



**Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu,  
Minister of Foreign  
Affairs**

- Pronunciation: MEV-LOOT CHA-VUSH-OH-LOO
- Founding member of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).
- Re-elected as deputy for Antalya in June 2018, but stepped down when he was re-appointed FM.
- FM since 2014, except for period from August-November 2015.
- PhD in Economics. Studied in Ankara, New York, and at London School of Economics.
- Speaks English, German and Japanese.
- Married with one daughter.

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## Minister of Foreign Affairs Call with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

DATE: TBD; TIME: TBD; LOCATION: TBD

### Objectives

- Reiterate support for a NATO Ally at a time of crisis and highlight Canada's response to Turkey's requests for assistance.
- Solicit Turkish views on the situation in Idlib, the prospects for the new ceasefire, and the impact of increasing numbers of Syrian refugees.

### Key Messages

#### Situation in Idlib

- I am deeply saddened by the recent killings of Turkish soldiers in Syria. We publicly condemned the attacks and called on the Syrian regime and its supporters to halt the offensive.
- I welcome the March 5 ceasefire agreement with Russia. What needs to be done to ensure its successful and sustainable implementation?
- How can we effectively engage the Syrian regime to respect the terms of the March 5 ceasefire?
- How does Turkey foresee the future of terrorist organizations such as HTS in Idlib in the context of the recent ceasefire?

#### NATO Article 4 Consultations/Requests for Assistance

- Turkey is an important NATO ally and friend of Canada. We stand in full solidarity with you in this time of crisis, and we value NATO unity on the issue.
- Look forward to hearing Turkey's views on the situation at the upcoming North Atlantic Council discussion on Syria on March 11.

#### Turkish Requests for Canadian Assistance

- Canada has received Turkey's request to apply more pressure to the Assad regime's backers; to publicly support Turkey and condemn Assad regime violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; to provide assistance to people displaced in Idlib; and to resume issuing export permits for arms sales to Turkey.
- Canada has consistently supported Turkey and condemned the Assad regime and its supporters – including several statements at the end of February in response to their Idlib offensive.
- Canada has allocated over \$488 million in humanitarian assistance funding in Syria since 2016. We remain steadfast in our commitment to supporting experienced humanitarian partners on the ground.
- There is no military solution to the conflict in Syria. Political dialogue, such as the UN process, is the only way to bring about lasting stability.

#### Syrian Refugees – Idlib Displacement and EU Tensions

- I commend you for your continued role in hosting the world's largest refugee population, including over 3.6 million Syrians.
- How will Turkey respond to the new displacements from the fighting in Idlib?
- What can be done to help address the tensions with the EU over increased refugee movements across their borders?

#### Responsive – YPG/PYD links to PKK

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- *Respectful of Turkey's position, Canadian law distinguishes b/w PKK & YPG/PYD. Only PKK listed terrorist entity. Do not view YPG/PYD as state actor.*

***Responsive – Export Permits to Turkey***

- *Canada has temporarily suspended new export permits to Turkey.*

***Responsive – Turkish requests to NATO***

- *Turkey is an important NATO Ally and a friend to Canada.*



- *As you know, Canada is already contributing to some of the areas where Turkey has previously requested the support, such as the Standing NATO Maritime Group Two (SNMG2).*

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## Context

- **Previous Interactions:** You most recently spoke with Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu during a call in January 2020 to discuss the situation in the Middle East in the aftermath of the PS 752 crisis.
- **Political Climate:** Turkey is a [REDACTED] necessary partner for Canada. It is a strategic NATO Ally, a member of the Global Coalition against Daesh, and an influential player in the Middle East and North Africa. Bilateral relations have improved recently, with more interactions in the past two years than the preceding decade. However, democratic backsliding and recent Turkish unilateralism, particularly its October 2019 incursion into Syria, [REDACTED]
- **Key Issues:**
  - Fight for Idlib: In December 2019, the Assad regime launched a military operation against Idlib, one of the last major areas outside regime control, violating ceasefire agreements with Turkey and killing 55 Turkish soldiers to date. Turkey responded by launching Operation Spring Shield on March 1, targeting regime forces and allied Iranian-backed militias. [REDACTED] and agreed to a new ceasefire beginning March 6 that includes a security corridor extending 6 km to the north and the south of a strategic highway and joint Turkish-Russian patrols along that highway beginning on March 15. Many details still need to be finalized and it is still unclear if this deal will hold.
  - Requests for NATO and Canadian Assistance: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] In the aftermath of the air strike in Idlib on February 27, Turkey invoked Article IV and called for urgent consultations at the North Atlantic Council (NAC). During the NAC session on February 28, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] On February 28, NATO Article 4 consultations took place on the situation in Syria, at the request of Turkish President Erdogan. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED] Canadian Export Permit Ban: Due to the fact that Canada's decision to stop issuing all new export permits was never officially announced and only conveyed through a quote given to the media, [REDACTED] It believes that it applies only to arms exports, likely due to the fact that this would be in keeping with the harshest measures implemented by other NATO Allies and like-minded in response to Operation Peace Spring in the fall of 2019. In the absence of a formal policy decision, Global Affairs has not been able to clarify this misinterpretation. With Turkey already upset over suspending arms exports and asking Canada to lift them, they will view an announcement of a broader export permit ban at this time as a further escalation that will put Canada far ahead of other countries in terms of the severity of measures imposed. It also puts us out of step with allies and like-minded who, especially in recent days, have increased their political engagement with Turkey and sought to diffuse tensions in order to move forward in key areas where interests are aligned.



- Syrian Refugees and Tensions with EU: The renewed fighting in Idlib is estimated to have displaced nearly 1 million more people since December 2019 and several million more could be displaced if the Assad regime retakes the region. The Turkish military operations aim to prevent this from happening, as Turkey already feels burdened by hosting the world's largest refugee population of over 4 million people, including more than 3.6 million Syrians. [REDACTED] that the EU has not fulfilled its 2016 refugee agreement commitments (including financial and other measures) and rhetoric about not blocking refugees from heading to Europe has increased tensions between Ankara and the EU, even though the UNHCR confirms that the vast majority of refugees in Turkey are not moving towards the border at present. The EU has criticized Turkey for using migrants to pressure the EU and called on Ankara to uphold the 2016 agreement. The EU also announced a pledge of an additional €60M in support for North West Syria.
- **Key Statistics:** Total Trade: \$3,665.9 million; Imports: \$2,327.4 million; Exports: \$1,227.4 million. Canadian Direct Investment: \$596 million.
- **Consular Issues:** Turkish assistance is essential for Canada to respond to consular emergencies in Iran, as seen with their role in facilitating the rapid deployment of the SRDT for the PS 752 crisis.
- **Representation:** Canada's representative: Ambassador Jamal Khokhar  
Turkey's representative in Canada: Ambassador Kerim Uras
- [REDACTED]

Author's name/division/tel.: Turner/ECE/203-3605

Consulted divisions/departments: ECE/MIX/IGR/ESA/EUB/BNATO/ANKRA/DND

Approving ADM: EGM

Name and symbol of departmental officer attending/tel.:





## MINA Turkish Foreign Minister Call on Situation in Syria

### Latest Developments

- The Assad regime launched military operations against Idlib in December 2019 that have killed 55 Turkish soldiers and displaced nearly 1 million people. The Turkish launch of Operation Spring Shield in Idlib has raised fears of an accidental conflict with Russia and heightened tensions with the EU over migration.
- Turkey and Russia reached an agreement for a new ceasefire on March 5, but there are still many details to be figure out and it is unlikely that it will hold.

### Current Position

- Turkey has called on its NATO allies for support and has specifically requested that Canada do several things to help, including lifting the restrictions on export permits for arms.
- Canada has condemned the Assad regime's attacks and expressed support for Turkey as a NATO ally, while calling for a ceasefire and a political resolution to the conflict.

### Background

Idlib governorate in northwest Syria remains one of the last major areas outside regime control. Russia and Turkey brokered several ceasefires and de-escalation zones in Idlib since the 2018 Sochi agreement, all of which have been broken. Over 2500 Turkish troops have established a cordon of checkpoints around Idlib. The recent Assad regime ground offensive made significant gains on strategic locations along the M4 and M5 highways. The situation remains extremely fluid, as pockets of territory continuously change between regime and opposition hands.

Turkey dispatched additional troops and assets to Idlib in an attempt to halt the offensive. On 27 February, at least 37 Turkish soldiers were killed by a regime-aligned airstrike, bringing Turkey's total losses to 55. On 1 March, Turkey officially launched Operation Spring Shield (OSS) against the Syrian regime, after regime forces did not comply with Turkish demands to halt the offensive and withdrawal to agreed territory per the 2018 Sochi agreement. The objective of OSS is to target regime-aligned soldiers under the right to self-defence. The Turkish Minister of Defence stressed that Turkey does not want a face-off with Russia. On 28 February, Turkey called for an Article 4 meeting of the North Atlantic Council which under the Washington Treaty allows an Ally to call for consultations whenever "the territorial integrity, political independence or security" of one of its members is threatened. While the SecGen issued a strong statement condemning the attack and expressing Allied support for Turkey, [REDACTED] In response to the crisis, many like-minded have increased their support to Turkey, with increased financial pledges and high-level visits. [REDACTED]

On March 5, Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire in Idlib commencing at 00:01, 6 March. The agreement also establishes a "security corridor" 6km north and south of the M4 highway, and joint Turkish-Russian patrols along the M4 highway within Idlib. Statements by Turkish President Erdogan indicate that the terms of the ceasefire are temporary, and not a final solution to crisis in Idlib. It has been assessed that the ceasefire is fragile as it does not address key Turkish concerns such as the fate of Turkish observations posts encircled by the regime. In addition, Assad has indicated that he intends to restore regime authority in every inch of Syria, militarily.

### Requests for Canadian Assistance

[REDACTED] In the aftermath of the air strike in



Idlib on 27 February, Turkey invoked Article IV and called for urgent consultations at the North Atlantic Council (NAC). During the NAC session on 28 February, [REDACTED]

On the request to lift the export permit ban on arms, those like-minded countries that implemented such measures have yet to lift them – although many countries imposed only more limited restrictions, such as reviewing export permits on a case by case basis. [REDACTED]

Canadian Export Permit Ban: Due to the fact that Canada's decision to stop issuing all new export permits was never officially announced and only conveyed through a quote given to the media, [REDACTED] It believes that it applies only to arms exports, likely due to the fact that this would be in keeping with the harshest measures implemented by other NATO allies and like-minded. In the absence of a formal policy decision (a memo has been drafted and is now awaiting approval), Global Affairs has not been able to clarify this misinterpretation. With Turkey already upset over suspending arms exports and asking Canada to lift them, they will view an announcement of a broader export permit ban at this time as a further escalation that will put Canada far ahead of other countries in terms of the severity of measures imposed.

### **Syrian Refugees and EU Tensions**

There are an estimated over 960,000 people displaced since December 2019. Many IDP's are in dire conditions, as they have fled previously from other parts of Syria. Several million more people could be displaced if the Assad regime retakes the region. The Turkish military operations aim to prevent this from happening, as Turkey already feels burdened by hosting the world's largest refugee population of over 4 million people, including more than 3.6 million Syrians. On February 27, Turkey announced that it would no longer uphold a 2016 accord with the European Union to keep refugees on its territory, as it believes the EU has not lived up to its commitments under the accord and due to the increased pressures it faces on the Turkish-Syrian border. Following the announcement by Turkish President Erdoğan, thousands of migrants have made their way to the Turkish-Greek land border, resulting in clashes between Greek authorities and migrants attempting illegal entry into Greece. Turkish complaints that the EU has not fulfilled its 2016 refugee agreement commitments (including financial and other measures) and rhetoric about not blocking refugees from heading to Europe has increased tensions between Ankara and the EU, even though the UNHCR confirms that the vast majority of refugees in Turkey are not moving towards the border at present.

Canada seeks to continue to cooperate with Turkey on issues related by the refugee crisis, including by sharing best practices on refugee resettlement and harmonization. Turkey is at the center of the global migration crisis, having spent over \$8 billion to host Syrian refugees since 2011, and was a co-convenor of the December 2019 UNHCR Global Refugee Forum. Under the Middle East Strategy (2016-2021), Canada has allocated, to date over \$488 million in humanitarian assistance funding in Syria since 2016 as part of our Middle East Strategy (2016-2019).

**The Minister of Foreign Affairs**

CC: The Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade  
The Minister of International Development

**Update on export permits to Turkey****Summary**

The purpose of this memorandum is to outline several developments that have taken place on the issue of the export permit ban on Turkey since the March 9, 2020 briefing for your office at which Action Memorandum BPTS 03767-2019, currently awaiting a decision, was discussed. These developments do not change the recommendation in that memorandum. However, the additional context they provide suggests that it is advisable to proceed with a ministerial decision as soon as possible.

for

Marta Morgan  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs



## Background

1. Since the last briefing to your office on export permits to Turkey on March 9, 2020, there have been several developments and an update is warranted. Nothing herein changes the recommendation provided in Action Memorandum BPTS 03767-2019, but it provides some additional context. This new information suggests that on balance it would be preferable to have a ministerial decision as soon as possible, rather than hold off on a decision at this time to avoid damaging bilateral relations with Turkey.
2. The following developments have taken place:
  - During a March 10 telephone call between you and Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu to discuss the situation in Idlib, Minister Cavusoglu provided the first confirmation that Turkey understands the full scope of the export permit ban when he asked Canada to lift the restrictions on all controlled goods. Prior to this, it appeared that Turkey [REDACTED] the ban to apply only to arms exports.
  - Diplomatic reporting from [REDACTED] indicates that the [REDACTED] has begun the process of shifting its stance with regards to the restrictions it has imposed on Turkey, returning to a case-by-case review of exports – although these changes still need to be finalised. An updated version of the chart listing the positions of like-minded and NATO allies is attached (see Annex A), although some missions have been unable to provide an update due to the COVID-19 crisis. Canada remains the only country to have implemented a full suspension of all export permits.
  - A series of interactions with the business community – including a March 13 letter to Assistant Deputy Minister MacDougall from the Vice-President of Turkey's Presidency of Defence Industries (see Annex B), a meeting between the Ambassador of Canada to Turkey and the [REDACTED] (see Annex C), and a request from the Canada-Turkey Business Council to meet with you (see Annex D) – have highlighted the increasingly damaging economic consequences of the prolonged uncertainty surrounding Canada's export permit ban policy.
  - Minister Cavusoglu sent a letter on March 22, requesting that you take action on Turkey's request to lift the export permit ban, noting that many of the items affected are purely civilian in nature. This letter provides a timely way of announcing a formal policy decision to Turkey, so as to limit the negative impact on bilateral relations (see Annex E).
  - Turkish Defence Minister Akar requested a phone call with Minister Sajjan on April 1, 2020, to discuss both [REDACTED] Efforts are currently underway to find a mutually acceptable time to schedule the call.
3. As mentioned at the March 9 briefing, [REDACTED] allies have become more supportive of Ankara, given Turkey's intervention to counter Assad's latest Russia-backed offensive against Idlib. They are examining ways to lean in and support Turkey, [REDACTED] This is based on a general assessment that Turkey has suffered losses and has legitimate security concerns due to its bordering Syria and as host of 3.5 million Syrian refugees. Before the COVID-19 crisis, many like-minded allies visited and/or engaged Turkey at high level and pledged funds. [REDACTED]
4. Taken together, these developments suggest that the balance of interests has now moved in favour of a ministerial decision, whatever the decision. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] given the confirmation from the March 10 ministerial call that [REDACTED] Canada has actually increased our restrictions. In addition, any further delay in taking a decision risks increasing the difficulties faced by Canadian companies.



Attachments:

- Action Memorandum BPTS 03767-2019
- Annex A: Controlled Exports to Turkey – Comparative Country Positions and Commercial Exposure
- Annex B: Letter from the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey – Presidency of Defence Industries – March 13, 2020
- Annex C: Report from ANKRA HOM on [REDACTED]
- Annex D: Letter from the Canada-Turkey Business Council – March 3, 2020
- Annex E: Letter from the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs – March 22, 2020

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BPTS: 03767-2019

## The Minister of Foreign Affairs

CC: The Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade  
The Minister of International Development

### Export controls with regard to Turkey

#### Summary

Effective October 11, 2019, Canada temporarily halted the issuance of new export permits to Turkey, a NATO Ally, in light of its military actions in northeastern Syria. This fact was made public on October 15, 2019, through media lines directed by the office of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. With this approach, Canada has gone significantly beyond most of our like-minded partners whose suspensions have been limited specifically to arms exports; other partners, such as [REDACTED], have not imposed suspensions.

[REDACTED] Turkey has indicated that it could retaliate further if Canada continues with its current approach. This would increase the risk of lost business opportunities for Canadian exporters and of other impacts on the bilateral relationship.

The Department recommends a new decision to apply the temporary suspension specifically to military exports only, consistent with like-minded partners, with an exemption for NATO-related cooperation programs. Such an exemption is critical to ensure that Canada and Turkey, as NATO Allies, can continue to collaborate on important NATO defence projects, [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] In 2018, the value of Group 2 (military items) exports to Turkey captured by the suspension was \$115.7 million. If you approve the recommended option, officials will proceed to issue the relevant permits (i.e. non-Group 2 items and items for NATO-related cooperation programs) that have been deemed ready for issuance.

You can amend this decision at any time in response to further political or security developments. The Department will revert back to you when a review of this position is warranted.

#### Recommendations

That you approve:

- option 1: the temporary suspension of the issuance of new export permits to Turkey to Group 2 items (i.e. military items) only; and
- an exemption for NATO-related cooperation programs.

  
Marta Morgan  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

- ☐ I wish to discuss      ☐ I do not concur
- ☐ I approve **Option 1** (recommended)
- ☐ I approve **Option 2**
- ☐ I approve **Option 3**
- ☐ I approve an exemption for NATO-related cooperation programs

Minister

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION





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## Background

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to seek a decision to apply the temporary halt on the issuance of new export permits to Turkey to Group 2 items (military items) only. The suspension of all new export permits to Turkey was introduced on October 11, by way of instruction provided by the Deputy Minister of International Trade pursuant to Turkey's incursion into northeastern Syria on October 9. This fact was made public on October 15 through media reports.
2. Under the *Export and Import Permits Act* (EIPA), you have discretion to issue or deny export permits, and to amend, suspend, cancel or reinstate any existing export permit. Your decisions must be based on relevant considerations in the context of export controls, must be supported by credible evidence, and cannot be made arbitrarily or in bad faith. A material change in circumstances in the recipient country would be considered sufficient to amend, suspend or cancel any existing export permit.
3. Since September 1, 2019, your discretion to issue or deny export permits has been partially narrowed as a result of amendments to the EIPA under Bill C-47, which enabled Canada's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty. You are now required to deny a permit if there is a "substantial risk" that the export would result in certain negative consequences, including serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.
4. You also have authority to put in place a temporary suspension on the issuance of new export permits. However, exporters need and expect clarity on the nature and extent of the suspension. Failure to render decisions on export permit applications within a reasonable delay could result in a mandamus order from the Federal court, forcing you to lift the suspension and make a decision. In order for a delay to be considered "unreasonable", a key question is whether the public authority responsible for the delay has provided "satisfactory justification" for it. In the present instance, the evolving nature of the situation in northeastern Syria would likely constitute "satisfactory justification" for the temporary suspension. As long as the situation in northeastern Syria remains difficult to assess, there are good arguments to be made that the temporary suspension is reasonable. If the situation in northeastern Syria becomes more stable, a continued temporary suspension will increase the risk of a mandamus.
5. For reference, attached is a chart of export permits issued to Turkey in the three months prior to October 11 to end-users in the following categories: Ministry of Defence, Navy, Military, and Law Enforcement (Annex B). These permits were valued at \$60 million and a majority of them were issued for Group 2 items (i.e. for military items). No new permits have been issued since October 7.

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## Options and Recommendations

6. The Department has developed three options for your consideration:
  - (i) Option 1 (recommended): Approve a temporary suspension that applies specifically to the issuance of new export permits for military items (Group 2 on the Export Control List – Annex C) to Turkey, similar to the arms embargos of [REDACTED]. Departmental officials will continue to monitor the situation and will revert to you as soon as a review of our position is warranted. If you approve this option, officials will proceed to issue the relevant permits that have been deemed ready for issuance (see Annex E for further details). Annex F lists the permits that would not be issued at this time under this option.
  - (ii) Option 2: Lift the temporary suspension of the issuance of new export permits for all controlled goods to Turkey. All permits would continue to be reviewed on a case-by-case basis and would be thoroughly assessed against the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) criteria prior to issuance, including the risk that they would be used to undermine peace and security, or commit serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law. As noted in Annex B, [REDACTED] have not implemented export restrictions.
  - (iii) Option 3: Maintain the temporary suspension of new export permits for all controlled goods to Turkey. If this option is chosen, Department officials will continue to monitor the situation and would revert to you as soon as a review of Canada's position would be warranted.



7. Whichever of these options you may choose, the Department recommends that exemptions be made for NATO-related cooperation programs, in which Canada has committed to working with Allies on specific programs related to defence production, logistics, intelligence-sharing, standardization or scientific research. Exemptions for NATO-related cooperation programs are critical because a complete ban on Group 2 items (military items) – i.e. without the NATO exemption – would negatively impact cooperation within the Alliance and have unpredictable consequences, given the complex nature of the supply chains in the cooperative programs. In many existing or potential NATO cooperation programs, Canadian industry and Turkish industry are working closely together to meet the requirements of the Canadian Armed Forces, the Turkish Armed Forces, and those of our other Allies.

This missile is vital for naval ship defence and is used by Canada on our Halifax-class frigates to defeat incoming air threats such as anti-ship missiles and aircraft. There are also possibilities that Turkish and Canadian companies would work together in future to supply other NATO-related cooperation programs such as the Leopard 2 Main Battle Tank. If Turkey were to decide to retaliate against Canada's export controls decision and deny the repair of warheads to Canada, it could prevent Canada from servicing our missiles and hampering cooperation in NATO relations.

### Considerations

8. The recommended approach would signal our strong concern in a way that is consistent with most of our like-minded partners. Some NATO Allies and partners have announced various steps to limit or temporarily halt exports of military items to Turkey (see Annex A). The actions taken by these countries have been limited to military items only, and not all controlled items. The announced and then reversed sanctions on five Turkish ministries, but did not apply export restrictions as a result of the incursion.

9. Turkish officials in Ankara and Ottawa have highlighted their concerns about the Canadian action, describing it as "not balanced and not measured." Turkey has repeatedly protested the broad suspension, most recently during a November 22, 2019, congratulatory phone call from Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu to Deputy Prime Minister Freeland, when Cavusoglu asked Canada to reconsider its decision. In addition, on November 5, 2019, Turkey's Ambassador to Canada signalled

Turkish officials have indicated that the ban on all export permits, as per option 3, would likely trigger further significant consequences for the Canada-Turkey bilateral relationship. A full list of bilateral interests and upcoming engagements that could be jeopardised is included in Annex D, but key points include military cooperation (bilateral and NATO), counter-terrorism, and trade. It is also possible that Turkey

10. Under the recommended approach, Canada would no longer be viewed as an outlier by Turkey, reducing the likelihood of Canadian interests being singled out for further retaliation. Turkey has criticised other countries' responses, but it has not taken concrete retaliatory steps as they have

Overall, Turkey continues to push for high-level political engagement with Canada, particularly at the leader level, as Canada is still viewed positively as compared to many other Western countries. To date, Canada has not responded to these overtures. As such, clarifying publicly that the temporary suspension of export permits applies only to Group 2 items (military items) and expanding high-



level political engagement (i.e. at the leader and/or ministerial levels) would give Canada a greater chance of influencing Turkey's approach to Syria and advancing our other interests.

11. This approach would also provide clarity for Canadian industry and exporters, many of whom have contacted Departmental staff with questions about the intent and scope of the current ban. A decision to apply the temporary suspension to Group 2 items (military items) only would also reduce the risk of Canadian exporters of other controlled items (i.e. not arms) losing business opportunities to competitors in like-minded countries that have taken a more focused approach. Narrowing the suspension would result in permits for controlled items other than conventional weapons being able to be issued following a thorough interdepartmental risk assessment. Of the permits currently deemed ready for issuance, [REDACTED] are Group 2.

[REDACTED] would be issued under the recommended option, as this Group 5 item has been consulted and partners indicated no concerns with this export proceeding.

12. Should the recommended approach be implemented, the Department will evaluate proposed exports of non-Group 2 controlled items to Turkey in accordance with the newly-enhanced assessment process on a case-by-case basis, as follows:

- a. The permit application will be consulted with experts across the Department and the government using the new risk assessment form. If consultees respond with no concerns, the Department will issue the permit. If a consultee registers a concern that the proposed export presents a risk associated with the mandatory ATT considerations (described in paragraph 3), but there is no consensus for denial, the file will be referred to the Director General Review Committee (DGRC).
- b. If DGRC discussions result in a consensus to approve the permit application, the Department will issue the export permit. If there is consensus for denial, the Department will submit a memorandum for your decision. If DGRC members cannot reach a consensus on approval or denial, the application will be referred to the Assistant Deputy Minister Review Committee (ADMRC).
- c. If ADMRC discussions result in a consensus to approve the permit application, the Department will issue the export permit. If there is a consensus for denial, or the ADMRC is unable to achieve consensus, the Department will submit a memorandum for your decision.

13. As a result of the robust risk assessment process described above, exports of non-military items on the Export Control List (i.e. captured in other groups of the Export Control List) could now be authorised when there is agreement across government that there are no concerns. In the past five years, [REDACTED] Canadian companies were issued [REDACTED] permits for exporting non-Group 2 controlled items, which were mainly related to navigation equipment for aerospace applications. Separately, certain low-risk items can be exported to NATO Allies, including Turkey, without an individual export permit. Changing this would require a regulatory amendment that may involve public consultations, and is outside the scope of this memo.

14. Bilateral Interests: Turkey is an important NATO ally facing significant security threats in a difficult region, and one with which Canada has a [REDACTED] bilateral relationship, including several high profile consular cases that we have been working to improve. However, Turkey's military actions in northeastern Syria undermine regional stability, exacerbate an already tenuous humanitarian situation, and risk allowing the resurgence of Daesh and other extremist groups by undermining coalition operations against Daesh. Unlike several like-minded countries that have limited exports of military items, Canada does not have a deep-rooted partnership with Turkey that could help counter-balance the negative fallout from the imposition of export controls. [REDACTED]

15. Canada cooperates with Turkey on issues such as international migration and refugee policy given its status as a major host country. Turkey is hosting over 3.6 million Syrian refugees. It believes that its partners have not done enough to help with this burden and fail to recognise Turkish security concerns about Kurdish-linked terrorism. [REDACTED]



16. Canada and Turkey have recently made efforts to advance defence relations. This includes [REDACTED] and senior level engagements (including the Chief of the Defence Staff visit to Turkey in April 2019). Turkey would likely respond to a permanent halt of export permits by [REDACTED]

17. Commercial Considerations: Bilateral trade has continued the recent trend of growing at about 20-25 percent a year, reaching just under \$4 billion in 2018, making Turkey Canada's 23<sup>rd</sup> largest trading partner. Canadian exports in 2018 were \$1.3 billion across a range of sectors. In particular, Turkey is one of Canada's largest export markets for lentils (\$104 million). Canada has become a top destination of choice for Turkish students seeking to study abroad. The number of Turkish international post-secondary students has doubled in Canada in the past three years. Turkey is one of Canada's 11 priority countries in Canada's new International Education Strategy.

18. In the context of this improved trade relationship, the former Minister of International Trade Diversification signed a memorandum of understanding with his Turkish counterpart in June 2019 establishing the Joint Economic and Trade Commission (JETCO). The inaugural meeting of the JETCO was held on November 13, 2019, in Istanbul. In addition, since 2018 Canada and Turkey have discussed a possible Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, although discussions have been sporadic. This would be of great benefit to Canadian mining firms, who account for the largest share of foreign direct investment in Turkey's mining sector (\$1.9 billion in 2016).

19. Canadian agricultural exports have been subject to market access challenges over the past several years in relation to Turkey's strict genetically modified organism policy, which has at times been applied in an arbitrary manner. In addition, several Canadian mining companies have experienced significant delays in receiving their operating, forestry, and concession permits. Tensions over export permits could exacerbate these issues, given that economic decision-making in Turkey can be influenced by political considerations.

20. Military Exports: As reported in the 2018 Report on Exports of Military Goods, Canada increased its exports of Group 2 items (military items) to Turkey from \$48.27 million in 2017 to \$115.7 million in 2018.

21. The suspension on the issuance of new permits, whether for Group 2 only or broader, captures relevant items that were previously approved for export, but for which export permits have expired. For instance, [REDACTED] has recently engaged the Department, [REDACTED] to discuss a [REDACTED] million contract to sell [REDACTED] and associated engineering services and technical data. The original export permit for the [REDACTED] technical data (which fall under Group 2) was issued in 2017, [REDACTED]. The company submitted an application for a new permit on [REDACTED] 2019, to continue to fulfill this contract.

[REDACTED] the company requires a policy statement from Global Affairs Canada stating Canada's current position towards Turkey which would be accomplished by a Notice to Exporters (see paragraph 24).

## Resource Implications

22. The anticipated incremental resources related to the temporary suspension of new export permits for Group 2 items (military items) to Turkey are estimated to be minimal and will be absorbed within the existing reference levels of the Trade Agreements and Negotiations Branch.

## Communications Implications/Actions

23. The Turkish incursion into northeastern Syria and the decisions by Canada and other NATO Allies to halt export permits to Turkey have garnered media attention in Canada and abroad. It is expected that this issue will continue to garner extensive media attention for the foreseeable future. A reactive approach is



recommended for communications with the media and the general public. Responsive media lines on export permits have been drafted to complement the existing approved lines on the broader issue of the incursion.

24. It is recommended to proactively inform the Government of Turkey and Canadian exporters of this decision to apply the temporary suspension to Group 2 items (military). Canada would inform the Government of Turkey through our Embassy in Ankara. The decision would also be announced to Canadian exporters through a Notice to Exporters, transmitted by the Department through Canada's export online permit application system (EXCOL). Notices are sent to registered users of EXCOL. Notices are also posted to Global Affairs Canada's export controls website.

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### Parliamentary Implications/Actions

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25. Parliamentarians are not expected to oppose the decision given that it aligns with steps taken by our likeminded allies in the European Union and that it represents somewhat of a 'middle ground' approach that will be reviewed when appropriate. During the 2019 election campaign, Conservative leader Andrew Scheer condemned Turkey's attacks in northeastern Syria and described the Kurds as Canada's allies. Of note, Conservative Deputy Leader Ms. Leona Alleslev also recently tabled a Question on the Order Paper (Q-182) asking numerous pointed questions about Canada's exports of military goods, writ large, including on changes to Global Affairs Canada's review process and the impact that delays and uncertainty are having on industry. The Bloc Québécois has long-supported the plight of the Kurdish minority in Turkey and their right to self-determination. NDP leader Jagmeet Singh has referred to the developing situation and the American response to it as "troubling". Former Green Party Leader, Elizabeth May has also suggested that NATO should review Turkey's membership in the NATO alliance on account of their recent actions.

26. Canada's export controls related to military items garnered significant scrutiny in the 42nd Parliament, including questions around the approvals process for export permits for Canada's NATO allies and questions raised with the export of light armoured vehicles to Saudi Arabia amid ongoing human rights concerns. As a result, parliamentarians can be expected to closely follow Canada's response to Turkish actions in northeastern Syria.

#### Attachments:

- Annex A: Controlled exports to Turkey - country positions and commercial exposure
- Annex B: Permits issued for military/police end-users in Turkey from July 10 to October 10, 2019
- Annex C: Explanation of Group 2 Military Items from the Export Control List
- Annex D: Canadian Interests and Upcoming Engagements with Turkey
- Annex E: Export permit applications directly or indirectly to Turkey deemed ready for issuance
- Annex F: Permit applications directly or indirectly to Turkey to be sent to Minister for individual decision

**ANNEX A - CONTROLLED EXPORTS TO TURKEY  
COUNTRY POSITIONS AND COMMERCIAL EXPOSURE**

**Countries fully or partially restricting exports to Turkey**

<b>Country</b>	<b>Country Position</b>	<b>Commercial Exposure</b>
<b>CANADA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• There has been a temporary suspension on issuing <u>new</u> permits to Turkey since October 11, 2019.</li> <li>• Shipments are proceeding under existing valid permits.</li> <li>• Certain lower-risk controlled items to Turkey are eligible for a General Export Permit (GEP) and can continue to be shipped unless a regulatory amendment is sought.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exports of military goods and technology to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$2.069 billion.</b></li> <li>• Canadian exports of military goods and technology to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$115.7 million.</b></li> <li>• Turkey is the #3 destination for Canadian military exports, accounting for 6% of exports to all destinations.</li> </ul>
<b>France</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The French government has <b>suspended</b> all existing licenses for <b>defence materials and dual-use goods with a clear military end-use</b> and is not issuing new permits for the same items.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• French military exports to Turkey in 2018 were <b>CAD \$65.9 million.</b></li> </ul>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The UK government has suspended issuance of new export permits for all arms sales to Turkey.</li> <li>• Ministers have ordered a full review into sales of items to Turkey that might be used in military operations in Syria.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2018, the UK issued 329 export licenses for military items to Turkey worth CAD \$107.3 million (the UK does not report on the value of actual exports, only on the value of permits authorized).</li> <li>• Most of the licenses issued in 2018 were for aircraft parts and components (110).</li> </ul>
<b>Germany</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Germany will not issue <u>new permits</u> to Turkey for any military exports that could be used in Syria.</li> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> <li>• Turkey has generally benefitted from the German equivalent of Canada's General Export Permits (GEPs). [REDACTED]</li> <li>• Two German opposition parties, Die Linke (Left) and Die Grüne (Greens), have said that preventing new deals is not sufficient, and have called for an immediate stop to all arms deliveries to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• In 2018, Germany issued 58 licenses worth CAD \$18.8 million to export military items. This was down from 147 licenses issued in 2017.</li> <li>• Despite restrictions on arms sales to Turkey, in place since 2016, Turkey remains the largest purchaser of arms from Germany, in terms of the value of items exported.</li> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> </ul>



Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As of October 11, 2019, Norway has suspended the issuance of new permits for military and dual-use items to Turkey.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Norway military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$5.99 million</b>, the majority of which was for "fire control systems" (i.e. missile targeting systems).</li> </ul>
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 9, 2019, Finland suspended the issuance of new permits for arms to Turkey [REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$24.5 million</b>. Mainly consisted of military armored plates for protection.</li> <li>Finland's annual exports of defense equipment represent about 1% of the EU total.</li> </ul>
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Netherlands (NL) suspended the issuance of new export permits to Turkey for any military items, [REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Permits for Turkey undergo a detailed review based on the EU Common Position. [REDACTED]</li> <li>NL advocated for an EU-wide arms embargo at the Foreign Affairs Council, but did not garner sufficient support. [REDACTED]</li> <li>In 2018, NL rejected five applications for Turkey, [REDACTED]</li> <li>NL has also removed Turkey from the list of countries eligible for global licences, which are issued when goods have multiple possible final destinations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$29 million</b>.</li> <li>Represents 8% of Europe's total arms exports to Turkey.</li> </ul>

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, all valid licenses to export military equipment to Turkey were revoked [REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>In 2019, no export permits for military equipment were granted and no new export deals to Turkey have been approved since April 2017.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Swedish FM Linde has proposed a weapons embargo against Turkey, and raised the idea at an EU meeting of Foreign Ministers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2017) <b>CAD \$9.64 million</b> of which only CAD \$13,621 was made up of military equipment for combat.</li> <li>Military exports to Turkey in 2018 were <b>CAD \$40.7 million</b>. However, no equipment that could be used to support combat operations was exported.</li> <li>In 2018, Sweden denied 8 export permit applications for items destined to Turkey, which is double the number of permits denied for Turkey in 2017.</li> </ul>
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective October 13, 2019, Italy issued an executive decree suspending the issuance of new export licenses for arms to Turkey.</li> <li>Reviewing existing permits to Turkey.</li> <li>Turkey is not eligible for any Italian equivalent to a GEP.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$531 million</b> (based on value reported by Italy's National Authority for the Authorization of Arms Materials).</li> <li>Italy undertook <b>CAD \$388.7 million</b> in actual exports to Turkey in 2017 under 75 valid licenses.</li> </ul>
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, the Minister for Defence said in an interview that she has asked for a pause in relation to export permits for Turkey.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Australia's 2017 report to the ATT does not indicate any sales of ATT items to Turkey.</li> </ul>

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Czech Republic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, the Czech Republic (CZ) announced a ban on all military sales to Turkey and stopped issuing new licences.</li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li>No GEP equivalents in place for Turkey.</li> <li>CZ has a special relationship with the Kurds having engaged in training of Kurdish Special Forces and provision of weapons and munitions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2018, total Czech arms exports amounted to <b>CAD \$84.4 million</b>.</li> <li>In 2017, CZ exported <b>CAD \$3.9 million</b> to Turkey. This comprised of firearms and related components, along with "armoured or protective equipment".</li> </ul>
Poland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poland has suspended issuing new permits for arms exports to Turkey,</li> <li></li> <li></li> <li>Poland includes Turkey on one of its GEPs for the export of Turkish strategic items that were imported into Poland for the purposes of tests and exhibitions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Polish military exports to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$713 million</b>.</li> <li>Polish arms sales to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$2.2 million</b>.</li> <li>In 2018, 5 export permits were issued for items destined for Turkey valued at a total of CAD \$35 million.</li> </ul>
Slovakia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Slovakia will not issue new licenses for arms exports to Turkey,</li> <li></li> <li></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> <li>In 2018, <b>CAD \$26.6 million</b> in export licenses to Turkey were approved.</li> </ul>

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Switzerland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No export ban has been announced.</li> <li>On October 15, 2019, the economics ministry told media that since the beginning of 2017, in principle no new arms exports to Turkey have been granted because of the conflict between the Turkish government and the Kurds. Only the supply of spare parts and "individual handguns and handguns for private use by diplomats" are permitted.</li> <li>In early October, the Socialist party (second biggest in parliament) called for a ban on the export of war material in addition to other sanctions. Parliament is not in session until early December.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arms exports to Turkey amounted to <b>CAD \$127,282</b> in 2018. The majority was "fire control systems" e.g., missile targeting systems for tanks, and CAD \$6370 was for individual handguns.</li> </ul>
Belgium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Belgian regions are responsible for issuing export licenses for strategic items.</li> <li>Flanders Region: no new licences for military or dual-use goods will be issued [REDACTED]</li> <li>Region of Wallonia: no new export licenses for arms and military equipment to Turkey, [REDACTED]</li> <li>Brussels: [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2017, a total of <b>CAD \$170, 170</b> in military items was exported from Flanders and Wallonia to Turkey. There were no exports from the Brussels region.</li> </ul>
European Union	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On 14 October 2019, the EU Council condemned Turkey's military action that "seriously undermines the stability and security of the whole region."</li> <li>The Council committed to strong national positions regarding Member States' arms export policy to Turkey, with a specific reference to the application of Article 4 of Common Position 2008/944, which stipulates that Member States must consider the need "not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way" when exporting military technology and equipment. While not a full arms ban, it does reiterate EU guidelines and commitments for Member States on arms exports.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2017, EU Member States reported a combined total of <b>CAD \$883.7 million</b> of actual arms exports to Turkey.</li> <li>There were over CAD \$4 billion in authorized exports to Turkey in 2017.</li> <li>The same year there were 16 licence refusals for Turkey across the EU.</li> </ul>

Countries that are considering restrictions on exports to Turkey

Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spanish military exports to Turkey (2017) <b>CAD \$1.41 billion.</b></li> <li>• Spanish exports to all destinations (2017) <b>CAD \$6.45 billion.</b></li> <li>• Spanish military exports to Turkey during the <u>first half of 2018</u> were <b>CAD \$ 236.7 million</b>, of which CAD \$180.9 million was for the export of a military transport aircraft.</li> </ul>
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Countries that have not introduced restrictions on exports to Turkey

United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The U.S. has not instituted any changes to its policy on military exports to Turkey nor have they altered their licensing policy with regards to dual-use goods.</li> <li>• On October 23, 2019, the United States removed sanctions imposed on October 14, 2019, on three senior officials – Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, and Energy Minister Fatih Donmez – and on Turkey’s Ministries of National Defence and Energy and National Resources.</li> <li>• The U.S. reserved the right to re-impose sanctions including tariffs on steel and other products should Turkey fail to honour its obligations, including the protection of religious and ethnic minorities.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• U.S. arms exports to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$13.9 billion.</b></li> <li>• U.S. arms exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$316.1 million</b>, up from CAD \$193 million in 2017.</li> <li>• In 2017, the U.S. exported <b>CAD \$180.7 million</b> through direct commercial sales.</li> </ul>
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New Zealand has very few military or dual-use exports to Turkey. [REDACTED]</li> <li>• New Zealand does not have a GEP equivalent for exports to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> </ul>

<b>Republic of Korea</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• [REDACTED]</li><li>• According to the Korea Trade Association (KOTRA)'s 2019 report, ROK has continued exporting defense goods to Turkey and participating in mega joint projects with Turkey.</li><li>• [REDACTED]</li><li>• [REDACTED]</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ROK does not release official data for sales of controlled items but limited information on sales of military goods can be found in the Statistical Yearbook for Defense Business released by DAPA.</li><li>• DAPA reported that ROK exported <b>CAD \$1.7 million</b> in military goods to the Middle East in 2017.</li></ul>
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*Note: the commercial data above is drawn from a variety of open sources and may not be directly comparable.*



## Annex B – Permits issued for military/police end-users in Turkey from July 10 to October 10, 2019

Ref. Id	Status	Applicant Name	Country	ECL	Submit Date	Description	End-User	Value (\$CAD)
	Issued		Turkey	2-11.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2	2019-10-07	Permanent export of [REDACTED] antenna, technology and software - [REDACTED]	Turkish MoD	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a, 2-22.a	2019-09-26	Permanent export of Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems including GPS Antenna and Cables for end use by the Turkish MoD.	Turkish MoD	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a	2019-09-25	Permanent export of [REDACTED] Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems ; components/sub-assemblies and related technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and operational software and firmware (Group 2) to consignee [REDACTED] in Turkey. - Items will be installed on the [REDACTED] to be used for surveillance and targeting; for the end-use of the Turkish Naval Forces.	Turkish Naval Forces.	

	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-15.d	2019-09-21	Temporary export of quantity each of Handcontroller Assemblies and Mission Grip Assemblies, and quantity lot Cable Assemblies to support demonstrations in Turkey at the Turkish National Police.	Turkish National Police.	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-15.d, 2-5.b, 1-7.A.3,d.1, 6-9.A.6	2019-09-13	Permanent export of: spare parts for Wescam MX Series EO/IR Surveillance Systems for in Turkey for end users in Turkey END USE: Wescam Inc. will export quantity CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance Systems and CMX-15D accessories and spare parts to in Turkey for installation on the End-Use :In support of Military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior respectively: Turkish Army, Turkish Navy, Turkish Gendarmerie, Turkish National Police	Military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior respectively: Turkish Army, Turkish Navy, Turkish Gendarmerie, Turkish National Police	
	Issued		Turkey	2-22.a	2019-09-06	Permanent export of: Technical data and assistance to bridge the gap between marketing proposal submittal and contract award. End USE: Turkish Navy.	Turkish Navy	

	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-15.d, 2-5.b, 2-22.a, 2-21.a	2019-08-26	Permanent export of [REDACTED] Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems, Ground Boresight Modules, related technical documents, maintenance and training courses and operational software and firmware (Group 2) to consignee Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police in Turkey. Items will be used for anti-terrorism activities of the Turkish Ministry of Internal Affairs.	Turkish Ministry of Int'l Affairs-National Police (anti-terrorism)	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-15.d	2019-08-28	Temporary export of [REDACTED] handcontroller assemblies, [REDACTED] mission grips with cables and a lot of cable assemblies (Group 2) to Turkey. Consignee and end-use is [REDACTED]. Item will be used to demonstrate the system capabilities in the scope of police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance.	police, maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance.	
	Issued	Horstman Systems Inc.	Turkey	2-21.a.1	2019-08-28	Permanent export of : Recovery Mode Software Package for 8x8 (Ride Height System Controller (RHSC) HD-79492 End-use: suspension system of a military vehicle	military	
	Issued	Horstman Systems Inc.	Turkey	2-6.a	2019-08-29	Permanent export of : HD-79592 Distribution Manifold. End-use: suspension elements of a military vehicle.	military	

	Issued	CAE Inc.	Turkey	2-21.a.1, 2-22.a	2019-08-08	Permanent export of software and technology (Group 2) to consignee CAE INC. in Turkey. Items will be accessed by consignee's employees on site in Turkey to provide support for the A400M CMOS Classroom and for the A400 CMO(S Touch Panel Cockpit for the end-use of the Turkish Air Force.	Turkish Air Force	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a, 2-22.a	2019-08-13	Permanent export of of CMX-15D cameras and related equipment to for surveillance purposes. End User: Presidency of Defence Industries (SSB) - Surveillance operations.	Presidency of Defence Industries	
	Issued	PROPARMS LTD.	Turkey	1-1.A.6.b	2019-08-02	Waterjet disrupter with Dual laser yolk Assembly and accessories for the neutralization of explosive devices for delivery through agent to Turkish Special Forces (these are non-lethal goods, consequently no consultation/pipeline).	Turkish Special Forces	
	Issued		Turkey	2-10.a	2019-07-18	Permanent Export of Probe Assembly, Part Number 7348-001-1 (21362-000). Probe assembly is used in conjunction with an ASIST system which is designed to aid in the safe landing of helicopters onboard naval ships. End User: Republic of Turkey / Ministry of National Defence / Turkish Forces. Naval Command	Ministry of National Defence / Turkish Forces Naval Command	

	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-15.d, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a	2019-09-23	Permanent export of Repaired CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules for CMX-15D Systems and Controlled Technical Data - document, training and software to the Turkish National Police. End User: Turkish National Police - Ministry of Interior - Anti-terrorism activities.	Turkish National Police - Ministry of Interior - Anti-terrorism	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6	2019-08-01	Permanent Export of Repaired CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems, Repaired Ground Boresight Modules (GBSM) and technical data to [REDACTED] in Turkey End User: Turkish National Police, [REDACTED] Turkish MoD	Turkish National Police, Turkish Aerospace Industries, Turkish MoD	
	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b, 2-15.d	2019-07-09	Permanent export of [REDACTED] Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance & Targeting Systems and related sub-assemblies/accessories (Ground Boresight Modules, Mission Grip Assemblies, PURGE KIT / OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE KIT and Cables Assemblies), Group 2, to consignee [REDACTED] in Tukey. Items will be integrated and installed onto [REDACTED] for the end-use of the Turkish Ministry of Defence for its surveillance operations.	Turkish Ministry of Defence	

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	Issued	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	Turkey	2-5.b	2019-08-07	Permanent export of [REDACTED] Ground Bore-sight Modules (GBSM) for Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR Surveillance and Targeting Systems) and repaired Ground Bore-sight Modules (GBSM). End User: Law Enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense of Ministry of Interior respectively.	Law Enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior	[REDACTED]
	Issued	Wade Antenna, Inc	Turkey	2-11.a	2019-07-04	Permanent export of: [REDACTED] ANTENNAS. THESE ANTENNAS WILL BE USED AT THE INSTALLATION [REDACTED] UHF RADIOS TO BE DELIVERED TO TURKISH AIR FORCES. End User: Turkish AIR FORCE	Turkish AIR FORCE	[REDACTED]
	Issued	ARMATEC SURVIVABILITY	Turkey	2-6.a	2019-07-03	Consultation waiver: Turkey Military Temporary export of [REDACTED] Driver Seat PN: AC49600-07 and [REDACTED] Commander Seat PN: AC49700-07 Goods listed will be tested for integration into the 8x8 NGACV/YNZMA Armored Vehicle Program and will be returned to Canada after testing program is completed. Turkey Military	Turkey Military	[REDACTED]
Total								[REDACTED]

- Since October 7, there have been no new permits issued for Turkey.
- [REDACTED] permits were issued to L-3 / WESCAM INC. worth [REDACTED] of the value of permits issued to police/military end-users.
- A further [REDACTED] Group 2 export permits were issued to non police/military end-users during the same three month period (July 10 to October 10, 2019).



**ANNEX C – EXPLANATION OF GROUP 2 MILITARY ITEMS FROM THE *EXPORT CONTROLS LIST***

The Export Control List (ECL) identifies specific goods and technology that are controlled for export from Canada to other countries, regardless of their means of delivery (including, for example, shipment of goods, electronic transfer or transmission of information, provision of technical or consulting services, etc.). Most items on the Export Control List derive from Canada's commitments to like-minded countries which participate in multilateral export control regimes or from Canada's international obligations as a signatory to multilateral or bilateral agreements.

In the case of Group 2, the list is derived from commitments under the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technology (WA), established in 1996. The objective of the WA is to contribute to regional and international security and stability, by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technology, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations. Both Canada and Turkey are members of the WA.

**Group 2 - Munitions List**

2-1. Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a calibre of 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches) or less and accessories, and specially designed components therefor:

2-2. Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons or armament with a calibre greater than 12.7 mm (calibre 0.50 inches), projectors and accessories, and specially designed components therefor

2-3. Ammunition and fuze setting devices, and specially designed components therefor

2-4. Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles, other explosive devices and charges and related equipment and accessories, and specially designed components therefor

2-5. Fire control, and related alerting and warning equipment, and related systems, test and alignment and countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor

2-6. Ground vehicles and components

2-7. Chemical agents, "biological agents", "riot control agents", radioactive materials, related equipment, components and materials

2-8. "Energetic materials" and related substances

2-9. Vessels of war (surface or underwater), special naval equipment, accessories, components and other surface vessels

2-10. "Aircraft", "lighter-than-air vehicles", "unmanned aerial vehicles" ("UAVs"), aero-engines and "aircraft" equipment, related equipment, and components, specially designed or modified for military use

2-11. Electronic equipment, "spacecraft" and components, not specified elsewhere on the Munitions List

2-12. High velocity kinetic energy weapon systems and related equipment, and specially designed components therefor

2-13. Armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components

- 2-14. 'Specialised equipment for military training' or for simulating military scenarios, simulators specially designed for training in the use of any firearm or weapon specified by 2-1. or 2-2., and specially designed components and accessories therefor
- 2-15. Imaging or countermeasure equipment, specially designed for military use, and specially designed components and accessories therefor
- 2-16. Forgings, castings and other unfinished products, specially designed for items specified by 2-1. to 2-4., 2-6., 2-9., 2-10., 2-12. or 2-19.
- 2-17. Miscellaneous equipment, materials and "libraries", and specially designed components therefor
- 2-18. 'Production' equipment and components
- 2-19. Directed energy weapon (DEW) systems, related or countermeasure equipment and test models, and specially designed components therefor
- 2-20. Cryogenic and "superconductive" equipment, and specially designed components and accessories therefor
- 2-21. "Software"
- 2-22. "Technology"

**ANNEX D: CANADIAN INTERESTS AND UPCOMING ENGAGEMENTS WITH TURKEY**

Canada and Turkey have [REDACTED] improving relationship. Many Canadian interests would benefit from expanding this relationship and would conversely be jeopardised by a deterioration after Turkey's military incursion into Syria. Key interests include:

- Geopolitically, Turkey is a NATO member (2nd largest military) and a strategic geographic location. It is a frontline state in the fight against Daesh (active in Counter-Daesh Coalition and NATO Mission Iraq), making it a valuable partner for military/intelligence cooperation.
- Turkey is key to containing expanding [REDACTED] influence in the region. [REDACTED] is actively seeking to pull Ankara closer to its orbit, by exploiting Turkey's perception that [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]
- Turkey is like-minded with Canada on a range of international priorities, such as global migration, Ukraine (Turkey recognises Ukrainian sovereignty over Crimea), and the OPCW.
- Commercially, Turkey is an emerging G20 market and our bilateral trade is growing 20-25% annually, reaching just under \$4 billion in 2018. Turkey is a priority country in our International Education Strategy & Canada is the top choice for Turkish students going abroad.
- Canada has several active consular cases with Turkey. In addition, Turkish forces may end up detaining Canadian extremist travellers in Syria.

**Additional Considerations:**

- [REDACTED]
- Canada has a relatively underdeveloped relationship with Turkey compared with our allies (ex: only one of our top 25 trading partners without an FTA, less high-level political engagement), so there is less to counterbalance a strong stance on export permit bans.
- While relations have cooled in recent years, Turkey remains one of the few countries in the region to have formal diplomatic relations with Israel, ongoing strong commercial ties, direct flights and tourism, and military/security cooperation.
- While Canada is concerned about democratic backsliding in Turkey, excessive Western criticism of its operations in Syria risks allowing Erdogan to benefit from a "Rally Around the Flag" effect [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**DND Concerns:**

DND has recently made efforts to advance defence relations with Turkey (ex: military-to-military staff talks, visit of Chief of the Defence Staff Vance in April 2019), and intends to continue pursuing bilateral defence cooperation.

DND wishes to be consulted on any further deliberations.

**Upcoming Engagements Between Canada and Turkey**

1. **Counterterrorism Consultations (Spring 2020):** Building on two previous events (July 2017, Jan 2018), Canada and Turkey are working to schedule counterterrorism consultations for Spring 2019 – a chance to gain information regarding Canadians in Syria and on Turkish planning for the aftermath of its operation in Syria.
2. **Alamos Gold (Ongoing):** Alamos was granted an operating permit for its main site, the Kirazlı Gold Project, in March 2019. Protests broke out in July over deforestation concerns, at the site and at the Canadian Consulate General in Istanbul. Alamos complied with Turkish government requests for a work stoppage during protests. Its concession lapsed on October 13. DMT phoned his counterpart on October 31 to express concern over the stalled project.
3. **Air Transport Agreement (Fall 2019):** Canada and Turkey have an ATA allowing Turkish Airlines flights to Toronto (six weekly) and Montreal (three weekly). Turkey requested a further expansion in 2016, and in October 2019 accepted a Canadian condition that expansion only serve Western Canada. Turkey has proposed three weekly flights to Vancouver, and is waiting on Canada to reply.
4. **FIPA / FTA Discussions (Mid-Late 2020):** Turkey and Canada have both expressed interest in a FIPA. Negotiations can start once Canada completes its FIPA model review to proceed. A FIPA would be in Canada's interest given investments in Turkey's mining industry (\$1.5 billion). Turkey repeatedly raised FTA negotiations after the signing of CETA. Political direction would be required to proceed.
5. **Foreign Policy Planning Consultations (Winter/Spring 2020):** Canada and Turkey are currently trying to schedule DG-level consultations in early 2020.

## ANNEX E: Export permits applications directly or indirectly to Turkey deemed ready for issuance – 2020-01-16

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee in country of destination	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	23-Sep-19	CMC Electronics Inc.		2-10.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Germany</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: <b>MoD of multiple countries including Turkey.</b> (Germany/Spain/France/UK/Turkey/Malaysia/Belgium/Luxemburg). EUS states re-export to above countries.</li> <li>Item Description: Permanent export of control panel assemblies.</li> <li>End-Use: To be integrated on the Airbus A400M aircraft.</li> <li>Condition(s): Quarterly reporting.</li> </ul>
	15-Oct-19	COM DEV LTD.		5504.2.c, 5504.2.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: United Kingdom</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey / Turksat A.S. End-use statement (EUS) states re-export to Turkey.</li> <li>Item Description: Permanent export of minor components of a communication system on board a telecommunications satellite, and related technical data.</li> <li>End-Use: To be used for the manufacturing of 2 satellites in the U.K. which will be delivered to Turksat A.S. in Turkey to then be launched into orbit and operated by Turksat A.S.</li> <li>Condition(s): None</li> </ul>

PROTECTED B  
COMMERCIALY CONFIDENTIAL

	20-Dec-2019	Amprior Aerospace (Aerospatiale) Montreal Inc.		2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Country of Destination: Belgium</li><li></li><li>Item Description: Permanent export of ( ) parts for integration into the wings of the Military Transport Aircraft.</li><li>End-Use: To be incorporated into the A400M military transport aircraft designed and owned by European aerospace company, Airbus.</li><li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting applied</li><li>Consultations:</li></ul>
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## ANNEX F: Permit applications that would not be issued at this time under Option 1 – 2020-01-16

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee in country of destination	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	13-Feb-19			2-6.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li></li> <li>Item Description: </li> <li>End-Use: </li> <li>Condition(s): Quarterly reporting</li> </ul>
	30-Oct-19	L-3 / WESCAM INC.		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Canada / L-3 / WESCAM INC. (for temporary use in Turkey for demonstration purposes).</li> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit for another year (permit expires on February 29, 2020).</li> <li>End-Use: To demonstrate the system capabilities in the scope of maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance.</li> <li>Condition(s): Temporary export conditions.</li> </ul>

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee in country of destination	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	28-Oct-19	L-3 / WESCAM INC.		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Canada / L-3 / WESCAM INC. (for temporary use in Turkey for training purposes).</li> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit for another year (permit expired on February 29, 2020).</li> <li>End-Use: To be used as loaner systems for training purposes.</li> <li>Condition(s): Temporary export conditions.</li> <li>Consultations:</li> </ul>



March 19, 2020

**ANNEX A - CONTROLLED EXPORTS TO TURKEY  
COMPARATIVE COUNTRY POSITIONS AND COMMERCIAL EXPOSURE**

**No New Permits:** Canada

**No New Permits (military items):** U.K., Finland, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, Australia, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria


**No New Permits (military end-use/use in combat/Syria):** France, Germany, Norway, Czech Republic

**Suspended Valid Permits (military items):** France, Sweden

**Reviewing Valid Permits:** U.K., Norway, Italy

**No Restrictions:** U.S., New Zealand, South Korea, Japan

**Countries fully or partially restricting exports to Turkey**

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
<b>CANADA</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Canada is proposing the strictest restrictions on exports of controlled items to Turkey (all controlled items).</li> <li>There has been a temporary suspension on issuing <b>new</b> permits to Turkey since October 10, 2019.</li> <li>Shipments are proceeding under existing valid permits.</li> <li>Certain lower-risk controlled items to Turkey are eligible for a General Export Permit (GEP) and can continue to be shipped unless a regulatory amendment is sought.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exports of military goods and technology to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$2.069 billion.</b></li> <li>Canadian exports of military goods and technology to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$115.7 million.</b></li> <li>Turkey is the #3 destination for Canadian military exports, accounting for 6% of exports to all destinations.</li> </ul>
<b>France</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The French government has <b>suspended</b> all existing licenses for <b>defence materials and dual-use goods with a clear military end-use</b> and is not issuing new permits for the same items.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>French military exports to Turkey in 2018 were <b>CAD \$65.9 million.</b></li> </ul>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The UK government has suspended issuance of new export permits for all arms sales to Turkey.</li> <li></li> <li>Ministers have ordered a full review into</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2018, the UK issued 329 export licenses for military items to Turkey worth CAD \$107.3 million (the UK does not report on the value of actual exports, only on the value of permits authorized).</li> <li>Most of the licenses issued in 2018 were for aircraft parts and components (110).</li> </ul>

March 19, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
	sales of items to Turkey that might be used in military operations in Syria.	
Germany	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Germany will not issue <u>new permits</u> to Turkey for any military exports that could be used in Syria.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Turkey has generally benefitted from the German equivalent of Canada's General Export Permits (GEPs). [REDACTED]</li> <li>Two German opposition parties, Die Linke (Left) and Die Grüne (Greens), have said that preventing new deals is not sufficient, and have called for an immediate stop to all arms deliveries to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2018, Germany issued 58 licenses worth CAD \$18.8 million to export military items. This was down from 147 licenses issued in 2017.</li> <li>Despite restrictions on arms sales to Turkey, in place since 2016, Turkey remains the largest purchaser of arms from Germany, in terms of the value of items exported.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Of the CAD \$6 million of recently approved German defence exports to Turkey (as of end January, 2020), CAD \$3.9 million were for naval items. [REDACTED]</li> </ul>
Norway	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As of October 11, 2019, Norway has suspended the issuance of new permits for military and dual-use items to Turkey.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Norway military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$5.99 million</b>, the majority of which was for "fire control systems" (i.e. missile targeting systems).</li> </ul>
Finland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 9, 2019, Finland suspended the issuance of new permits for arms to Turkey [REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$24.5 million</b>. Mainly consisted of military armored plates for protection.</li> <li>Finland's annual exports of defense equipment represent about 1% of the EU total.</li> </ul>

March 19, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Netherlands	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="380 242 943 342">• The Netherlands (NL) has suspended the issuance of new export permits to Turkey for any military items, [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 455 391 470">• [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 697 391 712">• [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 895 915 959">• Permits for Turkey undergo a detailed review based on the EU Common Position. [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 1034 932 1134">• NL advocated for an EU-wide arms embargo at the Foreign Affairs Council, but did not garner sufficient support. [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 1172 891 1236">• In 2018, NL rejected five applications for Turkey, [REDACTED]</li> <li data-bbox="380 1278 927 1406">• NL has also removed Turkey from the list of countries eligible for global licences, which are issued when goods have multiple possible final destinations.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li data-bbox="969 242 1414 306">• Military exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$29 million.</b></li> <li data-bbox="969 317 1398 380">• Represents 8% of Europe's total arms exports to Turkey.</li> </ul>


Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Sweden	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, all valid licenses to export military equipment to Turkey were revoked [REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>In 2019, no export permits for military equipment were granted and no new export deals to Turkey have been approved since April 2017.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Swedish FM Linde has proposed a weapons embargo against Turkey, and raised the idea at an EU meeting of Foreign Ministers.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Military exports to Turkey (2017) <b>CAD \$9.64 million</b> of which only CAD \$13,621 was made up of military equipment for combat.</li> <li>Military exports to Turkey in 2018 were <b>CAD \$40.7 million</b>. However, no equipment that could be used to support combat operations was exported.</li> <li>In 2018, Sweden denied 8 export permit applications for items destined to Turkey, which is double the number of permits denied for Turkey in 2017.</li> </ul>
Italy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Effective October 13, 2019, Italy announced an executive decree suspending the issuance of new export licenses for arms to Turkey. The decree also announced a review of existing permits to Turkey.</li> <li>NGOs have flagged that the decree has never materialized and [REDACTED]</li> <li>Turkey is not eligible for any Italian equivalent to a GEP.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Italy exported <b>CAD \$152.4 million</b> in arms and ammunitions to Turkey between January and October 2019</li> <li>Permits were issued for <b>CAD \$531 million</b> worth of military exports to Turkey in 2018.</li> <li>Italy exported <b>CAD \$388.7 million</b> in military items to Turkey in 2017 under 75 valid licenses.</li> </ul>
Australia	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, the Minister for Defence said in an interview that she has asked for a pause in relation to export permits for Turkey.</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Australia's 2017 report to the ATT does not indicate any sales of ATT items to Turkey.</li> </ul>

March 19, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
<b>Czech Republic</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On October 15, 2019, the Czech Republic (CZ) announced a ban on all military sales to Turkey and stopped issuing new licences.</li> <li></li> <li></li> <li></li> <li>No GEP equivalents in place for Turkey.</li> <li>CZ has a special relationship with the Kurds having engaged in training of Kurdish Special Forces and provision of weapons and munitions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2018, total Czech arms exports amounted to <b>CAD \$84.4 million</b>.</li> <li>In 2017, CZ exported <b>CAD \$3.9 million</b> to Turkey. This comprised of firearms and related components, along with "armoured or protective equipment".</li> </ul>
<b>Poland</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Poland has suspended issuing new permits for arms exports to Turkey,</li> <li></li> <li>Poland includes Turkey on one of its GEPs for the export of Turkish strategic items that were imported into Poland for the purposes of tests and exhibitions.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Polish military exports to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$713 million</b>.</li> <li>Polish arms sales to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$2.2 million</b>.</li> <li>In 2018, 5 export permits were issued for items destined for Turkey valued at a total of CAD \$35 million.</li> </ul>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Slovakia will not issue new licenses for arms exports to Turkey,</li> <li></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> <li>In 2018, <b>CAD \$26.6 million</b> in export licenses to Turkey were approved.</li> </ul>

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
<b>Switzerland</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>No export ban has been announced.</li> <li>The Swiss government continues to not issue any new permits based on the interpretation of existing legislation preventing the export of arms to states engaged in conflict. Only the supply of spare parts and "individual handguns and handguns for private use by diplomats" are permitted.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Arms exports to Turkey amounted to <b>CAD \$127,282</b> in 2018. The majority was "fire control systems" e.g., missile targeting systems for tanks, and CAD \$6370 was for individual handguns.</li> </ul>
<b>Belgium</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The Belgian regions are responsible for issuing export licenses for strategic items.</li> <li>Flanders Region: no new licences for military or dual-use goods will be issued [REDACTED]</li> <li>Region of Wallonia: no new export licenses for arms and military equipment to Turkey, [REDACTED]</li> <li>Brussels: [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2017, a total of <b>CAD \$170, 170</b> in military items was exported from Flanders and Wallonia to Turkey. There were no exports from the Brussels region.</li> </ul>
<b>European Union</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On 14 October 2019, the EU Council condemned Turkey's military action that "seriously undermines the stability and security of the whole region."</li> <li>The Council committed to strong national positions regarding Member States' arms export policy to Turkey, with a specific reference to the application of Article 4 of Common Position 2008/944, which stipulates that Member States must consider the need "not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way" when exporting military technology and equipment. While not a full arms ban, it does reiterate EU guidelines and commitments for Member States on arms exports.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In 2017, EU Member States reported a combined total of <b>CAD \$883.7 million</b> of actual arms exports to Turkey.</li> <li>There were over CAD \$4 billion in authorized exports to Turkey in 2017.</li> <li>The same year there were 16 licence refusals for Turkey across the EU.</li> </ul>

March 19, 2020

Country	Country Position	Commercial Exposure
Spain	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>On 29 October 2019, Spain temporarily suspended the export of all lethal products and munitions to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Spanish military exports to Turkey during the first half of 2019 were <b>CAD \$228.6 million</b>, of which CAD \$209.5 million was for the export of one military transport aircraft.</li> <li>Spanish exports to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$5.54 billion</b>.</li> <li>In 2018, Spanish exports of military goods to Turkey totalled <b>CAD \$475 million</b>. Spain issued 29 licenses for military exports to Turkey (1.8% of all licenses issued) in 2018.</li> </ul>
Austria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li> In 2016, the Austrian Parliament passed a motion banning all arms exports to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>N/A</li> </ul>

**Countries that have not introduced restrictions on exports to Turkey**

United States	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The U.S. has not instituted any changes to its policy on military exports to Turkey nor have they altered their licensing policy with regards to dual-use goods.</li> <li>Specific to U.S. export controls, all sales (direct commercial sales and foreign military sales) are assessed on a case-by-case basis with regards to all applicable sales requiring licensing and final review.</li> <li>On October 23, 2019, the United States removed sanctions imposed on October 14, 2019, on three senior officials – Defence Minister Hulusi Akar, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu, and Energy Minister Fatih Donmez – and on Turkey’s Ministries of National Defence and Energy and National Resources.</li> <li>Turkey’s decision to purchase Russian S-400 air defence systems rendered its continued involvement with the F-35 “impossible”. Accepting the S-400 has undermined commitments that NATO Allies have made to move away from Russian systems. U.S. officials have</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>U.S. arms exports to all destinations (2018) <b>CAD \$13.9 billion</b>.</li> <li>U.S. arms exports to Turkey (2018) <b>CAD \$316.1 million</b>, up from CAD \$193 million in 2017.</li> <li>In 2017, the U.S. exported <b>CAD \$180.7 million</b> through direct commercial sales.</li> </ul>
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March 19, 2020

	<p>confirmed that the F-35 will not coexist with a Russian intelligence collection platform that will be used to learn about its advanced capabilities. This will have detrimental impacts on interoperability between Turkey and NATO, but U.S. officials have reiterated that the U.S.-Turkey military-to-military relationship is strong and their extensive cooperation will continue, mindful of the constraints imposed by the presence of the S-400.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The U.S. reserved the right to re-impose sanctions including tariffs on steel and other products should Turkey fail to honour its obligations, including the protection of religious and ethnic minorities.</li> </ul>	
New Zealand	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New Zealand has very few military or dual-use exports to Turkey. [REDACTED]</li> <li>• New Zealand does not have a GEP equivalent for exports to Turkey.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> </ul>
Republic of Korea	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> <li>• According to the Korea Trade Association (KOTRA)'s 2019 report, ROK has continued exporting defense goods to Turkey and participating in mega joint projects with Turkey.</li> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> <li>• [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• ROK does not release official data for sales of controlled items but limited information on sales of military goods can be found in the Statistical Yearbook for Defense Business released by DAPA.</li> <li>• DAPA reported that ROK exported <b>CAD \$1.7 million</b> in military goods to the Middle East in 2017.</li> </ul>



<b>Japan</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Japan does not appear to have any restrictions in place for exports to Turkey.</li><li>• There are no references to Turkey on Japanese government websites related to export or trade controls.</li><li>• Japan is pursuing Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations with Turkey. Turkish media reported in November 2019 that the two countries were aiming to conclude the deal shortly.</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Turkey was Japan's 30<sup>th</sup> export destination by value in 2019 (at CAD \$3.3 billion).</li><li>• No arms or ammunition have been exported to Turkey by Japan in recent years.</li><li>• The most recent such export was in 2013, and consisted of CAD \$19,057 worth of shotguns.</li></ul>
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*Note: the commercial data above is drawn from a variety of open sources and may not be directly comparable.*

s.13(1)(a)

s.15(1) - International




PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY  
PRESIDENCY OF DEFENCE INDUSTRIES




March 13, 2020

Mr. Peter MacDougall  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dear Mr. Mac DOUGALL,



Yours Sincerely,

  
Serdar DEMİREL  
Vice President



Embassy of the Republic of Turkey  
197 Wurtemberg Street  
Ottawa, ON K1N 8L9

March 13, 2020

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to forward to you the letter by Mr. Serdar Demirel, Vice President of the Presidency of Defence Industries of the Republic of Turkey as herewith attached.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Kerim Uras'.

Kerim Uras  
Ambassador

Enclosure: As stated

Mr. Peter MacDougall  
Assistant Deputy Minister  
Global Affairs Canada  
Ottawa, K1A 0G2



**ANNEX C: REPORT FROM ANKRA HOM ON  
MEETING WITH**

**From:** Khokhar, Jamal -ANKRA -HM <Jamal.Khokhar@international.gc.ca>

**Sent:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** [REDACTED]

*Further to ANKRA/HOM Khokhar - [REDACTED]  
attached.*

[REDACTED] sought an update on the status of [REDACTED] pending export permit for technical services and alterations of [REDACTED] Project. [REDACTED] purchased and paid for the [REDACTED] prior to October 19, 2019. [REDACTED]

Ambassador provided status update per the TIE lines provided.

As expected, the [REDACTED] was frustrated with the thin guidance we were able to provide particularly given that the request has been outstanding for some months and that he had heard the same lines before. He politely remarked that "rather than getting closer to a decision, each time I meet with Canadians the time lines get further pushed further".

[REDACTED] highlighted the various reasons as to why [REDACTED] wishes to continue rendering services and technologies from Canada. He repeatedly underscored a strong preference to go with [REDACTED] and other Canadian suppliers for this project.

He also laid out a much a longer term investment strategy to develop a variety of aerospace projects in with collaboration Canadian industry, sub-suppliers and R&D groups (such as NRC wind tunnels). Ultimately, it is his aim to become "a Canadian-Turkish joint venture aerospace company". As a first step, [REDACTED] hopes to open a [REDACTED] office in Canada, hire engineers, work with NRC and other R&D groups; and compete with other international aerospace players for procurement not just in Turkey, but in third country markets. Incidentally, third-country collaboration is part of Canada's longer term commercial strategy with Turkey (ref DMX JETCO). NB: This same longer term investment strategy had been presented to previous ANKRA/HOM Cooter.

With the significant time passed, [REDACTED] signalled he is now reaching a decision threshold as to whether to shift from [REDACTED] to [REDACTED] and noted that [REDACTED] needs could be met from elsewhere if the Canadian government were not able to support.

The decision also has bearing on whether [REDACTED] should pursue procurement and systems solutions from Canada for another upcoming project for which he would like to approach [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is keen, but hesitates getting into another long-term waiting game. He asked HOM twice whether he should proceed in contacting [REDACTED] rather than [REDACTED]

Going back to this [REDACTED] reiterated that there would not be any offensive equipment installed or placed on the [REDACTED]. He also explained that the [REDACTED] would not be able to leave Turkish borders / airspace and would operate well outside the effective ranges of external air defense systems. Having the [REDACTED] sitting idly at their facilities, while also having to temporarily technical and engineering teams, while waiting for a decision, has created a very difficult situation for [REDACTED] and the company.



He explained that the Turkish aerospace sector, both civil and defence, must collaborate with international suppliers and that he has a strong affinity with and preference for Canadian suppliers. However, working with Canadian companies relies on a degree of confidence that export permits will be issued. That confidence in Canadian industry is being rapidly eroded, and, regrettably the reputation spreading to other parts of Turkish industry.

Drafted: ANKRA/TC Pinar Atakanli  
Consulted: ISTBL/STC Chris Wimmer  
Approved: ANKRA/HOM Khokhar

**From:** Wimmer, Christopher -ISTBL -TD <Christopher.Wimmer@international.gc.ca>

**Sent:** [REDACTED]

**Subject:** [REDACTED]

**Participants:**

**ANKRA Embassy:** HOM / Khokhar, STC / Wimmer

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] recently met with the [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] noted a key challenge was its inability to provide a publicly-available policy of the Canadian government regarding the export permit issue vis a vis Turkey. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] in the event that Canada refuses [REDACTED] an export permit. As there is no public announcement by the Canadian government, [REDACTED] is losing confidence in [REDACTED].

[REDACTED] HOM stated he would not speculate either on outcomes of a decision nor on timing, and [REDACTED] outlined its understanding in dealing with likeminded countries such as the UK and USA on their experience export permits issue, and that Canada is the outlier. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Earlier, [REDACTED] had told the same to STC/Wimmer who already had reported on such. (see attached). [REDACTED] also expressed that [REDACTED] experience over the years in dealing with Turkish companies and government as clients has been very positive, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] ANKRA/ISTBL believes that beyond the [REDACTED] this ongoing issue presents reputational risks for other Canadian companies with commercial interest in Turkey.

UNCLASSIFIED



[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would seek some form of written confirmation that an export ban is in place [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

HOM [REDACTED] and undertook to reiterate the substance of this telephone conversation to the responsible official in GAC.

[REDACTED] stated that [REDACTED] would like to meet the HOM to discuss the file. HOM welcomed the request for a visit. (Meeting with HOM has subsequently be set for [REDACTED]). We anticipate the [REDACTED] to ask [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Drafted: STC/Wimmer/ISTBL  
Approved: HOM/Khokhar/ANKRA

[REDACTED]



Canada-Turkey Business Council  
Conseil d'affaires Canada-Turquie  
Kanada-Türkiye İş Konseyi

March 3, 2020

The Hon. François-Philippe Champagne, P.C., M.P.  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
125 Sussex Drive  
Ottawa, Ontario  
K1A 0G2

**Re: Canada's Temporary Suspension of the Issuance of New Export Permits to Turkey**

Dear Minister Champagne,

I wish to bring your attention to the above-noted issue which has caused severe economic consequences to Canadian businesses operating in Turkey.

The Canada-Turkey Business Council (CTBC) is a non-profit business NGO that represents most major Canadian firms operating in Turkey, including in such key sectors as aviation and defence, advanced technologies, energy, and mining. Turkey is a very significant market for Canadian firms and is viewed by many as offering much growth potential in the years to come. If it were an EU member, Turkey would be Canada's seventh largest market in that region. In particular, Turkey is currently ranked as the third most significant non-US destination for the export and transfer of military goods and technology from Canada.

CTBC members strongly support initiatives that promote expanded two-way trade and investment with Turkey. Most recently, the CTBC applauded the June 2019 announcement by then International Trade Diversification Minister Carr and his Turkish counterpart on their signing of an MOU to establish a Joint Economic and Trade Committee (JETCO) between Canada and Turkey. The formation of the JETCO is a major step towards substantially increasing business between the two countries. We were equally pleased in 2019 when the Ontario Chamber of Commerce (OCC) signed an MOU with a Turkish counterpart organization to facilitate increased commercial activity between SMEs in Ontario and Turkey.

It is against this background of fostering increased two-way trade and investment that we wish to register our concern with the negative economic impact of the government's October 2019 announcement to temporarily suspend the issuance of export permits to Turkey as a consequence of that country's incursion into Northern Syria. The policy, which has been in place for over four months, lacks transparency and is impacting hundreds of millions of dollars in contract sales. We wish to emphasize that the measure applies to permits needed to carry out ongoing projects and to contracts already concluded prior to the October announcement. We further understand that our allies, in particular in Europe, have allowed ongoing projects to continue.

There is an urgent need for Canadian firms to highlight to you the current and long-term economic consequences of the policy on their business interests. And, they are entitled to a clear explanation of the policy elements and its timeline. It would appear that the event that prompted the October announcement has been evolving very rapidly in the last few months. There is a need to review in short order the October policy in order to avoid causing undue and irreparable harm to Canadian firms' interests in Turkey, and putting Canadian firms at a disadvantage relative to their US and European competitors, in particular.

Canada-Turkey Business Council  
48 Yonge St, Toronto, Ontario, M5E 1G6, Canada  
Tel. (613) 806-6728; matw52@gmail.com  
<http://www.ctbc.ca>



Canada-Turkey Business Council  
Conseil d'affaires Canada-Turquie  
Kanada-Türkiye İş Konseyi

The CTBC has worked hard over the years to increase trade and investment between Canada and Turkey, and to overcome bilateral irritants. It is our hope you will make yourself available to meet the CTBC on an urgent basis along with companies impacted by the decision and that an acceptable resolution will be agreed in the near future.

Yours truly,

*Mike Ward*

Mike Ward  
Executive Director  
Canada-Turkey Business Council  
[matw52@gmail.com](mailto:matw52@gmail.com)  
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<http://www.ctbc.ca>





*Minister of Foreign Affairs*


s.13(1)(a)


s.15(1) - International

Ankara, 22 March 2020

*Dear François-Philippe,*

It was a great pleasure to talk to you on the phone last week as well as recently together with other colleagues, to discuss the COVID-19 pandemic and a wide range of issues relating to our bilateral relations, regional and global developments. Unfortunately, the global health crisis due to COVID-19 pandemic has deteriorated; compelling all of us to work together in order to overcome the present challenges facing the entire humanity and increase our preparedness for the future. Allow me to express our full readiness to cooperate with Canada on any issue pertaining to our response against this pandemic.



  
Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu

**The Honourable François-Philippe Champagne**  
**Minister of Foreign Affairs of Canada**

## ANNEX F: Permit applications that would not be issued at this time under Option 1 – 2020-01-16

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee in country of destination	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
[REDACTED]	13-Feb-19	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]	2-6.a, 2-22.a	[REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li>[REDACTED]</li> <li>Item Description: [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-Use: [REDACTED]</li> <li>Condition(s): Quarterly reporting</li> </ul>
[REDACTED]	30-Oct-19	L-3 / WESCAM INC.	[REDACTED]	2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b	[REDACTED]	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Canada / L-3 / WESCAM INC. (for temporary use in Turkey for demonstration purposes).</li> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit for another year (permit expires on February 29, 2020).</li> <li>End-Use: To demonstrate the system capabilities in the scope of maritime surveillance and army reconnaissance.</li> <li>Condition(s): Temporary export conditions.</li> </ul>

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee in country of destination	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status
	28-Oct-19	L-3 / WESCAM INC.		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Country of Destination: Turkey</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Canada / L-3 / WESCAM INC. (for temporary use in Turkey for training purposes).</li> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit for another year (permit expired on February 29, 2020).</li> <li>End-Use: To be used as loaner systems for training purposes.</li> <li>Condition(s): Temporary export conditions.</li> <li>Consultations:</li> </ul>

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BPTS: 01794-2020

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION

## The Minister of Foreign Affairs

CC: The Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade  
The Minister of International Development

### Seeking a decision on Group 2 export permit applications for exceptional circumstances to Turkey

#### Summary

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your decision on [REDACTED] export permit applications and permit amendment requests (PAR) submitted by L3 Wescam for goods and technology destined to Turkey, valued at approximately [REDACTED] (The reference identification numbers for these permit applications and PARs are: [REDACTED])


This memorandum follows the advice provided in memorandum BPTS 03767-2019 and the subsequent direction that you provided that restrictions on the issuance of export permits to Turkey should be limited to Group 2 (Munitions List) items, with applications for these items to be assessed on a case-by-case basis in the light of potential exceptional circumstances.

The [REDACTED] L3 Wescam export permit applications in this memorandum consist of Group 2 items, and, according to the Department of National Defence, they are not being used in support of a NATO cooperation project. However, based on assurances provided to you by the Turkish Foreign Minister, officials have assessed that they are intended for use to help protect civilians in Idlib. The potential for a renewed Assad regime offensive on the region carries the risk of dire humanitarian consequences. Turkey's military presence in Idlib may help to deter or delay this eventuality, and may mitigate the humanitarian costs if a new offensive is launched.


These [REDACTED] export permit applications to Turkey have been assessed against the *Arms Trade Treaty* criteria enshrined in subsection 7.3(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* consulted across government, and deemed ready for issuance as a result.

#### Recommendation

- That you consider an exception to the Turkey policy, for the reasons outlined in this memorandum, and that you approve the [REDACTED] export permit applications/PARs for L3 Wescam to Turkey [REDACTED]

  
Marta Morgan  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

☒ I concur    ☐ I do not concur

  
Minister

Signed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs on May 6, 2020

MINA has explicitly stated that the permanent export permits within this memo ([REDACTED]) be valid for only one year. The other [REDACTED] permits are permit amendment requests to extend the validity of those permits by one year.



## Background

1. **EIPA and ATT:** Under the *Export and Import Permits Act* (EIPA), you have the authority to issue or deny permits for the export of items on Canada's *Export Control List*. The objective of export controls is to ensure that exports of strategic goods and technologies are consistent with Canada's foreign, defence and security interests. As of September 1, 2019, when amendments to the EIPA and the *Criminal Code* came into effect enabling Canada's accession to the *Arms Trade Treaty* (ATT), the assessment of new permit applications for "arms, ammunition, munitions and implements of war" must include an assessment of whether there is a substantial risk that the proposed export would result in one or more of the following negative consequences referred to in subsection 7.3(1) of the EIPA: i) undermining peace and security; ii) violating international humanitarian law or international human rights law; iii) contravening multilateral arrangements on terrorism or transnational organized crime; and iv) being used in serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. If a substantial risk is determined to exist, that cannot be mitigated, you are required to deny the permit application. Beyond the determination of substantial risk, the EIPA grants you broad discretion to determine whether an export is consistent with Canada's foreign, defence and security interests.
2. **Temporary Suspension on Export Permit Issuance to Turkey:** In October 2019, the former minister of Foreign Affairs announced a temporary suspension on the issuance of export permits to Turkey, following Turkey's military incursion into northeastern Syria. Canadian companies holding existing valid export permits for Turkey continued to be able to export. During this time, the Department continued to assess new export permit applications on a case-by-case basis, but did not issue any new export permits destined to Turkey.
3. **Turkey Exports Controls Policy:** On April 14, 2020, you directed the Department to limit the restrictions on the issuance of export permits to Turkey to Group 2 (Munitions List) items, taking into account exceptional circumstances, such as NATO cooperation programs. The policy of presumptive denial is founded upon Canada's concern that Turkey's military incursion into northeastern Syria could further destabilize the region, worsen the humanitarian situation, and roll back progress against Daesh. In light of these concerns, the export of Group 2 (Munitions List) items to Turkey from Canada at this time may not be consistent with Canadian foreign and defence policy interests. However, the Department will review each permit application on a case-by-case basis to determine whether there are "exceptional circumstances" that would warrant issuance of a permit.
4. **Exceptional Circumstances Criteria:** The Department has identified the following categories to guide decision-making regarding whether the export of a Group 2 item should be considered under "exceptional circumstances", although there may be other circumstances that would warrant consideration as well:
  - contribution to a NATO cooperation project;
  - contribution to other joint projects with Allies;
  - contribution to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, or a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance).
5. **Company:** L3 Wescam is a subsidiary of parent company L3 Harris Technologies headquartered in Florida, United States. Its Canadian offices are headquartered in Burlington, Ontario and its Canadian workforce exceeds 1,000 employees. For over 40 years, the company has been producing Electro-Optic / Infrared (EO IR), laser imaging and targeting sensor systems used by defense/military, homeland security and airborne law enforcement agencies worldwide. L3 Wescam's systems are deployed in over 200 different types of platforms (fixed-wing, rotary-wing, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and aerostat airborne platforms, numerous surface vehicles and marine-based platforms) across the air, land and maritime domains in more than 80 countries.
6. **Items and Stated End Use:** The items in the [REDACTED] export permit applications are all Group 2 (Munitions List) items. The total value of these items is approximately [REDACTED]. There are [REDACTED] export permit applications (ref id: [REDACTED]) from L3 Wescam for its CMX series camera



electro-optical infrared surveillance system, and supporting parts and technology (the CMX-15D model). There are also [REDACTED] permit amendment requests (PARs) from the company [REDACTED] for temporary exports that are part of the same series of CMX15-D camera surveillance systems. The PAR [REDACTED] is a permanent export pertaining to the MX-series camera surveillance system, support components, spares and repairs. The distinction between the MX and CMX series of surveillance systems is that the CMX components [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the MX series contains [REDACTED] All of the items in these export permits/PARs are intended to be integrated into medium-altitude long-endurance UAVs. The UAVs with these surveillance systems can be used defensively and offensively.

7. **End use:** Across the [REDACTED] export permit applications, there are [REDACTED] consignees: [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] export permit applications ([REDACTED]) are destined for [REDACTED] is owned by the [REDACTED]. The exports in the permit application [REDACTED] would be installed by [REDACTED] in its [REDACTED] UAV for its own end use, while the exports under the permit application [REDACTED] would be installed in a UAV for the end-use of the Presidency of Defence Industries, a civil agency affiliated to the Presidency of the Republic of Turkey that is tasked to strengthen Turkey's national defence industry, support the modernization of the Turkish Armed Forces, and manage the system and supply of Turkish military production and technology. [REDACTED] export permit applications [REDACTED] are destined to [REDACTED]. The exports in permit application [REDACTED] are for installation unto the [REDACTED] for the end-use of military and law enforcement agencies under the Turkish Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior. The exports in permit application [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] are temporary exports for loaner surveillance systems to be used by [REDACTED] for training purposes. [REDACTED] - the [REDACTED] specifically for the Turkish Armed Forces. The [REDACTED] export permit application [REDACTED] is a temporary export to a Turkish defense sector company, [REDACTED] for surveillance systems to be installed unto [REDACTED] for demonstration purposes.

8. **Precedent:** L3 Wescam has received [REDACTED] export permits for Turkey since 2010. L3 Wescam regularly applies for export permits and for the last 2 years alone, it received over [REDACTED] export permits from Global Affairs Canada to various destinations.

## Considerations

9. **Consultation:** In consultation with interdepartmental partners, including the Department of National Defence, the Department concluded that there is no substantial risk that any of the items in these [REDACTED] L3 Wescam export permits/PARs would be used for any of the negative consequences specified in subsection 7.3(1) of the EIPA. None of the consultation partners expressed objections to the issuance of these export permits. There are presently [REDACTED] other export permit applications for L3 Wescam to Turkey at various stages of review and consultation. These applications are being assessed in accordance with your policy on exports of Group 2 items to Turkey and the exceptional circumstances criteria set out in paragraph 4.

## Substantial Risk and Risk Mitigation Considerations:

10. **Northeastern Syria:** In October 2019, Turkey's Operation Peace Spring (OPS) targeted the U.S.-aligned People's Protection Units (YPG) in northeastern Syria. Turkey considers that group to be the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), a group listed as a terrorist organization by Canada and other likemindeds. Canada condemned the unilateral operation, concerned that the intervention would further destabilize the region, worsen the humanitarian situation, and roll back progress against Daesh. Since then, ceasefire agreements with the United States and Russia have produced an operational pause that has generally held. While low-level clashes between the YPG and Turkey and aligned groups continue, the situation has broadly stabilized. However, more than 200,000 Syrians were displaced as a result of OPS, of which 70,590 remain displaced as of January 2020, and approximately 50,000 have returned to Turkish controlled areas. To return, they must prove to Turkish/Turkish-backed authorities controlling the region that they are not affiliated with the YPG, a difficult, if not impossible task for most Kurds. Turkey also repeatedly proposed resettlement of a large number of Turkey's 3.6 million Syrian refugees to the OPS

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region, raising concerns about forced refugee returns and demographic engineering. Reports of actual Syrian returns indicate a very limited number, and the lack of concerning major developments since October has allayed concerns. Additionally, while there were initial concerns about the behavior of Turkish-backed armed groups in northern Syria in October 2019, there is no substantiated evidence of the Turkish Armed Forces committing human rights violations in Syria, neither in Idlib nor northeast Syria during OPS.

11. Northwestern Syria: The situation in regards to northwestern Syria is quite different, and the concerns that Canada had in regard to OPS are either significantly less pressing or do not apply in Idlib. The Syrian regime poses a significantly greater threat, to both Syrians and regional stability, in terms of security and humanitarian risks than the Turkish military presence. Turkey's recent military intervention directly reduced conflict and insecurity in the Idlib area by halting an offensive that had displaced approximately 1 million people. Retaking Idlib would allow Damascus to concentrate on ensuring regime survival. The Syrian regime has consistently used violence at every phase of the conflict, and there is no reason to assume it will change tactics now. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Idlib would likely face a humanitarian crisis if a regime offensive resumed, even if Turkey's defences generally held. Turkey's main objective is to avoid having more refugees crossing its borders. As such, its military actions should be viewed as a means to achieving or at least moving towards a political settlement of the Syrian conflict.

12. UAVs in northwestern Syria: Reports indicate that Turkish-built drones, specifically [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] UAVs, [REDACTED] were key to the Turkish air campaign that enabled Turkey's military to conduct a large-scale operation against Syrian regime forces in Idlib, compelling the March 5 ceasefire. They would likely again act as a significant element in Turkey's operations, were the March 5 ceasefire to collapse. They act as a significant deterrent against the Syrian regime (and likely Iran-backed forces) and may act as a mild deterrent against Russian or Russian-backed offensives. Turkey's continued presence is one of the few checks against a renewed offensive that could displace some 3 million vulnerable people in Idlib, many of whom have already been displaced from other areas of Syria. Additionally, as noted above, there is no substantiated evidence of the Turkish military committing human rights violations in Syria, and Turkey is unlikely to provide this equipment to militias it supports in Syria, particularly if it provides assurances to that end.

13. Risk Mitigation: The items in these [REDACTED] export permit applications may be used in both a defensive and offensive capacity. However, during your April 13, 2020 call with the Turkish Foreign Minister, he provided assurances that these items would be used and are required for Turkey's defensive activities in Idlib. Turkey has received varying degrees of support from NATO member states for its engagement in Idlib.

14. Moreover, based on the information available to the Department, there is no evidence to suggest that the Turkey military or security forces would use the proposed exports to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law or international human rights law either within Turkey or Syria.

15. **Bilateral and Multilateral Relations:** In calls with Canadian counterparts, as recently as April 23, Turkey's President, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Defence, indicated that Turkey needs these items to respond to the aggression of the Syrian regime in Idlib, to uphold the current ceasefire between Turkey and Syria, to continue its fight against terrorist organizations, and that they were necessary for Turkey's NATO defense along its borders. Allies and likeminded countries have become more supportive of Ankara following its intervention in Idlib, and are examining ways to support Turkey. This shift in approach is based on a general assessment that Turkey has suffered losses, has legitimate security concerns given its border with Syria (particularly as host to over 3.5 million Syrian refugees), and that Turkey's recent actions in Idlib have reduced threats to peace and security, unlike its actions in northeast Syria.

16. Impact on Canadian Interests: Turkey remains an essential ally for NATO, and a key partner for Canada. Particularly given Turkey's recent leader and minister-level lobbying for these permits in recent interactions, the lack of approval for these permits is becoming a bilateral irritant. [REDACTED]



This includes Russia's efforts to situate itself as an alternative to NATO for certain Turkish defence needs, most recently demonstrated by Turkey's purchase of a Russian S-400 missile defence system.

17. **Legal:** If you do not approve the issuance of these export permits, the Department will deny these export permits on your behalf and notify the company accordingly. A decision to deny an application under the EIPA must be reasonable and consistent with the purpose for which the controlled good was placed on a control list.

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### Resource Implications

18. Anticipated resource implications related to the approval of export applications and issuance of the recommended export permits are estimated to be minimal and will be absorbed within the existing reference level of the Trade Policy and Negotiations Branch.

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### Communications Implications/Actions

19. The issue of export controls has received significant and sustained public and media attention. However, the approval of the specific permits mentioned in this memorandum is not expected to garner media attention, as this process is not public. A responsive communications approach is recommended, with media lines drafted when and if necessary. Parliamentary scrutiny is expected to be limited given the current COVID-19 crisis.

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### Parliamentary Implications/Actions

20. Parliamentarians have followed announcements related to the issuance or denial of export permits in high profile cases. They have also routinely spoken out against the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. These particular exports have been assessed against the ATT criteria and are not expected to result in any of the negative consequences outlined in the EIPA. Given that it was reported in the media on April 22 that the Department confirmed that the ban on new arms exports to Turkey has been extended indefinitely, Parliamentarians may have questions about this memorandum's decision to proceed with the issuance of export permits of Group 2 military/munitions exports to Turkey. While this decision may not be made public, Parliamentarians can be expected to scrutinize closely the government's policies and practices around military exports and concerns over potential human rights impacts.

21. Parliament is officially adjourned until May 25, 2020 and is only meeting in committee to discuss COVID-19-related matters. Initial parliamentary scrutiny would be expected to play out in the media, if at all. In the event that these exports are discussed publicly, more intense scrutiny may be anticipated when Parliament resumes sitting and its regular committees begin meeting again.



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BPTS: 03389-2020

## The Minister of Foreign Affairs

CC: The Minister of Small Business, Export Promotion and International Trade  
The Minister of International Development

### Group 2 export permit applications to Turkey

#### Summary

The purpose of this memorandum is to seek your decision on [redacted] export permit applications and permit amendment requests (PAR) for Group 2 (Munitions List) items of the Export Control List (ECL) that are destined to Turkey, both directly and indirectly. The total value of the permit applications is approximately [redacted].

Following the advice provided in memorandum BPTS: 03767-2019, you directed the department to adopt a policy of presumptive denial for export permit applications to Turkey for Group 2 items. This means that—in the absence of a compelling reason to issue a permit—the department would normally deny any export permit application for Group 2 items destined to Turkey. In practice, officials are assessing every permit application on a case-by-case basis in order to determine whether exceptional circumstances exist to justify a recommendation for the issuance of a permit. Exceptional circumstances can include, for example, items to be used to promote humanitarian purposes or in the context of a NATO cooperation program.

The Department has assessed that there are exceptional circumstances for these [redacted] export permit applications and PARs, and the annexes include a description of the exceptional circumstances in each case.

The [redacted] export permit applications and PARs submitted in this memorandum in the accompanying three annexes have been assessed against the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) criteria enshrined in subsection 7.3(1) of the *Export and Import Permits Act* (EIPA), and are deemed ready for issuance. These export permit applications and PARs have not raised objections from any consultation partners within the department or across the government.

#### Recommendations

- That you approve the issuance of the [redacted] applications in the attached annexes; and
- That you indicate which applications you wish approved for issuance, and inform the department of any applications that you do not approve for issuance or wish to discuss.

for

Marta Morgan  
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

☐ I concur   ☐ I do not concur

Minister

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTION



## Background

### EIPA and ATT

1. Under the *Export and Import Permits Act* (EIPA), you have the authority to issue or deny permits for the export of items on Canada's Export Control List. The objective of export controls is to ensure that exports of strategic goods and technologies are consistent with Canada's foreign and defence policies. As of September 1, 2019, when amendments to the EIPA and the *Criminal Code* came into effect enabling Canada's accession to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), the review of new permit applications includes an assessment of whether there is a substantial risk that the proposed export would result in one or more of the following negative consequences referred to in subsection 7.3(1) of the EIPA: (i) undermining peace and security; (ii) violating international humanitarian law or international human rights law; (iii) contravening multilateral arrangements on terrorism or transnational organized crime; and (iv) being used in serious acts of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children. In the case of Group 2 (munitions) items, if a substantial risk of any of these negative consequences is determined to exist that cannot be mitigated, section 7.4 of the EIPA requires that you deny the export permit application. However, the government has opted to apply the enhanced risk assessment process and an ATT lens to all export permit applications, including non-Group 2 items. You also have discretion under the EIPA to deny any export permits that are not aligned with Canadian foreign policy values and interests.

### Exports controls policy for Turkey

2. In October 2019, following Turkey's military incursion into northeastern Syria, your predecessor temporarily suspended the issuance of new export permits to Turkey. This temporary suspension was based on Canada's concern that Turkey's military incursion into northeastern Syria could further destabilize the region, worsen the humanitarian situation and roll back progress against Daesh. The suspension did not affect valid export permits, and Canadian companies holding valid permits were able to continue exporting to Turkey. Following the suspension, the department continued to assess permit applications on a case-by-case basis, but did not issue any new permits for Turkey.

3. In April 2020, you directed the department to resume issuing permits for items destined to Turkey on a case-by-case basis (which the department has been doing through a weekly pipeline process with your office), with restrictions still in place for Group 2 (Munitions List) items, where exceptional circumstances would be taken into account. This policy was made public through a Notice to Exporters on April 16, 2020. Therefore, the department adopted a policy of presumptive denial for Group 2 items to Turkey. Accordingly, each permit application is reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine first, whether there is a risk that the proposed export would violate Canada's obligations under the EIPA and ATT; and second, to determine whether there are any exceptional circumstances that would warrant a recommendation to issue the permit. At present, these exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- a high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- there are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and



- export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

### Applications recommended for approval

4. The department has assessed that there are exceptional circumstances for these [REDACTED] export permit applications and PARs, and the annexes include a description of the exceptional circumstances in each case. The department also assessed all of the applications in the annexes attached to this memorandum against the ATT criteria enshrined in subsection 7.3(1) of the EIPA. None of these permit applications or PARs have received objections either within Global Affairs Canada or across the government. The permit applications have been divided into three annexes from lower to higher risk permit applications. Each annex provides details on each permit application, including a description of the exceptional circumstances that apply:

- Annex A: Contains [REDACTED] applications and PARs for Group 2 items. It includes indirect exports to Turkey via a like-minded country, which means that the item would be subject to a like-minded country's export controls regime; exports of items being returned to the original owners of items after repair in Canada; extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, for non-offensive purposes; and applications that comply with the precedent set in memorandum BPTS: 01794-2020 (same applicant, end-user and end-use), which you approved.
- Annex B: Contains [REDACTED] fully consulted applications for Group 2 items for which no concerns or objections were raised.
- Annex C: Contains [REDACTED] applications of Group 2 items for which consultations partners noted concerns relating to regional conflicts and diversion, but did not raise a formal objection.

### Considerations

#### Precedent

5. Following the advice presented in memorandum BPTS: 01794-2020, you approved [REDACTED] L3 Wescam applications of Group 2 items to Turkey, including [REDACTED] in Turkey (which manufactures the [REDACTED]). In the memorandum, it was noted that Turkish-built drones using L3 Wescam optical systems were key to the Turkish air campaign that enabled Turkey's military to conduct a large-scale operation against Syrian regime forces in Idlib, compelling the March 5 ceasefire. The memorandum noted that you personally received assurances from Turkey's Foreign Minister that these items would only be used for Turkey's defensive activities in Idlib. Based on your approval of this memorandum, we have included the [REDACTED] L3 Wescam export permit applications to [REDACTED] in Annex A. Since that approval was granted, Turkey has continued its military engagement in Syria, Iraq and Libya. It also took a strong public stance in favour of Azerbaijan during the recent fighting with Armenia, and adopted a confrontational approach on eastern Mediterranean drilling (with drones escorting drilling vessels) that has fueled tensions with Egypt, France and Greece—all of which could increase the risk of the drones being used in conflict. However, there have been no indications that Turkey has violated the assurances it provided to you, while the fears that Turkish military activity in Syria would produce widespread human rights violations and forced refugee returns (which prompted the original decision to suspend the issuance of new export permits) have not been borne out.

#### Impact on Canadian interests

6. Turkey remains an essential ally for NATO, an ATT signatory and a key partner for Canada. Turkey's leader and minister-level lobbying in recent interactions demonstrates that slow approvals of export permits destined to Turkey has become a bilateral irritant. Turkey has repeatedly raised several of these permits with Canadian officials in Ottawa and Ankara in recent months. Turkey's foreign minister sought a phone call with you recently to discuss the matter, which has not yet been possible to schedule. The tone of the most recent discussion in Ankara, on August 13, was described by our embassy in Ankara [REDACTED] and the Turkish embassy in Ottawa again raised the issue on August 17.



Turkey may view a refusal of these permits as a lack of support from a NATO ally at a time when the Syrian ceasefire remains fragile, and it is faced with threats from terrorist groups, such as the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Daesh. A refusal would likely have an effect on Turkey's perceptions about the support that it can expect from allies in times of crisis, potentially undermining Canada's vested interest in anchoring Turkey in NATO. Therefore, approving the export permits in the annexes attached would demonstrate the importance Canada places on its defence relationship with Turkey, assisting other allies' efforts to prevent Russia from driving a wedge between Turkey and other NATO partners. This includes Russia's efforts to situate itself as an alternative to NATO for certain Turkish defence needs, most recently demonstrated by Turkey's purchase of a Russian S-400 missile defence system.

### Legal

7. If you do not approve the issuance of these export permits, the department will deny these export permit applications on your behalf and notify the companies accordingly; or, if you elect to discuss some of these applications, the department can provide you with additional information. A decision to deny an application under the EIPA must be reasonable and consistent with the purpose for which the controlled good was placed on a control list, i.e. that their use may be detrimental to peace and security.

All of the export permit applications in the attached annexes have been assessed against the ATT criteria, and no concerns were raised by consultation partners in that regard. Accordingly, any denials would be based on national security interests as reflected in the presumptive denial/restriction policy that you announced on April 16, 2020.

### Resource Implications

8. Anticipated resource implications related to the approval of export applications and issuance of the recommended export permits are estimated to be minimal and will be absorbed within existing reference level.

### Communications Implications/Actions

9. The issue of export controls has received significant and sustained public and media attention. However, the approval of the specific permits mentioned here is not expected to garner media attention, as this process is not public. A responsive communications approach is recommended, with media lines drafted when and if necessary.

### Parliamentary Implications/Actions

10. Parliamentarians have followed announcements related to the issuance or denial of export permits in high-profile cases. They have also routinely spoken out against the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Syria. These particular exports have been assessed against the ATT criteria and are not expected to result in any of the negative consequences outlined in the EIPA. Given that it was reported in the media on April 22, 2020, that the department had indefinitely extended the ban on new arms exports to Turkey, parliamentarians may have questions about your decision to proceed with the issuance of these export permits. While these decisions may not be made public, parliamentarians can be expected to scrutinize closely the government's policies and practices around military exports and concerns over potential human rights impacts.

### Attachments:

- Annex A – Recommended Applications and PARs for Group 2 Items
- Annex B – Fully Consulted Applications for Group 2 Items with no Concerns
- Annex C – Applications of Group 2 Items with Concerns
- BPTS: 03767-2019 Export Permits to Turkey



- BPTS: 01794-2020 L3 Wescam Turkey Export Permits

Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
United Arab Emirates							
	2019/09/25	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)	L3 / WESCAM TERRITORY DIRECTOR – MIDDLE EAST AND TURKEY	2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Item Description: Technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software related to the MX and CMX surveillance camera systems</li><li>End-Use: To be used for the operation, maintenance and/or installation of the surveillance systems and transfer to third parties in consignee's assigned geographical coverage which is Middle East and Turkey; possible re-transfer to Turkey.</li><li>End-User Country/End User: UAE/various end-users in the Middle East and Turkey</li><li>Condition(s): None</li><li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns (ECE was also consulted for the Turkey angle)</li><li>Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to</li></ul>	<div><input type="checkbox"/> • I concur</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss</div>

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada’s values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada’s foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: Technical data regarding [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-Use: [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force.</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] raised repeatedly. [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



[illegible]

f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: Technical data related to [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-Use: [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Republic of Turkey Ministry of National Defense Turkish Air Force.</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Subject to the export controls of the [REDACTED] Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] raised repeatedly. [REDACTED]</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

[illegible]

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
<b>Turkey</b>							
	2020/03/30	Telemus Warfare Inc. (Ottawa, Ontario)		2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Instantaneous Frequency Measurement (IFM) receiver (Digitizing receiver), for return after testing.</li> <li>End-Use: Used for detection and monitoring of radar signals.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / ENOVAS Engineering Consultancy</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exception : D – Telemus permits raised repeatedly including at Min level. Telemus permits were last discussed during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> <li>Exception F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)	
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/24	FIELD AVIATION COMPANY INC. (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a, 2-22.a, 9-4.a.ii		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: ( ) Modified Bombardier Challenger aircraft including all materials, associated spare parts and kits.</li> <li>End-Use: For surveillance and Information Communication.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – This permit was raised repeatedly. In July, Turkey asked for an urgent call with MINA to discuss the Field Aviation permit. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> <li>Exception: E: Export permit applications</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Note: Department was advised that aircraft was already shipped against the company's previous permit, and that this permit is for materials/spare parts, no changes were requested to this permit.</li> <li>Note: Export is limited to the (1) aircraft noted, serial number 5946, and does not allow a second aircraft to be exported if this permit is approved.</li> </ul>
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: Ground Boresight Module/adaptor systems for the Wescam MX-15Di Surveillance Systems (a part for calibration of the camera system)</li> <li>End-Use: To be installed on a</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

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	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend validity date by a year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of various spare parts and components of the CMX/MX-series surveillance camera systems and related technology and software.</li> <li>End-Use: Used by consignee to repair MX and CMX systems in Turkey.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3 Wescam. The EUS states the items will not be re-exported or transferred to another party.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). The permit is for export of spare parts and components of the CMX/MX-series surveillance camera systems.</li> <li>End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey / of Turkey. EUS states no further re-export to a third party.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception : D – Wescam permits raised</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 6-9.A.6, 2-5.b, 2-21.a, 2-22.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by 1 year (permit expired on March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows a total export of surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems, Ground boresight modules, mission grip assemblies and technical data.</li> <li>End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey / Turkish Ministry of Defense.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

- Exceptions: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
- Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.

a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;

b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);

c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;

d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;

e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and

f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-22.a, 2-21.a, 2-18		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired March 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of ■■■ master control units, ■■■ handcontroller assemblies, and controlled technical data.</li> <li>End-Use: To perform repairs of MX-series surveillance camera systems.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey / L3. EUS states no further re-export.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li></ul>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
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- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/01/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-5.b		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend permit by 1 year (permit expired April 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total of ( ) surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems.</li> <li>End-Use: To be installed on the ( ) system, used for the purpose of surveillance and targeting.</li> <li>End-User: Turkey / Turkish Gendarmerie. EUS states no further re-export.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultation: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	26/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is permit amendment request to extend permit for 1 year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for a total export of surveillance and targeting camera systems, including ancillary equipment.</li> <li>End Use: The systems will be used for surveillance and targeting.</li> <li>End User Country/Organization: Turkey / Turkish National Police</li> <li>Conditions: Quarterly Reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns;</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired June 30, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Permit allows for the export of surveillance and targeting camera system, including ancillary equipment.</li> <li>End-Use: To perform surveillance, targeting, research, test and training by Turkish law enforcement authorities.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey / EUS states no further re-export to a non-listed party.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

- Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
- Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.

**Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:**

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	28/05/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the current permit by 1 year to June 30, 2023 (original permit expires June 30, 2022) For the export of technical assistance documents, training courses/materials and software and firmware related to the MX and CMX surveillance camera systems</li> <li>End Use: For a quotation/proposal on the surveillance systems, which requires the technical items.</li> <li>End User Country/Organization: Turkey /</li> <li>Conditions:</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept 17 call with</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	06/07/2020	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-14, 2-21.a.1		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expires on November 30, 2020) to provide continuous demonstration. Permit allows for a total of CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems, CMX-10D EO/IR surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems, hand controller units, mission grip assemblies, desktop simulator kits, laptops, kinetic computers and ground boresight modules.</li> <li>End-Use: Items will be used to demonstrate electro-optic and infrared system capabilities to the military, government and law enforcement.</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey</li> <li></li> <li>Condition (s): Temporary condition.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.).

- Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM- Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
- Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- 000095

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/21	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b; 2-15.d; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by a year to January 30, 2023 (permit expires on January 31, 2022). Export allows for a total of CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance &amp; targeting camera, ground boresight modules, mission grips and hand-controllers, and technical documents, training courses/ materials and operational software/firmware.</li> <li>End-Use: To be incorporated into the platform for the purpose of surveillance and targeting.</li> <li>End User: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-11.a, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Repair and return of MX-15 EO/IR surveillance camera systems, (CMX-15D and CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, repair/replacement parts, test equipment and related technical data, training materials and software.</li> <li>End-Use: Repaired full systems are to be returned to their foreign owners; the replacement parts, test equipment and technology will be used for in-country repairs/maintenance.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur... <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: F – request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)</li> </ul>
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems for their own end use and CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, as well as software.</li> <li>End-Use: For end use by who will use the CMX-15D for sustainability and maintainability purposes and for after sales support.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / SSB (Presidency of Defense industry)</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exceptions: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/04/06	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.b, 2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: ( ) CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, ( ) CMX-22D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, ( ) hand-controller assemblies, ( ) ground boresight modules, repair/replacement parts, and test equipment to Turkey.</li> <li>End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / ( )</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations Fully consulted no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss.

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/05/13	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d, 2-18.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems, ground boresight modules, handcontroller assemblies and technical documents.</li> <li>End-Use: Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
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- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
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Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/08	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Various spare parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems.</li> <li>End-Use: Used in the repairs and maintenance of defective CMX-15D surveillance systems owned by military and law enforcement agencies that fall under Ministry of Defense of Interior.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [REDACTED]</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/06/03	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Return temporarily imported [REDACTED] produced parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems.</li> <li>End-Use: Items underwent an independent assessment in Canada. Used for the purpose of Surveillance and Targeting.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [REDACTED]</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

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- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

					This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/29	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-5.d; 2-11.a; 2-15.d; 2-18.a; 2-21.a.1; 2-22.a; 6-9.A.6		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: repaired CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems, and MX-15D EO/IR surveillance &amp; targeting camera systems, replacement parts, related test equipment, technical data, training materials and software.</li> <li>End-Use: Foreign-owned items to be returned after repair.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Presidency of the Republic of Turkey and Presidency of Defence Industries</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception: D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's Sept. 17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception: F – Request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for repairs (Proof of import provided)</li> </ul>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	2020/07/15	L-3 / WESCAM INC. (Burlington, Ontario)		2-15.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Return temporarily imported [REDACTED] produced parts for the Wescam CMX-15D EO/IR surveillance and targeting camera systems.</li> <li>End-Use: Canada conducted an independent assessment of parts; the assessment had been completed and items are to be returned to consignee [REDACTED]</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / [REDACTED]</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Precedent memo - BPTS 01794-2020, which you approved. (See Section 5 of Cover Memo.)</li> <li>Exception D – Wescam permits raised repeatedly including at the leaders and ministerial levels. Wescam permits were raised in an April call between PM-Trudeau/Erdogan. Wescam permits were last raised during MINA's</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex A: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>Sept.17 call with Minister Çavusoglu. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's domestic UAV program are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relation with a NATO ally.</p>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
<b>United Arab Emirates</b>							
	29/09/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.E.2, 6-11.D.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>receivers, antenna, technology and software.</li> <li>End-Use: For installation of technology demonstrations to potential customers.</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/ Turkish Armed Forces</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly Reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exception: D – Permits by were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations. Although the final user is in the UAE, a refusal could be viewed as a lack of support from Canada to a NATO ally and impact our bilateral relations.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
<b>Turkey</b>							
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-14, 2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date of the permit by 1 year (permit expired January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). Export of hardware, software and technology related to the Image Generators program.</li> <li>End-Use: For the Full Mission Simulator Image Generator (for pilot training).</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey/Turkish Air Force</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exceptions: D – Permits for items used by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> <li>• Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing project from before Oct. 19.</li> </ul>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	25/11/2019	CAE Inc. (St-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec)		2-21.a, 2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: This is a permit amendment request to extend the validity date by a year (permit expired on January 31, 2020; however given that a review was underway, JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval). For the export of software and technology related to the Image Generator program.</li> <li>End-Use: Items will be accessed by consignee from their own systems, to provide on-site support to the Turkish Air Force (for pilot training).</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – Permits for items used</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

by Turkish Armed Forces are often raised at the highest level. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's military are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.

- Exception E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from before Oct. 19.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
				2-22.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: [REDACTED] [REDACTED] JLT/Legal division has advised that the permit could be reinstated, if approved; it would reflect the original request for extension or amendment, from the date of approval) [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-Use: [REDACTED] [REDACTED]</li> <li>End-User Country/End User: Turkey/ Turkish military.</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised.</li> <li>Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

before Oct. 19.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- 000121

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	30/08/2019	GENERAL DYNAMICS ORD./TACTICAL SYST.-CDA. INC. (Repentigny, Quebec)		2-1.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Spare Firearm Parts, for Simunition® Conversion Kit (device that simulates ammunition for training purposes).</li> <li>End-Use: For maintenance of previously procured GDOTS Simunition® Conversion Kits.</li> <li>End-User Country/End-User: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Expedited consultation with DND and GEO, no objections raised.</li> </ul> <p>Exception C – Items can only be used for training. Once installed, firearms cannot discharge live rounds, only simulated rounds.</p>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	10/10/2019			2-11.a, 2-21.a.1, 2-22.a, 6-11.A.3.b.3, 6-11.D.2, 6-11.E.2		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Antennas, technology and software upgrade downloads.</li> <li>End Use: For a drillship managed by The vessel's work is in the Eastern Mediterranean.</li> <li>End User Country / Organization: Turkey /</li> <li>Condition (s): Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – GPS receiver, for navigation, going to civilian end user.</li> <li>Exception D – Permits by were raised by President Erdogan during his January 2020 call with PM Trudeau. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry programs are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

[illegible]

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref. ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/12/2019			2-11.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Replacement parts and components for [REDACTED] Aircraft Ship Integrated Securing and Traversing (ASIST) System.</li> <li>End Use: To be used by the Turkish Navy on their MILGEM class ships.</li> <li>End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Navy</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – [REDACTED] permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

- Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- a) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	22/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Various spares and subcomponents used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system.</li> <li>End Use: To be used on the SH-70 helicopter.</li> <li>End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	27/01/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: cable cutter assemblies. Replacement of parts originally exported in June 2019.</li> <li>End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter.</li> <li>End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<p>impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exception F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned due to non-compliance.</li> </ul>
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Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to a NATO cooperation project;
- Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	05/03/2020			2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: cable cutter assembly. Warranty replacement of defective part.</li> <li>End Use: To be used in conjunction with the ASIST helicopter landing system on the SH-70 helicopter.</li> <li>End User Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Naval Forces Command</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – items secure helicopters to ship, serve no other purpose.</li> <li>Exceptions: D – permits raised repeatedly in July by MFA and TK Embassy. This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur. <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
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- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.

- Exceptions: F – Permit request to re-export parts that were exported under a previous permit but returned for warranty repairs.

**Exceptions Legend:** exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

- 000131

## Annex B: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	09/04/2020	ARMAMENT TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED (Halifax, Nova Scotia)		2-1.d		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: Export of ( ) firearm sights, and ( ) riflescopes.</li> <li>End Use: For commercial re-sale to law enforcement, security, military and civilian marksmen by the consignee.</li> <li>End-User Country/End-User: Turkey/ ( ) EUS states no further re-export.</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no concerns.</li> <li>Exception C – While this item is not used for self-defence purposes, it can help with targeting and avoidance of civilian casualties. In addition, these items are available widely on a commercial basis.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend: exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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- b) Export permit applications for items that would contribute to other joint projects with Allies; or to goals aligned with Canada's values and interests, such as humanitarian assistance, the protection of civilians in northwestern Syria, a stated NATO objective (indicated through an end-use assurance);
- c) A high level of confidence that the items in question are non-offensive in nature or would not be used for aggressive purposes and would not be re-exported to a third country where there is a significant risk of use in interstate/intrastate conflict that would run contrary to Canadian interests;
- d) There are grounds to think that there will be especially negative impacts on bilateral relations, which could impact Canada's foreign policy, security and/or defense interests;
- e) Export permit applications for an extension/new permit to continue an existing project that started before the October 2019 suspension of Group 2 permits, and is related to a permit that expired, or is about to expire, for non-offensive purposes or one of the above stated purposes; and
- f) Export permit applications to re-export defective parts that were exported to Canada under warranty, or for repairs under an existing permit; in cases where this export permit application would not be inconsistent with other Canadian foreign policy, defense or security interests.



## Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
<b>Turkey</b>							
					1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Technical data</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li></li> </ul>	
						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>End Use Country / Organization: Turkey / Turkish Air Force</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting.</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to regional peace and security were raised.</li> <li>Note: while the value of this item is negligible, as it is a data transfer, the Department has been advised that</li> </ul>	

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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### Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exceptions: D – bilateral relations. [REDACTED] permit raised repeatedly. In [REDACTED] This serves to demonstrate that decisions around permits are monitored at the highest level and decisions on these permits have a direct impact on the bilateral relations with a NATO ally.</li> <li>• Exceptions: E – Export permit applications for an extension to an existing permit from [REDACTED]</li> </ul>
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## Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
880499-3	04/10/2019	Excelitas Canada Inc. (Vaudreuil, Quebec)	BMC	2-5.c, 2-22.a	28,265	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item Description: (4) special optical sensors that detect the angle of incidence of a laser beam and associated technology. The devices are called Excelitas Angular Continuous Threat Detectors.</li> <li>End-Use: For use in Laser Warning Receiver Systems to detect and provide angle-of-arrival information.</li> <li>End-User Country/Organization: Turkey/BMC.</li> <li>Condition (s):</li> <li>Consultation: Fully consulted, no objections, some risks pertaining to Turkey's active involvement in regional armed conflicts were raised.</li> <li>Note: BMC is one of the largest commercial military vehicle manufacturers in Turkey.</li> <li>Exceptions: C – Primary function is self-defence warning system.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> I concur <input type="checkbox"/> I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

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## Annex C: Export Permit Applications Recommended for Issuance - Turkey

Ref ID	Submit Date	Export Permit Applicant in Canada	Consignee	Export Control List Number	Total Value of proposed export (\$CAD)	Description of Transaction/Consultation Status	
	02/12/2019	Honeywell Limited (Mississauga, Ontario)		2-10.a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Item description: Generator Control Units used on the T-70 helicopter.</li> <li>End-Use: Generator control units will be installed in the Turkish Utility Helicopter T-70. These devices control the electrical power generators on the helicopter.</li> <li>End User Country / Organizations: Turkey / Turkish Military (various)</li> <li>Condition (s): Quarterly reporting</li> <li>Consultations: Fully consulted, no objections, but some risks pertaining to the final end use of this equipment were raised.</li> <li>Exception D – Permits linked to Turkey's sensitive domestic defense industry are raised repeatedly, including at the leaders level. A refusal of this permit could be seen as bilateral irritant and a lack of support to a NATO ally.</li> </ul>	<input type="checkbox"/> • I concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I do not concur <input type="checkbox"/> • I wish to discuss

Annex has been reviewed by DND and GEO.

Exceptions Legend : exceptional circumstances can include, but are not limited to, the following situations:

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## Minister of Foreign Affairs Call with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

September 17, 2020, 09:00

### Biography



**Mevlüt ÇAVUŞOĞLU [CHA-VOOSH-OH-LOO], Minister of Foreign Affairs**

- FM since 2014. Career politician, founding member of the ruling AKP party.
- Well-liked by President Erdoğan, but influence on Erdoğan's decision-making unclear.
- Speaks English, German, Japanese, and Turkish.
- Last interaction was a phone call on April 13, 2020.

### Objectives

- Seek Turkey's support for former Finance Minister Bill Morneau's candidacy as the next Secretary General of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) An early call to its Foreign Minister would be beneficial as Turkey does not fall squarely within any of the various regional groupings within the OECD.
- Provide an update on two outstanding export permits that have not been issued due to Canada's restrictions on Group 2 items.
- Encourage Turkey to continue to engage with Greece within NATO on military de-confliction and de-escalation to defuse tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean

### Key Messages

#### Call Delay

- Apologies for not being able to organize this call earlier, I was on holiday **[Placeholder if permit is approved]** and wanted to call when I could share the good news that I have approved a number of permits on an exception basis.

#### Export Permits

- **[Placeholder]** "Pleased to let you know I have approved a number of permits on an exception basis." OR "I am aware of the concerns you have raised with my officials about a number of export permits and I will be considering those very soon, as a priority."
- Pleased to note as discussed earlier, Canada has recently made significant changes to Canada's export policy towards Turkey, relaxing restrictions for controlled items.

#### OECD Secretary General Campaign

- Canada is nominating Bill Morneau, our former Finance Minister, for the position of Secretary General of the OECD.
- Believe in the need and value of a high performing OECD, capable of adapting and responding to 21st century challenges.
- Canada wants to contribute to a new multilateralism that identifies positive solutions on those issues that cross boundaries.
- Mr. Morneau is a strong candidate and would be an asset to the OECD.
- Mr. Morneau is an accomplished business leader with proven management skills and extensive international experience.



- He built alliances in the G7 and G20 as Finance Minister.
- Brings necessary vision and leadership at a challenging international moment.
- Hope we can count on Turkey for support of his candidacy

***Responsive – Canada proposing a candidate when the person prior to the current Secretary General was a Canadian OECD has been led by North Americans for nearly 25 years .***

- *Canada supports the nomination of a strong candidate, regardless of geographic region, who has the necessary experience and broad knowledge of international affairs and economic issues, and the leadership competencies required to run such an important international organization.*
- *Canada wants to contribute to a new multilateralism that identifies positive solutions on those issues that cross boundaries, especially at this critical moment internationally. We share similar values with the Turkey regarding the importance of sound governance, effective multilateralism and the rule of law.*

### **Bilateral Relationship**

- Welcome the open channel of communications we have established and the frequency of our interactions, particularly your active participation in the COVID-19 ministerial coordination group.
- Pleased by recent calls between our leaders and defence ministers. Reflective of the value we place on our relationship, the potential for growth in many spheres.
- Congratulations on the election of Volkan Bozkir as UNGA President. Look forward to working with him on multilateral issues.
- Appreciated Turkey's support to Ocean Choice to enable them to send a crew to pick up the Calvert from Tersan Shipyard and take it safely to Canada. Also appreciate your Embassy's support in resolving some issues relating to PPE deliveries from Turkey to Canada.
- Glad that our officials are now actively planning the next Joint Economic and Trade Commission meeting (JETCO), which will be led by trade ministers. Understand that our officials are working to organize it.

### **Istanbul Convention**

- Understand that there has been some discussion in Turkey about a possible withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Canada would regret to see this.
- View Turkey's being first to ratify this convention as an important signal of commitment to end violence against women. Combatting violence against women is an important issue to Canada, and we see this as a common stance.

### **Eastern Mediterranean Dispute**

- Canada is deeply concerned by mounting tensions between Allies in the Eastern Mediterranean.
- We are experiencing uncertain and trying time on many fronts, and allied solidarity and NATO unity is now more important than ever.
- Canada calls on all our NATO Allies to exercise restraint and engage in dialogue to reach a peaceful solution.
- All parties must abide by their international obligations including, in this case, Article 1 of the Washington Treaty, and not take action that pre-determines the outcome of any dispute.
- NATO is the most appropriate forum for military de-confliction and de-escalation efforts between Allies. We fully support the NATO Secretary General's military de-confliction and de-escalation negotiations.
- We are encouraged that both Turkey and Greece attended mediation meetings on September 10th, September 15th and today (September 17) [**may require updates**].
- Canada is ready to assist to help defuse tensions and promote a constructive dialogue.

### **Alamos Gold**



- Has complied with all Turkish legal requirements over the years and has made over \$200M in investment in the project development.
- The company has invested \$25M in sustainable development projects for the local communities.
- Foreign investors in Turkey's mining sector are closely monitoring the situation. A swift renewal of the concession will ensure their continued confidence in the Turkish market.
- QUESTION: During Deputy Prime Minister Freeland's phone call with you on November 22, you stated that there would be no problem with renewing Alamos' mining license, but particular attention will first have to be paid to local sensitivities around the project before operations can resume. Can you please provide an update on the situation?

**Responsive – Invitation to Turkish MFA Global Heads of Mission Meeting**

- Thank you very much for this kind invitation. I understand that the event has now been cancelled or postponed due to COVID-19. Should a virtual event take place, please let me know.

**Responsive – Gülen movement in Canada**

- *We take information provided by Turkey seriously. We remain open to investigating those allegedly responsible for the July 2016 coup attempt, where evidence meets the standards required by Canadian law*

## Context

- **OECD priority areas of interest for Turkey:** Economic Policy, Education, Economic analysis and structural reform, Digitalization and digital taxation, Trade, and Tourism. Turkey expressed strong interest in joining the Global Partnership on AI (GPAI), which Canada (ISED) and France co-sponsored to be housed in the OECD. Our mission at the OECD worked closely with Turkey in this context and welcomed their interest to join GPAI at their earliest opportunity.
- As a non-EU member of the OECD, it is less likely that Turkey will have strong views that a European should be the next Secretary General, so it would be important to get early support from Turkey for Mr. Morneau. Mr. Morneau met with Turkey's Ambassador Kerim Uras on September 10<sup>th</sup> in Ottawa. The ambassador stated that Turkey has not yet decided whom to support.
- **Previous Interactions:** Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu has been an active participant of the covid-19 coordination calls that you lead. Experience has shown that sorting out difficult problems with Turkey usually requires high level engagement – PM to President or Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister. [REDACTED] the Erdogan government puts great stock in the frequency and quality of its bilateral interactions between government leaders at the highest level and its cooperation on key issues is calibrated accordingly.
- **Political Climate:** Turkey is [REDACTED] necessary partner for Canada. It is a strategic NATO ally and an influential regional player. Bilateral relations have improved recently, with more high-level interactions in the past two years than the preceding decade. Changes to Canada's exports control policy, democratic backsliding, recent Turkish unilateralism, particularly its October 2019 incursion into Syria, have raised tensions, although increased minister and leader level interactions since the start of 2020, Turkish assistance with the PS 752 response and the April helicopter crash, Turkey's positive intervention in securing the March 5 ceasefire agreement in Syria, your personal engagement through your "COVID 15 " group, and the approval of some key export permits have helped get the relationship back on track.



## • Key Issues:

- Istanbul Convention on Preventing and Combatting Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence: Istanbul Convention: The Istanbul Convention is a Council of Europe human rights treaty on violence against women and domestic violence Turkey was the first to ratify it, a move Canada views positively as part of our Feminist Foreign Policy. However, some officials, including the Justice Minister, have raised the possibility of Turkey's withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Withdrawal would come as violence against women remains the top issue in Turkey, and the discussion triggered protests by opposition and CSOs.
- Invitations to Events: Turkey may use the call to invite you to deliver the keynote speech and participate in a Q&A with Minister Çavuşoğlu at the Turkish MFA's Global Heads of Mission meeting on November 7-13 (exact date TBC). Canada's Ambassador to Turkey already conveyed to the Turkish MFA that you are not able to travel in person to this event.
- Idlib, Syria: In January 2020, the Syrian regime relaunched a ground offensive to retake Idlib, prompting Turkey to intervene. On 5 March, Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire which has held unexpectedly, partly due to COVID-19 concerns. Almost a million Syrians were displaced in the Idlib, although a few hundred thousand have returned. Ceasefire violations by the regime and Russia have steadily increased in recent weeks, while joint Turkish-Russian patrols have been targeted by extremist groups. The regime is expected to eventually resume its offensive on Idlib.
- Gülen movement: The coup attempt of July 15, 2016 had a traumatic effect in Turkey. Over 250 died, over 1000 injured, and the National Assembly was bombed. It continues to guide Turkey's domestic security posture and significantly influences politics. Many saw the coup attempt as an existential threat, overcome by a popular mobilization that rejected Turkey's long tradition of military tutelage. Turkey accused US-based cleric and former strategic partner of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Fethullah Gülen of orchestrating it. Gülen's movement, called the Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) by the government, is accused of building a 'parallel state' and seeking government overthrow. As Turkey tried to expel this movement, [REDACTED] with over 150 000 civil servants were dismissed, over 50 000 people arrested, and hundreds of media outlets and civil society groups closed for 2016-2018.
- Eastern Mediterranean Dispute: Longstanding Greek and Turkish disagreements in the Eastern Mediterranean have become increasingly tense in recent months with the potential discovery of new hydro carbon reserves in areas to which they both lay claim. Ankara and Athens have deployed military vessels to the region and conducted separate military exercises as a show of force, in addition to engaging in escalatory rhetoric. Germany, as the current EU Council President, is attempting to mediate on broader issues.
- The previous week, President Erdogan had confirmed that Turkey resumed its drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean (which the EU characterizes as "unauthorized") following the announcement of an August 7 agreement between Greece and Egypt on an exclusive economic zone covering that area (The disputed area is both part of Turkey's continental shelf claim and a signed maritime boundary agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord in 2019).
- Greece (with support of France, Cyprus and others) [REDACTED] and bring its territorial water disputes with Turkey into international forums (primarily EU, NATO), further exacerbating the situation.
- The NATO Secretary General, in an effort to diffuse tensions between Greece and Turkey, has established a technical-level military de-confliction mechanism. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Low-profile talks resumed on Thursday, September 10th, and are scheduled to reconvene this Tuesday, September 15th, and again on Thursday, September 17th.





- **Key Statistics:** Total Trade: \$3,58 million; Imports: \$1.96 million; Exports: \$1,62 million. Canadian Direct Investment: +-\$596 million.
- **Consular Issues:** Turkish assistance is essential for Canada to respond to consular emergencies in Iran, as seen with their role in facilitating the rapid deployment of the SRDT for the PS 752 crisis.

### Bilateral Issues

- Exports control: Following Turkey's October 2019 military incursion into northeastern Syria, Canada put in place a suspension on all new export permits. This suspension was lifted on April 16 and significantly narrowed the scope of Canada's policy on exports of controlled items to Turkey. However, restrictions continue to apply to Group 2 (Military) exports to Turkey. The remaining restrictions on certain military exports are making it more difficult for Turkish companies to procure essential Canadian technology required to develop and pursue sensitive domestic military programs including: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Satellite Program and Rockets. The significant delays and uncertainty around our exports control regime has become a significant irritant for Turkey that is often raised at the highest level. In fact, a few weeks ago, Turkey requested an urgent call with MINA to discuss two urgent permit requests. This serves to demonstrate that Canadian decisions on the issuance/rejection of export permits in certain sectors are noted at the highest level of the Turkish government and can have a significant impact on bilateral relations.
- [REDACTED]  
and [REDACTED]  
which were then supposed to be modified [REDACTED] for the use of the Turkish Air Force. Although [REDACTED] have been delivered, due to current exports restrictions, [REDACTED] is unable to [REDACTED] since it needs a permit to do so and has recently informed [REDACTED] due to its inability to get the required authorizations. This permit is recommended for your approval in a memo currently with your office.
- Field Aviation permit #891760: Field Aviation and Aselsan signed a contract on June 8, 2016 for a modified Challenger CL605 for use by the Turkish Presidency. Since the contract was signed, Aselsan has paid Field Aviation more than [REDACTED] to undergo various work on the airplane. Before Field Aviation's permit is set to expired on July 31st, the company flew the plane to Turkey. However, the company cannot perform any work on the plane and communicate with representatives of Aselsan since its permit expired. As such, Field Aviation needs a new export permit to be allowed to pursue its work on the aircraft and deliver it to its client Aselsan. This permit is recommended for your approval in a memo currently being drafted by the Department.
- Alamos Gold: In Summer 2019, Alamos' most important mine in Turkey became the target of large environmental protests after pictures were circulated showing significant deforestation. In October 2019, Alamos' concession expired even though it had done everything needed to secure a renewal putting its US\$200 million investment in jeopardy. Alamos has contributed US\$25 million to the sustainable development of local communities by providing 489 scholarships, renovating schools and local infrastructures. Alamos was raised in a November 22 call between Deputy PM Freeland and Turkish Foreign Minister Çavusoglu in which he said he understood there would be no problem in renewing Alamos' concession, but local sensitivities would need to be taken into account. At the Canadian Ambassador's credentials ceremony on January 2, President Erdogan said there were "more issues around Alamos" but nothing further. Alamos was last raised by Minister Ng during a pull-aside with her Turkish counterpart at Davos but did not get an answer on what needs to be done in order for the permit to be renewed.
- Joint Economic Trade Committee (JETCO): Turkey hosted the first meeting of the JETCO on November 13 in Istanbul. Most of the messaging from both sides was positive, reflecting the shared sense that the bilateral trade relationship has room to significantly grow. During the government-to-



government session, Turkey reiterated long standing asks for an FTA and FIPA, its concerns with several Canadian anti-dumping rulings on Turkish products while Canada raised concerns around market access and the lack of predictability in the granting of mining permits. The next ministerial level JETCO was scheduled to be hosted by Canada this fall has been postponed till 2021 (dates to be discussed with Turkey).

- Gülen movement in Canada: Turkey remains concerned by the activity in Canada of what it refers to as the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETÖ) (Canada does not use this term, and has not recognized it as a terrorist group), which it holds responsible for the 15 July 2016 coup attempt in Turkey. It regularly requests Canada take measures against allegedly affiliated individuals and groups, and registers concern when Canadian officials interact with them.



## Minister of Foreign Affairs Call with Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey

Date, time: tbc

### Biography



**Mevlüt ÇAVUŞOĞLU [CHA-VOOSH-OH-LOO], Minister of Foreign Affairs**

- FM since 2014. Career politician, founding member of the ruling AKP party.
- Well-liked by President Erdoğan, but influence on Erdoğan's decision-making unclear.
- Speaks English, German, Japanese, and Turkish.
- Last interaction was a phone call on September 17, 2020.

### Objectives

- To recognize Turkey's cooperation on COVID19, trade, and multilateral cooperation.
- To signal that while Canada values Turkey as a NATO Ally, we will need to examine the potential use of Turkish drones with Canadian components in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

### Key Messages

#### Bilateral Relationship

- We value our important bilateral relationship with Turkey and our cooperation on a range of common objectives, from trade promotion, to the COVID-19 response, to migration and refugee issues, as well as broader multilateral cooperation at the UN.
- Welcome the open channel of communications we have established and the frequency of our interactions, particularly your active participation in the COVID-19 ministerial coordination group.
- I understand that there is an outstanding request for a PM-President Erdogan call and recognize the importance of engagement at this level. I will follow-up through our channels.

#### Nagorno-Karabakh

- We are deeply concerned by the ongoing hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, especially by the shelling of communities and civilian casualties.
- As you might be aware, Foreign Secretary Raab and I issued a joint statement on Monday calling for immediate end to violence and respect for ceasefire.
- Turkey has taken a strong role in support of Azerbaijan. Hope that you can use your considerable influence to help bring an end to violence and to bring parties back to the table. There is no military solution to this conflict.

#### Export Permits Suspension

- I understand your disappointment with regards to the October 5 decision to suspend Wescam export permits to Turkey, pending further investigation, over possible use of Canadian technology in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh.
- My decision affects those export permits related to the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. No other permits have been suspended. I am aware of the concerns you have raised with my officials about a number of other export permits.



- We are concerned by allegations that Canadian technology used on drones may be being used in the ongoing hostilities and combat operations.
- There is concerning information, including through media reports in the Turkish Press, that points to the possible export of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with Canadian components to Azerbaijan from Turkey.
- The end-user statements provided in support of our export permits indicate that the goods will not be diverted, re-exported, or transferred to another party not listed in the statements.
- Given our rigorous export control regime, we need to seek further information through consultations, including between our defense institutions, to better understand the situation. Turkey's close cooperation would greatly help in this regard.

#### ***RESPONSIVE – Export of controlled goods to Saudi Arabia***

- *In Canada, all permit applications for controlled items – regardless of their destination – are reviewed under the same robust risk assessment framework, including against the Arms Trade Treaty criteria, which is enshrined in our domestic legislation.*
- *Canada suspended the issuance of new export permits to Saudi Arabia in October 2018 and conducted a review of allegations of misuse. In April 2020, I announced the results of that review and export permit applications to Saudi Arabia are now being assessed on a case-by-case basis.*
- *Canada will take appropriate action should credible evidence be found regarding the misuse of any controlled Canadian good or technology in any country, including to commit or facilitate serious violations of international human rights or humanitarian law.*

#### ***RESPONSIVE – End-Use Assurances***

- *In Canada, end-use assurances are an essential component of export permit applications and are reviewed during our risk assessment process.*
- *All exporters are required to identify the end-user and end-use of the goods or technology proposed for export.*
- *If an involved party becomes aware that the end user or end-use is not as stated, we would expect to be advised as the export permit is contingent on these assurances.*
- *I will suspend or cancel permits that do not comply with end-use assurances.*
- *This information will also be factored into future export permit application assessments and may affect the issuance of future permits.*

#### **Eastern Mediterranean Dispute**

- Canada is encouraged by the steps taken by Turkey to de-escalate tensions and look for a peaceful resolution to its disagreements with Greece.
- We welcome the valuable leadership role being played by the NATO Secretary General to broker a military de-confliction mechanism. I hope this can create the space for broader diplomatic efforts to address the underlying dispute.
- Canada is encouraged by the recent agreements between Turkey and Greece to resume exploratory talks.
- Canada is engaging with all parties to encourage positive steps and offer Canadian assistance where this may be helpful.
- Do you have more information to share on the proposal for a regional conference made by President Erdoğan during his address to the United Nations a few weeks ago?
- In your view, how could Canada help promote a constructive dialogue on this issue?
- Canada is concerned about the recent decision to reopen the beaches of Varosha. We have been a strong and longstanding supporter of efforts to achieve lasting peace in Cyprus and continue to



encourage the efforts of Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to find a mutually acceptable approach to a reunification of Cyprus.

### **Responsive: Syrian Kurd Support for Consular Case**

- Canada recently brought a five year-old orphan, [REDACTED] from al-Hol refugee camp to unite with her grandparents.
- As you are aware, Syrian Kurd authorities oversee al-Hol camp. They were provided very helpful support for this exceptional humanitarian case.
- We closed our embassy in Syria 2012. Our Coordinator for Syria, who monitors political developments in the country, led the delegation which brought [REDACTED] home.

## **Context**

- **Previous Interactions:** Last call took place on September 17.
- Your call with your Turkish counterpart takes place at a difficult moment in the bilateral relationship. Despite progress in early 2020 due to expanding cooperation, Turkey is frustrated that Canada did not fully lift the 2019 export control restrictions or grant several specific permits they repeatedly flagged as priorities. This was exacerbated by a failure to respond to a request from President Erdogan to speak with Prime Minister Trudeau (still under review at PCO), as well as Canada recently engaging with Syrian Kurdish groups Turkey considers terrorists on a consular case. For our part, Canada has been concerned by Turkey's increasingly aggressive stance in the Eastern Mediterranean and vocal support of Azerbaijan during the recent outbreak of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh – actions that risk destabilizing the region.
- **On October 5**, Turkey received a heads-up of your decision to suspend export permits at the level of officials.
- Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu has been an active participant of the Covid-19 coordination calls that you lead. Experience has shown that sorting out difficult problems with Turkey usually requires high level engagement – PM to President or Foreign Minister to Foreign Minister. More than with most other governments, the Erdogan government puts great stock in the frequency and quality of its bilateral interactions between government leaders at the highest level and its cooperation on key issues is calibrated accordingly.
- **Political Climate:** Turkey is an important partner for Canada, despite [REDACTED] in the relationship. It is a strategic NATO Ally and an influential regional player. Bilateral relations have improved recently, with more high-level interactions in the past two years than the preceding decade. Changes to Canada's exports control policy, democratic backsliding, and recent Turkish unilateralism, particularly its October 2019 incursion into Syria, have raised tensions. On the other hand, increased ministerial and leader level interactions since the start of 2020, Turkish assistance with the PS 752 response and the April Canadian helicopter crash, Turkey's positive intervention in securing the March 5 ceasefire agreement in Syria, your personal engagement through your "COVID 15" group, and the approval of some key export permits, have helped get the relationship back on track.
- **Key Trade Statistics:** Total Trade: \$3,58 million; Imports: \$1.96 billion; Exports: \$1.62 billion. Value of Canadian Direct Investments: Over \$2 billion.

### **Key Issues:**



### **Export Permits Issue:**

- On October 5, you made the decision to suspend all valid Wescam export permits to Turkey, pending further investigation, over allegations, including media reports in the Turkish Press (Daily Sabah articles), of the possible export of Turkish drones with Canadian components to Azerbaijan and reports that [REDACTED] unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) may have been used in combat operations.
- **Turkey's reaction** to Canada's decision (which, since Monday, has generated much public and media attention in Turkey) has been a mixture of disappointment and criticism. In a statement issued on October 6, the Turkish MFA accused Canada of practicing a "double-standard approach" by suspending Turkish permits while still exporting arms to Saudi Arabia despite its involvement in Yemen. The MFA statement further criticized Canada's uncooperative stance towards Turkey as being incompatible with the spirit of the NATO Alliance

**Potential Implications for Canada's OECD Candidacy:** in EGM's October 5 call with the Turkish Ambassador to Ottawa, HE Ambassador Uras stated that Canada's October 5 decision [REDACTED] for former Minister Bill Morneau. This reinforces Turkey's overall expression of frustration with Canada's delay in lifting our export permit restrictions on Turkey, as well disappointment with President Erdogan's outstanding request (more than three weeks) for a phone call with the PM.

### **Export Permit Restrictions (Overall):**

- Following Turkey's October 2019 military incursion into northeastern Syria, Canada put in place a temporary suspension on the issuance of all new export permits for controlled items destined to Turkey. Canada issued a Notice to Exporters on April 16, 2020, significantly narrowing the scope of Canada's policy on exports of controlled items to Turkey. While restrictions continue to apply to Group 2 (military) exports to Turkey, Canada will consider on a case-by-case basis whether there are exceptional circumstances, including but not limited to NATO cooperation programs, that might justify issuing an export permit for Group 2 (military) items. Exporters who were issued permits for the export of such items to Turkey prior to October 11, 2019 may continue to export against those permits during their period of validity.
- The remaining restrictions on certain military exports are making it more difficult for Turkish companies to procure essential Canadian technology required to develop and pursue sensitive domestic military programs including: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), Satellite and Rockets. The significant delays and uncertainty around our exports control regime has become a significant irritant for Turkey that is often raised at the highest level, including during your [REDACTED] call with your Turkish counterpart. A number of large companies including [REDACTED] have repeatedly advised the Department that the unpredictability around export permits is threatening contracts worth [REDACTED] in a high growing market (215% growth since 2017) [REDACTED]
- Prior to ministerial direction to suspend L3 Wescam permits to Turkey, an action memo (BPTS: 03689-2020) recommending the issuance of [REDACTED] export permits (valued at approximately [REDACTED] that could qualify for an exception under the current Turkey presumptive-denial policy was submitted for your decision. Of these permit applications, [REDACTED] are for L3 Wescam (valued at [REDACTED] – the recommendation related to these permit applications is currently being reassessed. The remaining [REDACTED] permits (valued at [REDACTED] include permit applications from companies such as [REDACTED]



some of which were raised at the ministerial and leaders level.

### **Permit Exceptions**

- After MINA directed the Department to suspend some L3 Wescam export permits to Turkey pending an investigation by Global Affairs Canada into allegations regarding Canadian technology being used in the military conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, the Department has identified a number of permits that could still qualify for an exception under the current presumptive-denial policy. There are remaining exceptions proposed for consideration relating to permits by

These exceptions were put together to provide a framework to facilitate decision making and are not meant to override Canada's obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty and the Export and Import Permits Act.

### **Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh**

- Nagorno-Karabakh (known in Armenia as Artsakh) is a historical flashpoint between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which has been the object of a protracted territorial and ethnic conflict between both sides since before the fall of the Soviet Union. Instability in this region carries high risks of spillover into surrounding countries, potentially involving regional powers, particularly Turkey and Russia, which have competing interests in this region. A major escalation could endanger pipelines transporting Caspian oil through Azerbaijan and Georgia towards Europe.
- Due to Azerbaijan and Turkey's close relationship, Armenia's continued support for ethnic-Armenian separatists in Azerbaijan's breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh is another major bilateral irritant between Turkey and Armenia. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in 1993, citing Armenia's continued occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey continues to claim that normalization is out of the question without the return of Azerbaijani territories occupied by Armenian backed-separatists. During the most recent flare up in Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkey has declared it will support Azerbaijan with "every possible means." Turkey reportedly has F-16s stationed in Azerbaijan, but there has been no evidence to indicate these assets have been involved in the fighting. At the same time, Azerbaijan released drone footage of strikes against Armenian positions and the footage appears to come from Turkish drones. However, Canada and like-minded missions do not have the capacity to corroborate what is happening on the ground, including the drone footage released by Azerbaijan.

### **Eastern Mediterranean Dispute:**


- Despite being NATO Allies, since Greece's discovery of oil in the northern Aegean in 1973, Greece and Turkey have periodically clashed on a wide range of issues in the Aegean Sea, including delineation of the continental shelf, the breadth of territorial waters, control of airspace, and ownership of various islands, rocks, and islets.
- In 2020, growing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean are being driven by perceived Turkish provocations giving rise to nationalist sentiment in Greece, Turkish feelings of regional isolationism, competing economic and energy interests, and differences among the parties with respect to the applicable rules under international law.



- Tensions between Turkey and Greece increased significantly following Turkey's July 2020 announcement that it would carry out seismic surveys on the disputed continental shelf. Since that time, there have been a number of escalatory incidents on both sides, including: the deployment of further Turkish research vessels to the disputed area; a minor collision between a Greek and Turkish frigate; rival military exercises involving Turkey, Greece, Cyprus, Italy and France; the Greek ratification of a maritime accord between Greece and Egypt; Greece's announcement of its intention to purchase 18 French-made Rafale warplanes; and the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) authorities' announcement of plans to open the city of Varosha, abandoned as part of past peace agreements.
- **Latest developments:** On October 1st, NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, announced that a bilateral military de-confliction mechanism designed to reduce the risk of incidents and accidents in the Eastern Mediterranean had been established. It includes the creation of a hotline between Greece and Turkey to facilitate de-confliction at sea or in the air. Following this announcement, the Secretary General travelled to Turkey on October 5, where he met President Erdogan, and to Greece on October 6, where he met Prime Minister Mitsotakis.
- European Council President Michel has also reiterated his call for a multilateral conference on the Eastern Mediterranean to tackle issues such as maritime delimitations, security, migration, economic development, and energy. Discussions are still at a very preliminary stage with respect to modalities and participants for the Conference, but Global Affairs officials have already signalled Canada's interest in being engaged in the event.
- On October 6, Turkish President Erdogan, in a joint news conference with Turkish Cypriot officials, announced that the beaches of Varosha, closed since 1974, would be reopened as of October 8. The EU has expressed its deep concern about the plan, noting that this will increase tensions and could "complicate the resumption of Cyprus settlement talks". The UN Secretary General has also expressed his concerns about "unilateral actions" and their potential to heighten tensions. Cypriot officials, meanwhile, have said they will launch formal protests at the UN, in the EU, and in other multilateral organizations.

#### Syrian Consular Case:

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#### PR Case


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## CANADA-TURKEY BILATERAL

Canada's relationship with Turkey is complex. Turkey is an invaluable, but [REDACTED] ally. Engagements have increased over the past two years. Relations are on a broadly positive trend with irritants related to export permits, Alamos (mining concession), some consular issues, and Turkish concerns about a lack of sufficient high-level political contact.

If we are seeking to diversify our partnerships, Turkey is a good choice. Turkey is an important NATO ally with significant influence on key Canadian interests like anti-Daesh efforts, the Canada-led NATO Mission in Iraq, and especially global migration / refugee issues (as the world's largest host of refugees).

Turkey also represents NATO's crucial southern flank at a time when Russian expansionism and regional influence are growing. However, [REDACTED]

In recent months, Turkey has been a constructive partner on many fronts, including in providing support for Canada's consular response on the PS 752 crash, support for Canada's search and rescue efforts for a downed Canadian military helicopter, support in Canada's repatriation efforts and on broader COVID-19 related issues, and in shared concern for refugee and migration issues.

**Turkey is Canada's third largest export market for military goods accounting for 6% of exports to all destinations. Canadian exports of military goods and technology to Turkey (2018) stands at CAD \$115.7 million.**

Canada-Turkey bilateral trade grew to \$3.58 billion in 2019, a 48% increase since 2015. Turkey is Canada's third largest export market for military goods. Canadian exports of military goods and technology to Turkey (2019) stands at CAD \$151.4 million, a 215% increase from 2017.

Joint Economic Trade Committee (JETCO): Turkey hosted the first meeting of the JETCO in November 2019 in Istanbul. Most of the messaging from both sides was positive, reflecting the shared sense that the bilateral trade relationship has room to significantly grow. During the government-to-government session, Turkey reiterated long standing asks for an FTA and FIPA, its concerns with several Canadian anti-dumping rulings on Turkish products while Canada raised concerns around market access and the lack of predictability in the granting of mining permits. Canadian and Turkish officials are actively preparing a ministerial level JETCO that Canada is expected to host next spring.



Turkey is a growing source of international students with 4735 students holding valid student visa as of December 31, 2019, a 116% increase from 2015 and has been identified as part of Canada's International Education Strategy as one of 11 priority markets in an effort to diversify the source of foreign students coming to Canada.

### **Turkey's Foreign Policy**

Turkish foreign policy has become increasingly pragmatic and assertive. It seeks to achieve strategic autonomy and prioritizes transactional and compartmentalized cooperation to achieve immediate interests – as seen with Russia. Turkey would like to be internationally recognized as an important, influential regional and global actor; in the words of President Erdoğan: “the world is bigger than five” (referring to the UNSC Permanent Five). Domestic concerns are major drivers in Turkish foreign policy. Key among these drivers is the perceived existential threat of Kurdish separatism, particularly the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).

### **Syria**

Turkey's objectives in Syria are twofold: counter and diminish the presence of the People's Protection Units (YPG), which it views as the Syrian-branch of the PKK; and, preserve the stability of its border areas in order to prevent a further influx of migration. To that end, Turkey has launched four major military operations in Syria since 2016, helping to defeat Daesh but also preventing the YPG from establishing a contiguously controlled area across Northern Syria. Turkey pursued these operations even when, as in the case of October 2019, it was criticised by countries (including Canada) for potentially undermining the enduring defeat of Daesh – leading to Canada imposing a full ban on new export permits and other countries to restrict military exports. However, its most recent military operation in February 2020 was crucial in preventing the Assad regime from recapturing Idlib, which would have triggered a massive humanitarian crisis. Turkey and Russia agreed to a ceasefire for Idlib on 5 March. The ceasefire has been mostly sustained, although there are increasing daily breaches.

Idlib remains one of the last major areas outside regime control. It now hosts an estimated 3.5 million civilians, the vast majority of whom are internally displaced from elsewhere in Syria as a result of the decade-long conflict. Control of the Idlib pocket is complex with various armed factions active, and now with a vastly increased presence of Turkish military forces. International Crisis Group (ICG) estimates that there are now approximately 12,800 Turkish troops on the ground, working in coordination with the armed opposition factions although competing reports estimate up to 21,000 troops. In addition, the area hosts an estimated 10,000-15,000 fighters from extremist groups, such as Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). The governance of Idlib province falls primarily to under HTS' control.

### **Libya**

Over the past two years, Libya has emerged as another theatre of geopolitical competition by powerful regional and global actors, with Russia, Egypt and the UAE supporting the Libyan National Army (LNA), led by Khalifa Haftar, while Turkey and Qatar supported the U.N. recognized Government of National Accord (GNA), led by Fayaz al Sarraj. Turkey has remained a steadfast supporter of the GNA government throughout the conflict, including with the likely provision of military supplies to GNA forces. A December 2019 U.N. Panel of Experts Report found that Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones, and possibly one Karayel drone, were exported to Libya, for use by the GNA (predating a December 2019 security arrangement), in violation of the arms embargo on Libya.

Libya's conflict intensified in April 2019 when the LNA launched a military campaign to wrest control of Tripoli away from the UN-recognized GNA. In December 2019, Turkey reached two significant deals with the GNA: one for maritime delimitation of the Eastern Mediterranean and the other for a security

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arrangement. As a result of the security agreement, the GNA formally requested Turkey to militarily intervene on its behalf. Turkey began sending military equipment, including drones, and military advisors, while also facilitating the transfer of possibly up to 16,500 Syrian fighters (recruited from various armed opposition groups) to Libya in support of the GNA. It has been widely reported that Turkish [REDACTED] drones were instrumental in helping the GNA to push back LNA forces from Tripoli in May 2020.

Author's name/division/tel.: ECE/Akkouche

Consulted divisions/departments: ECE/TIE/TIR/IGR/ESA/ANKRA/ISTBL

Approving ADM: EGM

Name and symbol of departmental officer attending/tel.: