:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 34 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the Standing Orders.
One of our witnesses, Mr. Peter MacKenzie, will be testifying on Zoom.
Before we continue, I would ask all in-person participants to consult the guidelines written on the cards on the table. These measures are in place to help prevent audio feedback incidents and to protect the health and safety of all participants, including the interpreters. You will also notice a QR code on the card, which links to a short awareness video.
I would like to remind participants of the following points.
Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, you can click on the microphone icon to activate your mic. Please mute yourself when you are not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: the floor audio, English or French. For those in the room, you can use the earpiece and select the desired channel.
For members in the room, if you wish to speak, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function.
Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on Monday, March 9, 2026, the committee is resuming its study of household debt in Canada.
[Translation]
However, before we begin, I see that Mr. Garon has a point of order.
:
We discussed this in advance. I'm definitely supportive of the idea of having the portal for pre-budget briefing submissions open for longer.
The only thing I want to double check is that we have enough time for the analysts to do some analysis before we break. I think June 22 is officially the last sitting day. Sometimes the House rises a bit earlier than that before the summer.
Am I wrong? Is it the 19th?
Pat Kelly is correcting me here. In this case, I totally don't mind. If it's the 19th, I apologize.
Whatever date it is, I just want to make sure with the analyst, Chair, just to be assured that the analysts will have time to produce a kind of “what we heard” report before we rise for the summer. I would value having that.
Is three weeks enough time? It's just a clarifying question.
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Are the Conservative members okay with that?
Seeing agreement like this in the committee is so nice. Thank you, everybody.
We'll extend the deadline to May 22. Maybe we'll encourage folks, if their briefing is ready by April 30, to submit it by April 30. If there are people who need more time, we'll allow briefs to be received until May 22, while encouraging folks to do so earlier.
[Translation]
Thank you, everyone.
[English]
Returning to the meeting at hand, I would like to welcome our witnesses.
For the first hour, we have Mr. Ronald Butler. We also have Mr. Peter MacKenzie, senior policy analyst from the C.D. Howe Institute, and Ms. Vasiliki Bednar, managing director from the Canadian SHIELD Institute for Public Policy.
Each of you will have five minutes for your opening remarks, and we'll go in the order I mentioned.
Mr. Butler, we'll start with you, please.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm always honoured to be here. I'm an old man who has followed politics my whole life, and it's still a thrill. Thank you for inviting me. I enjoy being here.
Our mortgage brokerage operates in three provinces—Alberta, British Columbia and Ontario. We get lots of calls. We're talking about 1,700 to 2,500 calls a month from people who have mortgage issues or renewals. It's chiefly renewals. This is the biggest time for renewals ever. There are more mortgage renewals happening this year than ever before in the history of Canada.
Overwhelmingly, they illustrate the nature of our economy today in Canada. They illustrate a K-shaped economy. We have a certain number of people who call us, and they're quite comfortable with the increase they're getting. Because they got their mortgage five years ago, 65% to 70% of them are getting an increase in their mortgage. Rates were incredibly low, and they're higher now. People had a 1.69%, five-year fixed mortgage in 2021, and now they're getting about 4%. That's a significant rise.
The group of people at the top of the K are somewhat annoyed and a little concerned, but they're fine with it. They can easily handle this mortgage rate increase. The payment increase is never the same amount. It's always a bit lower, percentage-wise, than the actual rate increase, so they can manage it. However, for the majority of people at the bottom of the K, it's a problem. In Canada today, we're all aware that inflation has eaten into family budgets. When we then move it forward into a 20% or 22% increase, let's say, in their mortgage payment, that is a different world. It's a meaningful change, and it's a problem.
We're approached to do restructuring and refinancing, to change amortization and to lower payments. What really hits us when we do this is that there's becoming an incredible importance to when you bought your house. That sounds crazy in a big, western country like Canada, but if you bought your house in 2015 and prior, you're probably pretty good, if you didn't refinance. You got a good price on your house when you bought it, you have a smaller mortgage and you are in pretty good financial shape. However, if you bought in 2018 and onwards, particularly in some provinces, you have a very expensive house and a large mortgage, and you're not in such great financial shape. In fact, in some cases, 50% of your net after-tax income is going to mortgage payments, property tax, other sorts of utilities and other types of payments.
There's something fundamentally wrong about that, if you think about it. Should it just be this strange bit of magical luck of when you were born? I'm a boomer, so I always make fun of boomers. We're all just people who don't realize how lucky we were.
That's something interesting, though. That should be interesting to everybody in government. At that moment when you were the right age and you bought that house in the 1980s, the average first-time buyer was 27 years old. Last year, they were 40. That should be meaningful to everybody in government, that we are denying a lot of young people the chance to own a home. If you have to wait until you're 40, you're not young anymore. At least, I don't think you feel young. Twenty-seven is a much better age to be buying your first home, and that's realistic.
Again, my thanks to the committee. If there are any questions, I'm happy to take them.
:
Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the invitation to testify today.
My name is Peter MacKenzie. I'm a senior policy analyst at the C.D. Howe Institute, where I lead the financial services research initiative and the financial regulatory excellence initiative.
My remarks today will draw on the institute's work on household balance sheets, financial stability and the housing market.
Canada has G7-leading household debt levels and rising consumer insolvencies. These are concerning, but they do not signal a systemic crisis. The banking system is resilient, aggregate household net worth is at a record high, and pressure on household cash flow has eased from its 2023 peak.
Severe pressure is concentrated in specific groups, including younger Canadians and highly leveraged homeowners in large cities like Toronto and Vancouver. Policy response should be calibrated to that distributional reality.
Let me start first with the aggregate picture. The measure most often cited in public debate about household debt is on household debt relative to disposable income. This ratio rose from about 114% in 2000 to a peak of 188% in 2022. It has since declined to 173%. That number alone does look alarming, and it is. Households have more debt than income.
The measure that actually tracks a household's capacity to pay is the debt service ratio, or DSR. The DSR is the share of household income going to principal and interest payments on outstanding debt. When interest rates fall or income rises, a household can carry more debt without a larger share of income going to payments. The DSR was largely flat over the same period that household debt income ratio rose dramatically. The DSR stood at 15% at the end of 2019, climbed to a record 15.2% in 2023 as the Bank of Canada hiked rates, and has since eased to 14.5% in the fourth quarter of 2025 as rates have come down.
The banking sector has absorbed the shock. In fact, the IMF's 2025 financial system stability assessment found Canadian banks and non-bank financial institutions generally resilient to severe solvency and liquidity shocks. OSFI's annual risk outlook, released earlier this month, identifies real estate-secured lending among its top risks while concluding that institutions remain well positioned to navigate the environment. Both documents point in the same direction of system-level resilience with some serious tail distributional stress.
Now, looking at that tail risk and part where there is stress or where the household distribution is hurting, we see younger Canadians. Looking at the Bank of Canada's Canadian survey of consumer expectations for the fourth quarter of 2025 shows that Canadians aged 25 to 54 reported a record 27% probability of missing a debt payment. Nearly half of those aged 18 to 24 expected to miss a payment. Canadians aged 55 and older reported just under a 1% chance of missing a payment. Household net worth reached a record $18.6 trillion at the end of 2025, but the wealthiest 20% of households hold the majority of that increase. Younger Canadians who did not yet own assets or homes have participated little in the gains.
I'll make a further point on the rise in insolvency filings. A filing can mean two very different things. A household is cash flow insolvent when it cannot meet monthly payments out of its current income, even if its assets exceed its debts. It is balance sheet insolvent when its debts exceed its assets outright.
A homeowner in Toronto, for instance, who might be facing a payment shock at renewal, is more likely to be cash flow insolvent. The equity in the home is there, but the monthly room to make the payment is not. A renter in their 20s carrying unsecured debt without assets is more likely to be balance-sheet insolvent. These two situations call for different policy responses.
Finally, this brings me to my three recommendations.
First, federal agencies should centre their public reporting on household financial health on the debt service ratio and how it varies across income, age and region, rather than other indicators such as debt-to-GDP or debt-to-income ratios. The breakdown will show that stress is concentrated in two groups, highly leveraged homeowners and younger Canadians.
Second, the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy should publish statistics that distinguish cash flow insolvency from balance sheet insolvency.
Third, federal infrastructure, immigration settlement and transfer design should be oriented towards growing mid-sized Canadian cities into economic alternatives to larger cities like Toronto and Vancouver. Canadians who move to those cities for work are more likely to take on outsized mortgages to afford a home, and each buyer joins a highly leveraged segment. Policies often focus on demand-side measures that shift where pressure lands, but they do not reduce that pressure.
Adding supply only within larger cities does not resolve affordability on its own, because in-migration from smaller centres follows—
:
Thank you, Madam Chair and members of the committee, for the opportunity to appear. My name is Vass Bednar. I'm the managing director of a new think tank, the Canadian SHIELD Institute, which is focused on securing our economic sovereignty.
I'm appearing today to elaborate on an essay that we published in the Walrus magazine. It was titled “How 'Buy Now, Pay Later' Seduced a Generation—and Trapped It in Debt”. We also proactively submitted a brief to this committee on this invisible problem of buy now, pay later in Canada.
A country loses economic sovereignty when it loses visibility into how households are coping and when private credit products start compensating for what is fundamentally a public policy failure. Buy now pay later is more than just a trendy checkout feature; it's a new layer of household debt infrastructure, and right now too much of it is invisible. Buy now pay later is often marketed as budgeting help for young people, but in practice it's microlending at the point of sale. It lets people typically split a purchase into four or more payments and defer the full cost of something major that they'll buy. I know you know what it is.
This sounds pretty harmless when we're talking about something like a sofa, a laptop or a one-time emergency purchase, but the concern that we raised and wanted to bring forward is that there's evidence that buy now pay later is increasingly being used to bankroll everyday routine needs: groceries, clothes, household goods and other everyday expenses.
This tells us two important things. The first is that we have that data blind spot. Canada has yet to clearly define buy now pay later in our legislative infrastructure. That means it doesn't show up in the numbers that my colleagues appearing today, my friends, cited, and that's a problem. Other jurisdictions have moved much faster to have legislative infrastructure reflect those realities.
Second, buy now pay later is symptomatic of a deeper prosperity problem. People aren't using these products because they're financially careless. They're using them because the math is not mathing. Paycheques are too low and costs are too high, so people are plugging holes. We need to pay attention to that and not demonize it. That is why we think that this committee should resist treating buy now pay later as a narrow consumer protection issue. Yes, we need more disclosure and understanding, but we also need to step back and ask ourselves why a product that was designed for larger discretionary purchases is becoming part of how people manage their everyday lives, including being used for groceries.
Our debt challenge in Canada is symptomatic of the broader prosperity and productivity challenge that many have been thinking about for quite some time. If wages don't keep up with costs, debt becomes a bridge. Rents, groceries, telecom bills, transportation and basic services have been rising faster than incomes. People are reaching for this credit product. Our productivity is weak, investment is thin and our living standards have stalled. We think, by now, that is a clear example of that shift.
Our recommendations are twofold. One is that this committee should identify and continue to pursue that gap. It's not that Canada has never considered buy now pay later or that a committee has never heard of it. We just haven't gotten to the finish line. If anything, we sometimes hide behind federalism a bit. We say that certain jurisdictions say it's not their key file or it's not their key element.
Second, we could maybe stretch the mandate of the study a bit. Debt is a prosperity signal too, and rising reliance on a short-term consumer credit product that's increasingly invisible and increasingly targeted to young people should prompt bigger questions about wages, market concentration, competition, productivity, housing costs and whether public policy has allowed too many essential markets to become too expensive.
Canadians cannot manage what policy-makers can't measure, but we also can't regulate our way out of a prosperity problem just by polishing our data dashboard. Buy now pay later needs to show up in our accounting, but the bigger question is why so many people need it in the first place.
Thank you so much. I look forward to the questions.
:
It's a hard question to answer in some ways, because there are so many confounding factors involved in it. I would say there are certainly reasons that the federal government or governments in general may take on debt, like in response to the great financial crisis or to COVID-19. As for whether or not they took on too much debt, they probably did when you see deficits balloon the way they have. Governments were responding to a crisis, so in some ways it's understandable.
I would say that this debt increase, corresponding with a period of very low interest rates, also allowed households to take on more debt, because they didn't have to pay as much monthly to service it. When you have a low interest rate environment, it's natural to increase debt.
From a business lending perspective, I think the response to the great financial crisis and the Basel III capital requirements have actually made the banks draw back a bit from business lending, especially on the smaller end. That has probably contributed to our decreased productivity. On that end, I think it's important to have pathways for more business lending and maybe have OSFI decrease prudential business lending requirements.
That said, on the consumer side, as on the homeowner side, the low interest rate environment plus the heavy government spending did allow consumers to take on quite a bit of debt. Nonetheless, as we can see, they seem to be handling it okay—at least on average—when you look at the debt service ratio.
:
I'm on CTV sometimes, so I can clear it up.
The most concerning issue that is prevalent today is that despite a drastic reduction in house prices, it's not enough. It's not enough to bring the average Canadian and young Canadians to a point where they can easily afford homes. This is very meaningful.
I support the idea of developing smaller centres and smaller cities getting bigger. However, the way the world works is that the action is in larger cities. It is just that way. We've seen Calgary grow. We've seen Edmonton grow. They are feeling the effects in the price matrix of those things.
The point I would make is simply this—and it's not necessarily a federal issue. It might be a provincial issue. There has to be deregulation of how we allow the building of houses. There have to be ways to get more land available at lower costs. There have to be ways just to have lower-priced materials in the homes. There have to be ways to address the massive charges that municipalities put on new home builds. The Government of Ontario just moved on that matter. That's been a crucial issue that has relentlessly increased the price of homes.
On another topic, when we look at social networks like TikTok, we see that there are a lot of people, a lot of young people who get information about personal finance, how to get rich and how to invest in people, some of whom are a good prospect, and some of whom are not. In addition, we've seen a real estate fetish develop. As a result, real estate is being presented as a way to get rich very quickly. Presumably, that's speculation. People have benefited from price increases in recent years.
What are your thoughts on that? What do you think about the quality of the information that young first, second or third-time buyers are exposed to?
Do you think that's a good strategy? In your practice, have you seen people become financially compromised by using these serial buy and refinance techniques?
:
I don't think it's good or bad that we have a lot more people engaging with buy now pay later. I think the failure is in our regulatory infrastructure. You could argue that buy now pay later is a really savvy competitor to the Visa-Mastercard duopoly, where front-loading somebody at zero interest with the ability to break something up into four payments is kind of great. We see this reflected in other policy areas, for example, a dental program we have that allows people to access dental care up front and pay it off in later instalments that are interest-free.
I don't want to discount financial literacy being an element here, but, again, when it's not reflected, when we haven't decided whether we see this as a credit product or a loan product, for young people, buy now pay later could be a vehicle to build credit outside of a credit card in the way we've seen that ability through incredible Canadian fintechs like Borrowell, which allows people to use paying their rent on time as a vehicle towards credit.
I'm more saying that often we talk about sovereignty as a deficit, something that we don't have or we don't do, but if you think of just keeping it in line with young people, like doing a quiz in a magazine, can you govern the markets you have, yes or no? Often we're talking about it on the no side, but on the yes side, the quiz isn't over. The next question is: Are you? I think with buy now pay later, there's a yes-no there. Right now we're on the no side. We need to get to the yes side, because young people, like all Canadians, expect our legislation to reflect the reality they live every day, and right now it doesn't.
I'm going to continue along the same lines as my colleague.
Ms. Bednar, if we want to understand debt problems, we need to understand the psychology of people who go into debt. For example, some bankers might tell us that the buy now, pay later plan is just a financial product available on the market. Reasonable and rational people use it intelligently. However, when these products are offered to people with self-control issues when they want something right way or when they're hungry and they have no income or are on a tight budget, they can be a tool that makes them even more financially insecure. They could start a cascade of financial events that can potentially lead to bankruptcy.
First, I would like to know how popular this practice is. What does it say about our needs and about how our environment is creating needs for us today? Isn't it also the source of a lot of debt problems?
I would also like to know whether using these products a lot leads to financial problems. Do we know if they indicate that someone will have financial problems in the future? What is the profile of people who use them a lot? Do they tend to be younger people? I can tell you that my grandmother doesn't pay for her groceries in 12 equal instalments. Are they more popular with young people, then? I'll let you comment on that.
:
My grandmother pays for her groceries in cash, too.
The information that's available suggests it is younger Canadians, 30 and under, who tend to turn to buy now pay later. Because we don't integrate it into our ledger of global household debt in Canada, which, as you've heard, is already quite high and rising, it's invisible to policy-makers. It's also invisible to the various buy now pay later programs. They have a harder time deciding who's creditworthy, unless you've been with one of the giants, a firm, and you've defaulted on that buy now pay later option, in which case they'll understand and be able to make a decision that this option may not be available to you. Because there are many of these products in the marketplace, that's how people can stack that debt.
In terms of the key indicators, I think what also matters is when and where people are using it. Again, if you move somewhere, you need a couch, you need a mattress. This makes sense in a particular way. The concerning element of it being used for groceries and other everyday essentials is symptomatic of the affordability problem and the broader prosperity problem. It's not that buy now pay later is bad.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
My question is for Mr. Butler.
In your opening remarks, you talked about how you would love to go back to seeing more ordinary Canadians making an ordinary income be able to afford a home. We used to see 27 as the average age when one would acquire a home, and now the average age is about 40. Clearly, there's a problem here that we need to address.
We have seen the government respond with a fourth housing bureaucracy, yet we continue to see reports that there are still even 100,000 construction workers who are at risk of facing layoffs, and we are still seeing Canadians struggle to enter the housing market.
What are your thoughts about this fourth housing bureaucracy as a solution to the problem?
:
It's no secret that I never understood Build Canada Homes or why the agency was created. I don't understand how it's going to move forward to accomplish very much in the end, because we had existing bureaucracies that could do the same thing. We had Canada Lands Company, and we had CMHC, which runs splendid programs in those areas.
We have to also understand really clearly that there's absolutely no home that Build Canada Homes will develop that will ever be sold to a Canadian. This is social housing and purpose-built rentals. There's never going to be a home for sale that comes out of Build Canada Homes, and that's my entire critique.
The greatest thing we could do in Canada is make it possible for more younger, middle-income people to buy homes in places they want to live. It is a good idea to develop smaller centres, but why would we want to insist that young Canadians move far away? You can't live in Burnaby anymore. You have to go way the hell to somewhere else. You can't do it, because it's just too expensive, and it will be too expensive forever.
That's my problem with the whole approach. Yes, more social housing is a great thing, because people who have problems need housing, but it's not helping young people buy homes.
:
I'll question Mr. MacKenzie first.
Mr. MacKenzie, we've heard a lot of testimony here at committee arguing that many owners of households may appear to be stable because of their accumulated home equity, but in practice they could be short on liquidity, and they're vulnerable to refinancing challenges and rising mortgage payments when they refinance, as well as the cost of insurance, taxes and maintenance.
My question for you today is this: Are you seeing more homeowners who are asset rich but cash poor? I thought that was always a farming term, but I guess it's spread to home ownership as well.
What specific mortgage market changes, whether around underwriting, refinancing flexibility or product design, would you recommend to help stabilize these issues?
:
Welcome back. We will resume the meeting.
[Translation]
I'd like to welcome the witnesses.
[English]
We have, from the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals, Mr. André Bolduc, licensed insolvency trustee, as well as Wesley Cowan, another licensed insolvency trustee.
[Translation]
We also have Maude Pugliese, associate professor at the Institut national de la recherche scientifique at Université du Québec.
[English]
We have as well Douglas Hoyes, the licensed insolvency trustee for Hoyes, Michalos and Associates Inc.
I would like to remind participants of the following points.
Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your microphone, and please mute it when you are not speaking.
For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: the floor audio, English or French.
As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.
As you just heard, all of our virtual witnesses have conducted a mandatory witness onboarding test.
[Translation]
Let's get started. Each witness will have five minutes for their opening remarks. Afterwards, we will proceed with a round of questions.
[English]
We will begin with the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals.
:
Madam Chair and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
My name is André Bolduc, and with me virtually is Wes Cowan. We are both licensed insolvency trustees, federally regulated by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy, and we appear on behalf of the Canadian Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals, or CAIRP for short. I am the immediate past chair, and Wes is the current vice-chair. CAIRP represents nearly 1,400 members and associates working in consumer and commercial insolvency and restructuring across Canada.
As frontline professionals, we work directly with Canadians in financial distress and, as the only professionals authorized to provide formal legal debt solutions to Canadians, we see first-hand the consequences of household debt.
I will now turn things over to my colleague, Wes Cowan, on the trends we are seeing.
We are seeing several consistent trends.
First, many Canadian households remain under significant financial pressure due to increasing debt levels. With little savings and many living paycheque to paycheque, even a modest shock can quickly lead to a financial crisis.
Second, we are seeing longer-term and riskier debt products, especially in auto lending. The combination of higher vehicle prices, loan terms stretching over seven to eight years and consumers carrying negative equity is a problem for households.
Third, alternative and digital lending, including buy now pay later products, have expanded rapidly. Once used mainly for small purchases, these products now finance everything from travel to major household expenses. These lending products are easy to access, but they are expensive and difficult to exit.
Fourth, the costs of housing pressures are increasing. Rents are higher, and many preconstruction buyers are losing deposits and walking away from contracts as falling property values make financing harder to secure. Longer mortgage amortizations may delay distress, but they can also mask underlying affordability problems.
Finally, income volatility is becoming more common. Irregular earnings in gig work and self-employment can leave households struggling to match tax obligations and cash flow, often increasing reliance on credit.
We believe there are four areas where targeted action could improve the resilience of Canadian households. At this point, I'll turn it back to André to expand on these areas.
:
These four targeted actions could improve the resilience of Canadian households.
First, we believe that stronger federal-provincial alignment is needed to improve consumer protection. Rules on issues such as statute-barred debts, collection practices, credit reporting and consumer remedies vary widely across provinces, creating confusion for consumers and regulatory gaps.
Second, stronger protections are needed against false and misleading advertising of debt solutions, along with clearer direction to trusted sources of advice. For example, Google offers a useful model whereby, in Canada, only federally regulated, licensed insolvency trustees may advertise debt services on its platform. We believe that similar standards should apply across other digital and social media platforms.
Third, CAIRP supports having responsible lending guardrails that preserve access to credit while reducing harm. Possible measures could include limits on auto loans where there is negative equity, clearer disclosure for high-cost and digital lending and, of course, more consistent oversight across all types of lenders.
Lastly, financial literacy efforts should continue to be strengthened. Licensed insolvency trustees contribute to financial literacy through the mandatory counselling we provide in bankruptcies and consumer proposals, but we believe that more could be done. CAIRP remains committed to working with the OSB and the FCAC to help Canadians access reliable and timely debt advice.
We look forward to answering the committee’s questions.
Thank you.
:
Good afternoon, Madam Chair and members of the committee.
Thank you very much for the invitation to appear.
I am a sociologist, a professor at the Institut national de la recherche scientifique or INRS, and the Canada research chair in family financial experiences and wealth inequality.
In 2022, I did a study on close to 5,000 adult Quebeckers to document their debt. My work is largely based on the results of that study. I've also submitted my full research report to the committee for further reference.
I'd first like to emphasize the importance of distinguishing between debt and excessive debt, that is, debt that's become difficult or impossible to repay. It's really these situations that cause stress, even psychological distress and a decline in financial health, particularly due to the accumulation of interest.
My study shows that, despite the extent of household debt in Canada, most people are not dealing with excessive debt, but a sizable minority is. In 2022, 66% of Quebeckers were in debt, and only 10% of those debtholders were having a very hard time paying it off or were unable to do so. Another 18% of them struggled to pay it off on occasion. That's a pretty big group.
We need to understand what leads to excessive debt in order to implement effective prevention strategies. My results suggest that it's not just a matter of how much debt one carries, poor financial literacy or spending beyond one's means. The determining factor is also the context in which the debt was incurred.
Those struggling to repay have generally taken on debt, not as a planned strategic investment, such as buying a house, but to make up for a lack of resources often linked to a destabilizing life event. In these cases, debt is urgently used as a last resort to meet basic needs, often through high-interest credit products—we've mentioned them at this meeting—because people have no other options or they are unaware of their options.
My study more specifically identified three major situations that lead to this type of debt, which I call compensatory debt.
First is support for children and loved ones: 12% of indebted individuals, especially women, reported going into debt to finance parental leave because they had no access to child care or due to a caregiving situation.
Second, 11% took on debt to cope with job loss, and this was often coupled with health problems.
Finally, 4% said they took on debt to offset a combination of financial problems related to chronically low resources.
More than half of the people who took on debt for those reasons were struggling to pay it off.
To prevent excessive debt, we need to act upstream, in my opinion, by helping people be better able to deal with these situations without resorting to costly credit.
I could offer three main suggestions.
First, certain social programs should be enhanced, including family policies, namely child care services, parental leave, and support for family caregivers and, of course, programs related to job loss and disability.
Second, we should improve awareness of available programs and alternatives to credit during transitions that may lead to compensatory debt, such as the birth of a child, job loss or illness, through education and financial counselling that truly aim to connect with people when they are experiencing those situations.
Third, we must also recognize the real need for small amounts of credit in the short and medium terms among people with lower incomes or who are experiencing a significant loss of income. For many of them, it's really hard to save for basic expenses like winter clothing or emergencies. Also, it's almost inevitable that they will purchase these expensive items on credit.
However, for people with lower incomes, the supply of short-term credit is currently dominated by alternative sector lenders that are often more expensive and less regulated. Banks, for example, often exclude low-income people from their best offers, such as their rewards credit cards, while at the same time indirectly making them bear the costs—
:
Madam Chair and honourable members of the committee, thank you for the invitation. My name is Doug Hoyes of Hoyes, Michalos. I am a licensed insolvency trustee. Over the last 27 years, my firm has helped more than 75,000 Canadians formally deal with their debt.
Let me give you three observations on what we're seeing on the ground right now. First, this isn't a new debt problem. It's the same problem stretched further. Canadians are carrying more debt for longer before they run out of options. Based on data we gather from our clients and publish annually in our Hoyes, Michalos Joe Debtor bankruptcy study, the average insolvent Canadian now owes over $67,000 in unsecured debt, spread across more than 10 creditors. That's not one bad decision. Canadians are layering debt on top of debt, using credit as a coping strategy. By the time they come to see me, they're not dealing with one problem. They're dealing with 10.
Consumer insolvency is a lagging indicator. People don't rush to file. They exhaust every option first—refinancing, balance transfers, minimum payments—before seeking formal help. What we are seeing today is financial stress being stored, not resolved. That doesn't fully show up in today's numbers, but it will. Today's relatively modest increase in insolvency filings understates the pressure building beneath the surface. That pressure will lead to a higher number of insolvency filings over the next 12 to 24 months.
My second observation is that the federal government, through the Canada Revenue Agency, is a creditor in over 40% of personal insolvencies. Based on my estimates, approximately $1.4 billion of CRA debt was included in consumer insolvencies last year. In most cases, the best outcome for all parties is a consumer proposal, one where the debtor repays a portion of their debt and creditors receive more than they would in a bankruptcy. In practice, though, we are seeing a growing disconnect.
As you may be aware, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada recently identified significant service delivery challenges at the CRA. I have the same concerns. In practice, when the CRA is a significant creditor, consumer proposals may take months to be reviewed. In some cases, the CRA requires repayment terms that exceed what the debtor can realistically afford.
The result is predictable. The proposal fails. The debtor files bankruptcy. Everyone, including the government, recovers less. The debtor was willing to pay more, but the system just didn't allow it. This is not a policy problem; it's a process problem. If the goal is to maximize recovery, then decisions should be grounded in what is achievable, not what is theoretically recoverable.
Finally, I would like to address the issue of unlicensed debt advisers. We continue to see cases where vulnerable Canadians unwittingly fall prey to unregulated advisers who charge significant upfront fees for unnecessary services or, in some cases, harmful ones. These consumers often arrive at a licensed insolvency trustee later, with fewer options and worse outcomes. As the superintendent of bankruptcy noted in her testimony before this committee last week, she has made progress in this area. I commend her for that and encourage continued enforcement.
Canada's insolvency system is fundamentally sound. It balances two objectives—maximizing recovery for creditors and providing a fresh start for the honest but unfortunate debtor—but right now we are seeing strains in how it operates. Financial pressure is building, process decisions are reducing recoveries, and vulnerable consumers are still falling prey to unscrupulous debt advisers. These are real problems, but they are solvable. If we focus on what people can realistically repay, we will improve outcomes for debtors, creditors and taxpayers.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to the witnesses.
Mr. Hoyes, you were talking about the consumer insolvencies. I was noticing, when I was doing my research, that prior to, let's say, the pandemic, we saw a lot of consumers go through bankruptcy. Today, it's proposals, so that trend, obviously, is better. It probably gets better returns for everyone affected by an insolvency situation.
Is there one point in particular that drives these? I'm thinking in terms of, is it housing costs, is it food and everyday expenses, or is it debt accumulated gradually through credit cards and unsecured borrowing? Is there one of those factors that plays a bigger role in what you see?
:
Okay, I'm going to move on to Mr. Cowan.
Mr. Cowan, I met recently with a lot of university and college students across Atlantic Canada, and one of the things I took from that meeting was they spoke about the amount of debt they started life with after school. In lots of instances, it's a lot more than $25,000, and particularly in Atlantic Canada, a lot of these students have to be mobile, in that they have to go and find work in their careers where the work is available, which increases their need either to find rental properties or—down the road, when they're established—to buy homes.
In your experience, are you seeing more young Canadians, particularly in regions like Atlantic Canada, entering insolvency? Are they hitting a brick wall?
:
Definitely, in my own practice, I've noticed that there is a growing number of younger Canadians who are running into financial difficulty and sometimes having to seek assistance and possibly insolvency services.
I think a lot of that has to do with just what we touched on in our introductory remarks. The nature of work, particularly for younger people, tends to be more short-term, the gig economy kind of thing, and that inconsistency in their income is what contributes to that problem.
To your point about the idea of student loans, fortunately the student loan bodies in Canada, for the most part, are very co-operative and try to help students as much as they can with payment deferrals and things like that. That's a great help to those students, those young people, but you know, it is a challenge right now to try to maintain a level of income that will allow them that mobility and those opportunities.
As it happens, my colleague Mr. McDonald almost saved me because I was going to ask Professor Pugliese some questions and apologize for perhaps mispronouncing her name. So I thank him, that's some very good cross-partisan work.
Professor Pugliese, you talked about the distinction between debt and excessive debt. I imagine that, somewhere, there must be a dynamic there. A person who has a lot of debt can, through a combination of circumstances, develop excessive debt. After that, they become subject to all the problems associated with that.
I'd like to know what factors in an economic environment can make someone go from being in debt to being in excessive debt. For example, I'm thinking of rising interest rates or rising commodity prices, but also of the fact that we have an employment insurance program. You talked about the social safety net, which, according to the latest figures I've seen, doesn't adequately cover nearly 45% of workers in Canada.
What factors take people from debt to excessive debt, with all the attendant ills?
:
Yes. When you look at consumers' budgets, probably the second-highest expense after housing is car payments, along with the gas and the insurance. Sometimes it's a lot more than food, even. If you have a household with two cars, it gets compounded.
We've found that cars are more expensive. You used to finance cars over four or five years. Now, the average is seven years, and we see up to eight years. These are major lenders giving those rates. Payments are getting spread out more.
Also, we're seeing people trade in cars that are not fully paid off. Those get traded in at what's outstanding on the loan, not what the car is worth. When you get a new car, you're rolling in the shortfall on the other one, and now you're paying for two cars or a car and a half. I've also seen scenarios where there are two cars that were traded in. When we see them, the shortfall can be $20,000 to $30,000. Over time, those additional payments grind down on your budget, and that's money you can't spend elsewhere. That's the problem we're seeing there.
It's a really great conversation today, and I appreciate all the witnesses' testimony.
As I'm listening here, I think our economy has gone through shock after shock after shock. We can go back to the 2008 financial crisis. We can think of COVID-19. We have climate change, and we have the trade and tariff war at this point. These shocks are what, predominantly anyway, have situationally had Canadians fall further and further behind.
Isn't the challenge really to build a more prosperous and resilient economy, so that Canadians who are accumulating debt...? For example, I know that my grandmother paid 19% on her first mortgage with my grandfather many years ago. We've been in a low-interest environment for quite some time that Canadians got used to, and rightly so. It's no longer a stable environment, due to all these shocks.
We've targeted supports as a government to individuals who find themselves extra vulnerable in that leg of the K-shaped economy that we've heard so many talk about. We have an income tax cut for 22 million Canadians in the lowest tax bracket, a groceries and essentials benefit, the Canada child benefit, child care and dental care. We've capped non-sufficient fund fees and done so much more. There are many other policies that have been targeted.
I'm asking myself what more we can do. We've heard that, in many cases, people have been pushed into further and further indebtedness through no fault of their own. A major life event has often precipitated their reaching that point where their over-indebtedness is something that they can't really cope with.
Ms. Pugliese, you talked about people who had experienced a job loss, were injured or went through a separation or divorce. A lot of the measures I've mentioned already target individuals with subsidizing child care, offering the Canada child benefit or reducing the cost of dental care. Those must be helping those families. What more do you think we should do? Can you acknowledge that those have helped, and can you also suggest anything further that we should be considering?