Thank you, Mr. Doherty.
Are there further questions or comments? I will call the question on Mr. Bittle's amendment.
The Chair: Now we go to Mr. Doherty's motion.
(Motion agreed to [See Minutes of Proceedings])
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Doherty.
Now we will get on with the business outlined in the agenda. We have the aircraft certification process.
We are privileged to have witnesses today. Between 3:30 and 4:30, as individuals we have Sylvain Alarie and Gilles Primeau, both professional engineers, to start us off. As well, from the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board, we have Kathleen Fox, who is the chair, and Natacha Van Themsche, director of air investigations.
To all, welcome. It's a privilege and honour to have you here.
Of course, we'll start with a presentation by you. You have 10 minutes each. That will be followed by questions from members of the committee.
I'm not sure who wants to start.
Ms. Fox, the floor is yours.
Good afternoon. I'd like to thank the committee for inviting the Transportation Safety Board of Canada, the TSB, to discuss the topic of aircraft certification.
Today I am joined by my colleague, Natacha Van Themsche, director of investigations in the air branch. She brings a wealth of experience and has a background as an aerospace engineer with over 20 years in the Canadian Forces.
As there are some new members on this committee, I'd like to take a very brief moment to tell you who we are at the TSB and what we do.
The TSB was created in 1990 by the Canadian Transportation Accident Investigation and Safety Board Act. Our mandate and our sole purpose is to advance transportation safety in the air, marine, rail and pipeline modes of transportation that are under federal jurisdiction.
We do that by conducting independent investigations, identifying safety deficiencies, causes and contributing factors, making recommendations and publishing reports. Put more simply, when something goes wrong, we investigate to find out not just what happened but why, and then we make public what we've learned so that those best placed to take action—the regulator and industry—can do so.
The TSB is independent and operates at arm's length from other government departments and agencies. We report to Parliament through the President of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada. This lets us be impartial, free from any real or perceived external influence.
lt is also important to clarify what the TSB does not do. We are neither regulator nor court; we do not assign fault, nor do we determine civil or criminal liability. We do not conduct inspections or audits. Those functions are left to the regulators and other organizations.
As for today's topic, aircraft certification, that is something that, generally speaking, falls outside of TSB's mandate as defined in the CTAISB Act. We cannot certify aircraft or aviation equipment. That is part of Transport Canada's role. The TSB would only be involved in such a matter if, during the course of our investigations, aircraft certification were identified as a safety-significant issue. Although such a scenario is not common, it has happened on a number of occasions. Allow me to provide two high-profile examples to give you a sense of when and how this works.
On September 2, 1998, Swissair flight 111 departed New York on a scheduled flight to Geneva. About 53 minutes after departure, the flight crew smelled an abnormal odour in the cockpit. A fire was spreading above the ceiling in the front area of the aircraft. This led to a rapid succession of aircraft systems-related failures. The flight crew declared an emergency, but several minutes later the aircraft crashed southwest of Peggy's Cove, Nova Scotia, killing all 229 people on board.
TSB's complex and exhaustive investigation made many findings. Two of them were both causal to the accident and specifically mentioned the issue of certification. First, the TSB found that the aircraft certification standards for material flammability were inadequate, in that they allowed the use of insulating materials that could be ignited and could sustain and propagate a fire. Second, we found that there was no requirement to consider a fire-induced failure when completing the system safety analysis required for certification.
The second example is from March 12, 2009, when a Cougar Helicopters Sikorsky S-92A experienced a sudden loss of oil from the main gearbox. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter crashed into the Atlantic, approximately 35 nautical miles from St. John's, Newfoundland and Labrador, killing 17 of the 18 people on board.
TSB's subsequent investigation found issues with the certification process for the main gearbox, specifically that the certification standards did not require the helicopter to be able to continue flight for 30 minutes following a loss of lubricant from the oil filter bowl, as happened in this occurrence.
Since then, other TSB investigations have made findings on topics including the design and certification of emergency locator transmitters, or ELTs, and the design of emergency exits and whether they are adequate in cases of emergency egress.
Over the years, the TSB has issued safety communications related to certification, such as safety advisory letters and board recommendations, and the subjects of these have included such issues as the recording capacity of cockpit voice recorders or CVRs, the aforementioned flammability standards for insulation materials, aircraft performance in icing conditions and the installation of stall warning systems.
In each case, once a recommendation is issued, we assess the minister's response and conduct an annual reassessment of the updated responses received. We evaluate progress made toward reducing or eliminating the identified safety deficiency and then report publicly on what remains to be done.
Again, I need to stress that the TSB is not itself involved in the actual certification process. As I said earlier, we are not the regulator. Our sole objective is to advance transportation safety by identifying safety deficiencies and reporting publicly on what needs to be done to reduce or eliminate the risks.
Thank you, and in due course I will be pleased to take your questions.
Thank you. It is an honour to be here.
I'm an aerospace engineer. I've been working in the aerospace field for 30 years, since graduating. I started out as a draftsman and worked my way up as a designer, structural analyst, project engineer and system engineer. Until recently, I was chief engineer on large fly-by-wire flight control systems, and today I work as an engineering consultant specializing in the development of critical systems, such as flight controls, fuel systems and hydraulic systems.
My approach to the certification process is mainly from the point of view of the system supplier. I want to highlight that a little bit to you to help steer some of your questions.
Since the late 1990s, a process has grown whereby the airframe manufacturers who apply for the type certificate will flow down certification requirements by contract to the system suppliers. These system suppliers, depending on their system, will negotiate which of the Transport Canada regulations are applicable to their system, and, through the whole development process, they will be working with the airframe manufacturer and by extension Transport Canada to design a system that complies with the regulations. They will also prepare all the plans and the familiarization and verification artifacts needed for the certification of the system on the airframe and the type certification itself.
My role as chief engineer was to oversee the design, but I was also responsible for the certification and responsible for costs, schedule and risk on the programs, which creates an interesting dichotomy whereby you have to manage these different priorities.
As I said, when I look at the certification process, it's more from a bottom-up perspective: How do systems comply? How do we apply the changed product rule when we make changes to our system? How do we flow to the airframer that the system change is coming? How do we deal with the change with Transport Canada?
I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and committee members.
My name is Gilles Primeau, and I want to thank the committee for inviting me to appear today as an individual, professional engineer and private pilot.
Flight controls problems are the dominant factor in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines 737 Max crashes. This is where my expertise and experience reside. Early on, I simulated them and spent hundreds of hours, notably in 737-300 level D full-flight simulators. Later, I worked for several aircraft types on the design, testing and certification of actual flight controls and on the horizontal stabilizer trim system, HSTS, in particular.
This is probably the most important of all aircraft systems. If its actuator breaks, or if its controller acts abnormally and the situation cannot be contained, you lose the aircraft. This happened before the 737 Max crashes. Alaska Airlines flight 261 crashed in 2001 because of the system's actuator, and in 2011 a Falcon 7X was almost lost because of the system's controller.
One year ago today, the second 737 Max crash took place. On that day, I started my independent, neutral and voluntary study into what caused those crashes. Contributing to the prevention of similar tragedies in the future became for me a professional and moral obligation and the best way I could ensure that the 346 victims have not perished in vain.
To prepare for today, I read the transcript from the February 25 hearing with Transport Canada certification leadership, and I can agree with their assessment of the high quality of regulatory oversight and the enviable safety record in Canada. I also agree with the spearheading by Canada of the need for high-quality simulation training, especially regarding MCAS. My experience as a pilot from three separate flights with specific difficulties encountered, one of them being during my first solo flight, has me absolutely convinced that in front of the unexpected, good training is your best ally.
I also agree that the level of international harmonization of regulations should be improved. The changed product rule, CPR, is a good example. This may also apply to regulation 25.1309, the most important regarding aircraft systems.
I now wonder whether there might be merit in having every national certification authority that oversees airframers in its own country dispatch permanently some of its own representatives to each of the other countries in the same situation. If everyone acts in good faith, new developments could be made more robust from the contribution of all stakeholders.
Also relative to the aircraft certification process, almost nine months ago I concluded that there exists the potential to introduce the following two new regulations.
First, regarding the CPR and the associated so-called “grandfather clause”, no grandfathering privilege should be granted if anything is interfaced, new or modified, to a previously certified critical system. The latter then needs to be recertified. With this rule, the introduction of MCAS would have forced the modernization of the HSTS.
Second, regarding testing—and this ties to a key recommendation from the JATR, the Joint Authorities Technical Review—testing for any critical system should be forced, maybe under regulation 25.1309, to be performed integrated with all its interfacing systems. Some call this aircraft-level testing. In other words, testing of critical systems individually or in silos is insufficient. With this rule, the simple test of a faulty AOA sensor would have easily uncovered its multiple effects, forcing architecture changes upon the 737 Max.
The MCAS software changes will make the 737 Max safer; however, the HSTS will then have become the next weakest link in the chain, and no chain is stronger than its weakest link. I have identified nine technical reasons to justify the need to modernize the 737 Max HSTS.
Another key finding was that a faulty AOA sensor, in addition to causing erroneous MCAS activation, has also caused a large increase of the control column forces due to the erroneous stall detection. High column forces, along with high manual trim wheel forces, a long-known problem, made it extremely difficult for the ET302 flight crew in particular to raise the nose of the aircraft, to trade airspeed for gaining altitude, which they had to do to avoid colliding with local peaks. Google Earth near Addis Ababa reveals why the ET302 crew requested from air traffic control a 14,000-foot altitude. That's what they were struggling to achieve.
The conclusions of my study have been compiled in a 44-page document, which was recently sent to Boeing. It notably contains 24 main technical questions, makes suggestions for rebuilding trust in Boeing and gives a synopsis of what likely occurred in each accident flight, based on the findings from my study. Because of the ties to regulations and the pre-cited incentive to harmonize internationally, the FAA and Transport Canada were also put in distribution of this document.
Thank you for your attention, and I am now prepared to answer your questions.
I'll answer that question.
First, I will put annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation of the International Civil Aviation Organization, or ICAO, into context. It is this annex that governs international investigations of aviation accidents and incidents. It includes very clear roles and responsibilities.
For example, in theory, the country where the accident takes place should be responsible for the investigation. Second, the countries that make up the investigation team, i.e. those that will actively conduct the accident investigation, are the State of Registry or State of the Operator of the aircraft, the state where the aircraft was designed and built, and the state where the engines were designed and built. These countries play a very active role in the investigation.
In the case of the Lion Air accident, Canada does not meet any of these criteria. The case of the Ethiopian Airlines flight is different. The annex I was talking about states that when citizens of a country are on board an aircraft involved in an accident, that country has expert status. However, this status is very limited. In fact, it allows them to visit the scene of the accident, to receive factual information that is ready to be publicly disclosed by the state responsible for the investigation, and finally, to receive a copy of the final report of the investigation. This is what annex 13 allows in such cases.
So, in the case of Lion Air, we have no status, and in the case of Ethiopian Airlines, we have expert status. That being said—
My question is for Ms. Fox.
This committee is tasked with studying the aircraft certification process here in Canada, so it's our duty, really, to ensure that all our Canadian institutions have the opportunity to comment appropriately when there is an aircraft certified in Canada that Canadians are going to be using, so that in fact every institution that touches this process has the opportunity to properly comment.
You have told us that within your mandate you were able to have only “expert” status, which was very limited as it related to the Ethiopian crash. Obviously, it's a terrible tragedy. Canadians died. What would you see? Would you like to have a larger role?
If you would like a larger role in terms of commentary and the ability to see what went wrong, how would we ensure that the TSB is actually able to play a larger role? Who decides those rules in terms of who gets to be at the site, etc.? Would you recommend that in some way we ensure the TSB has that role in the future?
The committee will reconvene.
First, I want to take this opportunity to welcome our witnesses for this session between now and the end of the meeting.
We have Jodi Diamant, chief engineer, airworthiness and certification, Pratt & Whitney Canada. We have Jim Quick, president and chief executive officer of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada. We have Michael Deer, airworthiness specialist at Bell Textron Canada Limited.
From Viking Air Limited, we have David Curtis, president and chief executive officer; and Steven Bruce, director of design and certification. From De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, we have David Joseph Watson, manager, airworthiness and air safety.
With that, we'll start with presentations for members.
Mr. Quick, you had your hand up, so I'm assuming you want to go first.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good afternoon.
On behalf of the members of the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada, thank you for including us in your study on the aircraft certification process.
Aerospace stands as one of our country's proudest achievements, providing 215,000 jobs and $25.5 billion annually to the Canadian economy.
It is also a sector that is facing increasingly fierce global competition. Frankly, Canada is falling behind from a competitiveness standpoint. That's why our association launched vision 2025, a pan-Canadian, industry-led initiative, just over a year and a half ago. We travelled across the country, engaging our members, federal and provincial governments and our 215,000 employees. The process resulted in a comprehensive report that outlines the industry's concerns. We have also provided recommendations.
One of the key priorities identified involved Transport Canada's certification process and ensuring its status as a world-class regulator.
I'd like to say right off the top that AIAC has full confidence in TCCA's work to certify Canadian aircraft. However, we have some recommendations from an organizational and resource perspective.
I'll start with the organizational structure of TCCA. My remarks today are not intended to criticize; in fact, we feel that TCCA has an unparalleled commitment to safety. However, opportunities exist to improve efficiencies in its interaction with industry.
Currently, TCCA is the only major civil aviation regulator that is structured within a government department. This isn't the case with our major trading partners. The U.S.A.'s Federal Aviation Administration, the FAA, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, EASA, are different. TCCA is hampered by a structure that places it in competition within a multimodal Transport Canada and with a complicated internal reporting structure.
AIAC's civil aviation technical committee, comprised of industry representatives and subject matter experts, has reviewed that structure and made the following recommendations: TCCA should be structured within Transport Canada as a stand-alone branch, with proper autonomy, authority and accountability. A senior-level official with relevant aviation experience—an ADM or higher, in our view—should be appointed with overall responsibility for civil aviation matters in Canada. A strong and clear mission statement for civil aviation should be issued. Finally, we recommend to work with us at AIAC to re-establish and invigorate the Canadian Aviation Regulation Advisory Council, CARAC, to ensure industry is working with government to assess and recommend potential regulatory changes through co-operative rule-making.
That brings me to the investment side. Our industry is growing at a rate of 5% a year, yet investments at TCCA are not keeping pace. Our most important trading partner, the United States, funds the FAA in a very proactive and transparent manner. It's a matter of public record. AIAC's civil aviation technical committee recommends that the Government of Canada create a high-level stakeholder team—industry stakeholders as well as Transport Canada—tasked with the following: identifying the staffing and funding requirements by the TCCA, and identifying fair and practical methods of achieving the staffing and funding. The team should be mandated to provide their findings and recommendations within a short, defined timeline, and this should occur in parallel with improving the efficiency of the organizational structure of TCCA.
I'll wrap up by reiterating that it's imperative that TCCA's reputation as a leading civil aviation regulator be protected and enhanced. These recommended changes, we feel, will ensure that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good day, Mr. Chair, vice-chairs and members of the TRAN committee.
I would like to thank the committee for undertaking this important review of Transport Canada’s aircraft certification process and extend my sincere condolences to those who have lost loved ones in the tragic events that have led to this study.
Let me introduce myself. My name is Jodi Diamant—Joanne to some. I am a professional engineer with a specialty in aircraft certification. I spent 18 years at Transport Canada Civil Aviation, and for the past 14 years I've been the chief engineer for airworthiness and certification at Pratt & Whitney Canada. I’ve been extensively involved in the development and application of design standards, the aircraft certification, validation and delegation processes, and implementation of safety management systems. I am here today in an individual capacity, because I've been involved in this process for over 30 years and I'm well qualified to explain how it works and how it can be improved.
As Mr. Quick indicated here, Canadian industry is a world leader in design and production of aircraft, helicopters and gas turbine engine products, and Transport Canada is recognized as having one of the most robust type certification processes in the world, resulting in an exceptional level of product safety.
As state of design under ICAO, Transport Canada is now responsible for the type certification and continued airworthiness of over 18,000 aircraft and helicopters today and over 60,000 Pratt & Whitney Canada engines currently flying in the world, including in Canada.
The type certification of aircraft and engines—which is exceptionally complex, as the Transport Canada representatives explained in February—is just the starting point of aviation safety, before the products enter service. It's very critical, though. It's a partnership in which there are very defined roles, obligations and accountabilities of the parties involved in the certification process. I'm going to go through it very quickly.
There are the regulators: ICAO, which you heard about from Ms. Fox; Transport Canada; and FAA. There's the applicant, which is us in the industry represented here, and delegates.
I have to stress that however it's been characterized, the system is not self-certification and it's not regulation at all. Very simply, starting at the top, ICAO—which Ms. Fox talked about—is an international body. It's a special agency of the UN that has been in place since 1944. Canada is a main signatory, and obviously ICAO is headquartered here. It defines the high-level responsibilities, requirements and processes that are used by countries, regulators and the industry to design and certify a safe product. It drives bilaterals and harmonization. Note that this approach is unique to the aviation sector. There is no other industry that has the same model of international regulation governance and oversight.
Transport Canada, based on the ICAO requirements, defines the design standards and processes to establish the product level of safety and the acceptable methods to demonstrate compliance with these requirements, and how to prove it.
Industry, the companies that design the products—we're called “the applicant”—have to design them using many suppliers and our own expertise. We have to design them to meet those design standards. That can take years. Then we have to prove to ourselves but, more importantly, to Transport Canada that a product complies with or meets all of those design standards that are set by Transport Canada and that the product is safe.
For an aircraft, there are over 1,200 requirements. For an engine, there are at least 100. We have to prove that each and every one of those meets those requirements.
Transport Canada will only approve that aircraft or engine once the company—the industry—has proven that each and every one of those requirements has been demonstrated. They have to have confidence in that.
At the beginning of the certification process, and throughout, there is constant communication between Transport Canada and the applicant. It's not just at the beginning and then we'll see you at the end. It's all the way through.
Transport Canada uses a risk-based approach to determine its involvement during the compliance demonstration phase of the process. They focus on safety-critical aspects, new and novel processes, and design and compliance methodologies. They witness tests. They read reports. They're in there constantly.
Post-certification, the type certificate holder—because we now hold the design approval—has the obligation to monitor the products in the field, identify and analyze issues that could lead to unsafe conditions, work with Transport Canada to introduce required corrective actions and apply lessons learned for design and certification of new products. It's a continuous improvement cycle.
The Transport Canada aircraft certification process is fundamentally robust. It results in an exceptional level of product safety. However, as we know, in the current environment of increasing product complexity and integration, evolving technologies and commercial pressures, the process can be further improved. My recommendations on industry require organizations involved in product type certification and production to have safety management systems.
Let me explain safety management systems, or SMS. Canada was a world leader and recognized in rolling out SMS in the early 2000s on our large CAR 705 operators. It has taken a bit of a hiatus. Many of the committee members may appreciate the journey it has been on.
For certification, let me say that SMS does not replace the certification process or requirements at all. They exist as they have been and will be. It complements and reinforces that by requiring an organization's management system to identify and manage product safety risks associated with the business processes and decisions. It requires executive accountability for product safety and the development of an organizational safety culture.
ICAO has recognized the importance of SMS, not just for operations, but also for our sector of industry, and has introduced the requirement into ICAO annex 19. Transport Canada should put the processes and resources in place to evaluate and recognize those organizations that would like to have SMS or should have SMS on a voluntary basis in advance of or in place of rule-making.
They need to mandate SMS. For Transport Canada, to echo Mr. Quick's comments, it is very important for the Canadian public as well as the industries sitting here at the table. They have to maintain their certification competency through the retention and development of sufficient qualified experts involved in key steps of the certification and continued airworthiness process.
That includes everything from standards development, bilaterals, involvement in the actual product certification processes and oversight of company processes for certification, as well as SMS. In addition, Transport needs to ensure that the appropriate organizational structure is aligned with main bilateral partners.
With the above suggestions, the current robust Transport Canada certification process and product safety record will be further enhanced.
I would like to thank you for your attention. I'd be pleased to respond to questions at the appropriate time on certification, delegation, validation and SMS.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today.
As a clarification, I am CEO of Viking. I am also the executive chair of Longview Aviation Capital, which owns Viking and a number of other aviation entities in Canada, including De Havilland Canada.
Longview, through its subsidiary companies De Havilland Canada and Viking Air, based in Victoria, Calgary and Toronto, designs, certifies, manufactures and modifies commercial turboprop aircraft, including the class-leading Dash 8 series 400 regional turboprop, the world-renowned DHC-6 Twin Otter aircraft and the highly specialized Canadair CL-415 water bomber.
The Longview group of companies employ nearly 2,000 directly and 4,000 indirectly within the Canadian aerospace supply chain, and we account today for over $1 billion in sales, of which 95% is exported. With Bombardier's exit from commercial aviation, Longview is now the largest commercial OEM of turboprop-powered aircraft in North America. We own over 23 different aircraft designs, 21 of which were designed and built in Canada over the last many decades.
Why is this notable? Certifying new clean-sheet aircraft designs is incredibly capital-intensive. We only have to look at the recent development of the Bombardier C Series, now the Airbus A220, to better understand this. Our entire business model is focused on developing second or third product life cycles from robust and proven designs.
The Twin Otter, for instance, was first certified in 1965 and in production until 1988. It was out of production for 22 years. Viking restarted production in 2010. It went through a robust CPR process with Transport Canada and has since delivered another 150 of those new variants. The same is true for the Dash 8. It was first introduced in 1983, and derivatives were developed and have extended the production life of the Dash 8 aircraft over 37 years.
The aircraft certification process and how CPR—the changed product rule—is applied is incredibly important to Longview and our subsidiary companies. The CPR process allows a robust evaluation of the design change with respect to maintaining an acceptable level of safety. The evaluation of newly proposed changes and the proven in-service performance of the aircraft is a fundamental key to identifying the certification basis and ensuring that the appropriate means and method of compliance are completed.
The early involvement of TC—Transport Canada—in the examination of the design change and the certification aspects enables evidence- and risk-based decisions regarding TC involvement throughout the entire certification process. TC's continual engagement with the applicant as the certification progresses allows for the monitoring and adjustments of their involvement as any risk factors change and the appropriate oversight requirements are maintained. Through this oversight and an established system of delegation, TC can rely on the delegated organization to complete the compliance findings with confidence.
Both Viking and De Havilland, through working experience with Canadian airworthiness and operational requirements, have established that we have the necessary knowledge and capabilities as organizations to enable authorized persons within our teams to make findings of compliance on behalf of the minister, not as an employee of the OEM.
TC is a worldwide and respected leader in aircraft certification. Once the aircraft is certified, as we sell globally, TC becomes a partner in achieving certification in other jurisdictions. They become our advocate. The acknowledgement of the role of TC as a certifying authority from the state of design through strong bilateral agreements with other foreign regulators is critical for our business and to sustain our business.
The Twin Otter and the Dash 8 are validated worldwide. This activity would not have been possible without TC maintaining its status as an industry-leading regulator.
I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the Canadian certification process. Bell has been developing and manufacturing helicopters at our Mirabel facility for more than 30 years now. To support the certification of our products, we built a strong relationship with Transport Canada and have held the Transport Canada designation of design approval organization based on the Transport Canada delegation system for over 28 years.
In my role at Bell, I'm responsible for the management and certification process for Bell Canada and for validation of our products globally. As such, I have had the opportunity to observe how Transport Canada compares to and is viewed by other authorities.
I can say that Transport Canada Civil Aviation has a strong reputation around the world as one of the premier certification authorities. Due to Transport Canada's reputation and strong bilateral partnerships, other countries recognize Transport Canada's competence and have trust in the Canadian certification process, which ensures that aeronautical products like ours, developed and certified in Canada, meet the safety standards that have been established by the world's leading authorities.
As mentioned before, Transport Canada uses a risk-based approach to certification. The Transport Canada certification process with its system of delegation is effective and robust. Transport Canada's oversight, known as level of involvement, is based on assessment of risk to determine where and when they are involved in certification projects so their attention can be focused on areas that are the most important and have the greatest impact on safety.
Bell has developed safe products through an open relationship with Transport Canada. The certification process is structured to initiate communication with Transport Canada early in the product development life cycle. The Canadian delegation system is mature and is based on trust. It includes Transport Canada level of involvement to ensure product safety. Early and open communication between Transport Canada specialists and Bell specialists is encouraged to ensure engagement and common understanding of our design and compliance with the applicable standards.
A strong delegation system is necessary to maximize the efficiency of the certification process and to ensure that Transport Canada resources focus on areas that have the greatest impact on safety. There are finite authority resources to provide oversight of the certification process, so delegation and a strong partnership with Transport Canada are necessary for the success of the Canadian industry. Early collaboration, trust, and continued delegation and reliance on the OEM's expertise are needed to continue to develop safe products.
Strong bilateral partnerships with other major authorities are also essential. If there is trust in Transport Canada's certification process, foreign authorities can focus their attention on areas of greatest risk as well.
We appreciate our partnership with Transport Canada. It's important to Bell that Transport Canada be properly resourced and have predictable and stable funding to retain a strong international and domestic voice.
I would also echo the recommendation from Ms. Diamant about the safety management systems. Bell has already started the process to voluntarily adopt safety management systems within our organization. We have already adopted it in several other facilities and are in the process of adopting a voluntary safety management system here in Canada as well.
Welcome to our witnesses.
Again, condolences to the family members as we discuss this very important topic.
Today we saw a CBC report commenting on two reports. One was from the Ethiopian investigation team, which clearly points a finger at Boeing. The other was from the U.S. House of Representatives, which I find somewhat disturbing, when we think about the comments they make in the report about the tremendous financial pressure to get things done, the culture of concealment, hiding flaws with the MCAS system from 737 Max pilots and failure to identify key safety problems. They're questioning the certification process of the FAA, obviously. I found that somewhat concerning.
Given the comments about the FAA and the failure, the shortcomings in what they did and how they collaborated with Boeing on some of these certification processes, why should we continue to trust the certification process? I guess the question is this. How would you expect other countries to react if we withdrew from the international system and stopped recognizing their certification process? What might some of the implications be for Canadian companies if other countries no longer recognized Canadian certification?
I'll ask Ms. Diamant to comment on that, and maybe Mr. Curtis.