SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Wednesday, October 29, 2003

¼

1835

The Clerk of the Committee (Mr. Richard Rumas)

Mr. Lynn Myers (Waterloo—Wellington, Lib.)

The Clerk

The Clerk

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

Deputy Commissioner Garry Loeppky (Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

¼

1840

¼

1845

The Chair

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.)

Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.)

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

¼

1850

Mr. John McKay

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Assistant Commissioner Richard Proulx (Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police)

¼

1855

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mr. Geoff Regan

½

1900

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Geoff Regan

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mr. Geoff Regan

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mr. Geoff Regan

A/Commr Richard Proulx

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Geoff Regan

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Geoff Regan

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

½

1905

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

½

1910

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

A/Commr Richard Proulx

½

1915

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.)

½

1920

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

½

1925

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mrs. Marlene Jennings

The Chair

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. John McKay

A/Commr Richard Proulx

½

1930

Mr. John McKay

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mr. John McKay

A/Commr Richard Proulx

Mr. John McKay

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

A/Commr Richard Proulx

½

1935

The Chair

½

1940

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

The Chair

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

The Chair

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

A/Commr Richard Proulx

½

1945

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

½

1950

Mr. Geoff Regan

A/Commr Richard Proulx

D/Commr Garry Loeppky

Mr. Geoff Regan

The Chair

A/Commr Richard Proulx

The Chair

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CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 011

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Wednesday, October 29, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¼  (1835)  

[English]

    The Clerk of the Committee (Mr. Richard Rumas): Honourable members, I see a quorum. Your first item of business is the election of the chair.

    Mr. Myers.

    Mr. Lynn Myers (Waterloo—Wellington, Lib.): I nominate Derek Lee.

    An hon. member: I second.

    The Clerk: Seconders aren't necessary.

    Are there any other nominations? If there are no other nominations, is it the will of the committee to adopt the motion?

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Clerk: I declare Derek Lee chair of the committee and ask him to take the chair.

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): Colleagues, thank you again for manifesting your confidence in the chair. We'll proceed with our meeting. In the event we require vice-chair elections later, we'll deal with that at a subsequent meeting.

    We have with us this evening Deputy Commissioner Loeppky of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Assistant Commissioner Richard Proulx. We've asked these witnesses to come, colleagues, so we could address matters related to RCMP operations in gathering intelligence, mostly with reference to counterterrorism in a way that at least I, and perhaps some others, have referred to as possible mission creep.

    Following September 11, the RCMP has been asked to take on a huge new piece of work, although they have always operated in the intelligence gathering envelope. Now we in Parliament are in a position of wanting to assess if the force and its partners are going about this in the right way. Your chair will have some questions, but I'll go to members. If either of our witnesses have any opening remarks, we'd be pleased to hear them first.

    Deputy Commissioner Garry Loeppky (Operations, Royal Canadian Mounted Police): Thank you, Mr. Chair, I have a brief opening statement, after which we would certainly be delighted to answer any questions you may have. My notes start off with “good afternoon”, but I think I'll change that to good evening, and thank you for the opportunity of meeting with you.

    Mr. Chair, as you've mentioned, our objective today is to provide some clarification and some responses to concerns you may have, and it is to highlight the RCMP's integrated national security enforcement teams, otherwise known as INSETs, and to describe our overall role in national security and how we work with CSIS. This is to expand upon the RCMP's appearance before this subcommittee on September 24. The purpose for highlighting these particular areas is to further help you understand the RCMP's serious commitment to its law enforcement and investigative function and to developing key partnerships and initiatives to enhance national security.

    Prior to September 11, the RCMP's federal policing role focused primarily on organized crime activity. However, we also had a responsibility for national security investigations under the Security Offences Act. Following September 11, Canada enacted specific legislative measures that provided investigative tools and created new terrorism offences. In particular, Canada has created new criminal offences that specifically target terrorist support activities. The RCMP remains directly responsible for conducting criminal investigations pertaining to terrorist activities and threats to national security.

    In terms of the INSETs themselves, the integrated national security teams, to help accommodate these legislative changes the RCMP has refocused its national security investigative efforts by creating integrated national security enforcement teams as well as integrated border enforcement teams for border protection and integrated immigration enforcement teams.

    Let me clarify the INSET role. The purpose of the integrated security enforcement teams is to focus on any threats related to our national security, including those that may involve chemical, biological, radiological, and/or nuclear means. INSETs are comprised of representatives from the RCMP, federal partners, and agencies such as CCRA, Customs, Immigration, CSIS, and provincial and municipal police services. These teams are currently operating in Vancouver, Toronto, Ottawa, and Montreal. Overall, INSETs enable an enhanced investigative capacity with regard to national security threats. They increase the capacity for collection, sharing, and analysis of intelligence among partners with respect to people who pose a threat to Canada's security, and they enhance partner agencies' collective ability to combat security threats and meet all specific mandated responsibilities. These teams will ensure that any entity posing a threat to Canada is dealt with at the earliest possible stage and with the most appropriate tools available to disrupt any actual or intended threats.

    I will now describe our role in national security.

    The RCMP has a dual role in countering threats to Canada's security. We are the law enforcement agency with the primary responsibility for investigating crimes that threaten Canada's national security, and we also have a criminal intelligence role that supports both those investigations and our protective policing mandate. The federal government's anti-terrorism act will be instrumental in conducting national security investigations. As I mentioned earlier, this legislation has been developed to specifically focus on terrorists and any organizations that support their cause. Under the anti-terrorism act, law enforcement has been provided with new investigative tools to enable agencies such as the RCMP to take preventive measures to weed out terrorist cells and organizations supporting these cells. More specifically, this important legislation provides Canadian law enforcement agencies with an enhanced ability to combat terrorism, particularly in the area of terrorist financing.

    The RCMP recognizes that terrorism is a matter of grave concern to all Canadians and is committed to applying these new comprehensive measures to protect Canadians against terrorist activity while respecting individual rights and freedoms under the charter. The new legislation also better enables the RCMP to work more effectively with our international law enforcement partners in crippling financial capabilities of terrorist organizations. This in turn will significantly impact their ability to recruit, train, and provide logistical support to potential terrorists.

¼  (1840)  

    The RCMP must operate on a global scale when it comes to eradicating terrorism. Our approach is based on the timely and relevant sharing of intelligence with our partner organizations. No one nation or organization has the resources to do it alone. We must work together by sharing valuable resources and integrating our efforts in an appropriate and effective fashion.

    We will continue to cooperate on initiatives that will improve security at our borders and ports of entry. Overall, in protecting our national security, as well as in supporting our immigration system, the RCMP is committed to integrating its investigative, technical, and scientific resources with key domestic and international law enforcement and government partners.

    With respect to the relationship with CSIS, I should first state that there is a fundamental difference between our respective agencies. The RCMP is a police service that has a mandate to keep the peace and to investigate and enforce the laws of this country, including the prevention of the commission of offences where possible. The RCMP does not have any mandate separate from this stated mandate to collect and report security and intelligence for its own sake, such as that provided, for example, by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, which provides that authority to CSIS.

    CSIS is a security intelligence agency that fundamentally exists to report this type of information to government. By contrast, the RCMP's primary purpose in this area is to collect intelligence with a view to preventing crime, to conduct investigations leading to the laying of charges, and giving evidence to the courts. What determines our collection of intelligence is whether something is illegal, not whether it pertains to national security.

    Given our respective roles, the RCMP and CSIS have a shared role with respect to protecting the national security of Canadians. The RCMP has a primary responsibility for the investigation of any crime that may constitute a threat to national security pursuant to the Criminal Code or other statutes.

    The relationship between the RCMP and CSIS is one of professional cooperation. The RCMP and CSIS share information, intelligence, and operational support with the respective security-related responsibilities of the other agency. Together this cooperation strengthens Canada's ability to investigate, prosecute, and prevent terrorist activities.

    We continue to seek new opportunities to enhance this level of cooperation. As an example, the new secondment program involves the exchange of management and regional level CSIS employees between the RCMP's criminal intelligence directorate, under the command of Assistant Commissioner Richard Proulx, and the service's counterterrorism branch.

    This concludes my opening statement, Mr. Chair. I would welcome any questions that you or the committee members may have.

¼  (1845)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Commissioner Loeppky. Your statement gives a good start. It brackets the area of concern the committee has indicated.

    I'll start with questions, and I'll go first to Mr. McKay.

    I'm wondering about the length of the rounds, so we'll just do seven-minute rounds.

    Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): There are three basic agencies that gather intelligence in this country--RCMP, CSIS, and Immigration Canada. One of them is supervised by SIRC, and that's CSIS. As you rightly state, the RCMP is primarily a police force. Immigration Canada, obviously, has other duties.

    It's right and proper that you share information among the various agencies--we all agree with that--but we do seem to be developing a bit of a bizarre anomaly in this country, and that is that there is no supervisory entity that evaluates the activities of Immigration Canada or the RCMP with respect to intelligence gathering.

    The last time this committee met, we had a strange experience of Immigration Canada talking about the 19 or 22 or whatever number of people they had rounded up, and if you read the newspaper reports, it was based on intelligence they had gathered both here and abroad. The impression the newspaper reports left you with was that it was a concern of national security that these people be detained. However, CSIS said they weren't involved in the securing of that intelligence. In fact, they went on to say that not only did they not participate in the securing of that intelligence, they had no interest in the intelligence that had been gathered by Immigration Canada.

    I'm assuming, although I don't know, that the RCMP was in a similar position to CSIS and that they had not participated in the gathering of that intelligence, either here or abroad, and similarly had no interest in the intelligence that had been gathered by Immigration Canada.

    The significant difference is that Immigration Canada is not supervised by anybody in terms of gathering that intelligence. Similarly, the RCMP is not supervised by anybody in terms of gathering that intelligence.

    I'm wondering whether we've opened ourselves up to some legislative anomaly and whether we should be concerned that there be a oversight body on both the RCMP and Immigration Canada with respect to gathering of intelligence. I don't pretend to know how to do that.

    Obviously, you can't comment on Immigration Canada, but I'd certainly be interested in your comments with respect to oversight on RCMP intelligence-gathering activities.

    Mr. Geoff Regan (Halifax West, Lib.): Your time's up. He has three seconds to answer.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Perhaps with respect to the arrest of the individuals you're referring to, I might have Assistant Commissioner Proulx speak to that issue.

    I just want to start by saying that when you speak about SIRC and its responsibilities with respect to CSIS, it does truly have an oversight responsibility. It has an oversight responsibility because very rarely, if ever, would anything that CSIS does go to an open court process or be disclosed to the public. That's the nature of security intelligence work, which I understand. When they undertake to collect security intelligence, it is very rare that it would ever be disclosed in any type of format.

    The RCMP, on the other hand, collects criminal intelligence with the objective of initiating criminal prosecutions, which then obviously have full disclosure through the court process. In addition, a number of the legislative pieces in place, such as Bill C-36, have their own internal review mechanisms that are required when pieces of that application are applied. For example, if there's a preventative arrest, then first of all it requires the consent of the Attorney General of Canada. It also requires the individual to appear in front of a judge and be represented by a lawyer within 24 hours. So there are built-in mechanisms to do that.

    It's also important to note that the RCMP has a review body known as the Commission for Public Complaints. That body can either respond to complaints from members of the public or in some cases initiate a public review process or public interest investigation on its own and come up with recommendations.

    When I think back to recent history, the APEC review in British Columbia was an example where the Commission for Public Complaints called a public inquiry and did a very thorough review.

    So there's the court process; the commissioner's accountability to the minister; the Commission for Public Complaints, which has a wide scope of authority; and there are other review mechanisms, like the Privacy Commissioner, which have full access to how we operate.

    I think the fundamental difference is in the mandates. Ours is criminal law enforcement, accountable to the courts, full disclosure, and SIRC has a review body.

¼  (1850)  

    Mr. John McKay: But you're both fishing in the same pond, and intelligence and criminal evidence are not necessarily discrete silos. I appreciate that your objective, your mandate, is to gather criminal intelligence for the purpose of prosecution, but in the process you also gather intelligence, and intelligence, of course, is not necessarily evidence.

    That silo, if you will, of security intelligence is not really adequately supervised if you are relying on the commissioner's relationship to the minister. It somehow or other doesn't fall within a public complaints process, because it is necessarily material that requires some sensitivity. And certainly, if it's never going to be used in a court process, it never sees the light of day in an open public forum.

    So in outlining the various public protection mechanisms that you think are there, I put it to you that they're not really there for the intelligence you may gather as, if you will, a by-product of a criminal investigation.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: It's important, I think, to differentiate between...the intelligence that is gathered by CSIS is for national security, while we are always focused on criminal intelligence. Where that impacts on or relates to national security, it is fully and totally shared with CSIS. The reverse is not necessarily true, because they have information that is not of a criminal nature and therefore is not shared back with us.

    But on the objective, why we collect intelligence, we recognize that every bit of that information that's collected ultimately will be subject to scrutiny--that's the intent--through the courts respecting charter issues and those types of things. So there's a different objective in our collecting that.

    Assistant Commissioner Richard Proulx (Criminal Intelligence Directorate, Royal Canadian Mounted Police): To add to Deputy Loeppky's comments, we don't collect security intelligence. That's the business of CSIS and other agencies with respect to security. We do collect criminal intelligence in support of our criminal investigations or our protective duties. That's all criminal intelligence.

    You're right, sometimes we do have intelligence that we will not go to court with, and rightfully so, because intelligence doesn't mean it's evidence. Normally, we're trying to transform that intelligence into evidence to go to court, but that's not always the case. Actually, sometimes it's unfounded and we close the file.

¼  (1855)  

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Mr. Sorenson, do you want to go now or do you want to wait for a minute?

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): Yes, I'll wait.

    The Chair: Mr. Regan, seven minutes.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Gentlemen, thank you for coming this evening and for waiting for us so patiently.

    Let me ask you about the intelligence-led approach to policing that the RCMP has adopted in recent years and how it has changed the way you work, how it compares to the traditional means of policing, and what success it has brought you.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Perhaps I'll provide some opening comments. Assistant Commissioner Proulx is kind of the creator of that philosophy that has now been adopted certainly North America-wide.

    Intelligence-led policing is the concept of ensuring that when you undertake investigations you already have a solid intelligence base of the activities of that particular group you're targeting. How that translates into the bigger picture is that as we collect criminal intelligence we're able to develop a picture of what is the real crime threat in Canada, what are the biggest threats in terms of organized crime groups, what is the impact on society, on the economy, their potential for violence.

    What that allows us to do is to get that big picture of the true threat and the potential of organized crime, recognizing that we have, like every other government department, limited resources and the need to dedicate those resources to the very highest priorities. We have a sophisticated tool that we use; it evaluates crime threats based on 17 characteristics, things such as I mentioned--violence, threat to the community's economy, a whole lot of things--and we actually scientifically look at that and say “This is the biggest threat to Canada”.

    We meet annually, and based on that strategic threat assessment we identify tactical priorities and commence investigations on those, recognizing that investigations may take some time. There was a recent partial release that's been in the newspapers over the last several days, and that is what the intelligence-led approach allows you to do, to really identify the key threats and then to take tactical action.

    Richard, do you have anything else? You invented the model, so....

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: You covered it very well.

    The intelligence process is a bottom-up process, so definitely now people on the street are providing us with information at the divisional level, a division being a province normally. Then, of course, that comes to us at a national level and we analyse what started the trends and all that, and then we propose intelligence priorities, strategic priorities. People validate those strategic priorities--I'm talking here about organized crime, of course--and then we view the technical priorities with the assistance of the criminal operations officers in the province. Those are the persons in charge of the operations in each of the provinces, 14 operational divisions. And then we set national priorities.

    Of course, in the divisions they have to set their own divisional priorities. Being intelligence-led, as you know, the police are often reactive and need to be reactive on certain calls because we need to focus on the right targets by doing the priorities and setting up.

    We have a tool we use to measure the threat on the organization or on the individuals, by which we validate the process and pick the highest targets on the scale. We then decide whether we'll put money on these organizations and investigate them at a national level.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: You said there are 70 components of this that you go through.

½  (1900)  

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: No, 17 components.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: And you do weigh them. I mean, do you give them a point for each...? How do you do that?

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: That's by order of priorities--for example, violence. If that organization is deemed to be violent, committing murders and all that, corruption--those are among the 17 descriptors we use--then of course we range them, and the top, when all of the line is read, are the ones that are most important to us.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: What benefits have you seen from the adoption of this system's approach?

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: I think in Canada, actually, all police forces are using that tool now. We're all working together in an integrated fashion on most of the major organizations we have in Canada. Actually, we have extended that to other countries, such as the U.S., to have joint targeting on priorities. So that's where we are now.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: I take it that you've done so because of benefits you've seen, obviously.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: I think the benefits, as you have seen, are some of the cases that went to court, the méga-querelle, especially in Quebec among the bikers last year and the year before. So that was a big success.

    We have other successes that happen throughout the year, such as happened last year in Toronto with other organized crime groups. So we do have success.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Perhaps I could give you one excellent example. Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, which the RCMP contributes to and all of the other police forces in Canada contribute to, provide that comprehensive picture. We don't police in Toronto, we don't police in downtown Montreal, although we have resources there.

    Criminal Intelligence Service Canada brings all of that information together, so for the very first time this last year we had one strategic threat assessment on organized crime for all of Canada. It included all jurisdictions. The objective is to undertake tactical operations in an integrated way, ensuring that all the law enforcement bodies, including the Halifax Police Service, Toronto, and so on, are all focused on the highest priorities.

    I think that's what Canadians expect.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Let me ask you about the times when you receive security intelligence information from CSIS. Can you give us some indication--I don't know if you can give us examples--of how you use that, how that comes to you, how it works, and what benefits you see from that?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: When we receive information from CSIS it is information that relates to criminal activity that is either taking place or that may take place. It is not security intelligence, the way that CSIS describes it, but they undertake a number of investigations, and occasionally those investigations will reveal significant criminal activity. At that point it is handed off to the RCMP to conduct the criminal law enforcement and the investigation of that information.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Do they not share with you the security aspects of the information? They share with you only the part that relates to what you're doing criminally, in terms of criminal investigations.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: It's the criminality portion that is shared with us. We respect their mandate that requires them to protect a significant amount of information that relates only to national security.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Are there measures...? Okay, my time is up.

    The Chair: It is, but go ahead.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Are there measures you take to bury information that is special in terms of protecting parts of the information received from them? You're saying there's not security information, but there's got to be some things that are on the boundary sometimes, or in a grey area, I suppose. Are there special measures you have to take from time to time to protect some of the information you get from CSIS?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: You have hit on a challenge that we occasionally have, and that is that CSIS may uncover information that is of a criminal nature but the source simply cannot be revealed or compromised. Given that we undertake criminal investigations where full disclosure is required pursuant to case law, we occasionally need to be very careful about whether we can actually use that criminal information, given that we simply can't compromise the source.

    Now, we have received some new legislation that allows us or will give us a greater protection of that information, but if it's a very sensitive source, obviously CSIS has concerns and rightfully so.

½  (1905)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Regan.

    Mr. Sorenson or Ms. Jennings.

    Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I have a couple of quick questions.

    I apologize for not being here for your presentation. Actually, the RCMP was putting on a reception at the other end, so I was able to be over there.

    A couple of months ago, it might even be six or seven months ago now, after the Iraq confrontation, there was a rumour. I don't know if it was ever official or if there was any official request made. There was some indication that the RCMP may be asked to send a group of officers to Iraq to help set up policing or to help form some type of law and order over there.

    Did we go over there? How many did we send? How long did they last?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: The RCMP was invited by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to participate in a fact-finding mission to Iraq. We identified two experienced peacekeepers, one of a very senior rank, who went over to Iraq in the company of an American contingent and some other partners from Canada.

    They did an assessment. They were there for approximately one month. The assessment consisted of looking at what it will take to establish a policing service that is based on democratic principles and that understands the rule of law.

    After one month of assessment they came back, and they were in the process of preparing a deployment plan when the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad was bombed, approximately two months ago. The deployment was put on hold.

    There are currently discussions now to revisit that and continue on with it, depending on what the security environment is not only in Baghdad but in Iraq proper. It is still a very unstable environment, as you know.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Are you allowed to carry a firearm when you're over there?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: In most peacekeeping missions we do not carry firearms. In Iraq it is somewhat of a different situation because at this point it is not a United Nations mission. You'll have to forgive me, I forget the terminology of what the mission is called, but it is not under the UN umbrella at this stage. The rules will vary there a little bit. We'll make that decision when the deployment takes place.

    I do believe that other countries are arming their potential deployments. If that is the accepted practice, then we will probably follow suit.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: If that is the accepted practice, you would expect that you would then be able to carry a firearm when you're in Iraq.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: If that's the mission—I don't want to call it “the mission”. If those are the guiding rules of the mission that are established and if we deploy there, then we would respect the rules that are set in place. Yes, we would carry firearms if others were and if those were the rules of the game, so to speak.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Right now in Canada we have about 15,000 RCMP officers, give or take a little bit.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: That's correct.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Now, 9,000 of those officers would be for community policing.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: About 9,500, I believe, yes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Okay. Out of the 6,000 or 5,500 who would be left, the commissioner, or I can't remember who it was, suggested that there could have been 2,000 taken off other duties and used during the anti-terrorism threats and all that.

    How are we doing as far as the domestic policing? If we take 2,000 police officers who are being dedicated to the anti-terrorism file, or to what you've talked about, the criminal intelligence directorate, is that part of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada? Is that what you're the director of?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: That falls in my area, but that is really only a criminal intelligence collection service.

    Immediately after 9/11 there were approximately 2,000 people redeployed. They were redeployed to those areas that required immediate attention, things like additional protective measures for diplomats, enhanced security around buildings, and dedicating resources to information that was coming in, both domestically and from foreign partners, in great quantities.

    We needed to respond quickly. We deployed not from the 9,500 front-line uniform people, but primarily from the federal units, those units that are dedicated to fighting organized crime and are dedicated to other types of initiatives.

    It was only a temporary deployment, because quite quickly the RCMP was provided with a budget increase of $576 million. That has allowed us to deploy resources to the INSETs, the integrated national security enforcement teams that were created, the IBETs, the immigration teams, additional people involved in intelligence, and additional people involved in technical support.

    Today, the impact of 9/11 and the ongoing investigations are really minimal in terms of front-line policing issues.

½  (1910)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: The $500 million extra that was given was over how long a period of time?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: It was five years, I believe.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Over five years.

    One of the concerns that has come from one of our good senators in the last couple of days is that although there has been a redeployment of RCMP officers to certain files, it certainly hasn't been at the ports or on our coastlines. There are some major concerns we have, not only with the terrorists or the terrorist element but also with the organized crime element.

    Can you tell me, out of the $500 million over the next five years that is being made available to the RCMP, how many more officers will that put on the streets? How many more people would be put into what I would call those high-risk areas of coastlines and ports?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: It equates to, I believe, 448 additional human resources in the force. That, of course, is split between the different initiatives. I do know that we have enhanced the number of people working in the ports, whether that's in Montreal or in the port of Halifax, but we've done it in a different way to what we would have traditionally done.

    Traditionally, we would have plugged-in resources. We now have really taken an integrated approach in those areas. While the RCMP has not put in all the resources, Canada Customs has put in additional resources as a result of some of their funding, as has immigration. We have municipal partners that are actually involved. It's a more effective way, I think, of trying to deal with the ports, both the marine ports and the airports.

    Having said that, though, I'll turn to Richard. It was under his pen, and ultimately my accountability, that the most recent threat assessment was produced. I think in the release documents they actually refer to some concerns around the ports. I think Senator Kenny in his report has also referred to some concerns.

    Richard, did you want to comment on that?

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: I have a point of clarification, Mr. Chair. I'm the assistant commissioner responsible for the RCMP criminal intelligence program. You have the Canadian Intelligence Service Canada, which is separate from me, but I'm a member of that, as are other police forces. The Canadian Intelligence Service Canada is a chapeau for all law enforcement in Canada.

    With respect to your questions, we receive funding for national security. We created the integrated border enforcement teams, and we have 14 of them.

    With respect to the ports, to answer your questions, we have put more resources into dealing with some investigations in the ports, be it in Halifax, Montreal, or Vancouver, with respect to organized crime. The ports are a priority for us. That's one of our strategic priorities, actually, for this year and even for next year. Yes, we have put additional resources, maybe not directly into the ports, but into dealing with the ports.

½  (1915)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Can I just have 30 seconds?

    The Chair: Why not?

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You know, it never ceases to amaze me that every time we have the commissioner or you gentlemen come forward, it's never a resource problem. Very seldom do we hear that you aren't getting enough. Even the $500 million was made accessible. But every time I talk to the RCMP officers out there on the street or the RCMP officers who are involved in these files, I'm telling you, all I hear about is resourcing problems.

    When we ask the commissioner, he says, well, we're quite pleased with the extra money we've been given, but yes, we're now risk managing, and we aren't even able to investigate a lot of the organized crime, other crime, any more; it's put on the back burner.

    I don't know. With the whole politicization of the police, with the commissioner as a deputy minister, certainly somewhere down the road.... I think Judge Hughes in the APEC report talked a lot about the politicization of the RCMP. I can tell you one of the most frustrating things I find here is that we hear everything is rosy, everything is going good, and we just know that when you talk to the rank and file, it isn't.

    I think the whole idea of this commissioner, for whom I have a great deal of respect, being a deputy minister is something that somewhere down the road has to be addressed.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: If I could just clarify, he's a deputy head, which is slightly different, I think, from a deputy minister. I don't want to get into a debate, but he is very much accountable to the Solicitor General for the good governance of the RCMP. In terms of operations, it's quite clear that he's accountable to the courts. That's where his accountability lies, and that's obviously under common law for very specific reasons.

    But I do want to pick up on a point. When I talked earlier about our model, in terms of how we figure out what we're going to do, the members out in the field--and I know many members out there; I spent most of my career out there--state that absolutely, there is a tremendous amount of work. There is more work than they can do completely.

    But I believe something we don't bring enough understanding about out there is that we live in an environment where there is an expectation that we'll do the very best with what we have, that we live in an environment with health care, with education, and there are a lot of other pressures on tax dollars. That's why we have to manage the organization smarter. We have to demonstrate value for results. We have to focus on the highest-level threats. We have to build partnerships so that we're not working in stovepipes and we have the other partners on board--the IBETs--that we have all the other federal government departments on board, that we have CSIS working with us, and by using that approach we're more effective.

    Are we dealing with every known organized crime group out there? No, we aren't. Are we dealing with the highest-level threats? Yes. In between somewhere, unfortunately, there is a cutoff where we have to risk manage and say right now we can't deal with these groups; we have to focus our energies.

    So I recognize that there are concerns, and it's our job as leaders, I think, to demonstrate that we're managing the organization within the parameters that have been set as well as we can, independently--in terms of identifying the targets we take on--and doing a good job at it and respecting Canadian's rights.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

    Mrs. Jennings.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you very much for your presentation.

    I want to come back to the integrated models, the INSETs, the IBETs, the immigration integrated team you have, and a point that my colleague Mr. McKay raised about the oversight.

    One of the concerns we have in Parliament in other areas, and it's also been raised by the Auditor General, is with the government's tendency to create these outside agencies where there's no audit authority by the Auditor General, for instance, no governance that would report directly back to Parliament.

    I'm not suggesting that's the case with these integrated models, but Mr. McKay certainly raised the fact that while there is some form of oversight of the RCMP, and there's definite oversight through SIRC of CSIS, some of your other partners, whether it's Customs and Revenue or Immigration, have no independent, outside oversight of their investigative authority, and in some cases their arrest and detention authority, what we would call law enforcement authority.

    I'd be interested in knowing how that fits when you're working with partners that are not subject to the same level of oversight and governance that you are. It has to be very difficult. Is it not somewhat similar to when you go to other countries, like Haiti, where I know the RCMP has done a great job in terms of training, trying to train the Haitian police forces, and you're going into an environment where some of the basic notions of oversight don't even exist? How do you deal with it, or do you deal with it? Is it addressed within your integrated model?

½  (1920)  

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: First of all, the integrated teams, whether it's the INSETs or the IBETs, all fall under the leadership of the RCMP. They're led by members of the RCMP, who obviously must adhere to the RCMP policies and directions in terms of how investigations are done, the training in terms of respect for charter rights.

    They also conduct investigations, and during investigations you're subject to scrutiny by various judicial authorities, whether you're looking at wire taps, which are supported by the judges...but ultimately, when you're looking at bringing a case for criminal prosecution.

    Our partners have to understand that you need to operate within parameters that will withstand the scrutiny of the courts today. That is the premise upon which every investigation is undertaken. You start that investigation expecting to go to court, ensuring the test will be met in terms of admissibility of evidence. The last thing you want to do is spend two years on a file to have it thrown out because you didn't respect somebody's charter rights or you violated a principle.

    I mentioned a little earlier there are various internal review mechanisms within the legislation provided. I would also say that with respect to things like Bill C-36, the Anti-terrorism Act, there's a requirement for tabling an annual report in Parliament in terms of its usage. And there's a three-year review, I think, by Parliament in terms of the renewal of that legislation.

    Bill C-24, which was provided about a year and a half ago, speaks to our ability to undertake organized crime investigations, to allow undercover operations to take place. We also have a tabling of that report that's required in Parliament, as well as a number of review mechanisms.

    So in terms of the integrated teams, we hold our people accountable to ensure the investigations are undertaken in a way that's going to address the principles of the charter and respect for people's rights. If there are incidents where that's not occurring, then we deal with the host agency.

    When we talk about the IBETs, for example, there are a number of joint management teams that come right up to the headquarters level, where we'd actually meet with our other counterparts and say we have concerns.

    There are a number of mechanisms to ensure investigations are conducted appropriately.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: When you say “appropriately”, it's not just that the charter rights are respected to ensure the integrity of the evidence you're collecting for a criminal prosecution; it's also that just basic common decency and courtesy--

½  (1925)  

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: We respect people's rights.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Yes, and they're there to support the criminal investigations, be it federal government departments or other law enforcement, such as those at the provincial or municipal level.

    But we also have a two-week course with respect to national security, and we're trying to get most, if not all, of them on that course as well so that they will have the same training as any other RCMP members with respect to national security.

    The rules in those units are rules because we are in charge. The only things we don't deal with, as mentioned by the deputy, are discipline matters. If there are discipline matters, they have to be dealt with by their own department.

    Mrs. Marlene Jennings: Thank you very much.

    I have no further questions.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Jennings.

    I have some questions.

    Colleagues, I thought because we started so late as a result of the voting in the House that we could go on a few minutes longer than 7:30, just a bit. I realize that no one around the table has probably eaten. Perhaps Mr. Sorenson got lucky at the reception, but other than that--

    Mr. Geoff Regan: He got Vegemite.

    The Chair: No, lucky.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Mr. Chair, if he was eating at an RCMP reception, I would have thought they would have provided something here.

    The Chair: Your brothers weren't looking after us.

    All right, there are members undoubtedly who have additional rounds they'd like to get into.

    Mr. McKay.

    Mr. John McKay: My question is shorter than his question. I have two questions.

    The first question has to do with Operation Thread. Can you tell me what the RCMP had to do with Operation Thread, if anything at all?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I'll make a few comments and then Richard will make a few perhaps.

    Operation Thread was an operation that was conducted by the integrated immigration enforcement team, and that was one of the initiatives that was funded pursuant to 9/11. It's a team that's comprised of Immigration Canada employees and RCMP employees. There are teams that are located in Montreal, Toronto, and Vancouver, and the objective of these particular teams is to identify and execute outstanding warrants under the Immigration Act.

    Richard.

    Mr. John McKay: Were you collecting criminal intelligence, or security intelligence, or immigration intelligence?

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Those were warrants on individuals here in Canada, so those were immigration warrants. Of course, we collected intelligence before the arrests. We always do that--conduct background checks and all that, getting the addresses, individual phone numbers, and any licence plates, etc., for the sake of our own protection when we go for the takedown.

    What happened in this case is that it was a joint project between RCMP and Canada Immigration. They received information, as you know, on the school. There was an investigation. Warrants were issued and we were there to assist Immigration with respect to the arrest. It involved not only the RCMP, but on the day of the takedown we also had the assistance of other municipal police forces and the provincial police of Ontario to do that.

    Having said that, we used search warrants. We had enough grounds to use search warrants--and I mentioned that before this committee the last time I was here--under the Criminal Code and the Immigration Act. There were documents seized. There was also other material seized that still needs to be reviewed. We haven't finished the review of all that we have.

    Initially, after a quick review of some of the documents, it was mentioned by the RCMP that there was no security threat to Canada, to our knowledge, although we needed more time to finish the review, and that has not been completed as we speak because there is lots of information in what we seized and it needs to be translated. That's a translation process.

½  (1930)  

    Mr. John McKay: CSIS seems to have dismissed this as having no national security value.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Actually, CSIS was called in. It has reviewed the documents that we have seized and the other materials. We are working together on that. What it came out with, and we stand by that as well, is that there was no information uncovered that said there was a risk for Canada.

    Mr. John McKay: Mr. Alcock seemed to think there wasn't too much interest on the part of CSIS in that material.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Yes, I was here when he said that, actually. He is right, the interest is not there because there is no information.

    Mr. John McKay: I have a quick question on Arar, and then like the rest I have to run.

    How is it that the RCMP ends up sharing intelligence with American authorities on the security risk of Mr. Arar? I would have thought that the appropriate channel there is through CSIS rather than through the RCMP. It goes back to, if you will, my original question. There seems to be a lot of slopover in terms of what intelligence is supervised by SIRC vis-à-vis CSIS, but not RCMP intelligence. Therefore, there is no oversight body on what the RCMP shares with a foreign intelligence service over a citizen's rights in another jurisdiction. I'm curious as to how that kind of situation develops, because it seems to me there's a lot more in play here than what initially appears to be in play.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I can comment on that.

    In any investigation the RCMP is involved in the integrated policing model, the integrated approach, and the sharing of intelligence information, criminal intelligence, is really the lifeblood of any investigation. I'm speaking generally now, but since 9/11, the number of requests we have received from international bodies, primarily the U.S., has gone up at least tenfold or fifteenfold. A lot of that is criminal information that we're expected to review and try to substantiate.

    What I'm saying is there is a regular information exchange between organizations that are involved in criminal investigations that focus on activities of individuals, and we don't comment on the nature of that exchange before charges are brought to the courts for a variety of reasons: to respect the integrity of the investigation, to respect the privacy rights of the individual, to maintain the international respect in terms of doing integrated investigations and ensuring that information we might have received from the U.S. is protected. It's important, in the democracy in which we live, that prior to charges ever being laid, the information is protected--for a whole host of reasons. I can imagine if we started to confirm or deny that we're investigating a particular member of the Hells Angels what consequences that might have for informers, for the other police forces, for our partners. It's important that we understand that there is a need to protect information before criminal charges are laid and it becomes disclosed through the judicial process.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: One thing I would add, Mr. Chair, with your permission, is that any information we have in a national security investigation within the RCMP is shared with CSIS. They have the same information, everything. I would like to emphasize that, and it was mentioned by the deputy. That is everything, except for perhaps a few documents, but that would be the exception.

½  (1935)  

    The Chair: I'm going to jump in here, colleagues, because we've just touched on the area I wanted to raise.

    Pre-9/11, pre-Bill C-36, the Mounties did not gather information on terrorism. They might come across a conspiracy to do a criminal act, an act of violence might involve terror, but after 9/11, after Bill C-36, terrorist activity, terrorist organizations, were folded into the Criminal Code. It became an offence to be a part of a terrorist organization. That became a criminal offence.

    So when you say the RCMP just investigates criminal offences, I understand that, but you're now looking at terrorists. You're looking for them and you're gathering intelligence about terrorists and terrorism. CSIS, pre- and post-9/11, always gathered information about terrorists and terrorism because that was defined as a threat to Canada under section 2 of the CSIS Act.

    So although I understand what you've said--you guys do criminal activity and CSIS does national security threats--you're now chasing an identical target. I'm not saying that's a bad thing, but you're both chasing the same target. If in one case your guys are watching a target, you do it using the normal procedures of the RCMP, or you might use a municipal police force partner, but in no case are there any review mechanisms or monitoring mechanisms the way CSIS has them.

    Now if CSIS is watching the same target, they are controlled by their own TARC mechanism, by SIRC as a review agency, by the Inspector General, which is a review mechanism, by Federal Court warrants. You have none of that. I'm not saying anybody is doing anything wrong here. I'm saying there's a systemic discontinuity here, that the Mounties are now by law doing things they have not done previously because it wasn't in the law for them to do, and things that were removed from the RCMP by the 1984 CSIS Act, which says the Mounties aren't going to do this stuff any more, CSIS will do it, and we'll protect civil liberties while we do it....

    I'm raising that as an issue. And I know the Mounties are doing it, because you've told us you're doing it, and you're supposed to do it and we're safer because you're doing it, but you're doing it outside of a framework that offers the same civil liberty protection as we have with CSIS.

    Second, a corollary, in 1984 CSIS was given the chance of collecting intelligence about threats to the security of Canada. One of those threats was defined loosely in section 2 as subversion; we'll call it subversion, the subversion section. Some years ago, after the predecessor of this committee reported and we did a review of the CSIS Act, subversion was dropped as a routine CSIS operation and they only do subversion on the specific written authorization of the Solicitor General. That's the policy now.

    I want to thank you for providing documents earlier, but in the MOU, the memorandum of understanding, between the RCMP and Citizenship and Immigration, there is in more than one of the annexes a section that says very clearly that the RCMP will exchange information with CIC, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, on money laundering, crimes against humanity, genocide, terrorism, espionage, and subversion. So who the heck is out there gathering intelligence on subversion? It's not CSIS. But this MOU says either you or Immigration are doing subversion investigations and espionage.

    Counterintelligence, CI, is a job of CSIS, not the Mounties. The Mounties were supposed to stop doing CI work when CSIS came into being 19 years ago. So those are the two areas.

    My question has taken up all of five minutes.

½  (1940)  

    Could you please acknowledge that CSIS and the Mounties are now, properly in law, looking at the same terrorist targets, something that's going to have to be managed?

    Secondly, I want you to explain where this subversion and espionage came from in this MOU.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I'll take a step back, very quickly. I think Bill C-26 provided some new legislation that criminalized certain activities that were not criminalized before, things like fundraising and those types of things. It did not give the RCMP new authorities, but gave it new legislation, which we were asked to enforce.

    With respect to the roles of CSIS and the RCMP, there is an area where there may be a perception that there is an overlap. For example, when CSIS uncovers information and it becomes of a criminal nature, at that point it is turned over to the RCMP. There could in fact be an occasion where targets are being monitored, a criminal investigation is being conducted based on the criminality of the group by the RCMP, while CSIS has other interests related to national security.

    In the past, if I can take a step back—I don't want to comment on an ongoing trial, but I do believe that as a result of the evidence that has already come out at the trial on Air India, there has been some discussion about whether the hand-off mechanism was working properly. It was back in 1984 when CSIS had just been stood up.

    I think today that mechanism works very well. When there's criminality identified, that's when it's given to us. There's a lot that isn't given to us. We, on the other hand, ensure that we do share with them.

    I think your question was, what are the roles of CSIS in terms of the review mechanisms? Obviously, there's SIRC and a variety of others. I've commented on some of those and the RCMP already.

    When you look at the number of mechanisms—and I won't bother repeating them—I think the objective of gathering criminal information is with the objective of charging criminally and recognizing that it's going to be subject to a court process.

    I think during those investigations there are a number of things that take place as well. If it's a part VI, for example, then there's oversight by the judge, and at the end of it obviously that accountability to the courts.

    With respect to the MOU, I have to confess to this committee that I didn't realize subversion was actually included in the MOU. It is something obviously that, if I'm not aware of it, I don't think we're doing any investigations in that area.

    I'll have to check on that, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: It's quite possible that the MOU could be 25 years old.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I can say, Mr. Chair, I don't know what the date of that is, but I do know that we signed a new one in the last year and a half, I believe.

    The Chair: Okay. Then it's problematic, I think.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Okay. I've taken note and I will check on that. It bothers me.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Can I provide further comments, Mr. Chair?

    Especially pre-9/11, we were involved in criminal investigations of terrorists. One good case, I think the best case, is Ressam. We were involved in the criminal investigation of Ressam. We had no Bill C-26 at the time, so we weren't investigating him under the Criminal Code for such an offence.

    With respect to your MOU, I guess when we talk about espionage, there is also espionage by criminal activities. At some point in time, that could happen. I haven't seen that for a long time, actually. That could be turned over to the RCMP for the criminal investigation and then the prosecution, if necessary.

½  (1945)  

    The Chair: Okay. I'm not going to pursue that any further. We've opened the issues on the record and we can continue to deal with them as members see fit.

    We'll try to wrap up as quickly as we can now. Are there additional questions?

    Mr. Sorenson has a question and then Mr. Regan.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Do you access the Canadian public safety information network?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Well, it doesn't--

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You're part of that. That is a consolidation of justice and police data systems, including CPIC, right?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Yes. It doesn't fall under my area, but the CPSIN project is actually a model that's under development. There are discussions right now to take that one step further, called the integrated justice initiative, which would actually tie together all police record systems, the broader criminal justice system, to truly have one-stop shopping.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: This is kind of the mechanism that is used for the sharing of information between the federal and provincial agencies. Is that correct?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: With respect to the sharing of intelligence on organized crime, that is done through Criminal Intelligence Service Canada, but what the CPSIN model or--

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Can you access that Canadian public safety information network or CISC?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: CISC is a databank. If you can imagine, there is a criminal intelligence databank, and what CPSIN or the integrated justice initiative is designed to do is to ensure that all the pipes going in there from the various law enforcement communities are hooked together.

    For example, if we were conducting an investigation in Prince George, British Columbia, about a suspect who was bothering children but we hadn't laid criminal charges, and Toronto had investigated that same individual two years before but had not laid criminal charges, currently those police systems don't talk to each other. What the integrated justice initiative is designed to do is to ensure that there is one seamless approach to the sharing of information on police record systems in Canada.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Okay, so we have that system. It's used between agencies--

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I'm sorry, it's not in existence yet; it's proposed.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: The public information network?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: The public information network is what is currently in place, but if you can imagine, not every pipe is plugged in there, so it doesn't really allow the broad sharing of information to the degree that it should.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: But it does allow the sharing of information between the federal and provincial law enforcement agencies and justice agencies, as well as the exchange of information between Canada and the United States, doesn't it?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I don't want to mislead the committee. It's not an area that falls under my responsibility, so I would want to make sure that you're given the right information, and I would want to get the expert here to really describe CPSIN in its fullness.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: But if information on someone--and I believe you mentioned Ahmed Ressam--

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: Yes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You had done some investigative work on him. But if information would have been put into a database on someone like Ahmed Ressam, and if the Canadian public safety information network is also set up to share information not only between justice agencies, law agencies, and federal and provincial law enforcement agencies, but also between Canada and the United States, could that have been where the information on Arar was, in that network, and someone else shared that information?

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: No, I think CPSIN is a vision. It is where we're going, but we're not there. You cannot share information on police occurrence management systems, on record systems that Toronto has, that Montreal has, that the RCMP has. There is no mechanism today to tie those together, and that's what the vision is. So we know where we want to go, we have a plan, we're working on it, but we're not there yet.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Regan.

½  (1950)  

    Mr. Geoff Regan: My question is short.

    I'm just kidding, Kevin. It's all right. It was a good question.

    We talked earlier, and I asked you about the intelligence-led approach you are using now. You talked about how it's used, particularly in cases of organized crime. I'm wondering about other areas where you might use the same approach and how that would work.

    For example, under the Security Offences Act, those kinds of issues where you have diplomats involved, or other terrorist activities, how will you use that approach in those kinds of cases?

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: We use the same process, although it's a little bit different in the system because we are of course dealing with CSIS. CSIS is part of our unit in providing security intelligence and in providing us with leads. Based on their information and our information and that of our other partners at the different levels—municipal and provincial—we are trying to set those priorities. That's a little bit more difficult than the organized crime priorities.

    D/Commr Garry Loeppky: I would also say that the scientific model I talked about a little earlier, Sleipnir, which refers to the 17 categories when we classify where organized crime fits in. It's based on the ability to corrupt, the ability for violence, the ability for profit—17 categories. We've modified that model slightly for national security threats, because generally they might not have the same characteristics. Their ability or their desire to use violence to promote their business is pretty rare, so we're modifying that.

    Mr. Geoff Regan: Thank you.

    Mr. Chairman, there are many other issues that certainly we could talk about, perhaps at another time, but at this point, from my point of view, my hunger for knowledge has been eclipsed by my other hunger.

    The Chair: Yes, you have the right idea.

    Our research table would be interested, if it's possible, in having a précis or a one-pager of this organized crime analytical tool that you've described a couple of times tonight.

    A/Commr Richard Proulx: Absolutely, it's in your booklet.

    The Chair: All right, that's great. Thank you.

    Secondly, if you could make an effort to explain the reason why subversion is shown in the MOU with Citizenship and Immigration, just to clarify where that may have come from, you can do that in a written answer to the clerk when you complete it.

    I apologize for the lateness of our meeting. Thank you very much from all of us for attending and providing good answers. We look forward to seeing you again at some point.

    The meeting is adjourned.