Good afternoon, committee.
This is meeting 13 of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, Tuesday, February 12, 2008.
Our orders of the day today include a briefing on the situation in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
As witnesses today we have senior officials from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. First of all, we welcome back Mr. Randolph Mank, director general, Asia South and Pacific bureau; and Jim Nickel, director of South Asia division.
In our second hour we will proceed with our committee business, but in this first hour we will hear from our officials on the briefing out of Pakistan. It seems like only a couple of weeks since we said hello. You're back again, and we appreciate it.
To the committee, because this was put together fairly quickly, there is no written text of what they're saying. They're here to give us just a verbal briefing.
We very much appreciate your coming on short notice, and the record will bear that short notice. We appreciate it, and we look forward to your remarks.
Mr. Chairman, honourable members, mesdames et messieurs
, I'd like to thank the committee for the opportunity to discuss the government's active role in working with the Government of Pakistan and other key international players to help Pakistan boost its security and return to democracy.
Pakistan is an ally in the global campaign against terrorism, and we seek and receive a high level of cooperation from the Government of Pakistan. Though Pakistan is of obvious relevance to our objectives in Afghanistan, I'll focus my presentation today on Pakistan itself.
Committee members will recall that on November 3 last year Minister Bernier issued a statement condemning the imposition of emergency rule in Pakistan at that time and urged the Government of Pakistan to cancel the state of emergency and the new provisional constitutional order. In our view, these measures were undermining democratic development, judicial independence, and the possibility of free and fair elections, to which the people of Pakistan are, of course, entitled.
The minister has called for the government to end the state of emergency and has urged it to respect the judicial process, to restore the powers of the judiciary, to abide by the principle of the rule of law and to allow free and fair parliamentary elections as scheduled. He has also asked all parties not to resort to violence and to respect human rights; he also stated that Canada expects the Government of Pakistan to continue its efforts to improve the security of the region.
Canada has played a pivotal role in the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, which, last November 12, issued a statement urging the Government of Pakistan to fulfill its obligations in accordance with Commonwealth principles through the implementation of the following measures:
- immediate repeal of the emergency provisions and full restoration of the Constitution and of the independence of the judiciary. This should also include full restoration of fundamental rights and the rule of law that have been curbed under the proclamation of emergency;
- President Musharraf to step down as Chief of Army Staff as promised;
- immediate release of political party leaders and activists, human rights activists, lawyers and journalists detained under the proclamation of emergency;
- immediate removal of all curbs on private media broadcasts and restrictions on the press;
- move rapidly towards the creation of conditions for the holding of free and fair elections in accordance with the Constitution.
As you know, Prime Minister Harper took part in the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Kampala at the end of November. With all the other heads of government, he approved the decision to suspend Pakistan from the Council of the Commonwealth. Canada played a key role in the discussions. He specifically pointed out that, while some progress had been made towards fulfilling the conditions imposed by the Commonwealth, Pakistan had not succeeded in meeting them all. In particular, the state of emergency had not been lifted and General Musharraf had not stepped down from his position as Chief of Army Staff, though he had promised to do so on several occasions.
Fortunately, some progress was made after that. We acknowledged that publicly, too. On December 15, 2007, the minister issued another statement, which welcomed President Musharraf's lifting of the state of emergency and his stepping down as chief of the army staff. However, the minister also encouraged the Government of Pakistan to create the conditions necessary for free and fair elections by clearly allowing electoral oversight by an independent judiciary, by releasing all persons detained during the state of emergency, and by lifting all restrictions on the media.
Then tragedy struck. Pakistani opposition leader Benazir Bhutto was assassinated at a political rally. Again, Canada urged the government and the people of Pakistan to continue to reject all forms of violence and to resist those who seek to destabilize their country. The elections were delayed by a month to their current timeframe.
We believe that it's important to maintain close engagement with Pakistan, given its importance as a pivotal country for regional security. While Canada has now rotated off the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group, after serving two consecutive terms, a Commonwealth mission will visit Pakistan following the February 18 parliamentary elections to assess the situation with regard to its readmittance to the councils of the Commonwealth.
The many high-level bilateral visits that have taken place lately, such as the visit of Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2007, the visit to Canada of the Speaker of the National Assembly of Pakistan and, more recently, the visit to Pakistan of Canada's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in January 2008, demonstrate that our bilateral relations with Pakistan are solid.
We continue to encourage the government and the people of Pakistan to remain on the path to restored democracy and specifically to hold parliamentary elections on February 18 in a transparent, peaceful, free and fair way.
Canada is committed to supporting a return to democracy in Pakistan, because we believe this is a key to security and development.
We're providing $1 million to a United Nations development program project to strengthen Pakistan's electoral processes and $1.5 million to the Free and Fair Election Network, involving over 30 non-government organizations spread throughout Pakistan.
As we do in other places, our high commission in Islamabad will also be unofficially observing the election, with officers travelling to key areas throughout the country on election day, provided of course that the security situation permits.
Given the fast-moving political developments in Pakistan, we continue to review our bilateral engagement to determine how best to influence a return to the path of democracy, while remaining mindful of our security interests in the region.
As a partner in the fight against terrorism, Canada continues to cooperate with Pakistan to address the cross-border movement of insurgents between Afghanistan and Pakistan. In particular, we acknowledge Pakistan's loss of about 800 soldiers in this fight. Canada urges the government of Pakistan to resist those who seek to destabilize their country. We are concerned that political instability in Pakistan is being exploited by Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other extremists who threaten Afghanistan, the international community, and Pakistan itself.
Canada strongly supports cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan and believes that positive relations are crucial for the long-term stability of the region. We're very supportive of the Pakistan–Afghanistan peace jirga process, recognizing that this must remain a process led by the parties involved.
We continue to support efforts to manage the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the provision of technical assistance.
We're also providing support to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime for work on border management and counter-narcotics and have increased our development assistance in the border regions.
In a rather unique initiative, Canada convened senior officials from Pakistan and Afghanistan from October 30 to November 1 in Dubai for a confidence- and capacity-building workshop to discuss bilateral cooperation on customs, immigration, law enforcement, counter-narcotics, and economic development of the tribal areas. It's not always easy to get these parties in the same room, but they seemed willing to work together. We're now preparing for five follow-up workshops to be held in the spring of 2008.
The goal of these workshops is to produce a Pakistan–Afghanistan-inspired action plan and list of capacity-building priorities. We see this as practical and important work that could have a positive effect down the road.
Canada's commitment to Pakistan, however, is not just limited to security interests. The record shows that Canada's engagement with Pakistan goes back many decades and has focused on a range of basic development needs, such as education, primary health care, governance, and gender equality. Our development assistance in 2007-2008 totals $43 million: $30 million in bilateral programs and $13 million for the ongoing response to the October 2005 earthquake.
The Canadian development assistance program has also been rapidly growing in recent years. CIDA programming has recently been expanded to include the Pakistan–Afghan border area in Baluchistan province and in the federally administered tribal areas of northwest Pakistan.
Canada also initiated the recent Pakistan–Canada debt conversion program, under which Pakistan's outstanding debt is converted into educational programming. This is Canada's largest debt-conversion initiative in the world, valued at about $450 million. Education is an area of obvious need, and we hope to make a difference with this support.
I'll conclude my remarks with that, since I know there will be many questions.
We are deeply aware that Canada's engagement with Pakistan is extremely important, as are our efforts to work with that country towards democratic development, particularly at this crucial time in its history.
Thank you very much for those questions. I'll take them as they came.
In regard to the reports of a ceasefire agreement between the Pakistani authorities and Mr. Mehsud, of course we've heard these reports. We don't have any way of confirming those independently.
Our message to the Government of Pakistan is always a consistent one: that they ought to be taking appropriate actions to put a stop to the violence in their own country, particularly in the tribal and federally administrated areas, and they ought to be doing whatever they can to control the flow of Taliban across that very important border, which is, of course, of tremendous importance to Canada at this particular time.
We haven't changed our messages to the authorities in any way in that regard. We'll wait for them to explain whether they are pursuing a ceasefire, and what that might mean in terms of their own efforts to achieve those two objectives that we insist they work towards achieving.
On the numbers of Taliban in Pakistan, I don't have those, I'm afraid. I don't have access to those numbers. We are, of course, concerned. The bottom line is that there are Taliban in Pakistan, and there is tremendous movement across that border with Afghanistan for historical tribal reasons related to the movement of the Pashtun population, which is enormous, as you know, and that is a matter of great concern. I think numbers would be very, very difficult to ascertain.
On national reconciliation within Afghanistan, I'm not going to really comment on issues related to Afghanistan, but of course our focus is on supporting the jirga process, which involves getting people together for a dialogue. To the extent that they want to initiate that, our belief is that we should be supportive wherever that kind of activity is going on.
On the question from Mr. Chan about the legal sector, I agree with you. We were very encouraged to see the independence of the judiciary, the way it had been developing last year; and then, of course, we're very concerned, equally, by the crackdown that was imposed upon that judiciary. The minister was on record as expressing Canada's concern in that regard.
What you're referring to, the imagery of the protests of the lawyers, and then repeated crackdowns on them, including the one that you saw recently, is something that concerns us equally. It's certainly not an image that gives anyone very much comfort around the world in watching Pakistan and hoping for national reconciliation and democratic development there. This is not a good sign. So our call has always been for respect for the judiciary, and for that matter, respect for peaceful protest.
It is difficult to bring lasting solutions to that area. In fact, the Pakistani government has little power to influence the development of the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The approach that Canada and our G8 allies have adopted, together with the governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan, is to deal with this very complex situation in various ways, choosing solutions that impact different aspects. For example, in economic development, those in the area face economic problems and extreme poverty. Here, our aim is to encourage greater cooperation between the Pakistani and the Afghan governments in helping the people who cross the border freely and whose families live on both sides.
We are also dealing with the problem of Afghan refugees who have been living in the area for 25, almost 30 years now. There are still 2.1 million refugees from Afghanistan in that border region today, on the Pakistan side. Then, of course, we cannot achieve security without dealing with the problem of drug trafficking, which is very serious in the area.
Working with the other members of the G8, and, of course, with the Pakistani and Afghan governments, Canada is trying to deal with at least four problems: economic development, the Afghan refugees who are still in Pakistan after 25 years, security, including the drug trade, and one more that I have not mentioned, border control. We foresee the border remaining wide open, but, with some investment made in the capabilities of Pakistani and Afghan guards, improvements could be made to border control, on both sides and with mutual cooperation.
Thank you, Mr. Mank and Mr. Nickel, for appearing in front of the committee.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister for his leadership in the Commonwealth and for the strong statements the Minister of Foreign Affairs has made in this regard.
I also want to compliment our mission in Pakistan. I have visited several times. They have good access, and they utilize that access to the best of their ability.
I just have a comment. Pakistan has up to 100,000 troops deployed on the border. And, sir, your estimate of 800 is an underestimate; I am told that there have been up to 4,000 casualities. They don't want to disclose all the casualities, because the people of Pakistan, naturally, don't want to see their soldiers dying in the war against terror.
I want you to understand the added pressure my colleague was talking about. What pressure can you add? It is time to work with people, and I think the DFAIT people are doing a great job of that. Certainly, on the pressure, the comments of the leader of the opposition about withdrawing from the United Nations mission in Afghanistan and about military intervention in Pakistan, a sovereign nuclear power.... As you said, sir, Pakistan is an ally in the global campaign against terrorism, which receives a high level of logistic and military assistance from the Government of Pakistan. These comments are foolish, foolhardy, and dangerous. This is not the type of pressure that's required in that country.
Having said that, we are also talking about the elections. General Kayani is the new chief of the army staff, and he recently made statements that there will be no military intervention. The military will be there only to assist the civilian authorities to keep law and order. I think that is a good sign. The politicians I spoke to over there are hoping for a free and fair election. The new chief of the army staff has indicated that there will be no intervention. They will also be getting transparent ballot boxes. They have representatives from all parties who will be deciding and counting the votes, instead of the elections commissioner announcing the results. They will be counted.
With all those things happening, this is a step forward. Once again, that is the outcome of continued diplomatic engagement and diplomatic pressure by Canada and the Commonwealth.
My question to you, sir, is whether there is anything else you are doing. The EU has observers in Pakistan. Is Canada going to be sending any observers? Or are we going to rely only on the deployment from the mission in Pakistan?
Is there a plan for settlement of the FATA? There is a plan. Is Canada considering any participation in that?
I think I will ask my next question after you answer these two.
Thank you to our guests for their presentations.
Many of us of course continue to be worried about the situation in Pakistan. In and of itself, just the situation within the borders of Pakistan is of concern—a nuclear power, with many, many expatriates here in Canada. I guess my concern, however, is not just confined to within of the borders of Pakistan but also to what has been alluded to as the Doppler effect, if you will, or the effect within the region of what's happened in Pakistan.
As a party, we have written to the minister. Back on November 6 I wrote to the minister asking for the following actions: to call on the Government of Pakistan for the restoration of constitutional rule and timely free and fair elections, unencumbered by the Pakistani military; to call for international observation of the elections; to offer Canada's experience in observing the elections; to empower Pakistani democrats and human rights activists in developing civilian leadership, free from military interests; and we called on the Commonwealth to suspend Pakistan's membership until such time as democracy has been restored. Some of those things were followed up on, I'm glad to say.
As for the idea that we can have elections there of the same standard as Canadian elections, I don't think anyone would assume those are going to happen. But you mention that there are going to be unofficial observations of the elections. I'd just like to know if we've provided additional resources to the consular services already in the area, and if so, how many resources have been afforded to our mission in Pakistan since the crackdown.
Secondly--this is related, but might seem like it's a little off topic--I'd like to know whether or not the whole issue of the pipeline presently proposed to go from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan to Pakistan and to India has come up. The reason I'm bringing this question up is that it's something we certainly haven't debated here, but it relates to energy security. I know it's going to be an issue that will be raised at the NATO meetings this spring. I think most Canadians are unaware that energy security has been an issue at NATO.
I'm just wondering if there's been any dialogue with our mission there about the security concerns regarding the proposed pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I see. I understand. Okay, thank you very much.
These concerns that you have about Pakistan as a nuclear power, as a country that faces enormous challenges to its own internal stability, and the fact that we have significant diaspora interests in the sense that we have many Pakistani Canadians in our country and we have other interests in the country and have long been connected to it suggest that it's a country we need to keep close contact with and keep a close eye on.
Your letter suggested things we should do. I'm very happy that we very much had a meeting of minds on most of those things. Those were things we felt we should do, and the minister went ahead and decided we should proceed to advocate on behalf of, for example, a Commonwealth action, which finally occurred. They remain suspended from the councils of the Commonwealth.
As I said in my remarks, we've also been actually contributing funds to support the electoral process. We very much want to see a return to democracy, and that's exactly what we're working towards, as well as making contributions, as appropriate, to the security situation, the security of the border.
You asked whether additional resources have been made available for consular purposes at the mission. I don't think so in the sense of new staff being deployed there, but we have looked very closely at the consular situation. We have sent a small team out to do the normal kind of contingency planning we do at all our missions around the world, to make sure everything's in order in the event that we need to exercise our planning.
On the pipeline issue, of course, we're aware of the dialogue on this, but we're not involved in it. We're waiting to see how that develops. Energy security is obviously an important subject for all of those countries of the region and for just about every country in the world these days. It will be an important part of the economic futures of these countries in the region.
Again, the question of the number of soldiers who are deployed in Pakistan to deal with the instability in the tribal regions is up for debate. The Pakistani authorities are the best sources of accurate numbers in that regard, and I don't want to guess or second-guess what the ambassador, the High Commissioner for Pakistan, has said about that.
We are working within our alliance, obviously within the Commonwealth, as I detailed in my remarks, to bring pressure to bear on Pakistan. There is no stone left unturned, as far as we're concerned, in trying to encourage them to get back to a path to democracy, whether bilaterally, regionally with our allies, or multilaterally through the UN.
What the neighbours are doing, of course, factors into Pakistan's situation itself, and we're encouraging everyone to stick to their own knitting and allow a country like Pakistan to deal with the challenges it faces with its own security and cooperation with those who want to help it in a positive sense, and that includes Canada.
On the question of the role of the ISI, as you put it, to stop supporting the insurgency, and how to get the ISI to accept democracy—
Speaking on the amendment, as I was stating before we broke, the purpose of my original motion was to talk about food delivery in Canada and its effectiveness in Canada. The proposed amendment talks about something else outside, by itself. We are now expanding the scope by bringing outside countries and developing countries into it. It takes away from the whole study on what Canada was going to do. I don't have it, in principle...another motion put forward by the Bloc somewhere down the line to study what that would achieve, which would be a different study.
From my perspective, to combine it within the context of what we would call a Canadian study would muddy the waters. I have no idea about the direction and which witnesses we would call. Would it require us to make an overseas trip to see whether the productive capacity of developing countries is there? We would have to see the structure and what is happening there. So what you have here are two totally different aspects of the study, hence our reluctance to agree to this amendment.
Based on my past experience with these things, I can talk about the developing capacities of these countries. Before I talk about that, I want to add a comment on what my colleague from the Liberal Party was saying about Pakistan. The productive capacity of developing countries would apply to Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Due to the war conditions and the insecurity that exists there, the local productive capacity of those countries has suffered seriously.
Let's talk for a minute about the poppy-growing issue in Afghanistan. The farming capacity of Afghanistan--agriculture--through all these years of war has collapsed. It has made room for this development of poppies, which one can very clearly say has damaged the agricultural capacity of Afghanistan. In that context, I was a little surprised that the Bloc refused to accept an amendment to discuss the security situation in Pakistan. That security situation in Pakistan also has a developing impact, a farming impact on that country, which is part of this thing here.
Frankly, because it came as a proposal from the Conservative Party, those in the Bloc don't want to support it, which goes to show the nature of partisan politics that exists in this committee. Even if you propose a common-sense motion, you are going to get opposition just for the sake of it. There was no reason.
After opposing it, they didn't realize they had made a blunder of it. Henceforth, the Liberals came along proposing to have an all-party committee meeting. My friend on the other side is the vice-chair of the Canada-Pakistani friendship group. He could have easily gone to his own group over there and asked the department to come to do something, but we were doing this portion here in the independent committee of the House of Commons, where we can decide what to do.
I'm still puzzled as to why the Bloc said no to a very good, common-sense.... We called the people from the department. It's all about local capacity.
Mr. Chair, the issue is quite serious. We want to discuss delivery of Canadian food aid. We want to hear from Canadian players. We want to hear about this thing. But when you start muddling this with capacity-building of developing nations.... It's a very wide subject.
Let's talk for a second about the capacity of developing nations and why the scope of that study would be very different from what I propose, and why the motion that Madame Barbot proposed would change the essence of what I'm trying to do.
Under the proposal that Madame..... She may have picked it up from the food convention, and that's fine, but I am more interested in the study that I put forward about how Canada's food aid program is effective and what it's doing to Canadian players.
When we talk about developing capacity, we can talk about many things. Every developing country is different. There is no cohesiveness over there. I said in my last speech that we had people here from Kenya, who talked about climate change and the impact it was having on the collapse of the Kenyan agricultural system.
When I was in Nairobi the grass that feeds the cattle industry and on which the milk production is based was contaminated. Canada had to help them because the milk production in that country had started falling down, which was impacting the poor people of that region. This is the kind of capacity-building you're talking about. I'm only talking of country number one, which is Kenya at this stage.
Let's talk about capacity number two, in Tanzania. When the Ujama program took place, and when the Government of Tanzania moved over a million people into collective villages, the whole delivery system of that country collapsed. The whole agricultural delivery system collapsed, and they had to start importing food. One can do the study and ask what happened in Tanzania and why the productive capacity of that developing nation has fallen down.
As a matter of fact, let's talk about Zimbabwe--the gentleman's favourite country, which he likes to talk about--and how the--
An hon. member: How long is he going to be allowed to talk?
Mr. Deepak Obhrai: You refuse to worry about Canada, because you're not following my motion. Let's talk about Canada. Let's talk about Quebec. Let's talk about what is happening. That's fine. Just leave my motion exactly where it is and don't go to the other countries.
But you want to go to the other countries. Let's talk about what has happened in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe the dictatorship of Mugabe and the moving of the white farmers has resulted in a total failure of the production of food grain in that country. So what happens? What is the food production capacity that we are going to talk about in these countries? This is only in Zimbabwe.
Now, for this present moment South Africa has a good agricultural policy. It is one of the driving economic forces. And in the developing countries, as Gerald Schmitz, who's written a very good book on international development says, agriculture is the prime economic engine of growth of those nations. Is it not? Therefore, capacity-building is critically important. That is why CIDA gives food aid, to assist.
I can give you a very good example. When I was growing up in Tanzania, Canadians came and said we are going to teach you how to grow wheat. They came in with their food aid program. They brought in large trucks. They had vast fields of maize plantation turned into wheat plantation, and it was considered to be the top disaster in the world for food aid programs into another country. Why? Because it didn't have the local capacity.
What I'm saying here is that every country has a problem, not only one country. We can't lump them together and ask, which developing country do we want to pick? Do we want to pick Egypt? Which country to we want?
Today they are fighting in Chad. Many of the experts who have come back talking about Darfur are also saying that Darfur is about land reform; it is about the capacity to grow food over there. That is one of the other major wars going on. Now that has spread into Chad. I just came from Mali, and the same thing. So which country are we going to talk about on this productive capacity of developing countries?
When I'm finished, my colleague will speak on Haiti. He did a thorough report on Haiti. You know what happened in Haiti.
An hon. member: The committee did the report.
Mr. Deepak Obhrai: Well, yes, you're right. The committee did the report. I'll give you that. The committee did the report, and the report talked about deforestation and agriculture, lost capacity in Haiti, which was, by itself, a big report.
We can do a report on Zimbabwe. We can do a report on all these countries. How in hell's name can you fix it in here? That's what I want to know. So in that capacity, I am asking that this amendment be removed.
I haven't even talked about Latin America, so let's go to Latin America. When I moved it, I just said Africa. So what about capacity-building in Latin America?
I've just been through five countries.
Mr. Chair, I have to agree with my colleague and emphasize that this amendment diametrically changes the original motion. I'll cite a couple of examples to illustrate this.
If we look at the issue of Haiti, what we're going to be determining there is its local productive capacity. Or if we look at the situation in several other countries—it might be Guyana too—what is the local productive capacity there? Without analyzing Guyana and understanding the necessity of it having dike systems and dams in order to have any productive capacity.... In other words, it's a multiple-layered analysis that would have to be done on each and every situation. In Guyana, it's like Holland, in that they've created their productive capacity by damming and diking the oceans. And if you look at Haiti, what is their productive capacity with all the erosion they've had in Haiti? Something has to be done on reforestation. The erosion is what's holding the productive capacity back.
Each and every country may have different elements to it. If we try to analyze what Canada's aid-giving capacity is for each country and get bogged down trying to analyze what each and every aid-receiving country has as its own inherent capabilities for producing foodstuffs on its own, we're going to be talking about two entirely different initiatives. I'm very much afraid the amendment that's being proposed to the motion would in effect make a very ineffectual study from the initial motion.
With that in mind, without going into all of the different countries, the 180 different countries, there are certainly enough examples to go by to see that each country, each area, has its own variables that would have to be examined. Those variables may be, as I said, from diking to damming to erosion, and they may also be irrigation requirements, or even salination plants in order to be able to have any water to be able to have any production.
So if we try to include that amendment, the complexity of any resulting study would be so vast as to be virtually ineffective.
I really appreciate the comments of Mr. Goldring. If you had spoken before your colleagues, we would have saved a good 20 minutes. Just to let you know, I really appreciate your comments.
But for me, the issue is the main motion itself. It proposes that we do a study investigating the effectiveness and quality of Canada's food aid policy, but we don't even know what we're talking about. Is it just when there is an emergency? Is it food aid quality or effectiveness? Let's say there is an earthquake or a tsunami like we had in Asia, or anything else like that. What are we talking about?
If it's just about those, we need to call CIDA officials to tell us how they're doing those things, and you will get the answer. I know the answer, because they have appeared before our committee before. Is it just about giving money to the WFP, or international food aid, or about what we are giving to the Red Cross? How do we proceed?
Before doing a study, first of all, I would like the department to come here to explain in one hour what they're doing; and after that, we will see if we want to have a study, yes or no. It's as simple as that. But now we're just talking and passing the time. We have another six minutes.
Those are all my comments—but I don't understand the main motion.