:
Mr. Speaker, I will continue on with the lawful access speech I was providing.
Basically, the growing global nature of crime increases vulnerability as terrorist networks, organized criminal groups and human traffickers all use modern technology to perpetrate crimes and avoid detection. Many criminal organizations are using communication technologies that cannot be easily or lawfully accessed by Canadian law enforcement and national security agencies. Communication networks themselves have become more complex through the rise of mobile and Internet communications, encrypted messaging services, international roaming, service resellers and ever faster network technologies. Generally, these new types of communication services are developed with consumer protection and security in mind, not lawful access, which has created tremendous challenges for investigators. As new technologies shape the way criminals operate, we must ensure that our law enforcement and national security apparatus have the tools and resources necessary to keep up with this changed and changing technical landscape.
In 2009, 2011 and 2012, successive attempts by Conservative governments to modernize Canada's lawful access legislation did not succeed. Over the last 10 years, Liberal governments ignored the issue, which allowed the problem to fester and organized criminals to take over our streets. Canada is currently the only Five Eyes nation without a clear lawful access framework for modern communication. Decades of successive governments have not only let down but actively hindered our law enforcement and national security agencies by failing to provide them with the required legislation to allow for adequate investigative tools and resources needed to keep Canadians safe.
The country's police chiefs have been calling for modernization of Canada's lawful access framework for many years, since as early as 2001. Canada's security and intelligence organizations continue to face significant challenges in successfully obtaining lawful access to communications due to the growing gap between the lawful authority to collect information and the technical capability to do so. In fact, the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police has urged elected officials to “recognise the critical need for amendments to Canada's laws, to address the widening gap between ever-evolving technology and the outdated legislative framework that Canada's policing services must work within.”
Our judicial system is constrained by investigative hurdles, outdated statutes, protracted pretrial and trial litigation and a lack of clarity. In 2018, the director of CSIS described lawful access problems as one of the most significant challenges he had identified to the government.
Three core factors contribute to the challenges faced by law enforcement: the effects of advances in technology, the absence of legislation for intercept capability and the jurisdictional issues arising due to the cross-border nature of digital data.
Our current legislation means police face barriers around seizure authorities, causing investigative delays, sometimes with no way to get access to the information they need. Modernizing Canada's lawful access framework is necessary to remove ambiguity and provide predictability and consistency for police and prosecutors while strengthening transparency and public trust. For these reasons, I personally am very pleased to see this legislation being brought forward as a stand-alone bill, and I support Bill being sent to committee, where it can be carefully studied, scrutinized and reviewed.
Part 1 of Bill aims to facilitate quicker evidence gathering by allowing police officers to demand a yes-or-no answer from telecommunications providers as to whether they provide service to a specific account. It would also create a specific judicial order to compel electronic service providers to give basic identifying information, such as a names, addresses and emails, and would introduce a new mechanism for Canadian judges to authorize requests for subscriber information held by foreign entities. This addition would be an important tool for law enforcement, as cyberspace is not constrained by Canada's domestic border.
In fact, a recent report by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians found that many, if not most, Canadians use digital services from third party companies based outside of Canada. This report also noted that most online child sexual abuse cases involve offshore tech companies. Under current legislation, if digital information is required from a company based outside of Canada, the RCMP may request that information through a mutual legal assistance treaty, commonly known as an MLAT, where one is in place.
For example, if the RCMP requires information from, say, Facebook or Apple, it sends a request to Canada's Department of Justice, which sends the request on to the U.S. Department of Justice. After that request is accepted by the U.S. Department of Justice, an assistant U.S. attorney makes an application before a U.S. judge to obtain a warrant for the information. The FBI can only execute that warrant after it is issued by a U.S. judge. Once the company provides the FBI with the information, it eventually makes its way back to the RCMP via the two justice departments.
Now, even if the legal process is successful, if a company does not have a data retention policy, the content sought by an investigator may be deleted before the investigation request even arrives. According to the RCMP, the MLAT process can take three to six months, delaying investigations while Canadians remain at risk. For example, if someone reports to police a case of extortion occurring, say, on Instagram, it is currently a very lengthy and complicated process for police to obtain the alleged perpetrator's name or IP address because Instagram is a U.S.-based company. Part 1 of Bill would allow police to obtain a warrant to request the IP address from Instagram; then identify which Canadian provider services that IP address, through a yes-or-no response; and finally compel that specific provider to disclose the name, phone number and address linked to the IP address with judicial authorization: a warrant.
By creating a mechanism to authorize these information requests from foreign entities, Bill would provide police with an important tool to seek judicial approval to obtain IP addresses and subscriber names linked to criminal communications routed through international platforms. It would also create a new tool of international co-operation in criminal matters to facilitate obtaining the court-ordered production of specific electronic data at the request of Canada's foreign partners, allowing for better co-operation with our allies. Even with these new production orders and judicial authorizations, these investigative processes often entail extensive work and time. In some cases, the time required to produce information exceeds the length of time that the service provider retains the information, meaning evidence is being purged before police can get the legal authorization to obtain it. Part 1 of Bill would expedite the response to production orders by changing the review period to 10 days, because having prompt access to these telecommunication records is a necessity for investigations.
Part 1 of Bill would also provide clarifications on the ability of police officers to receive and act on certain information that is voluntarily provided to them or publicly available. For example, if a parent discovers that their child is being sexually exploited online and finds explicit messages, the perpetrator's username and IP address may be visible directly within the chat logs. Under current law, police may hesitate to act immediately on this voluntarily provided information due to uncertainty around privacy laws and liability, potentially delaying intervention and allowing harm to continue. This clarification is important to ensure that police can lawfully and promptly use such voluntarily provided information, enabling faster identification of the service provider and quicker protection of the child.
However, this new lawful access framework is only useful if telecommunications providers have the ability to respond to these demands. Currently, Canada is the only Western democracy that does not have a legal framework requiring electronic service providers to develop and maintain certain technical capabilities. This means that even if law enforcement obtains a warrant for information to, for example, track the movements of a terrorist group through one of its members' cellphones, the electronic provider may not be able to give that information as it is not required to retain it. Some telecommunications companies' and social media platforms' policies simply do not involve tracking or saving the kind of data that police might require as evidence unless they are legislated to do so.
In addition to data storage, Canada currently has no comprehensive legislative or regulatory mechanism that obligates communications service providers to develop or deploy systems that provide intercept capabilities. When a new technology or communications service is introduced, law enforcement and national security agencies often have to research and develop new methods to gain lawful access to those networks. The lack of a technical solution, or a delay in the ability to use it, hampers investigations and prevents law enforcement and national security agencies from effectively acting on serious crimes or threats to national security in a timely manner.
Part 2 of Bill would require electronic service providers to develop and maintain the technological capacity necessary to respond to lawful access requests and would establish a monetary penalty for non-compliance. It would also empower the to issue flexible and targeted ministerial orders compelling an electronic service provider to develop and maintain specific capabilities. These ministerial orders would be subject to approval by the Intelligence Commissioner, as privacy and cybersecurity are explicit factors that need to be considered. With the establishment of legal obligations for service providers, when law enforcement agencies obtain a search warrant, they could be assured that the information they need to combat terrorism, organized crime or human trafficking, for example, would be provided quickly and accurately.
Finally, part 3 of the bill would mandate a comprehensive review of the entire act by Parliament three years after all provisions came into force to assess its effectiveness and impact. I personally believe it would be of significant assistance to law enforcement, national security agencies and prosecutors if the public safety committee, when it does this study, also undertook to discuss and recommend amendments to sections 37 and 38 of the Canada Evidence Act, which deal with what information must be disclosed in court and what can remain protected. Currently, when police officers develop and use certain investigative techniques, they may be required to disclose how those tactics work in court, which can expose sensitive methods and undermine future investigations. Previous committee testimony by the commander of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau of the Ontario Provincial Police discussed how amendments to the Canada Evidence Act are necessary to maintain confidentiality regarding the way in which investigative tools are developed and how they operate, function or are deployed to protect ongoing and future investigations. I hope that at committee, serious consideration will be given to these issues to ensure that police and our national security apparatus have the tools needed to prevent, investigate and prosecute serious and organized crimes, terrorism and other such offences.
Coming from a law enforcement background, I have witnessed first-hand the growing gap between what Canada's law allows and what technologies make possible for criminals. Conservatives believe in law and order and have always stood for common-sense measures to keep Canadians safe. With that said, I am also aware of concerns raised by Canadians about the implications of this bill on their individual freedoms and privacy. I want to clarify that lawful access does not mean expanded access to private information. Rather, it means more timely and consistent lawful access to information related to specific individuals suspected of being engaged in criminal activity. Law enforcement authorities are not interested in the millions of devices used by everyday Canadians. The framework in Bill is intended to target those devices or communications that are being used to plan or execute criminal or terrorist activities. We must remember that without judicial authorization, law enforcement cannot intercept communications or request information and data.
Lawful access does not allow access to private communications without a warrant, and interception can be carried out only with lawful authority, for targeted communications, for a specific period of time. Lawful access legislation does not allow law enforcement and intelligence investigators to simply monitor anyone's Internet use, email content or social media activity.
Conservatives have been and will continue to be unequivocal in our commitment to protecting the freedom, privacy and safety of Canadians. At committee, we will scrutinize, debate and propose amendments to improve this legislation and stand firm against unnecessary infringements on the rights of Canadians.
I remain optimistic that the government is open to non-partisan co-operation in assuring that Bill achieves its stated goal of strengthening Canada's public safety and national security, as well as safeguarding the rights and freedoms of all Canadians.
:
Mr. Speaker, I will be sharing my time with the member for .
I appreciate the opportunity to speak to Bill . Since my time is limited, I will focus on part 2 of the bill, which deals with the technical capabilities of electronic service providers, while part 1 deals with the legal framework for obtaining information.
It is widely accepted that most crimes committed today leave a digital footprint. No matter what crime is committed, there is almost always a trace that enables investigators to track the perpetrator and understand how it was done. In the case of organized crime, the digital footprint helps shed light on its ramifications. These criminals and individuals who pose a threat to Canada's security exploit the digital environment to carry out a wide range of malicious activities. It is also an open secret that our laws on lawful access have not kept pace with advances in modern technology. Canada is the only G7 and Five Eyes country that does not have a modern lawful access regime requiring electronic service providers to establish ways to ensure authorized and timely access to information.
That is where the paradox lies. Currently, law enforcement agencies and CSIS already have the legal authority to obtain information from electronic service providers. However, there is no law requiring these providers to maintain a system that enables them to respond effectively to lawful access requests. This means that even if a provider has the requested information in its systems, it does not necessarily have the ability to retrieve that information and provide it to law enforcement agencies with a valid warrant, because it is not required to do so.
Without a modernized framework, law enforcement wastes valuable time and potential leads and misses out on crucial information. This can even lead to investigations being abandoned, particularly since the Jordan decision. Above all, these delays result in an increase in the number of crimes and victims. That is important, and it is worth reiterating. Take, for example, the wave of extortion cases observed in British Columbia and Ontario. The same individuals, likely affiliated with organized crime, are behind multiple attacks.
As things stand, even with the proper authority, if electronic service providers are unable to quickly extract the metadata needed, investigations can run into significant delays. Arrests that take several weeks result in a much larger number of victims than arrests made within days of the initial offence. The same applies to cybercrime, sextortion or Internet fraud cases. Being able to conduct investigations quickly can make a huge difference.
Apart from its impact on our ability to conduct investigations, this situation also prevents us from fully participating in security-related international co-operation activities and thereby benefiting from our partners' information and support at a time when transnational gangs and terrorists are especially active. Bill , especially part 2, entitled “Supporting Authorized Access to Information Act”, will correct these problems and establish a modern framework for lawful technical access while continuing to safeguard the privacy of Canadians.
It is important to note that part 2 of Bill does not create any new surveillance powers, either for law enforcement agencies or for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. There will be no surveillance of social media content, web browsing history or text message content. I would like to correct the record on something my colleague, the member for , said this morning. He claimed that this would be the case, but that is not accurate. This is only about the metadata transmitted by electronic service providers. The production of such transmission data has already been approved by the courts, with a valid search warrant.
Imagine that a missing teenage girl, 16 years old, makes an emergency call 10 days after her disappearance. Although the telecommunications service provider is able to confirm the call and the antenna used, it cannot precisely identify the last known location of the phone before it was disconnected, because it is not required to have that capability.
Bill will correct this situation by requiring that these suppliers, considered essential suppliers, maintain consistent and reliable technical capabilities nationwide. Let me remind the House that these capabilities are already the norm in Europe and in Five Eyes countries. Under this bill, a supplier could be required to develop and maintain technical capabilities in two ways: based on specific requirements for major suppliers or, in other cases, pursuant to a ministerial order based on operational needs as new technologies emerge.
Instead of requiring entire industries, including small businesses, to develop the same capabilities, the proposed framework takes a more targeted approach by providing for the necessary capability development through ministerial orders based on strict criteria. Let me be clear. As an additional safeguard and external oversight mechanism, the bill requires the Minister of Public Safety to first consult with the relevant provider and then obtain approval from the intelligence commissioner before an order becomes valid. In addition, if the order is approved by the intelligence commissioner, the electronic service provider in question still has the option of challenging the order before a judge.
We have done our homework. We are talking about protecting the public and our country from bad actors in the digital world as we already do in the physical world, while protecting the privacy of Canadians and the rights enshrined in the charter. Criminals are constantly adapting to new technologies and finding new ways to commit crimes. We must ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies can adapt as well. Our government is committed to doing everything it can to prevent criminals from threatening the security of Canadians.
:
Mr. Speaker, I am very proud to speak in support of our new government's latest piece of legislation designed to keep Canadians safe and to ensure that our law enforcement and national security apparatus have modern lawful tools they need to carry out their vital responsibilities.
Bill , an act respecting lawful access, is our new government's seventh piece of legislation dedicated to enhancing our country's public safety and protecting Canadians. It builds on the broader suite of measures that include legislative action to combat hate and extremism, meaningful reforms to the bail system, stronger protections to address intimate partner violence, and steps to strengthen the integrity and effectiveness of Canada's immigration system. Together, these initiatives respond to evolving public safety threats while reinforcing the rule of law.
It is clear that public safety is a priority for our government, and we will continue to do everything we can at the federal level to keep Canadians safe. Bill was developed through extensive round tables and consultations with law enforcement, telecommunications providers and privacy experts.
Importantly, the scope of the bill has been carefully narrowed to strategically target telecommunication service providers while retaining the long-standing and well-understood legal threshold of reasonable grounds to suspect. This ensures that investigators could act swiftly when necessary while maintaining appropriate limits.
To be abundantly clear, there is nothing in this bill that would grant the capability or authority to conduct mass tracking or generalized surveillance of Canadians. As part of their normal operations, telecommunications providers already maintain technical information that shows which cellphones connect to which network or tower.
Bill would not expand that technical capability. It would simply establish a clear and lawful process to ensure that in the context of an imminent threat and/or legally authorized investigation, service providers could share specific information with law enforcement promptly and responsibly. During time-sensitive investigations that involve child exploitation, organized crime, terrorism or imminent threats to life, delays in accessing basic technical information can mean the difference between prevention and tragedy.
Bill would not give police new investigative powers. It would update how powers that already exist under Canadian law are used so they work in today's digital world. The same legal standards would apply and the same court oversight would remain firmly in place. This means there would be no additional access to the content of Canadians' communications without proper judicial authorization. Law enforcement could not read emails or text messages, listen to phone calls, view photos or access personal files without a warrant issued by a court. Through lawful access, there would be no access to an individual's browsing history or search history and no authority to monitor people indiscriminately or in real time.
The legislation is deliberately narrow. It would be limited to confirming whether a service exists, identifying the type of service being provided and obtaining the technical identifiers necessary to link activity to a specific service provider in the context of lawful investigation. This is about modernizing a process to make it timely in the 21st century.
Before this legislation, whenever police needed information to stop a serious threat like a child abduction, police had to go telecom provider by telecom provider and ask each one individually, with a warrant, in order to obtain basic information. That process takes way too long in a globalized world. When a threat to life is unfolding, time is the difference between life and death.
Here is the reality we are dealing with. When there is a serious threat to national security like a terrorist attack, our police and security agencies need to move fast. Every minute counts, but right now, even when the law says police can get information, there is a big problem.
Online service providers do not always have the basic technical tools to actually deliver the information. Sometimes the company does not have a secure way to send it. Sometimes they cannot retrieve it quickly enough, and sometimes they cannot guarantee it is accurate or complete. Because of that, police work is delayed or never even started. That is not acceptable when Canadian safety is on the line. This legislation would allow for a ministerial order during a serious national security event at the request of CSIS and other law enforcement agencies. It would require providers to have the basic technical capabilities to co-operate with law enforcement on demand.
Let me give another real-world example of why this matters. CSIS was investigating a suspected terrorist network and had received a court-approved warrant to track the cellphone of a person of interest. Even when the legal authorization was in place, the service provider did not have the technical ability to support the request because it was not required to maintain that capability. As a result, CSIS could not track the device digitally and had to rely on human intelligence and surveillance instead. That approach was slower, more expensive and carried a greater risk to the investigator and the public. Valuable time was lost, not because the law was missing, but because the system was not built to respond when it needed to.
Bill has robust guardrails to protect Canadians' rights and privacy. These safeguards include independent approval by the intelligence commissioner, enhanced oversight mechanisms and mandatory annual public reporting. In addition, Bill C-22 contains a statutory parliamentary review clause that would require the act to be reviewed during the third year after all of its provisions were put in force.
As technology continues to advance, so too do the methods used by organized crime, hostile state actors and individuals who wish to do our country harm. Our law enforcement and national security agencies must be equipped to keep pace with these 21st-century developments.
This legislation has the support of law enforcement and stakeholders from across the country, such as the Ontario Association of Chiefs of Police president Mark Campbell, who said, “Technology has changed the way criminals operate. We need 21st-century tools to investigate 21st century crimes—always with strong judicial oversight and respect for Canadians’ privacy rights.” Similarly, CSIS indicated publicly in October that the absence of modern lawful access legislation is placing national security investigations at risk. Canada remains the only western democracy without a comprehensive legal framework governing lawful access.
Outside of an outdated licensing regime dating back to the 1990s, co-operation between police services, CSIS and electronic service providers has relied largely on voluntary arrangements. These are slow and no longer relevant in a dangerous and fractious world. Bill would change that and finally align Canada with our Five Eyes allies and closest partners, including New Zealand, the U.K., Australia and France, by establishing a clear, lawful and accountable framework for access to essential digital information. Without these tools, Canadian investigators have at times been excluded from international investigations simply because it takes too long for us to obtain critical information.
If we are serious about strengthening our sovereignty, we must also strengthen our national security. Sovereignty requires that law enforcement and our national security apparatus be able to do their jobs effectively and operate on a level playing field with our allies on the world stage. Bill is a necessary and measured step toward ensuring that Canada remains secure, resilient and fully engaged in protecting its citizens in the 21st century.
:
Mr. Speaker, as always, it is a privilege and honour to speak on behalf of the great citizens of my riding, particularly on an important bill such as this. As a former member of the justice system, I know the great difficulty that law enforcement has had. Unfortunately, Canada has been an outlier in how efficiently law enforcement can gain access to information. Ultimately, the bill is a step in the right direction, but certainly much improvement is required.
I will start off with the general notion that Canadians expect their government to do two things well. Canadians expect it to, number one, keep them safe and, number two, protect their fundamental rights and freedoms. In today's world, that balance is becoming increasingly complex. We know that crime is evolving, technology is advancing and law enforcement is facing new challenges in accessing the evidence it needs to investigate serious offences.
No one in the House disputes that reality, but Canadians also expect that, when governments respond to those challenges, they do so carefully and not in a rushed manner. They will do it responsibly and with a clear understanding of the consequences. Unfortunately, that has not been the standard approach of the government. Time and again over the last 11 years, we have seen legislation from the Liberal government that is rushed, is poorly thought out and ultimately fails to strike the right balance between public safety and individual liberties.
Conservatives have always believed, and will always believe, in law and order. We have always stood for measures that keep Canadians safe while respecting the fundamental rights and freedoms that are enshrined in our charter and define our country. I know that Liberals often talk about being the only party that stands on behalf of the charter, but that is not the case. For nearly a decade now, we have been urging the government to get this balance right.
Unfortunately, what Canadians have seen instead is a pattern of failure, a pattern where the government lags behind evolving threats, introduces flawed legislation, and then expects Parliament to clean up its mess. We saw that just last fall when it introduced Bill . That piece of legislation fell well short of protecting Canadians, while at the same time it overreached into areas that raise serious concerns about individual freedoms and privacy. Conservatives did our job. We pushed back, and we forced the government to reconsider that flawed piece of legislation. We successfully blocked provisions that would have infringed on the rights of law-abiding Canadians.
Now, with Bill , we are once again being asked to consider a lawful access framework. Let me be abundantly clear that there is a real issue here. As someone who has spent close to two decades in the legal system, I understand first-hand how critical timely access to digital evidence is in modern investigations. Today's criminals do not operate in the same world as they did 20 or 30 years ago. They are always several steps ahead of law enforcement. As a result, our law enforcement agencies must have the appropriate tools they need to keep pace.
We know that delays in accessing basic subscriber information will often stall investigations. Quite often that is the difference between making an arrest and not. We know that gaps in international co-operation can allow serious offenders to evade accountability. We know that technological limitations can prevent police from acting on leads that protect victims.
These are the real challenges, and they deserve real solutions. The question before us is not whether action is needed. The question is whether the Liberal government can be trusted to get it right, because over the last 11 years its track record suggests otherwise. As I have indicated, we have seen legislation that is rushed, overly broad and insufficiently thought through. We have seen measures that go either too far, risking Canadians' rights, or simply not far enough, failing to deliver real public safety concerns.
Bill reintroduces elements from Bill , and that alone demands careful scrutiny. Conservatives will not simply take the government at its word. We will examine the details, test the assumptions and ensure that any new powers are justified, targeted and subject to proper oversight, because Canadians have already seen what happens when the Liberal government rushes ahead without regard for Canadians' privacy. The invocation of the Emergencies Act is but one example.
In Bill , the Liberals tried to give themselves sweeping, unjustified access to personal information without the appropriate safeguards and without respect for the fundamental rights of law-abiding Canadians. In fact, the Privacy Commissioner confirmed that the government did not even consult his office before attempting to grant itself these sweeping new powers to access Canadians' personal information from service providers like banks and telecommunications companies without a warrant. Conservatives stood up, pushed back and forced the Liberals to retreat.
Now, with Bill , Canadians are right to be cautious. Any expansion of state power, whether through lower legal thresholds, new data demands or broad retention requirements, must be tightly limited, clearly justified and subject to real oversight. We will never accept a repeat of the same overreach simply dressed up in new language. We must ensure that any lowering of legal thresholds does not come at the expense of Canadians' fundamental rights. We must ensure that data retention requirements, particularly those that apply broadly, are necessary, proportionate and consistent with the charter. We also must ensure that any obligations placed on service providers are clear and reasonable and do not create any unintended consequences for innovation or privacy.
This is especially important given the scope of this bill, which creates a new framework governing how electronic service providers must support lawful access. These provisions raise complex legal and technical questions. They involve requirements for data retention, technical capabilities and compliance mechanisms that could have far-reaching implications. While the government argues that this is necessary to modernize our investigative framework, we must ensure that we are not creating a system that overreaches or lacks sufficient accountability.
At the same time, we simply cannot ignore the broader context. Public safety and, I would add, trust in our federal institutions and in our democracy have been deteriorating.
Canadians are seeing rising violent crime, repeat offenders cycling through the system and a growing sense that the justice system is not working for them. In fact, many victims do not even refer anymore to “the Canadian justice system”. They do not see it as justice for them, as they have been ignored for over 11 years. They see it simply as a legal system. At the same time, we have seen failures in basic areas of law enforcement capacity. We have all read and seen reports that the RCMP has struggled to recruit enough officers to meet operational needs. We have seen gaps in resources, coordination and leadership.
Therefore, when the government brings forward legislation like Bill , Canadians are right to ask if this is part of a coherent plan to improve public safety or if it is another isolated measure that fails to address the root problems. Tools alone are not enough. We need the people, the resources and the leadership to make those tools effective.
Conservatives believe in giving police the tools they need, but we also believe in accountability. We believe in getting that balance right, and we believe that any legislation must be clear, targeted and respectful of Canadian rights. That is why we will be carefully reviewing the bill. We will listen to experts. We will hear from law enforcement and consider the views of civil liberty organizations. We will do the work necessary to ensure that any final legislation reflects the interests of Canadians, not the political priorities of the Liberal government.
Canadians deserve to be safe. They deserve a justice system that works, and they deserve a government that gets it right the first time. Unfortunately, that has not been the trademark of the Liberal government. That is why it falls to this House to do the necessary hard work of scrutiny, accountability and improvement. Conservatives will continue to stand for common-sense solutions that protect Canadians' safety, their privacy and their fundamental freedoms. We will scrutinize the legislation carefully. We will insist on the right balance, one that protects public safety while safeguarding the privacy and freedoms of law-abiding Canadians, because Canadians should never have to choose between being safe and being free.
I want to highlight some of the stakeholder reactions that I have been able to access so far with respect to Bill .
Law enforcement clearly welcomes Bill C-22 as a needed change to the legal frameworks for warrants and searches in Canada, for timely information gathering. The legal profession is skeptical of the bill. While they welcome the amendments from Bill , they are doubtful of its efficacy and of the charter compliance contained in part 2. The business community acknowledges the need for modern law enforcement but is wary of higher regulatory burdens and the impact on innovation and encryption. Civil liberty groups strongly oppose the bill.
This is by no means an exhaustive list. Some examples of groups that support the bill would be the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, the BC Association of Chiefs of Police, and the B.C. public safety minister, Nina Krieger. Those who have mixed opinions on the bill and who seek amendment include the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, Dr. Michael Geist, the Canadian Bar Association and Dr. Robert Diab, professor of law at Thompson Rivers University.
Those who flat out oppose this piece of legislation include the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, the BC Freedom of Information and Privacy Association, the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms and the Yanik Guillemette technology and entrepreneurship industry.
I will give members a flavour of some of the comments from these three groups. A passage from the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group, which opposes the bill, reads, “This legislation presents one of the greatest threats to privacy in Canada of the past two decades.” The changes from Bill to Bill do not go “far enough” in addressing the charter compliance concerns with Bill C-2. Bill C-22 adds a “data retention provision...that raises...additional privacy concerns.”
Those who support the bill include the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, which sees this legislation as “intended to modernize Canada's lawful access regime” and improve its “ability to investigate crime and protect the public in the digital age.”
It continues:
...investigators often rely on digital evidence to identify suspects, locate victims, and prevent further harm. Today, many of these crimes are...committed using digital platforms or encrypted communications.
Canada's legal framework governing warrants, searches, and seizures was created [for an analog] world [and] allows offenders to [evade] accountability.
...The results [of Bill C-22] will be more investigations solved in a timely manner, a less cumbersome process, and a strong lawful access framework that maintains the data privacy of Canadians.
Those with mixed opinion include the Canadian Chamber of Commerce. Businesses understand that “Canada needs modern tools to fight crime”, but they recognize that “strong encryption and consumer privacy are fundamental for our economic and national security.” They want to see Bill provide “surgical, proportionate” tools to law enforcement.
Another mixed opinion is from Dr. Michael Geist. He says that Bill significantly improves the timely access to data and information, which was in part 1 of Bill , while worsening the privacy concerns in part 2 of the new bill, but transforming the way that governments will interact with digital platforms and communication providers. He also says that the new “confirmation of service” demand power in part 1 addresses a long-standing police complaint regarding timely access to information, and part 2 covers “new requirements for communications providers to actively work with law enforcement on their surveillance and monitoring capabilities.... The government will point to increased oversight [through the Intelligence Commissioner], but the concerns regarding surveillance capabilities, security vulnerabilities, secrecy, and cross-border data sharing remain.”
A mixed opinion comes from the Canadian Bar Association, which says that while Bill “narrows the...powers from and increases some oversight, it also expands international cooperation in law enforcement.” Part 2 of the bill is seen as disastrous in their opinion, opening back doors for CSIS and the police to “get real-time access to their information”. Further, “systematic vulnerabilities are not defined [as specifically] as they are in Australia”, despite the bill including language that requires that the government not introduce “systemic vulnerabilities into these systems”.
I see I am almost out of time, so I will end at this point.
:
Mr. Speaker, it is a great honour, as always, to rise on behalf of the people of Elgin—St. Thomas—London South.
This is an incredibly important issue, and it is one that, as lawmakers, we cannot afford to get wrong. On one hand, we are talking about ensuring that the people enforcing the laws that we set out in this place have the tools, resources and laws in place to do their jobs. On the other hand, it is about being a guardian of the most fundamental rights and freedoms Canadians have: the right to due process, the right to privacy and the right to freedom from search and seizure. I am someone who understands and greatly values both of these things.
I have the great privilege of sitting on the justice committee, where Conservative colleagues and I worked vigorously to ensure that real, tangible reforms to the bail system were put forward in the government's bail bill, Bill , not so long ago. The bill was inadequate, but it did something. In fact, law enforcement officials had been telling us that they wanted more. They had been telling us that the Liberal government had actually caused the bail problems in this country and that they wanted more to fix them. We were happy to do that.
I have also been, as many people would know, very vocal, even before I was elected to the House, in calling out decisions and bills by the current government that would erode not only trust in institutions but also civil liberties of Canadians. I have seen this first-hand since I had the great privilege of being elected, just shy of one year ago.
The government's very first bill was presented to Canadians and to the House, Bill , as a border security bill. Again, I have been among the people talking for years about how the government has allowed the borders of this country to become a joke. I welcomed the Liberals' recognizing that there was a problem, but when we looked into the bill, we saw that lawful access provisions had actually been snuck in.
We also saw that the bill, which, again, was presented to Canadians as being an answer to the border crisis, inexplicably had a proposed ban on transacting in cash above a certain amount. That is not something Canadians wanted and is actually something that Canadians rejected so vociferously that the Liberals, thankfully, decided to, among other things, pull it aside and not proceed with it.
Bill also would have given the ability to, without a warrant, inspect Canadians' letter mail. Even letters that Canadians send to us as members of Parliament and letters that someone might send to a loved one across the country would have been subject to warrantless scrutiny by Canada Post. Therefore, we had to look into the details of Bill , and in doing so we found that it could not be supported.
Then there was Bill , which, again, on the surface is something we want and welcome. It is legislation that would deal with very real threats to cybersecurity infrastructure that companies and countries face. This was something that, again, I thought we would be able to find common ground on across party lines, but the devil, as always, is in the details.
We looked at Bill , and I thank my colleague from and my colleague from for their work on this. We saw that the bill would actually give the Minister of Industry and cabinet members of the Liberal government incredible power to take people or companies off-line, with no oversight and no scrutiny.
I am so proud to be part of a team that understood that enforcing the law and protecting Canada from threats cannot and need not come at the expense of fundamental rights and freedoms and at the expense of civil liberties. Conservatives worked collaboratively with our colleagues in the Bloc, and we put forward amendments that would deal with these challenges.
However, now there is Bill , a bill that repackages a lot of what was already in Bill , a lot of what had already been rejected by Canadians, and it puts it forward for review. Fortunately, the Liberals have finally understood the essence of some of these challenges. I am very grateful that in part 1 of the bill, they have eliminated some of the most problematic components. I will give credit where it is due. Again, the Liberals should have been more keenly aware of these things from the get-go, but there have actually been significant improvements.
That being said, the lack of oversight on some parts of Bill very much warrants scrutiny here. Why I bring this up and why it is so important is that the reason there has been such push-back with respect to Bill so far, from civil liberties groups in particular, on the left and on the right, is that the Liberal government has squandered the trust that Canadians have and can have in government, specifically in the current government, due to the way that it has eroded civil liberties in the past.
Again, as I say this, I am reminded of the fact that a few weeks ago the Liberals filed an appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on their Emergencies Act usage just over four years ago. That is relevant because what the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal found is that the government violated the charter rights of Canadians not only by unlawfully invoking the Emergencies Act but by using the fake emergency to justify freezing people's bank accounts.
Now, this was one of the reasons that our amendments in Bill included conscience and speech protections, because recent Liberal government history has revealed precisely why those protections are necessary, and why, when people come up with scenarios, we do not actually take the Liberals seriously when they try to dismiss those scenarios by saying that would never happen and it would never get there. We have seen them go there already. We have seen them go down roads that most people never would have thought possible, using plain language that we must take at its word and at face value.
The Liberal government has not been constrained by the charter, and it has not been constrained by norms. That is why Canadians from the International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group to the Justice Centre for Constitutional Freedoms have raised concerns about Bill .
That being said, I do have to acknowledge the very real demands that law enforcement have made. I have taken on the responsibility, not just as a member of the justice committee but as the member of Parliament for Elgin—St. Thomas—London South, to talk to law enforcement and to speak to them exactly about the shortcomings they feel exist in the current system. Now, one thing I will point out is that they welcome having expanded powers and clear authority. They welcome a lot of what is in Bill .
Last week I spoke to Chief Thai Truong of the London Police Service. It is a very large police service given London's size. I also spoke to Chief Marc Roskamp of the St. Thomas Police Service. I have spoken to other frontline officers and I am happy to continue doing this work because, unlike the Liberal government, this party has a history of listening to law enforcement when they say they do not want anything to do with the Liberal government's gun confiscation scheme, when they say they need real bail reform so they are not arresting the same people over and over again, and when they say there are tools and clarifications they need to do their jobs. We will continue to do that.
The men and women of law enforcement in my riding and across the country want to take bad guys off the streets. We, as a party, want to make sure they have the tools and resources to do that. It is not entirely accurate to say that Canada has no lawful access regime. Police have been able to access subscriber data, they have been able to access electronic materials and they have been able to get warrants to search people's computers, phones and accounts. The issue is the speed they need when dealing with it. We welcome anything that provides an opportunity, lawfully and with judicial oversight, to access the type of information at play here.
We cannot look at any of these things in isolation. We cannot look at simply being able to confirm subscriber data, perhaps for an offender or a suspected offender who is possessing, producing or disseminating child sexual exploitation and abuse material, and say that that will solve the overall problems.
We have to look at lawful access in the same vein as we look at other things in the criminal justice system that would interact with that suspected offender, such as the sentence they are going to get. This week the justice committee is reviewing Bill . We are saying that the Liberal government is jeopardizing mandatory minimum sentences for people who peddle in child sexual exploitation and abuse material. We believe wholeheartedly that the government needs to have robust punishments to vigorously go after these heinous predators.
What the Liberal government has been doing, and not just on lawful access but on other justice bills that have come before them, is selectively deciding when they want to listen to law enforcement and when they do not, selectively deciding when they want to hide behind this stakeholder or that stakeholder and when they do not.
We are the lawmakers in this chamber. It is an honour I do not take lightly. We have to listen to all stakeholders and come to a reasoned constitutional position that balances the rights and needs of a free citizenry in this country with the practical expectations and needs of law enforcement to effectively discharge their duties. That is a balance that we need to get right, not only because it is simply our duty but also because the last thing we want to do is pass a law that we will have to somehow find a way to fix years later if a court finds it to be unconstitutional. This is the tricky thing we have to deal with here. We cannot pass law that will not withstand charter scrutiny.
Interestingly, with regard to Bill , I mentioned the tremendous work of my colleagues on the public safety committee and other colleagues in caucus. Bill C-8 had been amended by Conservative efforts, with the support of the Bloc, to have judicial oversight for some decisions that the would make, and that was so important. In the end, it was unfortunate that this was ruled out of scope when it came back to the House because that would have been an incredibly important safeguard that would have told Canadians we are not giving unchecked power to cabinet ministers representing a government that, by the way, does not have a great track record on upholding civil liberties and that when cabinet ministers say to just trust them, we might as well play the laugh track from a 1990s sitcom because that is about as much as it is worth. We are always going to approach anything that looks like surveillance or a violation of privacy rights with a level of skepticism. When the Liberals bring forward bills that touch on these issues, they should not dismiss these very real and, I would say, good-faith concerns that people across this country are making because of that lack of distrust that I was talking about.
When we look at some of the details, there is a blanket retention of metadata, but so much of our personal information is captured and so much of what is in metadata is not as anonymized as people may think. For example, in comparing this to other jurisdictions, in the United States, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act allows for preservation of metadata on demand, but it does not require blanket retention. It does not even allow blanket retention. The Court of Justice of the European Union has declared that blanket retention of metadata is incompatible with the fundamental rights that Europeans have, especially when it comes to privacy.
When we look at electronic service providers, specifically the applications in part 2 of the bill, we do not have a definition of what a service provider is. We only have the expectation that the government will come up with a definition down the road. This category could actually include email providers. It could include messaging apps. It could include other cloud services and storage systems. It is not just about whether one has a Telus account or a Rogers account. It could extend to the accounts that have content. That is where accessing someone's electronic information is truly accessing a window into their lives, their most intimate experiences, thoughts, conversations and photos. Therefore, we cannot afford to not get this right.
I would much rather see a cohesive definition of what that category would be, not something that could be redefined based on the whims of not just the current government but future governments. As we well know, if we are talking about any legislated power for government, for cabinet, for law enforcement, we have to imagine what that power will look like in the hands of another government that comes beyond. This is not a partisan issue. It is where I look beyond the left versus right on this. I do not want my colleagues on the left to be concerned about how a theoretical Conservative government would abuse civil liberties, which is certainly not the Conservative governments that we are putting forward for Canadians to choose, but how another government might use it.
That is why we must always constrain government power to protect the vital privacy rights and autonomy of individual citizens, and the lack of oversight remains a very key problem in Bill . It would enable secret ministerial orders to any digital service Canadians rely on, with no public registry, no parliamentary approval and no right for Canadians to even know it is happening. That is the architecture of a surveillance state. That is something that we must always protect against.
I believe we must all come to an agreement on where we go forward, because we are being told by the Liberals that this is all fine and to just pass the bill through. We have been down that road before, and again, I do support, if the bill gets to committee, vigorously scrutinizing it, debating it, calling witnesses, looking at the ins and outs and going through it line by line, but there is a very real challenge, especially if I situate my remarks today in the broader political context of our time, in that bills can go into committee and come out worse than they went in.
The government can expand its power. We saw this recently with Bill , where a flawed bill went into committee and an outright dangerous one came out, so we have to be very mindful of whether the Liberals have signalled an intention that goes beyond the text of the bill. That is why we cannot look at Bill without looking at things that the Liberals failed to advance in Bill and Bill . Those have actually been pretty good indicators of where the Liberals want to go, where they think they can go and perhaps, if they have unchecked majority power in this House of Commons, where they are likely to go.
I go back to the comments I have made about law enforcement and how I am fully committed to listening to the perspectives of frontline officers and the perspectives of police leadership. I actually have a meeting coming up with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, which as timing worked out, I wish I had done before I had the opportunity to speak today, but it did not work out that way. However, I will listen to law enforcement, not just on lawful access, but on the whole suite of reforms to fix the last 11 years of Liberal justice legislation, which the police have been demanding, to make communities safer.
I will just end on why this is so important. I was speaking to a grade 10 class a few weeks ago about my job and about the work that we all do in Ottawa, and like anyone else speaking to a group of grade 10 students, it is not always as engaging to talk about politics. I choose to believe it was politics that was boring them and not me, but nevertheless, I was trying to make politics relatable to them. I was trying to actually come up with a way to provide them a window into why the work we do here matters to them, and I brought up two things. I brought up employment. I asked how many of them were having trouble getting a job, and every hand went up. Then I asked them how many of them feel safe walking around downtown, and they all laughed. They all laughed, truly. To them, safe streets are a punchline, and that is the record of Liberal so-called justice laws over the last 11 years.
If we are going to listen to law enforcement, let us actually listen to law enforcement and let us start opening up the door to undoing the harmful reforms that have gotten us to where we are. If the Liberals want to know why people are so skeptical of lawful access regimes coming from the government, they need to look in the mirror and see why Canadians do not trust them to not abuse power, abuse authority and violate the rights of Canadians.
We will always stand firmly behind that. We will support law enforcement, but not at the expense of the charter, as the Liberals have a record of doing.
:
Mr. Speaker, I will be splitting my time with the member for .
It is an honour to rise on behalf of my neighbours in Oshawa to speak to Bill .
Over the past couple of weeks, like all of us in the House, I was fortunate to spend time at home, where I had the opportunity to meet with many proud and resilient Oshawa residents, community leaders and local organizations. Those conversations are always meaningful. They are sobering, though, because again and again, I keep hearing one concern raised, and that is safety.
Canadians are worried about safety in their communities and about the never-ending crimes taking place in Oshawa. They are worried about violent repeat offenders who are continually being caught and released again. They are worried that the system is not working the way it should. This is the context in which we are debating the bill before us today. It is not just about lawful access or technical authorities. It is about trust in our justice system. For many Canadians, that trust has been shaken over the past 11 years of the Liberal government.
In recent weeks, the self-proclaimed, so-called “new” Liberal government, which has been in power for over a decade, has asked Canadians to trust it on public safety. At the same time, Liberals voted against four solution-oriented Conservative public safety bills that were all focused on one thing, protecting Canadians.
For example, Bill would have ended the practice of courts considering a non-citizen's immigration status when issuing a sentence. We saw that happen again recently, this time in New Brunswick, where a judge reduced a man's sentence so he would not be deported from Canada, just 10 days after that man was charged with assaulting his former partner.
Bill would have ensured tougher bail rules, fewer release loopholes for violent repeat offenders and real protection for victims and communities.
Bill , if passed, would have ended annual parole hearings for murderers, a practice that retraumatizes and revictimizes survivors over and over again.
Lastly, Bill would have ensured an end to sentence stacking for sexual predators, so that every crime would carry its own penalty.
These proposals were supported by police associations, victim organizations, victim services and advocacy groups across Canada, yet every single one of them was voted down by the Liberal government.
As the member of Parliament for Oshawa, I cannot fathom how every single Liberal MP representing a constituency in the Durham region, for instance, could vote against these bills. This is specifically difficult to understand given the clear calls from our own community. The Durham Regional Police Service, the Durham Regional Police Association and local victim organizations have all spoken out on the need for more solutions to strengthen our justice system. Andrew Tummonds, the president of the Durham Regional Police Association, said it clearly after Bill was defeated:
Yesterday Bill C-242 was voted down in the House of Commons. This Bill was supported by Police Associations and Victim Organizations and presented common sense solutions to ongoing problems within our Criminal Justice System. This non partisan Bill focused on the need for tougher bail conditions and allowed for the closing of loopholes that resulted in dangerous offenders being released.
Each and every day in the Region of Durham the Members of the DRPA work to keep violent repeat offenders off our streets. We are disheartened that much needed change was voted down and believe that community safety and the protection of victims should supersede partisan politics.
Those are not partisan words. They are the voices of those who serve and protect on the front lines. All of this is happening while our community faces very real and immediate concerns, including just a few weeks ago, when a convicted first-degree murderer and child rapist was granted an unescorted, 72-hour release in Oshawa.
When the Liberal government now brings forward Bill and asks Canadians to trust it with new powers over their digital lives, I am sure it will excuse us from wondering if this is a good idea. We have the right to question. In fact, it is our job to question. We have the responsibility to take a step back, take a look, ask the hard questions and ensure that we get this right for every Canadian who expects that their private life will remain private.
Part 1 of this bill focuses on giving law enforcement faster and more effective access to information, and we all understand that matters. Crime has changed; we get that. Criminals operate online, often anonymously. They use encrypted platforms and operate across borders in ways that make investigations so much more complex. Law enforcement has told us this has created some real challenges. In some cases, investigations into serious crimes can stall because authorities cannot quickly identify who is behind an account.
This bill attempts to respond to those challenges by allowing police to ask telecommunication providers to confirm whether they provide service to a specific account or identifier, which would create judicial mechanisms to obtain basic subscriber information such as a name, an address or an email; and clarifying how officers could search and examine computer data during an investigation.
Bill would also allow, for urgent situations, for certain information to be obtained without a warrant when time is critical and would enable Canadian authorities to work with international partners when data is held outside the country. These are meaningful tools, absolutely, and in the right circumstances they could help prevent harm and bring criminals to justice. However, we have to proceed with care, because when we expand powers, we must also make sure we are strengthening safeguards. When we act in urgency, we still must protect rights, and when we grant authority, we must also ensure accountability in that authority.
Part 2 of the bill raises another important set of issues. It would create a framework requiring electronic service providers to ensure they can support lawful access when authorized. In some cases, companies could be required to build and maintain systems that allow authorities to access information under legal authority. It would also allow the Minister of Public Safety to issue confidential orders requiring specific technical capabilities, subject to review by the intelligence commissioner.
It raises serious questions, though, about privacy, transparency and about how far government should go in shaping digital systems. It is up to us as the official opposition to ask those questions. In fact, it is a role that we take very seriously, and it is an important role that makes this Parliament work.
We have been told that Canada is behind other countries in adopting a lawful access regime. However, Canadians not only are asking us to move quickly but want us to move carefully and with great accountability and care in taking a look at what exactly is going on. They are asking us to get this right and ensure that any system we create reflects our values.
This bill would include a parliamentary review after three years. That is a positive step, but our responsibility to Canadians is to get this right from the start. Conservatives are the party of law and order. We believe in supporting law enforcement and protecting victims, but we also believe that freedom matters. That is why we are carefully reviewing the legislation. We are listening. We are asking serious questions. We are doing the work necessary to ensure that this bill strikes the right balance, because Canadians should not have to choose between safety and freedom. They deserve both.
:
Mr. Speaker, I rise today to speak to Bill , the lawful access act. Let me be clear from the start. Canada needs lawful access, but Canada must get it right.
Conservatives believe in law and order. We believe that police must be given the tools to stop criminals, dismantle organized crime and protect the most vulnerable, especially in a digital world. Today, this is a real problem. Our laws have not kept up with technology. The investigations are stalling. Evidence exists but cannot be accessed in time, and criminals take advantage of the gap. Bill is trying to fix this and that goal is necessary, but we must be prudent and use good judgment. In fixing one problem, we must not create another. We must not weaken the rights that we have and that we are trying to protect.
My office has heard from many people in my riding of Richmond Centre—Marpole. They understand the need for safety. They understand the threat of organized crime. They are asking for something simple: balance, accountability and restraint.
One concern raised by my community is the requirement for companies to build surveillance capabilities into their systems. That concern is straightforward. If we create access points into secure systems, we must be absolutely sure they cannot be abused. If they are, we do not just create tools for law enforcement; we create targets for bad actors.
We have already seen what can happen. In 2024, a major cyber-attack known as Salt Typhoon targeted telecommunications infrastructure and compromised sensitive communications systems. That operation has been widely reported as having involved highly sophisticated state-backed actors. This is the environment we are operating in today.
The question is not whether we need lawful access; the question is how we implement it safely and without introducing new risks.
Another concern raised by people in my riding is data retention. Bill would require certain providers to keep metadata for up to one year. The intent is clear. When police have legal authority, the data is there to help investigations. That makes sense.
People in my community are asking what the limits are. What are the safeguards? Even metadata can reveal a good deal about a person's life, where they go, who they contact and when those interactions happen. To be fair, this data is not freely available to the government. Law enforcement still requires proper authorization, including warrants in most cases. The bill does not allow the collection of content such as messages, browsing history or social media activity under these provisions. That distinction matters, but concerns remain. How do we ensure this stays targeted? How do we prevent this from expanding beyond its original intent?
Conservatives will be ready to hold the government accountable for any overreach. There are also serious questions about oversight. The bill allows for ministerial orders that can require companies to develop specific technical capabilities. These orders require approval from the intelligence commissioner but there is a clear gap. The Privacy Commissioner of Canada has no formal role in this oversight process. That raises a fundamental concern. If these powers affect the data and the digital lives of Canadians, why is privacy not formally embedded in the oversight structure?
Oversight must be balanced. Security considerations cannot come at the expense of privacy protections. Both must be present, and both must be strong.
Another concern is the scope of the bill. Part 2 would apply broadly to electronic service providers. This does not just mean large telecommunications companies. It could include messaging platforms, cloud service providers and email services. In other words, it could apply across the entire digital ecosystem that Canadians rely on every day. This is a very wide scope, and with a wide scope, the safeguards must be stronger. People I represent are asking for clarity. Who is covered? What exactly is required of them? Where are the limits? Without that clarity, there is a real risk of overreach, intended or otherwise.
A third concern is transparency. Under this bill, ministerial orders could be issued confidentially. There would be no public registry, no direct parliamentary approval and no guarantee that Canadians would ever know when those powers were used. That is a serious issue because lawful access in a democracy must not only be lawful but also be transparent and accountable. When significant powers operate behind closed doors, public trust begins to erode, and once that trust is lost, it is very difficult to rebuild. We should be careful not to move from a system grounded in reasonable grounds and judicial oversight to one where information is collected first and justified later. This would not be a small shift. There would be a fundamental change in the relationship between citizens and the state. Many Canadians are concerned that this bill could enable further surveillance architecture if not properly constrained.
We must also consider the burden placed on companies. They would be required to build and maintain systems, comply with strict technical requirements and face penalties for non-compliance. This would affect not only large telecommunications providers but also smaller and emerging companies. We must ensure that this would not discourage innovation or create barriers to entry in Canada's digital economy.
Now, there are strong parts in the bill. It would give law enforcement agencies faster access to basic information, clearer legal tools for digital evidence, emergency powers when time is critical and improved co-operation with international partners. These are tools that police have been asking for, for many years, and we recognize that. However, supporting these objectives does not mean we ignore legitimate concerns. It does not mean we stop asking questions. One resident wrote to me about Bill , saying, “Privacy is the shield of free people.” Another resident wrote, “A free society should not treat everyone like a suspect.” These are not extreme views. They are common sense.
Our approach is clear. Conservatives will focus on ensuring that data retention is limited, justified and proportionate; strengthening safeguards around technical requirements; clarifying the scope and application of the bill; and ensuring strong, transparent and balanced oversight, including the role of privacy protection. If this bill is to move forward, it must earn the trust of Canadians. Canadians want safety. They want police to succeed. They want criminals held accountable. However, they also want their rights respected, their data protected and their government to act with restraint.
This bill would include a review after three years. That is a step in the right direction, but we should not wait three years to fix what we can improve today. The choice is not—
:
Mr. Speaker, I am going to be splitting my time with the member for .
A big part of the conversation around this legislation, coming from the government, seems to be about why the Conservatives are doing their job. Why are we studying this bill? Why are we fulfilling our role as the official opposition? Why do we not just trust the government with criminal justice legislation? That is something on which one could write volumes. Suffice it to say that when all of us, as members of Parliament, were in our ridings over the last couple of weeks, what we heard was that there is a crisis when it comes to our criminal justice system. I know I heard this loud and clear in my riding of Fundy Royal, which stretches from suburban areas to rural areas outside of cities.
Having sat on the justice committee at one time, I was impacted by the testimony of one witness who said to our committee members that in Canada, we do not have a justice system anymore. We have a legal system, but not a justice system. Why is that? It is because this is a system that has failed victims over and over again.
Why would we not just trust the Liberals when it comes to criminal justice legislation? Well, over the last 11 years that they have been in government, there are some things they have been very good at. When it comes to making a grandiose promise or coming up with an expensive and wasteful program, they can knock those out of the park. However, when it comes to things like staying on budget, controlling costs, criminal justice legislation and keeping us safe, one of the most fundamental values we should have as an institution, the government has demonstrably failed Canadians.
I have to look at some of the stats to back up what I am saying. Since 2015, violent crime in Canada is up 50%, homicides are up 30%, and sexual assaults are up 75%. This is a party that loves to talk about firearms, so one would think that maybe the Liberals have done some good things, but no, violent firearms offences are up 116% since the Liberals took government. Extortion is up 357%. It does not matter which part of the country or which province one is in, whether in urban or rural areas; every one of us who owns a vehicle and pays insurance is impacted by auto theft, which is up 50% in Canada since the Liberals took government.
We might ask why, over the last 11 years, we have seen this. How has this possibly happened? Why have we seen such a spike? It is a spike that, if we are honest, in talking to our constituents, every one of us is hearing of.
If we were to ask Canadians if they feel as safe as they did 10 years ago sending their child to run an errand in the community on their bike or walking, or walking through one of their community parks, or going out to dinner uptown, they would say they do not. It is not just a feeling. It is the reality. Canadians are not as safe as they were 10 years ago. Why? It is because we have a government that created this crisis through the deliberate actions it was warned would result in the kind of chaos we are experiencing right now.
Here are just a couple of examples, but I could go on.
Bill eliminated mandatory jail time for violent gun crimes like robbery or extortion with a firearm. It eliminated mandatory jail time for criminals charged with importing, exporting or producing dangerous drugs like meth and fentanyl.
Bill , which created the revolving-door justice system, introduced a principle of restraint that all judges are forced to abide by. That essentially means that someone who is arrested and brought before a judge is going to be let back out on the street on bail. We heard testimony at the justice committee of individuals who were caught and brought before a judge for a gun crime. They were out on bail for when they were caught for a previous gun crime, and they were allowed out on bail again.
No matter what legislation the government brings forward, if we are going to allow repeat and violent offenders, property crime offenders and drug dealers to continue to be back out on the street, then all the legislation in the world is not going to help, and we are going to continue to see the rise in crime that I just listed.
What have Conservatives been doing? We have been listening to our communities and law enforcement. We introduced the protection against extortion act to restore mandatory jail time for the offence of extortion with a firearm. The Liberals voted against it. We introduced the combatting motor vehicle theft act so that convicted car thieves could no longer serve their time from the comfort of their own home. The Liberals voted against it.
In the last Parliament, I introduced the stronger sentences for safer streets act. It would have reversed what was introduced in Bill when it comes to sentences for those who produce, import and export dangerous schedule I drugs such as fentanyl, heroin, cocaine and meth. Of course, the Liberals were against that. When Conservatives have stood up for our constituents and brought forward common-sense legislation, the government failed, again, to take appropriate action.
We have all read, and I heard the reference of one of the previous speakers, a decision out of New Brunswick in which an individual from Nigeria had their sentence reduced so that they would not be deported back to Nigeria. An offender had a judge reduce their sentence so it would not impact their claim to stay here in Canada.
We, on this side of the House, are not going to take lessons when it comes to criminal justice. We are listening to our constituents and the experts, and we are going to take the time to study legislation. Time and time again, the government has brought in legislation that, rather than helping Canadians be safer, has put Canadians directly in the crosshairs of those criminals.
When it comes to gun crime, rather than focusing on the border, law enforcement, cracking down on repeat violent gun offenders and putting them behind bars where they belong, the government is currently spending hundreds of millions of taxpayers' dollars to buy back guns from law-abiding Canadians. These individuals are licensed, legally bought their firearms and are legal owners of their firearms. They are not the problem. We are focusing hundreds of millions of dollars of Canadians' resources to go after individuals who are not the problem, all the while turning a deliberate blind eye to repeat offenders, reducing sentences for offenders, or not having them sentenced at all, and releasing people on bail who have no business being out on bail.
We are going to study this legislation, listen to law enforcement and our communities and continue to stand up for laws that actually restore the word “justice” to our justice system. It is on that basis that we will continue to do our job as the official opposition, with our priority always being to keep Canadians safe.
:
Mr. Speaker, in an interview last week, the was asked a question that I think is very clear and straightforward. How can it be called democracy when a minority government effectively becomes a majority government through backroom deals? That is a good question. The journalist asked him if that is truly what a democracy is. I will give the Prime Minister's response. He said that it is indeed a democracy, that members find working with the government appealing and that it was their choice. He said that the Liberal Party is the party that defends the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
In my view, that is exactly where the problem begins. Apparently, it all comes down to people's understanding and perspective, because democracy is not simply a matter of procedure. Respecting Canadians means more than just making nice announcements and keeping Canadians happy. It means more than doing what is allowed. It is extremely important to keep ethics in the picture.
It is a matter of respect, actually: respect for each Canadian's vote, respect for the member's role and respect for the balance between powers and freedoms. Members will soon see where I am going with all this. When Canadians vote, they put their trust in a party and its values. They elect members who will serve the community and the common good. Members are not there for themselves. They are there for their constituents. That is our democracy. The government does not have all the power. That is only natural, as the government must not have all the power. It is important to have a counterbalance, an opposition. This is precisely what the opposition is for. It is not there simply to oppose and block everything.
The opposition exists to improve and test proposals, and to ensure that opinions contrary to the opinions of decision-makers are generally represented, and that proposals can be improved, always keeping in mind that they are there for their constituents. Decision-makers work for them. Whether in everyday life or here, in Parliament, we improve when people challenge our ideas. It forces us to become better and in the end, that is better for everyone.
When the Liberals say that the Conservatives vote against everything and that they are not happy, what they are actually saying is that they want us to let them do whatever they want. They want us to let them implement their ideas however they see fit. They say that their vision and their plan are what matter. I think that is a serious problem. That is not what democracy is about.
The reason I am talking about all this today is that we are debating the balance of powers, the limits of those powers and public trust. That is exactly what lies at the heart of Bill . The bill directly addresses something profoundly fundamental: the relationship between security and freedom.
Obviously, as we know, times are changing, technology is evolving and criminals are taking advantage of that technology. They use the Internet, they hide behind fake accounts and they exploit technology. Yes, our police officers definitely need access to more modern tools. However, the real question is this: How far can the government go without infringing on citizens' rights? Citizens' rights are something the Liberals seem to have taken rather lightly over the past 11 years. This is where it is important to learn from the past. In life, it is important to learn and adjust course in order to improve.
Not so long ago, the government introduced Bill . According to the same Liberal government, everything had been carefully thought out, it was a good solution, and every angle and every aspect had been thoroughly analyzed. The government told us to trust them and said that this new bill was truly in the best interests of the public. They told the Conservatives to stop opposing it. In reality, we realized that the bill went too far. It granted powers that were far too broad and vague.
I will give a few examples. Both the police and Canada Post could open letters without a warrant. Cash payments over $10,000 could be banned without taking into account the fact that, in some communities, cash is still used on a daily basis. Access to information was too broad, and there were no clear limits. A wide range of personal information could be accessed. There were therefore insufficient safeguards in place. This created an imbalance and posed a potential threat to individual rights and freedoms.
This caused concern among Canadians. The Conservatives did their job then, just as we are doing today. We asked questions and pushed back on things that we did not think were in the best interest of Canadian taxpayers. When things went too far, we spoke up and said that they had to change. We spoke out against excesses, and guess what happened? The government was forced to back down and introduce a new bill, which is now Bill .
Accepting that bill without question would have been a serious mistake. Today, we are seeing the result of what I was talking about. We are improving things precisely because we are able to challenge the status quo, explore other perspectives and approaches, and ultimately ensure that citizens have access to laws that meet their expectations. Today, the government is taking a new approach through Bill , and let me be honest: Certain elements are actually better.
I will give some examples, because I am not just here to say that everything the Liberals do is wrong. When they do something right, we should support them. The bill is much more targeted and precise. It primarily targets telecommunications and Internet service providers, not all services. It introduces a form of oversight for ministerial orders. What a minister is or is not allowed to do is therefore clearer. Most importantly, people's browser history, social media activity and personal communications are off-limits. This was extremely important to taxpayers, who reached out to us to say how concerned they were about the former Bill .
Improvements deserve to be acknowledged. However, that does not mean that everything is settled and done. Central to this bill is one extremely important question that keeps cropping up: Can we trust the government to use these powers responsibly? I think this is a perfectly valid question.
The bill makes it possible to obtain information without a warrant in some cases. Well, that raises a question. The bill makes it possible to obtain personal information in some cases. That raises another question. Even so-called “basic” information can reveal a lot about someone. Once these powers in place, the government will say they are there for the right reasons and that they are intended to keep Canadians and Quebeckers safe. However, once they are in place, to what extent will they be used even after the public no longer supports them?
There is another issue that I consider extremely important as an entrepreneur: the impact on businesses. The bill will require providers to put systems in place to store and transmit certain data. For large corporations, which could have big firms and many consultants—much like the Liberals, who use them regularly—things may be fine because they have the money to do so. However, this could place significant financial strain on SMEs, which account for 99% of the businesses in Montmorency—Charlevoix and across Quebec. It could be a major burden.
The fact is, every new regulation has an impact on businesses. It is easy to write things into laws and come up with brilliant ideas, but it is important to stay in touch with the real world and the impact these changes will have on people's lives. That should always be at the root of why we make laws. The goal must always be to serve the public. There is also a key issue concerning Quebec, and I think it is important for us to bring it up: respect for provincial jurisdiction. Issues related to privacy and digital technology fall under Quebec's jurisdiction. For Conservatives, it is very important that Ottawa not interfere in these areas, and that it manage its own affairs. Ottawa should focus on managing only a few key areas and leave the rest to the provinces, because they are the ones who truly understand their day-to-day realities.
In closing, I want to come back to something extremely important: trust in our institutions, trust in democracy and trust in rights and freedoms. A law like this one only works if citizens believe in it and if citizens agree with the decisions made by elected officials. If citizens believe that their rights and freedoms are respected, they will comply. If citizens believe that abuse will be punished, they will support what is happening here. After almost 11 years of Liberal governance, years of poorly balanced bills and decisions made without consensus, it is normal for Canadians to wonder whether things will be different this time.
We, the Conservatives, will continue to work in the interest of Canadians. We are going to study this bill seriously. We are going to propose improvements because our role is not to filibuster. Our role is to ensure that laws are better for everyone.
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Mr. Speaker, today, I will speak on Bill , the lawful access act, which asks Canadians to accept something very significant. It asks telecommunications providers across this country to build and maintain systems that would allow government-authorized access to their networks. It would expand expectations around the collection and retention of so-called metadata: the time, the location, the connection, details attached to the messages and the Internet activity. It would give ministers the authority to shape how those systems are designed and enforced. This is not a small technical change. It is structural in nature. It is a structural shift in how digital infrastructure is designed and who ultimately controls it.
Let me speak plainly. Before this bill, if a government wanted to access people's private communications, listen to their telephone calls or read their messages, they had to go to court. They had to make their case to a judge. They had to show why it was necessary. Judges and our judicial system were and are a critical safeguard to our privacy. This is a foundation of our democracy.
This bill would change the system around that process. It would require telecommunications companies to build this network that is ready for access, a lawful access network. It would allow governments and government ministers to set the rules of that lawful access network. Also, it would set how this system operates. It would do that not through a parliamentary process, but backdoor channels in regulation. Instead of access being something that happens only after a judge carefully considers it, we would now be building a system where that capability is always ready to access. The system of access would be largely created not by Parliament, but by ministers behind closed doors.
I want to bring members back to Bill . Colleagues should remember the uproar over the concern Canadians had, which was raised over the real issues about how governments could access their personal, private, confidential, most intimate and personal communications. Now what the government has done instead is to take a particular section out of Bill C-2 and put it in Bill . It deals with the same issue of access to information.
To be fair, there have been some changes made to Bill from Bill . The government could no longer directly obtain consumer information. That is something I am proud of. Canadians stood up and fought for that because it is important. The government now could only ask a narrow question to telecommunications providers, "Does this consumer have an account with your company?" If they wanted more information, then they would have to go to court to obtain a production order.
Here is what Canadians also need to understand about Bill . This bill is not just about whether the data can be accessed. It is about who designed the system that made the access possible. How has the system been designed? Right now too much of that system has been designed and built behind closed doors, through regulations and without parliamentary oversight.
However, there is also a deeper issue here. Bill does not operate in a vacuum. It is arriving in a country that has deeply unequal infrastructure when it comes to digital infrastructure.
Nowhere is this more evident than in rural Canada. In many urban centres there are millions of people who share dense networks, which are layered on top of each other. Thousands of users are connected through the same infrastructure at any given time in a large city. Metadata, in that context, is spread across large populations, so it is harder to isolate and attribute specific data to a specific individual.
However, that is not the case in rural areas like mine. In Haldimand—Norfolk we would face a new and different reality from the legislation. We have a population approaching 130,000 people, spread across more than 2,900 square kilometres. That is a density of roughly 40 people per square kilometre. In Toronto, for example, the number is over 4,500. That is 4,500 people spread over a square kilometre versus 40 people spread over a square kilometre. That is a difference in density of 100 times.
That difference matters when it comes to privacy, because data collected in rural Canada is not diluted across thousands of users. It is concentrated. In many parts of my community, a single tower or wireless node may serve only a few dozen or a few hundred households. When it is connected and when the connection is logged in a rural area at a certain time, it does not point to a crowd per se; it can point to a handful of homes, the privacy of which is then compromised, especially in low-density rural areas. Over time, that could also reveal patterns, such as when someone is home, when work on a farm begins or when a small business is operating.
When the government tells Canadians that metadata is not personal, this may be true in theory, but in rural Canada it is easier to identify which data is connected with which particular user.
There is something else fundamentally out of order. The government is moving to ensure that every network can be accessed, but ensuring that every Canadian can have access to the network was not a priority. In rural Canada, people are still struggling with basic Internet access and connectivity. In my community of Haldimand—Norfolk, students are still trying to complete their homework with unstable Internet. Seniors are being pushed into digital systems they cannot reliably access. Small businesses are competing in an economy that assumes connectivity, while they are still waiting for it.
However, instead of focusing on closing that gap between rural and urban Internet access, the government would be creating new obligations on top of systems that are already uneven. Bill would apply the same rules across the country, but the impact would be greater in rural communities, where fewer users share the network, as I previously said. Costs are higher per household, privacy risks are greater and infrastructure is still incomplete. When the government says the bill is about balance, rural Canada has to ask, “balance for whom?” The law that ignores the realities of rural Canada is not balanced. It is blind to those realities.
I recognize that we need modern and responsive systems in the digital era; however, we must ensure that the systems we build do not create unintended harm, especially in rural communities that are already underserviced.
I have searched high and low, and I could not find a rural impact assessment that addresses Bill . Without an impact study, we need to ask a deeper question: Who is this system being built for? Bill C-22 needs to address proportional requirements of smaller providers. If we take the rural Canada situation, we will see that in rural Canada, Internet providers are much smaller and they do not have deep pockets. Imposing this system on them is going to cause undue financial hardship.
I must state that we also need commitment from the government that infrastructure expansion, not surveillance capability, is going to be the priority and that infrastructure expansion comes first, before the surveillance capability of the government. Canadians should not have to choose between being connected and being protected. Rural Canadians should not have to carry a disproportionate burden for a system designed without their reality in mind.
It is not enough to say that Parliament will review the system later. Under the bill, the review would happen after three years. By that time, the system is already built. What is the point? The regulations would already be in force. What is the point of reviewing a system that could cause privacy issues after it is built? Let us do it right the first time. The system and the practices would already be entrenched after three years.
There need to be checks on the system. There need to be checks on government encroachment on our freedoms. The same way that we raised concerns about Bill , concerns need to be raised about Bill , if it is encroaching on freedoms. We need to ensure that whatever system is built for lawful access, it does not encroach on privacy. We cannot accept lax rules around the government being able to access our phone or our messages. These are things that we have grown, in Canadian society, to see as sacred, and now this bill would allow governments to have access to this.
Clear oversight after the system is in place is not real oversight. It is confirmation, and that is not acceptable. In a free and democratic society, it is not enough to ask whether the state can access our data. We must also ask who decided that the data should exist and be retained in the first place. Who is accountable for that decision? If the government is going to design a system that governs Canadians' data, then Parliament must be involved before those decisions are made, not after. This is only logical.
This is not just about access to data. It is about control over the system that defines our lives. Once these systems are built, they do not just respond to decisions. They shape decisions. They determine who has access, who has ownership and who benefits. It is very important, because the system that is constructed is going to be what informs the judges and what the judges look at when they say what data could be applied to the order that is being sought. It is very important that we understand that it is not just about data. It is about power.
The question before us is simple: Will Canadians have a stake in the system that defines their lives, or will they simply be surveilled and managed by this system?