:
Hello. My name is Jenny Jeanes, and I coordinate Action Réfugiés Montréal's detention program. Thank you for inviting me here today to speak about immigration detention.
Some of the comments I will make today will echo some of the evidence provided during the examination of Bill , but are relevant to the current study.
Action Réfugiés Montréal was founded in 1994 by the Anglican Diocese of Montreal and the Presbyterian Church in Canada through the Presbytery of Montreal. Our mandate includes assisting refugee claimants who are detained in the CBSA Immigration Holding Centre in Laval, Quebec.
Since joining Action Réfugiés Montréal in 2005, I have visited the Canada Border Services Agency holding centre in Laval on a weekly basis, meeting with individual detainees. Each week we meet newly arrived refugee claimants who have for the most part been detained in order to verify their identity. We help them understand complex immigration procedures, especially the refugee claim process; assist them in finding legal counsel; provide phone cards to those who need to call their families and ask for identity documents to be sent; and identify the more vulnerable detainees in order to provide them extra support.
I understand committee members have visited the three holding centres. Having visited, you have been able to gain valuable information about detention conditions. However, a single visit does not provide complete information. I hope that our experience visiting the centre on a weekly basis, following the cases of detainees through the investigations process, and accompanying them to detention review hearings will provide a more complete picture.
This information is essential for your study. When making decisions about detention as a tool to enhance security, the government has a responsibility to ensure safeguards are in place to prevent further harm to people fleeing persecution. The consequences of the decision to detain must be considered.
The four key points I would like to speak to you about today are the following: the situation of children accompanying their parents in detention; the inadequate consideration of vulnerability in the decision to detain or maintain detention; the inability of the immigration division to fully review detention on the grounds of identity; and the impact of detention on refugee claimants. All of the cases I will mention today are of refugee claimants detained on identity grounds.
I believe the committee has been provided with statistics about the number of children detained in Canada each year. It is essential to keep in mind that many of the children who spend time in holding centres each year are not officially detained but accompany their detained parents; these children do not appear in the official statistics.
The Canadian Council for Refugees published a report highlighting such cases in 2009. In theory, these children may leave into someone else's care; however, most of the families—
However, most of the families that I have met in detention include young children between zero and five, even breast-feeding children, where it is not reasonable or even possible for the children to be separated from their parents. One of the key problems with accompanying children is that the IRB does not consider the best interests of these children when deciding whether to maintain detention for or release the parents.
I would like to share stories of some of the families we have met in detention.
One is about a woman refugee claimant from Ethiopia and her three children, ages four years, three years, and eight months. At her seven day review, her lawyer presented a known shelter for women and children refugees as an alternative to detention, arguing that considerations should be given to the presence of three young minors in detention. However, detention was maintained, and the family spent 29 days in detention, during which the children were ill and had to be taken several times to hospital.
A female refugee claimant from Somalia was held with her young son who was quite ill. After more than 40 days their detention was once again maintained, despite affidavits from family members in Canada as to their identity, despite the presence of an alternative, and despite arguments about the child's health.
Some parents share with us the difficulties their children face in detention, including fear, trouble eating or sleeping, or physical discomforts. Other parents indicate that while their children do not seem disturbed by being in the centre, their own stress and anxiety have negative effects on their children.
The next point I would like to address is that of the detention of vulnerable persons, including the elderly, those experiencing physical or mental illness, pregnant women, or unaccompanied minors.
One of the problems that arises with vulnerable persons who are detained for identity is that once the decision has been made to arrest and detain, vulnerability is no longer directly relevant to the decision to release or maintain detention. There is no clear direction for either CBSA or the IRB to consider release due to vulnerability or compelling circumstances.
In 2009, I met a 75-year-old woman from the Democratic Republic of Congo in the holding centre, a refugee claimant detained on identity. She had a significant language barrier and health problems. An alternative was offered from the day she was detained in the form of a community worker who spoke her language and was willing to provide shelter and support. This alternative was endorsed by her designated representative, a social worker. However, the woman spent 17 days in detention, which was very difficult for her since she was unwell and had trouble communicating even via an interpreter.
In our experience, many vulnerable people end up in detention, which creates an enormous strain not only on them, but on CBSA's resources, and yet often suitable alternatives exist. It would seem there is a lack of clarity as to how to address vulnerability.
In 2010, CBSA conducted its own internal review process called “CBSA Detentions and Removals Programs - Evaluation Study”. In the final report released in November 2010, CBSA identified areas for improvement in detention, including better training on mental illness, and the need for clearer guidelines as to how to address vulnerable persons, since the wording of enforcement manuals was found to be insufficient. This was seen to result in inconsistencies across Canada. For example, minors, persons with mental health issues or other special needs were extremely unlikely to be detained in the Atlantic and prairie regions, unlike other regions.
A special mention should be made of unaccompanied minors. Although there is greater clarity in the law and regulations as to detention being a last resort, we have seen numerous cases of unaccompanied minors spending nearly a month or longer in detention, despite alternatives existing. In one fairly dramatic case, the unaccompanied minor herself had a baby with her, was breast feeding, and had family members with whom she could stay in Canada.
My next point focuses on the inability for IRB members to adequately review detention on identity grounds. Unlike flight risk or danger to the public, immigration division members cannot overturn the initial decision to detain on identity made by a CBSA officer, no matter how much evidence the detainee has provided, or how fully they are collaborating, and certainly not based on any compelling circumstances.
Sometimes new evidence is provided at detention reviews that was not available to the arresting or investigating officer, including new documents or significant testimony. Board members' experience in handling detention cases allows them to develop a familiarity with the identity issues, but they do not have the power to satisfy themselves of the person's identity, no matter how much experience they have.
In one case, a Kurdish refugee claimant appeared for review after having spent 40 days in detention on identity grounds, in part due to doubts as to the authenticity of two UNHCR identity documents. At the review, a letter from the UNHCR was provided to the board member confirming the authenticity of the documents; however, the board member was unable to render a decision on identity and instead provided an additional 12 days of detention for CBSA to confirm the information.
In other cases, documents with security features have been found to be authentic and verifications completed, yet CBSA calls for detention to be maintained for other factors, such as waiting for a passport to arrive. In such cases, the board member is unable to overturn CBSA's opinion on identity even when multiple elements confirming identity are present.
All of these factors place a strain on CBSA resources when alternatives are often possible, but I would like to focus on the strain it places on detainees. During our weekly visits, we hear from refugee claimants about how hard they find detention.
One of the most common things we hear about is the shame they feel at wearing handcuffs. Handcuffs are a powerful symbol of punishment for most. We also hear about the shame of being under constant surveillance, the fear of deportation, and chronic physical discomfort such as constipation and fatigue.
We regularly meet detainees who speak no English or French.
The toll that detention takes on the mental health of refugee claimants has been documented in the research of Janet Cleveland from McGill University.
There is the added stress of having to prepare one's refugee claim while in detention, with no privacy and with obstacles to communicating with family or legal counsel. Detainees regularly express distress at having to prepare their personal information form within 28 days. This will be exacerbated with the shorter delays under Bill .
In light of all these observations, I believe there is the potential for far more consideration of alternatives to detention by both CBSA and the IRB. This would reduce the human costs of detention and also the considerable financial costs.
I recently had the opportunity to participate in a binational round table meeting on alternatives to detention, which was organized by the UNHCR. Many examples of alternatives were provided. It was clear that alternatives can be effective and necessary, and that one key element is to develop tools for early screening of vulnerable persons.
The UNHCR has published new guidelines on detention that provide fresh direction to states as to when detention is reasonable, proportionate, and necessary, and when alternatives are appropriate. They call for an assessment of the overall reasonableness of detention, taking into consideration all factors, including special needs or considerations.
Good afternoon—or good evening, in my case—distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for inviting us to testify to the committee today.
In my statement I will focus on what steps Canada could and should take where suspects of international crimes are present in the country.
I'm counsel at REDRESS, an international human rights organization based in London that seeks justice for torture survivors worldwide. REDRESS has been involved in a number of cases in several countries around the world, cases aimed at bringing to justice perpetrators of international crimes such as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and torture.
Suspects of international crimes who are foreign nationals fall within the broad scope of immigration, but they clearly constitute a special category whose treatment raises some distinctive legal questions. Here I will focus on the situation that has given rise to concern in respect of Canada's practice; that is, what should or must the state do if it finds such suspects on its territory?
The rules of international law are quite clear on this point. The convention against torture and the 1949 Geneva Conventions require states either to extradite suspected perpetrators of torture or war crimes to face prosecution or to exercise their jurisdiction to prosecute such suspects. This principle is also increasingly held to be applicable to genocide or crimes against humanity; indeed, this is widely recognized and followed in state practice.
More than 125 states have relevant implementing legislation. Over 15 states have brought prosecutions on the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In Europe, this includes perpetrators of international crimes committed in Argentina, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
These developments are part of an international commitment to ensure that there's no impunity for those who inflict intolerable suffering on their fellow human beings and to provide justice to victims who have nowhere else to turn. To this end, the international system relies on states' commitment and cooperation to bring perpetrators to justice in the appropriate forum. Legislation enabling national authorities to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes and institutional arrangements to make prosecutions effective are the key means to achieve this goal.
Indeed, Canada is among the countries that have taken a lead to hold perpetrators of international crimes to account. Its Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act in 2000 was the first of its kind to implement the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in national laws, a move that has been followed by several states in Europe since. As a general rule, a state must prosecute a suspect found on its territory unless it extradites him or her.
Importantly, the rule explicitly refers to extradition as the formal procedure to be used in criminal cases. Other measures, such as deportation used in the immigration context, are insufficient to meet the state's obligation under international law, this for good reason. In extradition proceedings, a state actively cooperates with other states in line with its extradition laws, and this signals a mutual interest in criminal justice being done. Deportation proceedings, in contrast, are aimed at removing a person. The deporting state has no formal interest in what happens to the deported person. The person may or may not be prosecuted for international crimes, but the deporting state has no formal role in this.
On this point, I would like to draw your attention to the UN Committee Against Torture's June 2012 concluding observations on Canada's state party report. In its observations, the committee expressed its concerns that Canada's “policy of resorting to immigration processes to remove perpetrators from its territory rather than subjecting them to the criminal process creates actual or potential loopholes for impunity”. This means that individuals “have been expelled and not faced justice in their countries of origin”.
The committee therefore recommended that Canada exercise its jurisdiction over persons responsible for torture, including foreign nationals. It emphasized that Canada “should enhance its efforts, including through increased resources, to ensure that the 'no safe haven' policy prioritizes criminal or extradition proceedings over deportation and removal under immigration processes.”
This is particularly important, considering that Canada may not be able to secure extradition and may also be prevented from sending a suspect to the country concerned because he or she faces a genuine risk of torture, ill treatment, or persecution if returned. It is in these situations that a state must be ready to prosecute. If a state fails to do so, it breaches its international obligations.
There are also sound policy reasons for a policy of prosecuting suspects of international crimes found in Canada.
First, it sends a strong message to perpetrators that they are not welcome.
Second, it pre-empts Canada's having to face a situation in which it stands accused of tolerating the presence of war criminals or taking measures, such as deportations, that fail to ensure justice.
Third, it underscores Canada's commitment to international justice, which enables it to take a leading role and speak with enhanced legitimacy when seeking to prevent and respond to international crimes worldwide.
Fourth, such policy and practice act as a precedent and potential deterrent if coordinated with other states. As such, any expenditure for the prosecution of international crimes constitutes a good investment toward international peace and stability.
Fifth, mirroring the first point, Canada would send a strong signal that it is on the side of victims of international crimes. While there may be no short-term political currency in taking such a stance, it builds on historical precedents that are essential to a stable and just international order and international solidarity.
What does all this mean in practice? Where suspects of international crimes are in the country, Canada should cooperate with authorities of other states with a view to ensuring criminal accountability. Equally, it is important that Canada make strenuous efforts to strengthen the capacity of its authorities to investigate and prosecute suspects of international crimes when the individuals concerned cannot be extradited to face trial.
Experiences from Europe may be helpful in this regard. While there are a number of difficulties, the European Union has taken steps to strengthen state cooperation to make the investigation and prosecution of international crimes more effective.
Several countries have been inspired by Canada's war crimes program. Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland have established specialized units within their police and/or prosecution services dedicated to cases involving international crimes. What is critical here—and this applies equally to the crimes against humanity and war crimes program in Canada—is that sufficient resources are allocated so that these programs can effectively fulfill their task. In the absence of such concerted efforts, we risk that the cycle of international crimes and atrocities, and the instability and suffering that goes with it, will never end.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Welcome back. We certainly missed you. Welcome back to one of our guests, Ms. Jeanes, and welcome also to our guest overseas.
I'm going to start my questions with Mr. Oette. I hope I pronounced that correctly.
As you know, we've been studying security. You're probably very aware that we have problems with the asylum system in Canada. I'm going to outline one specific notable case, and I'm going to ask some questions related to that case afterwards.
The case is about a gentleman named Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad, who carried out terrorist acts with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Despite Mohammad's established connection to terrorism, and there's no disputing his connection to terrorism, he has been able to remain in Canada since 1987. He has done so by launching a series of judicial appeals, a process that has cost Canadian taxpayers—and you might want to write this down—$3 million.
I'm listening to you speak about how we deal with people after they're already in Canada and we need to remove them, and our other witness this afternoon is talking about asylum seekers who are in detention because their identities are unknown.
My question for you, Mr. Oette, is, how do we prevent someone who is a threat to Canadian security from coming to Canada, instead of having the situation of someone like Mr. Mahmoud Mohammad Issa Mohammad costing Canadian taxpayers $3 million and being here since 1987? What are the flaws in Canada's screening system that allowed him to come into Canada in the first place?
I think that the committee's visits to prevention centres in Canada is a very important initiative. Congratulations. I hope my comments today will complement that information. In fact, by visiting the centre, we can see what the conditions are like, but we cannot really get an idea of the procedures surrounding detention.
As for the impact on refugees and their integration, it is important to know that a number of people I am speaking about today were later accepted as refugees and began living in Canada. In some cases, these people end up becoming citizens. The first few days, weeks and months were spent in detention. The repercussions may decrease over time, but I think it is important to find a balance between security measures and, as you said, the humanitarian side of things.
Our agency's goal is not to look at the financial costs of detention, but it is an important issue. When there are minors, people who are ill and seniors involved, many more resources are required from the agency. For example, transport to the hospital is expensive. Moreover, the centre needs more security guards and specialized education services. These constitute significant costs.
However, should the government want to really look at security issues, the money could be spent in other ways. The vulnerability of people during the proceedings and all the factors of detention need to be taken into account. I think the UNHCR directives are very helpful in that regard. In fact, it clearly says that all the factors, be it identity, vulnerability or all the other possible solutions, need to be considered. To promote security, a balance really must be found between the amounts of money spent with respect to detention.
:
I promise not to use up my whole 10 minutes, after my last time here and your great patience with my going over time.
Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I want to thank you again for this opportunity. I apologize for not having copies of my remarks for you. Time ran away on us, unfortunately.
We would like to address two items in your area of study. I will begin with the issue of detention.
The committee has already heard that the majority of people detained for immigration reasons are being held because of identity issues, or because they are waiting to be deported and have been considered a flight risk. The majority of those in detention are in immigration holding cells and the rest are in provincial jails.
We are deeply concerned about both situations, but especially the latter, the fact that people who have not been charged or convicted of a crime are being held in the same conditions as those who have are being punished.
While immigration holding centres are different from provincial jails inside, whenever the person needs to go outside for something such as medical attention, she is often handcuffed and shackled and treated as if she were a criminal. I know you have that report. It was part of the presentation to you by Dr. Cleveland in April on Bill .
We know that people being held in immigration detention will often forgo medical treatment because they wish to avoid the humiliation and trauma of being treated like a common criminal.
Children in detention are an ongoing concern. I know that my colleague, Jenny Jeanes, spoke to that as well. Already they are being held with their parents under our current laws.
We were glad to see that when Bill came back, the government had removed the automatic detention of children. While it's not written into Bill C-31, the reality is that unfortunately, young children will end up in detention with their parents because otherwise, they will be separated from the only person—or persons, if both parents are being detained—they know and trust, as opposed to being left with strangers.
Either situation seriously affects children and their parents. It is not surprising then that many parents choose to have their children with them. I think the last time I was here I talked about that as putting parents in a position of no choice, where they have to choose between having their children detained or giving them up to the custody of the state.
Our concern includes as well that children between 16 and 18 years are detained. The committee has heard from government witnesses that 500 children were in detention last year, and these were refugee cases. Some of our colleagues who have appeared before this committee have already noted that those figures may not capture the full scope of which children are in detention with their parents—
Mr. Dykstra, when we received the invitation we looked very carefully at the scope of the study, and we made sure that detention and deportation would fit within the scope of the study. That is why we have chosen to speak to these two issues this afternoon.
In terms of the children, it has been well documented that the incarceration of anyone, but particularly children, has a detrimental effect. The front line workers in OCASI's member agencies often speak to this.
Many of those in detention are coming from traumatizing situations, and being detained retraumatizes them. We believe that the trauma done to children is deeply troubling, and is something that will have long-term effects.
While statistics show that the majority of those who are detained are let go within about 20 days, a significant number of people are detained for much longer. The longer they are held, the worse they are affected, and the greater difficulty they have in adjusting to life outside of detention.
Detention is an expensive proposition for the government, in terms of the damage it does to human beings and the long-term health and social costs, but also in terms of economic costs, such as the costs of building and maintaining detention facilities around the country. We anticipate that with the implementation of Bill we will see those numbers increasing.
I've said all of this because I want to talk about alternatives to detention.
I, too, attended the bilateral meeting that was held a couple of weeks ago, which was co-hosted by the Canadian branch of UNHCR as well as the U.S. branch of UNHCR. Both Citizenship and Immigration and CBSA presented, along with their colleagues from Australia, the U.S., and Sweden. What was surprising to those who were representing Canada there is that we seem to be way behind in terms of any formal program that looks at alternatives to detention.
You heard from the previous witness that Australia in particular has programs where they've built in conditions that address issues of security. We're not talking about looking at alternatives to detention that would allow, for example, war criminals to get out of detention, but about paying particular attention to those who are at low risk, those who are vulnerable, for example, pregnant woman or people in the deportation stream who are ready to go home and have no need to be in detention.
Here in Canada the only program we are able to point to as an example is the Toronto bail program. It's certainly something we can build on. Australia works very closely with the Red Cross, but also with other civil society organizations and NGOs. They have set up quite extensive and effective programs where those who do not belong in detention and are going through the process, either for ID purposes or deportation purposes, are able to live in the community until such time as they are removed from the country. We believe—and they have testified to the fact—that this is certainly more humane and cost-effective. Compliance is in the 90th percentile.
It is certainly something I'm strongly recommending. The time has come for us as a country to look at a national formal alternative to detention program. I would love to have a conversation about that when I'm finished.
Before my time is up, I also want to talk about the second point, which is the impact of the . My concerns are based on two factors. First—
Thank you, members of the committee, for inviting me today. I'm honoured to take part in the conversation you are having, which is an important one.
In the context of your discussion on security in Canada's immigration system, I want to address the specific issue of how security threats are dealt with in the immigration section, specifically under section 34 of the IRPA.
I am a lawyer, as the chair mentioned, and while I still have a small practice, I'm devoting my time right now mostly to doctoral studies on precisely this topic, on the application of security provisions both in Canada and in other jurisdictions. I've recently published a paper on the topic in the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal.
I want to begin by telling a story, which perhaps many members of the committee have heard, about Habtom Kibraeb, an individual in Halifax, who on a winter day in February 2010 walked to a car and committed suicide. It was a tragic event. It saddened many people in the Halifax community.
What I want to talk about with respect to Mr. Kibraeb is that prior to coming to Canad,a he had taken part in the independence movement of the Eritrean people in their efforts to create their own country and separate from the highly oppressive regime in Ethiopia.
The efforts he took part in were universally recognized as being for human rights and a democratic purpose. In fact, Canada was one of the first countries to recognize the legitimacy of the Eritrean liberation movement, and we opened up an embassy in the new Eritrean state very shortly after it was created.
There was no talk at the time the independence movement was being carried out about violations of human rights. In fact, it was the opposite. The struggle was intended to create a more positive human rights situation for the Eritrean people.
Fast forward 20 years, and Mr. Kibraeb was in grave danger in his home country, so he came to Canada. After he did, he was found by Canadian immigration authorities to be a terrorist threat. He was found, under section 34, to be inadmissible to Canada.
This was not a question of danger to Canada and not a question of the security of our borders, and it should not be portrayed as such. Nevertheless, he was captured under the rubric of section 34, which is about security. No one ever alleged that he was a danger to Canadians or Canada; it was all about the activities he had taken part in and the movement he had supported, as I said, some 20 years earlier.
Please don't take what I am saying to suggest that Canadian immigration authorities or officials are responsible for the tragic death of Mr. Kibraeb. What I want to talk about today, and what the story really illustrates, is that when immigration security decisions are made in a way that captures the wrong people, it ruins their lives. This happened with Mr. Kibraeb, but I've seen it personally happen to many individuals. This is what I want to talk about today.
The process prevents people who otherwise can't return to their country—and everybody recognizes this because of the threat they face in their country—from working in Canada. It forces them to go on social assistance. It cuts them off from any health care benefits they may have had. Most importantly, it forces them to live in constant fear that they are going to be returned to a country where they know they will be killed. It forces them to face the prospect that they will be wrenched from their family members, many of whom are here with them and not subject to the inadmissibility proceedings. For all family members involved, this is obviously a wrenching situation.
It's simply an incontrovertible fact that the inadmissibility provisions under section 34 capture a wide swath of individuals beyond those who may pose a security threat to Canada. The provisions of section 34 are clear. The plain wording captures any member of the African National Congress. In fact, we have seen that, and efforts are being made to obtain a waiver for ANC members. Also, because of the plain wording of the provision, any member of the U.S. armed forces is categorically caught.
Members should know the wording of section 34, but I'll repeat it. It is that anyone who has engaged in or instigated “the subversion by force of any government” is categorically inadmissible to Canada.
What happens in these situations? Discretionary decisions are made to let in some people and not let in others, to kick out some people and not kick out others.
I find this process to be fascinating and troubling because of the way it plays out very frequently.
The fact of the matter is that the way the inadmissibility provision under section 34 has been interpreted, there is no temporal dimension to it. It applies to anyone who has been affiliated with an organization that has sought to subvert a government, whether that government was a repressive one or a democratic one. For example, someone who today joined a party or an organization which a hundred years ago sought to subvert another government would nevertheless, in the plain wording of the act, be inadmissible.
As I said, the crux is that these fundamental decisions that are being made about the security of our country and the lives of individuals who may have a risk to their lives back home are discretionary in nature.
I want to propose three things that this committee should take into account in looking at these factors and discretionary decisions.
First of all, I think it is absolutely incumbent on this committee to propose to Parliament that broad waivers are afforded to the classes of individuals, such as the African National Congress, we know pose no threat to the Canadian public but who may have participated in events that put them on the wrong side of section 34.
This has been done in the United States. The United States has a waiver for individuals who belong to organizations that are not terrorist organizations and do not pose a threat to the United States, but who, in the same way in the United States, have run afoul of the terrorism legislation in immigration law.
Secretary Napolitano in August issued a broad waiver of this variety, so that anyone who was a member of one of these non-concerning organizations does not have to worry about being sent back to persecution and potential torture because of their involvement in one of these organizations.
Second, we need to do a better job of training individuals who make these discretionary decisions about what poses a threat to Canadian national security and what doesn't. We need to do a better job of training them as to the complexities that arise when people come to Canada from conflict situations all over the world.
It's very easy to cast the net broadly, but it's much more difficult and much more important to bring that net in, in a way that doesn't capture people who all of us would agree do not pose a threat to Canada. This could be done in part through this broad waiver scenario and in part through other specific training about what kinds of decisions should be made and who is and who is not a threat. That could be improved on, and I could go into more detail on that.
Finally, the waiver provision under subsection 34(2) would be changed somewhat under Bill . I won't tread on Bill C-43 territory, but the provision remains in the new legislation, albeit somewhat changed.
I am firmly of the view that this decision should not be made by the minister. It's currently, and always has been, in the minister's hands, but I would urge the committee to consider a suggestion to change the process. I would argue that no minister, Conservative or Liberal, has probably ever enjoyed or done a particularly good job of making these waiver decisions. They are inherently difficult for a politician to make. They have to worry about the prospect of providing a waiver to someone who has been caught in the terrorism legislation.
Also, the backlog of decisions under subsection 34(2) is simply an abomination. The waiting times are up to 10 years for people whose lives are in limbo. There is a lot of social science evidence to suggest that the waiting time that people face on immigration decisions can amount to a larger torture than people experienced in their home countries. To have to wait 10 years for these decisions, to be perfectly frank, is abhorrent.
I'll stop my comments there. I look forward to a larger conversation about these issues.
:
Sure. Thank you very much.
This actually continues on with the questions from Mr. Opitz that I didn't get to finish my answer to, which is that, in fact, as you, Mr. Chisholm, have referred to, it is possible to identify individuals who are of concern and who are not of concern. This is precisely what the Department of Homeland Security has done in the United States.
In the United States they have tiers of organizations: tier I organizations, tier II organizations, and tier III organizations. Loosely speaking, they relate to the level of threat that they may pose. A tier I organization would be al-Qaeda. Tier III organizations would be a very different variety.
The waiver that has been provided across the board is to tier III organizations, and there are some exceptions to it. Some of the exceptions are, for instance, where there is evidence specifically that someone has turned to violence as a means of furthering their goals or where someone who belonged to a tier III organization also may have potentially, in a different capacity, targeted a U.S. interest or an American person.
There are exceptions to it, but generally speaking and across the board, it's for people who belong to these organizations. The Department of Homeland Security has done its homework and in interaction with various stakeholders has created this list of organizations that generally relate to the example I gave. They are people who belonged to organizations that were supporting contained, regional, domestic, or internal conflicts that did not in any way touch upon the security of the United States.
At a minimum, this is what I am suggesting the committee look at seriously, because frankly, it's a waste of resources to deal with these individuals. An across-the-board waiver of people who simply are not any concern to us is a first good step to bring us in line with the United States, which is not generally known as being less concerned about security than Canada.
:
I was really glad to hear what you had to say, Ms. Douglas. I'm also someone who cares a lot about human rights. We probably have a lot in common. I created the Canadian Constitution Foundation, which is there to stand up for Canadian individuals when governments are pushing them around.
I think if we ask the wrong question, we may end up with the wrong answer. If we ask whether we have concerns about people who are wrongly detained, I would say yes, I regret that there are people who are detained who ultimately should not have been detained. If instead we ask whether we should close down the whole refugee system because we can't identify people, or because we don't have the security measures in place, then obviously, we'd be denying all those people who are truly being persecuted in their far-off lands. You and I and everyone else in the room would say that this was a wrong decision.
I think the parallel, and I'll get Mr. Grant to comment on this in a second, is whether we abandon our criminal justice system for fear of a wrongful conviction. We're humans, and we have imperfect human institutions, and there will be mistakes, no matter what we do. But most people would say that we still need a criminal justice system. Then we work progressively to improve its accuracy.
What I understand we're doing by looking at things like biometrics is improving the accuracy of our decisions so that we are, in fact, going to be detaining the right people. We will still detain people who ought ultimately not to have been detained, but that's the price for having the refugee system, isn't it?
I looked back at your comments in April when you were discussing Bill . You said that you were concerned about the characterization of refugees and that the Canadian people may develop an increasingly negative perception of refugees. Wouldn't it be true that they would be even more negative if we didn't have security provisions in place to give them confidence that we can continue our refugee program?
Could you comment on that?