill provides for an exception whereby third parties can use their own funds if contributions constitute 10% or less of the third party's revenue in the year prior to the pre-election period.
This appears to leave the door open to foreign money being used by third parties for regulated activities. For example, it's unclear how contributions made in the year prior to the pre-election period would be treated and whether they would be treated as melded into part of the third party's own funds and, therefore, funds that could be used for regulated activities.
Given that, why not simply close all loopholes with respect to foreign funding and require third parties, without exception, to set up a bank account with contributions coming exclusively from individual Canadians and permanent residents, just like political parties?
:
Thank you. That's a good question.
We followed, pretty much to the letter, the Chief Electoral Officer's advice on this issue. Let's agree that 10% does leave a crack in the door. Quite frankly, I think the Chief Electoral Officer probably also struggled with this. That is, if you reduce it to zero, you may be unfairly or unduly excluding some quite legitimately and indisputably Canadian organizations from participating.
I think we can agree on the objective: We want to squeeze foreign funds out of this third party regime. We have a third party regime in terms of our elections and financing that I would say is already a model to the rest of the world and already quite stringent.
I want to finish by saying I'm open to this committee's consideration of that very matter, and I look forward to your advice on it.
I would just say that I do think these loopholes need to be closed—to the extent that they exist, and I believe they do exist—because elections should be decided by Canadians free from foreign influence, including foreign funds. It has been a real problem. It's not just a hypothetical problem. It is a real problem that has been exploited at present by third parties.
On a different matter, this committee undertook a study on the malicious activities of the so-called longest ballot committee. We produced a unanimous report with recommendations to curtail the longest ballot committee or other malicious actors from weaponizing the ballot and disrupting the democratic process in future elections and by-elections. I'm pleased to see that most of the committee's recommendations are incorporated into Bill .
One recommendation, however, that has not been incorporated into the bill is “That the Canada Elections Act be amended to provide for penalties when signatures are obtained on a nomination paper before a candidate has been identified.” There was evidence that the longest ballot committee may have, in some instances, induced electors to sign nomination forms on which the candidate's name was blank, only to fill in the candidate's name after the fact, upon recruiting one of their fake candidates.
The intent of the act is that a candidate must receive the endorsement of at least 100 electors in a riding to get onto the ballot. Signing a blank nomination form is clearly contrary to the spirit of the act, yet this type of mischief can occur without penalty. In my view, an amendment should be brought to close this loophole. What are your thoughts?
:
Offences at the federal level tend to be dealt with much more stringently. You will see the enforcement powers of the commissioner being enhanced in these amendments, including her ability to compel testimony—all, of course, in the spirit of giving her more latitude and ability to deal with these. They are, in some cases, administrative penalties. We want to give her some discretion around that.
Let me give you some examples of administrative monetary penalties.
In Alberta, in the Election Act, it can be up to $100,000—again, depending on the offence. It's up to $50,000 in British Columbia, $20,000 in Manitoba, and $10,000 for individuals and $100,000 for entities in Ontario. Those would be maximum administrative monetary penalties.
Under other federal pieces of legislation.... It's up to $1 million in the anti-spam legislation. In the Financial Consumer Agency of Canada Act, it's up to $1 million for individuals. In the Competition Act, it's $750,000. You can see that the quantums are quite different.
:
I think we've found the balance with the timely publication of the information after the event. Keep in mind, however, that not that long ago—I'm old enough to remember a number of times when electoral financing was reformed—there were basically no limits on union and corporate contributions under the campaign finance rules.
I think the way in which the Canada Elections Act, as passed, was implemented, specifically to exclude all entities, other than individuals, to reduce the limits and to factor in inflation—that too is being removed at the discretionary level—was the ultimate choice to ensure transparency. Of course, contributions are published and contributors have to comply with the act.
In comparison with other countries, we have the most transparent and stringent political financing system possible. Stephen Harper even did away with the financing of political parties. This resulted in a somewhat purer system, in the sense that, for financing, political entities have to turn to individuals—individuals who can choose what to do with their money—and have to adhere to fairly restrictive limits. If you compare that with anonymous contributions from foreign corporations, which are common in other countries I won't name, I would say Canada is a model on this front.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Minister, thank you for joining us at committee today.
In 2017, the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench struck down the section of the Canada Elections Act that required candidates put up a $1,000 deposit to run in an election. It was that decision that opened the door to the disruptive activities of the longest ballot committee, because now, if you have a frivolous candidate, that candidate doesn't have to put up $1,000.
I couldn't help noticing, Minister, that in 2017 your government chose not to appeal that particular decision of the Alberta Court of Queen's Bench to the Supreme Court. With the benefit of hindsight, Mr. Minister, is it fair to say that your government should have appealed that decision all the way to the Supreme Court?
Thank you, Minister, for being here, along with your officials. Thank you as well for your work on this important bill.
We know that the world in 2026 is a very different place from what it was even just a few years, if not months, ago. As parliamentarians, we see the importance of ensuring that our democratic system is effective and protected, on one hand, and keeping up with the times, on the other. The Canada Elections Act is globally recognized for its robust procedures, strong political financing system and strict spending limits. Nevertheless, Canada is not immune to the growing threats facing the system or, above all, the erosion of public trust.
I'd like you to talk about how Bill deals with interference, particularly how it adds an extraterritorial application to certain offences, making it possible to investigate threat actors operating outside Canada.
:
It's a battle that is very current, so your question is quite relevant.
The areas or issues exposed by the Foreign Interference Commission were the motivation for the legislative and administrative changes we made to rectify the situation. I know that Elections Canada provides oversight. I want to highlight two other measures we announced when the bill was introduced, to monitor foreign interference, misinformation and disinformation.
The Government of Canada now has enhanced capacity in that area. We have the cabinet directive on election monitoring and the publication of incident reports. That has worked quite well. The updated system seems to have been very effective during the last election campaign.
This is about addressing misinformation, deepfakes and the malicious spreading of false information in relation to an election, among other things. Obviously, in no way did we want to capture parody, satire or comments made in good faith, meaning for the purposes of expressing an opinion by voting. However, people or entities who share or spread information they know to be false will be dealt with harshly under the provisions of this bill.
Earlier, we talked about the provisions pertaining to third-party contributions. While that funding is strictly regulated in Canada, these provisions will eliminate, or nearly eliminate, the potential for foreign funding to enter our electoral processes. They will prevent political parties from using cryptocurrency, gift cards, prepaid cards and more.
There are numerous measures, all recommended by either Elections Canada or election authorities, or the Foreign Interference Commission. I think we've put together a suite of measures that address all of those recommendations in a timely and comprehensive way. At least, that's my hope.
Minister, you broached the issue of party financing when you mentioned that Stephen Harper had done away with public funding for political parties. I'd like to hear your thoughts on the relationship between the use of public money and the expression of democratic voting.
Since the funding is based on the number of votes received, we know there is a direct correlation between public money and number of voters. However, under the current system, which uses tax credits, I would argue that the distribution of public funds is actually based on how deep the pockets of political party donors are.
Here's a hypothetical scenario. If I give the Bloc Québécois $400, I get a tax credit of $300. Indirectly, then, I'm forcing the government to give the Bloc Québécois $300. The connection to public funds is more dependent on voters' ability to donate.
Do you see the situation the same way?
:
I've taken part in many iterations of this debate, and I think there are good arguments on both sides. Some countries, of course, have a system of public funding for political parties. Federally, in Canada, Parliament decided to take away political parties' access to that funding and to limit their funding to contributions from individual Canadians.
I'm intrigued, but not convinced, by the arguments in favour of public funding for political parties. Nevertheless, I think it's a valid argument. I believe you or your colleague brought that up in the House during second reading debate, and I think it's a fair point.
Obviously, Canadian taxpayers contribute to the funding of all parties through tax refunds, which means political parties do receive public funding, but through our income tax system, not directly. That is the choice that was made in the past, and we decided not to revisit it in this review of the Canada Elections Act. It's a never-ending debate, as far as I'm concerned.
One of the gaps that we have, from the foreign interference investigation, was the nomination process. I appreciate the efforts on the actual delivery of an election, but I think we've seen and heard enough testimony to understand that nomination contests, which are very party-oriented.... I think there's a reluctance, for some, to let Elections Canada enter into the nomination process too much, yet here we are, dealing with this potential problem. We knew about 11 people who might have been influenced. All political parties were involved in this problem. It was particularly from the United Front.
You've added some penalties for this. What about the prescriptive nature of nominations? Is that going to change in the legislation, or is that something you're going to allow the electoral officer to design and implement?
:
Mr. Calkins, you and I share a bit of history around this place. You will know that in 2003, I believe, the Elections Act began to regulate party processes, especially the financing of party processes.
We have, over the years, tweaked and tried to continue to perfect that system. The line that we have never gone over, and one that I do not believe we should traverse, is that political parties should be able to govern their own democracies. That is not to say there are not things like financing that should have public and legal scrutiny. Parliament has, in its wisdom, decided to do that, and I think that's a good thing.
Parties are also public goods. They are imperfect. They are made up of volunteers. Anyone who has served on a volunteer board, whether it's inside a political party, in a charity or in any other kind of organization, knows that volunteer organizations are sprawling and hard to govern, and it's hard to enforce rigorous standards.
However, I think that the Conservative Party, the Bloc Québécois, the New Democrats, the Greens and the Liberal Party of Canada, for sure, should be the default choices for governing how their candidates are chosen, as in who is eligible and how the processes of electing candidates or leaders, for that matter, are set out. The financing, as is appropriate, is a public matter and therefore should be regulated by our public institutions, like Elections Canada.
The actual rules governing nominations and democracy in political parties—