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I won't take 10 minutes.
The main point that I've noticed in testifying before standing committees is that usually I'm off topic, because some of what I'm doing, of course, overlaps into other areas, and I keep getting the comment back, “You're not sort of in our compartment right now.” Again, at the risk of being off topic, there are a couple of points I want to make.
First, I have a handout. It's translated, and on the second or third page I start to list all of the reasons why there can be these offshore bank accounts. Given that we've done quite a few of the major sorts of securities scams—I guess that's a polite word—and quite a few of the failures of the major Canadian companies, we of course run into the offshore bank accounts all the time.
I just don't want to somehow leave the impression that people just take money offshore and leave it in an account in Switzerland, or whatever it happens to be, and earn pitiful interest rates. In the cases we've had over the years, for the most part somebody works some sort of securities problem. For example, they sell short; they do all sorts of other trades. There are restrictions on securities, but they ignore that and sell them anyway.
So the money then gets sent to a particular location, and within hours it gets flipped out of there into other locations. On that particular basis, trying to track these things is not at all easy. Mostly we've had to bring in other specialists with the problem. So this is not a situation where you just look at it and say somebody has something in a bank account. Where did it come from, to me, is the problem.
If you look at just the CRA attacking “particular accounts”, they could be gone days or even hours later. And this is not going to stop, because the root causes of most of these are, for example, people getting ready for a divorce and they send offshore. But the ones that trouble me immensely are the ones that arise from securities situations where trades that are barely legal, if at all, then end up offshore and the money gets transferred.
So if you look at this logically, eventually that money has to end up in territories where someone is going to get a decent return on investment. When you look at it that way, these plans are set up long in advance. I'm going to send it into A, then to B, then to C, then to D, and then finally it's going to be placed somewhere else.
Quite often you're going to find that lawyers' trust accounts are used to launder the money. Quite often you're going to find that these plans were put together by professionals, and as long as they are left exempt, that's not going to solve any problems.
We have, at this point, a major problem in Canada that is not being addressed at all, which has to do with where we're going to have these offshore accounts, etc., in a few years. This is a subject called international financial reporting standards. This was brought into Canada with virtually no debate. This affects the provinces as well as the federal government, and this is such a totally different concept we've had in my lifetime of how one counts income.
Many of these offshore accounts and so on are the result of Ponzi schemes, where you represent to people that you are giving them a return on investment, but all you're really doing is giving them back their own money. So if that's the basis for what is happening, then we have to look at how you minimize these Ponzi schemes, because that's where you cut off the money going offshore.
So these international financial reporting standards...it's not being monitored in Canada. It's being pushed by the audit community. It is based on European ethics and standards. We are sending out information to our clients about all of the frauds that can be worked through this IFRS. I have given up, quite frankly, but I've tried, along with my son, to alert most of the cabinet ministers and so on across Canada that this is a problem.
So what is the problem? The problem is, how did IFRS get brought into Canada with virtually no debate? Despite what's been said, it's been misrepresented as principles based and everything else. So we left control in self-regulating organizations for mutual funds, for investment dealers, auditors, and so forth, and there is the problem that then leads to the offshore.
There's no doubt in my mind. If you check my track record, we called the Nortel failure years in advance. We called the business income trusts years in advance. We had involvement with the asset-backed commercial paper to point out that the accounting and reporting didn't work. For leveraged ETFs, the same thing. If you look at Loewen Group, Cott, and so on, we called these in advance, so we're not stupid people. On that basis, somebody should be paying attention, and we've tried to do it through Finance, repeatedly, to say that this is a major problem.
So just trying to sum up where I am, I'm saying that many of the real serious problems start long before the bank account is set up offshore. If that is not looked at, in conjunction with whoever has to look at it, then you're picking the low-hanging fruit, so to speak, instead of dealing with the most serious problems.
Thank you.
And thank you also for this invitation to provide comment on this important issue. I'll also make very brief opening remarks. I'll touch on three areas. I'll discuss what is international tax evasion, try to gauge the extent of the problem for Canadians, and then discuss possible reform initiatives.
Of course, this is quite a complex and tricky area of tax law. Tax evasion generally requires a purposeful non-disclosure of income. This is to be contrasted with tax avoidance, which really involves attempts to engage in tax planning while complying with all relevant Canadian and foreign tax laws.
I just thought I'd note up front that our Income Tax Act encourages international tax planning, encourages the use of offshore tax havens for devices like double-dip financing, where you place a financing affiliate in your tax haven.
So my comments will only focus on tax evasion and not avoidance.
What is encouraging the enhanced international tax evasion? Tax academics have focused on two particular factors: globalization and technology change. Of course, globalization is shrinking the world, bringing us closer together, encouraging a greater provision of cross-border financial services, but also, importantly, there is the technology change. We have this information technology revolution. It's making it cheaper and easier to shift funds offshore. It's leading to the development of certain financial products, like offshore credit cards. These became more prevalent around 15 years ago. If a Canadian shifts his or her moneys offshore, she can now have a Bank of Nova Scotia branch in Barbados and have a credit card issued to that bank. The credit card is used to make purchases here in Canada, but there's no paper trail because all of the invoices get sent directly to Barbados.
In terms of gauging the extent of the problem, nobody really has their head around what sorts of revenue losses we're looking at. I'm not aware of any empirical studies that try to measure this problem. That would in any event be problematic due to the fact that this is illegal and secret. These offshore havens have bank secrecy laws that make it a criminal offence to divulge financial personal information to any third parties.
For comparison purposes, a U.S. Senate permanent subcommittee, back in 2006, estimated that U.S. residents are evading between $40 billion and $70 billion each year as a result of tax evasion. So they spent a lot of time half a decade ago looking at this problem, but they also acknowledge that this estimate is quite tentative.
How much is really in these havens, not just from Canadians but from folks all around the world? Again we don't know. Estimates range from $5 trillion to $38 trillion. The latter figure is from a Boston consulting report.
I think there is some good news, and that is that when tax academics measure tax compliance and they prepare these comparative international surveys, the surveys show that the vast majority of Canadians are honest. Our tax compliance rates are among the highest in the world.
But—and I think this is in part why this committee's work is so important—there are a lot of stories, anecdotes, that suggest international tax evasion is on the rise. Page 2 highlights some of these things. I won't get into them in any detail, but our Auditor General, Sheila Fraser, in 2001 and 2002, in those reports highlighted really aggressive international tax planning, not evasion. Nevertheless it brought some attention to the issue, and subsequently there were more resources devoted to fighting the problem, resources given to the CRA and elsewhere.
Then the other stories, which I think you've heard from other witnesses, about the Liechtenstein bank, the UBS Swiss Bank, and most recently the HSBC Swiss bank, all suggest that certain Canadians are engaged in this illegal international tax evasion. We've seen a rise in audits and moneys recovered from these audits. A previous witness here from the CRA indicated that in 2009 alone, $1 billion was recovered from international activities. It wasn't clear whether that's attributable to evasion. In fact I think for the most part it's audits of aggressive international tax avoidance.
So we suspect that the problem is on the rise, and what can we do about it? Well, again, page 2 of the memo sets out a number of possible reform initiatives. I've listed them in order of what I consider to be the cheapest, most realistic options to the more difficult options. I won't touch on all of them. I'm happy to answer any questions.
The first issue is that Canada needs to ratify the Council of Europe and OECD Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters agreement. We signed it in 2004. I've been told in the past by people at Finance that legislation has been introduced on several occasions to ratify this agreement, but for reasons that of course have nothing to do with this particular agreement, that legislation wasn't passed. In any event, the agreement is not in force in Canada, and it ought to be ratified.
Another possible reform effort could involve a public education campaign that would emphasize the criminal sanctions. Possibly, we need enhanced audits and even greater resources to the CRA. The Auditor General wrote about this in her 2007 report, but then she appeared later on that year before this committee, the standing committee, and indicated that the progress was satisfactory. So there is a view that maybe there are sufficient resources. But since 2007, again, we've heard all of these stories that suggest the problem may be greater than we previously realized.
I would advocate reforming the voluntary disclosure program. I think it's generally working, but it could be tweaked. The one recommendation I'll mention up front is to have a temporary reduction in the interest penalties, and this could be done by removing a subsection in the Income Tax Act, subsection 220(3.1), I think, that indicates there can be no interest relief beyond a 10-year period. But when I talked to lawyers in Toronto and elsewhere, their clients have had these accounts, some of them at least, since, say, the 1980s and they're not getting any interest relief. So the penalty, in their view, is so large that they're not coming forward and entering into the program. Again, the purpose of the program is to rehabilitate these tax cheats, and I think there could be certain steps to reform the program.
TIEAs are one thing that has been on the policy horizon in Canada since the 2007 budget, tax information exchange agreements. It's an open question whether they'll actually work. We've been signing them. The OECD currently is in the review stage of looking at them. Many tax scholars who have written in this area suspect that they won't work, there won't be meaningful cooperation by the tax haven countries. Perhaps we ought to offer incentives to certain countries to engage in this meaningful cooperation.
The bottom of page 2: the problem could be fixed, although it may require a level of global cooperation that's currently unrealistic. In a 2001 article that I wrote—it came out in the Minnesota Law Review—I set out a potential regime using the Internet to share taxpayer information, a secure extranet among all participating tax authorities. If we got all of the fairly wealthy countries, the OECD countries, to agree to it, then if they had absolute information sharing, we could impose a withholding tax on any payments outside of these participant countries. I'm not sure, again, whether that is politically feasible.
Then, finally I thought I would highlight taxpayer privacy. I'm a tax researcher, but I've also been a member of the Queen's Surveillance Study Centre since 2001. We conducted in 2005 an international survey of 7,000 respondents in eight different countries, and the Canadian respondents indicated that they were quite worried about their privacy; in particular, they're worried about foreign governments and foreign businesses misusing or mishandling their personal information.
So this is the tricky part: we want to be aggressive and go after the tax cheats, but the other side of the equation is we need to do it in such a way that it continues to preserve their taxpayer rights, including privacy.
Elsewhere, I've suggested that a multilateral taxpayer bill of rights might actually encourage heightened information sharing among different nations, because sometimes the Canadian authorities, other tax authorities elsewhere, are reluctant to share information because they don't know how that information is going to be treated. They don't know whether that information is going to be treated in the same way that would be required by their domestic law. But if we all got together and agreed on the threshold of legal protection for taxpayer rights, it actually, in my view at least, would enhance information sharing and would help to fight international tax evasion.
Thank you.
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Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here with us.
Since I was myself a university professor at the École des hautes études commerciales, HEC Montreal, I can confirm that university professors habitually go off on tangents. However, this was not the case with you and you have defined the issue very well.
First, I must say I agree with you. Indeed, we cannot determine the income tax-related shortfall because if we knew that, we would know where to go and get the money. That's obvious. Tax evasion is like a prisoner's evasion. When a prisoner has gotten away and you know where he is, you can go and get him. It is the same thing in this case.
As you both mentioned but in different ways, the problem concerns very large businesses. SMEs are not trying to set up fiscal evasion mechanisms. They might try and do a little tax avoidance to pay as little tax as possible since the objective of private companies' chief financial officers is not only to maximize profits, but to pay as little income tax as possible. So we are talking about big business acting this way, and not ordinary individuals.
So it is not every Tom, Dick and Harry, as certain political parties say. Nor does this concern the average taxpayer; but the very wealthy and large taxpayer attempts tax evasion. So the impact is quite considerable.
I would like to attempt to make a link between your two presentations. Mr. Cockfield, one can see on the second page of your brief that there has been an increase in the number of audits, but one also senses that there has been an increase in tax evasion. More and more, we get that impression.
Mr. Rosen, one sees on page 5 of your brief that we are losing ground because of the IFRS, the International Financial Reporting Standards, and the blind use of generally misunderstood accounting standards that no one understands, even in a business that has good accounting practices. These accounting practices are like large clouds within which only the corporation's accountant or a tax specialist can navigate. So we are looking at a sort of de facto deregulation.
Mr. Cockfield or Mr. Rosen, is that not one of the reasons that explains the “open bar” in Canada?
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I think the main challenge is the fact that all of these tax havens, at least to my knowledge, maintain bank secrecy laws. As a researcher, if I went to Switzerland, say, if I hopped on a plane and started to talk to either tax authorities or folks in banks, their answer would be, “If I reveal any information to you, I will go to jail. It's a criminal offence in my country to divulge personal financial information to any third parties.”
For that reason, we really have no idea how much is sitting in these tax havens around the world. Some studies have suggested that half is in one country, Switzerland. Sometimes in Canada we tend to focus on the Caribbean tax havens, but in fact they're relatively small players compared to some of the European havens.
Then, of course, Switzerland is a developed country with a very sophisticated financial sector. They did agree, for the first time in history, to share bank account information with U.S. authorities because of the UBS scandal. My understanding is that Canadian regulators also went and asked for information. They told us to go away. This was in part because the U.S. had conducted their Senate investigation that revealed this particular bank was sending people to the U.S. and they were pitching illegal tax evasion. Well, it turned out they had a Canada desk and they were doing the same thing here in Canada. Nevertheless, they refused to cooperate with us.
I should also highlight the fact that unlike Canadian banks, the Swiss government actually maintained, I believe, a 25% ownership in UBS at the time of all these scandals. So the government was a partner, in effect, with the banks. They subsequently divested their ownership interest in UBS. I'm not sure if they maintained interest in other banks. But because of the secret nature, because of these bank secrecy laws, nobody really has been able to estimate in any concrete fashion how much money is out there.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I find myself in agreement with Ms. Glover. We don't always agree, but....
Mr. Cockfield, when you talk about a voluntary compliance program...my understanding is that CRA has a voluntary compliance program for Canadians here who may not have filed a tax report four or five years ago, for instance, and nine times out of ten they just pay the interest, unless you have somebody represent you.
I guess there are two questions, and this kind of goes to both of you, I think.
It seems to me that folks who are actually bringing their money back, who are actually voluntarily complying...it must be because they want to actually repatriate the money they've actually put over there, because otherwise, if you want to leave it over there, what do you care? If you're bringing it back, you're bringing it back for a reason. Maybe it's an inheritance issue. You might be elderly. Maybe it's going to a family. Maybe you're trying to move it into a different business that might be legitimate. So we're allowing that to happen as a voluntary compliance piece and we're saying to them that it's okay to bring it back: we want you to bring it back; you can cut a deal with us and we'll reduce the penalties outstanding for you—never mind the moral piece about how we're actually rewarding you for doing something that was illegal.
It seems to me in the criminal justice system it's the only time we actually reward folks for doing something illegal in the first place. If I break into a Mac's Milk store and nobody catches me but one day I say I did it, the authorities don't say to me, well, let's cut a deal because you voluntarily told us that you've broken into the Mac's Milk store when you were 14. It doesn't work that way.
The other side is--Mr. Rosen, I will let Mr. Cockfield start, and then if you could help me with this....
Maybe I heard it wrong, but it seems to me that you are suggesting that this money being voluntarily repatriated—and looking, through advisors or whomever, for some sort of a deal, if you will, that's less punitive than what's established at the moment—seems to have started out as perhaps even illegal in some cases. I think you actually said it's now the majority of cases.
If that is true, we're now saying bring back the money that went offshore illegally—that was actually generated by illegal activity—and somehow we give someone a break for that. I hate to tell you, but I would have a tough time going back to workers at John Deere, whose plant disappeared, and saying to them that it's okay for folks to get that kind of deal when we couldn't save their jobs.
I wonder if both of you could talk about that issue. How do we make that salient with Canadians?
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It is a very tricky balance. In terms of what the profile is of these Canadian taxpayers engaged in international tax evasion, I think you'd see a lot of different types. You'd see the contractor who doesn't have withholding obligations imposed on him and he makes a million dollars, discloses $500,000, and puts the other half offshore.
There may also be, I've speculated in the past, a kind of unique taxpayer to Canada and certain other countries with lots of immigrants. Let's say a hypothetical taxpayer moved to Canada from Hong Kong and had $100 million in savings in 1990. They come to Canada, knowing that once they're a Canadian resident they're taxed on their worldwide income. That total $100 million earned outside of Canada will then be subject to Canadian tax, so before they move here they put it into an account offshore. That's another person who didn't initially generate illegal moneys to be put offshore. Then you've got the drug traffickers, etc. There's also a concern that tax havens are being used to finance international terrorism. We've got FINTRAC and other measures to address that.
As a concluding comment, I think fear is the main motivation for entering into these voluntary disclosures—not trying to repatriate the money. They can probably get it back here in some fashion, through offshore credit cards or some other device. They're worried that they're going to be prosecuted criminally, and therefore they're entering into these disclosures. It's kind of like a plea bargain the crown enters into with counsel for the accused. I mean, some Canadians probably aren't happy that we engage in this plea bargaining process in our justice system to move people more efficiently through the system and for other objectives—to encourage rehabilitation, etc.
That's how I look at the voluntary disclosure program. It's not going to make a lot of Canadians happy to see that folks get a break; nevertheless, we want to bring them into our paying system, to rehabilitate them, and to get their tax revenues to pay for roads, schools, etc.
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We have a little bit of time. Perhaps you could expand on this amnesty, and I could get both your comments, Mr. Cockfield and Mr. Rosen.
There are two problems. It's a short-term problem, in terms of getting the money that's out there now, and then there's the long-term problem of how you stop it from happening again.
The short-term problem is the question of amnesty. I've been hearing conflicting remarks from both of you. You're not in favour, but you say maybe it's the best thing to do because our authorities are not necessarily going after tax cheats. You say there's no energy, no money, no resources.
In the short term, would amnesty be the preferable solution? Nobody, I think, is questioning the fact that these people should be getting away with it, but in other jurisdictions it has worked.
The penalties are maybe a bit too extreme, and it's not encouraging people to come back, but in the short term, don't you want some of that capital to come back?
Perhaps you could try to keep your feelings aside in saying we're not going after them or they don't necessarily need to get a free pass. There has to be a way we can get some of that money in the short term, and then find another mechanism to avoid it from happening in the future.
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That was the main theory by the people who put it all together, and we've heard there are some problems.
The government can do more. Last year, in the budget, they introduced enhanced reporting for those who market aggressive international tax, and I think that was an important step.
In the late 1990s, there were a variety of scandals. KPMG was subjected to a heavy fine because they would go to a multinational CFO, for instance, and say, “I can save you $500 million in taxes next year through my international tax shelter, or whatever I save you, I'll take 30%.” This led to a proliferation of these sorts of schemes, which are tax avoidance and not evasion. They're attempts to reduce global tax liability while complying with all rules.
Now we're forcing the marketers to disclose. I do think the accounting profession could be better regulated, but regulating lawyers is a different story. I'm a member of the Law Society of Upper Canada, and we don't like government interference. We don't want the government to tell us, for instance, to disclose confidential client information. But I think, certainly for the accountants, enhanced disclosure is required.
I'm always fascinated when lawyers say they don't want to actually disclose things they happen to know about. It might be legal, client privileges being the mask, but that's a debate for another day.
I'm interested, Mr. Cockfield, about this sense of harmonizing regulations with the U.S., if you will, to make it easier...as you talked about that one example. And I give credit to the government side, who trumpeted that our regulations in the banking sector saved us from what happened in the U.S. It seems to me, if we want to harmonize with the United States, from that perspective, maybe they should have gone the other way and harmonized with us.
Here's my point. We were selling—not us, personally, and not you either, Mr. Cockfield, but folks were selling a pig in a poke for the last three years. Whether they call it derivatives or asset-backed paper, you name it, it would be fascinating to know how much of that money actually found its way to offshore banks. I would suggest a fair amount.
If we lose the oversight ability, in the sense that we give it up to someone else whose history, quite frankly, albeit short.... I wasn't around in the thirties, so I'm not really sure what happened then—I can read about it--but I lived through the last 10 years and saw the devastation, not just to the U.S. market, U.S. consumers, and U.S. workers, but right across the world. We got off a little bit lighter than some other places. The one thing I see, not as an expert—I'm not an accountant, nor am I a tax lawyer—that was absolutely true about all those jurisdictions, including the U.K., and I grew up in Glasgow, Scotland, was that they went to deregulated or self-regulated markets where they said, “Trust us.”
My old granny used to say, if you've got 5¢—or in her case five pence—and you don't know the guy who's asking for the five pence, do you trust him or do you keep your own five pence in your pocket? So if we look at recent history, where folks who self-regulated almost wrecked the financial world—almost, they came within a hair's breadth—why should we trust them?