Thank you, everybody, for being here this morning, at this hour.
Honourable members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss an important matter: the administration of the industrial and regional benefits policy managed by my department, Industry Canada.
I’m here today with Richard Dicerni, my deputy minister, on my right, and with Tom Wright, on my left, assistant deputy minister at Industry Canada.
Canada's new government, as you know, is committed to rebuilding our nation's place in the international community. That pledge includes meeting commitments made to our international partners, like NATO, thus making appropriate defence procurements to upgrade aged equipment.
Whether here, at home, or around the globe, the women and men of our Canadian Forces demonstrate their commitment to protecting Canada, its people, and our nation's interests. Through our announced military procurements, this government is demonstrating its commitment to our brave and dedicated soldiers.
[Translation]
First and foremost, ladies and gentlemen, we want to ensure that our personnel have the right transport to move them, and their equipment, to wherever they need to be, when they need to be there. Whether that's here in Canada or abroad.
As you are well aware, we need equipment to move the Canadian military around the world, as well as for rescue missions or disaster relief here in Canada.
[English]
Canada's new government is also committed to fostering a strong, competitive economy that benefits all Canadians. To achieve this goal, I firmly believe in the direction our government is taking to create an environment that encourages and rewards people who work hard, that stimulates innovation, and promotes Canadian industry.
We are strengthening the Canadian economy, giving Canada's industry the chance to participate in shaping future technologies and providing new, high-quality opportunities. Our commitment to a sustainable aerospace and defence sector and strong Canadian economy guides our approach to the administration of the industrial and regional benefits policy.
Ensuring that benefits to Canadian industry come from military procurements has been informally pursued since the 1970s and became formal government policy 20 years ago. The purpose of that policy is to make sure that no matter what company is selected to provide equipment our hard-working troops require, Canadian industry benefits as well. This is often referred to as industrial participation, or offsets, a practice utilized by many governments around the globe.
Our policy can attract quality high-technology work with lasting economic value for the Canadian economy, and that is why I’m here before you today. As you know, our aerospace sector ranks fifth in the world in terms of sales. I saw firsthand our people working in this industry at the Farnborough International Air Show in London last summer, and I can assure you that Canadian companies are global leaders, able to compete with anyone. This sector makes a huge contribution to Canada's economy, accounting for about $9.2 billion--yes, $9.2 billion--of our total gross domestic product.
I have had the opportunity to read some of the testimony your committee has already heard. As you have been told, whenever the federal government undertakes significant defence procurements, three departments are involved. The Department of National Defence determines what requirements the equipment must meet; Public Works and Government Services Canada is responsible for the procurement and contracting process; and Industry Canada, my department, develops an industrial benefits approach that looks to ensure there are real, high-quality, strategic benefits for Canadian industry.
[Translation]
As you know, on February 2, 2007, the government announced the purchase of four C-17 Globemaster III aircraft for a total acquisition cost of $1.8 billion.
The cost includes infrastructure built at National Defence, and the administration of the program done by the Government of Canada.
Infrastructure upgrades, training and administration by the government are direct investments into our economy, with no industrial benefit requirements.
Nonetheless, for the capital acquisition of the equipment, the Canadian industrial benefits will exceed $1 billion. Once the aircraft have been purchased, the government must also contract for their in-service support, or maintenance.
On this front, a contract has been signed with the U.S. Air Force for $1.6 billion. This contract is in two parts, the first, services performed by the U.S. Air Force do not qualify under the industrial benefits policy as the U.S. AF does not meet requirements that are in place for foreign companies.
The second part, approximately $900 million, will be subcontracted to the Boeing corporation. Boeing does meet the requirements of under the industrial benefits policy, thus we see a dollar-for-dollar return on investment.
These are the same types of benefits we will see from the acquisition of the aircraft, and will be spread over 20 years.
The suppliers that win the contracts with Boeing will be in a position to announce the contracts as they are received over the coming weeks and months.
Other procurements have taken two to three years to develop, but I am pleased to say that we have been able to develop the strategic airlift procurement in matter of months, and have secured approximately $1.9 billion in Canadian benefits on the acquisition and the in-service support.
[English]
As the members of the committee know, we have also announced acquisitions of helicopters, ships, trucks, and tactical airlift. Each acquisition will also bring significant benefits to Canadian industry.
[Translation]
Under the industrial benefits policy, every dollar companies receive from the defence procurement is matched by a dollar of economic activity in this country. That is a 100% return on investment within the contract duration. That is a dollar-for-dollar investment in Canada. And that is not negotiable.
What's more, we require companies that obtain these contracts are not only investing in Canada, but are investing in advanced technology in long-lasting and meaningful ways. The goal is to help Canadian companies become or continue as part of the global supply chains that are so important to this industry.
[English]
This means Canada's industry benefits from our procurements regardless of where the successful contractor is located.
In addition, benefit transactions must meet three criteria to be deemed acceptable to Industry Canada. First, the work must be causal; it should be brought about because of this procurement. The work must occur within the time period stated in the contract. The work must meet the incremental principle, which states that existing business relationships can be used but only the new work will count toward the obligation.
Moreover, for the C-17, we are stating that 50% of the benefit spinoffs will be in the aerospace and defence sectors, with at least 30% targeted into key technologies. The key technologies are as follows: advanced manufacturing and emerging materials, avionics and missions systems, communications and control, propulsion and power management, security and protection, sensors, simulation, training and synthetic environment, space, and unmanned vehicle systems.
We also require that 15% of Boeing's benefits contracts be with small and medium-sized businesses. As you know, small and medium businesses are vital to the growth and sustainability of the aerospace and defence sectors, and in general, small and medium-sized businesses are primary drivers of our economy as a whole.
[Translation]
The ultimate goal of the industrial benefits policy is to allow Canada's aerospace and defence companies the opportunity to demonstrate their ability and form long-lasting, sustainable business relationships with companies in other countries.
Our policy increases Canadian industrial competitiveness, marketing and market access, and investment in high technology sectors. While we encourage contractors to undertake partnerships that make real business sense, we work with the aerospace industry to make the best of the opportunities in this field, and we will continue to do so.
In fact, we have been working to improve the benefits process, making it more smoothly integrated into procurements overall and focusing on real strategic benefits for our industry.
[English]
For example, for the first time, the Aerospace Industries Association of Canada and the Canadian Association of Defence and Security Industries have collaborated with the government to develop the list of nine key technologies that I was referring to earlier. These are technologies that the industry sees as vital to its future development.
In addition, we work closely with the regional development agencies--the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, Western Economic Diversification, and the Economic Development Agency of Canada for the Regions of Quebec--to identify Canadian companies that might be interested in the opportunities available right now.
We also work directly with Canadian companies to highlight the opportunities that are available, that meet their unique abilities, and work with contractors to emphasize the importance of cross-Canada involvement. We work diligently to make sure international companies are aware of our forces and our strength here in Canada and are aware that we are proud of Canadian industry.
[Translation]
Canadian benefits are serious contractual obligations, and Industry Canada requires annual audits and performance guarantees.
Each year, contractors must report on what they have achieved when it comes to Canadian benefits. There can even be financial consequences for non-performance.
Industry officials continue to work with Boeing to help identify the partnerships that make good business sense for Boeing, meet the key technologies list, and provide real opportunities for our industry.
[English]
Our approach to industrial benefits is very much in keeping with the government's overall approach. Over the past year, our new government has taken significant steps to improve Canada's economy. Early in our mandate we presented budget 2006, which contained measures aimed at improving our quality of life by building a strong economy that is equipped to lead in the 21st century. These measures focused on making Canada's tax system more competitive and attractive to international investment and outlined our commitments to reduce regulation on businesses, such as the paper burden, and support science and technology in Canada.
[Translation]
Last fall, we presented a long-term economic plan in Advantage Canada: Building a Strong Economy for Canadians focusing on five Canadian advantages that will give incentives for people and businesses to excel and to make Canada a world leader.
We will continue our focus to draw maximum benefit for the Canadian economy through the Canada First defence procurement.
And we will continue our work with the aerospace and defence industry in order to capitalize on the opportunities that are presented.
[English]
Thank you very much.
[Translation]
Thank you very much.
[English]
My officials and I are available for your questions.
:
Thank you very much and you're forgiven.
I'll give you some background because your comments and questions raise other related questions. Last July 5th we posted an advanced contract award notice on the Internet; you're absolutely right. That was done transparently. Then, on July 16th and 19th last, I met with Boeing and Canadian companies in Farnborough. In August, in the wake of January's announcement of the Boeing contract, my colleague, Michael Fortier, the Minister for Public Works and Government Services Canada, closed the call for tenders.
I'd like to put this in perspective. Before meeting with you, I read the various party platforms on defence. I was shocked to see that the Bloc Québécois platform paid very little attention to defence. Investing in the armed forces so that they have modern and cutting-edge technology is not one of their priorities. I think it's a little strange that my colleague from the Bloc Québécois is happy with announcements for the military and for economic benefits for Canada.
The government's main role is to acquire equipment for the armed forces. The previous Liberal government neglected the armed forces for about 12 years. I read the campaign speeches and platforms of my Liberal colleagues who were promoting the Canadian Forces. In reality, no investments were made in that sector over the past 12 years.
Therefore, the main purpose of this exercise is to provide equipment to the Canadian Forces at the best price possible. We also have an industrial and regional development policy, like all countries in the world. Under that policy, we must ensure that for every contract dollar awarded to a foreign company, Canada gets one dollar in economic benefits. By "economic benefits", I mean real benefits flowing from technology transfers. Multinational companies such as Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Airbus are used to this because all developed countries have similar industrial benefit policies.
As the Minister of Industry, my role is to make sure, along with the senior public service and the Department of Industry, that these companies comply with our industrial development policy by obtaining benefits for the Canadian aerospace industry.
I am the member for Beauce and the Minister of Industry. I am grateful to the Prime Minister for his trust in me and for giving me the privilege of serving as Minister of Industry. In that capacity, I must serve the general interest, Canadian interests. I decided to go into politics not to partake in patronage or to decide which private company we were going to do business with, but rather to ensure that Canadian laws and policies are applied.
I am very proud, as I announced last January, that Boeing does follow our policy. I would even say to this committee that the contract that the Government of Canada negotiated with Boeing provides for significant financial penalties in the event that the company does not meet its commitment to provide high-quality industrial benefits to Canada.
Boeing has signed contracts with the Government of Canada in the past. Those contracts included provisions for industrial economic benefits and the company fulfilled that obligation. I am confident that Boeing will comply with its contractual obligation.
:
Thank you. Your question gives me an opportunity to specify what my role is, as you requested, and to clarify some percentages. Our Bloc Québécois colleague mentioned 60% and 40%. I would like to clarify that. The 100% policy applies to foreign manufacturers. When a contract of that kind is signed, 100% of the money you receive over the course of that contract must be reinvested in Canada in the form of industrial benefits.
In my opening statement, I quoted percentages, including 50%, 30% and 15%. I would like to explain what they mean. Fifty percent is the minimum economic benefits for the aerospace and defence sector. Thirty percent is the minimum in economic benefits for key technologies as I pointed out in my opening statement. Nine-key technology areas were identified, for the first time, through analyses undertaken with the aerospace industry. Officials from my department met with aerospace industry officials in order to determine what the key technologies of the future would be in the aerospace and defence sector, technologies that were the most important for the development of that sector. Together, they drew up a list of nine-key technologies. Thus, 30% of the contracts must be in those key technology sectors and 15% must go to small- and medium-sized businesses. It's important to understand that these are not exclusive percentages.Therefore, a contract between Boeing and a company might fall under the 50% category because it's in the aerospace and defence sector. It might also fall under the 30% category because it deals with a key technology and finally, it might fall under the 15% category because it's with a small business. The percentage categories are not mutually exclusive.
That said, it's important to understand something about the 60%, that we talked about during our press conference with Boeing. Before the contract was signed, 60%—that is, $577 million—of an $869 million contract was identified in industrial benefits for Canada, that meet the criteria. As I stated during the press conference, and as I am repeating it now, Boeing will be announcing those contracts over the next few months.
I'd like to take the opportunity to clarify some figures. We announced the acquisition of four C-17 aircraft, totalling $3.4 billion. How is that $3.4 billion spread around? An amount of $1,8 billion goes to aircraft acquisition, including $869 million for the purchase of the Boeing aircraft. There will be $869 million in economic benefits—one dollar for every dollar—because the purchase involves a foreign manufacturer.
Also $660 million will go to National Defence infrastructure development and to various projects National Defence manages. This involves items such as the construction of hangars for the airplanes. That money is spent directly in Canada, and therefore the policy does not apply.
The third part of this $1.8 billion is $271 million that will go to the purchase, from the American armed forces, of equipment to support these aircraft. As you know, the policy does not apply to the $271 million because this is a government-to-government purchase. The policy only applies if the purchase is from a foreign manufacturer. One portion of that $271 million will go to engines. Under this contract, the American armed forces will work with Pratt & Whitney to make sure that the aircraft have the necessary engines. The dollar-for-dollar policy applies to that portion. There will therefore be 100% in economic benefits for the acquisition of aircraft and engines and we will be receiving more than $1 billion in benefits.
Furthermore, the overall amount of $3.4 billion includes another $1.6 billion. That will be spent on services from the Canadian armed forces to pilot training. Out of that $1.6 billion, $900 million will go to Boeing in its contracts with the American armed forces for aircraft maintenance. Our policy applies to that $900 million.
That is why I can tell you that the $3.4 billion contract for the four C-17 aircraft will result in a minimum of $1.9 million in economic benefits, as well as $660 million in direct purchases in Canada. I think it's important to give you that context and I thank you for giving me an opportunity to do so through your question.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would not say that it is deplorable. However, I do feel that we need to have a significant debate on ministerial accountability here this morning. The minister is before us. As we speak, he is the one who is responsible for some $20 billion from Canadian taxpayers who will watch TV this evening and observe that we are talking about $20 billion. The people are saying this is about $20 billion, but I am saying that that is more like $20,000 million.
Today we are questioning the minister. His plan of attack is not insignificant. We can see that he is well prepared. If the Bloc Québécois asks a question that goes a bit too far, he replies that what we did was not in our program. Furthermore, the minister talks about history: the Liberals are criticized for things that were said when some of them were ministers.
Nevertheless, that does not resolve the issue that is currently before us. I am asking the minister to assume his ministerial responsibilities and defend the figures that have been submitted to us.
I do not want to relate the history of the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, and be asked whether or not my father went to Holland to defend the country, so that I have to answer that, yes, indeed, he did go because that is not the issue. Today we need to concentrate on the issue before us.
I am simply asking the minister to focus on this matter. I have two questions for him. After that, he could take the rest of the time to answer.
First of all, you talked about obligations with serious penalties. Minister, don't you think that Boeing couldn't care less?
By the way—I don't know if you know this—as far as the Sikorsky marine helicopter is concerned, you've just been told that delivery will be delayed, that the penalties amount to $100,000 per day and, believe it or not, your government responded by saying that this was not serious, and that the penalties would not be applied. So don't tell us that there are obligations with penalties, because the Sikorsky example is not a good one.
Secondly, with respect to the Chinook helicopter, there is still $4.7 billion to come; $4.9 billion for Lockheed Martin; $3 billion for the search and rescue aircraft. Will you change your approach, assume your responsibilities and tell these companies that you are the one signing the cheque? Will you ensure that the regional and industrial benefits match the size of the sector and inform these companies that 60% of the economic benefits must go to Quebec? If you do that, you will look like a hero in Quebec, Minister. That may work out very well for you politically. Now, because of the law of the jungle and the laisser-faire approach, the people are a bit upset when they see how Quebec is being treated when it comes to the division of these contracts.
Do you intend to continue in the same direction? It is not too late for you. Perhaps $3.4 billion have already slipped through, but another $10 billion at least, or maybe even $12 billion, is coming. It is not too late to change the way things are going. I would like to hear what you have to say on the matter.
Chris led an hour ago, so I'll take my turn. I hope we can both stick to 10 to 15 minutes, and then we'll have some time for questions. I will be brief.
[Translation]
Let me thank you, at the outset, for inviting us. It's a real pleasure to meet with you. This is my first experience here. I hope that, in 45 minutes, we will be able to talk to you a bit about an issue that has become the number one priority for NATO.
Five years ago, all of the material I had in my office pertained to the Balkans. Suddenly, we started to receive, every morning, information about Afghanistan and South Asia. Things changed a great deal. Every morning, the North Atlantic Council receives a page indicating all the progress achieved in terms of development and reconstruction.
This is something completely new for NATO. We are becoming extremely interested in everything that touches on reconstruction and development. We acknowledge that, without security, there can be no development and that, without long-term development, there will be no security. These are the two sides of the same coin. At NATO, we have a completely new integrated approach.
[English]
I think there are in essence three questions we have to ask ourselves about this mission. First, is it still in Canada's national interest, and in the national interest of the 37 countries, to be carrying out this mission and to carry it out over the long term?
As I just mentioned, I went back and looked at who was in Afghanistan in 2001, keeping in mind that this was basically five years ago--in other words, in a political sense, yesterday. In 2001, Afghanistan was a sanctuary for extremist groups from almost 24 countries, all training in well-manned, well-funded terrorist camps. Al-Qaeda had 3,000 fighters, of course, from at least 13 Arab countries. The Taliban also hosted Islamic extremist groups from Russia, Pakistan, China, Burma, Iran, Central Asia, and several countries of the Far East, all of whom fought for the Taliban while carrying out operations in their own countries. These are the same people who want to take over again.
So I think we need to be clear that with 20/20 hindsight, our national interest in being there, as Canada and as an international organization--in fact there are two international organizations--is absolutely key. Afghanistan was and can become again the Grand Central Station of terrorism, with extremists coming in and leaving better trained and better funded.
The second point is--and I think this is the question that is asked certainly in many of our countries--is it winnable, and are we winning? That is the question I get from journalists from at least the 37 troop-contributing nations. If you watch the daily news you might wonder, because the press corps certainly does not want to cover, will not cover, except in the most extreme circumstances, the positive developments. I sat down personally with the press corps in Kandahar and Kabul twice in the last three months to ask them what I have to do to get them to cover the building of a school or a road. They are very clear: they will not do it. They will do it if the school burns down. I've been told this in private meetings. That's the way it is. It is very hard to get the press--and I say this with due respect to my press colleagues--to write the positive stories, so it's a challenge.
The positive story is there. I will let Chris, who of course leads this effort in Afghanistan on the reconstruction and development side, to speak for it, but let me say this. There are now 17,000 reconstruction and development projects under way in Afghanistan, according to our NATO statistics, of which 1,000 are being carried out directly by the NATO provincial reconstruction teams. Chris will give you much more detail on the other development indicators.
What I can say is that on the security front, the Afghan National Army has grown in the last five years from zero to about 30,000 soldiers. We are aiming for 70,000. They are deployed and fighting all over the country. NATO countries have donated to them tens of thousands of small arms, millions of rounds, 110 armoured personnel carriers, a dozen helicopters. We have operational mentoring and liaison teams embedded in the Afghan National Army. It is an institution that is really just going through its birth pangs. It has difficulties in terms of pay, difficulties in terms of retention, difficulties in terms of recruitment, but we are making progress in all of these areas. It is our exit strategy, as an international community, to help the Afghan national security forces to be able to fight their own fight, and then we can step back and play a more supporting role.
The Afghan National Police is an institution that needs more work. I think they're maybe a step behind the Afghan National Army. The EU has committed to step up its support for them, but this will be a very long-term effort, and we can discuss that in more detail if you want.
The second question--I think the committee is particularly interested in this one--is do we have enough forces, and are the other allies pulling their weight? This is a political issue, I know. NATO's answer to this one is quite clear: we're not quite there in terms of the forces we would like to have in Afghanistan.
Now, you will rarely hear a satisfied NATO official when it comes to force levels. With more we can always do better. But in general, yes, we have what we need. A little bit more can be added, but in general, yes. And yes, the other allies are in general pulling their weight, taking into account the real political considerations in all of their countries.
Since the Riga summit three months ago, we have added about 7,000 troops to the force levels. Most of these are Compact troops. The U.S., of course, is the principal contributor, with the 10th Mountain Division and the 173rd Airborne. The U.K., as you know, has just announced an increase of 1,500 on top of the 500 or so that they had announced earlier.
These are the big-ticket items, but there are also Norwegian special forces, and special forces from other countries who have not made it public. The Danes are looking to increase their contribution, and the Australians are looking to double their contribution with 500 regular forces and 250 special forces, with transport. The German Bundestag is likely to approve the deployment of six Tornados, with about 500 associated troops for reconnaissance purposes, and more UAVs, more C-130s, etc.
In the south, an area particularly relevant to Canada, the number of troops has gone up in the past 18 months from 1,000 to about 12,500. In a year and a half, there has been a 12-times increase in what we have from eight or nine countries, all working together and supporting each other across the zone. So the idea that Canada is in the south alone is simply wrong. The idea that other countries are not contributing or increasing their contribution does not reflect the reality of the 12-times increase in the number of troops in the south, of which, yes, 2,500 are Canadian, but the rest come from other countries.
I might also add that Canada is not bearing the burden alone when it comes to casualities. The Secretary General expressed his condolences just last week to the Spanish, who have lost over 20, and to the U.K., who have lost far more than that; they lost two more last week. Over a dozen NATO countries have lost troops in significant numbers. I can tell you that we have a flag down in front of NATO headquarters on a regular basis.
I would just point out that these sacrifices are being made by everybody, in all zones--in the north, in the west, in the capital, in the east, and in the south. The U.S., of course, has lost far more than everybody else. I think they are up at about 350.
We are also making progress in removing what we call caveats, the geographic restriction on the deployment of forces. I can tell you that Minister O'Connor and General Hillier have been forceful advocates in private NATO meetings. The result was that at Riga there was a commitment from all 26 countries that in extreme situations, in emergency situations, troops can go anywhere in support of any other NATO ally. Just two weeks ago, French Mirage fighters, which deployed and fired in close air support for Canadian troops, killed a lot of insurgents who were threatening our soldiers. So it has happened, they do it, and it is a good thing. We have made progress in that regard.
I have two more points and then I'll finish.
Where do we need to make improvements? Chris will go into more detail on this, I believe, but I'll mention governance, and stemming the support that is coming across the border from Pakistan. We have to work with the Pakistanis. They have to be part of the solution to this. NATO is doing that through the Trilateral Commission, but of course continued high-level political attention needs to be paid to this issue.
Narcotics are obviously a cancer fuelling the Taliban insurgency. Like any mafia, they are taking their cut and using it. So it is of direct security interest to us that we address this issue. It is not impossible to do. In the 1970s Pakistan was the biggest producer of narcotics, of opium, in the world; 70% came from there. They were producing 900 tonnes a year. By 1997 Pakistan was producing 24 tonnes, and by 1999, two tonnes. That's right next door. As with Thailand, as with Turkey, this can be tackled, and I think we should look at it.
By the way, this is what the Afghan government wants. They want this problem removed from their country--because it fuels corruption, because it fuels the Taliban--and we want to support that.
Finally, let me give you some poll numbers, because there is an idea out in some of the press that the Afghans will reject foreign forces as they have always done in the past, or that they like the Taliban.
There are three major polls that have been conducted in Afghanistan in the past few years--Altai Consulting, Asia Foundation, and the BBC. Seventy-five per cent of Afghans, if you average them out, strongly support the presence of foreign forces. That's five years later, after all of these attacks. Second, 80% support their elected government, and 3%, which is basically a rounding error, want the Taliban back. That's today. These are strongly encouraging numbers. We are getting traction. We are supporting the Afghan people in their struggle, and it is working with all of the great challenges we face. I think it's an encouraging story.
Chris.
:
Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for inviting us here today.
I would also like to thank you for the serious attention that you have paid to the Afghanistan file. The time was right and also crucial for the plight of this country. Following a quarter century of conflicts, Afghanistan is going through a transition and is facing a more promising future, one that is more likely to evolve under the banner of peace and stability.
[English]
As a Canadian who is working in the United Nations and has worked in Afghanistan now for three and a half years, it is a particular pleasure to appear before you with my colleague from NATO, James Appathurai.
Afghanistan is not only a test of wills for the Afghan people and a test of their courage to stand up against the phantoms of the past, represented by the Taliban and other terrorist groups. It's also a test of the ability of the international community to come together, through its national institutions and international organizations, behind a common project of nation-building that deserves the attention it is receiving but is not as well understood as it should be in all the quarters where it should be.
Our challenge is to help you carry the message of what is actually happening in Afghanistan today to the Canadian people and the broader community. There are achievements, and I'd like to signal some of them, but there is still a conflict. I would like to describe that conflict and outline some of the major challenges to which James has already referred.
I'd like to begin by paying tribute to all of my colleagues in the Afghan government and the international community who are working day and night to try to realize the objectives embodied in the Afghanistan Compact. They are objectives that 70 countries and international organizations have agreed to and stood behind, and objectives that, above all, represent the aspirations and hopes of the Afghan people.
If there has been progress, Afghanistan has had the benefit of having exceptional people on the ground. As the Standing Committee on National Defence, you deserve to know that the Canadian soldiers, non-commissioned officers, officers, general staff, and flag officers who have served in Afghanistan have been not only exceptional representatives of their country but among the very best to have served in Afghanistan at all.
General Grant, the current commander in Kandahar; General Fraser, his predecessor; General Leslie; and General Hillier have given exceptional leadership to ISAF and the international effort to bring security to Afghanistan. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers who have served under them have proven their worth and professionalism in ways that, despite blanket media coverage in Canada, are still only dimly understood here at home. They have stood against an enemy and stood for security at a time when an opportunity has been seized to bring positive change to Afghanistan as a nation and as a society.
Let me just run through some of the headline statistics to remind everyone how much has been done.
In only five years a health care system that was virtually non-existent under the Taliban has been able to achieve 85% access levels to a basic package of health care services. That means 85% of the population of Afghanistan can now reach a clinic, can reach a hospital when necessary, and can receive basic forms of inoculation and medical treatment that were not available in the past.
Now 7.3 million children have been vaccinated; 5.4 million children, an historic high for Afghanistan, are attending Afghan schools, and 34% or them are girls.
The GDP was $4 billion in 2002--I cited a slightly different number to the previous committee because it was from a different international organization, but the scale of growth is the same. The GDP, which was $4 billion in 2002, is now $8.9 billion. There has been explosive economic growth in Afghanistan, and we're talking only about the legitimate economy, not the poppy economy, which is estimated to have grown strongly, but not as strongly as the non-illicit side of the ledger.
Four million refugees have returned to Afghanistan. A strong currency has been reformed and has maintained its value. Low inflation continues to be a fact of life, and the budget in Afghanistan is balanced.
What does this actually mean in the lives of Afghans? Let me give you a couple of anecdotal stories.
Some Fridays, when some of us are able to get away from the incessant demands of life in Kabul, we go walking in rural areas within one hour's drive of the city. On one recent occasion I had the pleasure of spending about five hours walking up the valley with a colleague who had been in that valley in 2001, just after the Taliban withdrawal.
In 2001, this valley was full of burned-out houses, schools, and public buildings, all of which had been put to the torch by the Taliban itself. The job at that time was to do an inventory of property that was still standing. Today, every one of those buildings has been rebuilt, repainted, and in many cases restored.
A micro hydro system, financed by the Government of Korea, sits at the base of the valley and supplies 2,000 households in this valley with electricity, households that never had energy in the past. A reservoir that serves the micro hydro station has given a new rationality and new reach to irrigation in the valley.
A national solidarity program, a rural development program financed primarily by Canada, has been implemented in all villages of this valley. Schools are open every couple of kilometres. They were never there before. There are two clinics in the valley.
This change has transformed the lives of people in this district. It is admittedly one of the better-served districts of Afghanistan; the same story could not be told everywhere across the country, but it shows the impact of concerted international efforts, and Canada has played a very central role in those.
But there is still a conflict. And what is the nature of that conflict? Why is the insurgency stronger in 2006? Why is it continuing in 2007? One of the legacies of the Bonn Agreement is that it was not a peace deal. Several parties who've played a prominent role in the Afghan history of the past 25 years, including in the conflict, were excluded from the Bonn discussions. Mullah Omar and the Taliban obviously were not captured as a leadership structure of the Taliban; they were pushed out of Afghanistan, and they were excluded from the discussions that led to Bonn, that led to elections and the foundation of new institutions in Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of one of the strongest jihadi parties for part of the conflict, the strongest jihadi party in the 1980s, was not part of the discussions at Bonn in November and December 2001. Jalaluddin Haqqani, one of the major jihadi commanders from the 1980s, was excluded.
These are the groups that have reconstituted themselves, that have come together to challenge the constitutional order, to challenge the hopes and aspirations of Afghanistan today. And it is, to some extent, Afghanistan's failure and our failure to recognize that the threat still existed, and that it was still as existential to Afghanistan's transition as it has proved to be, that has perpetuated and worsened the conflict. But there has also been, quite frankly, lacklustre performance by some of Afghanistan's neighbours, in particular the Government of Pakistan, to act against Taliban leadership structures.
You will recall that Pakistan at one point considered it an article of faith, part of its national interest, to support the Taliban. This is plain from President Musharraf's memoirs, it's plain from the memoirs of other Pakistani officials, and it's not really denied as a fact. Are groups and interests in Pakistan still supporting these groups, still giving sanctuary to Taliban leaders? Probably. The weight of evidence is on the side of the prosecution in this case. And quite frankly, for those of us interested in the defence of Afghanistan, the defence interest of Afghanistan, in bringing security to Afghanistan, this has to be a high priority.
Let me, in defence of this proposition, note that this issue is not really open to debate any longer. As General Eikenberry, the last commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan, said in congressional testimony only a couple of weeks ago, we cannot win this fight in Afghanistan alone, and “...I do emphasize Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership presence inside Pakistan remains a significant problem that must be satisfactorily addressed if we are to prevail in Afghanistan...”.
This is a consensus that is shared within NATO, within the United Nations, and within the principal capitals concerned with the future of Afghanistan. And quite frankly, it needs to be addressed cooperatively through support, through positive, mutually reinforcing dialogue, but dialogue that will lead to a better security situation for the region and for the world.
Security, however, in Afghanistan is an objective that will not be achieved by military means alone. The security equation in the country today includes many more elements and many more challenges than simply prosecuting the campaign against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.
The ministry of the interior and the role of police in Afghanistan remain an overriding priority for the international community, and indeed for the Afghan government. It's important for us to understand how much progress has been made, particularly in 2006 and 2007, quite frankly, after several years of neglect, when the policing in Afghanistan perhaps didn't receive the levels of attention it deserved.
Four tiers of selection, merit-based vetting, and competition have taken place to ensure that a ministry of the interior that was dominated by factional interests and, above all, by the interests of the Northern Alliance comes to be governed by the principle of merit and comes to be dominated by police officers who are, quite frankly, the best available in the country at their jobs. Tier one reform, which affected the senior leadership of the ministry, took place early in 2006. Tiers two, three, and four, reaching right down to the major level and lieutenant-colonel level, are being completed as we speak. With that reform comes a pay and rank reform similar to that implemented for the Afghan National Army, which quite frankly, for the first time puts the ministry of the interior on a professional basis and allows officers to step away from the temptation of corruption, from involvement in the drug trade, and from the factional affiliations that have dominated that ministry for too long.
There is still work to do. Finance and administration remain weak points for the ministry and accountability frameworks need to be strengthened. Civil administration, for which the ministry of the interior is also responsible--that is, administration of provincial and district levels--has not received the same attention as policing has received, and we in the United Nations would invite all interested donors to give more attention to this field. We hope that some of Canada's resources announced yesterday--war reconstruction, development, and institution-building in Afghanistan--will be dedicated to the governance challenge, as we have been given to understand will be the case.
[Translation]
What do we talk about with the people from the Department of the Interior? I will give you an example. Last summer, there was a riot in Kaboul following an accident that occurred in the northern part of the city. A coalition truck had crushed several people, including Afghan citizens.
Following this riot, which the Kaboul police contained with a great deal of difficulty, a new chief of police was appointed. This individual did not have any of the requirements to fill the position. The international community was very disappointed in the decision made by President Karzaï. He made this decision under very difficult circumstances. Indeed, a riot in a city like Kaboul is a destabilizing event these days.
We then initiated some reforms, not only in the process for selecting the Kaboul chief of police but all of the chiefs of police for the largest provinces in Afghanistan. On January 13, our hopes with respect to this matter were fulfilled. President Karzaï decided that 40 new chiefs would be appointed to various positions, including the chief of police of Kaboul. In all cases, the individuals appointed were professionals representing the ethnic, political and professional diversity of the Afghan police.
In all honesty, I can tell you that for the first time chiefs with a rank higher than that of colonel were selected on the basis of their merit. This was a very important message that was sent to the entire Afghan population and to the international community. These are facts demonstrating our ability to reform Afghan institutions and provide a professional foundation.
[English]
Mr. Chairman, I will not continue to cover all the points I would like to, and I would prefer to leave as much time as possible for an exchange, but let me simply list other areas where important progress has been made.
Disarmament in Afghanistan has been a remarkable story. Funded in very large measure by Canada, it has been the inescapable, necessary complement to the emergence of a professional army and police, which has started to take place, as highlighted by James.
The national development of security institutions responsible for security and intelligence in Afghanistan has had remarkable achievements. In late 2006 and early 2007, they were responsible for dismantling some of the most nefarious networks that were facilitating suicide bombings in Kabul, in Khowst, and of greatest importance for Canadians, in Kandahar. And we hope that success can be perpetuated in 2007.
Finally, the Afghan National Army remains an essential institution that must be stronger if we are to meet our objective of Afghanizing the process of providing security in Afghanistan. As a final point to the committee, I would call on Canada to give all due attention to the forms of support that are possible for the Afghan National Army. The Canadian army has already partnered very successfully with the ANA, but more can be done. There are innovative approaches that can be undertaken, and quite frankly, everything we can do to support the Afghan National Army institutionally will shorten, and not perpetuate, the need for the sorts of military investments and reconstruction investments that have been made so generously by this country and by others.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
:
I would like to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to express my dismay at the situation. We are hearing from two very important individuals and we have but three minutes to ask our questions and hear the answers. That doesn't make sense. We could discuss the matter later.
I have six questions, but I'm not asking you to answer. I would like you to send me your answers, in writing, because I feel that this is important.
You spoke about reconstruction. We, the members, are getting contradictory information. With NATO, I went to Faizabad and I did not see a great deal of reconstruction. I travelled to Kandahar with the Standing Committee on National Defence and, for security reasons, we were not allowed to leave the camp and see what was actually going on. I would like to know if there truly is reconstruction in Afghanistan and, if yes, where is this taking place. I find it very difficult to believe that much reconstruction is occurring in the Kandahar region, but I would like you to show us, on a map, where this reconstruction is taking place.
Let's talk about the survey. Earlier on, you talked about percentages. I would like to know what you think about the statements made by Gen. Richards, who for the past few months has been saying that if there is no change in attitude or in the mandate of the mission, 70% of the Afghans are going to be heading back to the Taliban.
My next question is for Mr. Appathurai. A little earlier you said that it was important that international organizations agree amongst themselves. I have just returned from Brussels and I don't understand why NATO and the European Union are incapable of agreeing with each other and are incapable of holding a meeting on an issue as important as Afghanistan. I would like you to explain, in writing, why you think this situation is occurring.
We talk about health services that have changed. However, the Senlis Council has just said that the Kandahar Hospital is really a place where people go to die, that is a place where people systematically die. You are telling us that things appear to have improved, but that does not seem to be the case. Once again, contradictory information.
Mr. Alexander, I would like you to talk to us about the amnesty. Currently, President Karzaï is grappling with the decision made by the Parliament to grant amnesty to many of the bandits whereas the international community is objecting. I would like to hear about the latest developments, I would like to know how that is going to work. We even heard that mollah Omar may be given amnesty and that he is being told that, if he ceases his involvement, he will now be part of Afghan society. I find it very difficult to understand some things.
Finally, let's talk about the 3D approach. It was confirmed to us in Kandahar that there are 2,500 soldiers, 6 Foreign Affairs representatives and 6 CIDA representatives. It seems to me that there truly is an imbalance in the mission's mandate. I would like to hear your opinion on the matter.
I heard the buzzard go off. I will expect your answers, in writing, in a few days time.
While I share my colleague's dismay at not having an opportunity to really get into a substantive question and answer period, it was interesting to hear you, Mr. Appathurai, talk about the media not telling the story. The fact of the matter is the Canadian media and most international media are embedded with the military and they tell the story that the military allows to be told from any objective perspective.
I also had some trouble listening to you talk about the casualties that other countries have suffered, because I don't take any comfort that other countries may have suffered higher casualties than Canadians have. I found that a disturbing comparison.
I'm wondering how often you've been in the area of Kandahar where the Canadians are right now, specifically to the internally displaced persons camps, where we see in the media--this is one thing we have seen in the media--people who are obviously not getting enough food aid. That's not getting through. Perhaps Mr. Alexander would respond to that. Why isn't food and clean water reaching the people in these internally displaced camps to the level they obviously need?
You also talked about the situation with Pakistan. You raise it, everybody raises it, but we need to find some solutions for it, and we need to find some action that's going to prevent the insurgents from going back and forth across the border. It's not enough just to raise it; we need some answers to that.
The other question I wanted to raise is around the issue of the detainees. Mr. Alexander, perhaps you can respond to this. Maybe if you don't get time you could do it in writing, also.
What are the conditions of the Afghan prisons? What kinds of situations are we turning people over to? We've been told about torture. We've been told about abysmal conditions. I would like to have some kind of report on exactly what the state of the Afghan prisons are at this point, where people are being turned over.
We know there are investigations going on now by Canadian authorities into this. We know the agreement that was signed by General Hillier is not up to the standards of the agreements that were signed by the Dutch and by the British in terms of following the care or the treatment of prisoners as they go through the system in Afghanistan and whether they're being transferred over to other nations as well. We don't know that, we really don't know that, and I think that's a big problem.
Finally, in terms of the numbers who are serving in southern Afghanistan, you talked about that. I've tried to question our own minister and officials around how the NATO mission meshes with Operation Enduring Freedom, which is still going on. There are still a large number of American soldiers fighting in southern Afghanistan, independent of the NATO mission. We don't have any information about how those things mesh.
We know that the two-week training program for the Afghan national auxiliary police is simply a two-week program and then--out into the field. It's worrisome. You acknowledge that the training of police is way behind. We were told, when we were in Afghanistan, it was seven years to ten years behind the training of the Afghan National Army, which really is not progressive and not, I think, at the rate the international community had hoped for.
So those are some of my observations. I'm sorry we don't have time for some back and forth.
:
I'll do the NATO stuff.
General Richards referred to a large percentage of the population looking to which force to back. They're not sure who's going to win.
The Taliban is from there and we are not. It is very important that we continue not only to think but to express our long-term commitment. The Afghan people want the Taliban to not be in charge; they want their democratically elected government in charge. We have to show that we're in it for the long haul. It's a very important message to give. They will come on board as they see the benefits, but also as they understand that we're there for the long term.
You will never hear NATO say they are satisfied with the relations with the European Union in terms of the breadth of discussions we have. I'm happy to explain at length why it doesn't work, but we would like it to work.
President Karzai briefed the Secretary General precisely on this subject when we were there last week. He is going to be working with parliamentary leaders to ensure the bill that has been put to him is adapted so that it reflects Afghan law, the Afghan constitution, and international law as is reflected in their constitution. He is very aware of international views on this, and he will ensure, as he works with his own leaders, that it reflects national and international law.
On journalists and the military, precisely because journalists are embedded with the military, they tell what we call the “kinetic story”, the military story. They're there and they move with them. It is much more difficult for them to get out and see the reconstruction story. The kinetic story sells papers. That's the other problem. That's the more sexy stuff. We try, but it is a great challenge for me and for all of my colleagues to convince the journalists to cover these other stories.
On casualties, the reason I mentioned other countries' casualties was in no way to denigrate Canadian casualties. I'm a Canadian, and they are my colleagues. But there is a perception, which I see reflected in the media, that Canada is there alone, that Canada is the only one taking the burden. I have seen this many, many times. It is simply not true. I want to make the point that everybody is there and paying the costs--all of our allies.
There are two final points. If NATO were to leave, it would be absolutely devastating for Afghanistan. They cannot defend themselves on their own. We have the potential to build a NATO right now--and we're doing it in Afghanistan--that is battle tested, highly interoperable, and an effective arm for the United Nations. We have 55,000 troops under UN mandate around the world. We are giving muscle to the UN under UN mandate. For Canadians, that is absolutely primordial. We need to build that, not throw it away. But that means active contribution.
On OEF and NATO, OEF no longer exists as a structure, but there are about 8,000 U.S. troops. Most of them are doing training and equipping of the Afghan National Army. There is a small group that continues to do targeted, intelligence-driven operations with the support of both the United Nations and the Afghan government. We have a command arrangement in place, so it's a different mission from NATO. NATO's mission is to provide security to create the conditions for reconstruction and development. We have a command arrangement in place with a deputy commander who de-conflicts the two missions so they don't step on each other's toes. Where necessary, particularly in extremist situations when soldiers from one side or the other are about to be in serious trouble, we can support each other. In essence, they are different missions with different mandates, and we have a command structure to de-conflict and, where appropriate in emergency situations, to support.
Chris, I'll leave the rest to you.
:
I'm not aware of that report, so I can't really comment on its significance.
We welcome debate about the insurgency and about drug policy, but the United Nations is not going to countenance any move to make opium poppy cultivation legal in Afghanistan or anywhere else. It simply has not worked in conditions where the rule of law is absent. And the biggest priority in Afghanistan today is to establish the rule of law, not to apply policies that have only worked in mature democracies, mature societies, where the rule of law has been established for some time.
What concrete measures should we be undertaking with Pakistan? Well, many. We should share and debate assessments of what is happening on both sides of the border. We should ask Pakistan for specific actions with regard to specific leaders or structures that are of concern to everyone. We should update UN Security Council Resolution 1267 to reflect the current reality of Taliban leadership. This is the list by which Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders are subject to a certain number of sanctions. We should provide additional support—and Canada has an important role to play here—for the issue of refugee returns on both sides of the border to create pull factors in Afghanistan and an enabling environment in Pakistan, and thereby help bring this challenge under control. And, of course, we should address the regional context, which includes not only Pakistan, but also Iran, India and many other countries.
We should also pursue confidence-building measures between the two countries. The United Nations has been particularly active trying to reinforce political dialogue between the two countries, and one of the agenda items we are interested in supporting is this idea of cross-border jirgas to allow civil society in both countries literally to ventilate their views on what it will take to bring security not just to Afghanistan but also to the region as a whole.
What is the role of Iran? On the whole, it's extremely positive: $250 million of assistance delivered in a principled and timely manner to rebuild roads, to support education, and to bring electricity to the city of Herat. The United Nations, with 59 other countries, is a prominent donor that has done a great deal to support Afghanistan's transition.
Detention is an area of major concern for the United Nations. Conditions in Afghan detention facilities run by the national directorate of security are relatively good; they are monitored extremely closely by the ICRC and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. Our mission is getting more and more involved in this area, and we have made conditions of detention one of our priorities in the human rights monitoring mandate we have.
There is more work to do on the Afghan prison system. The national prison in Kabul, Pul-i-Charkhi Prison, has been partially renovated and standards there have improved greatly, but there is a great deal more to do at the provincial level. I'm proud to say that the corrections adviser at the UNAMA mission in Afghanistan is a professional from the Correctional Service Canada, and we are making progress on these fronts. Obviously we won't achieve the results we want overnight.
James has mentioned the OEF, and there was a reference earlier to slow development. Obviously development has not been as rapid as anyone would like. Stick a microphone in front of any Afghan and they will respond in a predictable way: they would like more. Many of them have lived outside of the country and have seen what a better life is like, and they want it at home.
But slow with regard to what? We are slow in bringing Afghanistan to the standards of living we see in western Europe and North America. Those are distant objectives, but we have been rapid in bringing economic growth from the level at which Afghanistan began as a country suffering for too long from economic depression and decline.
So I would take issue with the German report and with anyone who maintains that nothing has been done. It's very difficult for us as westerners to understand what life is like with $150 per annum per capita and how much better life could be with $300 per annum per capita. But we must not trivialize the sort of progress that has been made, and the fact that it has not just been made for a select group in Kabul who are benefiting from government office; it has been made for the bulk of the population, thanks to programs sponsored by the government and funded by countries like Canada, programs that have reached the length and breadth of the country and up to two-thirds of rural communities—and 80% of the population is rural. This is the centre of gravity of the Afghan population, and we have already made a difference there.
That is why people in Afghanistan are continuing to invest their hopes in us. They will not do so indefinitely--we need to show results on the regional front domestically--but for the time being we do have a story that we are proud to tell. It is important to recognize, frankly, what has been achieved if we are going to justify the further investments that everyone is now being encouraged to make.
:
You're absolutely right that there's room for debate about the effectiveness of aid, and let that debate take place, but let it not convince anyone that nothing has been done. Quite frankly, those donors who have been most principled in their approach, who have chosen implementation mechanisms that are effective, which tend to be through the government, who have chosen not to operate through parallel structures but to use the government budget as the principal mechanism of coordination for policy, these donors have had a very serious impact. There is accountability, and there are results to show for what has been done.
Take Canada's commitment to the national solidarity program. There are 17,000 villages that have received block grant funding for the project of their choice, a project chosen by village shuras, village councils, sometimes men and women together, sometimes separate men's and women's shuras. This has reached half of the villages of the country. There is a paper trail every step of the way and really quite hard-edged accountability for this and half a dozen other national programs, to each of which Canada has contributed strongly.
And yes, it is very useful to see Canadians funding food-for-work programs in Kandahar, but quite frankly, there was a national emergency employment program as early as 2002 and 2003, under government auspices, that was doing this across the country very effectively.
We must not lose sight of the fact that it is Afghanistan as a whole that we are trying to heal and that we are trying to stabilize, not just one province, not just some villages. There is a tendency on the part of some members of NATO to now define the challenge for themselves, given the location of their PRTs, given the location of their troops, in terms of one province. It has been one of the great achievements of Canadian development assistance to Afghanistan up until now to have chosen national delivery mechanisms, and our argument in the United Nations would be that these have been the most effective.
Yes, people want food, particularly in the southern provinces. The insurgency has been particularly disruptive to food distribution networks in southern Afghanistan, where most communities face a food vulnerability and a food deficit, which they usually fill by going to market and by selling their labour on whatever market is available. All too often, that's the drug harvesting market these days.
A huge amount of food has been delivered by the World Food Programme, with the support of Canada and many other countries this year. The coverage hasn't been universal. We agree there are major pockets of vulnerability still in Afghanistan, and for that reason we in the UN are hoping to strengthen our humanitarian coordination capacity by bringing eight new professionals into the field, to be located in places like Kandahar, to look after just this kind of issue, and the Government of Norway is supporting us generally in this regard.
Is the army unbalanced in its makeup? Perhaps, but much less unbalanced, much more balanced than it was two or three years ago. Recruitment is now taking place across the country. The officer corps is more or less balanced province by province, but there is a historical challenge here. If you ask President Karzai and others who know pre-conflict Afghanistan--the Afghanistan of the sixties and seventies--there were not many recruits from Kandahar, Helmand, or Oruzgan in those days either. People preferred to serve in traditional structures, in the police, and not to come to Kabul and leave the hearth and home and the tribal affiliations that were so strong in that region.
So we're not simply trying to overcome the legacy of 2001, a Northern Alliance victory. We're trying to overcome a deeper legacy in Afghan history, and one of the tools for doing that is the Afghan national auxiliary police, not an unqualified success yet, but certainly a good effort to recruit people locally into the security equation and put them under the right form of discipline, command and control in the places that count most for the security equation, namely, Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, and Zabol.
With respect to diplomacy in Afghanistan, and as an instrument to resolve and overcome the obstacles we are dealing with, all of the key partners of Afghanistan could play a big role. We need to have an enhanced dialogue on security not only with Pakistan but with all of the other regional players, including India, Iran, the countries of Central Asia, Russia, China and others. We had this dialogue in a more structured fashion during the time of the Taliban regime, which was referred to as the group of "Six plus Two" which met primarily in Geneva, but which also included Afghanistan's six neighbours. We may need another type of format now, but we certainly do need this dialogue, particularly with Pakistan, but also with the other countries.
We also need to take a diplomatic approach to deal with the economic issues in the region. In the autumn of 2006, a conference was held in New Delhi regarding economic cooperation in Afghanistan. There were discussions about developing linkages in the energy and infrastructure construction sectors to commence the transportation systems of Afghanistan's neighbouring countries, and there were also discussions about trade and conditions to promote investment in Afghanistan. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and other players are very active in this sector, and you would probably be surprised to see just how much progress has been achieved. We've had difficulty explaining where progress has been achieved, but it has occurred.
[English]
To return very quickly to the question of timetables, we in the United Nations are of the view that Balkan-like timetables are probably appropriate in Afghanistan. No one wants to name an end-date or to be drawn on the question of how long this will take. We simply don't control the factors that are driving the insecurity. We are trying desperately to understand them better and to bring them under control. But let's look at the research that's been done. The RAND Corporation has a very exhaustive piece of research on all the insurgencies and counter-insurgencies fought since the Second World War. Their conclusion is that it takes 14 years to lose a counter-insurgency and 17 years to win one. That's on average.
Clearly, however, as James has said, the major challenge for us all today is to show resolve, to show will, and to demonstrate unity of effort. If we are rushing for the exits, if we are trying to cut things short, if we are flagging in our commitment to achieving the objectives set out in the Afghanistan Compact, we will be giving comfort to the enemies of this transition. And we will, quite frankly, be undermining the achievements and the effort that is under way today to bring stability to Afghanistan.
No one thinks that eradication of poppies alone will have any significant impact on the industry. There are eight pillars to the national counter-narcotics strategy, of which eradication is only one. Eradication can only be successful, if it can be successful at all, when the other seven are in play. That is simply not the case in southern Afghanistan right now. We in the United Nations will be vocal in arguing for a more comprehensive approach, when all the lanes are filled and all activities are taking place on the ground. It is, however, not a solution to simply dump this product onto the international pharmaceuticals market. If that legalization were to take place, you would see a spike. You would see Afghans cutting down their orchards, turning over new soil to cultivate opium, to meet the demands of both the legal market and the illegal market, which in this country, where the rule of law has not been established, would probably continue to experience astronomical growth.
With regard to Quetta, what is the forum for discussing these issues? Quite frankly, perhaps this should be a forum. Perhaps some of the regional players involved in Afghanistan's transition, involved in the security equation in Afghanistan, deserve to be part of your discussions. We are certainly very active in reaching out to various players in Pakistan as often as we can, and in trying to put these questions clearly and squarely before those who may have an opportunity to influence better outcomes. But there are some differences of opinion.
President Karzai says that Mullah Omar lives in Quetta or nearby. President Musharraf has said several times over the past six or eight months that Mullah Omar is happy and well and living just outside of Kandahar. We all have an interest in establishing what the facts of the matter are.
One of the tools we have available is UN Resolution 1267. But debate on this issue, candour on this issue, and clarification of the facts of the matter with regard to Taliban leadership structures are going to be required more, not less, in the months to come.