Good evening, everyone. My name is David Mondragon. I'm the president and chief executive officer of the Ford Motor Company in Canada.
Ford Canada is pleased to have this opportunity to address the subcommittee on the automotive industry in Canada.
With me tonight is Caroline Hughes, our director of government relations, and James Rowland, an executive with us in government relations. Together we'll be happy to answer your questions regarding the automotive industry in Canada from Ford's perspective.
First, though, I'd like to start with a brief overview of Ford's history and restructuring actions. Ford's position has not changed. We do not expect to access government loans for automotive business. At Ford, we are well on our way to transforming our company. In fact, few companies have restructured more aggressively than Ford. As Canada's longest established automaker, Ford Motor Company of Canada is proud of its 104-year history of contributing to the Canadian economy. Together with our 47,000 employees, retirees, and dealership personnel, Ford has demonstrated a legacy of hard work, innovation, and commitment to communities all across Canada.
Long before the current global economic crisis, Ford recognized its business model needed to be changed. During the past several years, Ford has taken steps to put the company on a path to long-term viability.
We have adjusted our automotive operations to meet demand at lower market volumes in North America, and these actions have resulted in difficult decisions to downsize our Canadian operations over the past few years. We took early action to restructure our business, focusing on product innovation, fuel economy, industry-leading quality, and unsurpassed safety. We'll introduce seven new vehicles in the first six months of this year; that's more than any other manufacturer.
And when it comes to product, everything we do at Ford is focused on excelling in four key areas: fuel economy, quality, safety, and smart technology.
When it comes to alternative fuels, Ford was one of the first automotive manufacturers to put fuel-cell vehicles on Canadian roads. We are the first automaker in the world to be operating hydrogen internal combustion engine vehicles, and those hydrogen vehicles are being used as shuttlebuses right here on Parliament HIll.
Ford is bringing affordable fuel economy to millions of drivers by delivering best in class or among the best in class fuel economy with every new vehicle we'll introduce. For example, this year we'll introduce the new Ford Fusion Hybrid, which is the most fuel-efficient mid-size sedan in the world.
Also this year, Ford will introduce industry-leading EcoBoost engines, delivering 20% better fuel economy and up to 15% lower CO2 emissions.
Ford will be selling a new battery electric commercial vehicle this year as well, the Transit Connect, a 2010 model we'll introduce later this year.
And we've introduced a joint venture with Canadian-based Magna International to develop a battery electric small car by 2011.
By 2012, Ford is bringing to market a family of next-generation hybrids, plug-in hybrids, and battery electric vehicles.
Now let's turn to quality for a moment. Ford quality is now on a par with Honda and Toyota, and that is consistently being recognized by important third parties like J.D. Power and Associates and Consumer Reports.
Ford is also leading in safety with more five-star safety ratings than any auto company, and recently moved past Honda with more top safety picks awarded by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.
Clearly, 2009 presents many challenges. Companies and consumers everywhere are feeling the impact of the global economic crisis, and we do not expect the Canadian auto industry sales to grow. In fact, we expect them to shrink by about 13% this year.
In February, industry sales were down 28%. So far this year, sales are down 26% compared to the same time last year. When you consider that 20% of all retail sales in Canada are automotive-related, this downturn will have a severe ripple-through effect. This decline in auto sales translates to about 250,000 fewer vehicles being sold, with an estimated impact of $20 billion in lost sales and nearly $3 billion in lost taxes in 2009. If we see even sharper declines like those the U.S. is experiencing, those losses will double.
By far the most important way the Canadian government can support the auto industry is through direct consumer stimulus to get people into our showrooms, willing and able to buy new vehicles. To do this, consumers need access to credit and incentives to purchase new vehicles during this difficult economic time.
There are two important actions the government can take to help in this regard. While the Canadian secured credit facility announced in the 2009 budget will help provide auto financing companies with the funds they need to provide consumer loans and leases, and to finance dealer inventories, the $12 billion announced is likely much less than what is needed. The Canadian Finance and Leasing Association estimates that annual auto loans and leases are worth about $60 billion.
The credit markets have been frozen for more than a year for the auto financing companies. As a matter of fact, not since 2006 has Ford Motor Credit been able to securitize any loans in the open market in Canada. These funds are needed to underwrite new loans and leases, and this lack of credit is reflected in the reduced industry sales and the pullback in leasing activities that have occurred over the last year.
With additional credit, auto finance companies will be able to underwrite more loans and leases for consumers. Investment-grade ABS securities offer the government and taxpayers a high-quality investment that will provide significant returns. These can be set up as low risk and will provide the industry with the flexibility it needs to raise funds in this challenging credit market. The funds should apply to automotive loans, leases, and dealer inventories, and the funding needs to be implemented urgently.
Canada appears to be three to six months behind the U.S. downturn in sales. Providing this access to credit will help us mitigate further declines. We need to establish an anchor in the sea, and right now there's no anchor in the sea for our ship.
The second action the government can take is to offer consumer stimulus, which would be provided in a program that would offer a $3,500 incentive to purchase a new car or light truck. In January, Germany introduced an incentive that provides consumers with 2,500 euros, or the equivalent of about $4,000 Canadian, to purchase a new car or light truck when they turn in a vehicle that's nine years old or older. Remarkably, new vehicle sales in Germany rose by 22% in February with the introduction of this program.
The federal scrappage program introduced by Environment Canada is not working, and no one appears to be using it. It's likely because a 10-year-old vehicle has a value of about $3,500 and the incentive offered is only $300. The Canadian government should introduce an immediate $3,500 consumer stimulus incentive for any new car or light truck purchased from now through to the end of the year.
To qualify for this incentive, consumers would be asked to turn in a vehicle that's 10 years old or older to be scrapped. This will ensure that the sales are truly incremental and the money is not being paid to consumers who would have purchased a vehicle otherwise. This program would also benefit the environment, because a 10-year-old vehicle produces 12 to 18 times more air pollutants than do new cars and trucks, and the average fuel economy of a vehicle purchased today is much better than the fuel economy of a vehicle purchased 10 years ago.
The consumer incentive is urgently needed to spur automotive sales, which will help drive economic activity and factory production for all manufacturers in Canada. With the livelihood of one in seven Canadians dependent on the auto industry, I don't have to tell you how critical it is that we take steps to stimulate the industry.
We look forward to working with this committee and helping to stabilize our economy here in Canada.
Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you.
Now, Caroline, J.R., and I will take questions.
:
I guess we at Ford would beg to differ with the analysts. We feel that we have a good financial footing today. We have over $24 billion in liquidity today, and we feel we have a financial footing to weather the storm. We are also working very closely with all stakeholders to try to find other avenues to strengthen our financial position, thus strengthening Ford Motor Company in total.
As a matter of fact, I handed out one of our cards, which is the fundamental plan at Ford. It talks about four key components. It's under “One Plan”.
And I apologize, Robert, that it's not translated. We will get you a translated copy.
It says we will be “Aggressively restructuring to operate profitably at the current real demand and changing model mix.”
Next it says that the second key component of our plan is to “Accelerate development of new products our customers want and value.” And that's happening today, as we bring out seven new vehicles over the next six months. They're resonating with Canadian consumers, and that's evident in the fact that our share has grown over 200 basis points in the last three months.
We also plan to “Finance and to improve own balance sheet.” We'll finance our way through these very difficult times and manage it through the very, very tough decisions that we're making at Ford.
And then we will “Work together effectively as one team.” That's the Ford Motor Company, our dealers, and our suppliers.
If you look through some of the actions Ford has taken, they're pretty substantial. We've cut over $5 billion in costs over the last three years. We are well positioned to manage our business going forward. We've eliminated excess capacity, closing 17 plants to right-size our production capacity in line with real customer demand. And we've right-sized our workforce, drawing down 60,000 employees over the last three years. Since 2005 we've retired 60,000 employees, 15,000 of them salaried and 45,000 of them hourly employees. We've reduced our labour costs, negotiating favourable agreements with our UAW and CAW partners. We've continued to invest in advanced technology while doing this. And we're leading on fuel efficiency in the market, with quality, safety, and technology that has really differentiated our brand in the marketplace.
Again, we've made very difficult decisions, and this plan at Ford started three years ago. These cards have been in place for over two years, so it's not something that just came about when the economy turned south and the industry got tough. We've been planning for this and we've built ourselves a financial reserve so that we can manage through difficult times ahead, and that's what we're doing as a company.
:
First and foremost, I'd say, just to expand on your point, the market here has basically shut down asset-backed security lending and financing.
That's the first and foremost thing that needs to happen. We need to loosen the skid. We need the government to open those doors and those channels, and quite frankly, it's a very good opportunity to get a great return on investment, because they are asset-backed securities. It means you have a note but you have a very tangible asset that has a great value that you can have support the note; it's not like there's air behind it.
The second thing is that the securitization and the open market needs to support loans, leases, and wholesale, all three of those components. We're having a very difficult time. A lot of dealers are losing wholesale lines. We have some major fleet accounts that aren't able to get financing, that are having to turn away from replacing and replenishing their fleet because they can't get financing in the open market.
There is only one place that is best suited, in my mind, to help facilitate these transactions, and at Ford that happens to be Ford Credit. Captive financing knows this business. We know how to loan, we know how to finance, and we know how to lease and carry wholesale lines. It's our area of expertise, and we know how to stimulate the business. You won't see the Ford Motor Company out there with a 30% rate for a customer. We offer value financing for consumers that is competitive in the marketplace, and we're driven by our competitive set as well.
The biggest casualty of the shortage of ability to finance securities in the market is leasing. The person who is paying the price for our drawdown in leasing.... If you look at leasing now, we're leasing as a brand at about 10%; we used to lease close to 50%. GM is down to single digits, Chrysler is at single digits, and we all used to lease at 40% to 50%. Who's paying the price for that decline? Our consumers. The reason consumers pay a huge price now is because they're forced to finance a vehicle and purchase a vehicle because we don't have an avenue to be able to support leasing.
Now, we do lease 10%, so we're still leasing, but it's a far cry from the normal consumer demand. What happens when a consumer buys versus leases? They have to pay taxes on 100% of the vehicle they buy. When you lease you pay taxes based on what you pay in each month, and if the vehicle has a residual lease-end value of 50%, that means you're only going to end up paying taxes on 50% of the vehicle. So we're penalizing a lot of consumers. The ripple-through effect is much greater, if you want to ask an expanding question, in terms of the duration of contracts today versus what they were just a few years ago.
In terms of the investments we've made, we actually have two investments that we've made with help from the government, federally and in Ontario. The first one in your riding, Mr. Young, is the Oakville assembly complex, where we transformed two existing plants into a new complex. It's a flexible assembly plant producing four world-class vehicles now on a global mandate. The flexibility of that plant allows us to produce any combination of those four vehicles, so we could have a different vehicle, one after the other, rolling down the line all day long, and they're produced with the highest quality. That allows us to more effectively utilize the capacity in the plant, to more effectively utilize our investment, and to protect against future market shifts. So that is a very competitive footprint.
The more recent program that you talked about with the AIF is what we call our renaissance project. That will reopen our Essex engine plant in Windsor, and that's a huge success story for us as well. The Essex engine plant will become one of four flexible engine manufacturing plants in our North American system, a very competitive plant that, again, will be protected against future downturns.
I do want to say, though, on the automotive innovation fund, that neither of those investments could have been possible without the government incentives that were available, both federally and provincially. That will continue to be needed going forward. That's one thing we haven't spoken about at length today. Because of the economic crisis that faces us now, not a lot of people are talking about future investments. We do need to make sure the investment incentives that are available in Canada remain competitive to attract the next round of investment that we see coming.
Specifically, in the U.S., the Department of Energy announced a revitalization fund of $25 billion that will be available to all manufacturers that invest in the next generation of fuel economy technology for vehicles and for manufacturing. That's something we need to make sure the automotive innovation fund in Canada remains competitive with.
:
Let me begin by thanking the committee for the interest in the auto industry and its significance, its importance to the Canadian economy. I obviously thank each and every one of you for your efforts and your commitment to preserving a very important industry in the Canadian economy.
Just as an introduction, the Canadian Auto Workers represents approximately 225,000 members across Canada. About one-quarter of those are auto-industry-related jobs, very significant jobs to our union, and again, very important.
Needless to say, I want to say right off the bat that Jim and I both flew economy on our way here today, and we were serviced by wonderful CAW members who took care of us from the time we left Toronto to the time we got here today.
I want to raise a couple of issues of major importance, recognizing that the time has changed. Obviously, we have been in collective bargaining with General Motors, Chrysler, and Ford. We selected General Motors to establish what we would call the pattern relative to these sacrifices that have to be made by auto workers and other stakeholders, as dictated by several people in terms of maintaining our Canadian advantage here in Canada.
I want to emphasize that because people are asking me why we opened bargaining in a time when we had a three-year collective agreement, it's very, very clear in terms of the downward pressure and the demand of the U.S. government that the UAW be an active part as a stakeholder in the United States to reopen negotiations. So we had to look at the UAW and say, “What are the competitive disadvantages that might result because of their bargaining relative to Canada's particular position?” In the last couple of days we bargained a collective agreement with General Motors that will be the pattern for Chrysler's and Ford Motor Company's. General Motors indicated to us very strongly at the conclusion of bargaining that we maintain our Canadian advantage relative to future investment decisions of the corporation, which is important.
I also want to recognize, as part of the negotiating process, that both Prime Minister Harper and Premier McGuinty announced in December that they would make a 20% footprint in support of the auto industry in comparison to the United States. That was a very important announcement as the Americans were dealing with how they were going to invest their moneys in the United States. So when Prime Minister Harper and Premier McGuinty suggested they would provide support up to the 20%, that was an important statement. And obviously they said at that particular time that all stakeholders had to make some sacrifices. Minister Clement, from that time forward, has indicated that all stakeholders, including auto workers, have to make some sacrifices.
What our deal contains is very significant. In terms of the provisions, we're obviously saving dollars off our active hourly labour costs. Again, General Motors said our active labour cost is competitive with any jurisdiction in the world, especially in areas like Germany, the United States, and Japan--areas that we compete with in a direct way.
We obviously did some substantial, painful reductions in legacy costs. The committee should understand that at General Motors, for example, we will have 30,000 retirees, with much fewer actives moving forward, so we had to deal with the question of legacy. We were able to significantly reduce legacy costs moving forward.
We said at that particular time that when the Government of Canada and the Province of Ontario introduced a support, or recommended support for the industry, we would be part of the solution, and we have been part of the solution. It is incredibly important now that all the stakeholders have made a contribution. I'm being told the dealers have done their job, the executives have done theirs, and the non-union folks.... Everybody involved in the industry has done their part. It's very important now for the industry to survive, that the Canadian government provide the support necessary on a proportionate level. So that's incredibly important.
Before I introduce Jim, I want to say a couple of words in conclusion. What's important today is that the Government of Canada provide the support. The second thing for us is to take a look at the terms and conditions of the agreement and maintain our proportionate manufacturing footprint right here in Canada as a condition of the loan and ensure that auto workers are also obviously protected. Again, only the government can do it today. People should understand that every country in the world that has an auto industry is providing support for their particular industry.
I also want to raise the importance of the auto industry--GM, Ford, Chrysler, Toyota, Honda, and all major auto producers in Canada--to the auto parts sector in Canada, which is facing a significant restructuring. I would ask the government, during the course of its deliberations, to consider support for the auto sector.
At this time, I would like to introduce the chief economist of the Canadian Auto Workers Union, a man respected from one end of the country to the other, Jim Stanford.
:
Thank you, sir, and thank you, Ken.
A short description of our current collective agreement with General Motors, reached yesterday, has been distributed to the committee in both languages.
What I'd like to do is just very quickly provide some additional detail on our reading of some of the economic context of the crisis in the auto industry, our recent bargaining, and the government's decisions in moving ahead. I will table three reports with the clerk for future distribution to the committee, in time for your study.
First of all, I would like to emphasize that one of Canada's greatest assets moving forward is our sustained and visible productivity advantage. The auto sector is one of the few industries where Canada is more productive on a consistent basis than the United States. The most recent data indicate that Canada has about an 11% labour productivity advantage in auto assembly versus the United States and a 35% advantage relative to Mexico. That advantage has been there consistently over the last decade; in fact, our productivity advantage relative to the U.S. has grown slightly in recent years. I think it reflects the emphasis of all Canadian participants, including the companies and the union, on modern technology and investment in new capital equipment, the high performance work practices, and also the health and wellness of the workers. That's an important part of what makes a productive workforce.
So I leave that for your consideration. The productivity advantage is there, and we'd like to make even more of it with more investment in our facilities.
My second point is about the economic importance of the auto sector to the broader economy. This is not just about helping the auto producers, and it's certainly not about helping the auto workers—as if we needed some kind of charity. This is about us as a country deciding that we need to preserve this vital part of our economic base.
I will table the study from the Centre for Spatial Economics in Ontario, which analyzes the spinoff impacts of the auto industry. It indicates that if the major North American auto producers were to fail, the ultimate toll, counting those spinoff jobs in Canada, would be 600,000 lost jobs, only about 25,000 of which would be the direct CAW members. Those are a lot of other non-CAW members whose future depends on this industry being here.
Substantial reductions in GDP would occur, of about $65 billion, or 4.4%. That's enough to take a recession, which we're already grappling with, and make it look a lot like a depression.
The data on the fiscal impact of the crisis in the auto industry are interesting. If the North American producers were to disappear, there would be a net negative fiscal impact of $13 billion a year on the federal government, which is substantial. I know there are a lot of folks who call themselves the representatives of the taxpayers out there, who complain about the government supporting the auto industry. If I really cared about taxpayers, I would be awfully worried about that $13 billion hole in the federal government's budget that would suddenly appear, and how we would fill it.
Finally, we will table additional information about the relationship between international trade and the industry's current problems and its future recovery. Our industry in Canada is totally dependent on foreign investment—of course, all of the auto assemblers are foreign owned—and on exports for its existence. That is something we celebrate. But we have to look at the context in which our international trade and investment relationships take place, and that context has shifted from a very strong positive to a very strong negative for our industry over the last decade. In 1999, Canada enjoyed a $15 billion annual surplus in automotive products and trade with the rest of the world. Last year that converted to a $14 billion deficit. So we've snatched defeat from the jaws of victory and lost what was once a bright spot in our international relations. It's now become a large and growing net drain.
The deficit reflects both a decline in our exports—mostly to the U.S.—and an increase in our imports, particularly from offshore. In fact, in 2008, for the first time in decades, Canada has experienced an automotive trade deficit within North America. We still have a small surplus with the United States, but that is now more than offset by a deficit with Mexico. That, I think, is both a cause and a consequence of the crisis in our industry and the loss of our jobs.
We think it will be interesting, given the restructuring in the U.S. and a parallel restructuring here in Canada, how that will affect the shape and the location of the North American industry. I think we face both a risk and an opportunity here. Obviously the Americans are putting money into their industry, and they are going to tie that to American investments, American supply, and American content.
Canadian governments will do the same thing, and we obviously encourage you to maximize the footprint commitments that will be made as a quid pro quo, if you like, for providing assistance to the industry. I would like to see us and the Americans work jointly around something that could end up looking like a new North American auto pact, where the governments in both countries will provide assistance to the industries in return for proportional commitments that would strengthen the North American industry.
We can't draw a line between us and the Americans--the industry is completely integrated--so it makes no sense to do it separately. If we did that, combined with some accountability from non-North American jurisdictions in terms of if they're going to continue to export here, they have to open up their markets to take products back from here or else they have to expand their own investments in North America, that could end up being a positive.
So I'd like to emphasize, as the industry recovers, that the international trade portion of it, that dimension of it, has to be part of the picture. This is something the Canadian Automotive Partnership Council and other stakeholders have examined, and I think it has to be on our agenda as well.
Thank you very much, and we look forward to your questions and comments now, sir.
From time to time, we get some political commentary happening in the committee, and I think we had that a while ago when Mr. Valeriote was talking. I'm going to take a second to answer his question regarding Canada's long-term plan.
We have a plan called Advantage Canada that was put in place a couple of years ago by this government, a broad economic strategy for Canada. Of course, we have a short-term plan, called the “economic action plan”, which we're implementing right now.
Here is some very quick commentary, first from Newsweek:
If President Obama is looking for smart government, there is much he, and all of us, could learn from our...neighbour to the north.
This is from the Daily Telegraph, in London:
If the rest of the world had comported itself with similar modesty and prudence, we might not be in this mess.
The Economist said:
...in a sinking world, Canada is something of a cork. ....The big worry is the fear that an American recession will drag Canada down with it.
And it went on to say:
Mr. Harper says, rightly enough, that his government has taken prudent measures to help Canada weather a storm it cannot duck....
And no less a person than President Obama, just a couple of weeks ago, said:
And, you know, one of the things that I think has been striking about Canada is that in the midst of this enormous economic crisis, I think Canada has shown itself to be a pretty good manager of the financial system...[and] the economy in ways that we haven't always been here in the United States.
That's just a quick answer to Mr. Valeriote's concern.
Now I have a few questions.
There's a lot of talk of restructuring, obviously, as we go through this process, and there's no question that one of the stakeholders at the table is going to be the CAW.
Mr. Stanford, maybe you can give some clarification. According to a presentation that I believe you gave in 2004, paid time off—this is time when people were paid for not working—cost the big three $10 per hour per worker actually on the job. This included regular time off as well as what's called “special paid absence” time off. Is that still about accurate?
:
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Good evening, ladies and gentleman. Thank you for this invitation to appear before you.
By way of background, for over 80 years the CVMA has represented Canada's leading automakers and sellers of light- and heavy-duty vehicles, that is Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, and Navistar Corporation.
Our member companies touch virtually all provinces and territories with their operations. Collectively we have 45 Canadian facilities, including vehicles and parts manufacturing, head offices, and sales and distribution facilities, and over 50% of the Canadian new vehicle dealer network, with 1,750 dealers in nearly every town in Canada. Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors are also the only auto assemblers that have significant research and development facilities and programs in Canada. Most importantly, they directly employ about 35,000 employees and support over 50,000 retirees.
We have thousands of suppliers and business partners across the country, everything from rubber manufacturing in Nova Scotia, mining natural resources and lightweight materials in Quebec, through to steel, chemicals, and high tech in Ontario, petrochemicals in Alberta, etc. So clearly we are national in scope.
These companies also purchase about $24 billion, out of the $30 billion annually, in terms of Canadian tier one auto parts. That's 80%.
Just to move on very quickly, over the past five years these companies have collectively invested $8 billion into their new Canadian operations to establish some of the most flexible, efficient, and greenest manufacturing facilities in the world. This $8 billion in investment represents over 80% of the major auto investment in Canada during this period. If you look at the total industry investment, $10 billion, that represents roughly a 10% return on the investment made by governments through the automotive manufacturing investment supports such as the automotive innovation fund established by the government. The investment made by government was a factor that was absolutely determinant in terms of attracting new production mandates, which are part of the broader effort of these companies to restructure their operations and to maintain competitiveness.
However, today, Canada, similar to other countries, has been hit by a very sudden and sharp collapse as part of an industry-wide and global auto crisis. Sales now register at declined levels that have not been seen in nearly four decades. The dramatic drop in vehicle sales is not a North American phenomenon, nor is it limited to only North American companies. In January, the latest month that detailed statistics are available, sales in France were down 8% year over year. Korea dropped 24%, Japan dropped 28%, Italy dropped 33%, Sweden dropped 34%, the U.K. dropped 35%, and Spain dropped 42%. This is clearly a global problem.
Today all manufacturers, regardless of their home jurisdiction, are taking immediate and sometimes very dramatic actions to deal with the current crisis, including eliminating and scaling back production, employee layoffs, and salary and benefit reductions, much of which you already heard about from certain companies.
The impact in Canada hits the full value chain. Dealers of all makes and models, with few exceptions, are struggling with dramatically decreased sales volumes and revenues. Parts suppliers have dramatically reduced purchase orders for their products. Corresponding with the drop in sales, manufacturers have cut production almost 60% so far in 2009. If this pace continues, production in Canada would fall to just 900,000 units in 2009--a drop in production of over 1.6 million vehicles compared to two years ago.
Given these realities, and recognizing the critical importance of the domestic auto industry to local economies, virtually all governments around the world, including the U.S., Germany, France, and Japan, have been taking complementary action, if you will, to support their domestic industries, by offering an assortment of support to manufacturers, dealers, parts makers, and consumers. Again, it's the full value chain approach.
The Canadian government is definitely playing its key role through the offer of emergency liquidity funding, extension of credit to suppliers through the BDC and EDC, and a secured credit facility, all of which are important, supportive, and highly welcomed measures.
It's critical that these supportive measures be implemented as soon as possible to be effective and that the government policies continue to be implemented to support the industry in a globally competitive manner. This is especially important in three critical areas: continued proportionate support to that offered in the United States, availability of credit, and direct consumer support to help drive vehicle sales--in other words, to help engender renewed consumer confidence.
Maintaining and implementing supporting mechanisms that are globally competitive, and in particular that are proportional to what is being offered in the United States, is absolutely critical if we are indeed serious about maintaining Canada's proportional auto production as we go forward.
Given this tight integration with the U.S., it is critical that the Canadian government implement its stated intention to adopt vehicle fuel efficiency rules like those of the U.S. national standard being developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
The U.S. government estimates that the proposed rules will cost manufacturers about $115 billion. In order to minimize the cost to consumers, this cost must be amortized over the largest vehicle fleet possible to create necessary economies of scale. Creating a Canada-only solution would cost both manufacturers and consumers a lot more.
Understanding the difficulties of meeting the new targets, the U.S. government, under its Energy Act, created a repayable loan fund of $25 billion U.S. for the industry to help research and develop fuel-efficient vehicle technologies and vehicles. This will likely be doubled to about $50 billion shortly, we anticipate.
The second issue I want to highlight this evening is the urgent need for the government to implement the actions it announced in its budget, as well as to expand support for consumers as part of future government stimulus action. Mechanisms such as the secured credit facility are critical to allowing finance companies to loan to both business and retail customers, and it must be implemented as soon as possible.
Additionally, as we move forward, given the worsening auto sales collapse, the government should introduce direct consumer stimulus for auto sales in an effort to create greater consumer confidence. Several other countries have introduced a variety of measures to improve consumer confidence and spur vehicle sales, including tax holidays and fleet renewal programs, otherwise known as scrappage programs.
These actions are being credited with lessening the severe downturn in new vehicle sales, where bold, very simple, and direct measures have been taken. Germany is perhaps the most prominent and successful example, where an aggressive vehicle scrappage program is being credited with increasing sales by what is being estimated at 200,000 units for all of 2009, or close to a 10% increase. In February alone that represented a 21% increase.
It is also my understanding that in conjunction with that program, Germany is undertaking to address the freeze on credit issue that we also experience here. The combination of those two efforts has been a tremendous success.
Aside from the immediate economic benefit, we inherently enjoy a triple win with new vehicles that are cleaner—that is, 12 to 18 times less polluting—more fuel efficient, and indeed safer by virtue of some of the most advanced safety systems we are placing on those vehicles.
In addition to the short-term priority issues to ensure the long-term stability of the health of the auto manufacturing industry in Canada, governments must continue to work constructively with the industry on a broad range of business and regulatory issues, which would include the following.
Both environmental and safety regulations must be fully harmonized with the U.S. federal standards. Creating different regulations in Canada simply adds unnecessary costs—and in some cases we can give you examples where the costs to meet these rules are in excess of hundreds of millions of dollars to manufacturers—restricts products that would be bought otherwise in the Canadian market, and increases the prices consumers pay for those vehicles.
Another one is continued manufacturing and investment supports that are globally competitive. This is the automotive innovation fund, which has indeed been responsible for some of these new product mandates that have come to Canada. It needs to continue for the long term.
Streamline border regulations to reduce congestion and delays, particularly at the Canada-U.S. border, and focus on a coordinated perimeter approach with the United States. Customs procedures and transaction costs are very much a part of that.
We are believers in free trade, but free trade must be fair trade. Free and fair international trade agreements level the playing field for Canadian producers and eliminate protectionism in foreign markets, particularly the systematic use of regulatory and non-tariff barriers. The most poignant example of the systematic use of non-tariff barriers to restrict vehicles into domestic markets from every vehicle-producing nation has been that of Korea. Canada should pursue trade agreements that are supportive of Canadian manufacturing and recognize and support our NAFTA history. Canada's ongoing negotiation on the FTA with Korea at present fails to meet these objectives. It's not the right time, nor is the right agreement currently being looked at.
We also need to eliminate unnecessary and unproductive regulatory cost burdens, especially the federal green levy, the program that penalizes manufacturers and consumers.
Those, in summary, are a few things we would ask you to look at in the longer term.
I would very much appreciate receiving your questions.
Thank you.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and committee members.
I'd like to thank you for inviting me to this forum to present the views of the Association of International Automobile Manufacturers of Canada on the current state of the automotive industry.
By way of background, the AIAMC is the national trade association that represents the Canadian interests of 14 international automobile manufacturers that distribute, market, and manufacture vehicles in Canada.
In 2008, AIAMC members sold over 839,000 new vehicles in Canada, representing 51.2% of Canada's new vehicle market, the first time ever that AIAMC members have comprised more than 50% of the Canadian market.
While our members' sales have grown, so has their Canadian investment. AIAMC members have invested over $8 billion in manufacturing facilities alone. Annual production reached 796,000 new vehicles in 2008, or 38% of the 2.078 million vehicles produced by the three member companies that have production facilities in Canada.
While the majority of vehicles produced--75%--are exported out of the country, almost exclusively to the U.S., each of these companies sells more of the vehicles it builds in Canada to Canadians. For instance, 48% of Honda and Acura vehicles sold in Canada were produced at Honda of Canada Manufacturing. Thirty-seven percent of Toyota and Lexus vehicles sold in Canada were built at Toyota Motor Manufacturing Canada. Additionally, 3% of Suzuki sales in Canada were built at CAMI, and although I didn't mention it earlier, 1% of Volkswagen sales in Canada are actually built at the Chrysler facility in Windsor. Further, compared to other companies producing in Canada, these three companies have a higher percentage of their NAFTA production in Canada: Honda has almost 27% of their production here, Toyota has 26.3%, and CAMI has 100%.
While many would view the membership of the AIAMC as importers, in the context of NAFTA, over 50% of AIAMC member sales in Canada in 2008 were produced in the NAFTA region. And when Kia's $1.2 billion plant in Georgia opens for full production, Porsche and Jaguar/Land Rover will be the only two of our 14 members not producing vehicles in the NAFTA region.
The North American production-to-sales ratios bear out the fact that import penetration has not increased. Since 1990, the North American production-to-sales ratio has ranged from about 78% to a high of 93%, with most years being in the low 80% range. In 2008, the production-to-sales ratio was 80%. So while more consumers may have been buying our members' products, more of them were also being made in North America, providing jobs both in automotive assembly and in the affiliated parts manufacturing facilities.
As you are well aware, things have changed dramatically, as Mark indicated in his remarks, in the Canadian automotive industry in the last eight months, even in the last week. While much of the dire news has been focused on GM and Chrysler, Honda Canada sales were down 42% in February and 39% year to date. Toyota Canada sales were down almost 26% in February, or 15.5% year to date. In fact, only five of our 14 members increased sales on a year-to-date basis over 2008. Overall, sales for our membership are down 15% year to date.
Neither Canada nor the U.S. are isolated cases, either, as Mark previously mentioned. In Canada, from January through December last year, consumer confidence plummeted almost 30 points as Canada moved into a recession that had already started in the U.S. at the end of 2007. The U.S. recession was largely the cause of Canadian production falling almost 20% from the 2007 level owing to the fact that 75% of our members' production is exported to the United States. And that number is higher for the Detroit three.
Canadians became wary of buying major purchases as concern over the economy and their jobs increased. This was clearly evident in vehicle sales. Despite the fact that our sales last year were only down 1.1% from the 2007 level, which represents the third best year on record, the sales were essentially marked by two dramatically different halves. At the end of the first quarter last year, sales were up 7.3% and were tracking for an all-time sales record. By the end of the second quarter, sales were only up 2.4% over 2007, and, as I noted, by the end of the year we were down 1.1%. So the trend is very import to focus on, not the relatively minor dip in overall sales.
As the recession has taken hold, so has the negative trend. Mark already alluded to some of the sales declines in January and February, which were significant. Sales are currently tracking at a rate of 1.3 million units, which would represent a 20% decline in auto sales if it continues at this rate. Most analysts seem to think that the trend will not continue, but even so, it's estimated that sales will be down between 13% and 15%.
Sales decline will be very challenging for Canada's 3,500 new car dealers, who are also feeling the impact of tightening credit. In that regard, we wish to commend the government on the provision of the $12 billion Canadian secured credit facility in the recent budget. We believe this is helpful in ensuring that more credit is available in the marketplace. However, the speed of getting this facility in place is paramount.
Additionally, in a consultation session sponsored by the C.D. Howe Institute last Friday, there was some concern that the $12 billion may not be enough. There's hope that if that is the case, there would be consideration of additional funds being made available. That said, as Mark indicated as well, more credit availability does not necessarily mean that consumers will re-enter the marketplace. In our view, additional consumer incentive is required.
I won't go into too much detail about the scrappage program. You've already heard remarks from Mark. I'll just say in that regard that we are supportive of an enhanced scrappage program as well. We appreciate that the original scrappage program was essentially designed as an environmental initiative, with no direct linkage to the automotive industry. However, we think an enhanced program, as an economic stimulus, is important and it needs to be put in place. In terms of broad parameters, we believe that establishing a $300 million scrappage program with the goal of removing 100,000 vehicles from 1998 or older from Canada's roadways over the course of a one-year period would be something to strive for. This would increase consumer throughput in dealerships, thus shoring up vehicle sales, while providing concurrent safety and environmental benefits.
Given that new vehicles are lasting upwards of nine years and we're heading into a regime of regulated fuel consumption in Canada, a program similar to the BC SCRAP-IT program, which provides a sliding incentive based on GHG emission reductions over a two-year period, would provide the government with a significant measurable reduction of GHG emissions as well.
While scrappage programs would most certainly assist in bringing consumers back to the dealerships, thereby assisting the retail industry in Canada, no amount of sales increase in Canada is going to appreciably increase Canada's production by any of the six manufacturers producing here. The same would hold true for the parts manufacturers in Canada. We saw production fall by 20% last year because the U.S. was already into a recession. It's clear that further production cuts in North America and elsewhere will be necessary to adjust to whatever the new normal of U.S. sales will be.
The $16.8 million seasonally adjusted average of sales that have occurred throughout pretty much the last decade are not realistic and they are not likely to return any time soon. Those sales volumes were predicated on easy credit, high levels of liquidity, and generous incentives from vehicle manufacturers, combined with a growing economy, high consumer confidence, and relatively low unemployment.
Since the end of 2007, the U.S. economy has been in trouble. Consumer confidence has plummeted and unemployment levels have been rising rapidly, with 651,000 jobs in the U.S. vaporized last month alone.
Production capacity in North America has been built up to around 17 million units, which means there is excess capacity right now of about 7 million units, or roughly 28 vehicle assembly plants in North America. New, significantly lower sales volumes have forced all manufacturers to ratchet back production. Most analysts suggest that it will be several years, if ever, before we get back up to 16 million units in sales.
A December 2008 study by the Conference Board of Canada noted that profits last year for Canadian parts makers would be down $1 billion, and an additional 10,800 jobs would be lost in 2008-09, on top of the 12,008 jobs lost in 2007. I suspect that Mr. Fedchun painted a more bleak and accurate picture of the automotive parts industry when he appeared before this committee, so I won't elaborate on that at this point in time.
In our view, the Canadian government, however, should do its utmost to preserve the automotive parts manufacturing base in Canada, as many of its largest parts makers are global innovators in automotive components and subassemblies.
With respect to the provision of public funds and aid to the auto industry, prospects for the automotive parts manufacturers and the vehicle assemblers will not improve, as I noted, until U.S. sales improve. It's important that any aid that is provided to the industry be available on an equitable basis for all who need it, including the parts makers and dealers. Additionally, aid should not confer competitive advantage on those companies receiving it. For this reason, it's fundamentally important that there be a transparent process for the application and receipt of public aid and an accountability structure put in place to ensure the aid is being used for its designated purposes.
Finally, as the economic situation becomes more dire, protectionist sentiments will take hold, and for this reason we believe that a commitment to the maintenance of an open automotive market in Canada should also be a condition of the provision of aids to manufacturers.
I have a bit more, but I'll leave it at that for now.
Thank you very much.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chair and committee members.
I'm not going to cover a lot of ground.
Mazda Canada is based in Toronto. We have offices in Montreal and Vancouver. We have a warehouse in Toronto. We have 164 dealers across the nation and we employ over 6,000 directly.
We've talked a lot about the declining industry, but I think one of the greater concerns we have right now is the speed at which this decline is taking place. If you look at what happened in the United States, you'll see that the decline started in December of 2007 and was half a per cent. It took seven months before it became a 25% reduction. The decline in Canada started in November. We reached a 28% decline in four months.
The United States is now down 41%, and I believe it's possible, if we don't take action quickly, given the speed at which this change is occurring, that we could also see declines at that same level. We are seeing members in this industry already taking declines at that level.
Another trend that's concerning us is the credit, which is contributing to the speed of this decline. The costs of our funds, despite the best actions that we've given to the banks, are going up. Right now, the funds that we acquire to lend out to customers in APR financing have, in the last 30 days, increased 50 basis points. The cost of funds for leasing has gone up almost 100 basis points in 30 days.
Now, these trends haven't affected the industry yet. These are things that have happened, but that haven't yet flowed through to the consumer side, so we anticipate more challenges in the very near future as the cost of credit goes up.
Leasing is a particular concern. If you take a look at the trends, a year ago we were leasing 43% of all car transactions in Canada. Forty-three per cent of cars were being leased. Today it's 19%. That's a 24-point reduction in the number of leases that are taking place. If you annualize that out over the number of car sales, that's over 390,000 car sales. The decline in our industry isn't that big.
There is a correlation between the decline in leasing and the decline in our industry. No, it's not the only problem, but it is a problem that the secured credit facility needs to be aware of and needs to address through securitization and through this additional focus on making sure we have as many competitive options as possible in the marketplace to secure leasing. What leasing does is provide our consumers an option for a lower payment. When you take that lower payment out of the marketplace, there isn't another option, unless they're going to go for 10- to 12-year finance terms, which doesn't make any sense.
For Mazda, this is particularly important in the province of Quebec. We were doing over 50% leasing. But because there are very few options available and the rates are becoming more and more expensive, that option is becoming less and less available to consumers. Yes, you'll hear that there is credit available, but at what cost? As the price of credit goes up and as the options on leasing disappear, the number of customers we can attract into our showrooms begins to go down. As that goes down, so goes our industry.
So one of our concerns is to keep an eye on the need and make sure there's ample credit, not just for the standard APR, but also for the leasing, which was such a big part of our industry less than a year ago.
Finally, I'm representing a lot of dealers across the country who are also having problems with financing and tight credit situations. Right now, we're seeing dealers who are fortunate enough to have flooring lines. Dealers don't buy the cars. They go out and they finance the cars that you see in the showrooms. If they're fortunate enough to have those flooring lines, their rates are going up. Our dealers' rates on their floor plan, over the last 60 days, have gone up 50 basis points. That means every car out there is costing them more to hold onto. That, coupled with the additional expense of financing the cars, is translating into higher prices for consumers, which is making our cars less affordable and is driving fewer customers into the showroom.
On behalf of the dealers, we also have to make sure that they have ample credit opportunities through our banking systems to provide competitive flooring, competitive construction, competitive flooring lines, and as well, ultimately the consumer financing they need to run their businesses.
Unlike the United States dealership groups, which in many cases are that—they're groups, large corporations—none of ours in Canada, for Mazda, are corporations. They're family owned businesses, small businesses, and many of them are owned by second- and third-generation people who have inherited these businesses and are just trying to keep them afloat right now.
It's hard enough, with the industry going down, to not have the credit available to buy cars from the factory, to floor the cars, to finish their construction projects, to add an additional service bay. When I talk about the tightening of credit, I want to make sure that we've kept in mind the needs of our dealer body—not just Mazda's, but those of every manufacturer out there—and the struggles they're having.
That concludes my remarks, other than to say that I appreciate all that has been done and the efforts you're making in having us here tonight. I know you're putting in a lot of late night hours.
But the industry is moving in the wrong direction, quickly. I believe that with the right actions made promptly, we can turn this around. The industry is sick, but it is not terminal.
I thank you for your time.
:
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to participate in this hearing on the auto industry in Canada.
First let me say a few words about our association. JAMA Canada was established in 1984 with the mandate to enhance understanding on trade and economic issues in the auto sector and to promote closer relations between Canada and Japan. Currently, we have eight members; four are manufacturing vehicles in Canada: Honda, Toyota, Suzuki, and Hino Trucks. Seven of our members have affiliated plants in the U.S. or Mexico.
Canadian manufacturing operations account for approximately a third of total light vehicle production in Canada. In 1984 every vehicle our members sold came from Japan. Today three out of every five vehicles sold in Canada by our members are made in North America. Moreover, Canada has been a net exporter of light vehicles every year since 1993. In 2008, twice as many vehicles were exported from Canada as were imported from Japan.
In the next few months Canadian production among our members will pass the 10 million mark. I note that Honda in Alliston will celebrate subproduction of its five millionth vehicle in 2009. Cumulative vehicle manufacturing investment stands at over $9 billion, including the new Toyota plant in Woodstock, Honda's four-cylinder engine plant in Alliston, and the Hino truck plant in Woodstock as well. Production in Canada last year totalled 682,000 light vehicles as well as 1,230 medium-duty trucks, and a little fewer than 74% were exported; 94% went to the U.S. and the remainder to a variety of other countries.
Compared to the Detroit three, Honda and Toyota devote a larger percentage of their Canadian production to the domestic market, as small vehicles such as the Civic and the Corolla are among the most popular with Canadian consumers. In addition, 65 Japanese-related auto parts, materials, and tooling manufacturers in Canada have been established and are employing over 16,000 team members. Total direct and indirect employment stands at over 70,000 in Canada, including dealerships, as well as about 29,000 in vehicle and auto parts manufacturing. I think you have a copy of a map I distributed, which shows all the vehicle and parts plants currently operating in Canada.
From our perspective, the current crisis facing the auto industry is not only global in scope, as many others have pointed out, but the industry is struggling with both structural and cyclical aspects. In spite of plunging demand in the last two months of 2008, it was a record year for sales for our member companies. However, combined sales are down 20% at the end of February, as others have noted. The onset of the recession has created widespread concern among our members over falling demand, lower consumer confidence, and tighter credit. For the Canadian and the global auto industry, 2009 may well be remembered as a transformative period in its history.
While the Canadian auto industry has been restructuring due to the convergence of several factors over the last few years--currency volatility, the price of oil and other commodities, and shifting consumer demand--in some respects the industry began this period of structural change over 30 years ago with the first oil shock in 1973 and the subsequent rise of globalization. For Japanese automakers in Canada, this period of continuous change has been remarkable for the growth of investment in local production for Canada and for export to the U.S. As you have often heard, the Canadian auto industry is deeply integrated within North America. This has allowed Canada to punch above its weight, producing about twice as much as we consume and exporting a high percentage of local production. With the relatively small domestic market, access to the larger U.S. market is necessary to sustain this level of production and export.
Clearly, the cyclical downturn that started last year in the U.S. is the reason production in Canada is now at risk. Moreover the return of the U.S. consumer is necessary to revive production in Canada. Meanwhile governments continue to play a critical role in stimulating consumer confidence as well as creating a positive and competitive environment for trade in investment by maintaining open, secure, and trade-efficient borders; infrastructure improvements, including the border points; sound fiscal and monetary policies; and supporting innovation through R and D tax credits, etc.
In this regard we are encouraged by the government's effort in the federal budget to backstop credit for dealers with the $12 billion secured credit facility, improving access to credit for suppliers, as well as extending the capital cost allowance on machinery and production equipment.
Whether these measures will bring consumers back into the market is not certain. A more direct consumer stimulus, such as an enhanced scrappage program that others have already suggested, may be needed.
With respect to financial support from the federal and Ontario governments, while JAMA Canada members are not seeking loans or credit assistance at this time, we are concerned that the proposed funds for General Motors and Chrysler may be used to create disadvantages for those in the market not seeking such assistance rather than to maintain Canada's current proportion of production in North America.
Finally, on the matter of harmonized regulations, JAMA Canada fully supports the position of the AIAMC and the CVMA on the need to establish a single dominant standard in North America for fuel efficiency, vehicle safety, and emissions in Canada due to the highly integrated nature of the industry.
We also have some concerns about the impact of an FTA with Korea, as well as the possible negotiations with the EU, but as the time is short, I will provide the committee with our position paper when it's available in both official languages.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in the discussion. I look forward to your questions.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Greetings, honourable members.
On behalf of the Canadian Association of Moldmakers, and in my capacity as vice-president, I want to say thank you. We appreciate the opportunity afforded to us by your committee to offer our input on the current state of the tooling industry in Canada as it pertains to the automotive industry, and we thank you for that.
To state the obvious, our toolmaking industry is in crisis. What may, or may not, be surprising is that we have been dealing with this situation for several years; it's not just due to the current financial crisis. In effect, the rest of Canada is just now feeling our pain.
The initial root of our problem has been inequitable payment terms from the Detroit three—the PPAP payment terms—who are traditionally the largest customers of tool shops. Traditionally, a car maker or OEM would place a production program with its preferred tier one supplier, who in turn would place a tool to be built with their preferred tool shop. The tool would be built and the parts that are produced from that tool would be approved for installation in cars by the OEM. The tier one supplier would receive moneys from the OEM to pay for the tool or the mould. This could typically take from 18 months to 48 months, depending on PPAP or delays. In this timeframe, the tool shops are not paid any amount of funds for their work.
Unfortunately, due to the pricing pressures on program costs by the Detroit three, many moulders and tier one suppliers encountered financial difficulties and either chose not to pay the tooling moneys to the tool shops and/or went into chapter 11—again keeping the funds.
We therefore consider this payment model to be broken and are requesting that a portion of any loans given out by our government be directed to the tooling companies, not as a loan to them but as a payment for work already completed on the OEMs' behalf.
We believe this must be pushed with the weight of government, because this payment plan is unfairly stacked in the favour of the OEMs, and they will not willingly desert this payment strategy as it affords them the ability to kick off tooling and keep the costs off their balance sheets. This payment strategy must be stopped for the future health of the small to medium-sized businesses, which cannot afford to finance the Detroit three. We believe this is an opportune moment for this endeavour, as there is currently a similar effort by the American tool shops that is being viewed seriously by their elected officials.
The mould/tool/die enterprise must be viewed as an independent sector of the automotive business. We are major suppliers to the automotive industry by virtue of its presence in the market, but we could in fact have a robust tooling sector supplying non-automotive industries, such aerospace, medical, wind energy, solar power, fuel cell, nuclear, and houseware products. But we need to be paid for our work so that we can reinvest in new technologies and pursue these opportunities.
Currently we're hindered by the following financial constraints. The majority of tool shops are currently owed significant amounts of money by the automotive sector. Banks are lumping the tool shops in with the automotive industry's difficulties and are therefore restricting credit.
Many banks will not offer accounts receivables coverage for a customer without that customer being approved for EDC coverage. Currently the EDC will not offer coverage for the Detroit three and most of their suppliers, which is in effect forcing the tool shops to refuse work from the Detroit three.
As an example, Chrysler, which is requesting loans from the Canadian government, cannot obtain coverage from the EDC and has recently announced that it will be releasing approximately $500 million in tooling for new models, which most Canadian tool shops will be forced to refuse to quote, given this situation.
This current situation could likely create the following scenario: Chrysler could be approved for loans and receive loans from the Canadian government; EDC, a crown corporation, could continue to refuse to offer receivables insurance to Canadian tool shops for Chrysler; Canadian banks would then refuse to margin Chrysler receivables without EDC coverage; the mould/tool/die sector would then be forced to refuse Chrysler work; Chrysler could then place their tooling either in the U.S. or overseas, where they honour progress payments, in effect paying foreign firms with Canadian taxpayer funds; Canadian companies would then be forced either to downsize or to close, and then would also draw down on whatever EDC-covered receivables they currently had, in effect promoting a type of double-dipping of taxpayer funds.
Therefore, we respectfully suggest the following for your consideration: that any funds have a portion earmarked to pay off critical suppliers, and that the mould/tool/die sector be designated as a critical supplier.
The PPAP payment term system must be discontinued. If the OEMs must pay progress payments to their Chinese suppliers, they can pay them to the Canadian suppliers.
The EDC must increase their credit coverage of the Detroit three in conjunction with the loan strategy. As a government corporation, their non-coverage of the Detroit three is inconsistent with the government's strategy of providing funds to the Detroit three.
The industry is doing its part by participating in various organizations, such as the Canadian Association of Moldmakers. Our particular association promotes the country's toolmakers through efforts such as our recent successful trade fair and our attendance at various trade shows in the U.S., England, and Germany, where we hand out members' trade magazines, meet with various trade representatives from other countries, and obtain sales leads to be distributed to our member shops. As well, we're working with various government MPs and MPPs, such as the Province of Ontario, which recently organized a hugely successive “Powering the Future Summit” at Windsor's new casino, which had in excess of 800 people in attendance. We are also working with agencies such as the Windsor-Essex county's development commission and with our trade commissioners and ambassadors to assist us in procuring out-of-country projects, because most tool shops are primarily export-driven concerns. We also maintain close ties with our local colleges and universities.
In conclusion, we've not come before you to request any loans, but only timely payment for services already rendered to the OEMs and a return to fair practice payment terms so that we can move forward and invest our own money in our own future. The typical Canadian small and medium enterprise shop owner is an aggressive and sometimes fearless and innovative business person who has the drive and desire to survive and prosper, as evidenced by the strong attendance at the “Powering the Future Summit”, which was promoting alternative manufacturing opportunities. It's also evidenced by the fact that most are still surviving in spite of the current formidable challenges described earlier.
Thank you for the opportunity to express our beliefs.
My question is for Mr. Nantais.
First of all, I'd like to thank all of you gentlemen for taking time out of what I am certain is a very busy schedule to come up and speak to this committee.
Just as some history, we know the government is looking at proposals submitted by General Motors and Chrysler, and they must have an answer by the end of the month. Concurrently with that, this committee was conceived by Mr. Michael Ignatieff, who thought it was important that we look outside the box and determine whether or not there are some things that could be offered by the industry as part of the overall solution.
So with that in mind, I move back to last year. I look at what I understood was going on in this industry before I became an elected member of Parliament. What I saw was a decline in the industry. I noticed from General Motors documents that in 2005 they were employing 20,000 people here in Canada, and that has steadily gone down to about 8,000 to 9,000 this past year, with an expected reduction to about 8,000 by mid-year in 2009.
Mr. Nantais, over that period of time, I am curious if there were proposals by the Detroit three in Canada to the Canadian government, proposals that could or should have evolved into a national auto policy of some sort to deal with this—not exclusively a national auto policy, but a North American auto policy, given the integrated nature of the American and Canadian industry. I ask this because I'm looking at an October 2007 document that was submitted by the Canadian Vehicle Manufacturers' Association, which shows that much of what's being discussed today was actually thought of and conceived back in 2007.
So could you talk to us about what was presented, what was asked, what was not responded to? And in your estimation, should we have a national auto policy, and what should it include?