ETHI Committee Report

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the current budget determination process for the funding of Officers of Parliament raises serious concerns. The Committee feels that the status quo is unacceptable. At the very least, it raises the perception that the critical functions of these Officers could be impeded by budgetary restrictions imposed by the very body whose actions they are charged with scrutinizing. All of our witnesses, including officials from the Treasury Board Secretariat, had concerns about the present funding mechanism; however, there was a divergence of views over how best to address this issue.

Although not everyone could agree on the particular funding model that should be applied to Officers of Parliament, it appeared to us that there was a general consensus on what should guide the development of an alternative mechanism. Primarily, the budget determination process must be removed from the exclusive domain of the executive; while at the same time, an appropriate performance review, budgetary challenge, and accountability mechanism must be maintained. Parliament must play a greater and more critical role in the budget determination process, and resource-allocation decision-making must be based on objective and expert analysis. The process should be practical, transparent, simple, and expeditious. Finally, the system should take into consideration the differing mandates and reporting requirements of the various Officers.

This Committee feels strongly that some form of parliamentary body must examine the Estimate submissions of Officers of Parliament. This body could be similar to the Public Accounts Commission in the U.K. in that it should be representative of all parties, and it could incorporate the Senate, perhaps by having both Speakers as ex officio members of the commission, thereby addressing the fact, for example, that some Officers report to both the House of Commons and the Senate. Like the U.K. Commission, and indeed the House of Commons Board of Internal Economy, this parliamentary body should have a permanent existence, and like the Board, its membership would be equally comprised of government and opposition representatives.

Given the expertise already developed by the Treasury Board Secretariat in the areas of challenging, analyzing and advising on the budgets of Officers of Parliament, we feel that it is imperative that the Secretariat continue this function by assisting the parliamentary body. The Secretariat could provide a separate submission that would accompany the Estimates proposals of the Officers. In other words, the Secretariat would set out budget parameters and comment on the budget proposals in the same manner as it currently does for the Treasury Board. For example, it would assess the consistency of budget proposals with the Officers’ mandates, review the proposals against prior spending and performance information from the previous Estimates cycle, and determine whether resource requests were aligned with proposed activities and anticipated results.

While we like the argument for utilizing the appropriate parliamentary committees whose mandates already include the work of particular Officers, we feel that these committees should continue their responsibility and oversight roles in relation to their Officers, rather than taking on this new budget-vetting function. If they were to determine the budgets of Officers of Parliament, we believe that this could compromise their effectiveness, or give the perception of such compromise, in relation to their existing responsibilities. These committees would, moreover, continue to review the Estimates of their respective Officers after those Estimates had been tabled in Parliament. They would also be consulted by the parliamentary decision-making body as part of its budget deliberations.

This Committee also feels that there is a need for in-depth knowledge and expertise in the areas in which Officers of Parliament function. We think that the use of experts to review and challenge budget proposals of Officers of Parliament is a vital component of any new funding model. There are two ways in which this could operate. First, each Officer could pay to have its estimate reviewed by qualified external experts, and the resulting expert report could accompany the Estimates proposal submitted to the parliamentary body. In the alternative, the parliamentary body could itself retain experts in the various areas in which Officers operate, either as witnesses or as staff.

Finally, while we appreciate the different mandates of the Ethics Commissioner and the Chief Electoral Officer relative to those of the other Officers of Parliament, we believe that there is still a need for greater scrutiny and accountability in their funding mechanisms. To this end, this Committee feels strongly that both Offices should be subject to the new parliamentary budget determination process. In the case of the Chief Electoral Officer, this would apply only to his Office’s annual appropriation vote. The Committee recognizes that all of the Officers of Parliament are to be held to a high standard of integrity and accountability with respect to their important functions and we believe that neither the Ethics Commissioner nor the Chief Electoral Officer would be averse to subjecting his budget proposals to review through a new parliamentary funding mechanism.

Given that the appointment, removal and reporting requirements of a number of Officers of Parliament, including the Privacy Commissioner, the Information Commissioner, and the Commissioner of Official Languages, involve both the House of Commons and the Senate, this Committee recognizes that there must be some form of Senate involvement in the new permanent parliamentary budget-determination body. It is unclear, however, how this involvement should operate in practice. In light of the fact that the Standing Senate Committee on National Finance is apparently examining the issue of funding of Officers of Parliament, it seems premature for us to make specific recommendations concerning a Senate role in a parliamentary funding mechanism. Clearly, discussions will have to take place between the leadership of the two chambers. We would, therefore, urge the House of Commons to initiate discussions to determine how best to structure a parliamentary budget determination process which incorporates a role for the Senate where appropriate.

RECOMMENDATION ONE

The Committee therefore recommends:

That a new permanent parliamentary body be created as the budget-determination mechanism for the funding of all Officers of Parliament.¹⁶ The new parliamentary body, and the new funding process established for it, should have the following features:

•	The membership of this body should be representative of both the House of Commons and the Senate, and equally comprised of government and opposition representatives.

•	Officers’ annual budget submissions would be made directly to this body, along with an accompanying submission by the Treasury Board Secretariat setting out budget parameters and providing analyses, challenges and advice on the feasibility of the Offices’ submissions.

•	The parliamentary funding body may obtain advice from experts, as well as from appropriate parliamentary committees, to assist in its deliberations.

•	The recommendations of the new parliamentary body should be submitted to each House of Parliament, as appropriate, who will provide the recommendations to the Treasury Board for tabling as part of the government-wide Estimates process.

In considering how best to formulate a funding model for all Officers of Parliament, we were sensitive to the fact that it is not possible to create a “perfect” system. Nor is it possible to achieve the perfect balance between ensuring the independence of Officers of Parliament from the executive and providing the appropriate measure of accountability for their spending and performances. Therefore, in the interests of moving forward in this area of longstanding concern, we suggest that a pilot project be launched for the next two fiscal years, starting with the fiscal year 2006-2007, using the existing House of Commons Board of Internal Economy as the parliamentary budget-determination body and the three Commissioners within our mandate — the Information, Privacy and Ethics Commissioners — as the initial participants. While the Office of the Auditor General does not fall within the mandate of this Committee, and it may not be appropriate for us to make recommendations specific to this Office, we think that it is imperative that the Office’s funding situation be addressed. The Auditor General has been seeking, with little success, progress on the adoption of an alternative funding model for over four years now and we therefore feel that consideration should be given to the inclusion of her Office in any funding mechanism pilot study.

Using existing parliamentary internal economy machinery would allow for the immediate launch of a funding mechanism pilot project. It would also greatly facilitate an assessment of how best to construct a parliamentary budget-vetting mechanism that could be legislatively applied to all the Officers of Parliament. The pilot project should therefore be subject to parliamentary review immediately after its completion.

RECOMMENDATION TWO

The Committee therefore recommends:

That the Board of Internal Economy serve as the parliamentary budget-determination body for the Offices of the Information, Privacy and Ethics Commissioners on a trial basis in the same manner as proposed in Recommendation One. This project shall be instituted for the fiscal years 2006-2007 and 2007-2008, and shall be subject to parliamentary review immediately thereafter.

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16	We include here the Information, Privacy, Ethics and Official Languages Commissioners, the Auditor General of Canada and the Chief Electoral Officer.