FAAE Committee Meeting

    I call this meeting to order.

    Welcome to meeting number 40 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development.

     Pursuant to the order of reference of the House of Commons of Tuesday, February 24, 2026, the committee will now proceed to the clause-by-clause consideration of Bill C-219, an act to amend the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law), the Special Economic Measures Act and the Broadcasting Act.

    I would now like to welcome the officials who are with us today to assist the committee and answer members' questions during the meeting.

     From the Canada Border Services Agency, we have Brett Bush, director general, immigration and asylum policy.

    From the Department of Canadian Heritage, we have Charlene Budnisky, senior director of communication legislative and regulatory policy, and Pietro Cimino, acting manager, broadcasting, by video conference.

    From the Department of Citizenship and Immigration, we have Matthew Sharp, assistant director of admissibility policy.

    From the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development, we have Robert Brookfield, director general of sanctions and strategic export controls. We also have Jennifer Keeling, deputy director, human rights and freedoms, as well as Vindya Seneviratne, deputy director, sanctions policy division.

    Before we proceed, I'd like to provide members of the committee with a few comments on how committees proceed with the clause-by-clause consideration of a bill. This is an examination of all the clauses in the order in which they appear in the bill. I will call each clause successively. Each clause is subject to debate and a vote. If there is an amendment to the clause in question, I'll recognize the member proposing it, who may explain it.

    The amendment will then be open for debate. When no further members wish to intervene, the amendment will be voted on. Amendments will be considered in the order in which they appear in the package that each member received from the clerk. Amendments have been given a number in the top right corner to indicate which party submitted them. During debate on an amendment, members are permitted to move subamendments.

    Once every clause has been voted on, the committee will vote on the title and the bill itself, and an order to reprint the bill may be required if amendments are adopted so that the House has a proper copy for use at report stage. Finally, the committee will have to order the chair to report the bill to the House.

    I thank the members for their attention and wish everyone a productive clause-by-clause consideration of this bill.

     Pursuant to Standing Order 75(1), consideration of clause 1, short title, and of the preamble are postponed.

    (On clause 2)

    The Chair: The chair therefore calls clause 2.

    Under clause 2 is the new G-3.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Before I begin, I'll say that we will be having a number of amendments that have been given notice for and maybe one or two that we will table during the meeting.

     I want to start by thanking Mr. Bezan for the bill; Mr. Lawrence, who had a bill in the last Parliament; and Ms. Lantsman, who worked extensively on that bill. Raising these issues for Canadians and for the international community has been really important. We will be, in good faith, attempting to do two things as we walk through these amendments.

    First, we want to strengthen some of the parts around transnational repression, which we think has been very much on Canadians' minds in a number of communities. This has been of interest to many Canadians who are worried about the safety and security of their neighbours and the ability for Canadians to exercise democracy in their daily lives without fear of some repercussion from another foreign entity.

     We'll also be mindful through this bill about ensuring that there's no collateral damage that was unintended in the bill. We want to ensure that we have a bill that is responsive to the needs of human rights defenders and those who are prisoners of political conscience, while also making sure that we respect their liberties and their freedoms at the same time. We want to ensure that we do not restrict the government from being able to help Canadians in trouble—primarily—as well as citizens of other countries who may find themselves victims of repressive governments. We'll be mindful of doing that.

     I come at this very much from my role as parliamentary secretary, more than my role as MP, in which I've had to work on these cases for many years. We've worked extensively with officials who do this in their daily lives. We get to pass legislation, and they have to work with it. Therefore, I also want to thank all the officials who are joining us today.

     Behind these officials are hundreds of people in missions around the world who deal with complex consular cases, as well as human rights defenders from other countries. We are going to be doing that.

     We also want to honour the life, work and witness of Sergei Magnitsky as we approach this bill. We want to make sure that it is honoured and that Canada can stand with like-minded countries around the world that are attempting to change the way repressive regimes work and the way we can stand up for democracy and human rights in the world.

     That being said, I'm going to take the third amendment, G-3, from the government side, which is in respect to clause 2. Clause 2 begins at line 3 of page 2 and continues through until line 20 or so of page 3.

     I move that clause 2 of Bill C-219 be amended by replacing line 10 on page 2 to line 13 on page 3 with the following.

     It would begin—let me get this correct.

    There's a point of order.

     We all have a copy of the amendments. If you want to give an explanation, fine, but I don't think we need to read them verbatim.

    Okay.

    It is short. It changes it to:

     That would be our first amendment, and you have it as G-3.

     I place the amendment on the floor for debate.

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

     We are not happy about this amendment, because it changes the front end of this on the human rights and removes some of the requirements around the reporting.

    We had witnesses. Vladimir Kara-Murza said,

    Brandon Silver, when he appeared, said, “more public reporting can be helpful. We've found cases in which it has, more often than not, led to release.”

    Marcus Kolga reflected that.

     Bill Browder said, “I can tell you that in 100% of the cases, it's a good thing for governments to name and shame, to label authoritarian regimes as acting out badly and arresting people who shouldn't be arrested, and to name prisoners of conscience. It's never a bad thing.”

    In light of the testimony we heard and the work that all of us have done with different diaspora communities in our meetings over the years, with prisoners of conscience and with people who have faced persecution because of their political beliefs, religious beliefs or opposition to these authoritarian regimes around the world, now we're going to take out some of the definition. We're going to, essentially, at the end of the day, reduce some of the reporting requirements and what's in those reports. The only ones, really, who are going to be happy about this are the dictators, such as Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and the ayatollahs.

    Mr. Oliphant, go ahead.

    With all due respect to those witnesses—particularly Mr. Kara-Murza—who spoke about their personal experiences, people who did not testify at this committee have had a different experience, and they have not had a public profile.

    I want to make sure that those who've had experiences of success—as we and the world had in that case—because of public attention.... There have been many cases that we don't hear about because they are still personal and private. We are trying to say one size does not fit all cases.

    We had testimony from the Human Rights Action Group in their written brief—which was our number nine brief—from Mr. Robert Brookfield with Global Affairs Canada, as well as from Angelica Liao-Moroz on May 7. There were three different opinions that were contrary to those.

    What I think the government is asking for is the flexibility to use nuance and discretion to decide when it is best to go public, and to encourage family members and NGOs to go public, and when not to go public.

    In my own personal experience, three years ago, I had a very difficult case. I was working on the case of a non-Canadian citizen who was a permanent resident of Canada incarcerated in another country. There were NGOs that wanted to go public. I had to work with them very carefully to ensure the safety of that particular political prisoner, as well as many others, and we were able to bring him home. That's a case in which he was in such a situation that he would not testify at a committee like this because it would be too difficult for him.

    We're trying to balance things. We believe that public declarations are, at times, extremely important and should be used. However, requiring these can put people's lives in danger. We have witness testimony that would back that up and would hold to our amendment.

    Are there any other comments on this amendment?

     There are other written briefs, as well, from people such as Michael Kovrig, Bennett Kovrig, Grace Chen and Ariana Botha, who said it's important to send a “vital message to families that their loved ones remain a priority and [this] reinforces transparency and accountability in efforts to secure their release.” They wrote in support of increased reporting requirements.

    The Prosperity, Advancement, Networking and Direction Settlement Services and the Iranian Justice Collective also wrote, “A response requirement would make Canada's sanctions system more transparent, more serious, and more accessible to victims and diaspora communities.”

    There was also Andrea Charron and the Human Rights Foundation. They said that having a consistent reporting mechanism, reviewing the people on the list and those whom we're trying to help, making that public is ultimately in the best interest of the victims and their families.

    I think it sets the standard for us as Canadians, as well.

     Mr. Oliphant is next.

    The point is taken. However, again I would say that my same argument would apply: Every family is different, and I don't believe that every family needs that to know that the government is standing with them.

    I know that our consular officials work literally 24 hours a day in supporting the families, but families don't always find the support successful, because their loved one is still not home and they're in a difficult situation. As a pastor, I know that if someone is in a difficult position, you want to show your support.

    Every family is different. Again, I would say that we want discretion at the hands of not only our minister in reporting, but of our consular officials in the way that they support families who are in very difficult positions.

     I see no further comments on this amendment.

    (Amendment agreed to on division)

    The Chair: We go next to CPC-1.

    Mr. Chair, I'm not going to move this amendment.

    (Clause 2 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 3)

     We're on clause 3.

    Mr. Oliphant is next.

    On clause 3, you're not—

    We have no amendments, and neither do you.

    Okay.

    Agreed.

     I'm just looking. I have a lot of paper here. I thought that there had been a Conservative one. I'm sorry.

    (Clause 3 agreed to)

    (On clause 4)

    On clause 4, we have the new G-4.

    Yes. I would amend that.

    Continue, Mr. Oliphant.

    With respect to clause 4, I move that we amend it by replacing line 1 on page 4 with the following:

    It also amends the clause by adding after line 6 on page 4 the following:

    Are there any comments on that amendment?

    Mr. Chair, I support the amendment.

    (Amendment agreed to)

    (Clause 4 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 5)

     On clause 5, we have CPC-2.

    Mr. Chair, I move CPC-2, which all members will have.

     Are there any comments or debate on CPC-2?

     On CPC-2, what we're trying to do is prevent the sanctions evasion tactics that are....

     Am I in the right spot? I want to make sure I have the right number here. There we go.

    We want to make sure that “immediate family member” is more carefully defined, and we want to strengthen it to ensure that people aren't using their family members or extended family members, whether it's siblings, their dependent children, parents or even grandparents, to hide their wealth and to avoid sanctions here in Canada.

    We've had support for that.

    Brandon Silver gave some really great testimony on this. He said:

     He also said:

    Vladimir Kara-Murza, in talking about what's happening in Russia, said that they “all hid behind not dependents but siblings, adult non-dependent children or spouses and so on.” That's for making sure they can hide their illicit wealth.

    That's where we need to go to ensure Canada is not being used as a safe haven to allow those who have already been named and sanctioned to use the back door in using their family members to access our better property market or our safer banking system.

     Are there any further comments on CPC-2?

    Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

     Our side will not be supporting the amendment. We have a concern that it introduces a wide-sweeping definition of “family member” not currently recognized by the IRPA. It is different, and it would use authorities in a different way.

    Our concern is with regard to the mechanisms and operations of government. We believe that there is power under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, administered by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, that would accomplish this work without us doing it. Therefore, we will not be supporting the amendment and ultimately will not be supporting clause 5.

    I want to give Mr. Sharp, an official from Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, the chance to offer his comments on this.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The challenge we see with this is that the bill, as worded, talks of visas and documents, but it doesn't speak to admissibility, which is ultimately the heart of how we enforce the IRPA. My colleague, Mr. Bush, can speak more to that.

    This government passed Bill S-8 in 2023, which introduced a new inadmissibility provision that covers all of the sanctions legislation. That's the Sergei Magnitsky Law, as well as the Special Economic Measures Act, which makes people who are sanctioned inadmissible to Canada.

    If we were to deny a visa.... Suppose, looking at this list of relatives, we were to miss somebody somehow. For example, H is a foreign national who resides permanently with the foreign national in question. They could come to Canada, and we would lack an ability to enforce against that person because that person wouldn't actually be inadmissible under the IRPA. As a result, we would propose that sanctioning these individuals through the sanctions legislation would be a more effective tool to prevent their travel to Canada.

    I would just say that we are in agreement with our siblings in the other department in that we also think there are some other problems with this with respect to dual citizens, who may be in a different position and be able to come into Canada another way. We think that sanctioning is the better tool for stopping them. That doesn't mean we are not concerned about family members being safe harbour for funds or other assets that we need to be concerned about. We are concerned about it.

    We also want to respect the work. As a machinery of government issue, it would be impossible to do. One of our problems with the bill as it forms is that it's an omnibus bill that is addressing several pieces of legislation, but not the IRPA. If there were some fine tuning under the IRPA, they could do it there, but we still think our acts are the best place to do this work. We will really take it under advisement to make sure that we are sanctioning the appropriate family members who don't harbour assets.

    Is there any further debate on this? Okay.

    (Amendment negatived on division)

    The Chair: Shall clause 5 carry?

     No, we will not support clause 5.

    You will not support clause 5, even without the amendment. You're cancelling clause 5. Okay.

    Mr. Chair, I propose an amendment for clause 5.

    I'm sorry. Let's back up here. You're asking if clause 5 is going to carry unamended.

     Yes, and we're saying no.

    Okay. We support clause 5.

    We will be voting against clause 5.

    (Clause 5 negatived on division)

    (On clause 6)

     We're moving on to clause 6 and to G-4.1. Are there any comments?

     We have, again, an amendment to clause 6. We would amend it by replacing....

    I just have to get my other paper here.

     Are you moving G-4.1?

     Yes, we're on G-4.1.

    It states, as item (a), that Bill C-219, in clause 6, be amended by replacing line 20 on page 4 with the following:

    That's changing it to 24 months.

    It would then, as item (b), replace line 22 on page 4 with the following:

    It would also, as item (c), replace line 24 on page 4 with the following:

    Those are our changes to proposed subsection 4.4(1).

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

     We want to move a subamendment to the amendment.

    Regarding subsection 4.4(1), it would say, “the restraint of private and public”. Under item (b), it would say, “apply for forfeiture of the private and public”. Under item (c), it would say, “(2) The Minister must dispose of the private and public property forfeited”. This ensures that government assets.... Oh, I guess it's not even going to be government assets, because it's not always public.

    I'm moving a subamendment to add...because they're just talking about private assets. They're not talking about government-held assets. If you think about it.... Maybe the word “public” isn't appropriate. I think it should be “government” or “foreign government”.

    Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

     We would not be in favour of that, because there's a separate set of international law that governs government or public property, which is quite distinct from private property—the object of our sanctions and forfeiture activities. I'm not sure whether we have an expert on this here.

    Maybe Mr. Brookfield could talk about that for us.

     I am not the expert on international diplomatic law, but I can say that, in general terms, this issue was also raised in the other place, in a related bill.

    There is a spectrum of property that can be owned by a government. Some of it can be commercial and may be subject to certain activities, but some of it is of a more “state” nature. The most classic example is diplomatic property, but there are others. Central banks are another question. It would be a violation of public international law to have seizures of that property.

     The example sent to me was this: The official residence of an ambassador, or an embassy, would be protected. It would be a complex thing under the Vienna Convention. It would be a different understanding, so we would like to stick to the basic point: 24 months, as opposed to 12. It would remain just “private”.

    We will be voting against the subamendment.

    To get this clarification, I will ask Mr. Brookfield, if I may, Mr. Chair.

    Go ahead.

    The Russian central bank holds something like $20 billion in Canadian currency, which we understand is not considered, right now, to be usable by them. It's one thing that has been sanctioned. At the same time, we're forcing any forfeiture of that asset. It still belongs to the Russian central bank.

    It's as Mr. Oliphant said. We have a court case in Ontario. The Ontario Superior Court ordered compensation for the victims of Ukrainian International Airlines flight PS752. As you know, over 55 Canadian citizens were killed, most of them of Iranian descent. Permanent residents were also on that flight. Some of those assets are the Iranian embassy, offices and residences they have in Toronto, Vancouver and here in Ottawa.

    Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.

    Those would not qualify for forfeiture.

    Go ahead, MP Fortier.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I recognize the importance of this private member's bill and the desire to advance certain ideas. The problem is that the subamendment was not received in both official languages or explained.

    I think we were discussing the amendment. So I'm wondering about the procedure at this stage. Honestly, I'm a bit confused. I just want to know a little bit about the procedure.

     I will turn to the legislative clerk for an answer to that.

    Mr. Chair, on the same point of order, it is procedurally in form for a member to introduce amendments or subamendments orally during the clause-by-clause process.

     My understanding is that the member can do that. The issue is that after the member does that....

    Unless there is an agreement to withdraw the subamendment, we have the option of suspending, and—

    Mr. Chair, that's when I'll have more information in writing so I can fully understand the subamendment. Is that correct?

     I will suspend briefly so that we can—

     I'll withdraw it. Robert has already said that you guys are voting against it, and I don't want to lose time.

     Okay. That was part of what I was trying to measure, to see if it was necessary.

    Thank you very much.

    We'll go back to amendment G-4.1.

    (Amendment agreed to on division)

    The Chair: We are now on G-4.2.

    Do we have any comments or debate?

    Yes.

    Continuing on with clause 6, we propose to add an exemption to the prior proposed subsection in clause 6 in order to accommodate due process concerns. We want to ensure that this is feasible and doable, as in the above proposed subsection, recognizing, however, that “do not apply in cases in respect of which legal proceedings are ongoing” would not put the minister in conflict with the law.

    Are there any other comments on G-4.2?

    (Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    The Chair: I would like to ask for direction and agreement from members. There is a vote in 28 minutes and 54 seconds. I'm asking for the permission that would allow us to continue until such time as we can vote from our phones.

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    (Clause 6 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 7)

    The Chair: We are at amendment G-4.3.

    Do we have any comments or debate?

    Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

     Yes.

    G-4.3 is our written amendment. It moves to amend clause 7 in Bill C-219 by deleting line 32 on page 4 all the way through to the end of line 29 on page 5.

    I will just say that we support the aligning of the tabling timelines at the beginning of the clause, but we're proposing the deletion of this. We think it would require that a new statement accompany every tabling of a sanctions order regulation, including the evidence or criteria used, enforcement details, coordination with allies and the number of properties seized or frozen.

    We have proposed a deletion of this clause, which would have required that a response to the recommendation of a committee be provided. We can give a policy rationale, but we are attempting a fairly large deletion on that.

    Do members have any comments or debate on that?

    Mr. Chair, we don't support the removal of that. We don't support the amendment.

    I'll just leave it at that.

    (Amendment agreed to on division)

    Go ahead, Anita.

    Thank you. I know it's already been voted on, but I did wish to speak to that.

    I just wanted to say that as Parliament, we have this power already. I've been on the subcommittee on international human rights, and at the end of our reports, we name different people who should be sanctioned. We then request a government response.

    Parliament already has this power.

     Thank you.

    (Clause 7 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 8)

    The Chair: Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

    We have an amendment for clause 8.

    Is there unanimous consent not to have Mr. Oliphant read the amendments? That way we can move faster.

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    Okay.

     I am proposing the deletion of clause 8 because of the problem of machinery of government again and the policy directive of telling the RCMP or FINTRAC to do something to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which would take it out of the appropriate wheelhouse for their activity.

    It's not an amendment. It's a deletion.

     Shall clause 8 be negatived?

     I would like to speak to—

    On a point of order, Mr. Chair, I want to point out that the deletion is not in our package.

     They're voting against the clause.

    I understand, but it is in order.

    It is in order. I was thinking amendment, but I guess I have a paper here. It's not a deletion. We will be voting against the clause. Sorry, that was my mistake.

    I'd like to speak to why it's important to have it.

    Part of it is that if you look at the performance report of Global Affairs Canada's sanctions operations of 2018-24, it says, “Canada's sanctions legislation did not articulate a role for the FINTRAC”, which is clause 9. Clause 8 says we need to work with “improved coordination with other government departments,” such as the RCMP, FINTRAC and CBSA.

    That's what this is all about. It addresses the concerns that were raised in the performance report and the evaluation of Global Affairs Canada's sanctions operations. The report said that, looking at reports coming from the Senate and House of Commons committees, there was “a lack of clarity of departmental roles in sanctions enforcement. An underlying issue is the tension between authority and power for enforcement.”

    This is helping address those shortfalls. All we're asking for is better reporting between these government agencies to ensure that the sanctions bureau is operating across the responsibilities within the whole-of-government approach.

    Are there any further comments on clause 8?

    (Clause 8 negatived on division)

    (On clause 9)

    The Chair: We're on clause 9.

    Go ahead, Mr. Chong.

     Mr. Chair, I'd like to move amendment CPC-3.

     Sorry. There's a new clause, clause 9.1.

    We have to deal with clause 9 first, and then we'll go to 9.1.

    I would add that I believe you will find that CPC-3 and G-5 are similar. They are very close, so I think we'll be finding agreement on that.

     We're not there yet. We still have to deal with clause 9.

    Before we get to 9.1, I'd advise you we'll be voting against clause 9, just so you know. There'll be a new clause that will replace 9, which is no longer 9 anyway.

     All right.

    (Clause 9 negatived on division)

    The Chair: Now we can go to new clause 9.1 and amendment CPC-3.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I move CPC-3.

     Are there any comments or debate on CPC-3?

    Since CPC-3 was moved, G-5 cannot be moved, as they are identical. That deals with the next item.

    Could we get advice, Mr. Chair, from the legislative clerk?

    We think CPC-3 and G-5 are so similar that we would simply withdraw G-5. Is that how that would work?

    My understanding from the clerk is that because G-5 is identical to CPC-3, it cannot be moved anyway; there's no point in withdrawing it, because it can't be moved to begin with.

    We're happy to have CPC-3 be moved first, and we would support it.

    (Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (On clause 10)

     We're on clause 10.

     We will not be supporting clause 10, but we will be making a change in clause 11.

    Are there any further comments or debate on clause 10?

    We heard from witnesses that we have to make sure we are sending a strong message with the long and short titles of SEMA. Brandon Silver said:

    Vladimir Kara-Murza supported the renaming of it.

    Bill Browder called for it. He said, “When every other country calls it a Magnitsky act and Canada does not, that alignment becomes harder than it needs to be.” He also said, “When his name is embedded in law, it tells the world—every abuser, every corrupt official and every torturer—exactly what these sanctions are for and exactly whom they are named after. That clarity has a power.”

    By not using the name “Magnitsky”.... Again, why are we trying to appease Putin?

    We have a response, because we thought that was coming.

    What we are suggesting is not clause 10. We're going to be suggesting we defeat clause 10 and amend clause 11. I've given you some new paper on clause 11, which is with respect to the SEMA. Instead of being this way, it would read, “This Act may be cited as the Global Sanctions and Special Economic Measures Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 2)”.

    We're trying to do both of these things. We're going to end up—and I will just give you advance notice—with three Sergei Magnitsky laws. We have the existing one that we call the Magnitsky law, which will retain its short name afterwards. SEMA will add “Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 2”, and this law, once passed, will be called “Sergei Magnitsky law no. 3”, which enacts changes to others. There will then be three Sergei Magnitsky laws, including the original one—the victims law—and SEMA, which will be renamed with a short title of the “Global Sanctions and Special Economic Measures Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 2)”.

    I will tell you that's partly financial. We looked at the cost of up to $50,000 to change all of that. We thought that was not a good use of the money, but then we would also honour this private member's bill by referring to it as “Sergei Magnitsky law no. 3”. We'll get to that when we get to the preamble and the title of this act. There will be three.

    Are there any further comments?

     I'm not happy about it.

     It was going to be the James Bezan law.

    No, I don't want my name in it.

    (Clause 10 negatived)

    (On clause 11)

     We're on clause 11.

    I will propose that amendment at this point.

     Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

     Did it get to our side as well? I'm not sure.

    I move that Bill C-219 in clause 11 be amended by replacing lines 29 and 30 on page 6 with the following: “This act may be cited as the Global Sanctions and Special Economic Measures Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 2)”.

    We'll take a brief suspension so folks can digest the amendment.

    I think we're good. They know what they're doing. It's short and sweet.

    Okay.

    Therefore, I pose the question to members: Shall clause 11 as amended carry?

     We have the amendments first and then the clause.

    Apparently we're calling the amendment that has just been moved by Mr. Oliphant new LIB-5.1.

    (Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (Clause 11 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 12)

    The Chair: Are there any comments or debate on clause 12?

    Could you give me one moment, please?

    Yes, we are supporting clause 12 with no changes, but then we are going to make an addition.

    (Clause 12 agreed to)

     We now move on to amendment G-6, which proposes a new clause 12.1.

    Mr. Oliphant, go ahead.

    You will find that in G-6.

    This is where we're hoping that we actually bump up the bill a notch. We think it will replace clauses of SEMA, ensure that it captures both state and non-state actors, and align the language with new and updated triggers proposed in the bill. I move the following:

    We're broadening it to try to make it a bit richer based on.... We think it's still within the scope of the bill.

    Mr. Chair, I support the amendment.

    (Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (On clause 13)

     Now we move on to amendment new G-7.

    Yes, I will continue in that vein.

    In clause 13, we are proposing an amendment. As you can see, it is fairly extensive. Clause 13 would be amended by replacing, as you'll see, lines 12 to 20 with the text that you have in front of you and “by adding after line 25...the following”, as it is in the written document.

    (Amendment agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (Clause 13 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 14)

     Next is amendment CPC-4. Are there any comments, questions or debate?

    Mr. Chair, I'll move CPC-4.

    Again, this is similar to what we did earlier. It reflects our amendment to clause 5 in the bill. It provides that wider definition. We've already heard the argument from the government, so I'm not going to waste a bunch of oxygen on it.

    We appreciate your sensitivity to our needs.

    Don't read it that way. It's about picking your battles.

    Shall CPC-4 carry?

    (Amendment negatived on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (Clause 14 negatived on division)

    (On clause 15)

     We have G-7.1. Are there comments or debate?

    I have Mr. Oliphant.

    What we are proposing is that in clause 15 be amended by replacing line 1 on page 8 with the following:

In addition:

and

It's the same as what we did in the earlier clause.

    Are there any comments?

    We're opposed to G-7.1, but they have the votes.

    We're in favour of it.

    (Amendment agreed to on division [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    We're on G-7.2.

     Similarly, in G-7.2, it's that clause 15 be amended by adding after line 6, as we did earlier in the bill, that:

    This is to ensure that the minister doesn't get into trouble.

    (Amendment agreed to)

    (Clause 15 as amended agreed to)

    (Clause 16 and 17 negatived on division)

    (On clause 18)

    We're on G-7.3.

    You'll see that, at G-7.3, we move that Bill C-219, in clause 18, be amended by deleting lines 7 to 13 on page 9.

    We keep the first part of it, and then we delete from lines 7 to 13.

     If G-7.3 is adopted, CPC-5 cannot be moved. This is due to a line conflict.

     As House of Commons Procedure and Practice, fourth edition, states in section 16.71, “Once a line of a clause has been amended by the committee, it cannot be further amended by a subsequent amendment as a given line may be amended only once.”

    (Amendment agreed to on division)

    I've already addressed CPC-5.

    We've struck those lines.

    (Clause 18 as amended agreed to)

    (Clause 19 agreed to)

    (On clause 20)

     On clause 20, we have G-8. Is there discussion on G-8?

    Yes. I have an amendment with respect to clause 20 that it be amended by replacing line 24 on page 9 with the following:

    I just need to have the act, because these are odd little things.... What we are attempting to do is change the word “Act” on line 24 to “under this Part” to be more accurate in what is actually happening.

     It would then read: “The original or a copy of a bill of lading, customs document, commercial invoice or other document is admissible in evidence in a prosecution under this Part”. It really refers to part of the act, but that's the legal way of doing it, apparently—the “Part”—and it's “in relation to any dealing with respect to goods, or services”. It takes out “Act” and puts in the word “Part”.

    (Amendment agreed to)

    (Clause 20 as amended agreed to)

    (On clause 21)

    We're on clause 21.

    Just give me one minute. Sorry, where are we at with the votes?

    It's less than five minutes.

    We'll suspend.

    It's five minutes until the vote's called, and then we have 10 minutes. Okay.

    Sorry, I have a question on clause 21. In this, we have already replaced the name by an earlier amendment that we added under clause 11, and so it seems to me that this doesn't apply now under 21 because we've already changed the short title. I need help on this.

    I know what you're saying, Robert.

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

    This would go to the legislative clerk. It's that the short title of “Special Economic Measures Act” has been changed now to the “Global Sanctions and Special Economic Measures Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 2)”.

    You're saying that it's not the short title that has changed in any of the other pieces of legislation. That is why you're saying that clause 21 is now no longer relevant.

     That's what I believe.

    I have a question, because that's a legislative issue.

    We've already changed the term.

    We'll do a brief suspension to allow the legislative clerks to look into this. We have to vote anyway.

    Our main concern, so you know, is that clause 11 has now been changed. What do we do with terminology then after?

    It's a brief suspension.

     We are resuming the meeting.

     I'm asking for agreement among members to set aside clause 21 and clause 22.

    Is it agreed?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    (Clauses 21 and 22 allowed to stand)

     We will consider clause 21 and clause 22 on Tuesday at 5:30. The clerk has agreed to ask for extra resources for that day.

    (On clause 23)

    The Chair: We're on CPC-6.

     Mr. Chair, I move CPC-6, and I'd like to speak to it briefly.

    The first point to make is that airwaves are publicly owned. I believe that comes from a very old decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which ruled that—

    Mr. Chair, I'm sorry to interrupt Mr. Chong, but interpretation is currently not being provided in French. I can hear the member speaking in English, not in French.

    We will briefly suspend to make sure it works.

    We are resuming the meeting.

     We were discussing CPC-6.

    Go ahead, Mr. Chong.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I want to thank my Bloc Québécois colleague for emphasizing the importance of both official languages.

     Mr. Chair, I want to speak to why I'm moving this amendment.

    The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, back in the 1930s, very clearly ruled in their decision that the spectrum licensed in Canada is public property and is owned by the Government of Canada. It's considered a public property.

    The reason I point this out is that, while we all support freedom of expression here, the government is under no obligation to provide public space to authoritarian state broadcasters. For example, the Government of Canada is under no obligation to provide facilities for rent by Russia Today to host events. The same thing goes for public property, like the spectrum that the CRTC licenses. This is why the Government of Canada issued a directive in March 2022, under section 15 of the Broadcasting Act, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It directed the CRTC to study whether Russia Today should remain on the list of broadcasters of non-Canadian programming services and stations authorized for distribution.

     The purpose of this amendment is to make the government's broadcast policy one that is of even more general application. This amendment doesn't single out any particular state-controlled broadcaster, such as Russia Today.

    Rather, it adds, under section 7 of the Broadcasting Act:

    It's consistent with the direction the government issued under section 15 four years ago. It would make that direction of even more general application and would likely capture authoritarian state-controlled broadcasters like CGTN.

    The reason this is important is that, among many of our allies—the United Kingdom, for example—both Russia Today and CGTN have been pulled off the airwaves. That's not the case here. Russia Today is no longer broadcasting as a result of the section 15 direction from four years ago, but CGTN continues to broadcast. The challenge is that it has aired forced confessions on its broadcast. It is also editorially controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.

    That is the purpose of this amendment. I hope members of the committee will support it. It also fixes the existing drafting problem.

    Are there any comments on CPC-6?

    Go ahead, Mr. Oliphant.

     We have a few concerns about this.

    I would say that my first concern is that it is somewhat outside my expertise, as a member of the committee, to be dealing with this because it's not been our [Inaudible—Editor]. However, it also seems to push the scope of the bill and the intent of the author. We think it could be ruled out of order because it would open an unrelated provision of the Broadcasting Act, which deals with the power of the Governor in Council to issue directions under general application on broad policy matters, and this is not within the original scope of the bill.

    We have some other problems with clause 23 even as it's written, in that it requires the CRTC to do a number of things that are outside its expertise and its mandate, including an evaluation process with respect to the integrity of someone on the list. We don't issue licences to broadcasters that are foreign; we put them on the list of broadcasters that can be added to a licensed broadcaster. We think that this is not the best place to do it. It's becoming an omnibus bill. We think that the amendment itself is not within the scope of the bill as it's been presented. Even if it were, we would be concerned about it giving authorities that it may not be within the power of the CRTC to do.

    Given that, I would like to turn to officials from Canadian Heritage to make sure I'm not wrong.

    Mr. Chair, I have a point of order.

    Could we get the legislative clerk to tell us whether the amendment I moved is in order?

    Upon the advice of the legislative clerk, I'm told that the amendment is in order.

    It's in order.

     Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I'll turn back to Mr. Oliphant's request for the officials to comment.

     Thank you very much for the opportunity to comment on this amendment that would be proposed to the Broadcasting Act.

    You're absolutely right. Section 7 of the Broadcasting Act does, in fact, allow the Governor in Council to issue binding policy directions to the CRTC “of general application on broad policy matters” related to “broadcasting policy” or “regulatory policy” objectives. Accepting this amendment would place the CRTC in a position of assessing complex matters such as war crimes, human rights abuses and corruption, which fall outside the expertise of a broadcasting regulator.

    I accept the chair's ruling that it's in order, but I would say that it is outside the expertise of the CRTC—and its mandate—to do that. It would put the CRTC, as an independent agency, in a position of doing something it cannot do. I also worry that it gives cabinet—even though I know people there—a power of censorship that I think is not something we would be moving toward in this country. We want to find ways to ensure that the CRTC acts when there is any odious activity, or to be supportive of that, but I would still be very careful on a censorship issue.

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

    First of all, as we just heard from witnesses, they already take their direction and policies through orders in council that get issued by cabinet. In this amendment, this is still a cabinet decision by Governor in Council. It's still very specific on Mr. Oliphant's concerns about censorship, but it's tied to “breaches of international peace and security, transnational repression, gross and systemic human rights violations or acts of significant corruption”. It's very well defined, and we trust cabinet in drafting regulations. Regulations all become public at some point in time, and everybody gets to comment on them.

    Again, I think it provides direction and policy for the CRTC, and it refers to the list that is provided to those that are providing services to Canadians across this country for their TV watching. I think this falls in line with government policy. It definitely strengthens this bill, and it ensures that, again, it's in the hands of cabinet to make the decisions on who, on those bases—which entities—should be removed from those lists.

     Mr. Chair, I would add, though, that the CRTC has a system and series of processes whereby every decision they make in this sort of line has hearings, and there are appeal procedures. This gives cabinet absolute power to do something by directive to the CRTC, and we don't believe CRTC has the investigation power. This is something we're very concerned about.

    Even from the government side, we think that the CRTC needs to be protected as independent. When concerns are raised by the public, the CRTC has to deal with them, but not by direct order from the cabinet to make a decision. That's our concern, but I would turn to the officials to correct me or not.

    Yes, that is absolutely correct. In fact, the CRTC has a number of measures that it can put in place to bring a licensed Canadian broadcaster into compliance. For instance, if there was some soupçon of influence, or vulnerability to influence, the CRTC could issue orders. It could monitor things; it could ask for information, or it could issue administrative monetary penalties. These are all of the tools that it has available to it to bring a licensed Canadian broadcaster into compliance. Yes, certainly this would be the procedure that the CRTC would use to do so.

    Thank you.

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

     When was the last time CRTC actually sanctioned, banned or fined a non-Canadian broadcasting entity?

     I would have to do some research on that. I do not have the answer available to me.

     It took forever to get RT removed.

     If I may respond to that, it took two weeks to remove RT once the—

    After an order was given....

    —section 15...was issued.

    Some of us have spent years asking that RT be removed.

    Go ahead, Mr. Chong.

     The amendment doesn't actually ask the CRTC to adjudicate whether grave breaches of international peace and security, transnational repression, gross and systemic human rights violations or acts of significant corruption have taken place.

    What the amendment says is that the Governor in Council must issue a direction regarding state-controlled broadcasters from foreign states who have done those things. Presumably, this is not going to be the exact wording of the Governor in Council's direction. It is going to issue direction in line with this law, and that direction will be worded in a way that the Privy Council Office thinks is consistent with the other measures in the Broadcasting Act. That will be signed by certain ministers and then provided to the CRTC.

    This clause is not mandating that the CRTC is going to adjudicate the items enumerated here; the government is going to issue a direction to the CRTC regarding state-controlled broadcasters that have undertaken or committed these acts. I just want to point that out, because I think that's an important point to make.

    We have Mr. Oliphant.

    I'm afraid I read it differently. It says, first of all, that “The Governor in Council must, by order under subsection (1), issue to the Commission a direction that state-controlled broadcasters”—and this is undefined; we're still not always sure exactly what state-controlled and not state-controlled are, because some of them are grey—“from foreign states that have committed [these atrocities] not be on the List”. It's not giving discretion to the CRTC. It gives a direction saying that if this has happened, they are no longer on the list, so they're taken off with no recourse, no hearings, no anything.

     What I would say is that we, on this side of the House, have heard and seen it. I think we have to go back to the government to say that if this is defeated here, the government—not this committee necessarily—has some work to do on the Broadcasting Act so that Canadians have a way into this discussion to find out how we can ensure that our broadcasting system is not used by malevolent state actors. I think it's a good warning. It's a good signal. We just think that this is not the appropriate place to do it, and it is going to be difficult. We would be against the amendment; even if the amendment failed, we would still be against clauses 23 and 24.

     Mr. Chair, debate has been exhausted. I think that's clear.

    Absolutely.

    (Amendment negatived on division)

    (Clause 23 negatived)

    It's not on division. It's defeated, period. There's a problem with clause 23.

    (Clause 24 negatived)

    (On clause 1)

     We are on the short title.

     We would just like to hold for now, because there's a relationship between the SEMA change of title—we added Magnitsky 2—and the short title of this bill, which we would like to do as Magnitsky 3.

    However, we recognize that clause 11 is still in play in terms of how it affects the later two clauses. If we have to come back to the bill, we could come back to these two clauses—clause 21 and clause 22—in a separate meeting, as well as the short title and the preamble, so that we make sure to clean it up appropriately.

    That would be our suggestion.

    Go ahead, Mr. Bezan.

    It's just a request.

    If you're changing the short title, can you put on the record what the amendment will look like, even though we aren't going to vote on it today?

     My understanding is that the clerk has also sent out that amendment.

    Do we have it?

    I have it here. This act may be cited as the “International Anti-Corruption and Human Rights Act (Sergei Magnitsky Law No. 3)”. We take the title, but we put “Magnitsky” in brackets.

    We'll have three bills: number one, Raynell's bill; number two, SEMA; and number three, Bezan.

    We don't need to put—

    It will be called “Bezan”. You know that. We call the other one “Andreychuk's bill”. It is “Andreychuk”.

     I have a point of order.

    We're not going to consider G-1 and G-2 right now. We're going to set those aside until—

    I would suggest that we put them on hold.

    That's the suggestion, but again, it will depend on the will of the committee.

     We agree.

    Based on that decision, there's no more work we have to do today, in terms of the bill.

    This concludes the business of the day.

    Thank you. The meeting is adjourned.