JUST Committee Meeting

     Good afternoon everybody. I'd like to call this meeting to order.

    Welcome to meeting number 29 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights. Pursuant to the order of reference of February 2, 2026, the committee is meeting to pursue its clause-by-clause study of Bill C-16, an act to amend certain acts in relation to criminal and correctional matters regarding child protection, gender-based violence, delays and other measures.

    Today's meeting is taking place in hybrid format. Members are attending in person in the room. No one is attending remotely on Zoom today.

    I'd like to make a few comments for the benefit of witnesses and members. Please wait until I recognize you by name before speaking. For those participating by video conference—I don't think there are any—click on the microphone icon to activate your mic. Please mute yourself when you are not speaking.

    I remind you that all comments should be addressed through the chair. For members in the room, please raise your hand. For members on Zoom, please use the “raise hand” function. The clerk and I will manage the speaking order as best we can. We appreciate your patience and understanding in this regard.

    I'd like to welcome our witnesses back. They're here to answer technical questions that you may have.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor and Ms. Burt. You really need no introduction at this meeting, having spent so much time with us.

    When we adjourned, we were debating the subamendment to CPC-23. We will continue from there and start a new speakers list.

    Mr. Brock is first on the list, followed by Mr. Lawton.

    Mr. Brock, you have the floor.

     Thank you, Chair.

     I'd like to start off by recapping how things progressed last Monday. I believe every member of this committee will recognize the efforts made by Conservatives to essentially deem movement of probably the last two dozen or two dozen and a half government amendments without the necessity of any explanation because I truly felt we were on a path to complete Bill C-16 clause-by-clause.

    I'm not going to get into the circumstances that came up at the very last minute with respect to the deferral of two Conservative amendments—that's water under the bridge—but for the record, I want to telegraph that it was the Conservatives' intention all along to see the passage of Bill C-16 out of the justice committee. I strongly believe that there is a pathway to that today. To get to that pathway I wish to put on notice that I'm seeking unanimous consent for the following motion:

    I propose, Mr. Chair, that we suspend briefly so that this can be submitted to all committee members in both official languages.

    Ms. Lattanzio has the floor.

    On what may be a point of clarification, my colleague is seeking unanimous consent to be able to present this motion, correct?

    That's correct.

    Okay.

    He read everything. Are we voting?

    Do we have unanimous consent?

    Some hon members: No.

    The Chair: Okay. Thank you.

    That takes us back to the subamendment of CPC-23. Mr. Brock, I take it that you're finished speaking.

    I am for now.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Lawton, you have the floor.

    (On clause 63)

     Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    We're debating here the subamendment that was put forth on Monday by Mr. Mantle. It's a substitution for an amendment from Mr. Baber on clause 63. This is the clause dealing with the so-called safety valve that the Liberals have opted to put in Bill C-16 to tremendously weaken the force and effect of mandatory minimum penalties.

     Mr. Baber's amendment would add:

    Mr. Mantle's subamendment would replace all the words that we just read with this:

     That would become the text of proposed subsection 718.4(1.1).

    With all due respect to Mr. Baber, I'm inclined to favour Mr. Mantle's subamendment slightly more. However, I think it's important to situate this in the context of the actual clause we're discussing here, and that is clause 63 and proposed subsection 718.4(1), which says:

    I'm going to turn to the officials in just a moment on this, but as far as where I hope this came from.... In the fall, we had the Senneville decision from the Supreme Court of Canada, which was rooted in a really horrendous decision by the Supreme Court, but the truly atrocious part was actually the original trial judge in the Senneville and Naud cases, who found that a mandatory minimum penalty of one year was itself cruel and unusual punishment for men each in possession of hundreds of videos and images of absolutely horrific child sexual abuse and exploitation material.

    This has come up in discussions we've had with witnesses on this, and this has come up even as we have debated some of the clauses and amendments of Bill C-16. We have to look at mandatory minimum penalties as a safeguard against this sort of really insane leniency that some judges are inclined to give to really brutal offenders.

    Now, if I had my way, the one-year mandatory minimum would be back in. It would be defended by the notwithstanding clause so that we don't have activist judges shouting down what parliamentarians, representative and accountable to the people, have said. We would also ensure, in an ideal world, that it was more than one year because, for the types of crime we're talking about here, I think that is entirely appropriate. Most people would be shocked to find that one year was the mandatory minimum for having hundreds of images of children as young as four years old being raped and abused in any number of ways.

    I find it to be really disheartening when we talk to people. We've had witnesses at this committee such as Liz Brown of Valora Place in St. Thomas and Jennifer Dunn of the London Abused Women's Centre. We've had London Police Service chief Thai Truong. We've had activists and advocates representing women's agencies and child protection agencies. Every day, all these people have to live with witnessing brutality in the world that most of us never have to encounter. They see the pieces that these crimes leave behind on the victims.

    Despite our disagreements on this bill, I truly believe that everyone on this committee wants to do right by children in our society and wants to do right by women and all victims of crime. I feel that where the divergence has happened here is that there is a belief system that is rooted far more in abstract legal theory and less in standing up for victims. That's what's driving a lot of these very dangerous policies we've seen, not just on bail legislation but also, and especially, on things like mandatory minimums. We get so focused on what law professors and legal scholars are saying that we lose sight of the purpose of the justice system, which is to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions, to deter future perpetrators and to give some modicum of justice to people who have been victimized by crimes or whose family members have been victimized by crimes.

     We can't lose sight of that core objective, which should govern all the work we're doing as MPs and certainly as members with the great privilege of being on the justice committee, which has two more members now that the Liberals have stacked the committee. I welcome our new colleagues.

    We have to put justice and victims' rights first. It would provide a way out for judges who fundamentally reject the idea of mandatory minimums, which parliamentarians have put in place time and time again. It would give judges a button they can press if they felt that it was not fair to put a child pornographer behind bars.

    I want to talk about what this safety valve says.

    Officials, this will sound like a broad question, but I hope you'll understand where I'm going. If you're unclear, I'm happy to clarify it. What does “in the circumstances” refer to?

    When a judge is making this decision on whether a safety valve applies, what information are they permitted or compelled to bring in, as far as that assessment of circumstances?

     Since the threshold chosen for the safety valve was the constitutional standard of cruel and unusual punishment, then I think we can expect courts to rely on the body of jurisprudence that has developed around section 12. They would look at examples of previous MMPs that were struck down and situations in which those MMPs were struck down. There will be a broad body of jurisprudence for courts to rely on.

    Where it says, “minimum punishment would amount to cruel and unusual punishment for that offender”, they're deciding whether it's cruel and unusual not only based on the facts of the crime, but also based on the circumstances of the offender, as I read that.

    What is being drawn into that assessment?

    I think we could expect courts to look at the circumstances of the offence, the degree of responsibility of the offender and the types of factors that courts are accustomed to analyzing when reaching a proportionate sentence.

    Would an offender's immigration status be considered?

    As part of this analysis, they would look at all of the circumstances surrounding that particular offender and the events.

    If a judge believes an offender's immigration status could be jeopardized by upholding the mandatory minimum, could that be factored into cruel and unusual punishment being determined?

     The courts have been pretty clear, and we've talked at this committee, about the Supreme Court decision in Pham and the role that collateral consequences can play in sentencing. Sentencing courts are allowed to take into consideration collateral consequences of a sentence, whether that be immigration status or employment status. However, when they take those consequences into consideration, they cannot adjust the sentence in a way that would result in the sentence being unfit for that particular offender.

    When determining whether the circumstances are cruel and unusual, there is nothing in proposed subsection 718.4(1), nothing in the safety valve, that compels judges to look at the effects it would have on victims and their rights.

    As Ms. Burt mentioned, when assessing whether a particular sentence would be cruel and unusual in a constitutional context, they are going to look at the seriousness and the gravity of the offence. I think that would provide an opportunity for them to consider aspects related to the victim.

     I will look up some of the cases you've cited.

    Please add me back to the speakers list, Mr. Chair. I'm finished right now.

    Thank you, Mr. Lawton.

    I'm going to suspend for a few moments.

     I'd like to call this meeting back to order.

    Mr. Brock, I think you have a question.

    There was a question, Mr. Chair, posed to you and the clerk before you suspended, approximately 15or 20 minutes ago. A certain number of questions were put to you. I'm hopeful that you have an answer you can share with us.

    On the basis of the way you put it, I don't have anything to answer, because I had a number of questions while we were suspended. If you have a specific question you want to ask me or that Mr. Gill wants to ask me—

    Yes. I'll make it very specific, Chair.

    Ultimately, if hypothetically we moved to a vote on Mr. Baber's amendment and Mr. Mantle's subamendment, that would take us to the rest of clause-by-clause consideration and ultimately you would be putting a question to this committee. That question is: Shall the bill, as amended, carry? I want to know, as members of my party wish to know, whether that issue is debatable.

    Or “Shall the chair report the bill as amended to the House”....

    That as well, yes.

    It's either-or.

    Yes.

    When we get to that point, if somebody asks to make submissions on that, I will allow it.

    Thank you, Chair.

     On that basis, I understand that the Conservative position is that we move to a vote on Mr. Baber's amendment and Mr. Mantle's subamendment at this time.

    Okay. We'll have to vote on the subamendment first.

     We will read the subamendment again.

     In English, it's to replace the text after 1.1 with: “In determining the constitutionality of any mandatory minimum penalties, the court shall not consider reasonable hypotheticals.”

     Mr. Fortin has the floor.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I would like to propose a friendly amendment to Mr. Baber. It's a bit odd to write in a piece of legislation that reasonable hypotheticals can't be considered. I think what he's getting at is that hypothetical scenarios can't be considered. I would agree with that. I would remove the word “reasonable”. Saying that the court “shall not consider reasonable hypotheticals” is like saying that it can consider hypotheticals if they're unreasonable. That makes no sense, and it's not what we want to do. If he accepts my proposal, I'm fine with that.

     Mr. Fortin, I believe we were getting to the point where we were going to vote on the subamendment, and we are at that point.

    (Subamendment negatived: nays 7; yeas 4)

    (Amendment negatived: nays 7; yeas 4)

     (Clause 63 agreed to: yeas 7; nays 4)

    The Chair: This takes us to the concluding parts of the process. We have four items before us, just so we're clear.

    Shall the short title carry?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: Shall the title carry?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: Shall the bill as amended carry?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    Some hon. members: No.

    The Chair: We have a speakers list, starting with Mr. Brock.

    Actually, it's Mr. Caputo.

    Okay. I had Baber and then Caputo, but I don't suppose it matters if you want to switch. I'll leave it up to you.

    It's really great to back here at the justice committee. I wonder if I was missed. I just heard a “no” from across the way. Mr. Fortin says I was missed. The chair is giving me a hard time and I'm hearing—

    We're glad you're back, Mr. Caputo, but let's get to this important issue, shall we?

    All right.

    This is for the officials. One of the things I find very interesting in the bill is the importation of “cruel and unusual”, which has been defined in the jurisprudence. One of the things you said, Ms. Burt, is, “we can expect”. Is it a grossly disproportionate threshold? Is that still the threshold for cruel and unusual punishment?

    Yes, that's what we expect that the courts would follow. It's the threshold of gross disproportionality.

    When you say “gross disproportionality” and “we can expect”.... Obviously, there is some ambiguity whenever something is not defined in legislation. Is that right?

    We can expect that the courts would have, as I said earlier, a robust body of case law to rely on, given the threshold that was used, but that's correct. If it's not defined, it is open to the courts to interpret.

     The Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court in the land, as we all know, and it has taken a living tree approach to all sorts of law. In fact, in the Rodriguez decision—if memory serves, it was in 1993—the judges said there was “no constitutional right” to die, as in there was no constitutional right to kill oneself through what we then called euthanasia.

     Carter came along in 2015. That was a mere 22 years later. That's not very long in the life of the law. Carter came to a completely different conclusion after just 22 years. There was no new statutory law that Carter was based on. Carter wasn't interpreting a different provision of the Criminal Code or of some other federal legislation. Carter was an application that said they wished to engage in what was rebranded as medical assistance in dying, just as Rodriguez was seeking, I believe, to strike down the Criminal Code prohibition on euthanasia.

    They were both asking the exact same question and the court came to very different conclusions only 22 years later, when the body of law—that which was being considered—was largely the same. I don't think I'm going out on a limb here.

    The point I am trying to make is that “grossly disproportionate” is what the court is saying today. Do you have any idea about what the court will say tomorrow?

    I understand the question.

    I think, as Ms. Burt has said, there is a fairly robust body of jurisprudence on gross disproportionality. We know it's a high threshold. We know it's not something that is routinely meant to be bound to exist. The courts have talked about it as being something that outrages society's sense of decency that the punishment in a particular case would be so excessive.

    However, I think you are correct, Mr. Caputo, in the sense that what those concepts mean continues to be informed by judicial interpretation and guided by stare decisis.

    Exactly. You said it much better than I could have; you said it so much more eloquently.

    The point is that nowhere in Bill C-16 is “cruel and unusual punishment” defined. Is that correct?

    That's correct. In choosing the standard, the government has made a policy decision to import the jurisprudence that Ms. Burt and I have talked about in response to different questions.

    It's interesting that you say they've chosen to import the jurisprudence, because they haven't chosen to codify the jurisprudence. Isn't that right?

    I think in using the standard of cruel and unusual punishment, the intent is that the courts would be guided by the jurisprudence that interprets that concept.

    I agree with you that that's what they are saying, but they haven't said.... For instance, the bill doesn't say, “You will be subject to a mandatory minimum penalty unless the penalty would be grossly disproportionate in the circumstances.” They didn't say that. Do you get what I'm saying? It is a different.... They're using the section 12 language. They're not using the section 12 test.

    Do you get what I mean by that?

    I think so. The test is different, Mr. Caputo. The point of proposed section 718.4 is to provide the courts with a mechanism by which they can depart from the imposition of a mandatory minimum penalty in very circumscribed circumstances in a case where—based on the facts in that particular case, the seriousness of the offence and the degree of the responsibility of the offender and other sentencing principles—the imposition of the MMP would, in that case, to use the language of the court, outrage society's sense of decency.

     That's a really interesting one.

    I'm going to talk for a second here on outraging society and decency, because in the Senneville case, in the court's eyes, to impose a one-year mandatory minimum would outrage the sense of decency in society. That was the court's decision, whereas I think a lot of Canadians here...and I'm not assailing the court's decision. I'm speaking about what I think, what I hear from constituents, which is that the striking down of that actually outraged a number of Canadians and their standards of decency.

    One of the interesting things we have to look at is what is in Bill C-16 and what isn't in Bill C-16. I spent far too long dealing with sexual offences against children. One of the highlights in coming to Parliament Hill was meeting Justice Moldaver, who, for those who don't know, was on the Supreme Court of Canada until, I guess, roughly 2020, and maybe 2022 or something like that, and somebody here probably knows better. I met him and I referenced the Woodward decision on Internet luring. I could talk about this for hours.

    We know.

    You know? Oh, come on. It would be so insightful, would it not, Ms. Lattanzio?

    It would.

    What Woodward said was about Internet luring and its minimum penalties. It talked about this insidious crime and how the range should probably be from three to five years. That was when Parliament had a 10-year maximum.

     I will make this point very quickly. Nowhere are we dealing with mandatory minimums on sex offences in Bill C-16, the most insidious types of offences: production of child sexual abuse material, Internet luring, offences like that. It should be there.

    Thank you.

    Thank you, Mr. Caputo.

    Mr. Brock, please go ahead.

     I have another motion for consideration on unanimous consent that I have shared with the parliamentary secretary. I wish to read it out as follows:

    Do we have unanimous consent for Mr. Brock to introduce that motion?

    Can we have it in writing, Mr. Chair?

    I'm sorry, Mr. Fortin. I beg your pardon?

    Can we have the text of the motion? If not, can it at least be sent to our P9?

     We'll suspend for a moment to get that in writing.

     I call this meeting back to order, please.

    The motion, I understand, has been circulated by email.

    Mr. Fortin, did you receive a copy?

    Yes, Mr. Chair, I received it.

    Are we in a position to vote on the motion, then?

    Mr. Chair, I would like to move an amendment.

    Okay.

    My motion to conduct a study on the judicial appointment system, which had been proposed in April, was adopted in September, and that study was given priority. I understand that we have a full agenda and that bills have to return to the House by certain dates, but I think we can complete that study. The motion I'm talking about proposed that we devote four meetings to it.

    What I propose as an amendment is that we insert a paragraph between bullets 2 and 3 of Mr. Brock's motion to move that the committee go ahead with the study on the judicial appointment system under federal jurisdiction, immediately after the study of Bill C‑231, for four meetings, and that it then report back to the House, as stated in the motion.

    We should be done with those four meetings somewhere around June 10, and we could then proceed with the study of Bill C‑235. I have been calling for this study for years. We prioritized it in September, with the consent of the Liberals and the Conservatives. I was glad to see that we were all in agreement on that. Now, I'm afraid that it will be forgotten, which would be quite a shame for all Quebeckers and Canadians, who are waiting for us to conduct this study.

    Ms. Lattanzio has the floor.

    Mr. Chair, we fully understand my colleague's request. Regardless of the fact that we agreed to do a study on the issue that Mr. Fortin raised, we won't have the time. We have about seven meetings left, and there are already private members' bills that will definitely be referred to this committee. More importantly, government bills will likely also be referred to this committee. I would be uncomfortable committing to devote four meetings to this study, when we'll have seven meetings left as of May 25. It's a lack of time, not a lack of will.

    That said, I'd like to take a few seconds to discuss this with Mr. Fortin. Again, if I'm reluctant, it isn't because I don't want us to do this study. The members of this committee have already expressed their willingness to do it. However, we're running out of time. I'll say it again: We only have seven meetings left, and as you know, Mr. Fortin, government bills always take precedence over other ones.

    For those reasons, Mr. Chair, I ask you to suspend the meeting for a few minutes.

    We are suspended.

     I call the meeting back to order.

    We left off discussing Mr. Fortin's amendment to the motion. I don't think anybody wants to speak to that.

    Mr. Fortin.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I would simply like to conclude by saying that we had already agreed to do this study in September. I think I said so earlier, but I'm saying it again. I apologize for that. I understand that government bills could be referred to our committee. According to the information I have, there's no rule that we have to give them priority, but I understand that there may be one, from what I'm told. We'll see. I haven't seen it yet, and nobody on my side has seen it either, but never mind.

    I understand that, for one reason or another, we're probably going to have to prioritize the bills that are going to be referred to the committee, but right now, we're making a decision on a schedule. We're blocking a study that we agreed to in September just because we think there may be—we don't know—other bills in June. I find that a shame. We should work according to the information we have. If something else comes up in June, our Liberal colleagues will have all the flexibility they need to tell us that, despite what we agreed on, there's a bill that we have to study as a priority for one reason or another.

    I think it's a shame that decisions we have made over the past year are being set aside today. The only reason I can see is that the government, which now has a majority, believes that what opposition members think in committees is secondary or even irrelevant. I apologize; I don't want to be mean to my colleagues, for whom I have a great deal of respect, but the fact remains that we're preparing to set aside decisions that have already been made, and I find that a shame.

     Thank you, Mr. Fortin.

    (Amendment negatived: nays 6; yeas 5 [See Minutes of Proceedings])

    (Motion agreed to: yeas 10; nays 1)

    The Chair: Going back to the bill, shall the bill as amended carry?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    An hon. member: On division.

    The Chair: Shall the chair report the bill as amended to the House?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    An hon. member: On division.

    The Chair: Shall the committee order a reprint of the bill as amended for the use of the House at report stage?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    An hon. member: On division.

    The Chair: That concludes that.

    I will say thank you to the members.

     I want to say thank you to our witnesses, who have been here for days and days and hours, and who have been incredibly patient and understanding. We're very grateful for that.

     I want to say thank you to the people sitting beside me on each side, behind me and over to my left, because this has been a long, gruelling and unpredictable process. You've been incredibly patient, and we couldn't have done it without you.

     I want to say we appreciate every one of you. We're incredibly grateful.

     Even to the people who came to watch, thank you, too.

    Mr. Brock.

    To follow up, to Mr. Taylor and Ms. Burt, I echo the chair's comments. Please extend our gratitude to your colleagues, who withstood gruelling days at this committee as we studied Bill C-16. Their patience was noted and we thank them for it.

    Thank you.

    Lastly, I will thank all of the members, because it was a long, gruelling process, but we got there.

     With regret, I have a very brief point of order.

    In light of the motion we just passed, are there any deadlines that we need to be made aware of to submit witness names to the committee?

     I believe the next meeting is going to be with the minister on Monday the 25th.

    We'll get an email out to you.

    Thank you, everybody. The meeting is adjourned.