:
I call this meeting to order.
Welcome to meeting number 33 of the Standing Committee on Science and Research.
We are meeting today to resume our study on the implications of the Canada-China preliminary joint arrangement on Canada's electric vehicle sector.
As a heads-up to all members, I'll be saving a few minutes at the end of our meeting to discuss some committee scheduling.
I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of all witnesses and members. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of your screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. As a reminder, all comments should be addressed through the chair.
With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses for our first panel.
We are joined by Margaret McCuaig-Johnston, senior fellow at the University of Ottawa. She's here in person. We are also joined by David Shipley, chief executive officer and co-founder of Beauceron Security. Our third witness for this panel is Rachel Doran, executive director of Clean Energy Canada. She's joining us by video conference.
All of the witnesses will have five minutes for their opening remarks, and then we will go into our rounds of questioning.
With that, I'll ask Madame McCuaig-Johnston to start.
You have five minutes for your opening remarks. Thank you.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
In my positions with InnovAction, the science strategy, the Prime Minister's national advisory board on science and technology, advanced manufacturing technologies and ADM positions at the Department of Finance, NRCan and NSERC, my career has focused on science and technology policy, programs and funding, including initiating Canada's technology road map for electric vehicles so that Canadian companies could be major players in the sector.
I have a master's focused on China and have spoken Mandarin since 1979, so I was often asked to lead delegations to China and help them build their R and D capacity. I therefore see China through the lens of technology. As I've focused in recent years on China's surveillance technologies, I've seen clearly the risks they pose to people in China as well as to Canadians. That's why I'm concerned with the prospect of Chinese EVs coming here.
I'd first like to address the serious risks posed by the Baidu software in the vehicles that are to be imported, including Teslas and other western cars made in China. Simply put, the data from the microphones, cameras and GPS are stored in China, where they can be reviewed by Chinese officials using algorithms. In addition, any firm or individual in China must spy for Beijing if requested.
We've seen that vehicles can be remote-controlled from China. A U.S. Department of Energy report says that a surge through the cars while they're charging would destabilize the electricity grid and cause brownouts. We simply can't have such vehicles on our roads. Any that arrive must use QNX software by BlackBerry with data stored in Canada. While QNX is used in some Chinese vehicles, Chinese authorities there require that their data be stored in China. This is not acceptable for cars coming to Canada.
Furthermore, I've done a six-year study of dozens of Canadian technology company joint ventures with Chinese partners. All of them have had problems, most of them serious. If we have joint ventures here in auto technology, we should have technology transfer to Canadian firms, but their foreign investment law says Chinese authorities are not permitted to require a company to share its IP with a foreign firm. Chinese officials may say they will try to do that, but in the final analysis they will say that their hands are tied. Also, there is a strong business culture in China that no technology must be shared outside the firm, so we shouldn't be expecting that to happen.
I've spoken elsewhere about the risks of the aluminum in the vehicles as coming from unpaid Uyghur forced labour. With increased attention being devoted to that issue, I and several others wrote a constructive letter to the about the gaps that Canada has in 2026 regarding its forced labour policy enforcement, in contrast to what it was doing just last year. Canadians don't want to be driving cars made by slaves.
In addition, it's critically important that we be in a strong position to defend our enforcement of forced labour policies in the face of the U.S. section 301 investigation that will assess Canada's current practices. If they determine that we've dropped the ball, all Canadian products entering the U.S. could face tariffs of 25%.
Worse, while we've called for verifiable transparency in supply chains, Beijing brought in a new national security regulation on April 7, after our letter to the was sent, that prohibits anyone in China from revealing any information on their supply chains. Executives of foreign firms asking whether products come from Xinjiang could be banned from leaving the country, or worse. Why would Beijing pass such a regulation? It is because they don't want anyone to know.
Now we're left to accept that the aluminum is made with forced labour, but importing products made in whole or in part with forced labour into Canada is illegal. Given that, I don't see how we can import the cars at all. However, we know a consequence could be Beijing punishing our canola farmers for the fourth time. We should be diversifying our canola trade away from China as a top priority or find that every Canadian foreign policy is subject to Beijing's approval.
Thank you.
:
Thank you so much, Chair and committee members.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear again to talk about this issue.
I want to begin with a simple truth. The issues I'm going to speak to are not about Chinese vehicles only, and they are not limited to electric vehicles. I'm going to focus on the issues around connectivity. I've provided images to help you understand what I mean. Unfortunately, I can't share them by screen, but the clerk has sent them to your emails.
Exhibit A is a photo that shows the display of the modern software-defined car that comes from Hyundai's user experience lab in Seoul, which I recently visited. Exhibit B shows a modern steering wheel. It's important to note that there is no mechanical link to the front wheels. It's drive-by-wire. Software controls the steering. Exhibit C is the wireless connectivity functionality and secure gateway systems in this computer on wheels. Exhibit D is the fuse box, which is the last, best opportunity to intervene for safety and privacy.
The architecture that I have shown you in those images isn't unique to Hyundai or electric vehicles. It's in almost every new Ford, Toyota and Honda in Canadian driveways. An F-150 is just as much a computer on wheels. So is a Civic, and so on. If someone can connect to them, they can find ways to hack them.
In 2015, security researchers remotely took over a Jeep Cherokee on a highway, with a Wired magazine journalist behind the wheel. They cut the transmission at speed, and later demonstrated control of the steering and brakes when the car was in a parking lot. One vulnerability forced the recall of 1.4 million vehicles.
Little has changed in vehicle cybersecurity over the past decade.
Last year, researchers at Black Hat Asia demonstrated how they compromised a 2020 Nissan Leaf through its Bluetooth connection, pivoted through the internal network and set up persistent remote access over the cellular modem. From there, they controlled the doors, the wipers, the horn, the camera, the in-cabin microphone and the steering wheel, including while the car was in motion. It took Nissan more than 18 months to resolve that.
Earlier this year, a cyber-attack took down a Russian alarm system provider serving multiple car brands. Thousands of drivers could not unlock their cars or start their engines. Some reported engines shutting down while they were driving.
If anyone on the committee believes that the hardware and software designed outside of China are immune to their advanced, state-sponsored hacking teams, the examples I provided show evidence to the contrary. All software can be hacked.
Banning Chinese-branded cars will not stop China's advanced hacking teams. They will redirect their efforts. They will look for holes in every other manufacturer. They will look for holes in the cloud platforms that every automaker now runs, and they will find them.
The risks are not unique to Chinese EVs, and it would be a catastrophic mistake to think they will not hack other cars to achieve the same objectives. China has demonstrated the capability and the audacity to hack into even the most sensitive government systems. They can and will hack connected cars.
Last year, we learned that a Chinese state group called Salt Typhoon lived inside AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile and at least six other American telecoms undetected for three years. They compromised the very wiretap systems the U.S. government built for itself. Canada's own cyber agency co-signed the public warning. They broke into those same systems again this March.
By the way, China did not invent this playbook. The Snowden disclosures showed that western governments have pressured companies to compromise technology in the interests of their states. If we are going to take this entire issue seriously, we need to take it seriously for every vehicle on Canadian roads, from every jurisdiction.
Now I want to focus on what keeps me up at night. Espionage and privacy are real risks. They are serious, but they are not at the top of my list. Physical safety is. A compromised phone can leak your location or listen to conversations. A compromised car, at 100 kilometres per hour, is a two-tonne weapon.
The pool of people who could wield that weapon is widening. State services are no longer our only concern. Concerns now include a domestic abuser tracking a partner through a vehicle app, a grievance-driven misanthrope egged on by online radicalization groups like “The Com”, and a ransomware crew. Apps and AI tools are lowering the skill floor for exploitation, and Canada does not have a framework to detect, deter or respond effectively to any of this. We are behind, and the risk grows every day—not only from the PRC.
I made recommendations earlier this year to the Standing Committee on Industry and Technology that would help us address these risks.
The first is a physical disconnect requirement. Every connected vehicle sold in Canada should include a clearly identified hardware switch or fuse—a real one, not a software toggle—that can sever cellular and wireless external communications at the owner's discretion. This power-down is the last, best option. No, AI can't override physics.
The second is a connected car bill of rights—
:
Good morning, members of the committee and Madam Chair.
Clean Energy Canada is a national think tank at Simon Fraser University that is focused on advancing the country's energy transition.
I want to acknowledge, as the other speakers have spoken to, that this committee is studying a complicated issue involving geopolitics, security and a technology shift. These are issues that attach to much of the relationship and trade between Canada and China, as China is Canada's second-largest trading partner.
To zoom in on electric vehicles for a moment, there are a few key facts.
Electric vehicles will save Canadians money, period. Electric vehicles reduce carbon emissions over their lifetime versus a fossil fuel-powered vehicle, period. Electric vehicles are at the bottom of a long ladder of technologies that we can electrify to improve efficiency and affordability in people's lives, which is why they're the first technology to kick off a global shift to electrification, period.
The last period is this: The global auto sector is undergoing a rapid transformation. EVs are expected to make up 30% of new sales worldwide this year, and 40% by 2030. China is poised to see a sales share of around 80% by this time. China bet on electric vehicles almost two decades ago and now has a head start in technology, producing cost reductions and exports that can dominate global markets. You can't have a strategy around the future of transportation without having a China strategy, period.
In the summer of 2024, when Canada first announced the 100% tariff on Chinese electric vehicles, we noted that the federal government had had an opportunity to take a measured approach that balanced the priorities of traditional automakers in Canada's local industry with the needs of affordability-constrained Canadian consumers and our climate. Instead, Canada started with a 100% tariff approach—one that mirrored only the U.S. at that time—while Ethiopia, Australia, Brazil, the U.K. and Nepal gained access to lower-priced Chinese EVs and experienced the massive savings that come with these vehicles. Our recent analysis shows that in Canada these savings can be between $23,000 and $32,000 over 10 years of vehicle ownership. This year, we ran those vehicles that are currently on the market in a comparator of two popular Chinese models—without the federal rebate—that could make their way to the Canadian market potentially. These figures were before the recent hikes in gas prices.
To be clear, Clean Energy Canada does not support fully opening domestic markets to Chinese EVs at this time, but if Canada wants to have an auto sector in the future, let alone a competitive one, we need to be able to produce high-quality, affordable EVs and the parts and materials that go into them. “Technological and production cost reduction advancements by Chinese automakers and battery manufacturers present an opportunity for Canada to diversify its electric vehicle supply chains through strategic partnerships.” That's not Clean Energy Canada. That's the chief economist of TD Bank in 2025.
While unrestricted exposure risks wiping out domestic industry, controlled competition forces domestic manufacturers to step up their game and learn. Joint ventures can help bring technology and know-how to our manufacturing base. This can all drive innovation and productivity gains, while leading to better cars for consumers. Take the EU, which reached 27% new electric car sales in 2025. It maintains tariffs on Chinese EVs, but these are lower and more flexible tariffs. It has over 20 EV models available at sub-$40,000 Canadian price points. Only seven of those are from Chinese brands and 10 are European.
Chinese EV manufacturing plants have led to investments up the supply chain for local suppliers. Last June, BYD announced that Voestalpine, an Austrian steel manufacturer, will supply their $6-billion EV plant in Hungary. Similarly, Forvia, a French car parts supplier, has signed a deal with BYD's second EV factory in Turkey. Some local suppliers have cited falling demand from existing automakers as an issue that Chinese automakers can make up for.
A two-pronged approach of selective exposure to Chinese EVs and opening the market simply back to 2023 levels, or below 3% of the market, plus preferential market access for domestic producers, is a better path for Canadian auto sector competitiveness into the future.
At the end of the day, the Canadian government also needs to be standing up for Canadian consumers. Canadians want these vehicles and believe they'll be of high quality. Our January 2026 polling shows that more than one-third of Canadians are open to buying a Chinese EV. Among the 50% of Canadians who are interested in an EV generally, 70% expressed varying levels of interest in getting a Chinese one.
By allowing the sale of a limited number of Chinese EVs into Canada at a lower tariff rate, and by reserving a rising portion of this quota for EVs with an import price of less than $35,000, Canada is making the right choice. It's focused on creating the affordable EV segment we've been missing, while setting us up for success in a swiftly changing global market.
:
I don't, and I'm very concerned about our auto workers.
There was no consultation with our Canadian auto manufacturers in the course of these negotiations. You see this by the fact that they weren't aware of things they should have been aware of—things like forced labour for vehicles and software risks with vehicles.
I will mention, specifically, the EU tariffs, if you're talking about affordability. The EU tariffs have been up to 35% lower, but the EU has found that this is eating into not just comparable competition among EU vehicle manufacturers but also, even, combustion engines and used car sales. They're getting rid of the tariffs. Vehicle manufacturers in China can opt for them, if they want to. SAIC has opted to keep its 35% tariff. The others are negotiating prices that will be at the same level as the competition.
What we're doing here in Canada is the reverse. We're going way below the competition. When I say “competition”, we've heard that Chinese EVs will be just 3% of the Canadian car market. Well, look at electric vehicle sales. You heard the number at this committee of 30% of electric vehicle sales. That's if you include buses and electric vehicle trucks. I asked the president of Electric Autonomy to cut the numbers for me in order to carve out the autos and SUVs. The number of sales in 2025 was 123,000, so 49,000 of that would be 46%, not 30%. That rises to 70% quickly, and that's way more than half—57%. Chinese EVs, within a couple of years, would be getting way more than half of all the EV sales in Canada last year.
:
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here.
I want to begin by saying that I have, for a very long time, like others from all parties, been deeply concerned about workers' rights—not selectively. I think issues that many have raised in China and other parts of the world are real concerns that we should be mindful of in the agreements that we strike and in the way that we position conversations that we have.
I'm sorry, Professor McCuaig-Johnston, for the challenges that you are now dealing with.
I want to bring us back to the conversation that we are having here about domestic issues related to Chinese EVs and their sale in Canada. I also want to talk a little bit about the broader question of data, because you and a couple of other witnesses have mentioned data, the ability of cars to be taken over, and so on and so forth. We've heard from Mr. Shipley about the issues related to cars being taken over and these challenges.
Professor McCuaig-Johnston, are you concerned about Polestar 2s that were sold in Canada prior to 2025?
:
Okay. The agreement, if it does.... I think this is one of the things that we need to dissect a bit, because I want to make sure, like you, that Canadians are kept safe.
There are several separate issues. One is, of course, the issue related to labour and China. There's the issue related to making sure we're protecting jobs in this country and the issues related to how Canadian data is stored. I want to make sure that in these conversations, all of which are important, we're not conflating one with the other and vice versa. Sometimes we have a tendency in short spurts of questions to try to conflate one with the other.
For me, there are really three batches of things that we need to interrogate. One is obviously the issues related to labour in this country and in China. There's the issue of jobs in this country versus the export of jobs to others. The third, then, is the issue of data.
When it comes to the privacy protections of Canadians, this is something that has come up in previous conversations. There's been an acknowledgement that privacy laws in this country should apply and do apply to any vehicles that are imported. I would observe and I would consider that under the agreement we have to bring in the 49,000 Chinese EVs, this applies to them as well. We should all, I think, take a moment to figure that out, because I think it does then address that particular piece of the conversation.
When we go to the issue of jobs in this country—I would pose this to you, Professor McCuaig-Johnston and then to Mr. Shipley—the reality is that vehicles made in this country have components that have come, fortunately or otherwise, from different places, whether it's the U.S. or it's China, and so on and so forth, and those components go into Canadian-made vehicles.
Canadian-made auto jobs right now are not growing. Is there an opportunity for us to work with Chinese manufacturers to create jobs in this country? Do you think that's something that as a government we should be looking at?
:
We will always trade with China. The question is how you protect yourself from what are, in many cases, obvious risks. That's one of the things we're here talking about today: the range of risks that we face with this deal.
We've seen a lot of commentary on the risk of the agreement between the RCMP and the security police, the same security police that set up police stations across Canada, Chinese police stations, and in other countries as well.
There is a range of risks, and in taking China's approach of “strategic partnership”—that's their language—and having their requirements for what they call a “stable” relationship with China, and being “pragmatic”, which is the Chinese language they put into their readouts, Canada has gone, in my view, a bit too far, in that I thought we could have put something else on the table to relieve canola, something like investment in conventional energy rather than EVs. I think EVs are too big a risk.
I want to come back to the red flags you mentioned.
I'd like to hear your thoughts on Canada's current foreign policy.
The government has made certain statements. It's the same government—we've just changed the bus driver—but it's as if, now, human rights are no longer being taken into account when establishing economic partnerships.
How is it possible to say one thing just a few months ago and do the exact opposite today?
What is your opinion on this?
:
Yes, it's our opinion in looking at the global transportation market that the direction towards electrification is pretty undeniable.
Maybe just to speak to the complexity of the issues this committee is trying to address, it's important to realize there are companies like Volvo that have parent companies, such as Geely, that are Chinese. We have, as already mentioned, Teslas that are manufactured in China. General Motors is sourcing CATL batteries from China for Chevy Bolts. Stellantis has taken a stake in Leapmotor.
There are a lot of new partnerships emerging around the world. Because Canada has so many of the critical minerals that will feed into the battery supply chains, it's important for us to think about our opportunities in the auto sector really being much broader than final manufacturing. We should be looking for opportunities along the supply chain where we can insert our innovation and our materials, and ensure that we're getting more value-added along this supply chain. Now is the time to fit into some of those decisions and supply chains that are forming globally.
:
I call the meeting back to order. Welcome back, everybody.
I would like to make a few comments for the benefit of the witnesses, as well as the members. Please keep the noise level low. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference, click on the microphone icon to activate your mic, and please mute yourself when you're not speaking. For those on Zoom, at the bottom of you screen, you can select the appropriate channel for interpretation: floor, English or French. This is a reminder that all comments should be addressed through the chair.
With that, I would like to welcome our two witnesses for this panel.
We are joined by Dr. Ryan Ahmed, assistant professor, and Moataz Mohamed, associate professor. Both are joining us by video conference.
Welcome to committee. Thanks for appearing. Each of you will have five minutes for your opening remarks, and then we will go to the rounds of questioning.
I will ask Dr. Ahmed to start.
You have five minutes for your opening remarks.
:
Chair and honourable members, thank you for the invitation.
My name is Dr. Ryan Ahmed. I'm an assistant professor of mechanical engineering at McMaster University and the deputy director of the Centre for Mechatronics and Hybrid Technologies. My research focuses on artificial intelligence and electric vehicle batteries. I held engineering roles at General Motors, Samsung and Stellantis, working on electric vehicles and autonomous vehicles in both the U.S. and Canada. I'm a professional engineer in Ontario.
I would like to leave the committee with three observations, followed by three recommendations.
The first observation is that the technology gap is widening. There is a growing gap between Chinese and North American EV manufacturers, driven primarily by vertical integration. Chinese firms, such as BYD, manufacture roughly 75% to 80% of their vehicle content in-house, compared to about 40% for Tesla and 20% to 30% for traditional OEMs, like General Motors and Ford.
Having worked on both sides—at Samsung on the supplier side and at GM on the OEM side—I can tell the committee that the tier-one and tier-two suppliers have a built-in limitation. Each supplier protects its own know-how and optimizes its own subsystem, and there is minimal optimization happening at the vehicle level. Without closing that integration gap, a tariff simply protects a shrinking share of the value chain.
The second observation is that Canada has made a generational bet on a softening market. Canada has committed $32 billion to electric vehicles and battery manufacturing, but the market is softening. With EV sales declining and major automakers scaling back programs, we are commissioning world-scale capacity into a softening market. The 49,000-vehicle arrangement with China must be evaluated in that context.
The third observation is that the Canada-China arrangement can be constructive, but only if it's paired with conditions on science, research and domestic value-added. If pre-built Chinese vehicles are sold directly into Canada, they obviously improve affordability, but they add little Canadian engineering or IP. If the agreement is instead tied to joint research with Canadian universities, local critical minerals sourcing and, of course, enforceable data security requirements, the agreement can accelerate rather than displace Canada's EV sector.
My three recommendations are as follows.
The first is to condition quota allocations on a minimum threshold of Canadian-engineered content and critical minerals inputs, such as lithium, nickel and cobalt.
The second is to require that connected vehicle data from imported EVs on Canadian roads be stored, processed and audited under Canadian jurisdiction.
The third is to direct federal research funding to a national battery and vehicle software program that pairs universities, such as McMaster University, Waterloo and the Polytechnique Montréal, with Canadian automakers and suppliers so that the next generation of EV platforms is co-engineered in Canada, not just simply assembled or sold here.
Canada is not behind on minerals, talent or ambition. It is behind on integrated execution. Handled carefully, this agreement is an opportunity to correct that.
Thank you, Madam Chair. I welcome the committee's questions.
:
Good afternoon, Madam Chair and honourable members of the committee.
My name is Moataz Mohamed. I'm an associate professor in the department of civil engineering at McMaster University and the director of the McMaster Institute for Transportation and Logistics. My research focuses on transportation electrification, including bus transit electrification and personal vehicles. I have been researching how Canadians perceive, evaluate and decide whether to adopt electric vehicles, and what infrastructure and cost conditions shape those decisions.
I have over 54 peer-reviewed publications and my work has appeared in Nature Communications, Nature Scientific Reports and leading transportation journals. My research has been funded by Natural Resources Canada, the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.
I will use my time to present evidence from my research on four interconnected dimensions of electric vehicle adoption in Canada.
The first is the environmental benefits. In a comprehensive, evidence-based review, my team synthesized findings from over 4,700 different studies. We have found that electric vehicle adoption consistently produces a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants relative to conventional internal combustion engines. However, the magnitude of that benefit is directly tied to the emissions intensity of the electricity grid used to charge electric vehicles. Canada's electricity grid is among the cleanest in the world, which places Canada in a very strong position to realize environmental gains.
The second is vehicle utility. Understanding why adoption still lags despite the strong environmental case is a central question that my research addresses. Our data, drawn from a national survey of approximately 20,000 households across every province and territory in Canada, consistently showed that the vast majority of Canadians drive well within the range capability of modern electric vehicles, yet the gap between the perceived and actual utility remains one of the most persistent findings in our work.
The third is the perception and adoption gap. Our research found that attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural control are among the primary determinants of electric vehicle adoption intentions. However, positive adoption intentions do not reliably translate into actual behaviour decisions. We also found that many respondents reported being unaware of charging stations near their homes, yet when we cross-referenced their postal code with actual infrastructure data, charging stations were frequently present nearby.
The fourth is cost sensitivity. Across multiple studies, the purchase price emerges as the single, most consistent barrier for Canadians who have not yet adopted an electric vehicle. Even among those who acknowledge the long-term fuel savings, the upfront costs incessantly outweigh life-cycle cost reasoning in consumer decision-making behaviour. The picture is clearer when the transaction type is considered. Households replacing a primary electric vehicle are more sensitive to battery electric vehicle operating costs, while households that are adding a second vehicle are more sensitive to conventional vehicle operating costs.
The evidence from my research points consistently to a picture in which the environmental case for electric vehicle adoption in Canada is very strong, the practical utility of electric vehicles for Canadian drivers is frequently underestimated and the relationship between the infrastructure and adoption is mediated, in many ways, by perception. However, cost sensitivity at the point of purchase is a significant constraint for Canadians.
The findings point to one overarching conclusion, which is that access to lower-cost electric vehicles will increase adoption, particularly among the segment of the Canadian population that is currently on the margin of a decision. A greater availability of lower-priced electric vehicles in the Canadian market will expand the market incrementally and open the door to a segment of Canadians that current price points have kept out.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
:
It will definitely have an impact on the market.
From a technology standpoint—and I have seen this as well, working in the industry—Chinese EVs compete significantly when it comes to cost. They can offer a lot more features per dollar compared to North American vehicles. For example, the starting price point of a BYD Seagull electric vehicle with significantly more features compared to North American vehicles is at around $22,000. It will definitely have an impact.
Of course, having cheaper electric vehicles available in the market would be beneficial to consumers. We can't just open it up without any conditions on it. When it comes to owning Canadian IP and also having the universities involved, that will open up the market to us.
To answer your question, yes, it will definitely have an impact on the market.
:
That's a good question.
My recommendation is.... Having both the OEM and the supplier model, as we speak right now, is not efficient. For example, the life cycle for an electric vehicle made by an average North American company, like GM and Ford, is around five to six years, while for BYD, it's between 18 and 24 months. Having vertical integration based here within North American manufacturing will be required to be able to compete with Chinese vehicles at the moment.
It is doable, but it requires significant investments from OEMs, suppliers and, of course, the government as well.
:
Thank you for the question.
The most important aspect that motivates or triggers the market is the price at the point of purchase. Once you buy a vehicle the first time, you start developing so-called habitual behaviour. You immediately alleviate your range anxiety. You don't think about range anxiety. You don't think about buying a bigger battery. The purchase price is a critical point for people joining the EV market.
What we have observed from our studies.... In science, we've coined the term “willingness to” analysis. It's the willingness to evaluate in the era of incentives or in the era of fuel savings, especially when fuel prices spike, compared with electricity prices. We consistently found that every dollar reduction in the gap between battery electric vehicles and internal combustion engine vehicles is evaluated by users at $1.40. If you reduce the gap in price, they see added utility and receive more incentive to get into the electric vehicle market.
We have also seen this when people are considering the pre-owned electric vehicle market. The pre-owned electric vehicle market is also growing. However, we can echo most of the same conclusions we found regarding new vehicles when it comes to pre-owned vehicles.
If you are a first-time EV buyer, purchase price is the Achilles heel.
:
Thank you for the question.
Let me start with the environmental gains, because I strongly believe.... Also, evidence from research points, very clearly, to the competitiveness of Canada when it comes to clean electricity production. I'm speaking about the national average. We have very superior provinces in Canada that produce pretty much near-zero greenhouse gas emissions for each kilowatt hour of electricity produced in the grid.
In a professional capacity, I can state that the environmental gains from electric vehicles in Canada would be significant compared with other places, including the United States. Increasing the market adoption of electric vehicles in Canada will substantially reduce the transportation sector's greenhouse gas emissions.
As for the second point in your question—
Quebec is a pioneer and a very useful case study to dig deep into in order to understand and learn about the EV landscape.
As I noted in my opening remarks, we also have attitudinal and psychological factors that impact EV adoption. One that's very strong is the social norm. Educational and awareness campaigns to educate end-users on the benefits of electric vehicles, including the environmental benefits as well as the life-cycle cost benefits, are significantly important.
There's also the infrastructure intensity. What we have observed from our data is that a lot of people are not aware of the infrastructure. They don't see the charging stations because they don't use them, and their perception is that there are not enough charging stations. There is also peer pressure. When you see a lot of EVs on the road, this is an open invitation for other users to attend.
Aside from the cost, it's infrastructure in terms of charging infrastructure, especially in a multi-unit residential building. The second one is education and awareness. Both of them will motivate the market, as will stability in the incentive program.
:
Given my limited expertise in the oil and gas industry, I can comment on the electrical vehicle infrastructure.
One of the untapped markets when it comes to EV consumers is the multi-unit residential buildings, because they don't have points of access for slow charging overnight. Also, the condominium agreements in many situations and cases are not updated to reflect a high percentage of electric vehicle buyers. If we are looking into electrical vehicle infrastructure, I would say that there is still a gap. It's the so-called chicken-and-egg situation. You provide the infrastructure and the visibility, and you hope that this will trigger users to utilize the infrastructure. It's the same as most of the fundamental services that we interact with on a daily basis.
If I were to comment on the EV infrastructure, I would echo the statement that there is a need to invest in electric vehicle infrastructure, especially when it comes to low-income neighbourhoods, as well as multi-unit residential buildings, just to make sure that there is a lens of equity and inclusion when it comes to the EV landscape.
:
I think I can get some answers for next week. Otherwise, we will have to cancel the meeting on Thursday. Is it the will of the members to have the meeting cancelled on Thursday? Because if I don't get some answers today....
Some hon. members: No.
The Chair: That means we have to make some decisions today.
With that, I would like to thank both our witnesses.
Thank you, Dr. Ahmed and Dr. Mohamed, for your important testimonies and for taking the time to appear before the committee. You can leave while we move to the business part of this meeting. Thanks a lot once again.
With that, I would like to get back to some of the scheduling we have to do.
Next Monday, April 27, will be our last meeting on the EV study, so witnesses are scheduled for that.
The committee needs to determine its next study. Pursuant to the practices of this committee that we have seen in the last year, it would be the Liberal Party's turn to choose the next study. The committee adopted a few motions to that effect on February 9. To hear which one will be the next study, I will turn to the Liberal members.
MP McKelvie.
:
As we come to an end, I wanted to raise something that came up earlier in the committee.
Thus far, I think we have managed to work in a reasonably collegial, collaborative format. A couple of members have expressed some concern over some reasonably unparliamentary language that was used, in particular a comment that was made about somebody who may or may not consider switching teams, which folks were pretty offended by.
Among us, I wonder if there's a way we could try to—
An hon. member: [Inaudible—Editor]
Taleeb Noormohamed: I don't think it was very much on the record. That's part of the challenge.
:
Thank you, MP Noormohamed, for pointing that out.
I would request that all members use parliamentary language and work collegially with each other. This is one of the topics, I think, where too much partisan politics is not needed. I think we can do important work and contribute towards building Canada strong. I hope the members can work together. Building Canada strong is not partisan.
There's one quick thing before we end this meeting.
On March 23, the committee adopted a motion to invite the chief statistician, the president of the NRC, the chief science adviser and the president of the Canadian Space Agency each for two hours. Lisa Campbell, president of the CSA, is confirmed for Monday, May 25. The chief statistician is confirmed for May 28.
The president of the NRC would be available June 4, 8 or 18. Can we send an invitation for June 4? Would that work for everybody?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Okay. The chief science adviser has scheduled activities outside Canada in May and would be available in June. We could invite her for June 1 or June 8. Is that agreed?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Okay.
Go ahead, MP Noormohamed.