:
I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to address this committee. I'm a professor in the department of plant sciences at the University of Saskatchewan, and I've had a long-term interest in Saskatchewan farms. I've been involved in the wheat industry on the Canadian prairies for my entire life, and I've spent most of the last 38 years on winter wheat development and related issues.
Since 1991, my breeding program has released eleven winter wheat cultivars that have occupied as much as 95% of the winter wheat acreage in western Canada and have been grown extensively from Minnesota to Washington state. I've been the coordinator of the Central Hard Red Winter Wheat Co-operative test for the prairies recommending committee for wheat, rye, and triticale since the inception of the tests. This involvement has provided me with a unique vantage point from which to view and compare the practical operation of western Canadian quality and quality assurance programs.
In the time I have this morning I will restrict my comments to a consideration of problems associated with kernel visual distinguishability, or KVD, and the Canadian wheat quality assurance program.
As you know, the western Canadian wheat industry has been using KVD as the main tool for identifying wheat classes delivered to the elevators for over eighty years. For at least fifty of those years, KVD requirements have been criticized as a major restriction to cultivar release and the development of new wheat markets.
From the onset here, I must take issue with the second sentence of the quality and quality assurance section--this is section 6 on page 47 of the Review of the Canadian Grain Commission and the Canada Grain Act. This sentence states:
KVD has made possible the efficient segregation of quality based on defined visual characteristics of different classes.
As far as I am concerned, there is a complete lack of objective evidence in support of the claims that KVD has played a positive role in our wheat marketing system. All the data I have seen suggests that it never was an effective method for segregating cultivars according to class when the farmer delivers it.
:
I would like to now present some of the evidence that KVD has never been an effective method for quality segregation of the different wheat classes.
One, evidence for the unreliability of KVD can be drawn from the hard red spring wheat class. Approximately 10% of the time, registered spring wheat cultivars have been classified as having unacceptable KVD when they're included as hidden checks in spring wheat breeding trials. If this is the case, then one should also expect that 10% of the hard red spring wheat farm deliveries to elevators would fail KVD. This has not happened, suggesting that KVD has never been successfully employed as a method for identifying wheat classes at the time of delivery.
Two, the Canadian Grain Commission will not provide KVD descriptions of entries in cooperative trials unless checked cultivars have been identified. If the KVD system can effectively classify the different wheat cultivars, then the identity of the sample should be unknown at the time of description. If the KVD system actually works, there should be no need for a farmer to declare the cultivar name or class at the time of grain delivery. The buyer should be able to determine this by looking at the sample. However, if the Canadian Grain Commission experts cannot routinely identify registered cultivars through class using KVD unless they have reference checks grown in the same environment, are we then expected to believe that the grain buyer, who is grading on individual deliveries, can efficiently segregate for quality based on KVD?
Three, this comes from recent experiences with the one-week cooperative testing program that provides as a clear example the limitations that KVD have imposed upon the Canadian wheat development programs. In the last four years, not a single entry from any breeding program has survived more than two years in cooperative trials because the Canadian Grain Commission describes them as mixtures of red spring and winter wheat kernel characters. This includes nine entries where both parents were registered cultivars with KVD characteristics that were acceptable for the winter wheat class. One of the parents of all the remaining entries had KVD characteristics that had been determined acceptable for the Canadian Wheat Board market class in early cooperative trials. Now, if KVD is an inheritable trait, in other words if it's consistent from year to year, then it is next to impossible for all progeny of all entries to show mixtures of winter and spring wheat.
I'd like to move now to the cost of this system and move directly from this point. If the Canadian Grain Commission will not allow us to register winter wheat cultivars because they are mixtures of hard and red spring wheat kernel types, then I think this probably demonstrates that KVD is also bringing a problem into the system. If the Canadian Wheat Board experts tell us we cannot release these varieties because they're mixtures, what is there to stop farmers or the people who are handling the grain from mixing the current winter wheat and spring wheat cultivars and selling it as hard red spring wheat, which is a premium product?
It would appear that KVD would not be effective in maintaining quality standards in this instance, and I suggest that our present segregation equality at the time of delivery of wheat is not based on KVD but is in fact based on farmer declarations.
Every additional character the plant breeder must select increases the cost of the program and reduces the likelihood that overall breeding objectives will be met. There are ten kernel characteristics that are used to describe KVD and have no direct economic value by themselves. As such, they provide a tremendous drag on breeding programs and they interfere with us accomplishing our other objectives.
As noted as well in the review that you have, KVD has necessarily blocked the introduction of some new varieties that were greatly desired by those who would buy it for feed or feedstock. Two of the biggest individual markets we have for wheat in western Canada in the near future--right now feed is the biggest one, and fuel stock for the alcohol industry will become the next largest one. If KVD is interfering with us taking advantage of these opportunities, then I think we really have to question it.
I'd like to turn now to the solution to this problem. It's pretty obvious that the simple and most effective solution to restrictions imposed by KVD is the complete elimination of KVD requirements and the official recognition that we are actually using farmer declarations at the present time to segregate our wheat. The farmers tell the agent what they're delivering. Agents can't tell from looking at it what is on the load. The farmers are telling them.
There are examples where we have effectively separated out the different varieties. In 1985, U.S.A. hard red spring wheat semi-dwarfs were segregated on the basis of cultivar name; Grandin wheat was; and at the present time, KVD is not used to distinguish among quality types within durum and winter wheat classes. Cultivar name is used, and that name is declared.
There are no KVD requirements in other cereals that we grow. Oats never had KVD, and it was removed from barley a few years ago. We are the only country in the world, or western Canada is the only place in the world, that uses something like KVD to identify quality types.
I'd like to close by suggesting that the elimination of KVD requirements would allow for a completely fluid wheat marketplace based on cultivar name. A system would evolve that would allow for an immediate assessment of potential market opportunities. The availability of cultivars with the desired quality characteristics then becomes the factor limiting our ability to capitalize on market opportunities. This would make it important to have a wide selection of cultivar quality options available in the system.
The other option is the one we have at present, which is to identify a potential new market and then wait for fifteen or more years while plant breeders develop the necessary adapted prototype cultivars with accepted KVD so that true market opportunity can be established. We need a change in this system and we need it badly.
Thank you.
:
Again, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I farm in southwestern Saskatchewan--the Bracken-Climax area, in Mr. Anderson's area--and I'm chairman of the board at Great West Rail.
Great West Rail is a short line in southwest Saskatchewan. It was an abandoned CPR line that they started to salvage until a group of area residents banded together and we bought it from a B.C. company. Our owners consist of farmers, private individuals, towns, villages, rural municipalities, the grain company, and two terminals.
We operate on 306 miles of track. We have 38 loading sites along our line. In saving that line we've created 30 full-time jobs, and our railway has become an integral part of our economy.
We're also an investor in and operate Fife Lake Railway. It's another short line that runs from Assiniboia to Coronach in southeastern Saskatchewan. We have three loading sites on this line.
We moved 4,352 cars last year, and we're the largest producer-car short line in Canada. All our cars are moved back to Assiniboia, where it's a hook and haul for CP.
While this review of the Canada Grain Act and the Canadian Grain Commission covers many topics, there are a few that concern us, and they're extremely important to the viability of producer-car shippers.
We're pleased to see the right of farmers to load producer cars be kept in the Canada Grain Act. We know that loading producer cars doesn't work for everyone, but it's a very important option for producers in our area.
We would like to see the inward inspection remain mandatory. While some industry players may see this as unnecessary, we feel that with the system we now have in place, mandatory inward inspection is essential for producer-car shippers and should remain for producers in general.
We also feel the recommendation for mandatory licensing and bonding of producer-car loading facilities is unnecessary. While the review mentions a safety factor concern in not licensing all our facilities, producer cars and producer-car facilities should be as safe as you can get. The grain is virtually all identity-preserved, as each car is loaded by one producer and its contents can be traced back to that producer. While their initial destination isn't overseas, producer cars can be regarded as container shipments of grain. You can always link the product contained in the individual cars back to individual farms.
The mandatory bonding issue the CGC has put forward also affects many facilities on our line. Being bonded certainly doesn't guarantee total payment in the case of default and doesn't guarantee the honesty of the company that's bonded. These requirements simply add cost back to smaller facilities that are doing fine without the bonds now.
I'm involved with a cleaning plant in Bracken, Saskatchewan, where we ship cleaned yellow peas for several different companies. We've been careful in choosing the companies we deal with and we've built a good reputation as a reliable company to do business with. But we still continually see producers deal with unknown companies because they're offering a few cents more for a certain product than we are. Should we, as a reputable company, have to bear the cost of being bonded because some producers let greed drive their marketing decisions?
Failures happen in the business world every day. If producers choose to deal with companies that aren't bonded, so be it. Good business practice and prudent marketing will be more of an asset to farmers than simply making bonds mandatory.
On the governance issue, we would like to see the three commissioners remain at the top level. We believe the decision-making process could be adversely affected if it's done by just one person and not by the three commissioners who are there now.
As for the assistant commissioners, we want someone in the field working for producers, as was supposedly their role. They shouldn't be government appointments. They should be hired by the Grain Commission. What their job title is would be up to the commission itself, but they should be in the field, not back in a Winnipeg head office.
While the proposed office of grain farmer advocacy might work as a base for these people, they must be available to solve problems where they occur.
We don't know if there would have to be the six field people or if the workload could be handled by fewer employees. But we do know that some of the assistant commissioners were invaluable to producer car loaders and farmers in general as they straightened out mistakes and unfair practices that occur in our industry.
The last point we want to address is by far the most important to our rail line and to producers. While the Canadian Grain Commission is always associated with producer cars, it's our present visual grading system that we find to be the biggest detriment to growth on our rail line. Farmers are never sure of grade when they load a producer car, and far too often we find inconsistencies in the grades at unload. We continually have producers load cars with grain from the same bin on their farm, and we have those cars come back with different grades.
Everyone hears about these problems, and after the stories hit the coffee shops, it takes forever to convince new customers to try producer cars.
KVD or visual grading has cost prairie producers millions of dollars over the years. We must begin moving immediately to a different system. The so-called black box technology is out there now and should be implemented.
There seems to be this myth that if grain doesn't fit into KVD, it isn't quality grain. Our producers are being forced to grow grain that fewer and fewer markets want. The U.S. has spring wheat varieties that outyield ours by 40%, and they continue to take market share from us.
Customers want to buy on the physical attributes of grain, not what it looks like. With black box technology, where falling numbers of the grain could be more of a price factor than the look of the grain, producers could be sure of the grade when they loaded their cars. The CGC will still have a role in making sure all those machines are calibrated, but visual inspections have to be phased out.
Statutory declarations are used all over the world to ensure the variety of grain delivered by farmers. With statutory declarations and black box technology, we feel a lot more grain would find its way to rail.
While this change has been talked about, there is a move by the CGC to have some new varieties outside of the KVD system. Hard red spring wheat and durum would still have those KVD requirements. Waiting until 2008 to end KVD requirements for minor wheat classes means they have no plans to drop KVD for hard red spring wheat and durum. We have to begin this transition now.
Please remember that there will be resistance from within the CGC for this transition, as there are jobs that will be affected by the change.
While this is a review of the Canada Grain Act and the Canadian Grain Commission, please consider how it not only affects industry players, but take it right back to the farm gate. While our grain is graded with a visual system, it is being sold into a world market that uses a different system. Too often we are selling oranges into an apple market. Being located near the U.S. border, we are familiar with their grading system. While it's deemed a premium market, the first thing they want to see when given a grain sample is a falling number test. They don't care what it looks like. They want to know what it does.
Countless trade problems and irritants have occurred and will continue to occur if we don't move to similar technology.
Given our geographic location and the condition of our road system in southwest Saskatchewan, producer cars are extremely important to our area. We must do everything we can to see more grain move by rail. This past year we kept the equivalent of 12,000 B-trains of grain off our roads. Savings in elevation charges put $4.5 million back in our producers' pockets, and that money finds its way into our local economies. Changing to a grading system that will give farmers confidence of their grade when they load producer cars will allow our line to grow and will ensure a more vibrant farm economy.
While we are sure these changes will be strongly opposed by some in the industry, please take this review back to the farm gate and consider how it affects the returns there. Farmers are too often the forgotten drivers of this industry.
Thank you for your time.
:
Thank you very much for asking me here today. Some of you may know me. Gerry certainly does, and I'm sure David does.
I've been a kitchen advocate for agriculture for many years, and I have a passion for this industry. I also have a passion for politics, because I recognize how both of them work together.
On the decisions here today, I am so thankful to see the government moving to review this institution.
On page 28, there is a quote that says, and it annoyed me greatly when I read it:
It matters hardly at all insofar as the productivity, profitability, and viability of [the] grain sector...are impacted....
And that's basically by the policies of the Grain Commission. I don't think you realize how much this institution affects what I do at the ground level. We are farmers, we are exporters, and we are suppliers to exporters.
When the wheel hits the pavement, the tread marks are on my face and on the faces of the farmers. It is so important that we get this review correct, and that we then go and maybe risk, as Conrad said, some of the institutions that we have grown to love in this country but that need changing so much.
Anyway, thank you for the review. Thank you to the committee members and all the contributors.
I would like to add something to “Challenges Facing Canadian Producers in the Next 10 Years” on page 107. I think one key exclusion from that is the fact that we are competing with the world. I haven't travelled, as many of you probably have, but I face competition every day from the Ukraine, from countries that I do not even know how to find on the map in northern Europe, with names I can hardly pronounce. They are shipping grain into my major markets at $20 and $30 a tonne less than mine. When I say to you that $1 or $2 a tonne in efficiency matters, you bet your boots it matters. It matters so darn much that when I offer, and I am at $20 a tonne over somebody else because I can't compete, you are damn right that it matters how efficient we are here.
It begins with the Grain Commission. I can only tell you how much money I have lost as a company because of improper grading. I ship it, as Conrad says, in the country and it is graded as something, and it gets to the coast and somebody says it is a grade something else. Then the process of review takes that sample and sends it back to Winnipeg and they say, “Do you know what? They're right in Vancouver. Saskatoon didn't know what they were doing.” I would like to add that up. I know that in one instance an inspector took my sample, went to lunch and looked at it over lunch, and then the product entered the vessel, and that delay alone cost our company over $300,000. That sample should have been inspected at the time, immediately.
So it does affect us, and it is important to get it right.
I would like to focus on grade, obviously, which I just have, and I would like to focus especially on your arbitration and your mediation committees. One of the problems I have is that when I have a grade dispute, I feel that the bureaucracy doesn't allow me a method of resolving the conflict. We normally deal with SGS, which is a private grading house. We don't deal with the CGC very often. Mostly we deal with the private grading house. So I do like the contracting out that you have in your policy. I think that's good. I do think you have to maintain the CGC as the benchmark and the provider of the grading standards, but I see no reason why you can't contract it out. We do it already every day.
We're container shippers. We're IP shippers. We ship to world markets, to niche markets, all over the world. So we're doing it. It is certainly possible, and private grading will work. I believe that contracting out, as I said, is certainly something we can use well, but you have to provide a benchmark.
I think you also have to recognize that there are many stages that the CGC does. They do it from the farmer. The farmer can go to the elevator, the elevator can go to me. The big problem we have is that there are many stages of that. Sometimes the arbitrators will have time. In the cases at the port where there is a grade dispute, they have no time. So we need an emergency response team for grade discrepancies that happen at the port that may indeed affect export shipments or the grade of export shipments.
I like research. I like your coordinated report. I like your round tables. But I think the centre should be in Saskatoon. Sorry, but we have the best darn university for agricultural research and we have the best place to have it. If there is a centre of excellence, I'm voting for Saskatoon.
In general, I find the biggest one that I have issue with is the licensing and bonding. We've operated our plant for 25 years. Up until 2006, I was not bonded. I believe it should be optional, because I think farmers know their risks. They tend to trust people. They can do credit reviews. However, if we are implicit upon maintaining risk management....
And don't get me wrong, I do think it's an important part of what we do. Indeed, in the financial times we face with farmers today, sometimes losing $5,000 or $10,000 on a load is key.
The current system, as you know, by Naber and Venture Seeds, is impossible to police. We know by the failure that the CGC cannot expect it to do a job that changes every day.
I see you've recommended this clearing house. I do not know why the committee or Compas did not look at the Ontario Corn Growers' model, which is basically temporary risk insurance that's put in place at the time of delivery. It works very well in Ontario. I would urge anybody in the committee to review that, or if there is an ongoing stakeholder review, as is discussed here, to review the best system, then that should be looked at.
The $1 or $2 a tonne, or whatever the cost of security, is not a cost borne in many of the countries I compete against. If I wanted to run a grain business in the U.S., I would have a $150 licence in many of the major producing states. So let's try to make it simple, let's try to make it bankable, and let's try to make some way that they don't have to be the police. Let's make a system that works for everybody. Like the levies I collect for farmers every time, I could send in insurance remittance that would give them security for the time the grain is exposed. That's a big one for me, because I find that one of the things you don't want to do....
We are special crop producers. We came from the ground up. We're one of the few success stories of Canadian agriculture. We're the little guy. We're not big. But we're in a world that we weren't in twenty years ago. So enable the spirit of the pioneer, enable the builder, enable people to see and to be able to function.
For this risk management and the bond system, I have to have a fair amount of money. If you'd asked me to be bonded 25 years ago, I would have never got Western Grain off the ground, because we didn't have half a million, or a million, or two million. It inhibits my growth. Now that I'm bonded, I look every day at what are my receivables; what do I have in here? And, oh, we can't buy that because we're going to be out of our bond. Let me spend my money buying grain and shipping grain, and let farmers be aware of the cost. That's a big problem: farmers aren't aware of the cost.
At the end of the day, the big one is language. What I really appreciate about this report, and I don't know who to thank for it, is the language. There's a tone in this report that we haven't heard for some time--that is, respect for my industry and respect for it as an industry, and the realization that it serves Canada well. There are many quotes in there that I could pick out. So I really appreciate the language and the tone that recognizes the need, the desperate need, to get this industry profitable again.
I think that's probably about it.
By black box technology, I meant that DuPont has what they call black box technology out there. You can rent one of those machines for $750 a month. Essentially, it uses an imaging process and will tell you in about two minutes what the grain is. They've tested that against CGC inspectors, and it's far more consistent than humans are. It takes the human factor out of it.
As for statutory declarations, the Australians use them all. We asked them if they were followed, and they are followed because the producers police them themselves. If one individual messes up a whole silo of grain for them, they tend to get a little rough with them.
I'll go back to what you said about our being a quality exporter of grain around the world. I agree that we have that reputation, but you can't take a handful of grain and look at it and say that is quality grain. The board and CGC call the U.S. a premium market. If you go to the durum plant in Great Falls, Montana, they'll take durum that you absolutely wouldn't feed to a chicken in Canada. They don't care what it looks like. The quality they are looking for is the intrinsic value of the product, not what it looks like. The board gets blamed for all the trade disputes that we have about getting into the U.S.--and we've had lots of them. Maybe some of them are the board's fault, but too often they're selling our apples into that orange market.
You can go back as far as 1992, when we had frost in our area, in David's area. They sold what was called feed weed into the U.S. It was our grain, and it was classed as feed weed up here. The falling numbers were great in the U.S. It was some of the best milling wheat they had. At three points on that little line--Bracken, Climax, and Frontier--we lost $12 million on that one sale. That's been proven.
A lot of trade disputes we have exist because we give quality grain, but they get quality that they don't pay for. It's not the price so much. You can't mix and match the two systems. You can't use a visual grading system when you're selling into a market that doesn't give a damn what something looks like and instead wants to know what something does. There are going to be problems there, and there will continue to be problems.
As far as our statutory declarations go, we use them here now. There are two durum varieties that are IP'd, and they have no problem with them. We could do that with all the varieties, and we wouldn't have to wait until 2008. We could do it tomorrow if we wanted to, if they would move toward that.
:
What you need from the bonding system is a level playing field for the industry. Right now, I'm sure there are still people in the industry who are unbonded and operating outside the law, as we did for a number of years. There are people who are bonded, like the larger grain companies. I have no idea if the larger grain companies need to have the maximum extent of their grain in a bond. At one time, they did not. That's a question your committee would have to look at. So for the industry players, under the current system, the level playing field is not there.
The recommendations made in August, including the changes that allow us to apply to EDC to be bonded, have improved our ability. It ties up less capital, though it is an onerous process. We report monthly. Within our reporting timeframe, we are expected to be within the levels of our bond. This inhibits our ability to expand our business during peak periods. If we can't come up with more money for the bond, we are limited to it. I know the bonding this year will limit my trade.
I question whether a risk management system for farmers that inhibits business is something you would like to see as Canadian policy. The current bond requirement is fairly onerous. It's very simple to do $7 million worth of business. It's a low margin but a high-volume business.
You want something effective: a level playing field that is efficient and simple to administer and that isn't subject to a regular audit. There's reference in this report to making the CGC accountable and liable to be sued. I would challenge that, because it would be very difficult, unless you're living in that office every day, to know exactly when somebody is over or under their bond.
So I think it's an impossible task you're giving the CGC, and any policy that requires the impossible is not good. We have been part of a committee that was a proponent for many years of the Ontario Corn Growers' Association model. It exists. This is one of the differences between western and eastern agriculture.
The Ontario Corn Growers' model is a system of insurance. You deliver to me, I fill out a form, and I buy temporary insurance until you're paid for. It's been a while since I've reviewed this model. Unfortunately, we had to give up on it because of the current round of CGC that enforced the mandatory requirements we're under now, which I disagree with.
So the Ontario Corn Growers' model is temporary insurance. There was a fee that was charged and it was accumulated. As I understand it, the money held has now gotten so large that the fees have gone down. Keep it simple: KISS. Also, it's bankable. When the farmer delivers, he knows he's going to get whatever was decided: 70%, 80%, 90%, 60%, 50%. When he delivers, he knows what the percentage is.
That's a problem. The report says that the Canadian Grain Commission, in their advertising, went to great lengths to deal with licensed and bonded people. I told I don't know how many grain commissioners that the system just didn't work. So when Naber Seed happened, it wasn't anything new to anybody in the industry. Everyone knew it was possible.
Needless to say, it's not bankable to the farmers, and the CGC cannot police it. So basically I'm in favour of the Ontario Corn Growers' model or something else. Another possibility: there is ''buyer beware'', but I would support risk management that's simple and effective.
The other beauty of this is that it could be extended to other commodities. There are many organic grains not covered, feed grains. It's simple.
So with regard to the part of the report that recommends taking time to find a better system, that's where I would go.
Let's move on to KVD. I'd like to get a handle on what's happening here. It's my understanding that we have this visual system. We also have a declaration. I don't quite understand how the declaration works when the grain is just delivered. Maybe I'll just throw some questions out, and I can get some answers.
According to you, Dr. Fowler, KVD interferes with markets. For example, it can interfere with the possible markets for biotechnology and feedstock. It's not useful.
My question is, why is it still in place? Maybe that's why we have a report, a commission. There are those who have stated they would like KVD to stay in place because they're not sure if there's anything better on the horizon, yet we're hearing that there's a black box technology that isn't expensive--it's seven hundred and some-odd dollars a month to rent. I'm not sure how it works, but it seems logical that if there is a technology, we could use it. If that's the case, why hasn't it been put in place before?
We're the only ones in the world to identify the quality type by KVD.
What's the solution? I'm hearing a bit. I'd like to start with you, Dr. Fowler. Exactly what do we have to do to make this system better, if in fact KVD is not working?
:
I think the first question you have to ask and the first answers you have to get are that there has to be some real evidence that KVD works within the system.
The fact that the Canadian Grain Commission inspectors will not tell me whether my lines will meet the KVD standards unless they have a control variety that has been grown in the same place so that they can make direct comparisons tells you that if you as a farmer were to bring your variety in to deliver that doesn't have that check in place, they can't use the KVD to identify the variety.
The only reason for KVD is to identify varieties that will fit into the quality package that the Canadian Wheat Board is marketing. But there are things other than the genetic makeup of the variety. Environment is a very, very big factor, and environment has a very, very strong influence on the expression of the KVD characters. So if environment is affecting the expression of these characters, then as you move from one environment to another, you're going to see different shapes and sizes.
If you take a sample of grain from southern Alberta in a good year and then another sample of the same variety that is grown in northeastern Saskatchewan when they have high moisture conditions and a drought, you would not even recognize it as being the same variety. Yet we're using that system to identify varieties that are eligible for different quality types that we're marketing.
So the first question that has to be asked is, does that system work? There has to be some proof. We cannot go on the assumption that it works, because nobody has ever provided any evidence. It has been around for eighty years. Has it ever been looked at in the last eighty years to establish whether it's actually working?
The next issue is whether it actually prevents dishonest people--we won't call them farmers, but people who want to be dishonest--from delivering into the system? Grain handlers are handling the grain, and they can do the same thing.
We have lots of instances where winter wheat--as mentioned earlier--has been blended in with spring wheat on the farm, in the grain handling system, and it's going out as spring wheat mostly, because that's where the extra price is.
There was a time when we had contracts with countries like China allowing us to deliver either 3CW hard red spring wheat or winter wheat into that contract. They're priced about the same, so it probably didn't make any difference.
But if an official inspector cannot tell the difference between a mixture of hard red spring wheat and winter wheat--they will not allow us to release those varieties--if they cannot tell the difference between that and spring wheat, then how on earth can one argue that the system is working out in the field? Anybody could mix.
:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have one question. However, I would like to come back to the bonding system you spoke of, Ms. Dutton. I want to be sure I understand.
The purpose of the bonding system is to protect producers and ensure that the companies buying the grain are creditworthy and capable of paying the producer. That is the purpose of the bonding system.
You say that the companies producers sell to have no bonding system. In my opinion, the issue is really that we have a free market system. A producer is aware of the risk he runs if he sells to a business that is not necessarily bonded.
However, you talked about an insurance system and of the some 2% in investments that would represent, as opposed to setting money aside to be bonded, as is currently being asked of you.
Are you talking about a private or public insurance system? The two systems are quite different. Under a private insurance system, the costs go up considerably when there is even one accident. When costs go up, the person at the bottom--namely, the producer--is the one that ends up paying them. Even if the company pays some of them, it's clear that most of the costs will be passed on to the producer. They can't be passed on to the buyer, because it's a question of staying competitive. So there is an issue there, if you're talking about private insurance.
So, I would like you, on behalf of your company, to present your personal vision of how this could work--in other words, what you would like in the way of a bonding system.
:
Thank you for your question.
Previously there was an option for a grower to deliver to an unlicensed company at their own risk, and some people recommend that this indeed be part of the new system. Right now the risk insurance for a farmer is covered by a system of bonds. This means that I have to have, in any given month, enough of a bond held in place to cover the liabilities I incur during that month. To assume that there's a difference in cost between risk and bond is not accurate, because you're still covering the percentage of sales. The only time that's different is when a client is over his bond; then they're not covered for whatever percentage is exposed, and not covered by perhaps not reporting accurately or by whatever system is being bought by non-licensed companies.
With the insurance, I really think we shouldn't focus on what the number or the percentage is, because it will vary. It probably will vary per client. It can be a public insurance or it can be a private insurance. Right now we operate under our export insurance. We use EDC to insure our outgoing exports. We use that as a method to protect our investments. So indeed, upon delivery, the farmer would then be insuring his product during that time.
I find there's a very disjointed understanding of the costs. When I talk to farmers, they tell me they won't pay for insurance for their grain. What they don't realize is that the cost is in the equation, whether I pay it for them, they pay it on their own behalf, or there's some type of cost-sharing.
I think the point you made that is important to focus on is that during the initial stages of any program, there will be an outstanding liability. There won't be a big enough fund, and perhaps the insurance won't be willing to take on the enormous amount of risk that perhaps could be involved. It then would be the role of government to pick up the slack in the terms of overexposure at the time, and to protect and to keep the royalties or the premiums at a lower level.
It's also important to realize that if we are going through humongous changes in our industry.... For instance, in terms of the ethanol and biodiesel component that we're seeing reflected in the study, we're looking at 25% less wheat going out of the country and some 30% less canola. And that's just talking about Canadian statistics; it's not talking about how much is going to happen when we get pressure from the U.S. because they need our grain more. There are some people who feel that our trade will become more north and south than indeed export-oriented.
It's important to ask, if we also look at the Canadian Wheat Board and the changes that may happen, what is the most bankable and simple system?
In my former life, I was a grain producer and buyer. I'd like to draw a parallel with Quebec. As far as grading is concerned, the Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec is responsible for training graders, who are accountable for their decisions. The producers themselves can register with the Régie and become graders.
As well, again in Quebec, every time someone sells grain, he is responsible for that grain. The buyer can always refuse the grain if his grader grades it differently from the sellers. For example, if I'm selling No. 2 corn, I have to provide the weight and the grade. If my buyer determines it to be a different grade--supposing it's No. 3 corn, then an independent grader must automatically proceed with a third grading assessment. Then, if they still don't agree, the case is submitted to the Régie. It is very rare for this sort of thing to happen. Only 3% of gradings are submitted to a third grader, and about 0.8% of gradings are submitted to the Régie. This is a system that makes it possible to resolve a lot of problems in a number of markets.
We're from the East, but we have noted that in Western Canada, that is not at all the way the system works. We have trouble understanding your issues, because we work a different way, which may be closer to the way the Americans work, since we buy a lot of American corn.
In fact, our grading is based on the specific weight, the humidity, and the broken grain in the shipment. In terms of proteins and so on, the grading is done with grain orders called “identity preserved grain”.
I'm trying to draw a parallel between what happens in the West, and your way of grading grains, which is causing us problems. Indeed, it seems that in Western Canada, grain is not graded the same way it is on the world market. You export your grain around the globe, but your grading system does not seem to be internationally recognized. The other countries may have evolved and have moved now to a global system with respect to grain and grading. Or is it because here in Canada, and specifically Western Canada, we haven't gone along with that trend and have thus inhibited developments in that regard?