:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chair and members of the committee, we are most grateful for the opportunity to appear before you.
Our point of departure for our presentation today comes from our involvement in the Centre of Excellence for Security, Resiliency, and Intelligence at the Schulich School of Business at York University in Toronto. However, for the record, our comments are our own.
Clearly, our current immigration policy has significant issues. As per the official record, some two-thirds of our current refugee applicants are found to be, by Canadian standards, inadmissible to Canada. However, the time between arrival and determination is not only a costly exercise to Canadians, but also a largely inefficient one, inasmuch as national interests are harmed, and legitimate claimants are adversely affected by this state of affairs.
The overriding fact of the matter is that the majority of people landing in Canada—excluding the majority of those travelling from the United States—either as legitimate visitors or as refugees are currently a product of a system that is based on discretion, intuition, and often by the determination of foreign nationals working for our embassies abroad. They are not, as the Auditor General observed, people vetted on the basis of sound, shared Canadian intelligence that would pre-screen any of those who potentially represent either criminal or security threats to this country.
Put simply, we do not have an elegant intelligence interface that allows us the benefit, in the age of information, of information that is the product of multiple vetted sources made available to those in our government who need it as the basis for sound decision-making.
In addition, those individuals within government who have an understanding of the differing sources of intelligence and how best to leverage these assets to not only support sound immigration policy, but also how to further our collective national interests, are often prevented from developing and implementing the necessary policies and initiatives. Accordingly, current policy is reactive rather than proactive.
As a result, individuals who represent various levels of threat to our national interests increasingly burden Canadians. Further, some of these individuals further threaten another critical interest and relationship, that of our neighbours and friends to the south. I would like to recall to members of the committee the damage done to our national interest by the mere perception in the United States, post-9/11, that a number of terrorists had come through Canada. What if our current policies lead to real threats to our friends and neighbours to the south? Might we not expect a significant tightening of what is effectively a critical component of our national economic interests? Might we not also expect other measures in what we have proudly seen as the world longest and oldest undefended border?
In the 21st century, the age of information, we need to force multiply and force protect our national interest by an aggressive and effective application of intelligence. In a time when a single individual can make war upon the planet, this is fundamental to our national interests. But, again, our interests are not limited to ourselves. Because we share a continent with a country that has been targeted by many and suffered much, we also need to think about our continental responsibilities.
With a view to that, I should like to give the remainder of our time to a great friend of Canada, Admiral Donald Loren. We have asked him to give you the benefit of his thoughts on these matters from an American perspective.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and honourable members of the committee. Thank you for inviting me here today.
I am honoured to be a great friend of Canada and a senior adjunct faculty member at the centre of excellence.
It is at my colleagues’ request that I have joined them today to appear before you. In their view, my work at the U.S. Department of Defense, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security Integration, and my work with the Director of National Intelligence, as the director of operations at the National Counterterrorism Center, is particularly related to the matters that you're going to discuss. It gives me certain insights that might be of benefit to your thinking on your way ahead.
I'm not here to address Canadian law in specific. As an American, it is not my place to do so. Rather, I am here to offer my perspective, as testimony, with a view to addressing your questions on how you are defining your own interests in the legislation. Certainly we all find this of interest, inasmuch as we do share the continent, and issues in either of our countries can quickly become important to both nations.
Clearly, a significant terrorist event will not be deterred by the longest undefended border in the world. A major attack would not, as it has been demonstrated in the past, be limited by borders, as evidenced by the death of 24 Canadians in the horrific events of 9/11. And it would not be inappropriate to single out singular events of impact alone when discussing this subject matter. What must also be considered are the policies and the legislations that address the ever-changing issues we face globally today, particularly where the threat spectrum continues to grow on an exponential basis.
You will recall how during 9/11 you assisted so many of my fellow Americans in accommodating landings of aircraft in your country. What this single event demonstrated is that we share the consequences of being neighbours. Therefore, within that context, we are concerned not with the legitimate traveller or the legitimate immigrant, but rather we are concerned about those who would threaten either of our countries, threaten our citizens, threaten our values, and threaten our interests.
In the 21st century, where transnational crime and terrorism pose substantial and increasing threats and risks, we cannot underestimate the impact of a single individual. What is worrisome for both of our countries is that the growing nexus between criminality and terrorism force multiplies the threats we currently face.
The degree to which we can be proactive is the degree to which we shall both succeed or fail as we face the challenges that lay ahead. Therefore, within that context, the challenges that both Canada and the United States face with respect to border security and immigration can only be resolved through both nations working together as we have done in the air and missile defence of North America through NORAD.
The key to working together will be to ensure that not only are the policies and programs that are implemented by both nations in alignment, but each nation is comfortable with the measures that are in place to address the customs and immigration challenges. In my professional experience, I can state that addressing these challenges is not only about ensuring that the necessary equipment and resources are in place but equally, if not more important, ensuring that the intelligence and law enforcement information upon which decisions are based is sound.
For example, biometrics is often presented as a potential solution to solve many of the immigration issues we both experience, but it would be naive to believe that implementing expensive technical solutions without the necessary intelligence to inform the technology is the sole answer. It is akin to buying the most expensive computer available, but not purchasing an operating system that it can use.
Canada’s membership of the Five Eyes provides access to significant amounts of information that can be used to better assess the potential risks posed by individuals attempting to enter the country, but this information must be readily available to the appropriate decision-makers and shared across agencies, something that both of our nations can do much better.
But even if the information was made available and utilized properly, there are secondary and tertiary concerns that must be addressed before courses of action are undertaken. For example, the security and assurance of the information must of course be protected.
This means it is paramount that the infrastructure and architecture of the security intelligence apparatus used creates a level of confidence amongst Canadian allies in order to have a more open flow of information.
The strong relationship between Canada and the United States must always consider political dynamics that face our respective countries, as these same political dynamics could have a significant impact on moving border initiatives forward. A mutual respect and understanding of the political winds of both countries should be considered when any course of action is taken, thus ensuring there are no misconceptions or misunderstanding among nations.
The United States works hard to ensure that its border, immigration, and security policies are correct, in the same way that Canada works hard at these very same issues. Our nations have built our relationship on trust and mutual cooperation, and that should continue to be the case.
In closing, both the United States and Canada have talented security and intelligence professionals to perform the work that lies ahead. These people exist both within and outside of our respective governments, and it should be a priority of government to engage these professionals and use to the fullest capacity the sound knowledge and practical solutions they offer to the security problems our nations face together.
Thank you.
First let me say that information sharing amongst our nations continually improves and is at a very high state. I know I, for one, worked very closely with ITAC when I was at NCTC, worked very closely with the Canadian defence forces at the Department of Defence.
But what I was alluding to, sir, is much, much broader than the information-sharing amongst nations. I think we're pretty good; we have lots of room for improvement, but there are vehicles in place. And there's a tendency to certainly treat the members of the Five Eyes and certainly our relationship with Canada as a very important and very special relationship where information-sharing is part of the norm.
I'm actually talking about not only amongst our nations, but internally amongst our own agencies within our own countries, and respectively amongst those agencies. For us in the United States, information-sharing has gone much further than the foreign intelligence of the past and it now butts directly against law enforcement intelligence.
Of course, as you know, as you are very sensitive to that, we are very sensitive in America to ensuring a distinction between foreign intelligence and law enforcement intelligence and information, because we will never have the federal government, and the military, and our homeland defence apparatus using intelligence against American citizens. We try to protect those rights and work very hard at it. That in itself creates a very convoluted system of sharing information among agencies and among law enforcement and intelligence agencies as well.
Case in point: when we talk immigration, one of the things we must consider, of course, is health and medical. I can't speak for Canada, but I would submit to you that we have lots of room for improvement in the United States in the ability to bring our immigration services in line with our health and human services and our centre for disease control, many of the areas that have to come into contact with each other, to ensure that we are protecting the nation against...whether it just be natural occurrence of people with various diseases transmitting globally in a much smaller world that we face today, or, quite honestly, if you get somewhat science fiction about it, perhaps a specific threat of spreading disease throughout the world, the hemisphere, the North American continent.
My point is that we have to work together as a nation and we have many of those vehicles in place. We have to work internally within our respective nations, and then we have to ensure that information and intelligence are shared appropriately across all those interfaces—while protecting sources of information, of course.
:
Thank you very much, the three of you, for coming to spend some quality time with us.
I think all of you will be aware that just a year ago we adopted Bill and the components of Bill C-11. Also, I think it has been very clear as we have questioned both staff and others that the key elements from Bill C-11 have not been implemented yet, so we actually don't even know whether we really have a problem.
Bill is called the great compromise. The minister and our critic of the day, Olivia Chow—and I'm sure Mr. Dykstra was involved in it as well—all talked about it being a great piece of legislation, because it brought all the elements together and there was a lot of agreement. It seemed to address the key issues arising from boatloads of people coming to B.C.'s shore, the two boats.
I have to say that most of those people—as we know, even before Bill —have been accepted as refugees. Refugees very rarely stop to think, especially if their lives are in danger and they've had the kinds of persecution they've had, about the dangers of the seas, because they're in a corner and they have to escape. They're worried about their lives, limbs, and their families, and all of that. They came to our shores, and as we know, a vast majority of them have been accepted as legitimate refugees.
In Bill Canada also has, I would say, some of the strongest sentencing for human smugglers. Really, in Canada we can't go greater than life imprisonment, because we don't have the death penalty in Canada, and I'm not hearing anybody from either side say that it is where we want to go. So we already have the strongest deterrent possible for smugglers, a life sentence and also $1 million in fines.
But as you know, smugglers are very sophisticated operatives. I often say that while we're chasing the victims, they're probably sitting—and I don't mean to malign New York—in a New York side street café drinking lattes and wearing their Armani suits, for all we know.
Yet it's the victims I want to focus on here, because I believe Bill already has very strong punitive measures towards smugglers. I also recognize the fact, and I would say many experts do, that smuggling is an international problem—it's a curse across the world—and it needs to have governments working together to address it in a way that targets the smugglers, not the victims again.
The other aspect of Bill is the detention part. Bill C-11 allows detention of people, but not just for a year; they can even be detained longer, for identification and for security checks. But what's different about Bill C-11 is that periodically you have to go back and justify why you want that extension.
So as far as detention goes, I think it's already covered, because the minister, even under the current system, has been able to keep some people in detention for far longer than this; whereas with this new piece of legislation, all the irregular arrivals would end up in detention. Notice a marked difference from where Germany is, as we heard in earlier testimony as well.
The other concern, when I look at all of this, is over the detention. My colleagues across the aisle have sort of said, “Yes, but the minister....” That's another concern we have: there is too much power in the hands of a minister.
It's not because it's this minister; I would have concerns about a minister of any stripe having that much power in individual hands. What we're seeing is more and more of that power being centralized and therefore losing some of the objectivity that you count on when you have a panel of experts, say, or others.
One of the other things we're hearing a lot about is cost. Well, I can tell you that the cost of detention is very, very high. I have often said that if we were willing to spend even one-tenth of what we're prepared to spend on detention for youth...in my previous life. We would not have the need to have that many detention places if we were willing to spend one-tenth on education, on prevention programs, and a lot of those things.
But in this case, the cost for detention for a year...? This is for everybody who comes here in an irregular way in a group of more than two—except for families, and I appreciated that clarification this morning. We really have to take a look at that as well. Surely this can't be another prison-building agenda when we look at where we want to go with our refugee policy.
One of the other concerns we've had raised by quite a few witnesses of all stripes is the timelines and the kind of charter challenges that could be opened because people are not being given due process.
Other countries that have taken these kinds of measures of mandatory detention are actually moving away from them. Here we are in Canada, a progressive country; instead of learning from the mistakes of others, we have a tendency in the last little while to want to copy the mistakes of detention.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you, colleague.
A special welcome to Ward Elcock, a fellow Osgoode grad. Thanks for your help in keeping the peace in the 2010 Winter Olympics, much of which were in the riding that I have the honour to represent.
The NDP this afternoon, through my colleague Ms. Sims, raised the straw man of “prison-building agenda”, as she said. I think that's characteristic of many of the issues that have been brought up. We've heard that time and time again in the House, and in fact no prisons have been built by this government, nor are there any planned.
Much of what is being objected to, in my assessment, falls into a similar category. We have serious intelligence concerns that you have raised.
Admiral Loren, you've talked about consolidating different branches in the U.S. experience in order to be more sophisticated. Our own minister came here and said, frankly, we're not prepared for the kind of mass arrivals that we have seen in recent times.
I'll address my first question to you, Mr. Perchal. Are we correlating our information on gang behaviour, criminal activity, with foreign intelligence on terrorism so that we can identify some nexus there—the word “nexus” has been used several times—for instance in the case of a country like Iran?
:
I've been before this committee, but I'm not sure if it was in this incarnation. I appeared before committees when the Liberals were in power, and when Mulroney was in power. I worked with Jim Hawkes when he was trying to design a new refugee determination process in the mid-1980s after the Baker decision.
I was a student lawyer assisting groups that were opposed to the legislation introduced by the Liberals in 1976. I appeared before the committee that debated the implementation of the Immigration and Refugee Board in 1989. I appeared again in the mid-1990s when there were changes made, and I appeared before this committee in its incarnation when the Liberals were in power and IRPA was implemented and voted on in 2002.
I should say to you that I have an historical perspective with respect to this. I'm always glad to come and discuss the refugee determination procedure, because I've been involved in representing refugees since 1974—that was my first case—and since then I have represented thousands of persons before the Immigration and Refugee Board or its predecessor, the Immigration Appeal Board.
I understand that the committee has heard a great deal from witnesses who have divergent views on this issue. I don't expect my comments will change anyone's mind, but I'm grateful for the opportunity to share a few of my concerns.
The first point I wanted to deal with was the speed of the process. I wonder if any of the members of this room have ever been at a refugee hearing. As I said, I've attended thousands. I can tell you that it is a process that is fraught with pitfalls that can trap genuine refugees.
I've heard the members here speak repeatedly about the need for an efficient process, and I agree. I see clients coming into my office who have been incredibly frustrated by the delays in the current process, I mean people who are genuine refugees who want their cases decided so that they can start the process of family reunification, something that will be hindered by some of the provisions of this bill that I'll speak to in a minute.
I agree that it is vital that we make this process more efficient, but efficiency cannot be prioritized at the expense of fairness. With all due respect to those who share the contrary position, I can assure you that this process as it's currently drafted, and given the speed with which it is expected to take place, will not result in a fair determination for many people.
Consider the consequences. The first most obvious consequence is that many of the claimants will not have counsel, either through the whole process or at least at the initial stage when they file the first form, the BAC.
What are the consequences of this? There will be omissions in the BAC and, as we all know, the initial presentation is vital, and there's a great deal of jurisprudence from the Federal Court that says that a tribunal can draw adverse inferences if there are omissions from this initial form.
The fact that refugees don't have counsel to prepare the form will undoubtedly lead to many circumstances where there will be vital omissions that could result in adverse inferences being drawn against genuine refugees.
Many claimants will not have counsel at the hearings. I was at the Canadian Bar Association meetings in Kelowna, and some of the members of the Immigration and Refugee Board were there, and I spoke to some senior people who acknowledged that they are fully expecting that the number of unrepresented claimants will increase dramatically under the new process.
I think you have to consider the impact of that. There's already jurisprudence from the Federal Court that says that, in cases of unrepresented claimants, the members who decide the cases will have to take more time to ensure that the hearings are fair. The onus will be on the member to dig out all the details that might be relevant to the claim, and, if the member fails in his duty to conduct that process, the hearings will be set aside by the higher courts.
This will result in lengthier proceedings in cases where counsel is not present. It will also result in many more negative decisions because claimants will not have had a full understanding of what is relevant. There will be many more judicial reviews in which claimants will challenge the fairness of the proceeding because they did not have counsel properly guide them at the initiation of the proceeding.
The speed that this bill envisions will produce a huge pressure on decision-makers to make rapid decisions. We know that when decision-makers are pressured into circumstances, it results in a deterioration in the quality of decisions, and will put greater pressure on the appeal process. The speed with which the appeal process is designed to take place isn't possible.
It's impossible for a person to perfect an appeal in any kind of meaningful way in the timeframe set out in the legislation, given the complexity of the issues. The original proposal was that transcripts would be available, but transcripts will not be available, and that will mean it will make it even more difficult for people to perfect their appeals.
Another important impact will be that refugees themselves will not have time to obtain corroborating documents. One of the things we're seeing more and more in decisions by refugee board members is that they draw an adverse inference when claimants don't have corroborating documents to sustain. So if a claimant says he was arrested and tortured, the member will say,“Why don't you have a medical report?” Well, claimants often can't come with these reports, because if they're fleeing their countries they can't take the documents with them, and they need to have time to obtain the corroborating documents.
This process and the speed with which it is designed to take place will make it impossible for corroborating documents to be obtained. Members will still continue to draw adverse inferences and this will result in more unfair decisions.
Another very important factor is that refugees who come from designated countries will not benefit from either a legislative stay or from an appeal. This will result in a significant increase in the number of stay applications to the Federal Court.
I can tell you, because I was at a meeting with Federal Court judges this past weekend, with the Federal Court bar and bench liaison committee in immigration matters, that the Federal Court is already bursting at the seams and is under-resourced. They're three judges short, and four judges are on sick leave. They cannot afford to have the increased work that will certainly result from this process.
There will be even more and more unfair decisions, and this will lead to more and more cases where claimants will have to seek recourse to the courts, to the minister, and to the media.
The second point I wanted to deal with is the question of detention. I've represented many of the people on the boat and I can tell you that the conditions—I went to the jail in Maple Ridge where they were detained—are shocking. I was shocked when I was there. I went into the cells and I couldn't believe these tiny cells where people were double- and triple-bunked. I'm sure other people have already told you about this. The conditions were unbelievably poor.
People who suggest that refugees are being detained in hotels are misleading the committee. It's true that in Toronto there is one converted hotel that holds about 70 people and I think it's being expanded. But the vast majority of refugees who are in detention are in detention in provincial jails where the conditions are poor to extremely poor. Many of my clients have been traumatized by the experience.
I've heard the questions that were asked by the committee before about the security needs. I can tell you that, having represented many of the claimants who came off the boats, the current legislation was more than adequate. People were detained upon arrival until they could satisfactorily prove identity. Some of my clients were held three or four months under the current legislation, until they got identity documents that satisfied the minister as to their identity. Once identity was satisfied, people could be detained if there was a reasonable suspicion. The Federal Court said that the reasonable suspicion is an extremely low threshold. Individuals who pose a danger were detained until there was a determination that they were not a danger. Indeed, there are still people who arrived on the boat who are still under detention.
Requiring mandatory detention for one year is unnecessary. It is also unconstitutional, and you've been told this many times. The Supreme Court of Canada made it clear in Charkaoui that there must be a regular review by judicial authorities of the grounds of detention or it's a violation of section 7.
To be perfectly clear, and I looked at the legislation again today and I'm more than glad to take you to the sections, the legislation as currently drafted does not provide any judicial mechanism to review a detention within the one-year period. It is true that the legislation says that a person is detained until they're found to be a convention refugee or there are other conditions. The difficulty with that is the next provision right after that says there is no detention review for a period of one year.
The problem that the refugee has is that the refugee cannot go and seek his release after he's been accepted. The only way he can be released is if the minister exercises his or her discretion, depending on who the minister is, to order the release. That's the difficulty with the bill. Why it's unconstitutional is that there is no mechanism for the refugee to review his or her detention within the one-year period. That is the provision that is inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Charkaoui.
There are many other issues, but the last one I want to personally address, because it's one that I see so often in my office, is the impact of designation. These are the provisions that I find particularly difficult to accept.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today. It was interesting to hear your comments.
We've been meeting, as you may well know, with several groups over the last little while, listening to the concerns people have either in favour or in support of certain clauses in Bill . The process for us here is that in due course we'll be reviewing the bill line by line and taking into consideration this democratic input that we have from our witnesses, so your testimony is very important to us. So thank you again for being here.
I want to address the issue of a legitimate refugee who actually really needs the help, because I think that is a common element for all of us. We all want that. We all want to be able to service as quickly as possible the person who is coming here, who was persecuted, whose life was in danger, possibly facing torture or death in their own country. We're finding that a lot of these folks who need help are tied up in a system behind a group that is quite often not a legitimate refugee group, tying up the system.
To process a claim today can go as long as 1,038 days. With the measures in this proposed bill, we can reduce that to 45 days for claimants from designated countries, and 216 days for all other claimants.
One phenomena we're seeing is that we're getting, from one part of the world in particular, 95% of the claimants either abandoning or withdrawing...or their claim is flat-out rejected.
Now, that 95%, apart from the fact that it's costing about $170 million a year—let's just not put a value, because we're talking about human life here—is really tying up the people who legitimately can come into the country.
Can I get your comments on why people would voluntarily abandon or withdraw their claim and return to a country in which they originally claimed they were being persecuted?
:
The only comment I'll make on the bias is that I'm the author of several books on immigration and refugee law, which are often cited by the Federal Court. I've been called a scholar by judges of the Federal Court, so I think that's a fairly fulsome answer to suggestions of bias. I won't respond to the other aspect of that.
What would be a fair process? A fair process would be one that requires a timely decision. I have no difficulty with timeframes, but the timeframes have to be reasonable regardless of whether the person is designated or not. The problem with the current process is not that it's problematic; it's that it wasn't sufficiently resourced to do the job it had to do in the time it had before it.
I'll give you an example, if you want to see an irony. The current IRPA says that a Federal Court judge has to review an application for leave, of any immigration decision, render a decision, and the hearing has to be held within 90 days.
Because they don't have enough Federal Court judges to decide the leave, what happens is that a judge will look at the decision, but in order to comply with the law, he will then wait, and the formal order won't be issued until there's a slot. There are not enough Federal Court judges to hear the leave.
So they get around the law by deciding the matter but not formally issuing the order. One can imagine similar scenarios beginning to occur in the refugee determination process.
Depending on the volume of claims, if there are enough people to decide the claims, then claims will get decided in a timely fashion. It doesn't matter what the timeframes are. Refugees would love to have their hearings held within two or three months, as that would allow them to have sufficient time to retain counsel. My clients suffer greatly by having to wait for years before they get a positive determination. There's absolutely no dispute about that. The reason this happened was that the system wasn't properly resourced.
There's no problem with the current system if it's properly resourced. Fundamentally there aren't any significant changes. The big change is that instead of having order in council appointees we're having public servants. The same decision-maker, the same division, is still going to be making decisions. There's going to be the same basic form. Instead of having 28 days, it's going to be filed in 15.
The question really is, regardless of what the legislation says, will there be sufficient resources to allow for a timely decision? I mean, to decree 30 days, 60 days, 90 days, 120 days won't make any difference; if there aren't enough resources, the refugee board will have to find ways to deal with the caseload—
:
That's probably about two minutes more than I need, Mr. Chair.
All kidding aside, I am here as a guest today. It's the first time I've actually even subbed in on this particular committee. Obviously, I'm seized with the issue and I appreciate your being here.
Reverend Prentice and Reverend Gauthier Glasgow, I just want to say how much I appreciated your testimony. My grandmother was very strong in her faith as a Christian. She practised as an Anglican, and I had many occasions to visit our church in my hometown of Lacombe. She was a very interesting lady, very compassionate in her own right, but also very staunchly conservative in her views. I'm sure she would be having a similar conundrum in trying to reconcile some of the things we're discussing here today.
The question I have for you is one of where we can do the most good. From a global perspective, is it in the best interests with the limited resources that we have—and I'll get to resources with Mr. Waldman in a moment—and I've heard lectures from people on both sides of the issue, to be investing our capital and our time in a bureaucratic process here to bring a limited number of people here, and let's face it, it's a lot of people, but it's a very limited number of people who might otherwise need help throughout the world. Or, should we be using those resources to do more good, whether it's capacity building, governance building, democracy building, any of those other kinds of exercises around the world? If you could answer that, just from a 30,000-foot view, because we all want the same thing. We want to do what's right for humankind. We want to do what's in the best interest to elevate everybody's standard of living around the world.
Could you help us with that? Are those questions that you ask yourselves when you're doing this? We're spending a lot of time and effort talking about a select few people who come here to seek refugee status, and we're spending a lot of money trying to sort out this process. Is that the right thing to do, from a global perspective?
[Translation]
Mr. Chair, honourable members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or UNHCR, welcomes the opportunity to comment before the committee on Bill , the Protecting Canada's Immigration System Act.
UNHCR offers these comments on federal legislation further to the mandate entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly, in other words, to direct and coordinate international efforts to protect refugees around the world and to seek solutions to their problems.
UNHCR recognizes the strength of Canada's commitment to protecting refugees around the world, as well as the challenges that the country must address. Canada must ensure the sustainability of its system and maintain its high standards in protecting displaced individuals seeking asylum, while finding durable solutions within its borders.
[English]
The UNHCR written submission, a copy of which has been provided to this committee, provides our full comments and recommendations regarding Bill .
My comments today will focus on selected provisions of the bill that will have the most significant impact on Canada's asylum procedures. These comments fall within two general themes: provisions that provide for the differential categorization of asylum seekers and provisions that have the effect of restricting access to the asylum process.
Regarding the designation of foreign nationals as irregular arrivals, UNHCR understands and shares the Government of Canada's concern about the need to combat people smugglers. Yet asylum seekers are often compelled to resort to smugglers to reach safety. The proposed designation of irregular arrivals may lead to an unwarranted penalization of those in need of international protection and, in effect, punish the victims of the smugglers or traffickers for having sought to escape persecution.
With regard to the grounds for designating someone as an irregular arrival, Bill will create two classes of asylum seekers and refugees in Canada based on the designation provision. Of particular concern is the designation for operational reasons.
Consequences of the designation that are of concern to UNHCR include mandatory detention without review for 12 months, no appeal rights, restriction on the issuance of convention travel documents—which may be at variance with article 28 of the 1951 convention—reporting requirements despite the granting of convention refugee status, and the five-year bar on regularizing status and its implications for family unity.
UNHCR recalls that the principle of family unity is enshrined in international law. The UNHCR executive committee, of which Canada is a founding member, has underlined on several occasions the need for the unity of the refugee's family to be protected. From a non-discrimination point of view, UNHCR does not believe that the grounds for designation as irregular arrivals provide a legitimate justification for a substantially differentiated treatment. The legislation may be at variance with human rights-based non-discrimination guarantees contained in international human rights instruments.
UNHCR's long-standing position has been that the detention of an asylum seeker is inherently undesirable. The situation of asylum seekers differs fundamentally from that of ordinary immigrants in that asylum seekers may not be in a position to comply with the legal formalities for entry, not least because of the urgency of their flight or their inability to approach authorities. Article 31 of the 1951 convention takes this situation into account and prohibits penalties being imposed on refugees on account of their illegal entry or presence.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has noted that for detention to be lawful, it must pursue a legitimate governmental objective that it is determined to be necessary, reasonable in all circumstances, and proportionate in each individual case, and that detention can only be justified where other less invasive and coercive measures have been considered, and that mandatory and non-reviewable detention is unlawful as a matter of international law.
In UNHCR's view, the relevant provision of Bill as currently drafted would be at variance with several international standards. For these reasons, UNHCR strongly recommends that the government refrain from introducing a mandatory detention regime for irregular arrivals in relation to refugees and asylum seekers, and that alternatives to detention be explored.
Regarding designated country of origin, UNHCR does not oppose the introduction of a designated or safe country of origin list as long as this is used as a procedural tool to prioritize or accelerate the examination of applications in carefully circumscribed situations.
The designation of a country as a safe country of origin cannot establish an absolute guarantee of safety for nationals of that country. It may be that despite general conditions of safety in the country of origin, for some individuals the country remains unsafe.
It is important than an assessment of countries of origin as safe is based on reliable, objective, and up-to-date information from a range of sources. One way of achieving transparency and quality decision-making could be by ensuring that the designation is done by a panel of experts.
I now wish to turn to measures that UNHCR fears may restrict access to the asylum process.
Regarding the restriction of access on asylum on criminality grounds, in UNHCR's view asylum applications should not be considered inadmissible unless the individual concerned has already found effective protection or access to an asylum procedure in another country.
UNHCR has already expressed its views in the past over exclusion elements being examined under the heading of ineligibility or inadmissibility to the refugee proceedings. Our submission to this very committee on March 5, 2001, which set out the office comments on the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, remain valid. UNHCR is of the opinion that exclusion from refugee status on criminality grounds should be considered in accordance with article 1F of the 1951 convention, within the assessment to determine the merits of the claim, rather than at the admissibility or eligibility stage.
Regarding shortened time limits under the new asylum process, UNHCR supports efforts by government authorities to decide applications in a timely manner. However, states need to balance efficiency with the fairness of the procedure. Overly restrictive timeframes in the context of a sophisticated asylum process can lead to increased rates of abandonment and the rise of a number of unrepresented claimants. Asylum claimants do not ordinarily have the knowledge to navigate the legal system. Even where a client retains counsel, enough time needs to be allowed for applicants to apply for legal aid and to find a counsel. The consequence of abandonment are, in effect, a final, negative decision, as there is no right to an appeal or access to a pre-removal risk assessment for one year after the negative decision. In this respect, appropriate resources should be allocated towards creating, maintaining, and supplementing legal services for asylum seekers.
Regarding the refugee appeal division, UNHCR welcomes the implementation of the RAD; however, it would recommend that an appeal be available to all claimants. The right to appeal is a fundamental requirement of a fair and efficient asylum procedure, to which no exception should be made. At the core of the 1951 convention principle lies the principle of non-refoulement, whereby those with protection needs cannot be returned to a place where they will be at risk of persecution. The purpose of a second review through an appeal mechanism is to ensure that errors of fact or law, at the first instance, can be corrected to avoid injustice and to ensure respect for the principle of non-refoulement.
Regarding restricted access to the pre-risk removal assessment and to humanitarian and compassionate applications, pre-removal risk assessments and humanitarian and compassionate applications are important safeguards against the deportation of persons who are not recognized as refugees according to the law, but who are still in need of international protection. In particular, given that many categories of asylum seeker will not have access to an appeal under the RAD, the availability of such mechanisms are all the more important to maintain as a procedural safeguard.
Regarding the reopening of a refugee claim, UNHCR maintains that claims for protection should be reopened when new evidence comes to light, including situations where there has been a breach of natural justice, to allow for the claim to be re-examined in its entirety, and recommends that the jurisdiction of the RPD and the RAD to reopen claims be affirmed.
Regarding the cessation of refugee status, the proposed amendments in the bill to bar the appeal against a negative decision on cessation of refugee status, leading to subsequent possible revocation of permanent resident status, will result in a state of uncertainty for many refugees, including resettled refugees, and thus will undermine the durable nature of the resettlement solution. UNHCR recommends the decision on cessation should be subject to appeals and should not automatically bar access to or revoke permanent resident status.
Finally, regarding the disclosure of information, in the context of refugees and asylum seekers, UNHCR recommends that appropriate safeguards be introduced in the text of Bill to avoid the transmission of biometric and other information, either directly or through a third party, to countries of alleged persecution.
Chairman Tilson, honourable committee members, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you.
:
I certainly appreciate that. I'm just stating examples of where our detention legislation in Bill is actually not as aggressive as it may be in some other countries.
I think you would understand that as we were developing the policy, we did look to what other countries were doing that were not accused of being in contravention of the UN convention on refugees.
I have another example. I just returned from the Netherlands, and in my meetings with officials, I was surprised to learn about one of the aspects of detention they use when individuals destroy their documentation after they arrive at the airport. When individuals walk up to the visa officers, immigration officers, and indicate that they arrived in the Netherlands with absolutely no identification, those individuals are then held and detained at the airport until their information...or at least until information is available to determine who these individuals are.
At the airport, if they are determined, there and then, not to have an issue with respect to asylum, it is the airline that is actually responsible for flying these individuals back to their country of origin.
I'd like to get your thoughts on that. I certainly entertain the recommendation that you made that there are alternatives. I'd also point out that there are other countries that are far more aggressive than Canada in terms of detention, number one.
The second is that we're in a position of not being as aggressive as a number of other countries that we partner with in a lot of other areas. So I would submit that you would have to take a look at that when you're viewing this, because that's exactly what we did, and you're viewing other countries in terms of their detention law versus the one that we're bringing forward here.
:
I will answer in English, if I may.
[English]
It's very clear that UNHCR does not oppose a list of designated countries of origin. However, it must be understood that the DCO list is a procedural tool. It's not a process, only a procedural tool. We are putting too much emphasis and focus on this. It is a procedural tool that may help in certain situations to facilitate the processing of asylum claims.
What is really important is the process. In order to make a solid process in refugee status determination, there is a need for certain things to happen. Once the process is solid, a designated country list is a tool. It's a tool that may be helpful if used in a certain manner.
The process that makes for a strong and robust asylum determination system includes adequate time for submitting an application—there has to be enough time to find counsel and collect the information necessary. There has to be a first-level hearing that is solid and robust by an independent tribunal like the IRB. Of course, IRB members must be well-trained decision-makers. There must be enough resources put into research on countries of origin, because refugee status determination is a difficult art and requires continued training.
You also need a review phase, a capacity for reviewing errors, in fact and in law. It's very important to catch errors, which may lead to bad decisions and therefore refoulement.
Finally, at the end of the process, there must be a quick removal. The quick removal part of the process is the real disincentive. We are talking very much within the context of Bill . If you have a solid process and a quick removal at the end of that process, you will create a disincentive, which hopefully will take care of the people who want to abuse the system.
:
Faux réfugiés you would translate as “bogus refugees”, in English?
That is a terminology that actually, I have to say, does not exist. It's a contradiction in terms. If you are a refugee, it means you are recognized as a refugee at the end of a process for which, by definition, you are genuine.
If you are not a refugee, you are still an asylum seeker. Asylum seekers are those who seek asylum. They may become refugees, they may become failed asylum seekers. But not all failed asylum seekers are fraudulent by nature. Some may become failed asylum seekers in good faith, genuinely. Let me give you an example.
Take a person who flees from domestic violence—possibly a woman, but not necessarily—and wants to get as far as possible from the abusive family. She arrives in Canada under bad counselling from friends and fails the asylum application because she has not sought national protection in the country she has fled from. In order to be a refugee, you have to prove that you sought national protection, but it was unavailable to you. This is very important in becoming recognized as a refugee.
That person will fail and she will be a failed asylum seeker, but I would not call her fraudulent. She didn't know. She was badly advised.
So the term “failed asylum seekers” may include fraudulent asylum seekers, I agree; but “failed asylum seekers” may also include those who made their applications in good faith and failed.
:
Thank you, Mr. De Angelis and Mr. Casasola.
The time has expired. Thank you for coming and taking the time to meet with the committee to give us your comments. We appreciate it very much.
I have just a couple of words for the committee. I regret to advise you that there will be no meetings tomorrow.
An hon. member: Gee whiz.
The Chair: I'm sorry. The deadline for submitting amendments is tomorrow at noon. So if you have amendments, submit them to the clerk by that time or they will not be accepted.
We agreed on April 26 that we would start clause-by-clause at noon on Wednesday. The clause-by-clause schedule is starting Wednesday from noon to 2 p.m. and from 3:30 p.m.to 7:30 p.m. Thursday is from 8:45 a.m. to noon and from 3:30 p.m. to midnight.
Mr. Rick Dykstra: If necessary.
The Chair: I hope it's necessary, because it's after my bedtime, and I get very cranky late at night.
Mr. Rick Dykstra: Do you mean more cranky than usual—sir?
Some hon. members: Oh, oh!
The Chair: This meeting is adjourned.
Thank you, gentlemen—