FAAE Committee Meeting

     Order, please.

    Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), we are studying Canada's Arctic foreign policy.

    I just want to welcome our two witnesses. We have Donald McRae, who's a professor at the University of Ottawa. Welcome, Mr. McRae. It's nice to have you here this morning. We also have Michael Byers, who is a professor and Canada research chair in the department of political science at the University of British Columbia. Mr. Byers, welcome to you, sir, as well.

    As we continue our conversations on the Arctic, we're going to start with you two gentlemen, with some testimony for about 10 minutes each, and then we'll move around the room and go for some questions back and forth.

    We could probably do this for about an hour, an hour and a half, depending on what we're doing, and then we have a little bit of committee business that we could deal with after that point in time.

    Mr. McRae, why don't we kick it over to you. You have 10 minutes, sir.

     Thank you, Chair. I'd like to thank you and the members of the committee for inviting me here this morning.

    I'm going to talk about the international legal regime for the Arctic. It's a topic on which I think there's some public misunderstanding. Speculation about the need for a new legal regime and imagined disputes over territory and resources I think ignore the legal reality that actually exists in the area. Let me provide some fairly basic clarification.

    When I'm talking about the Arctic, I really mean primarily the waters and seabed of the Arctic Ocean, not the land territories of the states that surround the Arctic, although I'll say a few words about the land a little later on. The Arctic Ocean is just that; it's an ocean, water that historically for most of the year was covered with ice. As an ocean it's governed by the regime set out in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which largely reflects customary international law. The fact that the U.S. is not a party of the treaty is for the most part of no real significance.

    In legal terms, the Arctic is like any other ocean around the world, whether we're talking about the Pacific, the Indian, the Atlantic, or even the Mediterranean Sea, except that it has been historically covered by ice. As a result, each coastal state in the Arctic is entitled to the living and non-living resources of a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone and the resources of the continental shelf extending beyond 200 nautical miles, to the limits of the continental margin.

    These are rights that belong to the coastal state automatically and don't have to be claimed by the state. That's why the Russian flag-dropping incident of a few years ago, while amusing and scientifically interesting, was of no legal significance whatsoever, and the Russians themselves recognized that.

    Just as the states within the region cannot enhance their positions by making claims, rights over the continental shelf within the Arctic cannot be claimed by states from outside the region. The continental shelf, in legal terms, is the prolongation of the land territory. If you don't have any land in the area, then you cannot have a continental shelf.

    There are, of course, five Arctic coastal states: the United States, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark, in respect of Greenland. The other states that are often referred to as Arctic states—Iceland, Sweden, and Finland—all of whom are members of the Arctic Council, do not have any rights over the waters or of the continental shelf that extends into the Arctic Ocean. They are blocked by the Arctic five, whose EEZs, exclusive economic zones, essentially surround the Arctic Ocean. This means that access to the Arctic Ocean has to be through the EEZ of at least one of the Arctic states.

    The distance to which the continental shelves of the Arctic states extend beneath the waters of the Arctic Ocean is a matter that is of course being investigated by all of the Arctic coastal states. There's a complicated formula under the Law of the Sea treaty involving distance and sedimentary depth, and it is to determine these outer limits that these large-scale scientific investigations have been undertaken in the last few years by most of the Arctic coastal states. Canada, as you know, has been engaged in collaborative research with both the United States and Denmark.

    Canada must submit its view on the limits of the continental shelf to the United Nations body, the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, by the end of 2013. But one must be a little cautious about this. Given the backlog in the commission's work, it may be 20 years before the commission will actually express its views on Canada's submission. That would be 20 years before we could be confident that the limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic had been finalized.

    Although it may be some years before we know the precise outer limits, I think most predictions are that most of the seabed of the Arctic Ocean will be subject to the continental shelf jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states. There will not be much left there that will be international seabed, and that means that boundaries will have to be drawn between the continental shelf jurisdictions of these states.

    There are rules for determining maritime boundaries based on the Law of the Sea treaty. They are not very clear—they are somewhat vague—but they have been developed in state practice and in the decisions of international tribunals. The Arctic states have indicated in the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration that the Law of the Sea regime will apply to the Arctic, so the rules for maritime boundary delimitation will apply when they have to come and determine the continental shelf boundaries beyond 200 nautical miles.

    Let me turn to another aspect of the Arctic Ocean, and that is navigation. The bulk of the Arctic Ocean is high seas, and thus there is freedom of navigation through it. But as I mentioned earlier, access through the Arctic Ocean must go through the exclusive economic zone of at least one Arctic coastal state.

     Under article 234 of the Law of the Sea treaty, Arctic coastal states can establish within their exclusive economic zones—in areas that are ice-covered for much of the year and where there are exceptional hazards to navigation—non-discriminatory rules relating to marine pollution from vessels. They can enforce those rules. An attempt is being made, through negotiations in the IMO, for the development of a binding polar code that would establish binding international standards for navigation in Arctic waters, and it would therefore make national rules uniform.

    There are, of course, two more specific navigation questions in respect of the Arctic. Russia claims that parts of the northern sea route are the internal waters of Russia, and Canada claims that the waters of the Northwest Passage are the internal waters of Canada. We solidified that claim when we drew straight baselines around the Arctic archipelago in 1985.

    Because the United States and some European states object in principle to the treatment of the Northwest Passage's internal waters and regard it as an international strait, there is a dispute over this. I would suggest that as a practical matter this dispute is overblown. The United States does not object in practice to the actual jurisdiction being exercised by Canada, although if you raise an issue with the United States, such as the NORDREG extension, it makes an objection in principle. This objection, in my view, is more about the implications of Canada's position for other waterways around the world than concern about what Canada does or might do.

    Moreover, because of the 1988 icebreaker agreement between Canada and the United States, U.S. government ships will pass through the Northwest Passage with the consent of Canada. The issue again, as I say, is a matter of principle, not really a matter of practice.

    The real test for Canada's authority—or Russia's, for that matter—will come if Canada has to arrest a foreign flag vessel in the Northwest Passage and the flag state challenges Canada's right to do so. In my view, such a challenge would fail, either because the internal waters claim would be upheld or because Canada's exercise of jurisdiction, in any event, will be justified under article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.

    Given the hazards of navigation in the Arctic, which will no doubt remain into the foreseeable future, the most likely scenario is that vessels transiting the Northwest Passage will need the kind of coast guard support that Russia provides in the northern sea route. We see this with the current vessel, the LNG carrier Ob River.

    I think the greater openness of the northern sea route may suggest that passage through the Arctic Ocean in the near future will more likely take that route. Northwest Passage navigation may be more to provide access to and from resource development activities on land or to coastal communities. I would suggest that practical challenges to Canada's jurisdiction of the Northwest Passage seem unlikely, but of course one can never rule them out.

    I would suggest the consequence is that Canada's position in respect of the Northwest Passage is best enhanced by simply going ahead with treating it and managing it as internal waters and retaining it as open to international navigation. I think repeated attempts to try to get the United States to agree with us are counterproductive. The U.S. has good geopolitical reasons for not agreeing with Canada. At the same time, it has good reasons not to object to what Canada is doing in practice. I would suggest that long-term acquiescence in the management that Canada exercises may be more important than an objection in principle, and therefore we should not encourage the United States to object in principle to what we're doing.

    I will mention a couple of other legal issues with respect to the Arctic. First, title to land territory in the Arctic is not really an issue, except with respect to what we might describe as the Lilliputian question of sovereignty over Hans Island, which has no strategic geopolitical and probably no resource implications, and no doubt can be managed between Canada and Denmark. Second, there are a few outstanding maritime boundary issues within 200 nautical miles. There are some minor ones with Denmark in the Lincoln Sea and a major one with the United States in the Beaufort Sea.

    Again, there are principles of law to resolve these issues. In the case of the Beaufort Sea, Canada and the United States could send the matter to international arbitration, or the ICJ, as we did in the Gulf of Maine case. I would suggest that—given the inconsistency between a boundary that is good for Canada within 200 nautical miles and what is good for Canada on the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles—further thought needs to be given to the Canadian position before entrusting it to international dispute settlement.

     There is a major gap in the international legal regime, and that is the involvement of Arctic indigenous peoples. The Law of the Sea Treaty was negotiated before any real concern was given to indigenous rights. Major instruments recognizing those rights, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, came later. The Arctic is an area that has historically been, and in many respects still is, predominantly occupied by indigenous peoples. The Arctic Council provides for permanent indigenous participation. The legal rights to land and maritime territory rest with the Arctic Five, not with the full membership of the Arctic Council. When the Arctic Five have met, as they did in Ilulissat in 2008, there was no indigenous representation.

    There is a broader policy concern, and this is where I'd like to finish on the appropriate level for Arctic diplomacy. The Arctic is often seen by countries in Europe and around the world as an area of international interest and concern. It is true that many issues affecting the Arctic have to be dealt with on a multilateral basis—global warming, atmospheric pollution, and some aspects of marine pollution. They can't be resolved by the Arctic coastal states acting alone. Title to territory in the Arctic and ownership of the mineral resources and fisheries within 200 nautical miles and beyond, as far as the continental shelf is concerned, is national. It rests with the Arctic Five states. What's the balance to be effected between Arctic diplomacy at the level of the Arctic Five coastal states, at the level of the broader Arctic Council, or at the broadest level of the international community? That is a major issue for Canada in trying to implement an Arctic foreign policy.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I look forward to any questions you may have.

    Thank you very much, Mr. McRae.

    We're now going to turn it over to Mr. Byers.

    Thank you very much. Mr. Chair.

    I speak French but, today, I will stick to English.

     I agree with almost everything my friend and colleague has just said, which enables me to stand on his broad shoulders and venture into a couple of specific areas.

    First of all, I'd just like to explain to the committee members where I'm coming from in general. I regard the Arctic as an area of broad political agreement within Canada, so partisan views are not particularly important here. I certainly come to this issue on the basis of academic expertise. Among other things, I am a principal investigator with ArcticNet, which is a federally funded consortium of Arctic scientists from 27 Canadian universities and eight federal departments. I think it's also relevant that I advised former Foreign Minister Lawrence Cannon on his Arctic foreign policy statement two years ago and was very pleased with that document. So I'm here to give my best advice to this committee in the hope that all parties can work together to come up with the right answers here.

    It's highly appropriate that this committee is considering this issue because many of the challenges concerning the Arctic are quintessential foreign policy challenges. The Arctic Ocean is surrounded by continents, and of course across that ocean you have the former Cold War divide between Russia and NATO. You have some very significant challenges coming up with melting sea ice, shipping, potential threats from non-state actors. There's a dynamic here that is really very much a foreign policy dynamic. Just to give you one example, the Russian military has most of its strategic nuclear deterrents based on the Kola Peninsula, which happens to be north of the Arctic Council. The moment you start talking about the Arctic, you're talking about the relationship between Russia and the United States; you're talking about Mr. Obama's effort at a reset of that relationship. We can't divorce these issues from that larger geopolitical dynamic, and one needs to recognize that there are forces at work—including Mr. Obama's major diplomatic push—that should affect Canada's approach as well.

    The other thing to say is that there's a general recognition that there's little prospect of military conflict between nation-states despite that Cold War history. Thanks to WikiLeaks, for instance, and a cable from Ambassador David Jacobson to Hillary Clinton in January 2010, we know that the Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper, told the Secretary General of NATO that there was no role for the alliance in the Arctic because, and I quote, “relations with Russia are good”.

    So behind closed doors, certainly, there's a very strong recognition that this is not a sphere where there's any likelihood of military conflict. In the Arctic, if not elsewhere, Russia has embraced and is implementing a policy of international cooperation. That is something that is quite significant. It was in that spirit that Foreign Minister Cannon crafted the foreign policy statement that committed Canada to resolving, through negotiations, its Arctic boundary disputes, and we are now in active discussions on the Beaufort Sea boundary with the United States, in active discussions on the link and sea boundary dispute with Denmark. Our scientists and our diplomats are talking with the Danes and the Russians about possible disputes—not yet disputes—in the central Arctic Ocean once submissions are made by those three countries to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

    So, generally, it's a pretty positive scene: international cooperation, recognition of this by the Canadian government, and now, with our upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council, an opportunity to lead that cooperation further, to build on the government's Arctic foreign policy statement from two years ago. The challenges are enormous, obviously, and so too are the opportunities.

    Speaking of challenges, it needs to be emphasized that the Arctic is on the very front lines of global climate change.

     In the western Canadian Arctic, we have already seen a five-degree Celsius increase in average annual temperature. That is phenomenal, and it has all kinds of consequences. The Arctic Council has played a lead role in the past on this issue. In 2004, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment was the definitive study of climate change in the Arctic—its causes, mostly man-made, and its various consequences, some of them quite severe for indigenous peoples, ecosystems, and adaptive challenges.

    There are things that Canada and other Arctic countries can and should do with regard to this challenge. There is the global issue of reducing our carbon dioxide emissions. One cannot divorce that from Arctic foreign policy. There are also specific Arctic causes of climate change. I would mention black carbon and Arctic haze, which are short-lived climate forcers. There's an opportunity at the Arctic Council to move on those issues—to partner with the United States and Russia in reducing black carbon emissions from diesel generators and diesel trucks to deal with the challenge of Arctic haze. These things are accelerating and exacerbating the larger climate changes resulting from other greenhouse gases.

    The other issue that arises in terms of adaptation is shipping. We have seen a record-breaking melt of Arctic sea ice this past summer. I remember six or seven years ago, when I was warning that we might see seasonally ice-free waters through the Northwest Passage, I was assured by very many people, including a number of distinguished scientists, that my concerns were overblown and that we wouldn't actually see any significant melt-out of the Arctic Ocean ice pack until at least 2050, and probably not until 2100. The leading scientists are now predicting that we could see a total late-summer melt of Arctic sea ice as early as 2015 to 2020. That is truly astounding—not only for what it says about the pace of climate change, but also for the consequences. We could be seeing hundreds if not thousands of international ship movements through the Northwest Passage within the next couple of decades. We need to get on top of that.

    In the Q and A, if people are interested, I would like to talk about the possibilities for diplomacy with the United States and Russia regarding the Northwest Passage issue and its link with the northern sea route. I would also appreciate a chance to talk about the U.S. concerns about precedents. An important article has just been published by Frédéric Lasserre at Laval University and Suzanne Lalonde at the University of Montreal, suggesting that there are only two straits significantly affected by a potential Northwest Passage precedent—one is between the island of Hainan and mainland China; the other is the northern sea route. In practical terms, no one is going to challenge either China or Russia over their claims.

    Another adaptation issue is oil and gas development. There is a lot of excitement about Arctic oil and gas. There is not enough appreciation of the challenges and the risks. Shell just spent $4 billion failing to drill wells north of Alaska. Cairn Energy just wrote off $1.4 billion drilling dry wells just west of Greenland. Part of the cause for these high numbers is that the remoteness, the challenges of ice, and the short drilling season pose real limitations. Then there's the fact that oil dissipates and disperses very slowly in cold water. Your security measures have to be ramped up several times over as compared with other regions. I would like to talk about that in Q and A. I would like to talk about what the Arctic Council is doing on this. There is going to be a new treaty on oil spill preparation and response. We need a new treaty. Canada could lead on a new treaty on oil spill prevention.

     I would love to have a question about fisheries management and protection in the central Arctic Ocean. The United States has been making a real push for the creation of a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean. Canada knows all about regional fisheries protection because of our experience with Spain off the Grand Banks of Newfoundland back in the 1990s. The United States is looking for leadership here. I believe Canada could step up to the plate and help the Americans protect the Arctic Ocean fisheries to the benefit of everyone.

     Thank you very much. Merci beaucoup.

    Thank you, Mr. Byers.

    Mr. Dewar, you have seven minutes, please.

    Thank you.

     And thank you to both of our guests today. You complement each other. You also reinforce some of the testimony we've already heard.

    Mr. McRae, the notion that we need to understand what is at play legally and what isn't is important. We heard that from department officials: don't create a conflict where none exists, and we welcome that.

    Mr. Byers, department officials were here at the last meeting. They were talking about the four pillars the department has when it comes to the Arctic and our foreign policy. They are exercising our sovereignty—we've talked about that a bit—promoting economic and social development in the region, protecting the Arctic environment, and improving and devolving northern governance by empowering northerners. That's not hugely controversial.

    I want to focus on the issue of climate change. I brought this up in questions to the department officials, and you touched on it. It seems to me there is no controversy anymore about the science of climate change. Even the skeptics recently admitted they were wrong. The evidence is there. The question is, what are we going to do?

     When it comes to our agenda for the Arctic Council, which is.... By the way, we should mention this to all our guests. This committee report is to give, if you will, our advice and perhaps instruction, as best we can, to our chair and to the government when we take the chair in May.

    Tell me what you think is the best way to advocate for the need to realize that climate change not only has happened, but is also something we are behind on, and how the Arctic Council, working in this multilateral way that you've indicated, can best address climate change in partnership.

    The place to start here is to address a mistaken assumption that's often made with respect to the issue you've identified. Some people see the impact of climate change in the Arctic as creating opportunities, and they talk about access to resources and new shipping routes. There's excitement about all the untapped oil and gas in the region.

    As someone who spends a lot of time in the Arctic and a lot of time talking with Arctic scientists, the risks and the costs associated with climate change in the Arctic greatly exceed the opportunities.

     Let's just speak here of the impact of climate change on melting permafrost and the absolutely massive impact on infrastructure, roads, pipelines, and communities. We could talk about the erosion of coastlines, especially along the Arctic Ocean, the impact on communities as a result of that erosion caused by the melting of the sea ice, allowing weather and waves to impact on the coastline. Then, of course, there's the increase in extreme weather events that we see linked with climate change. There was a massive Arctic cyclone last summer—an unprecedented climatic event. It accelerated the melting of the ice and may well have had an impact on weather systems farther to the south.

     The costs are greatly in excess of the opportunity, and it's important for northern countries to realize that.

    That doesn't mean we shouldn't seize the opportunities that arise. Yes, we should. But let's not be naive about what's happening and about our need to do something.

    In terms of Arctic countries dealing with climate change, I've already mentioned the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment from 2004. It was a massive study initiated by the Arctic Council, tapping into the world's top Arctic climate researchers, tapping into indigenous knowledge and making it part of the science report, and coming out with a very clear picture as to what was happening. It was assumed that the Arctic Council countries would meet and decide on real action to address climate change. Unfortunately, that next step of real action was essentially vetoed by the Bush administration.

    My message to you on this is that the Arctic Council has been ready before to act in concert. It was prevented by an administration eight years ago that didn't realize the full impact and potential consequence of climate change. We know better today, across party lines, that this is a real problem, and the Arctic Council is a place.

    In terms of regional impacts, I mentioned black carbon, Arctic haze, places where we could lead specifically at the Arctic Council. We shouldn't think that these things can be done informally. We all know that when it comes to the most important issues in the world, countries negotiate binding treaties because they can be enforced. These issues are of such importance that we need to be talking about law-making.

     Mr. McRae, in terms of the legal aspects we have to deal with, you touched on the fact that there are opportunities for certain countries to make certain claims. I hesitate to use the word “claims” because we were instructed earlier not to claim something that we already have.

    When it comes to the issue of China, where do you stand on this? There are those who suggest that it's better to have them in some way at the table—obviously not at the decision-making table, but at least to be recognized as having a role. Are there any perils to that, legally speaking, if you have them in the tent, so to speak?

    I don't see any perils, legally speaking, for that. If “in the tent” means being a member of the Arctic Council, as long as the Arctic Council is not seen as essentially legislating matters that are within the jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states but dealing with matters that collaboratively they want to put before the council, then that seems to me to be worthwhile.

     If there's navigation of the kind that Professor Byers mentions is a strong possibility, it's going to involve China. We're going to want China there to deal with issues relating to navigation. Climate change and atmospheric pollution are all affecting large numbers of countries. They have to be involved in that. My concern is to know when you want to deal with the Arctic Five alone and when you want to deal with the Arctic Council.

    There is a suggestion coming out of Europe that we need to have a new regime dealing with matters that are essentially under the domestic jurisdiction of the Arctic coastal states. I think to allow that impression to continue is actually not a good idea.

    Thank you very much.

    We'll now move over to Mr. Dechert for seven minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    Thank you, gentlemen, for being here this morning and sharing your expertise with us.

     To start with, I'd like to ask some questions to Professor McRae.

    Professor McRae, you mentioned the passage that's apparently occurring right now by the Ob River, which is a Norwegian ship that's transiting the Russian Arctic passage between Norway and Japan, carrying Russian gas, I think. I understood from an article that I read yesterday that taking that route saves 20 days of shipping between Europe and Asia. Apparently, it's being escorted by a Russian icebreaker.

    Do you see that as becoming a very significant passage for ships carrying that kind of cargo? You mentioned that Russia provides coast guard support for that passage. If, for example, the Canadian Northwest Passage were opened up to similar kinds of shipping, what would be the costs and benefits of providing that kind of coast guard support in the Canadian Arctic, and is it feasible? In your opinion, would there be benefits to helping open up development in the Canadian north, if the Canadian government were to pursue opening up that route? Could you compare the Russian route to the Canadian route for us?

     I think it's something that perhaps Professor Byers, who knows a lot more about the practical aspects of these things than I do, will also want to comment on.

    The immediate advantage, of course, is the one you mentioned, and that's the time. Compared with the Panama Canal—or going the other way, through the Suez Canal—there's a substantial saving in time. Therefore, that has to be attractive to anyone shipping.

    The Russians have developed fairly substantially their ability to provide protection for shipping. One of the problems for shipping going into unknown areas is if they have a problem, what do they do? If you go though the Panama Canal and you run into a problem, you have all the way down the coast of the United States and up the coast on the other side with ports you can go into. The problem in the Arctic is there may be nothing. That's what the Russians have done in having ports and having protection, and that makes it very attractive.

    I don't know what the current state is now, but Russia, for a period of time, was asking for a very substantial fee for that kind of service. That does raise difficult legal questions about the extent to which you can charge a vessel going through your internal waters and whether you can charge for a service that you provide. If, of course, it's an international strait, as the United States would argue, then you would not be able to make that kind of charge to vessels. As well, of course, that would add to the cost.

    On the Canadian side, at the moment it appears that the northern sea route is an easier route. It does not have the navigational difficulties of narrow channels that are involved in the Northwest Passage. Frankly, I don't think we have the infrastructure to provide the kind of current support that the Russians provide to ships going through there. I think they've tried to make it attractive for shipping, but if they put a fee that's too high, it will make it less attractive for shipping.

    There are other factors that still have to be worked out. The vessels going through are very much a trial. But what is the long-term insurance cost of having to do something like that?That's a factor that's going to be taken into account, and because of the unknowns...there may be no surface ice, but there may well be ice under the water and hazards that vessels will have to take into account. Those things will have to be worked out to assess the viability of it. But at the moment, I think it would be for a vessel....

     Depending on where you go, if you're leaving from Norway, as they were, the northern sea route would be more attractive. If you're leaving from further south, in terms of distance the Northwest Passage might be a more attractive route, if you're comparing distances.

    Interesting.

    Professor Byers, do you have a comment?

    Yes.

    I think one needs to see the provision of infrastructure and services in the Northwest Passage in terms of several possible benefits. One is obviously in relation to having a presence to provide environmental protection and protection against non-security threats. Think about smuggling or illegal immigration coming from ships that may be entering our waters.

    The other thing is that in terms of our sovereignty, our claim that the Northwest Passage constitutes internal waters, the more we can get foreign shipping to accept our jurisdiction, the better off we will be. The best way to get foreign ships to accept our jurisdiction is to provide them with necessary services: to provide them with ports of refuge, to provide them with world-class charts, world-class weather forecasting, world-class ice forecasting, to provide them with world-class search and rescue—in other words, to make Canada an absolutely essential component of their shipping plans.

    I have been to conferences with the executives of major Asian shipping companies who are almost desperate to partner with the Canadian government in building up this kind of infrastructure. They don't want to work against us, because they know their ships and crews will need us in some instances, so I'd like to see us step forward on this.

    Further to this, because you spoke about Russia and the northern sea route, our legal position in the Northwest Passage is identical to the Russian legal position in the northern sea route. I think as part of our diplomacy in the Arctic more generally, we should seek to identify those commonalities with the Russian government, while of course being cautious about the Russian government in other domains. There was an American president who said “Trust, but verify”. I think there's an opportunity for that with Russia in the Arctic.

    Thank you for that.

    Professor McRae, you mentioned the indigenous people of the region. I understand there are six different indigenous peoples' organizations that are permanent participants in the Arctic Council. How important is the participation of indigenous people of the region to the Arctic Council, to Canada's term as chair of the Arctic Council, and what are the benefits for indigenous people of development in the region? What should we be doing in terms of the Canadian government approach and the international approach to the Arctic Council to ensure that whatever development takes place in the Arctic region accedes to the benefit of the people of the region?

     That's all the time we have, but, Mr. McRae, I'll let you answer the question quickly if you could, please.

    I'll quickly answer the question.

    I've had the benefit of attending two of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference meetings recently, one when they developed an Arctic sovereignty statement and one when they developed a natural resources....

    Their concern is partly the one I've been expressing. Participation in the Arctic Council is fine, but if the Arctic Council is not having any say on how resource development is going to occur, and resource development is something that affects them directly, then that participation is not very fruitful. If matters are going to be dealt with by the Arctic coastal states acting independently of the Arctic Council, I think they have to make some provision for indigenous involvement and participation in that.

    That can happen in a variety of ways. It's all very well to say it happens in the Arctic Council, but if the Arctic Five get together and agree among themselves and then present things as a fait accompli to the Arctic Council, that's not really involvement of the indigenous people.

    There is a serious question about how they can be involved in decisions affecting the resources and affecting their livelihood more directly than just being permanent participants in the Arctic Council.

    Thank you very much.

    We're now going to move over to Mr. LeBlanc, for seven minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

     Thank you, gentlemen, for what is clearly very interesting evidence you're giving this committee.

    Professor Byers, I'll take the bait—no pun intended. My father was the Minister of Fisheries when the 200-mile fishing limit was proclaimed in the 1970s. I'm curious to hear what you would answer if somebody were to ask you about Canada's fisheries management jurisdiction in the Arctic.

    The answer there is that within 200 nautical miles from shore, we obviously have exclusive jurisdiction. There is the issue of the disputed sector in the Beaufort Sea, 6,250 square nautical miles, but the legal dispute essentially means there's a de facto moratorium in place in that area. Within 200 nautical miles from shore, it’s not an issue.

    The challenge is that as the sea ice melts, access to waters further north becomes possible. Indeed, there's an area beyond 200 nautical miles—north of the Bering Strait, north of Alaska and the far east of Russia—that has become ice-free in summer already. It's closer to South Korea, to Japan and China, than some of their fishing areas off Antarctica. You can expect that long-distance fishing trawlers will go into the Arctic Ocean relatively soon.

     This poses a real challenge for Arctic coastal countries because we have straddling stock issues, just as we've had off the east coast of Canada. We might want to develop a responsible fishery within 200 nautical miles in the Beaufort Sea, but if the South Koreans or the Chinese are syphoning up fish just outside of 200 nautical miles, there goes our fishery.

    The United States has taken the lead on this, starting with a Congressional resolution put forward by the two senators from Alaska, signed by President Bush, that has been taken up by President Obama. They are pushing for a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean.

    Sort of like NAFO maybe.

    Exactly like NAFO.

    The beauty of such arrangements is that quotas are signed based on science, using the precautionary principle, and subject to negotiations obviously. The other beauty of it is that such organizations are open to membership from states outside the region. China, for instance, participates in several regional fisheries organizations, so you deal with that challenge of long-distance fishing countries to some degree. This best practice we've learned how to do elsewhere in the world is readily transferrable to the Arctic.

    As I understand it, the Americans were looking for partners on this initiative and have been working closely with Russia, but Canada for some reason has been missing in action. I don't think we would oppose such a thing, but in terms of opportunities for leadership, this is it.

    Finally, some people say that the Arctic Council is the wrong place to do this, because Sweden and Finland are at the Arctic Council and they are subject to the common fisheries policy of the European Union. Therefore, the Arctic Council is the wrong place because of that EU connection.

    My response is that we need the European Union onside with any regional fisheries organization, just as we need China, just as we need Japan and South Korea. If we don't have those Spanish trawlers subject to this agreement, then we're in a problem right from the start.

    Let's do it in the Arctic Council, or at least try it at the Arctic Council. It's a major item for Canadian leadership. We know how to do this. We have our experience from the Atlantic. Let's show the other countries how to work together in the north.

     I think that may be an opportunity for Canada's chairmanship to focus on the NAFO equivalent in terms of Arctic fisheries. It's an interesting approach. Thank you.

    In 2011, Professor Byers, you published an article in Policy Options that, fast-forwarding to the re-election of the Obama administration, may even be more or as relevant today as it was a year ago, in terms of saying there is a pretty broad willingness to treat issues like search and rescue, like environmental stewardship among Arctic nations, as a cooperative foreign policy effort. And I think Professor McRae said the same thing.

    There has not been a great deal of confrontation or certainly dramatic discord. If the Obama administration has previously shown a willingness to negotiate or discuss with Russia and Canada issues like search and rescue, access, policing—a whole series of these potential areas of overlap—can Canada use its Arctic Council chairmanship to perhaps drive a multilateral agenda further, to use the goodwill from the American administration and not lose any momentum? Or do we run into what Professor McRae I think correctly noted, that you don't look for too many international fora to resolve it, as you may not like the conclusion? You're perhaps better to simply occupy the space properly, functionally.

    You said the same thing yourself with respect to Asian shipping companies.

    I may disagree with my friend and colleague a little bit on this. The changes are happening so quickly in the Arctic that having a wait and see policy and allowing time to work to our advantage might result in our missing opportunities and ending up in crisis.

    Let's take the Northwest Passage. The Northwest Passage dispute, for all practical purposes, was dealt with by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1988. It was an incredible diplomatic accomplishment. He himself cites the Arctic cooperation agreement with President Reagan as one of his signature accomplishments.

    Were it not for the subsequent changes resulting from climate change, we wouldn't be talking about the Northwest Passage. The problem is that commercial vessels are entering in increasing numbers, and this agreement, which applied to U.S. government vessels, doesn't cover the new challenge. So we need an updated Arctic cooperation agreement. We need to take the work that Mr. Mulroney did and update it to the 21st century.

    I know there are American diplomats who would welcome such a conversation, because they realize that having the longest coastline of North America seasonally ice-free is not in their interest if it's a wild west zone, with only international jurisdiction, as opposed to being part of a North American states' internal waters jurisdiction. They want to have that conversation. It will be a tough negotiation. There will have to be compromise.

    In 2008 I did a model negotiation with Paul Cellucci, the former U.S. ambassador to Canada, on this very issue. In a day and a half we didn't solve the sovereignty dispute, but we came up with nine concrete recommendations as to how the two countries could work together. This is a moment where we should be talking with our ally.

    As I said, we should also be talking with Russia and the other Arctic countries. But this dispute, the Northwest Passage, will be resolved when Mr. Obama and Mr. Harper sit down together, just like Mr. Reagan and Mr. Mulroney did. They should talk about it and come to some kind of new arrangement soon.

    Thank you very much.

    We will now start the second round for five minutes of questions and answers.

    Ms. Brown.

    Thank you very much.

    Mr. Byers, I am going to let you carry on with that for a little bit. You said you would like a question about diplomacy. I watched your YouTube video, your TVO interview. I have two pages of notes and questions. Perhaps we will pursue this diplomacy issue.

    You talked in that video about the terrorist threat the United States felt after 9/11, about the northern flank being exposed—I think that was your term. Then you talked about sitting down with Mr. Cellucci and having this discussion, and you said there were nine concrete steps to improve cooperation with regard to the Northwest Passage. I wonder if you could talk about some of those concrete steps. Give us an idea of what some of them were.

     Yes, thank you.

    I was pleased with that interview, in large part because the interviewer was so good. Allan Gregg is really quite exceptional, so I was able to tease out a few ideas that I hadn't clearly articulated before.

    I personally don't think the terrorist threat in the Arctic is all that substantial. Among other things, strangers are very easily spotted in small northern communities. Mr. Bevington will know this. It takes about three seconds for news to get around town that someone new has arrived. Add on the fact that they might have an accent and all of a sudden the local RCMP know about it. The terrorist threat is perhaps not so much.

    But in terms of the challenges that come with an international shipping route, in terms of smuggling or illegal immigration, or the transshipment of illegal goods, potentially including weapons of mass destruction or other things that we try to regulate in ports and shipping lanes around the world, yes, there are issues. Mr. Cellucci picked up on this in 2004 and 2005, saying that for the Americans the terrorist issue was important. And even if we in Canada don't think it's as pressing in the Arctic as they do, it does provide a reason for getting them to the table. If our concerns are protecting our citizens and protecting our environment, and if their concerns are about terrorism, and if it leads to the same result and a negotiated agreement, that's good.

    In terms of specific recommendations that came out of our mock or model negotiation, perhaps the most important one is that we should encourage both countries to raise their game in the Arctic. We should encourage the United States to adopt a mandatory ship registration scheme, like NORDREG, for the waters north of Alaska. It's impossible for them to criticize us if we're doing something that they're doing themselves. It also provides the notice and the communication that is appropriate for both countries.

    In similar respects, back in 2006 Canada and the United States modified the NORAD agreement, the North American aerospace defence agreement, to include the sharing of maritime surveillance. It was clarified by then Defence Minister Gordon O'Connor that this included the Northwest Passage.

    Some people think that I would be opposed to sharing maritime surveillance with the Americans concerning the Northwest Passage. I'm certainly not. We live in a shared continent; NORAD is about protecting the continent from external threat. Maritime surveillance, like air surveillance, is an important component of that. One of the recommendations in our model negotiation is that we implement that fully so that we actually do have shared maritime surveillance and response in places like the north, and get on with that essential job, raising the confidence of the Americans.

    If we want to have an updated Arctic cooperation agreement with the United States, we have to recognize that their concern is that if they sign an agreement and recognize our legal claim—internal waters—the risk is that we then do nothing, that we get the legal jurisdiction but don't step up to the plate in terms of the policing, the infrastructure, and the surveillance. If they leave it to us and make that legal commitment, we might drop the ball. So we need to show them we're serious about this, that we want to raise our standards, and we want them to raise their standards too. We're ready to implement; show us that you're ready to implement too. Let's get serious about this space in a way that makes sense for both countries.

    This is the final recommendation I'll touch upon. We said we should create a bilateral commission on northern shipping modelled on the international joint commission that manages transboundary waters between Canada and the United States, or modelled on the St. Lawrence Seaway, where the two countries together use their national jurisdiction to create an international shipping route that works to the benefit of both countries. That's what we need in the Northwest Passage, that kind of vision, where it's not Canada versus the United States, but Canada and the United States, using Canada's status as the coastal state to the benefit of both countries.

    Thank you very much.

    We'll start with Mr. Dewar, and then Mr. Bevington for five minutes.

     I'll be very quick. I actually just want to underline a point that comes, Chair, from the meetings we had informally with our friends from Iceland. You'll recall their testimony. I just want to make sure we don't lose this.

    They had referenced in their informal testimony—it might be a good idea to request it from them formally, and we'll figure out a way to do that—the changes in the fisheries there. You'll recall they said that all of sudden they have an abundance of, I think, mackerel. I would like to know from them what they've done in terms of surveying their waters and any science from that that might help us in light of what we've heard today.

    I'll turn it over to Mr. Bevington.

    Thank you.

    I didn't really want to spend a lot of my time on the Northwest Passage, because I kind of agree with Mr. McRae and some of the evidence coming out—especially with the passage of the Snow Dragon icebreaker through the North Pole area this summer—that the likelihood of massive shipping through the Northwest Passage is diminishing because the ice is very temperamental in the route through the Northwest Passage. Anyone who's been in the north working on ships over the last number of years knows that the movement of ice is critical to shipping, and with open water there's more movement. We've seen that this year with the blocking of Iqaluit harbour, with the blocking of one of the straits of the Northwest Passage. In the High Arctic, what we're seeing is that there's very little multi-year ice. That was evidence that was presented by Shelagh Grant at a forum I attended earlier this year, that the multi-year ice is very limited in the High Arctic, in the North Pole region. The distance through the North Pole is 12,000 kilometres—Europe to Asia—versus the North Sea route at 15,000 kilometres. Those are the options that are now open for shipping, taking into account the likelihood of the ice melt continuing in the Arctic.

    Should we be focusing on...? The extra movement in the Northwest Passage is mostly of a tourist nature. We're seeing more tour ships, more private vessels moving through the Northwest Passage.

    I want to put that in context. You talked about that a little. Could you expand your thoughts on that?

    Where I would agree with Professor Byers is that one cannot rule anything out, so to make the assumption that we'll all be in the northern sea route or in the Arctic Ocean and not on the Northwest Passage would be a dangerous assumption to make. On the other hand, in terms of planning, it seems that the likelihood at present would be that the shipping initially will be more in the northern part, in the Arctic Ocean.

    But even if there are tourist vessels coming through, that, it seems to me, requires the same kind of domestic planning to be able to manage that waterway as it would if you thought there were going to be larger ships coming through or commercial LNG carriers and so on. That's why I said we should simply go ahead and manage that as internal waters. If what Professor Byers suggests happens, I think it would be wonderful. Having been Canada's negotiator on the Pacific salmon with the United States over two years, I'm not so sure that the Americans necessarily see their best interests as what we perceive to be their best interests. They're very difficult people to deal with, as we found with the Pacific salmon negotiations for a number of years. So as you said, it would be a tough negotiation.

    But in terms of priority, I think our priority should not be trying to get the Americans to agree. Our priority should be developing the infrastructure to manage the Northwest Passage for whatever vessels are coming through, and to treat it as our internal waters, not as though we have to ask anyone else for authority to do it.

    But you've admitted that the likelihood is more in the international waters.

    That would be my assessment, yes.

    Wouldn't the priority then be to set international agreements on shipping, on the types of vessels that are transiting the Arctic? Those international agreements would apply to international waters. If we focus on our internal waters as the prime object area for shipping, then we're talking about something different from setting up large international agreements with countries such as China, or Singapore, which has a large merchant vessel fleet, and all the countries of the world that might be interested in shipping through the Arctic.

    Isn't the first priority to get the big agreement rather than the little agreement?

     They're parallel. I don't think you can say one rather than the other. I think you have to work on both. The forum for doing the other is the attempt to make a binding polar code, through IMO, which is where you get all the countries in the world that are interested in shipping, and ideally you get that polar code to establish the standards, the same sorts of standards we're trying to apply in the Northwest Passage as well, so you don't have a domestic-international divide.

    Thank you very much.

    Ms. Grewal, we're going to turn it over to you for five minutes.

    Thank you, Chair.

    My question goes to Professor McRae, and it follows up on Mr. Dechert's question, except with specific regard to Russia.

     Last week we heard testimony from Department of Foreign Affairs officials that Canada's overarching priority as Arctic Council chair will be to focus on development for the people of the north. Recently, however, Russia suspended the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, an aboriginal group representing more than 250,000 northerners. Given that Canada has signalled that northern peoples are a priority for chairmanship, what impact do you anticipate this new development in Russia will have on our objective?

    I think the first thing I'd say is that it is one thing for the Canadian government to suggest that its objective is development for indigenous peoples. I think the question might be put to the indigenous peoples themselves as to whether they see that as something that will benefit and help them.

    In respect of Russia, I think the problem with Russia at the moment is unpredictability. I mentioned attending the Inuit Circumpolar Council conferences. One of those conferences the Russian indigenous people were able to come to; another one they were not. It was a matter of visas at the last minute. So you can never tell whether their representation is going to be there or not. There may well be serious problems about the way in which Russia treats indigenous peoples. There's a problem with the way many countries around the world treat indigenous peoples. I'm not trying to single out Russia.

    I don't think it's a consequence of a decision by the Russian government to prevent them from attending. Some kind of particular issue at a particular time has caused that reaction. I think the difficulty with indigenous representation from the Russian Federation is that you're never going to know exactly whether they'll be there, whether they'll be able to have their say. When they did come, it was clear that they were acting with the Russian government, against the Russian government, with domestic industry, against domestic industry. They were vibrant and active in trying to deal with the interests and issues in Russia, but the overall political situation is sufficiently unstable to make it complicated.

    My other question is for Professor Byers.

    Professor, you explained in your report on circumpolar challenges that the Arctic Council is in the process of adopting a new treaty on oil spill preparedness and response. This treaty closely resembles the 1990 Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness. It provides for signatories cooperating in the event of a spill, in such things as providing equipment and developing cleaner plants. You suggest, however, in the report that this is not adequate and that beyond preparedness we need to look at prevention. You suggest that what is really needed is an Arctic-wide treaty that focuses on oil spill prevention.

    Can you speak a little bit more on how Canada might pursue an agreement on prevention and what such an agreement would provide for within the Arctic Council?

    If I could just start with one sentence in your question for my colleague on the suspension of RAIPON by the Russian ministry of justice, I do think that was likely an example of two government departments not talking to each other within Russia.

    It was noteworthy that the Russian senior Arctic official, Ambassador Anton Vasiliev, participated in the Arctic Council's expression of concern about that action by the Russian ministry of justice. So just as in Ottawa, when sometimes departments don't talk enough to each other, there is a benign explanation as to what might have happened. There are also less benign explanations, but we shouldn't jump to conclusions.

    On the issue of a new treaty on oil spill prevention, I have a couple of things to say. If an oil spill occurs in the Arctic, it may well be transnational in implication. The Beaufort Sea is an example. A major oil spill would have consequences for both Canada and the U.S. An oil spill in Baffin Bay? Same thing—Greenland and Canada. Around the Arctic, a massive spill would be transnational in consequence, and therefore we should be looking at this as a transnational challenge.

    In terms of oil spill prevention, I think it's also important for us to have a level playing field in terms of safety and regulations, so there's no race for the bottom to try to not have regulations, because the Arctic is such a risky place for such activity. Canada should embrace the drive for higher standards. We all know what happened in the Gulf of Mexico. We all know that ultimately the consequences for both oil companies and governments are extreme if this is not done.

    A final example of that.... There's an issue as to whether countries should retain the requirement for same-season relief well capacity with regard to the Arctic. As exploration moves into deeper and deeper water, this becomes an issue of pressing concern. Other countries, like Norway, Greenland, and Denmark, are maintaining the standard. I think we should do so as well here in Canada.

    The consolation to us is that there's increasing evidence, particularly in the Arctic, that the major oil companies want to have a high degree of regulation and safety with regard to these issues, because they've seen the BP spill. They've seen the consequences for that oil company, and we saw this last summer in Canada. We opened up five new lease blocks in the Beaufort Sea and none of the majors bid for them. The majors in the last couple of years have shifted their attention to places like Russia, Norway, and Greenland, perhaps because Canada's been behind in terms of adopting tough standards.

    So let's get with the momentum and show leadership, and raise our standards collectively with other Arctic states.

    Thank you very much. That's all the time we have.

    We'll turn it over to Mr. Dechert.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I want to go back to Professor McRae for a moment. If you had to boil it down to three to five items to be put on the agenda for the Arctic Council over the next two years, what would be the three that you would suggest to the government?

    I certainly would suggest the protection of indigenous peoples and the reflection of their interests in development. I would certainly suggest the issue and how broadly you put it is a matter of perception, issues relating to environmental protection, which can move into climate change or move down to narrow issues like oil pollution or pollution from ships, but broadly the environmental issues in the Arctic.

    One issue that I know indigenous peoples really want on the agenda, which is refused, is with regard to security issues in the Arctic. I know that's an issue that they would be particularly concerned to be able to have a say on in the Arctic.

     I think the related issue is in respect of shipping and essentially being able to monitor shipping on a regional basis, and not simply have everything being dealt with by the IMO, the International Maritime Organization, and treated as a regional issue within the Arctic Council as well.

    Mr. Bob Dechert: Professor Byers?

     On the same question?

    Mr. Bob Dechert: Yes.

    Prof. Michael Byers: I have four. Oil spill prevention in addition to oil spill preparedness and response—that's number one.

    Number two would be the short-lived climate forcers. I've already mentioned black carbon and Arctic haze. I think we could make real progress there in two years with strong Canadian leadership.

    Number three, I mentioned a regional fisheries organization for the central Arctic Ocean. The U.S. is ready. Russia is ready. Canada has a huge opportunity to have a diplomatic victory that we could call our own and contribute to that issue using our experience.

    The fourth issue, and this is going to be controversial, is that I think we should push for the admission of both the European Union and China as permanent observers at the Arctic Council—not members, not voting members, not members that can be at closed meetings, but permanent observers. The reason I say this is that any international organization, any international forum, is only as important as the people in the room. We want the Arctic Council to be the centre of Arctic diplomacy, Arctic governance. It is a compliment to us that the European Union and China want to be there.

    Additional to that, there are some issues here that can't be dealt with in the absence of cooperation from those major players. If we want to deal with black carbon, we need to have China in the room. If we want to deal with regional fisheries management, we need to have the European Union in the room.

    Now, there are indigenous groups that are hostile to this suggestion, and they have reasons for that, including the European Union's ban on the importation of seal products. That's an opportunity for diplomacy, to actually say to the European Union, “We want you in the room for all these good reasons, but you have to help us here. How are you going to compensate the Inuit of Canada for the impact upon their economies as a result of your policy on the seal hunt?” Instead of yelling at them and litigating against them, here's the opportunity. They want in on the Arctic Council. They're causing problems for some of our citizens; let's work it out.

    Across all these Arctic issues, the age-old mantra that you need to talk is centrally applicable. If there's one thing that perhaps we haven't been doing enough of—not just in the last six or seven years, but in the last couple of decades with regard to Arctic policy—it's that we haven't been talking enough to our neighbours.

    Thank you very much. That's all the time we have.

    We're going to move over to Madame Laverdière for five minutes.

    Thank you very much. Mr. Chair.

    First, I want to thank the witnesses for their presentations and comments, which were very interesting.

    To pursue my education, as someone said a while ago, I have a very short question for you, about something I do not really understand.

    What is a same-season relief well?

    I mentioned it. If you have a buildup of pressure in a well or a blowout in a well resulting from an accident, as occurred with BP in the Gulf of Mexico, one of the main ways you seek to control that development is to drill a parallel well to extract oil and relieve the pressure. You want to drill such a well as quickly as possible.

    In Norway, including in the Norwegian Arctic, companies have to demonstrate that they can begin to drill a relief well within 12 days of an accident occurring. In Canada, when we were pioneering Arctic oil and gas development in the 1970s and 1980s, we introduced world-leading regulations that said you have to have a same-season relief well capacity. In the Arctic you can only drill for two, three, or four months each year. It's longer and longer as the ice melts, but it's two, three, or four months each year. You have to be able to get that relief well in to stop the blowout before the winter closes in and the ice re-forms, because otherwise you're not going to be able to do anything for 10 or 11 months, and you have this blowout continuing through the winter season. That was our policy.

    Under some pressure in the last few years we've hedged away from that policy a little bit, and I don't think we should. I think it should be very firm to the oil companies. Yes, this means you'll have to have a second drill ship close by. Look at the United States. This last season in Alaska, there were two drill ships precisely for this reason.

    We shouldn't back away from this in Canada. The fact of the matter is that Arctic oil and gas will be attractive as prices go up, but we cannot lower our standards to the disadvantage of our environment, our indigenous peoples. Let's hold to the standard we put in during the 1970s, at a very basic minimum.

     On another issue, maybe both of you could expand on the issue of fisheries in the region. It's a subject we have touched on here and there this morning.

    I agree with my colleague that fisheries are and will be an important issue in the region. As he mentioned, we can manage within 200 nautical miles, and that may be the area that we have to focus on in the near future, because it may not be much beyond that. Beyond that is an area of high seas. High seas means that any country in the world can fish in that area. No matter how far the continental shelf extends, beyond that 200 nautical mile zone is an area of high seas. High seas in every other area in the world now has complete coverage—not necessarily all agreed.

    A regional fisheries management organization tries to get cooperation among those countries that are fishing in the area, or those potentially interested in fishing in the area. We had a bad experience with NAFO. Frankly, NAFO is not atypical of regional fisheries organizations. One of the big problems with regional fisheries organizations is that most of them do not have a binding system for setting total allowable catches and allocating quotas. Under NAFO, we have an objection system whereby for many years the European Union has simply said they didn't agree with the scientifically assessed quotas and they were going to go their own way and set their own quotas. That has been a source of difficulty. Now there are potentially opportunities for challenging their ability to do that. Still, we have a problem that we don't have a compulsory regime.

    I would think that if we're going to develop a fisheries regime for the Arctic, we have to be fairly careful that we're not going to simply duplicate the existing fisheries management regimes, which do not have the ability to ensure that everyone adheres to the quota. They don't have very good systems to deal with what are called new entrants, when someone from outside the region says they'd like to fish in the area now. Because this will be an open area, it may well be that states will appear in the Arctic that have never fished in the northern areas before, because fish around the world are drying up. There's a substantial capacity in the southern Atlantic Ocean—way over-capacity in fisheries. If a new area opens up, we're going to have high-powered fishing vessels flagged, and flagged with convenience countries, crewed or captained by highly sophisticated former Russian naval captains who know how to fish and run vessels in this area.

    It will be very difficult for management to occur. It's a big challenge, but it has to be done right; otherwise we will duplicate what has happened in other areas of the world.

    Thank you.

    That's all the time we have.

    Mr. Byers, you had a quick response?

    I have just one simple point. If we're going to create a regional fisheries organization, let's do it before the commercial fishing starts. Let's get there before interests are vested. I agree entirely with Professor McRae that the timing here is opportune. If we miss this opportunity in the next two years, those long-range fishing trawlers could be there already. That's where we'll get the real opposition to this scheme.

    Thank you very much.

    We're going to move to Ms. Brown for five minutes, please, to finish the third round.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    Mr. Byers, in that same interview with Mr. Gregg, you talked about 100,000 people flying over the Arctic every day. Then, in an article from August 15, 2012, in the Globe and Mail, the title of which is “Canada's not ready to have the World in the Arctic”—the World being the largest privately owned yacht on the planet. In that article, you talked about the number of ships that are going through, the challenges they are facing, and tourism going north. You said the weather problems could significantly impact and leave people in a tenuous situation, maybe even life-threatening situations. You end that article by saying:

     I think one of the other things you talked about in that interview with Mr. Gregg was the need to provide more icebreakers. I'm wondering if you could talk about what you think that emergency search and rescue should look like. We are putting money into the icebreakers, as you know. The commitment is there from our government. What does it look like from your perspective?

     Thank you, and my compliments on your research as well. I'm glad you were following my work.

    Yes, the search and rescue challenges are increasing almost exponentially. Yes, there are more than 100,000 people who fly over the Canadian Arctic each day on flights from Los Angeles to London or New York to Beijing. At some stage, unfortunately, there's a statistical risk that an accident will occur. If one of those planes were to crash-land in an area remote from any community in the middle of the winter, it would not be just an issue of the people onboard—and one would feel terrible for them in that situation—but also of the enormous embarrassment to Canada as we scrambled to respond with search and rescue helicopters based on Vancouver Island and in Nova Scotia to a situation that would be almost half a world away, many thousands of kilometres.

    The issue of shipping is the exact same thing. I've travelled through the Northwest Passage a number of times on Russian-owned and -crewed ecocruise ships in Canadian waters with Canada's permission, with more than 100 ecotourists onboard in some very remote and challenging places. These navigators, as Professor McRae said, are very competent, but inevitably some kind of challenge will occur. In 2010 we had three ships run aground in the Canadian Arctic.

    Yes, we need to be ready for this. The activity is increasing. Then there's all the mineral prospecting and everything else that's occurring. Iqaluit is one of the busiest airports in Canada during the summer months.

    How do we deal with this? We need to understand that it needs to be a priority, even though relatively few Canadians live there. The fact that there is no large urban centre is not an excuse for not having world-class search and rescue. Do we position a search and rescue helicopter in the Arctic during the summer months? Yes, I'd like to see that. Do we prioritize the acquisition of new fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft for the Canadian Forces? Absolutely. Do we prioritize the re-capitalization of our Arctic fleet, which is currently made up of icebreakers that are as old as or older than I am? Absolutely.

    With all respect to the government, there have been some really good promises, but the delivery has been slow on this. The contracts for the Arctic offshore patrol ships have not yet been signed, and that's seven years after the Prime Minister made his initial promise on this. The fixed-wing search and rescue situation is that procurement has been under way for almost a decade, and again, no contract has been signed.

    My message to the government is that you're making all the right noises, and you have for some time, but what really matters is being able to deliver. If that massive, tragic accident occurs and we're not ready, it won't impact on our sovereignty, but it will impact on our credibility as an Arctic nation.

    Can I ask a question of logistics?

    That's all the time we have, but we have one more round, so you can fight it out for who gets that one.

    Mr. Bevington, you have five minutes.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    I just want to change the subject a little bit. Mr. McRae talked about the need for dealing with national issues at the Arctic Council—economic development and social development. There was a big forum in Winnipeg two weeks ago with the University of the Arctic, which was well attended. It was the best forum they've had. There's a built-up sense that we need to communicate throughout....

    Is an international organization the best tool—and both of you can answer this—to use to spread the word about national development, economic development, and social development? Should we not be putting more effort into UArctic, which is an international organization that shares information on all of these subjects? Two years ago the government withdrew its funding from UArctic. Should it not get back into this business of information sharing at this level, because it is very critical to really understanding...?

    I guess my point as well is that the Arctic Council is an international organization designed to deal with international issues. Will we have trouble with other states if we start dealing with national issues there? Both of you can answer that.

     Thank you for that.

    This comes back to my initial point in my presentation. The Arctic Council is a venue for foreign policy for international relations. It brings together former Cold War adversaries. You have the United States and Russia sitting at the same table and a U.S. administration that has explicitly recognized the Arctic as an opportunity to engage Russia in a cooperative direction. These are really high stakes. What happens at the Arctic Council is right at the pinnacle of international relations. It's about nuclear relations between former Cold War adversaries. It's about addressing the crisis of climate change. It's about managing China's interest in resources around the world. This is big stuff.

    For a Canadian chairmanship...when we have two years, we do need to prioritize and we do need to recognize that this is international relations at the highest level. We need to be focused on what we can do in cooperation, in concert, with other countries—stuff that we cannot accomplish on our own. As much as I support the idea of disseminating knowledge about Canada's Arctic and Canada's Arctic citizens and what we're doing, I wouldn't want that to squeeze out these other priorities, or things that should be priorities. We need to focus on, as I mentioned, that issue of fisheries, that issue of oil spill prevention, that issue of short-lived climate forces. We need to get those jobs done.

    You're right, there are other venues for pursuing education and the dissemination of knowledge about what we're doing here at home.

    The other thing I will say, and I just need to make this pitch, is that the Arctic is changing so very quickly that it is imperative that we have the very best science possible on all these issues, and this science should be exercised and dealt with in terms of its recommendations and consequences in concert with other countries. If I have one real beef with the Canadian government's Arctic policy recently, it's been the cutting of funding for PEARL, the atmospheric weather station at Eureka in Canada's Arctic. There are some issues that are so utterly important—understanding climate change, understanding the changes in the Arctic—that other countries look down at us when we curtail our ability to contribute there.

    The Arctic has been a priority of a lot of government funding, and I've benefited from it through ArcticNet, but we need to recognize that if we want to have a serious Arctic foreign policy, if we want to be taken seriously in venues like the Arctic Council, we need to be stepping up our game rather than curtailing aspects of it.

    Let me just put this one other way. I sometimes hear civil servants express concern about how much the Arctic costs Canada. They talk about the billions of dollars in transfers to Nunavut. They talk about the expenses of providing search and rescue across this vast region. This sounds a little bit flippant, but it's not meant to be flippant. I tell them that they should put the Canadian Arctic up on eBay because other countries would pay trillions of dollars for the opportunities we have in the Arctic.

    This is not a moment for penny-pinching. This is a moment to embrace the opportunity that we have as an Arctic nation, as the second-largest country on earth, to do it properly in terms of search and rescue, in terms of climate change research, in terms of supporting indigenous peoples, in terms of leading the Arctic Council. The Prime Minister, to his enormous credit, is the first Prime Minister in decades to take the Arctic seriously. Now he has to implement on that vision.

    Thank you very much.

    We're going to finish up with the last questioner, and we'll start with Ms. Brown and then go to Mr. Van Kesteren.

    Thank you.

    I just have a very quick question, Mr. Byers, following up on my last question on search and rescue. How much do we need up there? You just used the words “vast territory”. It is an immense territory. How do we ensure that we have the right pieces of equipment in the right places to respond to these kinds of issues that you identified in your article? It could happen in any part of that vast area. We could be thousands of kilometres away from an incident, even if we have multiple search and rescue facilities available.

    We're doing a lot of catch-up right now for a decade of non-investment in our military and our search and rescue. In fact, we had a cancelled contract, so we're doing a lot of catch-up right now in that kind of capital cost. But how do we ensure that we have enough, and in the right places?

     Let me give you just a couple of examples.

    We have great surveillance capacity from space in the Arctic right now. Surveillance is a component of search and rescue in terms of tracking vessels and being able to get high-quality imagery in emergency situations.

     I would love to see the government fully commit to the RADARSAT Constellation series. As I understand it, the government blocked the sale of MacDonald, Dettwiler in part because it recognized the importance of RADARSAT-2 to Canada's Arctic policy. So here again is a central component: RADARSAT Constellation.

    Another thing we need to recognize is that because the Arctic is changing, we need to change our assumptions as to where we should be basing search and rescue equipment.

     To give you an example, a couple of years ago, I was at Inuvik, talking to a helicopter pilot from Cougar Helicopters who was on contract with one of the oil majors—I think it was BP—that was doing seismic work in the Beaufort Sea. They wouldn't rely on a Canadian Forces search and rescue helicopter based in Comox, on Vancouver Island. They actually contracted with Cougar to provide a private capacity to do search and rescue.

    Now, you can say that it's an important opportunity and a responsibility for private actors, but it highlights the remoteness of our aircraft from this region. If we want to encourage development in the Arctic, and if we want to support Arctic communities, then it's important that we perhaps rethink what we're doing.

    The other thing to say in terms of search and rescue is that we need to get serious—for instance, about the way we approach search and rescue across the country in terms of the response time expectations we put on the Canadian Forces and their personnel. To my mind, it is unacceptable to have a half-hour standby during business hours and a two-hour standby policy at night and on weekends. It's not just a question of equipment. It's a question of whether we have enough SAR techs and enough pilots to provide that rapid response—short-term call-up—across the country with respect to our assets.

    You can put many billions of dollars into search and rescue aircraft and yet not have enough flight engineers to operate them, so it's also an issue of how well we staff this service. Also, where are the bases? Are there forward-operating bases? As well, do we have the personnel necessary to provide 24-hour short-term call-out, not just in the Arctic, but everywhere across this land?

    Thank you.

    A quick question, Mr. Van Kesteren?

    I was going to go somewhere else, but I'm going to follow up on that, Mr. Byers.

    What's wrong with that, though? Is that a direction that we may want to pursue? That if people want to explore in the Arctic, even if they want to travel in the Arctic, that they do hire out private industry for search and rescue...? It's a vast country. Let's not forget that.

    Prof. Michael Byers: Yes.

    Mr. Dave Van Kesteren: Is that an option too? Is that maybe something we should pursue?

    One of my favourite Canadian-owned companies is Viking Air of Victoria, B.C. They're making brand-new Twin Otters, one of the best aircraft ever built in the world. They're making them and selling them around the world. I understand they will be putting in a bid for new DHC-5 Buffalos for fixed-wing search and rescue. As part of their scoping out of Canada's search and rescue needs, they have proposed basing search and rescue assets across Canada's north, assets that are owned and operated by a private company.

    Now, I'm a little bit agnostic on this. What I want to see are services that are reliable and do the job well. The actual mode of delivery is less important. There are other models in other countries as to how this can be done efficiently, so let's not close off any options here, but let's recognize the urgency of the task. What I don't want to see—with all respect—is this sent off to another committee for a long study. The defence minister has his brief on this. This has been going on for almost a decade. It's time to deliver on fixed-wing search and rescue.

    Then, in terms of the helicopters, that's a decision that can be made by the Canadian Forces at the top level. Do we need to put a Cormorant in Rankin Inlet, Iqaluit, or Inuvik during the summer months? I think the answer is yes, but those experts know more than I do. They're the people who actually deploy the aircraft and run the personnel.

     Thank you very much.

    That concludes all of our rounds. My question to the committee is this. Are there any additional questions? I don't think committee business will take a half an hour, so do the NDP, Liberals, or Conservatives...?

    Mr. Dechert.

    Thanks, Mr. Chair. I appreciate this opportunity.

    Professor Byers, you mentioned in your opening comments that you had advised former Minister Cannan about his Arctic policy statement a few years ago. Can you tell us about what some of that advice was, and what it was in that statement that you said you were very pleased with, in that document that was produced under his leadership?

    I would encourage the committee to read that Arctic foreign policy statement closely, because of course it is the last official comprehensive position of this government on the matter before you of Arctic foreign policy.

    There are a couple of things that I would highlight about that policy. It was very emphatic that cooperation was the current trajectory of Arctic international relations and that it was very much in Canada's interest to continue that trajectory. We're playing in a region that involves the United States and Russia, right? As much as we might be Canadian nationalists, we have to recognize that in that kind of context, diplomacy is essential, because we are the smaller state.

    Obviously, in a post-Cold War environment, the dynamic has changed. Russia was just admitted to the World Trade Organization. How do we capitalize on that engagement by Russia in the international system while not letting down our guard in terms of authoritarian tendencies, for instance, in Russia today? It's a tricky one, but that's what we have diplomats for; that's what we have foreign ministers for. Mr. Cannan clearly recognized and embraced that, and among other things worked very hard on his own personal relationship with the Russian foreign minister. So that's very important.

    The other thing Mr. Cannan recognized was that there are a couple of loose ends in terms of Arctic maritime boundary disputes. There's the one in the Beaufort Sea and there's the one in the Lincoln Sea. He recognized, I think to his enormous credit, that you deal with these things when they are not in crisis mode. It's just like the issue of central Arctic Ocean fisheries. You do these things when the moment is quiet, when you can have reflective diplomacy and a friendly negotiation and you can craft appropriate compromises. He initiated discussions with the Americans on the Beaufort Sea. There was a speech he gave in Washington, D.C., where he publicly made the offer, which was accepted, to open discussions there.

    There are discussions taking place with Denmark, and I'm very hopeful that we'll see some announcement there. The issues with Denmark are so small as to be almost laughable, both on Hans Island and in the Lincoln Sea. But what an opportunity to create a positive momentum by saying “We can work this out.” Among other things, we're negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union. Denmark is an important member of that. How do you ratchet up the goodwill just slightly with the European Union while you resolve the disputes we have over Arctic boundaries with the European Union state that's in the Arctic?

     You mentioned earlier that you and former Ambassador Cellucci had worked on a model agreement or treaty a few years ago. Could you table that for the committee, for our review?

    Yes, I can.

    You said there were nine concrete steps outlined in that.

    There were nine concrete steps. Just so you know, we quite deliberately set it up so that there was a team of American negotiators, Canadian negotiators, all non-government or ex-government people.

     Mr. Cellucci came in as the lead American negotiator, and the first thing he said was that he was putting his personal views on the shelf and behaving as if he was negotiating for the United States. He had previously expressed the view that the U.S. should embrace Canada's legal position in the Northwest Passage. That was not his position in the negotiation. He came in as a hard-nosed negotiator.

     It's tough. The Americans are tough negotiators. But we were able to actually arrive at some mutually agreeable recommendations. If we could do that in a day and a half, imagine what Gary Doer and his team and the team in Foreign Affairs could do if you gave them six months.

    That's great.

    If we could have that to look at, that would be much appreciated. Thank you.

    Yes, absolutely.

    Ms. Brown.

    Mr. Chair, as long as he didn't put his personal feelings on the continental shelf....

    Mr. Dewar.

     Thank you, Chair.

    I want to put on the record that when we talk about multilateral forums and inviting others in, we have a model already, and it's NATO. The parliamentary group just had meetings in Prague. The Russians were at those meetings. They were voting on motions that were being put forward. There was shared information. Of course, they aren't part of NATO, as we all know, but there is a confluence there and there's a space created.

    So I think it's important to note that this isn't that unusual to contemplate, and both of our witnesses have suggested that we should look at embracing both the EU and China as permanent observers.

    We haven't talked about it yet, but you touched on it, Mr. Byers, and that is the whole issue of nuclear weapons proliferation. The idea has been put forward, and I think we'll touch on this later in our committee, that we should consider what has been done in other parts of the world, which is to have an agreement to ensure—and these would be tough but important negotiations—that the Arctic will be a nuclear-weapons-free zone. As you said, we should do things when they're quiet. Right now they're quiet. There is mutual benefit, particularly for the U.S. and Russia, in being seen as achieving something here.

    I would like your comments or thoughts about pursuing this as part of our foreign policy.

    Very briefly, I think the only way forward with regard to nuclear-weapons-free zones in the Arctic is in taking an incremental approach. It is essential to recognize that the Arctic Ocean is one of the most heavily nuclearized places on earth, because of the Russian northern fleet and the U.S. navy's presence to monitor and track Russian nuclear submarines. Murmansk is north of the Arctic Circle.

    So, in reality, getting the Russians and the Americans to agree on a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Arctic is probably the last thing we'll do before we totally denuclearize the planet.

    But there are important incremental steps. The one I would point to as most achievable is a recommendation that was put forward by our colleague, Franklyn Griffiths, at the University of Toronto three decades ago. That was to seize on the fact that the surface of the Arctic Ocean is currently demilitarized. Because of the ice cover, the shifting, moving ice, and the very inclement weather conditions and total darkness, we don't have surface naval vessels in the central Arctic Ocean. This would be an opportunity for us to get ahead of the melting ice and say, “Let's simply do an agreement to maintain the central Arctic Ocean, the surface, as demilitarized.” That would be step one.

    The key with nuclear-weapons-free zones and other issues of this matter is to always pick the low-hanging fruit first. This is there as low-hanging fruit, but it won't remain there for very long, because as that ice melts and all those fishing trawlers move in and everything else, there will be a move of surface naval assets to follow them. We can manage those fisheries without having nuclear-powered destroyers chasing those fishing trawlers. Let's get ahead of that curve.

    Thank you.

    I had a couple of quick questions left over here, so why don't we go with Mr. Schellenberger and then Mr. Van Kesteren?

    Mine is going to be very short.

    I know definitions are very important in any agreement or any law.

    Mr. Byers, you mentioned black carbon and Arctic haze. I was with a delegation in Germany not too long ago, and they talked about the carbon clouds that were up in the sky. Am I wrong, or is carbon not heavier than air?

    Could you explain black carbon and the Arctic haze? What are they?

     First, I'm not a scientist, so my answers need to be taken with an understanding that this is not my expertise.

    Black carbon and Arctic haze are particulates, very fine particles, produced through the burning of fossil fuels. Black carbon is specifically in developed countries mostly from diesel generators and diesel trucks. It can cause respiratory problems. The Government of Canada has dealt with that in southern places.

    As a consequence, because these particulates are heavier than air, they actually fall onto snow and ice. They don't stay in the atmosphere, like carbon dioxide. And because they're black, they absorb most of the solar energy that strikes them. The ice and the snow reflect 90% of the solar energy; the particulates absorb 90%. Therefore, they cause a warming and a melting of the ice and snow on which they sit. There are scientists who say that upwards of 40% or 50% of the snow and ice melt in the Arctic is the result of these particulates. So it's augmenting the climate change caused by warming air temperature.

    The response here is simply to adopt available modern technologies to reduce the particulate production, with scrubbers on diesel generators, for instance. We don't need to invent any new technology here, but it's a question of recognizing that, for instance, in many of these northern communities—and Mr. Bevington knows all about this—sometimes quite aged diesel generators are used to power whole communities. That's producing black carbon, which is then having an impact on the snow and ice for tens and hundreds of kilometres around.

    It's the same thing for Arctic shipping. As I understand it, there's consideration about putting world-class scrubbing technology on the coast guard icebreaker Diefenbaker, which the government plans to build as a recognition of this problem. If you're going to have a heavy icebreaker operating in the Arctic, it should not be contributing to the black carbon issue.

    Mr. Gary Schellenberger: Thank you.

    The Chair: Mr. Van Kesteren, do you have another question?

    I don't have a whole lot of time, do I?

    The Chair: No, you don't.

    Mr. Dave Van Kesteren: I've got to say that it's a tough sell. It really is. I hate to be identified as a naysayer, and I'm not suggesting that there's no validity to that, but that's a tough sell. You'd have to see the carbon. I know this is a new challenge. It's something I've just started to hear myself, too. You can understand why Canadians and people in general just kind of approach this with some skepticism.

     I know you're not a climatologist, but if the Arctic is going to melt, just give us some indication of.... Obviously the darkness you talked about would absorb more of the sunlight than reflect it from the snow. What kind of climate change...what would that make in terms of picking up precipitation and dropping snowfall in northern hemisphere countries? Is there some thought? Are there some climate models?

    I'm going to defer on the climate science question because I don't want to mislead you. You should call an Arctic scientist, perhaps Louis Fortier from ArcticNet, to talk to you about this.

    On the issue of it being a tough sell, similar concerns were expressed back in the 1980s about the remedial measures needed to address acid rain. To his enormous credit, Mr. Mulroney got an agreement with the United States on acid rain that resulted in the installation of scrubbers for sulphur and nitrous dioxide on American power plants, which is why we still have fish in lakes around Ottawa.

    These are new developments. They require new responses. Again, as I said, this isn't a partisan issue. I cite Mr. Mulroney because I admire what he was able to do on these issues, and I put him forward as a model. By working with allies like the United States, by embracing the opportunity to address new challenges, including through science and technology, we can be responsible stewards of Canada's Arctic.

    That's all the time we have because we have some committee business. I do want to thank our witnesses for being here today and for all your information.

    Thank you very much.

    We'll suspend for two minutes.

     Here's the process that needs to happen. We need unanimous consent for Mr. Dewar to withdraw his motion. Is that okay?

    Some hon. members: Agreed.

    The Chair: We have consent. Thank you very much.

    Now we have a new motion to put forward.

    Mr. Dechert, go ahead.

    Mr. Chair, I'll read it. It is slightly amended from the motion that was previously put before the committee members.

     I'll read it from the top:

—and this is where we insert some new language—

    That's the insertion. I'll give this to the analysts so they have it. Then we go on with the words as they currently exist:

—so the word “providing” needs to be inserted—

    Thank you.

    Mr. Dewar, go ahead.

    That's agreed to by our folks.

    All right, then. I will just call the question.

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Chair: Thank you very much.

    Is there any other new business?

    Thank you very much.

     With that, the meeting is adjourned.