:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Good afternoon, committee members. Thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.
My name is Dominic Rochon. I'm the senior assistant deputy minister of the national and cybersecurity branch here at Public Safety Canada. I'm pleased to be joined today by my colleagues Tim Hahlweg from CSIS; Michael Duheme and Mark Flynn from the RCMP; Artur Wilczynski from the Communications Security Establishment; and Jill Wherrett, assistant deputy minister at Public Safety Canada, joining us in her role representing the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.
Preventing and countering violent extremism in all its forms is a complex and ever-evolving issue. Effective and sustainable efforts require a comprehensive approach, combining domestic and international efforts, and involving a range of stakeholders.
Public Safety Canada, its portfolio agencies and partners such as the Communications Security Establishment have distinct but complementary roles as they relate to violent extremism, the terrorist listings process and related enforcement measures, which we will be pleased to discuss with you today.
Ideologically motivated violent extremism, or IMVE, is the term that Canada has adopted to describe what was previously referred to as right-wing and left-wing extremism. My colleague from CSIS will expand on this in a moment, but in brief, the violent actions and rhetoric of IMVE actors are fuelled by white supremacy, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, violent misogyny, anti-authority and, often, all of the above, making IMVE one of the most serious threats we are facing today.
[Translation]
The listing of terrorist entities is one tool that is available to the Government of Canada.
In 2019, as you may recall, the Government of Canada added the international neo-Nazi network Blood & Honour and its armed affiliate Combat 18 to the list.
The listing of terrorist entities is one tool that is available to the Government of Canada.
In 2019, as you may recall, the Government of Canada added the international neo-Nazi network Blood & Honour and its armed affiliate Combat 18 to the list.
Operationally, those listings contributed to the removal of the groups’ online presence. This meant that social media platforms that had previously sold group-affiliated merchandise banned any associated accounts. Additionally, Canadian service providers also shut down affiliated websites.
[English]
Earlier this year the government placed 13 new groups on the terrorist list, including an additional four IMVE groups: the Russian Imperial Movement, Atomwaffen Division, The Base, and the Proud Boys. Being listed as a terrorist entity can carry significant consequences. Although it is not a crime to be listed, once listed, an entity falls under what are defined as terrorist groups in the Criminal Code, which apply to several terrorism offences, including recruitment, training, travel and terrorist financing. A listing, therefore, may help support criminal investigations by the RCMP that could trigger potential charges. A listing may also trigger non-criminal measures such as the deregistration of a charity or the inadmissibility of a foreign national into Canada.
A broad Government of Canada approach is taken to identify entities to prioritize for listing. This work is then further supported by criminal or security intelligence reports, which are ultimately independently reviewed by the Department of Justice to ensure that entities meet the threshold test as set out in the Criminal Code. It is important to note here that the legal criteria are not restricted to groups that actually commit violent acts. The threshold also applies where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an entity attempted, conspired for or counselled the commission of a terrorist activity.
In order to ensure that the listings process is balanced and fair, there are several safeguards built into the regime. A listed entity may request that the recommend to the Governor in Council that it be removed from the list. This can happen at any point. The Criminal Code also allows for a review of the minister’s decision by the Federal Court. Finally, there is a statutory requirement to review each entity on the list every five years to ensure that it merits continued listing.
[Translation]
We recognize that addressing the ideologically motivated violent extremism threat is not only an enforcement or technological issue.
The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence leads the Government of Canada’s efforts to prevent and counter radicalization to violence. The centre provides funding to support the efforts of researchers and frontline practitioners to understand, prevent, and counter radicalization to violence in Canada through its grants and contributions program.
The Government of Canada is actively working with Five Eyes partners and G7 allies, the technology industry, experts, and civil society to more effectively counter ideologically motivated violent extremism in the online space.
Canada is also a signatory to the Christchurch Call to Action to eliminate terrorist and violent extremist content online.
Our government will thus continue to bring the full range of resources we have to bear in dealing with this issue and to keep our communities safe from violent extremism.
[English]
Thank you. I will now turn the floor over to my colleague, Mr. Hahlweg.
I'm grateful for the opportunity today to appear before this committee and appreciate your taking the time to study the issue of IMVE in Canada. The threat that IMVE poses remains a high priority for CSIS.
As mentioned, my name is Tim Hahlweg, and I'm the assistant director of requirements at CSIS.
As this committee is well aware, CSIS has the mandate to investigate threats to the security of Canada, to advise the government on these threats and to take steps to reduce them.
Since 2014, Canadians motivated in whole or in part by extremist ideological views have killed 21 people and wounded 40 others on Canadian soil. This threat is a multi-faceted problem, going well beyond law enforcement and national security, and requires a whole-of-government response, engaging social, economic and security mandates. You will likely hear this refrain from all of my colleagues here today.
Using accurate terminology when discussing national security threats, particularly as they relate to violent extremism, is important. In 2019, CSIS, in consultation with other security intelligence community members and our Five Eyes partners, took a leading role in developing terminology that more accurately reflects and depicts the violent extremist threats facing Canada.
Thanks to this effort, the Government of Canada now uses the following terminology in its discussions of the violent extremist threat landscape: religiously motivated violent extremism, politically motivated violent extremism and ideologically motivated violent extremism.
With respect to the IMVE landscape in particular, our analysis demonstrated that the traditional terms of right-wing and left-wing extremism were overly simplistic and politicizing and did not accurately reflect the complexity of this threat landscape.
While it is difficult to perfectly label the threats in this diverse and very fluid landscape, this new terminology, RMVE, PMVE and IMVE, was also chosen to mirror existing domestic legislation, paragraph 2(c) of the CSIS Act, and section 83.01 of the Criminal Code. None of these categories are necessarily mutually exclusive, as extremist narratives often derive from the personal grievances of the individual.
Even within IMVE, there is no one-size-fits-all ideology. IMVE adherents are driven by a range of grievances, ideas and narratives, including conspiracy theories. They may be motivated to commit acts of violence against others or incite violence to achieve societal change.
CSIS identifies four subcategories of IMVE: xenophobic, gender-driven, anti-authority and other grievance-driven violence. These categories are not silos, however, and threat actors may be motivated by more than one grievance or shift from one to another. IMVE threat actors continue to target equity-deserving groups, including racialized individuals, religious minorities, LGBTQ2+ community and women.
As we know, it is not illegal to be hateful, racist or misogynist. Freedom of speech is constitutionally protected, and CSIS is expressly forbidden from investigating lawful dissent, advocacy and protest.
CSIS only investigates threat actors who rise to the threshold outlined by the CSIS Act. The actor must engage in activities “directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence...for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective”. Only a small fraction of individuals who adhere to the IMVE narratives go beyond the chat rooms to mobilize to violence. CSIS investigates those suspected of posing a threat to the national security of Canada, working closely with law enforcement partners, including the RCMP, to ensure the appropriate response.
The rapid spread of IMVE narratives online adds to this challenge. Online platforms can serve as echo chambers of hate. IMVE adherents are able to connect and communicate anonymously online and mobilization to violence can occur rapidly. Particularly troubling is the number of youth who are espousing these narratives and inspiring others to violence.
The COVID-19 pandemic has only amplified the IMVE threat. We have seen that COVID-19 public health measures have intensified xenophobic and anti-authority narratives as well as conspiracy theories, some of which rationalize violence. We are continually seeing these narratives play out during the vaccine rollout.
In addition to my testimony today, I invite you all to read the “CSIS Public Report 2020”, which we released earlier this spring. It details the very important work that CSIS did last year to keep Canada and Canadians safe in a rapidly evolving threat environment.
The public report makes clear that violent extremism continues to capture a significant portion of our attention and our efforts, particularly IMVE-inspired online and real-world threats. IMVE is a complex and multi-faceted threat that erodes social cohesion, and CSIS, working closely with communities and our partners across the country, is committed to fulfilling its mandate to keep all Canadians safe.
Finally, I would like to thank the employees of CSIS, our police colleagues and everybody else working in the national security space. It's difficult work, often requiring exposure to vile and abhorrent content to detect and investigate these threats, and for that I thank them.
With that, I'll be happy to respond to any questions throughout this session.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Good evening, Mr. Chair and members of the committee.
My name is Michael Duheme. I am the deputy commissioner for federal policing.
[English]
With me, I have assistant commissioner Mark Flynn, who is the executive director for national security, as well as protective policing, for the RCMP.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to answer questions about IMVE, along with our federal colleagues who are also impacted by this highly concerning issue.
The IMVE threat environment is rapidly evolving and complex, and it requires close collaboration among security and intelligence partners at all levels, both nationally and internationally. From a law enforcement perspective, hate-motivated violent incidents and criminal threats related to IMVE are increasing in frequency across the country. The most common threat actors we see are individuals with no clear group affiliation, who are motivated by highly personalized and nuanced ideologies that lead individuals to incite and/or mobilize to violence.
Perhaps most importantly, the RCMP is seeing a rampant growth in hateful and IMVE content online. We are gravely concerned with the extremist views that are first fostered online, which can lead to actual physical violence—and have. The RCMP has seen several examples of this evolution, although I can’t provide details in this open forum, as several of these investigations are either ongoing or currently proceeding through the courts.
The increasingly individualized and leaderless nature of this threat environment, combined with the amplifying effect of the online space, carries detection and other challenges that are driving a shift in the RCMP’s national security priorities. With this in mind, we are re-evaluating elements of our current counterterrorism posture, our strategies for countering IMVE threats and our resource capacity requirements. The RCMP takes its preventive mandate very seriously, and the key to prevention is timely information and intervention before it’s too late.
The nature of the IMVE threat also raises jurisdictional and mandate considerations that enhance the need for coordination and information sharing between domestic law enforcement partners and the security and intelligence community.
The RCMP’s federal policing national security program is mandated to investigate IMVE-related criminal activity that rises to the level of a national security threat as defined in the CSIS Act. As such, we maintain close partnerships with CSIS and other domestic security and intelligence agencies and engage in tactical information sharing with foreign partners to counter IMVE threats.
On the other hand, police of jurisdiction have primary responsibility to investigate hate-motivated criminal activity. These jurisdictional realities highlight the importance of law enforcement coordination at all levels to combat this evolving threat and the value of intelligence-led policing.
Since there is often overlap between hate-motivated crimes and IMVE-related criminality, the RCMP works closely with police of jurisdiction to identify criminal threats of national security interest and conduct coordinated investigations. We are also working internally to develop uniform guidelines and indicators for assessing when a particular threat or criminal activity falls within the national security mandate of the RCMP.
In terms of criminal investigations, the RCMP’s foremost priority is protecting the safety and security of Canadians. It is also important to note that minority Canadians are disproportionately the victims—and not the perpetrators—of hate-motivated and IMVE-related violence. It is incumbent upon the security and intelligence community to use every tool at our disposal to protect these communities against violent acts.
The RCMP has a robust mandate to prevent criminal activity, and we can pursue various investigative avenues to mitigate potential threats to public safety or national security when they are brought to our attention. Where criminal charges are applicable, the RCMP works together with Crown prosecutors, including the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, to carefully consider which offences have the best chance of successful prosecution.
On that note, I thank you. I'm hoping that my presence and that of Mark Flynn can help you clarify the situation with regard to IMVE.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thank you for the invitation to appear today to discuss ideologically motivated violent extremism in Canada.
My name is Artur Wilczynski, and I am the assistant deputy chief of SIGINT at the Communications Security Establishment, known as CSE.
CSE, reporting to the Minister of National Defence, is one of Canada's key security and intelligence agencies, with a mandate to provide foreign intelligence in support of a broad range of government priorities. CSE is also the country's lead technical authority for cybersecurity.
[English]
As my colleagues have indicated, the threat landscape as it relates to ideologically motivated violent extremism continues to evolve, amplified through the increased use of the Internet and social media by threat actors. Through these outlets, there has been a surge in violent extremist and terrorist media production, as groups continue to spread their extremist messaging while attempting to recruit like-minded individuals to their cause and planning activities.
Under its foreign intelligence mandate, CSE works to uncover foreign-based extremists' efforts to carry out attacks in Canada and abroad, including those that are ideologically motivated. It is important to emphasize that CSE cannot direct its activities at Canadians or at anyone in Canada. Our efforts must be focused on foreign actors outside Canada.
In addition to foreign intelligence, CSE can provide technical support to key Government of Canada partners, those in national security or federal policing roles as well as defence agencies. Any assistance that we provide is conducted under the authorities of the requesting agency and in alignment with the legal and policy parameters of their mandate.
CSE has a strong and valuable relationship with our international partners. We regularly share information on a wide range of threat actors, including IMVE. This exchange has a significant effect on protecting our respective countries' safety and security.
[Translation]
Addressing ideologically motivated violent extremism requires collaboration from our federal and international partners, and I want to assure you that CSE will continue to work within our mandate and with these partners to support efforts to fight extremism.
Thank you.
I look forward to answering your questions.
:
Thank you very much for the question.
Maybe I can start at the bottom. I think I can work my way through that a little more clearly if I start with the “other” category, because it helps to describe the narrative in the IMVE space.
For the IMVE space, the “other” category is obviously part of the four that I articulated at the outset, which include xenophobic, linked to white supremacy or neo-Nazism and ethnonationalism; anti-authority and targeting of government and law enforcement; and gender-driven, which can lead to violent misogyny. The “other” category is an example of the fluidity of this environment because we have a number of individuals who don't have a defined ideology, who aren't linked to a certain conspiracy or who move around to various groups, and it's very difficult to place them.
In the RMVE space, we have additional threat actors like al Qaeda. We have ISIS. We have a group ideology that these people adhere to.
In the IMVE space, it's quite different. We see a lot of movement depending on the nature of the grievance, and those grievances change all of the time, depending on what situation is happening. We see this in the COVID example, where that has galvanized some individuals in that space, so it's not as fluid as the other typical and more traditional categories in the RMVE space.
I hope that answers your question.
Starting in 2014, we have the Moncton shooting perpetrated by Justin Bourque. In that shooting, three were killed and two were wounded. In 2015, we have the Halifax mall plot. That plot was disrupted and there were no casualties. In 2016, we have the Edmonton stomping attack. One individual was killed. In 2017, we have the Alexandre Bissonnette attack on the Quebec City mosque. Six individuals were killed and 19 were wounded in that attack.
In 2018, we have the Toronto van attack by Alek Minassian. Ten people were killed and 16 were wounded in that attack. In 2019, we have the Sudbury knife attack, and two people were wounded in that attack. Finally, in 2020, we have the Toronto spa attack, where one person was killed and one person was wounded.
I think I've covered that. If I've missed anything in that depiction, I will defer to my colleagues in the RCMP.
I'd like to thank all of our witnesses for being here today, especially on such short notice. Your testimony is very valuable to us.
My first question is for CSIS.
You mentioned online hatred and the prevalence of “echo chambers of hate”, whereby mobilization to violence can occur quite rapidly. The National Firearms Association is a group that shares offensive images online and has shared tweets that have been sympathetic to groups alleged to have IMVE affiliation. In one of them, the tweet said, “If the police will not protect you during a violent riot, you will have to protect yourself and others”.
I have personally been the subject of their comments. Recently, this committee voted to condemn remarks made by the group that discussed guillotining parliamentarians who support gun control, describing what is happening in Canada as “tyranny”.
My question for you is straightforward. We've seen far too many examples where language is later masked as jokes and then turned into real-world violence, either by those making the remarks or those following. I'm just wondering; what impact do these kinds of comments have on individuals who may be radicalized by them and should we be calling it out for what it is?
:
That's an excellent question, and I think it would be useful at this time to give a snapshot of how we investigate in this space, from a CSIS perspective. I think it will help articulate the space we hold vis-à-vis other people in this landscape.
The way that we look at it organizationally is really in three tiers.
We have the first tier, which is passive engagement. There are a lot of books out there, and there are videos and chat rooms. A lot of people are listening to some of this violent, abhorrent content, but these people are passive. They're not moving to violence at this stage.
When those individuals move to our second tier of threat actions, it is a more active engagement. This is where we're seeing people not just listening but putting some propaganda out there. They're adding content, communicating and letting their voices be known. A lot of this still falls in with freedom of speech, but some of it starts to bleed into what is the third tier. That's where the service gets involved.
The third tier sees these people mobilizing to violence or potentially mobilizing to violence. In the third tier, we're seeing a lot of increased operational security by these individuals. They're not staying in the open. They're going into more private chat rooms and more encrypted forums. We're seeing them go to a lot of alternative platforms. When we look at this third tier, from a service perspective it's really important that we look at what triggers the CSIS mandate. We have done a lot of work in this space over the last couple of years with our partners in the S and I community.
What do we require to actually investigate these threats? We need a willingness to kill or inspire others to kill; a threat of serious violence; an attempt to effect societal change, so not just a personal narrative but something bigger; and an ideological influence. Once we have those triggers, we're able to investigate these threats. We deconflict on a regular basis with our police colleagues, especially the RCMP, and then we decide who's best positioned to deal with them.
I hope that answers your question.
I thank the witnesses for being here. I am very grateful to them.
Last week we had Mr. McGuinty from the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, who presented his annual report to us. He explained how the members of that committee were taking stock of the situation and making recommendations to the government.
How does the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness react to this status report? What does it do with it?
Terrorism is still recognized as the greatest threat to Canada. I was wondering if you perceive this whole rise in ideologically-based violent extremism as a form of terrorism right now.
My questions are for Mr. Rochon from the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. If officials from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Communications Security Establishment want to add anything, I invite them to do so.
:
Thank you for the question.
I think it would be more appropriate for the RCMP and CSIS to talk about their definition of threats.
That said, I can give you a quick answer. As my colleagues have said, this is a team effort on a very complex topic. It is true that, until now, terrorism was really the most challenging threat. Violent extremism is a sub-category of that threat. It is part of terrorism, but as my CSIS colleagues have explained, we need better definitions.
We are in the process of defining these different categories so that we know exactly where these threats are coming from and can better respond.
That is my answer to your question. Perhaps my colleagues at the RCMP or CSIS would like to add something.
:
I'll talk about what the RCMP can do with respect to websites.
The majority of the investigations we conduct into hateful comments spread on social networks are triggered when we receive reports from people who have observed this on a site and report it to us. In most cases, we trigger an investigation.
Of course, if the social networks remove the information without notifying us, we don't have access to that information. It's no different than when someone calls the police to make a report and the police initiate an investigation, except that it happens on social networks.
If the platforms remove this information without notifying us, we can no longer take informed action on the complaint.
Members of Parliament often receive derogatory or hateful messages on social media. In these cases as well, the RCMP initiates an investigation and we follow through. Sometimes that's a challenge because people can use all sorts of mechanisms on social media to avoid being found.
I won't hide from you that this is one of our concerns, and it's not just about social networks. When you implement a new law or a new process, people always find ways around that through other mechanisms.
You've all heard of the dark Web. There are probably already many IMVE groups on the dark Web.
I would respond first by saying that this is how complex this investigative effort we undertake is, because a lot of the personal grievances and a lot of the conspiracy theories are not tied to one solid ideology that motivates a lot of other people. There are a lot of individuals who might move from one to another very quickly. From a CSIS perspective, it is absolutely crucial that we reach the threshold of violence or threat of violence and the four steps I talked about a little bit earlier before we can actively investigate.
In terms of the overall numbers, yes, if we look at this like a funnel, in that top tier I discussed, there are hundreds of different narratives out there, different ideologies, different conspiracy theories. A lot of that still falls into the free speech space. A lot of those individuals will just remain passive. They will not mobilize to violence, ergo not affect our act, from a CSIS perspective.
I hope that answers your question.
Thank you to all of the witnesses for being with us here today and enlightening us on this very important topic.
I'm just going to follow the previous line of questioning with Mr. Hahlweg, if you don't mind.
There's been quite a bit of talk today about the three different categories of motivation for violent extremism. I wonder how important it is to define those different categories. For example, one of the witnesses mentioned the 21 deaths that occurred at the hands of ideologically motivated extreme actors, one of them being the Quebec mosque shooting. I would have thought that maybe that falls within the religiously motivated.
How important is it, Mr. Hahlweg, to get those categorizations right? How is that a tool for CSIS to keep Canadians safe and for prosecutions?
:
I'll lead it off, Mr. Chair, but I think there's a little bit of Public Safety and also CSIS in this.
What's important here is that the RCMP's mandate, when it comes to national security and IMVE, is that really our sandbox is when there's a criminal element.
Tim mentioned how we work well together. We do work well. We deconflict as to who will take the lead, but when there's a criminal element to the file, it becomes our responsibility. We still work closely with the service throughout.
On the returnees, if you wish, we are looking at a list of people who have gone there, whom we were invested in before and know they've been involved in criminal activity. The service would have a different list, if you wish, based on their mandate and intel.
Do they pose a threat? There are several discussions with the community on how to best follow up on that when they return, or if they return, to make sure that we have the appropriate resources and the eyes and information on it. You can appreciate that when someone has left the country for six, seven or 10 years, you no longer have an intel picture of what's going on or what they've been involved in.
It's not an easy issue, but the community is together and monitoring it closely to make sure that we have the right resources in place to address it.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Thanks to all of the witnesses. This is incredibly compelling testimony. I want to thank you for being here.
Personally, I'm glad we're talking about this today. In my riding of Dartmouth—Cole Harbour, people are extremely concerned about organizations such as the Proud Boys.
My question would be for Mr. Rochon of Public Safety.
It was not until 2019 that two ideologically motivated white supremacist organizations—and they were mentioned today, Blood & Honour, or I think they called it B&H, and Combat 18, C18—were added to the terrorist code listings. Earlier this year, there were four additional groups added, including the Proud Boys.
I touched on this with the other day, but what is the goal that you hope to accomplish through the listings process? What message does it send to Canadians?
:
Thank you for the question.
Frankly, I think I may have done Madame Michaud a disservice earlier, because I think that's what she was getting at in terms of IMVE and terrorism and where the two somewhat meet. The question that was just asked about Canadian extremist travellers touched on that issue as well.
These are not mutually exclusive categories, and it's a very complex situation. In order to address ideologically motivated violent extremism, religiously motivated violent extremism and all the various things that we're now starting to define, we need to make best use of the tools that we have at our disposal.
The Criminal Code listing regime is one of those tools. I think we've been talking about national security criminal investigations, or CSIS investigations, as other potential tools. You have the Secure Air Travel Act, which is another tool. We have the terrorism peace bond provision. These are all tools to help us deal with the evolution of the threats that we're seeing.
Up until 2019, as you rightly point out, ideologically motivated violent extremism, as such, was not part of an entity that had been listed until then. Canada was one of the first Five Eyes countries to actually list—as you point out, back in 2019—these types of groups. Earlier this year, we added another four groups.
I think that shows there's a trend, an identification that, for the Criminal Code definition of what terrorist activity is in order to be able to list an entity, these IMVE groups are starting to meet that threshold. As they meet that threshold, we're starting to list those entities, which is yet another tool to bring to bear on being able to deal with them.
:
I'll take a stab at answering that.
I think my colleague from CSIS, Mr. Hahlweg, certainly did a good job of describing the dangers that of course will continue to happen once you start listing these entities. By default, listing them does enable social media platforms to remove these entities. What I mean by this is that they might have a social media presence in order to try to raise funds for their cause, for example. With their being listed, it allows social media platforms to say, “No, we're not going to be selling T-shirts to promote your particular ideology.” As such, they start removing that particular presence.
It doesn't mean that you're eradicating their presence in terms of their ability to propagate. I think it was my colleague from the RCMP, Monsieur Duheme, who mentioned that inevitably what they will do is revert to going to the dark web, or they will revert to going to encrypted channels or hidden channels to be able to continue to spread their rhetoric, but with that tool of a Criminal Code listing, at least they're not going to be able to do it as overtly.
As I said, though, Criminal Code listing is but one tool. It does help with certain aspects, but it does then push us further downstream to have to try to cope with some of the challenges of the spreading of their rhetoric in other avenues.
Thank you, Mr. Rochon and Mr. Duheme, for your previous responses.
I will continue in the same vein. You said that the RCMP can intervene when a situation is brought to their attention, not necessarily because a citizen files a complaint, but also following a call to report something to you. So I guess you can document the kind of entry that is violent in nature or ideologically motivated violent extremism.
I'm thinking of the infamous ideology of incels, involuntary celibates. You said that an accusation has been made in this regard. Beyond that accusation, in this time of rising femicide and a lot of talk about violence against women and how we can find solutions, the incel ideology is extremely disturbing.
How do you deal with it? Do you find the way cases are reported to you disturbing?
:
I'll take that question.
There are definitely tools required for intel to evidence, and it's a priority area for us. The approach that we're taking, from a law enforcement perspective, is always focused on public safety.
If you look at statistics for terrorism convictions or terrorism offences and charges, you'll note that the numbers are not high. From a law enforcement perspective, we are taking the first opportunity to impact the individuals involved and prevent them from moving forward in that violent space. That can be a simple knock on the door and letting them know. It can be adding a particular group, or advocating for the addition of a particular group, to the listings so that people know that a behaviour is not acceptable and will disassociate from them. You'll also see recent charges related to firearms offences, uttering threats, possession of explosives, attacks against critical infrastructure, etc.
Even though challenges exist with the intel that may give us a much better awareness of the totality of the problem, as law enforcement we are leveraging opportunities that already exist, where legislative elements can be applied, to ensure that action is taken and there's early intervention.
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
First I want to thank all of the witnesses here today.
I thank you for your service to Canada in protecting our communities, and also for your testimony today, which is very compelling. It confirms the importance of this committee addressing the issue of ideologically motivated violent extremism.
My first question is for the Communications Security Establishment.
Last week, we heard from the chair of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians, or NSICOP. He mentioned, among other things, that the threat of violent extremism is much more diffuse than it was in extremism inspired by the ideology of Daech or al-Qaeda. It is often a constellation of different diffuse and not necessarily connected actors. Added to this is the multiplicity of means of communication, i.e. more underground channels. One only has to think of Parler, Telegram and Gab. These are new platforms for communication. In his report, the chairman mentioned to us that there were now 6,600 channels of communication for extremist groups, often from the far right.
What challenges does this represent for the Communications Security Establishment?
How are you adapting to this new environment?
My next question is for the CSIS representatives.
You were mentioning that the COVID-19 crisis amplified not only xenophobic sentiment among certain groups, but also anti-government and anti-authority attitudes.
Was there a shift from some groups that were more xenophobic, to conspiracy theories and anti-government, anti-authority, and anti-public health measures?
There were media reports, for example, that many members of an overtly xenophobic group with a particular presence in Quebec, the Meute, had redirected themselves to anti-public health and conspiracy-minded groups.
Have you observed this change?
Foreign interference is one of the most important strategic threats to Canada's national security. The CSIS director has mentioned this at numerous venues. It undermines Canadian sovereignty, our national interests and specifically our values. It is a very complex threat.
It's also a national threat. It targets all levels of government, as you know, in communities all across the country. The threat activity has always been persistent in the FI space in Canada, but the scale, speed, range and impact have grown considerably as a result of globalization and technology. It encompasses a range of techniques, including human intelligence operations, state-sponsored or foreign-influenced media and sophisticated cyber-tools.
I'm sure my colleague Mr. Wilczynski can talk further to that, but it is a significant threat that we are absolutely seized with from a CSIS perspective.
:
It's a very good question. It's a complicated question.
If I go back in time to when we still had the nomenclature of right-wing extremism and we had the attacks in Quebec and some other attacks.... At that time, just for context, we were dealing, in 2014, with the attacks against Parliament Hill and a lot of other attacks that fit more into the religiously motivated violent extremism category. This is an exercise that all of us undertake at all times. It's reprioritizing threats and allocating the resources to deal with those threats.
With the re-emergence of IMVE and the recalibration that we took as a service, we absolutely saw, with regard to the second part of your question, a more sophisticated threat actor than we had seen before. You had new online tools. You had new ways of communication. You had accelerated interaction whereby these people could sit in their basements and never have to meet face to face. This accelerated the IMVE space, and it has actually grown ever since then, making it very difficult and complex to follow.
Thank you.
:
When we look at groups such as incels, involuntary celibates, that ideology bears many of the hallmarks of many more traditionally recognized ideologies, from our perspective.
Incels belong to a misogynistic community of males. They, like most others, associate primarily through online platforms. They use a unified terminology. They're not really an organized group, from our perspective, and they have no centralized structure or planning. They believe, though, at their core, that their genetics determine the quality of their life and relationships, meaning that they blame their unattractive physical features for their inability to attract women. They attribute their perceived failings in life to women and society in general.
We're also seeing subcategories of these types of ideologies. The manosphere is one that has cropped up. This is a network of online misogynistic and male-supremacy communities talking about men's rights issues to glorify the violence in violent misogyny. These subgroups are very concerning to us.
From a service perspective, I would say that not all of them are violent. From a service perspective, in terms of the act and meeting our threshold, a lot of that activity takes place in that first tier that I was talking about. However, it is absolutely something that is concerning from a national perspective.
Thank you.
We understand that religiously motivated violent extremism that relies on social networks is an extremely modern threat, and it becomes difficult to legislate against it. As you were saying, Mr. Duheme, people will likely find a way around these new laws, quickly rendering them obsolete.
You are probably all aware of the Christchurch massacre, which the Prime Minister of New Zealand called an act intended to be broadcast on the Internet. As a result of this event, Australia passed the Criminal Code Amendment (Sharing of Abhorrent Violent Material) Act 2019, which amends the Australian Criminal Code by adding as an offence the act of hosting or disseminating violent content on social networks or on any sites.
In your opinion, should Canada adopt similar legislation?
[Translation]
Thank you for the question.
[English]
I won't comment on government policy in terms of legislation, but I would say that, as my colleagues have described, there really are a variety of tools that can be brought to bear, whether they're legislative tools, working with civil society organizations or voluntary work that can be done between governments and social media platforms and the digital industry. That's certainly a big focus, in fact, of the Christchurch call that my colleague was just speaking about, where there's a series of commitments for governments, commitments for technology companies and shared commitments.
One of the elements—and something that we've been working on here—is that there's the legislative aspect, but there's also the crisis protocols that can be put into place, so that when there are streaming activities happening, as in the case of Christchurch, we can mobilize quickly to work with companies to make sure that content is no longer disseminated. That's another tool that we can use. Legislation, I think, is one part of the picture.
:
Thank you for the question, Mr. Lightbound.
[English]
The Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence was formally launched in 2017. It is really a centre of excellence in terms of coordinating the Government of Canada's efforts related to countering radicalization to violence and complementing some of the security responses you've heard about today through an emphasis on prevention and intervention.
The Canada centre is focused on all types of radicalization to violence, regardless of ideology or political or religious motivations. As outlined in the national strategy on countering radicalization to violence that was issued several years ago, there are three priority areas that the centre is looking at. One is building, sharing and using knowledge. That's about really building up the knowledge base we have in Canada and internationally. The second is addressing radicalization to violence in the online space. As you know well from the conversation today, that's a pre-eminent concern currently. The third is supporting frontline interventions.
To be clear, the Canada centre does not work directly with individuals at risk or those who have radicalized to violence, but what we do have is the community resilience program, which is a $7-million-a-year funding program that provides financial assistance for some of the research efforts I talked about in terms of our building knowledge, as well as support for frontline practitioners and community-based organizations that prevent and counter radicalization to violence in Canada. That's where those kinds of organizations are dealing with some of the individuals who have indicated some signs of radicalizing to violence.
To date, we've funded about 42 projects across Canada. Again, some are research projects, but a large part of that funding goes to prevention and intervention programs.
:
Of the 273, there are about one-fifth of them, the majority of which include anti-government and anti-law enforcement. What we're seeing are disparaging remarks, condescending remarks towards elected officials or appointed officials. I would say that most of time, or a lot of the time, they don't meet the criminal threshold to lay a charge.
That's where we do some disruption. The team that looks after it does work with the behavioural science team to try to get a better understanding of the individuals. There are mental health issues involved in this, but often what we've been seeing is that a simple knock on the door is enough to disrupt it and the person doesn't repeat it.
People sometimes feel safe in their basement. They feel protected because they're online and not face to face, but a simple disruption is just as good.
Is there an increase? Yes. I mentioned earlier on that we've seen an increase in what we are looking at, not necessarily towards all elected members but ministers. In my personal opinion, what we're seeing is people being at the residence due to COVID, as I said, and feeling protected on the Internet. We did see an increase in negative comments, I'll say. They're not always threats.
I think Mark would like to add something to this, Mr. Chair.
:
I can't shy away. I was the one who said that.
On the national security side for the RCMP there is a 1-800 number, 1-800-420-5805, but I think the underlying message here for the Canadian population is to call their local police, to call the police of jurisdiction. We have ties in different provinces with the POJs. They understand roles and responsibilities and mandates. If it's imminent, obviously, there is 911, and there are other ways to contact your police of jurisdiction to inform them.
To me, that's very important, because, as I said, it's not the law enforcement, the security community, that will be able to detect everything that's going on. Most of the work we're doing in this space is based on what is being reported to us by citizens.
On behalf of the committee, and individually, I want to thank you for your service to our country. Many of you go along underappreciated because it's a necessary hazard of the job, but I think you should be acknowledged publicly for the tremendous service you provide to our country.
I also want to thank you for appearing here today on short notice and for putting up with the vagaries of parliamentary calendars. You have been very generous with your time, and we appreciate it. You have certainly gotten our study off to a flying start.
With that, colleagues, I think we will retire. Mr. Harris can now feed his nutritional needs, and Mr. Fisher is going to do the same, no doubt sharing a meal with Mr. Harris.
Thank you very much. We will talk later. The meeting is adjourned.