:
I call the meeting to order. I want to welcome everyone, especially the witnesses here today.
The orders of the day deal with chapter 3, on the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, of the October 2007 Report of the Auditor General of Canada.
From the Office of the Auditor General we have assistant auditor Ronnie Campbell, and principal Frank Barrett. Welcome.
From the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development we have the deputy minister and accounting officer Michael Wernick. He's accompanied by Michel Roy, the senior assistant deputy minister, claims and Indian government; and Terry Sewell, director general, implementation branch.
I want to again extend to each and every one of you a very warm welcome to the committee.
I understand, Mr. Campbell, you have an opening statement. I'll turn the meeting over to you.
:
Mr. Chair, thank you for the opportunity to present the results of our audit of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement from chapter 3 of the Auditor General's October 2007 report. I am accompanied by Frank Barrett, who is the principal responsible for this audit.
The Inuvialuit Final Agreement is one of Canada's first comprehensive land claim agreements. When it was signed in 1984 it was the first such agreement to be signed north of the 60th parallel, and is only the third comprehensive land claim agreement to be finalized in Canada. As with all comprehensive land claim agreements, the Inuvialuit Final Agreement is protected by the Constitution.
[Translation]
Modern comprehensive land claim agreements are complex and address the roles, responsibilities, and obligations of each party as well as other things, such as a land transfer and cash settlement. Land claim agreements are not designed to end relationships between governments and the aboriginal groups; they are designed to change those relationships.
The principle objectives of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement are to: preserve the Inuvialuit cultural identity and values within a changing northern society; enable the Inuvialuit to be equal and meaningful participants in the northern and national economy and society; and protect and preserve Arctic wildlife, environment, and biological productivity.
The Inuvialuit Final Agreement includes more than 80 provisions, under which the federal government is obligated to take certain actions or participate in certain activities. More than three quarters of these obligations are ongoing, such as regular participation on boards and committees.
We audited federal activities related to 29 of Canada's obligations that we deemed important for fulfilling the agreement. We also examined how Indian and Northern Affairs Canada—the lead federal organization—planned for, carried out, and monitored the implementation of Canada's obligations under the agreement. Finally, we assessed whether, or how, INAC monitored and reported on the extent to which the agreement's principles were realized.
We found that the federal government had not met some of its significant obligations. Often, this was because it had not established the necessary processes and procedures, or it had not identified who was responsible for certain actions.
[English]
For example, it had not yet established a process to remove restrictions on use called “encumbrances” from 13 parcels of Inuvialuit land that would transfer control and use of the land to the Inuvialuit. Furthermore, in 1984 INAC erroneously transferred land to the Inuvialuit that contained municipal infrastructure that belonged to the Government of the Northwest Territories and to Transport Canada. Our audit found that INAC had not established processes to reacquire these lands in exchange for other lands.
Some of the obligations are being met, Mr. Chairman. INAC has paid to the Inuvialuit Regional Corporation almost $170 million, over 14 years, according to the schedule set out in the agreement. Canada has transferred approximately 91,000 square kilometres to the Inuvialuit and created three national parks. Federal organizations have collaborated with joint management boards and with committees that were established under the agreement. They have also advised environmental screening and review bodies when requested to do so.
Mr. Chair, we found that the Department of Indian and Affairs, on top of not meeting specific obligations, still had not developed a strategy for how Canada would implement its responsibilities. This is 23 years after the agreement came into effect. We also found that INAC, the federal lead, has taken no action to ensure that progress towards achieving the principles of the agreement is monitored. During the audit, officials stated that they did not view this as the department's responsibility. As a result, the department does not have a comprehensive picture of progress of the three fundamental goals expressed in the agreement.
We made six recommendations. INAC agreed with all of them. When it responded to each one, INAC made various commitments, with specific timeframes, some of which were to be acted upon by March 2008. The committee may wish to invite INAC to table its action plan and explain what changes have been put in place to ensure it lives up to the commitments it made in response to our recommendations.
Mr. Chair, that concludes my opening statement. We would be happy to answer any questions the committee may have.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the invitation to appear before the committee today.
This is my third parliamentary committee appearance in about a month. I spoke recently to the Senate committee on aboriginal affairs on this very subject--the Inuvialuit agreement. I'm pleased to have the opportunity to address the findings and recommendations on implementation of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement contained in the Auditor General's October 2007 report.
[Translation]
First of all, I would like to thank the Auditor General for her report. I appreciate the diligent effort and careful study undertaken by the Auditor General and her staff, and I genuinely welcome their thoughtful recommendations.
We recognize the seriousness of the matters raised in the report. Any failure on our part to fully abide by the terms of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement not only undermines the relationship with this aboriginal community, but also diminishes the hard-won credibility of the federal government as it enters into negotiations on agreements with other aboriginal communities across Canada.
[English]
In her report, the Auditor General suggests six precise ways in which the department can completely fulfill its responsibilities under the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. The recommendations touch on key aspects of the agreement: land exchange, contracting, economic review, interdepartmental communication, overall implementation strategy, and performance measurement issues.
We are working and have been working in all these areas. Since the report was presented to the House, we have increased our efforts to address the concerns raised by the Auditor General, in order to fully implement the terms of the agreement.
We have been working on developing an action plan to ensure that we are on track, setting realistic and concrete deadlines to address the recommendations. We met with the staff of the Office of the Auditor General, and they provided us with some guidance on the appropriate form and language of an action plan following on our most recent audit and evaluation committee meeting, which was held on February 28.
My officials have provided me with an update on the department's response to the recommendations of the report since it was tabled, and we've made substantial progress even since then on a number of the items highlighted by the Auditor General. I'll just touch on a few of those, and then hopefully that will set the table for questions. I'll deal with them in order.
On land exchanges, accelerated work over the last few months has led to progress on the issue of the airports and the Pingo Canadian Landmark land exchanges. Negotiations with the Inuvialuit and the other federal parties are in fact now finalized and final approval of those parties is expected within the next six months.
This highlights one of the generic challenges for us, in that the department is not solely responsible for or capable of delivering implementation or in possession of all of the levers and tools. Some of those rest with other federal departments. As you may be aware from reading the report, the Government of Canada is the signatory to the agreements, and often this involves a range of federal government departments and other parties.
On contracting, for example, we've worked closely with the Treasury Board Secretariat and Public Works and Government Services Canada to ensure that contract practices across the government reflect our commitments as a government. An amendment will be finalized within the next fiscal year, and the systems to monitor compliance will be brought in line with the new policy.
With regard to economic reviews, we have provided funding to the Inuvialuit to assess the economic development opportunities and potential in each one of the six Inuvialuit communities. We recognize that successful aboriginal communities mean a more prosperous country for us all, and this practical community-based approach supports the objective.
Let me confirm that we continue to explore approaches to enable us to assess and report on a timely basis on land claims implementation activities and obligations, not just in the case of the Inuvialuit Final Agreement, but all of our land claims settlements across Canada.
Stronger accountability mechanisms for implementation of modern treaties—including multi-party implementation bodies, quarterly reporting, and audits, both internal and external, when required—are adding greater rigour into our work. To address recommendations of internal audits, we're improving the process we use for tracking implementation and we're producing a practical implementation handbook for staff. We've also conducted workshops to identify performance measures and indicators that will assess and report on the impact of our implementation activities, and all this is imbedded in a larger department-wide performance measurement framework.
The department's implementation branch, led by Mr. Sewell, who joins us here today, has led a series of discussions over the last few months with representatives of all the aboriginal signatories to modern treaties and with all other federal government partners to gain a greater understanding of implementation challenges and to make sure we work together on solutions.
Finally, an evaluation of the impact of modern land claims agreements is underway, starting in five communities in both the Northwest Territories and Quebec, and the evaluation results will be available later in the coming fiscal year.
[Translation]
These initiatives are clear proof of our commitment. Despite the obstacles we encounter we should not lose sight of the fact that the current land claims process works and that agreements are having—and will continue to have—a profound effect on the lives of members of aboriginal communities. By working together we will continue to make progress.
[English]
I would cite recent testimony of Chief Joe Linklater of the Vuntut Gwitchin First Nation in the Yukon before your counterparts in the Senate committee on aboriginal peoples. I have an interesting and compelling quote from Chief Linklater in which he said, “I tell people all the time that these self-government agreements were not negotiated to resource ourselves. They were negotiated to give us the ability to look after ourselves and to be self-determining.”
Well, the ability to look after ourselves is what all Canadians want. I believe that the measures this department and other departments will be putting in place, have put in place, and will put in place to respond to the Auditor General's report will bring us much closer to that ultimate goal.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I'd be happy to take your questions.
:
In the end, you are saying that it is really an issue of the level of commitment. What was to be done systematically, when it was easy, was done. But the long term obligations, the whole issue of the future of people and measures that need to be monitored, that is much more difficult.
Mr. Wernick, you are a deputy minister. I find it really disheartening to read a report like this. It was 24 years ago, and when the audit was done, that was 23 years back. Moreover, an audit from the Auditor General's office was required for this update.
Were there any assessments done of these measures within the department, without the Auditor General being involved? What credibility do you think you have with the aboriginal people, those who negotiated the agreements? I take note of Mr. Campbell's answer. As far as any action that will be taken in the future, the aboriginal people may think that they can count on short-term measures, such as signing a one-time agreement or selling lands, but as for the rest of it, where you have not fulfilled your commitments, how will they be able to count on the department to sign an agreement in good faith?
:
Thank you for that question. As I said at the outset, the fact that there are differences between certain provisions or measures in the agreement troubles me greatly because that undermines our credibility at the negotiating table with other aboriginal groups. Having said that, we are making progress. We have just signed two treaties in British Columbia and we have just settled claims with the Inuit in Northern Quebec, and so on.
As I tried to explain, following the signature and the celebration of a treaty there is a relationship between the government and the aboriginal group that begins. As Mr. Campbell said, most of the obligations are ongoing, and there are unresolved issues in terms of financing. It is clear that we have not done our work with certain land exchanges, that I admit. We are now trying to complete as many transactions as possible. As Mr. Campbell explained, the agreement involves approximately 80 obligations in different categories. Two of them have been identified as deficiencies in terms of transactions, and there are outstanding disagreements on two very important issues: acquisition policy and economic development. We are trying to make progress.
To answer your question, I would say that yes, we do audits and evaluations internally, and from time to time, the Auditor General's office helps us. We appreciate it because it is an accountability measure. There are 21 agreements. Those that were signed at the beginning of the cycle, such as the James Bay and Iqaluit agreements, do not have the same implementation structure. We have learned lessons from the past, and the new treaties include implementation and dispute resolution measures that are much more robust.
These issues of implementation are so fundamental to the people of the north, to the different agreements that have been struck, I'm kind of amazed at how we can have reports like this without this being almost a crisis for the department. But it isn't, obviously. INAC is following its usual line of non-effort in moving forward with these obligations. It's hurting the people I represent here in Parliament, and certainly the frustration is there throughout the north. The kinds of agreements that were made between the Government of the Northwest Territories and the Inuvialuit are a direct result of the failure of INAC to live up to its responsibilities. That's why those were bilateral sidebar agreements.
In this audit, INAC officials describe the principles of the IFA as being Inuvialuit principles, not the principles to which Canada adheres. This is a statement I have difficulty with, of course, because to have an agreement work out and then to have the statement that the fundamental principles are not shared seems to be a bit ludicrous and it seems to be the basis by which everything else falls out afterwards. If you're not willing to accept what was negotiated in the land claim, signed on to and agreed to as a department, if you're not willing to accept what the Government of Canada has done, then you're not fulfilling your responsibility.
So how do you characterize your position as outlined here?
:
Deputy, perhaps I can tackle that.
As a clarification, I believe that senior officials, in pointing out to the Auditor General's staff the question of who owned the principles, were simply quoting from the agreement, which states: “The basic goals expressed by the Inuvialuit and recognized by Canada in concluding this Agreement are...”. So I think it was attempting to draw attention to that phrase, which says that the Inuvialuit came to this discussion with these principles, Canada recognized them and indeed respects them, and they are principles that we would all want to pursue.
To help the committee understand these principles, these are fairly significant and overarching principles, and I'll quote them:
(a) to preserve Inuvialuit cultural identity and values within a changing northern society;
(b) to enable Inuvialuit to be equal and meaningful participants in the northern and national economy and society;
(c) to protect and preserve the Arctic wildlife, environment and biological productivity.
So these are huge, huge principles.
So, Mr. Bevington, in answer to your question as to how the existence of these principles would shape how the federal government deals with its obligations inside the agreement, it would be, in the case of a Mackenzie Valley gas pipeline, ensuring that all proper review processes take place and that we respect the desire to protect Inuvialuit culture, to provide a meaningful role in the economy, and to protect Arctic wildlife, environment, and ecology.
It's an attempt to implement the agreement in a way that respects these principles, but the point is that these principles are not, in themselves, obligations. They're something we all want to achieve.
:
Mr. Sewell alluded to a few of them.
I would say a couple of things. One is that INAC doesn't do very much of the procurement. It's either done by Public Works or other federal departments. There's a hell of an information-gathering challenge, which we're trying to get to the bottom of so we can insinuate the Inuvialuit obligations into decisions that are made across the federal government on procurement decisions--many by Public Works, some directly by departments--when they're buying goods and services. We have not done a great job of tracking and tracing that in the past. We'll try to do better in the future. That's the kind of thing Mr. Sewell was alluding to, and I'll turn to him in a moment.
“Reasonable share” is one of those terms that the negotiators at the time agreed to as part of an overall bargain. I would deduce that in 1983 they could not define that there would be a numerical share 20 years or 30 years from now, because there was no way to forecast the economic development. Nobody, in 1983, would have predicted $100-a-barrel oil or what happened in diamonds or whether we'd be buying whatever, so the parties agreed that we will work towards a reasonable share. That's a moving target. We wanted a legal opinion because I don't want to expose the crown to litigation on this matter. If we say there's a certain reasonable share, somebody will go to court and challenge us on it. It's normal due diligence, to make sure we understand what the lawyers think “reasonable share” is.
We may have a view of it. The Inuvialuit undoubtedly have a view of it. We're going to have to sit down and talk to them about it.
:
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
I think there have been several references to a disagreement. In an effort to try to be helpful, I would sort of offer the following. Mr. Wernick introduced a notion that there was a respectful disagreement between us. That was a surprise to me. In the subsequent articulation and discussion of that disagreement, I don't see that there is a disagreement.
I think there are two issues. One is who has ownership of the overall objectives and principles of the agreement. What I hear the department saying is it's not the department alone. We agree with that. We never said otherwise.
We believe that notwithstanding that ownership is shared, there should be a measurement of the progress towards attaining those principles. And the department agrees with that.
I would point out that in a recommendation in paragraph 3.85 we actually say “the department in consultation with” those other parties.
I just wouldn't want members to believe that there's a disagreement where I don't think there is one, unless Mr. Wernick still believes there is.
:
That's what we're trying to do today.
When I read some of these statements and consider what we've had today in responses, I have to ask myself whether DIAND works for first nations people or for the best interests of other Canadians. I know I can't get an answer to that, but I wonder who DIAND works for.
It has always been my impression that the minister has to represent first nations people. It's his responsibility to see that they receive the benefits of our great Canadian nation--a nation they controlled until a few hundred years ago. If we don't take that as the ultimate responsibility of the department and the minister, I wonder how we as Canadians can have a government to maintain this country.
With the file, when you go back to 1983-84, I assume that before it was signed, other departments were involved in signing off on that agreement. Is that correct, or was it simply signed by DIAND and the Government of Canada? Was it signed off by Parks Canada? Was it signed off by Transport Canada? Was it signed off by the Department of National of Defence? Did all those deputy ministers sign a due diligence on this agreement before it was brought to the Governor in Council to be signed as good Canadians making an agreement with people in the north of our country?
:
This matter kind of reminds me of the episode we had a while back with education performance with your department. It was not a ringing endorsement. For all the money that's spent by the department on education, when you look at the results and the auditor's report, there's a colossal problem here.
What I'm hearing today is that the land has been transferred, large amounts of money have been expended, the agreement has been substantially performed, but the thing I really find troubling—and this reminds me of the education file as well—is that the standard of living of the people who are most affected by the agreement has not improved. It appears as if it's the same as it was before, and you have to wonder what the exercise is all about, if people's lives are not improved at the end of the day.
A famous person once said that eleven of the most dangerous words in the English language are “Hello, I'm with the government; I'm here to help you.” When I see that quote, I very often think of the Department of Indian Affairs.
With that, I'm going to ask a few questions. It seems to me when I look at the economic development objectives under this agreement—and I'm not familiar with all the details and the guidelines on it—they seem to me to be classical centralized economic planning. Governments, through regulations and mandates, are trying to order results, and other than a few leftist friends around the world, most reputable schools of economics have totally rejected that as an economic strategy. It's a strategy that has proven to be a failure, and if I look at the results here about the standard of living of first nations people affected by this agreement, it would seem to me we have another failure.
Is this what we're trying to do here, a process managed by central planning to get results for people in this area? Mr. Wernick, would you have any comments on that?
:
Thank you for the question.
Not at all. In fact, it's diametrically the opposite. The point of reaching land claims settlements is to give the communities the tools for self-reliance so they can take control of their own futures, participate in economic opportunity, participate in development opportunities, and create their own businesses. If you were to bring the Inuvialuit people here you would find they're the most business-oriented, entrepreneurial aboriginal people you're likely to meet. They own businesses. They have revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars. This is why we vigorously pursue the settlement of claims, because the land, the money, and much more importantly, the governance gives those communities a much brighter possibility of greater self-reliance.
The issue of living standards is one we will get to in looking at those communities. I think there are all kinds of methodological issues about relative to whom and relative to what, because there are other people in the Northwest Territories doing very well off diamonds. As I said, $100-a-barrel oil is a new phenomenon, and so on, so I think you're going to have to bear with me that there have been great improvements in the lives of the Inuvialuit people. Relative to other first nations people and relative to other people in the NWT is kind of a hard thing to capture in a snapshot, but they have been provided, through the agreement, all kinds of tools for greater self-reliance and participation in the opportunities that are taking place in the north.
I have a couple of very brief comments I would make. One is in the interest of clarification. Mr. Lake asked a question in relation to the audit process. I just want members to understand that we have a very vigorous process in all of our performance audits, and it's not just the recommendations we get agreement on in the departments. We get agreement on all of the facts contained in the report. I just wanted to clarify that.
An interesting point that Mr. Wernick made throughout the testimony was that what the department appears to be doing now is trying to develop the tools that officials need in order to be able to properly implement all aspects of the agreement.
I think we'd all agree that it would have been a much better world if we'd had those tools in place 23 years ago, and I think if we're looking for lessons learned, perhaps when we enter into agreements we need to make sure officials have the tools they need. I think it was mentioned today--the need for evaluative tools, measurement tools, some contracting tools, and basic information on some of the economic development.
And finally, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Wernick talked about his action plan. We at the Office of the Auditor General would be happy to receive the plan and comment on it to the extent that it covers the recommendations we've made.
Thank you.
:
Thank you, Mr. Campbell.
Thank you, Mr. Wernick.
Thank you, others. We will be writing a report and tabling it with the government in the House of Commons in due course.
The committee has a couple of other motions we're going to deal with now, so you can leave if you wish. And again, I want to thank you very much for your appearance here today.
Colleagues, we have two motions. What I propose is to deal with them similarly. The first motion is by Mr. Poilievre. It's a very simple motion, actually: that the committee schedule a meeting with Ralph Goodale, Don Boudria, and Jean-Marc Bard in relation to its study of chapter 7 of the Auditor General's May 2006 report.
I'm going to give Mr. Poilievre two minutes to speak to his motion. I'll entertain up to six interventions of one minute each, and then I'll go back to Mr. Poilievre for his closing comments, and put the question.
I propose to deal with Mr. Wrzesnewskyj's motion in the very same manner.
I should point out, Mr. Poilievre, I'm sure you won't have any problem if we just eliminate Jean-Marc Bard. He is subject to a previous motion. That motion has been passed. A summons has been issued, and we have him scheduled for sometime in April. So that matter really is taken care of.
So we're dealing with Goodale and Boudria in the motion.
Is that okay with you, Mr. Poilievre?
:
I'll just talk about the reason I want to invite the three witnesses who are suggested in the motion. Jean-Marc Bard goes without saying. He was the chief of staff. That motion is now passed, so I won't address it at any further length.
Second, we have Boudria, and third, Mr. Goodale.
What we have here is that the first minister to be involved in this affair says that all of the mistakes were made after his tenure. The third minister who was involved in this affair says that all of the mistakes were made before his tenure. So that leaves the guy in between, who of course is Mr. Boudria.
[Translation]
Mr. Laforest mentioned to me that he wanted to hear from Mr. Boudria on this issue. That is why I added his name.
[English]
And finally, on the question of Mr. Goodale, I still have questions for him that I was not able to address to him at the last round of hearings. I don't expect we should need him for very long. But anyone who listened carefully to his words would agree that he made some fairly spectacular claims when he said that the Auditor General did not have the information necessary to conduct her study. There is absolutely no supporting evidence for that view anywhere in our documentation, nor during the testimony of Ms. Fraser or her staff. In fact, one of her staff members says exactly the opposite.
So one question I would have liked to ask him had the time not expired is what evidence he has to suggest that the Auditor General's office was information-deprived in reaching its conclusions. That's a question that's clearly not answered.
We don't often get witnesses who question the work of the Auditor General. We now have one, and I think it raises a whole series of other questions that need to be posed. And finally, it can't hurt. If he comes back, he might not have a lot more to offer, but we're talking about an hour of his time, and I think at the very least, it will be helpful.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
On a personal note, I've never been in favour of bringing in ministers, because they tend to change the dynamics of the committee.
Leaving that aside, because that's a personal issue, it's a longstanding policy of the public accounts committee. Mr. Goodale has already been before us for one hour. He reiterated what Janice Cochrane had said, that despite what we think, the government now sees this as two separate issues.
There was a contract with Bonaventure and a contract with Place Victoria. Nobody is going to admit they were the same, because they did this splitting of hairs right down the middle and treated it as two separate contracts. When you use that philosophy, there's nothing. You can't break down that logic, although I totally disagree with it.
Yes, you can answer a few more questions, but when I think about what we just dealt with here today, I could go on for a week lambasting what the government hasn't done in the last 25 years as far as Indian affairs is concerned and this first nation in the Yukon Territory.
We have other issues we need to deal with. I think we should be thinking about writing a report condemning what happened in Place Victoria and the way it transpired, and say we never want to see this again. But I'm not sure it's good value for time to bring in Mr. Goodale and Don Boudria. Jean-Marc Bard--I don't mind kicking him around; we kicked him around before, and he deserved it and needs it again. But the ministers, I'm reluctant.
I'm comfortable with Mr. Boudria, only because I think it makes eminent good sense. We've heard ministers bracketed on both sides. And this was the key time, so it would be to be consistent. I'm not convinced that we need to bring Mr. Goodale back. I realize that it's not a big deal to us, but it has an impact. We shouldn't do these things willy-nilly.
I understand the point Mr. Poilievre makes about wanting to find out what's behind that information, but all that's about is whether it was a $4.6 million loss or a $2.1 million loss, and I'm not all that interested, at this point, in which number is correct. They're both unacceptable.
If we're going to call anybody back, I would look at Drouin. For the longest time I thought there was something here, money-wise, that was not right. Something smelled. But now I'm beginning to wonder. If that's not the case, then the only other alternative is that this newly minted minister didn't like the digs he'd be going into in the new place and wanted to stay in the current place, because he talks about prestige and all that. And everybody else fell in line to take care of their friend. The government had been in power so long that they kind of got used to the idea that they ran everything.
So I would bring him back.
I'm going to vote against the motion, but I would say that if it loses—it may not—and there's another motion with Mr. Boudria in it, I would support that.