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Good evening, everyone. It's a pleasure to be here to welcome all of you to meeting number 38 of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities.
Today's meeting is taking place in a hybrid format, pursuant to the House order of January 25. The proceedings will be made available via the House of Commons website. Just so that you are all aware, the webcast will always show the person speaking rather than the entire committee.
To ensure an orderly meeting, I would like to outline a few points to follow. Members and witnesses may speak in the official language of their choice. Interpretation services are available for this meeting. You have the choice at the bottom of your screen of either the floor, English or French.
For members participating in person, proceed as you usually would when the whole committee is meeting in person in a committee room. Keep in mind the directives from the Board of Internal Economy regarding masking and health protocols.
Before speaking, please wait until I recognize you by name. If you are on the video conference, please click on the microphone icon to unmute yourself. For those in the room, your microphone will be controlled as normal by the proceedings and verification officer. Just as a reminder, all comments by members and witnesses should be addressed through the chair. When you are not speaking, your mike should be on mute.
With regard to a speaking list, as always, the committee clerk and I will do our very best to maintain the order of speaking for all members, whether they are participating virtually or in person. I will remind all members to use the “raise hand” function. I will also be utilizing that function to indicate one minute left on the floor. When you see my hand go up, that means you have one minute remaining. Of course, with that, you are expected to conclude your remarks within that one minute.
Members, pursuant to Standing Order 108(2) and the motion adopted by the committee on April 27, the committee will now begin its study of railway safety and the impacts of railway operations on neighbouring properties.
I would now like to introduce our witnesses.
For the first hour, from 6:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m., from the Canadian Transportation Agency we have Mr. Tom Oommen, chief compliance officer. From the Department of Transport we have Mr. Aaron McCrorie, associate assistant deputy minister, safety and security; Mr. Michael DeJong, director general, rail safety; Mr. Benoit Turcotte, director general, transportation of dangerous goods; and Mr. Jasmir Basi, regional director, surface transportation.
From 7:30 p.m. to 8:30 p.m., our second hour, from the Canadian National Railway Company we have Mr. Tom Brown, assistant vice-president of safety; from the Canadian Pacific Railway, Mr. Keith Shearer, assistant vice-president, safety and sustainability; from the Comité ferroviaire de Boucherville, Ms. Isabelle Bleau, city councillor, City of Boucherville, and Mr. François Beaulne, chair, subcommittee; from the Friends of Morice-Bulkley, Ms. Dawn Remington, chair; from the Railway Association of Canada, Mr. Marc Brazeau, president and chief executive officer; and finally, from the Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako we have Mr. Gerry Thiessen, chair.
With that, we'll start off with the first set of witnesses for our first hour, beginning with the Canadian Transportation Agency
Mr. Oommen, you have five minutes.
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Thank you, Chair, for this opportunity to appear before the committee today.
My name is Tom Oommen. I am the chief compliance and enforcement officer of the Canadian Transportation Agency.
[Translation]
The Canadian Transportation Agency was established in 1904 and is Canada's longest–standing independent, quasi–judicial tribunal and regulator. The members of the agency, including the chair and CEO, are appointed by the Governor in Council for fixed terms. The decisions of the agency are made by panels of members, which are established to deal with specific issues under consideration by the agency. The decisions of the agency are made independently of government. The members of the agency are supported by a staff of public servants, like myself, who assist the members in their decision–making role.
[English]
The agency, through its members, has statutory authority to make decisions on a wide range of matters in the transportation sector. For example, the agency makes certain regulations, issues licences to air carriers, issues the annual maximum revenue entitlement to CN and CP for the carriage of western grain for export, approves railway line construction and adjudicates complaints from passengers and shippers. Agency staff also monitor compliance with and enforce agency orders and the regulatory framework for which the agency is responsible.
A fundamental public interest role of the Canadian Transportation Agency is ensuring that railway companies in federal jurisdiction have the required liability insurance. Federally regulated railway companies must have a certificate of fitness issued by the agency under the Canada Transportation Act, as well as a railway operating certificate issued by Transport Canada under the Railway Safety Act. In order for the agency to issue a certificate of fitness to a railway company, the agency must be satisfied that the railway company holds the liability insurance required by the Canada Transportation Act.
The Canada Transportation Act requires that freight railways hold specific amounts of liability insurance depending on what they carry. The highest tier of liability insurance is required by those railways that carry over 1.5 million tonnes of crude oil per year, or over 50,000 tonnes of toxic inhalation hazard per year. These railway companies are required to hold liability insurance of $1 billion per incident. The railway companies' liability does not depend on proof of fault or negligence. If more than one railway is involved in a railway accident, they jointly and severally bear the liability, up to the amount of insurance that they are required to hold.
In order to maintain their certificates of fitness, each year a railway company files a number of documents with the agency, including a certificate of insurance. This documentation states the forecasted amount of crude oil and toxic inhalation hazards to be carried by the railway company. It lists the insurance policies that the railway company holds, up to the required amount. Following submission, there's a careful review of the documentation. The agency would suspend or cancel a certificate of fitness if the liability insurance requirements are not met.
Just before closing, I will also mention one additional role for the agency. In June 2015, the Railway Safety Act was amended to allow a provincial or municipal government to apply to the agency to recover costs reasonably incurred in responding to fires resulting from railway operations. If the agency determines that a fire was the result of railway operations, it will then decide the costs that were reasonably incurred by the relevant authority in responding to the fire.
Thank you, Chair. That concludes my opening remarks.
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Thank you, Mr. Chair. That will be me, Aaron McCrorie.
On behalf of my colleagues Ben Turcotte and Mike DeJong, it's a pleasure to be here this evening. Unfortunately, due to technical difficulties, our colleague Jasmir Basi was not able to join today and she sends her regrets.
Today, I would like to take this opportunity to update you on our work to ensure rail safety in Canada and share a brief status update on our efforts to implement the Auditor General's recommendations from the follow-up audit on rail safety, as well as the recommendations from the commissioner of the environment and sustainable development's follow-up audit on the transportation of dangerous goods.
Every day railway companies carry goods, including dangerous goods, across the country that are essential to our well-being, the creation of jobs and economic growth. For example, rail transportation ensures that prairie grain gets to export markets, consumer goods get to Canadian households, and communities get chlorine to ensure safe drinking water or propane for heating and fuel. Transport Canada is committed to ensuring the safe and secure movement of these goods by rail, especially dangerous goods.
An effective safety program is built around multiple lines of defence, with each component enhancing and complementing the other. Transport Canada has a comprehensive safety strategy in place to prevent and minimize the impacts of rail accidents and to effectively respond to incidents involving dangerous goods. Transport Canada prescribes stringent safety requirements for railway operations and to transport dangerous goods by rail. For example, all federal railways operating in Canada are required to ensure that dangerous goods are transported in the appropriate means of containment, such as the new more robust tank cars required for flammable liquids; comply with the key trains and key routes rule, which sets out slower track speeds and increased track inspection requirements for trains carrying dangerous goods; adhere to the track safety rules, which set out strict safety requirements to protect the integrity of our railway tracks; have an improved emergency response assistance plan, ERAP, that describes the response capabilities, including the specialized personnel and equipment needed to respond to an accident involving dangerous goods; and to provide comprehensive dangerous goods information to emergency planning officials, which can be easily accessed in an emergency to support first responders.
These requirements are supported [Technical difficulty—Editor]. On average, Transport Canada completes about 35,000 rail safety inspections and about 4,000 dangerous goods inspections per year. Additionally, the rail safety program now conducts, on average, 25 SMS audits, safety management system audits, per year, up from three per year in 2013. These inspections and audits allow Transport Canada to swiftly detect and support the resolution of non-compliances, educate stakeholders on regulatory requirements and best practices and take enforcement action when necessary.
These efforts have allowed us to demonstrate real results for improving safety for Canadians and their communities.
I would like to quote the Transportation Safety Board, which tweeted in March, “959 railway accidents were reported to the TSB in 2020—a 12% decrease from the five-year average of 1,091—and 59 rail-related fatalities reported in 2020, 13 fewer than the previous year”.
The transportation of dangerous goods program is also making progress on the safety front. There were 81 rail accidents where dangerous goods were present, though not necessarily released in 2020, down from 171 in 2019 and well below the five-year average of 128. These statistics show that our improved oversight is leading to better results, but we can and need to do better. We are always striving to improve upon our strong foundation of safety.
The Auditor General’s work on rail safety and the transportation of dangerous goods has challenged and guided us to do better in our commitment to being a world-class regulator, and to continuously improve. Recognizing the importance of continuous improvement, we are working hard to implement the Auditor General’s recommendations.
The transportation of dangerous goods program has made significant progress in addressing the recommendations from their follow-up audit. For example, we have improved and updated databases to have more complete and accurate information on regulated companies and their compliance status. We have enhanced how we assess compliance for means of containment. We have implemented an online tracking system to ensure conditions for moving ERAPs are met.
The rail safety program is also making progress to address the Auditor General’s recommendations. We have established a process to integrate the findings from audits of safety management systems into our oversight planning. This means that our oversight is even more risk-based and comprehensive. Our inspections account for the findings from safety management system audits, and vice versa.
We have also achieved early progress against other recommendations. For example, we have developed guidelines for follow up on safety management system audits, improved our data management of safety management systems by launching the pilot of a new database that tracks audit findings, and established a framework to support our auditors in conducting effectiveness audits of safety management systems.
I'm pleased to note that we are on track to launch effectiveness audits of safety management systems in September 2021, which aligns with the Auditor General's recommendations.
To conclude, these actions are consistent with our broader commitment to protecting Canadians who live and work along rail lines. While the data shows we have a strong safety program in place, we remain committed to doing even better.
Thank you. We look forward to your questions.
Thank you to all of our guests for being here tonight.
With your indulgence, Chair, I'm going to relay a story that I've already told once before, but seeing that we're discussing rail safety, this is a very pertinent and touching story.
I'd like to recall a tragic event that took place in my riding just this year, on February 21, 2021. On a crisp winter morning, a Sunday morning to be exact, at 9:20, a young 13-year-old, grade 8 student by the name of Kevin Morgan, who attended Portage View Public School in my riding, was walking his dog along some CP railway tracks just north of Highway 90 in Springwater. What happened was very tragic. This young boy's dog got loose from his lead, and the young boy tried to push the dog out of the way, successfully saving the dog, but regretfully, didn't himself get out of the way in time to miss an oncoming train. His life was taken that early morning. Obviously, it's a tragic event that has affected the community and family.
I know that all accidents are not preventable, but I would like to know that there's some comfort to the family in knowing that something can be done going forward.
I'd like to address this to Mr. Oommen and also to Mr. McCrorie. Is there any way, going forward, we could help educate youngsters on, obviously, the perils of being on train tracks?
I know this isn't the first time, and it's not the last time, but hopefully it will be some of the limited times. Perhaps you could expand on a tragic incident like this and what's being done to prevent it in the future.
Thank you.
First of all, our deepest sympathies to the family.
This is the business we're in, trying to prevent these kinds of deaths.
The member highlights a particularly challenging area for us in railway safety. Last year there were 59 rail-related fatalities, and 39 of them, the majority of them, involved what I'll describe as “trespassing”. I don't want to suggest that in this instance it was trespassing, but that's where the vast majority of the deaths are taking place.
One of the challenges we have, from a regulatory point of view, is that it's very hard to regulate that. The success story that I can point to is Operation Lifesaver. In 2020 we gave $2 million in funding to Operation Lifesaver, which is an organization that does a lot of community outreach—safety promotion efforts with community groups, with schools, for example. It's a long-standing success story in the rail safety program. I think it's these efforts, which are very much about educating people about the perils and dangers of being around trains, being around railway tracks, and addressing individuals when they're young, so that we create a culture of safety from the get-go.
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Thank you, Mr. Chair, for the question.
Indeed, as the Auditor General's follow-up audit pointed out, Canada's railway network is impacted by extreme weather and climate change. To address those risks, Transport Canada has put in place specific aspects of our oversight program, such as our winter track inspection program. We specifically take a risk-based approach that looks at where track is particularly susceptible to cold weather patterns or, for example, washouts or erosion that could be caused by climate change. Then we specifically focus our inspection to help detect and then mitigate issues that would arise from climate change.
That is one example. There's another example specifically around the natural hazards track inspection program that looks at other impacts, such as the impacts of climate change on terrain and track beds. That allows us to then focus our oversight regime to take a look at those types of impacts and then mitigate them.
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I'll start, then perhaps turn to my colleague, Michael DeJong.
If you cast your mind back to those tragic events of Lac-Mégantic, Transport Canada took immediate action in the aftermath to that. For example, we strengthened our tank car standards, put in place new rules to secure trains, new track safety rules and the key routes and key trains rule that required track inspections and reduced speeds. Those actions were taken immediately.
In fact, since 2013, there have been five parliamentary reports and OAG reports that have provided 58 recommendations in total to Transport Canada. Over that period of time, we have addressed 36 of those, which is 62%, and we are continuing to work on the remaining 22 recommendations. In addition, the Transportation Safety Board over that period of time issued eight reports that included 14 recommendations. Of those, eight are closed, three are considered satisfactory in part and two are considered satisfactory intent.
Part of what we've had to do as we've dealt with the recommendations that have come over the last eight years is—
I'm sorry?
One of the major actions we took after the Lac-Mégantic tragedy was to develop a new, more robust, crash-resistant tanker standard for the transport of flammable liquids. Part of that standard also included requirements for the gradual phase-out of DOT-111 tank cars, which were proven to be less crash resistant.
As of 2016, there are no longer any tank cars of crude oil using DOT-111s; they have been completely phased out. Understanding, of course, that the phase-out schedule was risk-based, based on the volumes of dangerous goods such as crude oil and ethanol, we prioritized the phase-out of DOT-111s first, but eventually that phase-out will see the complete elimination of DOT-111s by 2025 for all flammable liquids.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I want to begin by thanking the witnesses for joining us today. It is always interesting. Our topic of study is especially important for many people who live near railways. Your answers are even more important and relevant to the questions we have for you.
My first question is for Mr. McCrorie.
In his 2013 report, the Auditor General recommended to Transport Canada that it improve its oversight activities of railway companies when it comes to safety.
In her latest report on railway safety, the Auditor General notes that Transport Canada has been unable to show that the new oversight measures implemented by the department have been effective or that they have improved railway companies' compliance with the regulations implemented to ensure enhanced safety.
Why has that will to remedy the situation been lacking? It's easy to say that new standards are being implemented and that oversight is being increased, but it is important to know whether the work being done is effective.
Do you have that will to remedy the situation?
If so, why has that not already been done?
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I think I got most of the question. The translation was a little bit broken up. I apologize; I had a call come in to talk about my computer.
I think it's important to recognize that our surveillance program post-Lac-Mégantic, we increased the number of our inspectors on the rail safety side from 107 to 155, and then, on the transportation of dangerous goods side, from 30 to 90. As a result of that, we've increased the number of inspections that we do to about an average of 35,000 per year on the rail safety side, and on the [Technical difficulty—Editor] and on top of that, we've greatly increased the number of SMS audits that we've done, going from three to 25. As a result, last year we inspected 13,000 kilometres of track using our inspectors as well as 10 track assessment vehicles.
The challenge—and it's a good challenge—is how we measure the effectiveness of that oversight program. We pointed to our safety statistics, where there's been a decline in the number of accidents and fatalities, so we think that things are going in the right direction. That said, it is a challenge for any regulatory program to draw a direct line between the oversight that we do, the regulations that we put in place, and the ultimate outcome of improved safety. There are many other factors that are at play here, including company operations, weather, etc.
We're reasonably confident that, if you look at the safety stats, they're going in the right direction. We believe that it's in part due to the efforts of our professional inspectors who are dedicated to safety and are conducting those 35,000 rail safety inspections every year.
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Thank you for your answer.
I hope [Technical difficulty—Editor] that the work done by the inspectors is producing results. At the end of the day, we want to know whether they are inspecting the right thing and whether resources are being allocated to the right place. I am looking forward to hearing about the results achieved and corrective measures taken by Transport Canada.
In her latest report, published in February 2021, the Auditor General mentions that, over the past 14 years, a lot of reports have asked Transport Canada to assess the effectiveness of railway companies' safety management systems. For instance, there was a report by the Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities, as well as oversight audits, reports on the Lac‑Mégantic disaster and auditors general reports.
In light of all those reports tabled over the past 14 years, why hasn't a railway safety management system assessment worthy of the name been implemented?
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Perhaps I'll start and then ask my colleague Mike DeJong to elaborate.
It's a great question. For us, the starting point was the decision to strengthen our safety management system regulations in 2015. With a new set of regulations, a new set of requirements, our first order of business was to make sure that those were properly implemented by railway companies. That has been our focus over the last several years. As I noted, we're now turning our attention to developing the tools. We have developed tools to do an effectiveness audit of safety management systems. We plan on launching that in September of this year.
There was also a mention of risk-based inspections. I think the honourable member is absolutely correct in terms of using data to better focus our inspection efforts.
Mike DeJong could speak a little bit about that as well.
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Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here today and answering our questions.
I'd like to start off by briefly responding to Ms. Martinez Ferrada's line of questioning around whether the issues raised by the Auditor General in 2013 had been adequately followed up on by Transport Canada. I'll just read a passage from the transcript from the Auditor General's visit to our committee on April 13. This was regarding her follow-up audit in February of this year. She said:
In this audit we examined whether Transport Canada implemented selected recommendations from our 2013 audit on the oversight of rail safety. Overall, we found that eight years later, the department had yet to fully address our recommendations and that, in fact, there was still much to do to improve the oversight of rail safety in Canada.
I think that makes fairly clear the point that was raised at the public meeting that the honourable member referenced. There's a real concern that this hasn't been adequately followed [Technical difficulty—Editor].
The interim commissioner of the environment stated that, based on his assessment, the window for a Lac-Mégantic-type disaster is very much still open.
First, Mr. McCrorie, do you agree with that statement? If not, why not?
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I'd like to highlight the approach we take to safety at Transport Canada. We've built multiple layers of defence against any rail accidents, especially those involving dangerous goods. For example, we have measures in place to help prevent accidents from taking place. We've talked about some of those, including train securement rules, track inspection rules, key trains and key route rules, all of which were put in place post Lac-Mégantic to help prevent accidents from taking place.
It's not enough just to put the rules in place. We also need to oversee them. Again, we have a very robust oversight program that goes out to make sure that railways are following the rules. I've mentioned the fact that we do about 35,000 inspections per year on the rail side and 4,000 on the TDG side. That's all about making sure that companies are operating safely.
Above that is an additional layer of safety. We have new, enhanced safety management system regulations in place. These are requirements that go above and beyond the basic regulatory requirements. They require operators to have systems in place to identify, assess and mitigate hazards above and beyond what we require from a pure regulatory point of view. We oversee those as well.
In addition, we have in place measures to help first responders mitigate or limit the impact of accidents when they do occur. These include stronger tank cars to protect them, as well as information for first responders and communities through which dangerous goods are brought.
We're always striving to improve and we're not going to stop striving to improve, but we do think we have very robust layers of safety in place.
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Thank you for that response, Mr. McCrorie.
I think everyone on this committee is now familiar with the tragic and fatal rail incident that occurred in February 2019 near Field, B.C., in which three workers, Andy Dockrell, Dylan Paradis, Daniel Waldenberger-Bulmer.... I read their names each time because I think we need to remember who these men were and to remember the circumstances in which they died. Canadian Pacific left a train parked on a hill without the handbrake set and it became unsecured. I raise this because you just mentioned train securement in your previous comments.
Two years later, CP parked another train in the same area without the handbrake secured. Transport Canada reported that there was an imminent risk of another fatal accident. We had Mr. Keenan, the deputy minister of transport, at the public accounts committee, where he suggested that there was some ambiguity or misinterpretation by CP as to Transport Canada's order following the 2019 incident. After the 2019 incident, Transport Canada put forward an order around unsecured, unattended trains. CP seems to have misunderstood what the agency was saying. Could you explain in greater detail how such a misunderstanding, which nearly resulted in another fatal accident, could have taken place?
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Thank you very much, Chair.
I'd like to turn to the part of our motion that actually addresses the impact of rail operations on neighbouring communities, because I know that a number of MPs, including some on this committee, have to deal with constant complaints from their citizens. These are complaints about excessive noise, vibrations, tying up traffic at intersections and issues that generally reduce the quality of life of residents. Probably at the back of their minds they do know about Lac-Mégantic and the derailment in Mississauga many years ago, so this is a source of not only annoyance, but also potentially of serious issues.
I'd like to ask Mr. Oommen about this. What exactly does the Canadian Transportation Agency do in these cases to help citizens?
Mr. Chair, protective direction 36 does, indeed, require our railway companies to share information on dangerous goods passing through communities. Communities must first register with CANUTEC, our 24-7 emergency response centre, which will facilitate that sharing of information.
Once that is done, the appropriate officials within each municipality will have ample information on dangerous goods passing through their communities, the type of dangerous goods, the volumes of those dangerous goods and whether those dangerous goods are being transported in unit trains, for example. That information is relayed directly to the municipal officials.
There is also a requirement in protective direction 36 to provide publicly available information. For example, the class 1 railways, CP and CN, have very detailed information on a provincial level on what is being transported through a particular province, the volumes, the type of dangerous goods and their percentage of the total volume of dangerous goods.
We think there's adequate information, and we always work with municipalities as well to help them understand that and to provide support and advice on planning for emergency response, should it be required.
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Perhaps I could start, Mr. Chair, and then Ben might like to elaborate on some of the more particular emergency response measures we have in place.
Again, I'd like to emphasize the fact that we're in the business of building layers of protection, so our interest first and foremost is in trying to prevent accidents from happening. We have various measures in place, especially when moving dangerous goods, that require rail companies to do risk assessments of the trains they'll be running, to increase their track inspections and to use more robust tank cars, all with the goal of reducing the likelihood of that accident happening.
If that accident does happen, because they're at reduced speeds and because they've used more robust tank cars, they are less likely to have more tragic consequences.
In building those layers, the emergency response assistance plan also puts the onus on companies to have in place procedures so that they have the capacity to respond when necessary to accidents.
Ben, do you want to elaborate on some of the other measures we've put in place in terms of providing information to communities?
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Again, if you look at where fatalities are taking place, the two biggest problems we have are trespassing and grade crossing accidents. We're taking action in both areas.
In particular, when it comes to trespassing, it's hard to regulate that. You can't regulate that kind of behaviour, so it's really about using other tools like education and awareness. That's where we provide funding to Operation Lifesaver, which has been a very successful organization over the years in developing educational programs for youth. They have now started to focus on suicide prevention. It's very much one of our top concerns, and we're doing our best to address that.
If I could squeeze in one other little point going back to an earlier question about information for communities, one of the biggest challenges we found with PD-36 is that communities just aren't aware of their ability to get information, so anything that can be done to promote awareness of that would be very helpful for us.
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It's just a clarification, Mr. Oommen.
You mentioned that, on noise, odour and vibration complaints, you have a protocol that you abide by, but you never mentioned in response to the question that was asked what, in fact, those recommendations would be by the CTA to impose upon CN or CP based on those complaints.
It's a simple question: What do you do about vibration, noise and odour complaints? What will you actually recommend that railway operators do to rectify those situations for the neighbouring properties?
Thank you, members.
To the witnesses, I want to thank you for your time today. This is a very important study for all members, me included, as I have a railway operation in my riding that's very negatively impacted by the CN operation in the shunting yard and, of course, there are impacts on the neighbouring communities, so I appreciate your time here today. Don't be surprised if you get a second invitation to come back as we embark on the report moving forward.
With that said, I again express my appreciation to members as well.
We're going to suspend for a few minutes so we can do some sound checks for the next panel.
Mr. Clerk, I will leave that to you.
Thank you.
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No problem. Thank you, Mrs. Kusie.
I have two answers to that question. The first is that my intent was to take the full hour. That was about 20 minutes ago, if not longer. Now here we are, that much further away. We started late, and that would have brought us to about 8:40, so that's as far as I'll go with respect to how we started. That brings me to my second point, which is our upcoming meeting on Thursday. Correct me if I'm wrong, but the intent would be to speak with the whips to see if we can get that extra hour, as well as have a question posed to the House to see if the resources would be available.
Mike, did you have any clarification on that?
Good evening. My name is Isabelle Bleau, and I am a city councillor and president of the Comité ferroviaire de Boucherville. The City of Boucherville is crossed by the railway segment that is part of CN's Sorel subdivision dedicated to the transportation of goods, mainly to supply metropolitan area industries. Although the rail line mainly traverses farm land, it also goes through the heart of the urban perimeters of the cities of Boucherville, Varennes and Verchères, including a large residential area of more than 5.5 kilometres in Boucherville.
Railway transportation of dangerous goods and substances in urban areas causes numerous nuisances and is a concern for citizens. Among the issues, we note traffic, crossings, emergency service maintenance, noise pollution and vibration, safety, air quality and urban planning. Those issues are even more important since the container terminal project in Contrecœur will considerably increase the frequency and length of trains on that line.
To that end, the City of Boucherville has contracted a company to carry out a prefeasibility study on relocating CN's rail line from Boucherville to Sorel-Tracy. That company concluded that the project was possible and that there were a number of potential routes. A more thorough feasibility study will now need to be carried out to establish which of the proposed routes could be selected and how that relocation could materialize in the other affected cities that are part of the line. CN and CP could also benefit from this.
The objectives of the Comité ferroviaire are to make the House of Commons Standing Committee on Transport, Infrastructure and Communities aware of the relevance of reviewing railway relocation projects where dangerous goods are being transported through densely populated areas and to facilitate citizens' access to information on dangerous goods travelling on those railways.
The issue of railway transportation safety has been relevant for several decades in cities traversed by CN's railway, especially in Boucherville and in Varennes. Initially focused on nuisances caused by trains passing through urban areas, citizens' concerns have extended to risks of hazardous material spills and on their impact on safety and the environment. Those concerns have intensified since a crude oil shipment was derailed in Lac-Mégantic. Fears about seeing that kind of a catastrophe occur in Boucherville have also intensified since the appearance, in November 2013, of large trains transporting crude oil for export from Alberta to be loaded onto supertankers at the Kildair Service ULC terminal, in Tracy.
According to the International Energy Agency, the global demand in oil should surpass pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2022. It is also clear that the low level of social acceptability and the abandoned major pipeline projects indicate that oil transportation, especially from Alberta, will continue to be done by train for several years.
In addition, according to the Transportation Safety Board of Canada's quarterly review, the number of accidents involving dangerous goods on major rail lines has increased in recent years, going from 10 in 2017 to 17 in 2018, six of which led to hazardous materials being spilled.
On July 24, 2016, Marc Garneau, then federal minister of transport, announced his intention to advance by six months the phasing out of DOT‑111 tank cars, which were involved in the Lac-Mégantic tragedy, transporting crude oil. However, those cars could continue to transport refined oil or any other dangerous goods through our cities. But the previously set deadline has rather been pushed back to 2025. So we can deduce that, over the next four years, transportation of heavy oil and dangerous goods through our densely populated urban areas will continue to pose risks.
Protective Direction 36 issued under the Transportation of Dangerous Goods Act, 1992, requires railway companies to provide municipalities with data on the goods transported by trains passing through their territory. However, since the transportation of crude oil has resumed in earnest on the Saint‑Lambert-Sorel‑Tracy rail line, it has been very difficult, in practice, for citizens and for our committee to obtain information about those trains, under the pretext that the data is confidential owing to antiterrorist precaution measures.
We think that the process lacks transparency and that people living in cities affected by the transportation of oil and dangerous goods should have access to more information provided by the appropriate authorities and by CN.
In closing, we think that the project for relocating CN's Boucherville-Sorel‑Tracy rail line is in line with the commitments made under the Trois-Rivières declaration, and we want the Government of Canada to support its participation in a feasibility study on that project.
Thank you.
My name is Gerry Thiessen. I am the mayor of the District of Vanderhoof, and also the chair of the Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako. I am speaking from the traditional territory of the Saik'uz First Nation.
In our regional district, we have six communities like Vanderhoof. Each of these communities has a rail line going right through it. We were brought to this area. My grandfather was asked, on a program with CNR and the Government of Canada, in 1942, to move from the Prairies to our area and settle here with the hope of settling the railway as we went along.
At that time, there was lots of opportunity for industry to have access to rail cars. We saw our cattle being moved to market through the railway. We saw our lumber moved through the railway, and there was lots of access for us to sell our goods.
That has changed. We now have about 30 trains that go through our communities; whereas, in the past there were about a half a dozen a day that would go through our communities. A long train used to be 40 boxcars. Now it's not uncommon to see 100 boxcars.
Along with that, we are told that about 10% of the goods that go through our communities have hazardous material on them. That is significant. It's really significant when each one of our six communities in the regional district of Bulkley-Nechako operates with a volunteer fire department.
These men and women leave their families and volunteer their time to give back to the community, to make sure that we have a safe community in a place where their families can grow up and be part of living here in a rural lifestyle.
It's not fair for us to be told, as communities, that we have a joint responsibility to keep hazardous material and that, if there is a problem in our area, we will need to be responding to those things. We do not have the equipment, as volunteers, to address that.
At a recent meeting in the early part of November, we had a presentation from CN Rail at the regional district. Our understanding from the presentation was that there is no equipment in our regional district of Bulkley-Nechako, which has a bit more than 300 kilometres of rail line in length from one end to the other. There is equipment in Prince George, as well in Terrace, British Columbia.
What we understand is that train personnel—should there be a derailment, should there be a fire or anything like that—would need to come out of Edmonton. We were told that if there were something, we would need to somehow get close enough to a derailment to check to make sure what the bar-code was on the side of the train, and that if we got that information and sent it to CN, they would be able to tell us what was in that derailed car.
That's not a viable solution when you're working with volunteers. They give of their time. There needs to be quicker access to an emergency.
If there were an emergency in the town of Vanderhoof, which I am very familiar with, many of our emergency personnel would be in a tough situation because our volunteer fire department, which is our emergency response team, is within about a half a block of the rail line.
To me, it would just put us at a really [Technical difficulty—Editor]. We would have to evacuate our town while we were waiting for the information coming back of what was in those boxcars that were derailed.
Recently there was an accident that came through our community during my time as mayor and the first I heard about it was when I received a call from the local news media, asking me what I thought about the rail accident in my community.When I called to ask about it, I was basically told that they were taking care of it and that they were okay.
When there was a derailment just east of our community and I had some concern about how close it was to the Nechako River, again I was told that this wasn't something we needed to worry about and that they were taking care of it.
:
I acknowledge that I'm speaking from the traditional territory of the Wet'suwet'en First Nation.
Similar to Gerry, I'm going to tell you about our recent experiences in my small town, in the same regional district, actually. Smithers is a railway town. It was surveyed during construction of the railway, what's now CN railway. It's a divisional town where trains stop for several hours to take on fuel and new crews. They spend time in town. It's an important employer and important to our local economy and regional economy.
We became aware of upcoming changes from a newspaper article, in 2019, announcing the opening of a propane export terminal at the port in Prince Rupert. The terminal requires delivery of 50 to 60 propane tank cars per day by rail, and soon we were seeing strings of black tank cars rolling through town. We then learned that three other export terminals were in the works. The largest, Vopak, would export 240 cars per day: 60 of propane; 50 for fuels like diesel and gasoline; and 90 of methanol, methyl alcohol.
If all four terminals are approved, we will have approximately four 100-car trains per day passing through town and stopping in town, carrying what are regulatory hazardous, flammable products. Liquids like diesel and gasoline also have a hazard if they are spilled in our river, as it could cause serious harm to salmon stocks.
The terminals were being reviewed with no consideration of the rail portion of the project. Residents began to feel like deer in the headlights seeing our rail line becoming a hazardous products corridor, and we were receiving no information and having no opportunity to input any decisions.
The fact is that train can derail, and collisions happen inside towns. Propane compressed into a 30,000-gallon tank—that's over 113,00 litres—has a huge explosive potential.
I'm going to try to show you a map of the rail corridor through Smithers. The yellow and red are the evacuation corridors for propane, the yellow is for fire. This side of that zone is the steep slope of the mountain, the other side is another slope onto the river, and the town is completely under the evacuation zone. This includes the municipal office, ambulance, fire station, police station and the hospital.
We started talking to local governments, telling them our worries. In Smithers, the fire chief is on staff, but the rest of the firefighters are volunteers. When the chief was asked if his department was prepared to handle a large propane accident in town, his answer was definitely not.
Smithers council invited CN and learned that the nearest emergency response team was in Prince George, over 370 kilometres away, and it would take 12 to 24 hours for them to get to town. This is tough for a small community, because the town council is responsible for making its decision to evacuate the town.
Local governments began writing the asking for an independent, public, risk assessment of hazardous traffic on the northern B.C. rail line, and they also asked that local governments be included in the process. To my knowledge, the transport minister or ministry hasn't replied to any of these letters, so we have no more information than we did.
I'd like to thank MP Taylor Bachrach and your committee for studying this issue and perhaps getting some answers for us, and perhaps getting some attention to the hazardous situation we feel we've been put in.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Ms. Remington. That was well done.
Members, we're running short on time here, and we only have resources available to us for a limited time, so I want to try to get the first round in. The only way I can do that is if I cut back to half the time. Is everybody okay with that?
Some hon. members: Agreed.
The Chair: Everybody is okay with that, but I know that Taylor is a bit hesitant.
I'll try to squeeze a bit more time in for you, Taylor, because this is your study. You championed this from day one, so I'm going to try to get you in a bit more.
With that, I'm going to start off with Ms. Kusie for three minutes.
I'd like to say welcome to all of our guests.
Unfortunately, the technical problems that we have cut into some of our time. Hopefully we'll get a chance to see some of these people on Thursday.
Mr. Thiessen, I listened with interest to your comments about the situation in your municipality and some of the concerns you have about safety. Being a former mayor, I understand, when you're talking about volunteer fire department and lack of resources, and so on, the concerns that poses for you as a mayor and the challenges when you have cargo travelling that can be potentially explosive—or very challenging if there were a derailment.
What suggestions have you made to the rail companies? What suggestions or ideas have you put forward to them to address your concerns?
I first want to let the committee members know how disappointed I am that we aren't able to have a full meeting. We were supposed to hear from some important witnesses today, and it would've been very useful to have the opportunity to ask them questions.
I won't waste any more time, but I would like to share a little story.
I grew up next to a set of railway tracks in Boucherville. I lived there for 30 years. When I was young, I loved watching the trains go by. I would count the cars; it was an important part of my day. Time passed, the accident in Lac‑Mégantic happened and the types of railcars going past the house changed. We saw more oil cars and we started to worry that what happened in Lac‑Mégantic would happen to us. The railroad, something that used to bring me happiness, became a source of anxiety and fear.
I know we don't have much time, so I will get to my questions for Ms. Bleau. I want to address some of the things she said.
Ms. Bleau, in your opening statement, you talked about the importance of municipalities and citizen groups having access to information on what the railway cars going through the city are carrying. At the very least, those parties should have more latitude to access the information. What are your complaints in that regard? How should the information be made available? What needs to change?
You also talked about relocating the railway line to keep it outside town boundaries so residents are no longer at risk. That would even allow railway companies to operate more efficiently, since they would be subject to fewer restrictions outside town boundaries.
Lastly, you said the city had already invested in a pre-feasibility study. I realize that a feasibility study costs a lot more. How would federal support make a difference?
To answer what I think was your first question, Mr. Barsalou‑Duval, I want to point out that the information is available now, but only after the railcars have gone by. The information is not available before the trains and railcars go through the town. When they go by, our safety has already been jeopardized unbeknownst to us; we didn't have the benefit of knowing that we should have been especially careful, that we should have been on alert. Our security is always on the lookout and ready to respond, of course, but it would be helpful to have the information.
Yes, the city did put money towards a pre-feasibility study to determine whether the railway line could be diverted around the urban area. We found out that it was indeed possible. A feasibility study would be incredibly useful, since it would provide a more comprehensive analysis. We would then be able to show that both CN and CP would benefit from relocating the railway line to the centre of Highway 30 or adjacent to it.
The Contrecœur port terminal is expected to handle thousands of containers a day. If the number of trains allowed to pass through Boucherville is limited to two, the highway will have to be used to transport the rest of the goods. That isn't any better for the environment. If support is provided to the Contrecœur port terminal for advancement and development, CN and CP would benefit even more from the relocation of the railway line.
That is why we would like the Government of Canada to help us pay for the feasibility study.
:
Thank you, Ms. Remington and Mr. Bachrach.
Members and witnesses, I truly apologize for the technical difficulties we've had today.
Witnesses, your testimony is very valuable; although limited, it is very valuable. You can rest assured that your testimony will be included with the analysts' reports to us, and will of course be included in our final report.
Members, I want to thank you as well for your patience today.
To the House resources team, these things happen. I want to thank you for your time today as well. I know that you were sort of chomping at your nails a few times. I want to thank you all for your job today too. Well done.
With that, members, I will take this opportunity to adjourn the meeting. Have a great evening.