The chair would like to read a very brief statement to the members.
I met with the clerk and the staff this morning. It's a very complicated bill, and I'm looking to the committee to help me, as chair, go through this rather complicated procedure. I'd like to read a brief statement to clarify what I believe is the procedure we should follow. If the committee members don't like it, presumably they'll come up with something else. If they like it, we'll proceed.
We're now about to embark on the next stage of our examination of Bill C-2, the detailed clause-by-clause consideration of the text of this legislative initiative. I'm told that there are 208 proposed amendments so far.
In accordance with Standing Order 75(1), clause 1 of the bill, the short title, would be postponed until the end of our examination.
Clause 2, on the other hand, is something that we need to look at. We need to spend some time on it, and I'd like to make a statement as to how the chair intends to proceed.
Clause 2 contains the new Conflict of Interest Act, which has some 66 proposed sections. Other clauses in Bill C-2 also relate directly to clause 2. For example, clause 4 contains a consequential amendment to the Canada Post Corporation Act.
In order for us to proceed in a cogent fashion and consider all amendments that have an impact on one another, I will proceed to propose all such amendments before putting the question on clause 2. This means that the amendments to clause 2, clause 3, subclause 3(1), clause 28, and clause 38 should be considered and voted on before we vote on clause 2.
I'm proceeding in this fashion so that this very complex bill will be considered in a coherent manner and so that any decisions taken by the committee are being consistently applied throughout those clauses of the bill that are linked together. In this way, we will complete our study with a bill that accurately reflects the committee's decisions.
Once again, I intend to call one by one for debate each amendment in our package that relates to clause 2, clause 3, subclause 3(1), clause 28, and clause 38. Then, once all those amendments are decided, I would put the question on clause 2.
The manner of voting would then proceed as follows: the vote on clause 2 will apply to clauses 4 to 38, subclauses 108(1) and 108(2), and clause 227. If clause 2 is agreed to, a separate vote is needed on clause 3. If clause 2 is negatived, the vote applies to clause 3.
This is a great thing, isn't it? The reason for this voting pattern is that a number of clauses are all dependent on clause 2. That's the reason I'm going through all this.
The chair is proposing this manner of proceeding after consulting the legislative clerks working on this bill. If members wish to have a further explanation on how this process has been elaborated, I'll ask the clerk to provide some more detail. This procedure is being proposed as the most efficient manner of considering all of the amendments, which are inexorably intertwined in a most complex piece of legislation.
Mr. Sauvageau, I think, is first, and then Ms. Jennings.
Does anybody have any comments on that question? I don't know. We'll do it as soon as possible. In my estimation, unless there's a surprise—which seems to happen in this place—we will be on clause 2 for some time today.
We'll get it to you today. Is that all right?
I'll give you the statement, and it will be quite clear as to—and of course, we've only gone to clause 2. There may be more exciting moments.
Does anyone else have anything to say before we start?
Then we will proceed on page 4, which is a government motion.
(On clause 2)
The Chair: Mr. Poilievre.
This motion proposes that a minister or parliamentary secretary cannot offer membership in his or her party to a member of the opposition or accept membership in an opposition party.
House of Commons Procedure and Practice states, at page 654: “An amendment to a bill that was referred to a committee after second reading is out of order if it is beyond the scope and principle of the bill.” I therefore rule, Mr. Martin, that this motion is a new concept that is beyond the scope of Bill C-2 and is consequently inadmissible.
So we will proceed to page 11. This is a government amendment.
Who's taking over here? Mr. Poilievre.
Yes, but we're told the French text has to be corrected because there was a mistake. Why shouldn't the English text be corrected instead? Why isn't it being suggested that the French version was correct?
Let's try to interpret it. This means that a minister can't solicit funds personally, but that he can ask anyone else to do it for him. That enables him to do indirectly what he isn't allowed to do directly. According to the French version, the office holder can't do it personally.
Even if it's only once in a hundred times, couldn't the French version be correct and the English version not? I simply want to emphasize that fact. Is that possible?
Are you finished? Is that supposed to explain?
I thought I understood why this amendment was being brought forward. The discussion between Monsieur Sauvageau and Monsieur Poilievre muddied the waters for me. My question to you is on the objective of proposed section 16 and why you state that the English version attains that objective and the French version, as it is now written, does not and therefore it is necessary that the French version be amended by the government amendment G-10.
Is that clear? You did not answer my question, so I've now given it again, slowly, clearly, and I'd like an answer.
Mr. Chairman, perhaps I'm going to surprise my Conservative friends, but I'd like to make this part of Bill C-2 a little less harsh. Subclause 35(1) states:
||35.(1) No former reporting public office holder shall enter into a contract of service with, accept an appointment to a board of directors of [...]
We think there may be exceptional provisions. I used an example the other day. I did it pleasantly, but it was thought that that was not the case. We wouldn't want, for example, a former Minister of Justice with a clean record not to be able to work at a tribunal after his employment. On an exceptional basis, the Commissioner should be able to exempt a former public office holder upon request, but providing the name, conditions of the exemption and the reasons for his decision. That may occur once in 10 years.
I'm going to give you another example, which doesn't apply to Ottawa. Would this mean that a doctor who is a Minister of Health subsequently be unable to practise at a hospital? He wouldn't have been a lobbyist, he wouldn't have been corrupted, or anything like that. We want to ensure that, in some cases, the Commissioner can exempt former public office holders from this restriction, but on certain conditions.
Let me address that point. Proposed section 39 of the proposed act in the bill that's before you actually does provide for a discretion in the commissioner to reduce the limitation period referred to in proposed section 36, and proposed section 36 itself refers back to the substantive prohibitions in proposed section 35.
In respect of a minister, if that's the example before us, a minister is governed by proposed section 35 for a two-year period; however, under proposed section 39 that minister may apply to the commissioner. There are criteria in that section to guide the commissioner, who may, in the appropriate case, reduce in part or in whole the limitation period of a government minister. And there is a similar procedure for all public officer-holders.
The amendment is withdrawn.
On the next two, I have a problem I'm going to need some help with. Page 23 has a line conflict with page 24. It has to be one or the other, or you could have a subamendment.
Monsieur Sauvageau, I'm just pointing out to you that we have this problem. I don't know what the government....
Do you understand what I've said?
That's precisely what we understood. That's why we're tabling the amendment. Since transparency is the underlying principle of the bill, we don't want the minister to decide which individual in his department is to be subject or not subject to clauses 35 and 37. We also want the Integrity Commissioner to decide for all other positions.
So we want to amend subclause 38(1). We want to replace the words “A minister of the Crown or a minister of state may exempt” with “The Commissioner may exempt”. We could also write: “may exempt upon consultation with the minister.” That wouldn't be a problem at all.
Why would the minister be judge and party with regard to the decision to exempt or not to exempt a particular member of his staff?
I'm sure this is just a minor breach of transparency by the Conservatives that they'll no doubt want to correct immediately.
Again, the purpose of this proposed section in the first place is to avoid a situation where someone who has, say, a very short-term temporary role, perhaps they work from out of a temporary agency and they serve in a minister's office for a brief period of time.... Having worked with a minister's office in my role as a public office holder, I've seen this happen already, where people have been in and out of the office on very short-term bases. We do not want someone who comes in and serves as a secretary for a very short term, two or three weeks, from a temp agency to be then covered by the provisions dealing with lobbying and prevent them from ever getting a job working for a lobby firm because they might have been a secretary in a minister's office for a few weeks.
So that's the reason this exists. We just think it would be far better from an administrative standpoint if you allow the minister, who will see up close what kind of work this hypothetical individual will be doing, to make the determination rather than have someone who's detached from the situation make the determination for him.
But the rules are very clear. It's not as though the minister can pick a friend in the office and say, you, you, and you are all excluded; we're not going to apply the law to you. The definitions in the law are very clear, so the room for abuse, which I think is what Mr. Sauvageau is trying to get at, is almost non-existent, and as such, we don't see the purpose of the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, let's start from the premise that the person who is appointed Commissioner is a competent person. If the Commissioner is a competent person, he'll definitely want to understand everything that Mr. Poilievre has told us, that is to say when a person has worked in the minister's office for four hours, the minister could say that person is excluded, period.
In a bill on transparency, why would we allow the minister to decide who in his or her cabinet has or hasn't worked long enough?
I've often heard the party in power tell us that it's a matter of perception, that the public's trust absolutely had to be restored with regard to wrongdoing within government, and so on. Now we would be giving the minister the opportunity and the power to make decisions within his department about people he can exempt and those he cannot exempt based on rules that can be quite complicated.
The Integrity Commissioner, who will be appointed upon consultation, could apply the rules, give the reasons, consult the minister and arrive at a response. We simply want to remove any appearance of conflict of interest and give the bill all the transparency it aims to achieve.
If the Conservatives don't agree on this, let them live with it.
Before I debate the substance of this amendment, I would like to ask a question of the legal staff. I have been unable to find in this legislation any clause or section that states that the commissioner would have the authority to review a decision made by a minister of the Crown or a minister of state under proposed subsection 38(1), where that “minister of the Crown or minister of state may exempt from application of section 35 or 37 a former reporting public office holder” etc.
I would be very pleased if you could point out what section would give the commissioner the authority to review that. The only issue of review that I've been able to find is proposed subsection 38(3), which says:
||Every decision to grant an exemption under subsection (1) is final and shall not be questioned or reviewed in any court, except in accordance with the Federal Courts Act on the grounds referred to in paragraph 18.1(4)(a), (b) or (e) of that Act.
Under Bill C-2, is there a section that affords the commissioner the authority to review a decision of exemption that a minister of the Crown or minister of state may have taken under proposed subsection 38(1)? Yes or no.
Now I will go to the substance of the amendment. I find it surprising, and I'm sure that the government, in good faith, did not realize that in wishing to provide the authority that they provide the minister of the Crown or minister of state under proposed subsection 38(1), they had neglected to ensure that it would be reviewable by the commissioner. Given that the objectives of Bill C-2 are to ensure (1) transparency, (2) integrity, and (3) proper and effective oversight, I cannot but be in favour of the Bloc amendment, which would rest that authority under the commissioner rather than under a minister of the Crown or a minister of state.
I will be voting in favour of the Bloc amendment.
We're going to move on to BQ-4 on page 25.
We have more line conflicts. There are line conflicts between BQ-4, G-15, and G-16. Amendments G-15 and G-16 may be moved as subamendments to BQ-4.
BQ-4 also has a line conflict with NDP-1.1.
Isn't this exciting television?
As BQ-4 also has a line conflict with NDP-1.1, the committee will have to choose between BQ-4 and NDP-1.1.
These four amendments will be grouped for debate.
We were made to get along.
By amendment BQ-4, we want to correct the problems raised by Mr. Walsh and the legislative drafters, that is the problem of parliamentary privilege. When we attended the briefing for the introduction of Bill C-2, I raised this question, saying that it was all well and good in theory, but that it was unfeasible and unthinkable in practice.
I'll give you an example. All the citizens in my electoral district read the bill, and one of them observes that there's been wrongdoing under the terms of the bill. He has to go through the member, who has to determine whether or not his complaint is admissible, then swear an oath and tell it to the Commissioner.
If I remember correctly, none of the witnesses who appeared told us that this way of proceeding made any sense. The law clerk told us the same thing. Furthermore, we have a model that we can follow, that of the Commissioner of Official Languages. If a citizen sees that something isn't right, he can file a complaint with the Commissioner of Official Languages.
First, we have to delete the stage of going through a member. I wonder whether a single member from any of the parties would tell one of his or her constituents that that person's idea makes no sense and that he or she considers it inadmissible.
Second, our population may include a number of pressure groups. Let's suppose pressure group B decides to send three people, five days a week, to the member's office to file a complaint. That may complicate our everyday work.
For all these reasons, I propose that we adopt the tested model of the Commissioner of Official Languages, that we eliminate the stage of going through the member and that we correct the points that troubled the law clerk from the House of Commons.
That's why the Bloc moves amendment BQ-4, which appears on page 25.
I would like to make a general comment, without arguing one point or the other, that this is not an uncommon provision in legislation of the ombudsman type.
In France the Médiateur de la République has the same provision. That is the ombudsperson of France. Also, the commissioner for public administration in the U.K., the U.K. ombudsman, has the same. Both have those provisions.
It stops landslide complaints, perhaps, for those offices. It stops having to constantly deal with very large numbers of complaints and having to turn people down because their complaints are frivolous, vexatious, or apparently without merit.
I'm not offended by this. There is a solid rationale for it. It is quite commonly practised in these types of offices in other countries. That's just for people's information.
I'll comment on the Bloc amendment and then I'll table a subamendment.
The reason we chose the member of Parliament route is that we want to make this process administratively sound. If you allow 30 million people access to one bureau to submit their complaints, there might be so many complaints and so many of them frivolous that they're not ultimately going to be investigated with any rigour.
For example, I think back to the gun registry. I think you would have found that out of the Prairies in western Canada you probably would have had over 50,000 complaints about the ethics of that program and the people who were involved in administering it. To expect that one commissioner would be able to investigate all of those complaints with any rigour is unrealistic. So what we suggested instead was that they make their complaint through their member of Parliament and that the member of Parliament then move forward with the ones they find have some merit and discard the ones they believe do not and then ultimately be held accountable for their decisions locally at election time.
That is the only way we can do this, I believe, with any administrative sanity. That is why we opted to allow every citizen the right to raise a concern and submit a complaint. That is our approach. We believe that every citizen should have the right to do that, but that a member of Parliament should have the responsibility to take a look at it first and decide whether they believe it has merit.
I should also say that if there is any question about the ethical behaviour of a public office holder, in a House of Commons with 308 members representing four parties, somebody is going to raise the concern. Somebody is going to submit the complaint. Somebody will have a partisan interest to submit the complaint. There's nothing wrong with their doing that. So we think that it's more than sufficient to allow members of Parliament to lead this process, and with that, I'd like to move on to a subamendment I have.
I move that government amendment G-15 be made a subamendment of BQ-4.
I just want to ask the clerk one question.
Okay, I'm going to say this now, so that everybody is clear. I appear to have been in error. I apologize for what I said before. You'll have to disregard it. We can vote on BQ-4 or NDP-1.1 and G-15 and G-16. If BQ-4 carries, we don't vote on the others. If BQ-4 fails, then we can vote on the others.
Mr. Sauvageau, I have Mr. Martin and then you.
Okay. Well, I'm in favour more of NDP-1.1, the reason being, in all seriousness, that in BQ-4 what the Bloc contemplates is that the conflict commissioner would have to investigate everything brought to that office, because there's no screening contemplated; there's no process whereby you could eliminate frivolous or vexatious complaints. In fact, any reference to “frivolous and vexatious” has been deleted. There's a whole paragraph related to this in Bill C-2 that's been taken out by the Bloc's amendment, as they see it.
To eliminate the member of Parliament as the one to make the reference to the commissioner would, I too think, open the floodgates to bombard the commissioner, making that office virtually dysfunctional.
Our recommendation is quite different. It doesn't deal with the same issues at all. In fact, most of the mandate and powers of the commissioner would remain as contemplated in Bill C-2. The only change we seek to make with NDP-1.1 is that when they're talking about the obligation of the member to identify the alleged contravention and set out reasonable grounds—“under subsection (5)” is the language in Bill C-2—we would suggest it should say:
||The member shall identify the alleged contravention and set out the reasons for believing a contravention has occurred.
In other words, the language in Bill C-2 prejudges that the grounds are reasonable, or it leaves it up to the member to make the determination whether the grounds are reasonable or not. We believe they have an obligation to set out their reasons for believing that a contravention has occurred, but this doesn't give additional weight to what they have to say in that way.
Our recommendation in NDP-1.1 is far more modest than the Bloc's. We believe the Bloc's is a substantive amendment that changes the mandate and the powers of the commissioner in such a drastic way that I'm surprised it was in order, in fact, because it really does alter the whole concept of what the office of the commissioner should be.
So I speak strongly in favour of voting against the Bloc amendment and voting for NDP-1.1.
I sense less enthusiasm than there was for my other attempt, but I'm going to continue using Mr. Poilievre's example.
Let's suppose 50,000 complaints are filed in the West with regard to firearms. I did a brief calculation with the help of Mr. Murphy, whom I thank. There are 75 ridings in Quebec, 125 in Ontario and about 30 in the Maritimes. That leaves about 70 ridings in the West. That means that each member of those ridings receives about 8,000 complaints.
That's exactly what I was saying. I would distinctly prefer that complaints be sent to the Integrity Commissioner, who would have a standard letter saying that those complaints are considered vexatious or frivolous. As Mr. Poilievre has just shown, and I completely agree with him, pressure groups shouldn't bog down the members from the West and prevent them from working. Moreover, this is an area where we have no candidates and no members. Consequently, I'm working for them in this case.
Second, this addresses the remarks of the law clerk and the parliamentary advisor of the House, who says this removes a privilege from parliamentarians.
Third, it's also out of respect for Mr. Martin. Unless the Official Languages Act is completely inadequate in this country, I've never heard it said that the Commissioner of Official Languages would be overwhelmed with complaints because there wasn't a member as a barrier. The Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages has regional offices, including one in Montreal and one in the Maritimes, to facilitate citizen access.
Fourth, I would remind you that we all agreed that government officials were fundamentally honest. However, if there are 50 complaints in the first week, that's because there are a fair number of dishonest people, but that's not what we were saying at the start.
So, out of respect for the law clerk and parliamentary counsel, out of respect for public servants, whom we believe are honest, out of respect for what already exists, that is the mechanism of the Office of the Commissioner of Official Languages, and out of respect for Mr. Poilievre, who has told us that the offices of the members from the West, who are, in the majority, Conservatives, should not be obstructed by people who are opposed to the firearms registry, I believe we should support the position of the Bloc québécois.
I have a question and a comment to make. I'm speaking to Mr. Wild, since it appears he's a law clerk who drafted the document.
If agreed to, amendment BQ-4 will amend the proposed section 44 in the act. In proposed subsection 44(1), we want to delete the expression “has reasonable grounds to believe” and replace it with “who believes”. Isn't there a big difference between the words “has reasonable grounds to believe” and the word “believes”? The person must no longer have reasonable grounds to believe that...
In view of the case law, if we agreed to this amendment, we'd be faced with all kinds of problems. Regardless of who files the complaint, from the moment we replace the words “has reasonable grounds to believe”, an expression we are all familiar with in Canadian law, with the word “believes”, how are we going to make it, since the word “believes” used alone is not the equivalent of “has reasonable grounds to believe”? The case law will overwhelm us and we won't be able to go any further under this section. We may cause a problem in which an individual, no matter how well intentioned he may be, who does not have “reasonable grounds to believe” may well be prosecuted, precisely because the word “believes” is not the equivalent of “has reasonable grounds to believe”.
I'd like the committee to consider my comments, since the texts on the evidence are diametrically opposed. The word “believes” is being proposed in one case, and “has reasonable grounds to believe” in the other.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the counsel very much for the explanations they've provided to Mr. Petit.
I've carefully examined clauses 43, 44 and following, precisely because they concern the accountability of parliamentarians. We'll see how the clause-by-clause consideration of the bill continues, but I must inform my Bloc québécois colleagues, with some regret, that we think the only problems with clause 44 are those raised by Mr. Walsh, the law clerk and parliamentary counsel. On the other hand, we believe that amendment NDP-1.1 from Mr. Martin corrects these deficiencies in the wording of proposed section 44.
So we can't support the Bloc's amendment.
However, I'd like to emphasize that, when the members of the House of Commons considered the possibility of adopting a code of ethics for members, particularly regarding conflicts of interest, and creating an independent Ethics Commissioner position, they wondered what person should have the power and even duty, in a way, of filing a complaint alleging that the conduct of another parliamentarian violated the code that would eventually be adopted, and that was.
What concerned most parliamentarians was precisely that a member, regardless of political allegiance, might be the subject of numerous frivolous, vexatious and other complaints, whereas the Commissioner had no power to sanction a person other than a parliamentarian.
The House—I don't remember whether the result of the vote was unanimous, but it was definitely a majority vote—deemed that the only persons in power to file a complaint had to be parliamentarians, who themselves were subject to the code of ethics.
The Liberals therefore will not support the Bloc québécois amendment. We're going to support the New Democratic Party's amendment instead.
We are ready to vote.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I would only reinforce or perhaps clarify one point.
The last time Mr. Sauvageau spoke, he mentioned that we want the commissioner to be the one to determine vexatious or malicious complaints, but his amendment takes out the very section that contemplates giving the commissioner that ability. Under the heading “Mandate and Powers of the Commissioner”, there would be no adjudication as to malicious or vexatious complaints.
That's a necessary or key component of any office of this nature. In fact, in some offices of this nature there are very stiff penalties associated with making a malicious complaint. For instance, in the whistle-blowing section, if you make a malicious complaint—if you're really just trying to perform industrial sabotage with your whistle-blowing—and the officer of whistle-blowing determines that, you're up for stiff sanctions for throwing a wrench into the works. It's another good reason not to support the Bloc amendment.
(Amendment negatived [See Minutes of Proceedings])
As an overview, three provisions would be removed from the current proposed section 44.
The first is the question that the member of Parliament must have reasonable grounds, as set out in proposed subsection 44(5), and there's been some discussion about that.
Proposed subsection 44(6) is a duty on a member of Parliament to refer a matter to the commissioner when there are such reasonable grounds, and there has been some discussion about the floodgate concern.
What this provision is designed to do is strike a balance. In other words, once an MP has come to the view that the threshold has been met, there's a duty to refer. Why the need to balance? Just by way of background, under the current regime members of Parliament may bring complaints forward only in respect of ministers and parliamentary secretaries. In other words, at any given point in time there are only about 60 people who may be the subject of a complaint. Under this new regime proposed in the bill, all 3,600 public office holders are the potential subjects of complaints under the regime, so a much larger population of people may be subjects of a complaint.
Obviously the reasonable grounds are mentioned there to give the MP a gatekeeper function like the one MPs have currently in respect of complaints brought against ministers.
The duty to refer is a bit of a countervailing principle; namely, if an MP does have the view that there are reasonable grounds, then he or she must bring the matter forward.
The attestation is there simply to confirm that the reasonable grounds exist. Again, that's part of the balance; it is to ensure that frivolous complaints aren't brought, especially with the much larger group of people who may be subject to these complaints.
It seems to me that what's being set up under these subsections is this. If the amendment doesn't go through, it leaves the member in the position of having to actually swear or attest to something that's very subjective, and it seems to me that puts someone at risk of criminal offence if it is determined that the grounds aren't actually reasonable.
That's a very subjective thing. I understand the reason for a screen, but I think that could put quite a chill on someone's willingness to attest that something's reasonable. The reasonable man on the Clapham omnibus is pretty hard to define sometimes.
Is that what is happening here? Could someone be liable for a criminal charge for attesting to something that somebody else didn't think was reasonable, but that person did believe was reasonable?
I'm going to keep this brief, then.
You have just voted an amendment to the bill. It contains a blanket clause in relation to a privilege and, on its face, preserves all the privileges and immunities of parliamentarians in relation to the operation of this act. That's a policy decision entirely, and it was put forward, clearly, with the best of motives on the basis of the discussion that occurred before the committee the other day.
It's entirely within the purview of Parliament, acting under section 18 of the Constitution Act, 1867, to determine, and in so determining, limit the scope of parliamentary privilege in relation to any of the activities of members of Parliament or, in this case, ministers of the Crown, parliamentary secretaries, other public office holders. You've had a series of amendments and you've chosen to go one route in this regard.
You already have in the Parliament of Canada Act a provision dealing with perjury in relation to the examination of witnesses, so it's not unheard of to have that in these types of provisions. But by and large, it's hard to see how you would go behind the standard rule, which is set out here, the standard words of reasonable grounds, and come to some conclusion that would be beyond the purview of this act and would reach into the Criminal Code and apply it in these circumstances.
But Parliament can make itself as clear as it wants in relation to the extent to which these privileges and immunities apply to members.
Yes. I won't go beyond that.
I just want to reinforce, in case there is any misunderstanding, that we are not only changing the language around reasonable grounds--although with Mr. Owen's subamendment we've put it back to reasonable grounds; we've come full circle on that--but it also seeks to delete the next three subsections. Proposed subsection 44(5), dealing with reasonable grounds, will no longer be in effect under this amendment. The act will be silent on the duty to refer, because currently the language is quite binding in Bill C-2, that “the member shall draw that information to the attention of the Commissioner”. It's not optional: “the member shall”. And the attestation, as Mr. Owen pointed out, would be deleted. There will be no reference to the attestation any longer.
I think this is in keeping with the theme of the suite of amendments that Mr. Walsh introduced when he was talking about the fish not seeing the water that they swim in, etc. That's the elusive, esoteric thing that we're trying to shield and protect here, that in our zeal to make this act better we don't want to inadvertently or subsequently affect this greater atmosphere in which we operate.