:
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We'll call this meeting to order and get rolling.
Today we're going to continue our study on the hopper car fleet and railway performance as an overview of that.
With us today, from the Department of Transport, we have Kristine Burr, assistant deputy minister, policy group; Helena Borges, director general, special projects, policy group; and John Dobson, senior policy coordinator, grain monitoring, surface transportation policy. Welcome.
From Canadian National Railways, I understand Mr. Mongeau will be just a tad late. Claude Mongeau is executive vice-president and chief financial officer, and Paul Miller is vice-president, transportation services. From Canadian Pacific Railway, we have Judy Harrower, assistant vice-president, agri-business, and Jim Buggs, general manager, car management. Welcome, folks.
We'll start with roughly a ten-minute presentation, as we generally do. We'll start with the department, if you care to, then we'll move on to questions.
:
Thank you very much, and good morning.
[Translation]
Mr. Chairman, I want to thank committee members for this opportunity to address you concerning the hopper car fleet, a topic of particular importance to the Western Canadian grain industry.
First, I'll provide you with some historical context, in order to explain the role that hopper cars play in the transportation system. Then, I'll attempt to answer questions that have been raised by the parties concerned since the government's announcement on May 4, 2006.
[English]
Mr. Chair, I would like to give you a very brief overview, because I think it helps to shape what has happened over the last few years. The government acquired the grain hopper cars in the 1970s and 1980s when the Crow rates were in effect. The Crow rates were maximum rates for grain movements that dated back to 1897. The government implemented the hopper car acquisition program because the Crow rates had become such that the railways could not recover their costs. In other words, there was no incentive for the railways to invest in infrastructure or equipment for grain transportation.
This issue was addressed with the passage of the Western Grain Transportation Act in 1984, which established compensatory, cost-based freight rates. The introduction of compensatory freight rates eliminated the need for government involvement in the acquisition of grain cars. By 1996 the government moved further toward a more deregulated system by repealing the Western Grain Transportation Act and incorporating the remaining regulations governing grain transportation in what became the Canada Transportation Act. In the 1996 budget the government announced its intention to dispose of the 12,400 cars that it owned.
However, the transaction was delayed for a number of reasons, including a crisis in grain transportation in the late nineties that led to the extensive reviews of the grain handling and transportation system conducted by, first, the late Chief Justice Estey and subsequently by Mr. Arthur Kroeger, a former deputy minister of transport. As a result of these reviews, in 2000 the Parliament of Canada replaced the regulated maximum rates with a grain revenue cap through the passage of the grain reforms contained in the Canada Transportation Act.
Since 2000, Mr. Chair, the railways have had a cap on the revenue that they are allowed to earn from the transportation of western Canadian grain for export. Within that cap they have the flexibility to offer better rates for larger unit trains. This approach was intended to promote improvements in grain transportation by encouraging larger trains moving to port position and in turn improving the speed with which grain moved to market. However, it should be noted that the introduction of the revenue caps included an 18% reduction in the revenues that the railways would have otherwise earned under the former WGTA.
And as you all know, on May 4 of this year the government announced that to maximize benefits for farmers and taxpayers, it would retain ownership of the hopper cars, rather than transfer the cars to the Farmer Rail Car Coalition, or FRCC.
Within that context, I would like to address three key issues that have been brought to the attention of this committee: namely, that the railways have overcharged for maintenance, that the replacement of the fleet has not been addressed, and that there are concerns regarding the future management of the cars.
As you are aware, imbedded in the revenue cap is an amount for maintenance of the hopper car fleet. The amount is based on the costs associated with maintenance of the hopper cars contained in the last quadrennial costing review, performed under the WGTA back in 1992. Since 1992 the railways have made substantial productivity gains in most areas of their operations, including maintenance.
The work once largely performed in railway maintenance shops by large work crews is today performed by a one- or two-person crew in a mobile workshop. Consequently, a gap has developed between what was imbedded in the revenue cap and the actual cost of performing the maintenance work. Some have referred to this gap as evidence that the railways have been “overcharging” shippers for regulated grain movements. Mr. Chair, the revenue caps are monitored by the Canadian Transportation Agency to assure compliance by the railways. The agency audits the railways' revenues from regulated grain movements to determine that they are within the eligible limits. The railways' actual revenues have been within these eligible caps, except that in each of the last two years one of the railways exceeded the revenue cap by a very small amount.
In accordance with the regulations, the railways repaid the excess amounts plus a penalty to the Western Grains Research Foundation. This was all laid out during the 2000 reforms and this is an established procedure.
On May 4 of this year the government introduced Bill C-11 in the House of Commons. It proposes amendments to the Canada Transportation Act, so that the agency can more closely align the costs and the revenue caps with the actual costs of maintaining the hopper cars in revenue service. Until the bill is passed, however, it will not be possible for the revenue cap to be adjusted to better reflect the actual costs of maintenance.
Turning to the replacement of the hopper car fleet, some of the hopper cars are indeed reaching the end of their economic and useful lives. However, the cars were bought over a period of about 25 years, and the majority of cars still have many years of useful life in grain service. A small portion of the fleet will reach the end of its useful life over the next few years.
Mr. Chair, it's important to note that the railways have a statutory obligation to provide an adequate supply of cars under the level-of-service provisions of the Canada Transportation Act. As I noted earlier, the government purchased the hopper cars at a time when the railways' revenues were not compensatory, and this limited their ability to invest in the cars. As we are all well aware, today the railways are on a firmer financial footing and can fulfill this statutory obligation. The railways have already begun replacing some of their grain fleet with larger and more modern hopper cars. Since the railways are responsible for replacing the cars, they are in the best position to determine when and how the federal fleet should be replaced, based on future economic conditions.
It should also be noted that the government originally purchased around 13,100 cars. The fleet now comprises about 12,100 cars, and the cars that have been taken out of service have been replaced by the railways, not by the government. Further, the federal cars represent roughly half of the railways' grain cars. As such, shippers already rely on the railways for a significant portion of the overall grain fleet. The railways are also already making use of high-capacity cars, and it is expected that this trend will continue. With larger capacity cars, fewer cars will be needed in the future than has been the case in the past.
Over the coming months, we at Transport Canada will be negotiating new operating agreements with the railways. At the same time, Transport Canada will also negotiate a refurbishment program with them. The refurbishment work on the hopper cars will include, among other things, appropriate attention to the gates and hatches that may need repair, as well as to other items that had been negotiated with the FRCC.
Going forward, we will also be implementing monitoring systems to ensure that the refurbishment work is carried out, and that maintenance is performed to the appropriate standards, to keep the federal hopper cars in good and safe operating condition. With these measures, we are confident that grain producers will continue to benefit for many years to come from the government's decision to retain the federal fleet of hopper cars.
That concludes my remarks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, members. On behalf of Canadian Pacific Railway I would like to thank the committee for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss the government hopper car fleet.
My name is Judy Harrower and I'm assistant vice-president of agri-business. I'm joined today by Jim Buggs, general manager of car management.
To summarize CPR's position up front, we believe the government has made a good decision in retaining ownership of the hopper car fleet. It restores some certainty to the effective and efficient operation of the grain handling and transportation system. We look forward to finalizing details with Transport Canada on the new operating agreement.
Before delving into our perspective in more detail, I'd like to first tell you a little bit about our company, as it's important context for how grain fits in. Then I'll describe how the current grain handling and transportation system works at CP.
Canadian Pacific Railway plays a major role in the movement of goods across all commodity sectors. Our franchise is national and North American. Our head office is in Calgary, Alberta. We employ approximately 16,000 people across North America, and move approximately 2.6 million carloads of goods every year.
It is an extremely important time for our railway. A solid strategy of revitalizing and expanding our infrastructure to accommodate the growth in demand for transportation of the goods we move is under way. This strategy includes substantial investment and improving the use of our assets to maximize capacity. To sum it up, we are investing in our business--rail infrastructure, locomotives, crews, and railcars--which I will speak to in a few moments.
On the infrastructure side of things, we completed the first step in a major expansion of our network. The work was completed last year, cost approximately $160 million, and involved 25 individual projects. This included extending and building sidings, laying of double sections of track, and a number of other projects.
CP is now able to handle an incremental 12% more demand, starting at Moose Jaw in Saskatchewan, through to the port of Vancouver, which is our fastest-growing corridor. This investment demonstrates our commitment to be a major player in supporting Canada's position as an exporting nation in grain and other commodities, as well as a key player in the supply chain to bring low-cost imports into Canada.
I'll speak to the year-over-year improvement in Canadian grain volume shortly, but it is critical to note that part of this improvement is directly attributable to the capacity improvements we put in place.
Several important developments gave us the confidence that the time was right to make this kind of investment. One of the most important factors was to ensure that there was a stable regulatory and policy environment. The stability factor comes into play when we talk about ownership of key assets that move in this corridor, like the covered hoppers we are discussing today. The second key factor is to have the financial ability to invest. Customers must understand their role in supporting this kind of investment to facilitate their own growth.
Now I'd like to turn to grain. Efficient, reliable, low-cost grain transportation is key if our producers are to be competitive in world markets. There are many players, from grain marketers--including the Canadian Wheat Board--to elevator operators, producers and processors that use grains and oilseeds, export terminals, consumers, and railroads.
Having personally led a number of different commodity groups at CPR, I can attest to the fact that this business is one of the most complex of all commodities we handle. Grain markets are also very diverse. We move western Canadian grain from hundreds of origins to several ports, as well as numerous domestic destinations.
MaxTrax, which is our order fulfillment system for Canadian grain, continues to allow grain customers to order multi-car blocks in advance. This has improved the fluidity of moving grain in all of our corridors, and has led to a reduction in our cycle times over the last few years.
The overall system presents its challenges, but it is working well. It is delivering grain reliably and effectively. Because of deregulation there have been some significant improvements in system performance, especially in recent years. The trend continues and improves the overall service offering to the customers.
I mentioned earlier that I would speak briefly to the volume improvements we've seen in the Canadian grain side of the business. Our volumes are up approximately 25% for the first quarter of this year versus last year. There are four key drivers of this business segment success, in our view. One is better overall coordination with all of the stakeholders in the industry. The second is improvements in car-cycle times. The third is aggressive weekly car placements at our customers' sidings, and the fourth is the capacity we invested in.
I would like to give you some specific performance numbers for reference. The cycle time in our Vancouver corridor on grain shipments improved to 17 days in the first quarter this year versus 20 days in the same period last year. This represents a 15% improvement. The cycle time in our winter rail corridor improved by 7%.
You might ask why we care about cycle time. It's because it creates more overall carrying capacity. A one-day improvement in cycle time is equivalent to approximately 400 to 500 incremental cars of grain moving in a year; for two days it's 800 to 1,000, etc.
We do recognize that agricultural producers in western Canada have experienced major challenges in recent years. The main problems have been drought, excess global capacity, some market-distorting policies like direct subsidization, fuel price increases, and escalation of other farm input costs. But these are not problems created by rail transportation. If you look at Statistics Canada's latest data on farm input costs, it shows that the most significant increases in input costs over the period from 1998 to 2005 were machinery, fertilizer, and fuel. These components alone are up 25%, 35%, and 65% respectively. In comparison, freight rates for movement of regulated grain have increased less than 10% over this period, an increase that is less than the rate of inflation for that same period.
Now I'd like to move to discussing hopper cars. CPR welcomed the government's announcement on May 4 that it would retain ownership of a hopper car fleet. This decision removes the uncertainty around the ownership of the cars and enables the implementation of initiatives focused on improvements in the overall grain-handling and transportation system.
While it's premature to engage in the details of a new operating agreement, we will approach the negotiation from the perspective of pushing the grain-handling and transportation system forward, not anchoring us in the past. An example of what we mean by this would be the overall use of the cars. A revised economic and broader permitted-use model for the federal cars would create incentives for us to potentially allocate a higher proportion of our state-of-the-art new high-capacity covered hoppers in regulated grain movements. These details need to be worked out but would provide for improvements in the grain-handling system that don't exist today.
Our primary concerns regarding leasing of the cars to the Farmer Rail Car Coalition--which concerns were also shared by other important grain industry stakeholders--were twofold. One was the insertion of a new organization into an already very complex grain-handling and transportation system; and the second was the real potential for some reduced system effectiveness and efficiency, for a number of reasons: potential for increased line-haul costs and switching costs, more complex maintenance activities, a potential perpetuation of a non-homogeneous fleet, and overall reduced railway flexibility.
At CP, we have approximately 25,000 covered hoppers in our fleet. This includes about 6,300 federal government cars, 1,000 provincial cars, and approximately 18,000 cars that we lease and own. Our objectives are to look at our fleet in its entirety and utilize the various types of hoppers in the most efficient way possible, and make improvements and additions as the marketplace and economics provide for it.
I'm very pleased to be able to state here today that we are in the process of taking delivery of 500 new high-capacity cars built by National Steel Car in Hamilton, at a cost of approximately $40 million. These cars have 16% more cubic capacity, 9% more content weight capacity, and are 9% shorter, which means 10 more cars can be added to a train set. The cars have a much more robust bottom gate, designed for today's high-speed, powerful gate-opening equipment. The gates are much larger, for faster unloading, and are much more resistant to product leakage. These will be added to our existing fleet of 8,000 high-cubic-capacity covered hoppers.
The government's decision to retain ownership of the federal government hopper fleet and negotiate a new operating agreement should provide the certainty to plan fleet improvements, including the acquisition of additional high-capacity cars. Pending the outcome of our negotiation with Transport Canada, we hope to be able to use more of these cars in the Canadian grain-handling and transportation system. We still have many details to work out with Transport Canada regarding the new operating agreement. Nevertheless, I have the confidence today to say the new agreement will provide multiple benefits to the grain system in Canada--to name a few, reliable demand-based fleet size from year to year and during peaks; an increased proportion of high-capacity cars in the fleet; a program to improve the quality of the federal government hopper cars; and most importantly, the ability to effectively move large amounts of grain to destination markets.
In closing, I would like to thank you for this opportunity and respectfully reiterate our view that we support the government's decision to retain the ownership of the fleet, while negotiating a new operating agreement with Transport Canada.
Thank you.
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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm very pleased to be here with my colleague Paul Miller, from operations, to give you a little bit of our perspective, but also to answer, most importantly, your questions about this important issue.
A lot has been said over the last few years on the hopper car fleet and the maintenance cost issues, and actually the two issues are very much linked.
To give you a bit of context and history as to how we are where are today, a lot of the debate and discussions have been centred on the proposal by the Farmer Rail Car Coalition to take over the ownership of the cars on a go-forward basis. We understand where the Farmer Rail Car Coalition is coming from. There is a need to address, from a policy standpoint, the need to replace that fleet over the long term. Those cars are coming to the end of their useful life, and if we want to have a world-scale grain logistics system on a go-forward basis, we will need to replace those cars in the next several years. So we understand that this is a very significant and very important issue.
The Farmer Rail Car Coalition construct or approach to this problem is also very understandable. In a sense, what they're trying to do is to come forward with a proposal that would replace the cars over time without adding costs to the farmer. If I were a farmer or a grain stakeholder, I would want to have the same basic outcome at the end of the process.
There are, however, two problems with the approach that's been proposed. One is the efficiency of the system and the other one is the maintenance cost offset, or the so-called excess maintenance cost embedded in the revenue cap.
I'll come back to the efficiency problem in a little bit more detail at the end, but the important point is the following: we believe that adding another player to an already complex system would not promote efficiency in the grain-gathering system. What we need is a system that promotes efficiency so that ultimately we have the lowest possible cost and the best service for the grain system. To add another player to switch out cars to do maintenance outside of the rail network would not be productive and would require more cars over time, so we would not really be helping the situation. We are pleased with the government's decision to retain those cars in light of this efficiency reason.
The other issue is the maintenance cost offset. To put it bluntly, the idea from the FRCC was because we needed to pay a lease payment going forward to the FRCC as a railroad, and if we did not want to increase the cost to farmers, we needed an offset. The offset has been debated around the issue of excess maintenance costs. The idea was if you increase the lease but offset it by the excess maintenance cost, you would have a situation where net the cars could be transferred without added costs to the farmers.
The problem with this is that the maintenance cost is a bit of a technical and flawed construct. We believe at CN that the government 15 years ago moved away from a cost-based system. In actual fact, we are not paid to do switching, inspection, or car maintenance as activities. What we are paid for is to move the cars to destinations in the most efficient fashion with a rate that is fair to farmers and fair to the industry participants, railroads included.
The actual fact is the rate we get paid is under a framework of a revenue cap. That revenue cap has been decided by the government, adjusted recently downward, and overall is a very fair rate for farmers. Farmers in Canada pay the lowest grain rates in the world by far. They pay about 35% less on a tonne-mile basis than what farmers in the U.S., just south of the border, are paying to move their products to destinations. There are no questions that the government, in setting the revenue cap, has done something that is very fair to the farmers.
It's also reasonably fair for the railroads. While we do make slightly less money moving grain, we do make enough money to reinvest in the plant, reinvest in assets, and continue to offer good service for farmers on a long-term basis. So we do not believe that there is a maintenance cost issue.
I'd be happy to answer the questions that you have on this particular aspect, but we do believe that the issue the FRCC is putting forward of the long-term replacement of this fleet is one that has to be looked at very seriously.
As I said, those cars are coming to the end of their useful lives. Many of them are obsolete in terms of market demand. They are too small. It's not really economical to replace those cars, and it's not going to give us the best system we can have. We need to decide how we're going to replace those cars. The government has to take a policy stand.
Many years ago the government decided we should move toward a more deregulated framework for grain within the proper safeguards of a revenue cap, one that allows the railroads to foster efficiency to go for market pricing, one designed to get the highest level of efficiency. At the end of the day, the best promise for a good system is an efficient system. We don't need a win-lose proposal. Unfortunately, if we are trying to make a case that railroads have to be paid less because of a technical debate on maintenance, it's not fair for the railroads. It would be good for the farmers, but it's a win-lose situation.
More recently, by asking the government to step in and replace those cars, we created another losing party, the taxpayer of Canada. To replace those cars over the next five to ten years would cost taxpayers in the order of $1.5 billion, if the government has to pay for those cars. It has been decided that is not the best solution. There is a better plan. We can have the best system in the world, we can achieve efficiencies, and through efficiencies we can pay for a good part of the investment required to move toward a jumbo car fleet that will be the best car fleet in the world, in the best grain system in the world, at rates that are competitive, if not far better than what exists elsewhere.
The way to go about this, Mr. Chairman, is to have a win-win-win approach. The solution is right there in front of us. If we focus on efficiency, we can gain cycle times in the use of the hopper car fleet in western Canada, and the productivity derived from faster transit time and faster cycle time will allow us to invest in a jumbo car fleet that will allow us to have better capacity to meet the needs of farmers.
If we focus on productivity and efficiency, we will have more throughput capacity for farmers and better efficiencies, so we'll have lower costs over time. If they have revenue stability in terms of the revenue cap, productivity will allow the railroads to play their part and invest in those cars at no cost to farmers. That is a far better approach, one that is win-win-win. From our perspective, that's what I would encourage the committee to focus on.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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On this question, when you talk about the end of a hopper car's life, there are two parts to that question: the first is from a straight mechanical point of view; the other is the economic life of the car, which Mr. Mongeau was referring to.
In mechanical terms, these cars can go on for a long time. The AAR has rules. For example, cars built before 1974 have a 40-year life, after which they must be retired. The oldest cars were built in 1972 to 1974, and they would have a theoretical mechanical life of another five to seven years. The cars built after 1974 have a 50-year life, as mandated by the AAR, on a mechanical basis. The majority of them have another 15 to 17 years, other than the CN aluminum ones and some of the 2,000 cars that were built pre-1974. It's nice information to know relative to how long you can theoretically run these cars.
The big issue we're talking about is competitiveness. We're talking about choices on how we want to proceed as an industry. We're talking about the total industry, the farmers and the railways, working together towards selling products in international markets. Those are the trade-offs.
What we always get into is this. While it's clear that the new high-capacity cars are more efficient, they are also quite expensive. The cars provided by the government are older and obviously less efficient, but they're provided to the system at no charge right now. The trade-off we want to work through with Transport Canada is that those cars have a value.
As in all businesses, you cascade older equipment into less productive services. There's a high volume in grain, and it's a business that is very good for the railways. Our niche is moving high volumes from a limited number of origins to a limited number of trainload movements, opposed to single cars that you have to gather up and switch through yards, etc.
If we want to be the most efficient, we have to match the two, while capturing the value of the cars. We're going to talk to Transport Canada about broadening the permitted use of those cars so that we can capture value, not only for us but for the system, and work in that way.
The other thing you were talking about was on refurbishment. There are various things, but the biggest issue, as was identified through the QGI report, is on the gates of certain types of cars, as well as the capstans that are used to open them up.
The problem we have is that on half of our cars, first of all, the gates were designed and put on these cars long before the current methods of opening up these gates. In the old days, they used big steel bars. They now use high-powered pneumatic guns, and the gates are not designed for that. Very clearly, when you have a piece of machinery used in an application it's not designed for, continuously year after year, you're going to have some problems.
We're looking forward to negotiating with them now that we have some certainty. Replacing gates is also a costly endeavour. We need some certainty, and we need to negotiate an understanding with Transport Canada. Once we've done that, we're going to do so.
Around or slightly in excess of $2,000 per car is not a bad number over a longer period, without refurbishment. That is running repairs.
Maintenance cost, as an economic activity, depends a lot on the usage of the cars, the volume, and the distance that's being travelled.
The $4,300-per-car number that has been used by FRCC is based on an estimate of what the car cost would have been in 1992. Mr. Atamanenko, 1992 was a 35-million-tonne crop year. That is the highest that we can find on record. If we adjusted the revenue cap in that year to make it equal, we would have had, instead of the $700-million revenue cap for railroads in 2004, a $1.1-billion revenue cap calculated by the government.
The reality is that you have adjust the maintenance cost to the actual volume and the distance being travelled. The CTA, when they did that estimate and debated it publicly, came down to $3,600 as an estimate that would be volume-adjusted. We don't actually agree with this number either, but the reality is we're not talking about $1,600 versus $4,300; we're talking about something much smaller than that, perhaps a lot less than half of that--but we're in a highly technical debate trying to reconstruct costs that 15 years ago would have been 5% of the overall cost structure of a railroad.
The reality is we've moved away from that. Today, we are getting a revenue. That revenue is 35% less than what U.S. railroads receive for the same basic activity just a hundred miles south of the border. The revenue is fair to the farmers, and it's just fair to the railroad.
It is highly misleading to single out the maintenance cost, which is 6% or 7% of the overall cost, and to construct 15-year mathematics to try to get to a number, and it is not very relevant to the long-term issue of what we do to make sure there is enough revenue for the railroads to invest in the cars for the long term and avoid taxpayers' having to spend $1.5 billion to replace the cars.
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How we would love to have that kind of return on capital in the farm community; we don't.
You've said that we should promote efficiency, the lowest possible cost, and the best services. I don't disagree with that point. The problem is that those savings have never been transferred back to the farm community. I mean, you do have a return on capital that is assured to you on your investments. And I can understand why you want to buy hopper cars; if I had that return on capital in my operation, everything I bought with that return in capital would make me money.
Let me put it this way: history has shown that the railways, with increased efficiencies in the system, have never really returned the greatest share of those efficiencies back to the farm community. You haven't; you've returned some, but I am not confident that...and it concerns me.
That brings me to the point about the FRCC, Mr. Chair, which we're here to talk about. I understand that Transport Canada has brought one report to the committee. When can we expect the other two? I understand discussions are taking place with the railways.
We know, as Alex had said, that over the past number of years the railways were charging $4,329 per year for maintenance when the cost was $1,686.
Now, to the railways, can we expect those...I won't use the word “gouged”, but certainly those “excess” maintenance costs, which were applied to the farmers under the cap, to be passed by the railways back to the producers? You've made millions. You've made millions overcharging on maintenance under the cap, and got away with it. Now we're entering a new phase. We want to forget about that old phase where you gouged--I will use that word--the farmers on transport and maintenance costs. Transport Canada let you get away with it.
Can we expect some of those excess maintenance costs to be returned from the railways?
Mr. Buggs, in response to Jacques, you kind of made it sound like you're operating at a competitive price and doing everything that you can to move grain. You kind of made it sound like the railways are doing farmers a favour. The fact of the matter is that on every tonne of grain you move, you make a profit. That's fine, that's fair, nobody's arguing about that. But from the farmers' perspective, in Canada versus any other country in the world, we average 900 miles from tidewater position. Farmers have no other options; there is no competition to the railways. You can't truck grain 900 miles and be competitive.
What's crucial to the farm community is that because there isn't competition and you're both operating under the revenue cap, you have to have an efficient operation. And I will admit that you've come some distance in that area, with better turnarounds and so on, from where you used to be. But there isn't any real competition to the railways from the farm community's perspective. So what's extremely important to the farm community and certainly to us on the agriculture committee is that any cost savings that are made do in fact go back to the farm community.
You guys are doing quite fine; they're not. Their costs have gone up in a lot of areas and they continue to creep up on transportation. That's why the FRCC was so concerned about wanting to take over the 12,600 cars, because they felt they could save the farm community $30 million. The reduction in revenue cap, if the $2 per tonne is saved, will make a difference. But that's a big if. It's “if“ you folks are going to transfer any other efficiencies back to the farm community. That's why we're concerned.
I have to ask Transport Canada about the return on capital. Do you have the figures, John, on what the railways are assured under the cap on return on capital?
I'll come back to my original question. Will we see those other two reports that will give us some data? I recognize it's old data, but the fact of the matter is I personally feel you have exploited the farm community on maintenance costs over the last number of years. I can't forgive the railways for that, and I can't forgive Transport Canada for letting them get away with it.