SNAS Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

¹

1550

The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.))

Mr. Arnold Zeman (Assistant Inspector General, Department of the Solicitor General)

¹

1555

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance)

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

º

1600

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

º

1605

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

º

1610

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

º

1615

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

º

1620

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

º

1625

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. David Pratt

º

1630

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

º

1635

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

º

1640

The Chair

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Kevin Sorenson

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

º

1645

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. David Pratt

The Chair

º

1650

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.)

º

1655

The Chair

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. John McKay

The Chair

»

1700

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Chair

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine))

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

»

1705

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Ms. Joanne Lacroix (Director, Review, Office of the Inspector General of CSIS, Department of the Solicitor General)

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

The Chair

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

»

1710

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

»

1715

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. John McKay

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. John McKay

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

»

1720

Mr. Arnold Zeman

The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings)

Mr. Robert Lanctôt

The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings)

---

CANADA

Subcommittee on National Security of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights

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NUMBER 008

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, May 27, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹  (1550)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. Derek Lee (Scarborough—Rouge River, Lib.)): Colleagues, we are reviewing the estimates for the current fiscal year.

    We have as witnesses today, from the Department of the Solicitor General and representing the inspector general's office, Mr. Arnold Zeman and Ms. Joanne Lacroix. The inspector general himself has not been well and is not able to be with us today, so we're delighted to have the backup team. Hopefully we'll have a good discussion of these issues from the estimates perspective.

    As colleagues know, the actual dollar amounts used by the inspector general are not broken out in the estimates documents--am I right in that, Mr. Rosen? Consequently, we're not dealing with any mathematics directly here. We are dealing with the broader policy issues and the role of the Office of the Inspector General in the functioning of CSIS as one of the oversight mechanisms set out in the CSIS Act.

    Do you have an opening statement, Mr. Zeman? You could proceed with that, and then we'll get to questioning.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman (Assistant Inspector General, Department of the Solicitor General): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your welcoming words.

    What I'm about to read is what Maurice Archdeacon would have read had he been here this afternoon:

    Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I'm very pleased to appear before you today to provide you with some information on my work as inspector general of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. The last time I came before your committee I was the executive director of the Security Intelligence Review Committee, SIRC.

    While the day-to-day work of my office and of SIRC is quite similar, our functions within the national security system differ substantially. This is not surprising. Otherwise, one would be left to conclude that in 1984 Parliament wished to create two review bodies for CSIS with identical functions and purposes. So I welcome this occasion to try to clarify the role of my office within Canada's national security system.

    To begin with, as you know, my duties all relate to the activities and policies of CSIS, but I am not part of the organizational structure of CSIS. I am responsible to the Deputy Solicitor General and therefore part of the administrative apparatus of the Department of the Solicitor General.

    It has been said that the Office of the Inspector General is the internal mechanism of CSIS accountability, while SIRC is its external mechanism, but I don't think that goes nearly far enough in distinguishing my functions from those of SIRC. The best description so far was in February 1991, in On Course, the government's response to the parliamentary review of the CSIS Act: “The Inspector General conducts independent internal reviews for the Minister.”

    Here we get to the crux of the nature of the functions of the inspector general, combining the two notions of the independence and of being internal to the workings of the government. But being internal and being independent would at first glance appear to be in opposition to one another. If the inspector general is part of the system, part of the government, how then can he be independent? Conversely, if he is independent, how can he function within the machinery of government?

    It is precisely in this no man's land between independence and being internal to government that the inspector general's value to the national security system lies. It's also here that the inspector general's role differs so clearly from the other accountability mechanisms built into the CSIS Act. For example, SIRC is independent of the government. It is a creature of Parliament. It is not, nor could it be, within the structure of government.

    Conversely, the Deputy Solicitor General is not only integral to the government's apparatus but is also statutorily assigned functions under the CSIS Act. For instance, the director of CSIS is required to consult her on the general operational policies of the service, as well as on applications for warrants under sections 21 or 23 of the act. These requirements to be involved in day-to-day activities and decisions mean that the Deputy Solicitor General is involved in matters that subsequently will be reviewed by SIRC or by the inspector general.

    The Office of the Inspector General therefore is in a unique position to support the minister's responsibility for CSIS by providing the minister with an internal review mechanism that is also entirely independent of day-to-day operations in a way that his--the minister's--deputy, his department, or the director of CSIS are not and cannot be.

    The effective functioning of the office lies in achieving a sustained balance between independence and being internal to government, two ideas that, as I said earlier, do not easily fit together but are each equally indispensable to our role. If independence is taken too far, it's at the expense of being truly internal to government supporting the minister. Of course, why have an inspector general at all if he is only doing what SIRC is already doing? On the other hand, if the dimension of being internal to government is taken to an extreme, what would distinguish us from the Solicitor General's department or from CSIS itself?

    So both these characteristics of our work, of being independent and of being internal to government at the same time, have to be balanced in such a way as not to err too much in either direction. In our view--and we know this is arguable--maintaining a balance between two competing operating principles is the only way the Inspector General can support ministerial responsibility while also adding some special value to the reviewing and monitoring functions.

¹  (1555)  

[Translation]

    We decided nearly four years ago that, at that time, a particular effort was needed to establish the fact that, while remaining independent, we would be working within the national security system.

    We drafted our strategic perspective—of which you have copies—which was intended to lay the groundwork for building constructive working relationships with CSIS, SIRC and with the department as such.

    We believe that in order to be effective in supporting ministerial responsibility, we have to go beyond merely reporting critical findings—we have to be a part of the solution; in other words, we have to find ways, with CSIS, to develop mutually satisfactory solutions to issues our staff identifies. There is no magic to any of this; it is simply a matter of acting openly and with integrity.

    But it is labour intensive—it requires the investment of a great deal of time in the pursuit of working relationships. We have found, however, that the payoff is substantial. This is not to say that we don't have disagreements and differences of view; rather, we have a foundation of mutual understanding and respect that usually allows us to get beyond conflict.

    How this translates into everyday practice is also simple—open communications and early indication of arising issues, and efforts to address any concerns at the working level before raising the level of discussion.

    Now let me turn to what I regard as our primary role. Again, it is a matter of searching for the right balance; this time, however, the balance is between the importance in a free and open society of protecting individuals against arbitrary intrusions by the state, and the importance of protecting the state itself.

    This is not new; it is indeed the core challenge faced by all intelligence review and oversight agencies in the free world. It is however a challenge that has become more acute since the terrible events of September the 11th.

[English]

    This balance in everything we do as a review body requires a capacity to make intelligent judgments, of course, but it also requires adequate resources, both people and money. Given the increase in the threat of terrorism and the daunting task of finding strategies to manage the analysis and reporting of the truly enormous amounts of data collected every day, this is simply an extension of the growing challenge that security intelligence services themselves and governments are facing. We in turn must determine which of all the extensive operations we will examine and how deeply we will probe.

    So far, because I have a hard-working and quite experienced staff, we have been able to cope with the service's considerably increased level of operational activity. It remains to be seen whether terrorism has reached a peak or will continue to increase in scope and intensity. If it is the latter, then the resources devoted to the agencies tasked with ensuring Canadians' safety may be further increased. This in turn may require an increase in the resources devoted to the review process, because it is not enough that a free society defend itself from danger; it must also do so within the framework of the democratic values upon which it has been established.

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll try to answer any questions you might have as best I can.

    The Chair: Great. Thank you very much for your opening statement.

    We'll go to colleagues now for questioning. Your chair was thinking we'd do seven minutes today. We went through ten.

    Is seven minutes a good fit, Mr. Sorenson?

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, Canadian Alliance): It fits here.

    The Chair: Provided we don't get into the club-sandwich approach. I know we'll cooperate today, and we did a great job the other day.

    Mr. Sorenson, for seven minutes.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Thank you for coming. We appreciate you coming and bringing a little bit of a report from a department, or not necessarily a department, but a position, I guess, I am not familiar with in comparison to CSIS, SIRC, and some of the other parts of the Department of the Solicitor General and CSIS.

    You said in your presentation that your responsibility was more of an internal accountability of CSIS, whereas SIRC was external from government, removed from government, more independent, and would hold CSIS to account from the periphery, or from the outside looking in.

    My question is how closely, on the day-to-day operations of CSIS...? Is this something the minister would have some concerns about? Would he ask the inspector to report back, or is this just an ongoing responsibility the inspector has to keep the Solicitor General informed about things that maybe he needs to be careful about or watch out for?

º  (1600)  

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It's a bit of both.

    Certainly the bread and butter is what you referred to latterly, keeping the minister informed. It's important to emphasize and to note that we're very much a review body, not an oversight body. We review after the fact. We don't provide oversight as things are being carried out.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: So when there is a concern that is voiced or brought forward.... For example, we know how it works with SIRC. If somebody presents a dispute, SIRC reviews it. That's much the same?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: No. If you're referring to complaints or issues raised by the public, we don't have a role in that at all.

    If the minister is interested in a particular problem, issue, or question, he certainly can ask and has asked in the past for the inspector general to do a review, to have a look at it and report back to him.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Fairly recently we had a change in Solicitors General. The old minister went out and the new minister came in. You say in your report somewhere that ministerial accountability is important, or ministerial.... What's the term you used? Ministerial responsibility I think is what you termed it. That may not be the right term.

    A new Solicitor General isn't going to really set the tone for CSIS, will he? I mean, CSIS has its mandate. Everything is ongoing. Is there much difficulty when we have a transition with a different minister?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I'm not really in a position to answer that. I think the Deputy Solicitor General is in a better position to answer that, and I believe she'll be in front of you next week.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Your office doesn't provide a report or a budget. There's nothing that is ever presented to Parliament, so we don't have any detail, really, as to how the budgetary and personnel resources are allotted to you, if they're enough.

    How large a budget does your office have? Did you see a major increase after September 11, for example? Is this something that had an impact on the inspector's role?

    The other question is one the research people brought out. It's a huge concern that since September 11 we have lost some very key people in CSIS and people in intelligence-gathering agencies to the private sector.

    How many people were employed in the office of the inspector general? Are there any positions there that since September 11 have...? Maybe you've needed to increase your resources. Maybe in another way you've lost resources to the private sector. Have you felt those same frustrations that other areas of CSIS have?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: We are a very small organization. We have nine people in total, an overall budget of just slightly over $1 million. But that is for salaries, employee benefits, and operating expenses. The operating expenses are very modest, about $100,000 a year. So of that million, $900,000 is going to salaries and employee benefits, principally.

    Have we lost people? Yes, we've lost people--as their careers have progressed, they've moved on. So far, we haven't been a talent pool for other members of the intelligence community to come along and fish from us, no.

    Did our resources go up in relation to September 11? No, they've been stable for some time now.

    One of our interests in terms of September 11 has been to look at CSIS activities not only in relation to the threat that September 11 represents, but also to ensure that other threats not represented by September 11 but posed by others are also being given the coverage they merit.

º  (1605)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Okay.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Sorenson.

    Mr. Pratt, you'll have seven minutes.

    Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would like to understand a little better how some of the work you do is triggered. Presumably some of it would be triggered by the minister and some from your own internal knowledge of investigations CSIS is doing. Is that an accurate portrayal of the situation?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Conceptually, yes, but in practice it's largely being self-generated. We have a review plan every year. We have some core activities in that review plan that we know we have to look at it in ensuring that CSIS is complying with the law and with ministerial direction, etc.—things such as targeting, warrants, human sources.

    In addition to that—I mentioned how deeply we'll probe—we'll also identify some investigations of interest that we've come across in the previous year's work and probe a little deeper.

    There may also be some issues, as opposed to investigations of Mr. Anonymous, that we want to look at, such as the use of human sources, or weapons of mass destruction. That kind of thematically related area will also be incorporated into our work.

    The short answer to your question is that it's generated by our research staff. Of course, if the minister asks for something, we do it.

    Mr. David Pratt: Mr. Archdeacon has a vast knowledge within the security and intelligence apparatus of this government, and his role as inspector general presumably points him in a particular direction, as far as the certificate process is concerned, in certifying that CSIS is operating according to the act. Does he also provide any information or suggestions to the Deputy Solicitor General about targeting, or that sort of thing?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: No. I would say he's fastidious about not doing that. I think he would view that as compromising his independence. If he were asked to provide advice about targeting and then to look at the targeting decisions and evaluate, assess, and report to the minister, I think he feels, and quite rightly, that he'd be put into a bit of a conflict.

    Mr. David Pratt: I gather that when the CSIS Act was passed, some people felt that having both SIRC and the inspector general was a bit of overkill, that it was maybe too much in the way of review bodies and oversight bodies. Have you any thoughts about or can you give us an assessment as to whether the original framers of the CSIS Act got it right? Is the Office of the Inspector General still feeling its role out after almost twenty years, or are they solidly part of the system and a good functioning part of the security intelligence apparatus in this government?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I joined the office after Mr. Archdeacon was appointed in September 1999. In the period since, I think the office has certainly defined a role that is well understood by CSIS, and it's a role that is quite different from SIRC's. We are not content to review something, identify questions, and then walk away from them. We see our role—and this is the approach Maurice Archdeacon has brought to the office—as working with the service, once questions and problems have been identified, to achieve solutions, so that at the end of the day the service is functioning the way it's supposed to within the security system.

º  (1610)  

    Mr. David Pratt: Is there any more time, Mr. Chair?

    The Chair: Yes, as a matter of fact. There's two minutes and fifteen seconds.

    Mr. David Pratt: Let me get another question in, then, and that is with respect to the whole issue of abiding by the spirit of the law as well as the letter of the law.

    One of my little hobbies these days is the whole issue of a foreign intelligence agency for Canada. I'm wondering if you can venture any opinion as to whether, in connection with some of the foreign intelligence activities CSIS has been involved in, it may be abiding completely by the letter of the law but not necessarily by the spirit of the law in terms of what was intended by the McDonald commission as far as foreign activities by an organization like CSIS are concerned.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I'm not aware of any situation that would lead to making a distinction between abiding by the letter and abiding by the spirit.

    At one point you asked for an opinion, and I'm not sure I know what you want an opinion on.

    Mr. David Pratt: It's as to whether the letter versus the spirit of the law issue comes into play in terms of CSIS's foreign intelligence activities. Maybe I could expand that question a little as well, from the standpoint of asking you if any of the issues that may have been flagged for the Deputy Solicitor General relate to some of the foreign intelligence activities CSIS may have been involved in.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think we're very attentive to CSIS working within the parameters established by section 16 of the act, versus or distinct from the framework that's established by section 12. I am not aware that there has been any problem of spillover, if I could call it that.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, then.

    The Chair: Monsieur Lanctôt, you have seven minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt (Châteauguay, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I would first like to apologize for arriving late. As you know, this is not the only issue we are considering. Things are pretty busy, especially at Public Works.

    Unfortunately I have not read all the documents. However, I do have a few questions about internal activities. Currently, because of internal reports at Public Works, it is impossible to have public investigations. That prevents us from obtaining information that could be seen by others.

    I'm having a hard time understanding how transparent you can be. I must say that I looked at this quite quickly. I do think, however, that according to this definition, it is quite difficult to figure out how independent you are, given, among other things, that you advise the solicitor. Once again, I would like to apologize for being late; perhaps this has already been explained. I do not see how useful this is; this is not part of the solicitor's department. You are in the department, yes, but we already have a commissioner. A commission or a committee already looks into CSIS's activities.

    How do you fit in there, and how useful is your position, really—not for the solicitor, because this is an opportunity for him to obtain additional funding and to benefit from the services of other advisers. How necessary are you for Canadians and, of course, Quebeckers?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It is difficult to know how to begin.

    Of course, there could be a problem in terms of concepts. Nothing is black and white in our office. I would say with respect to this—and this is a very personal opinion—that the British tradition is to seek pragmatic solutions. Sometimes, that can conflict with pure concepts.

    I think that Mr. Archdeacon interpreted the mandate given to Parliament very wisely; his feeling is that this mandate is dynamic to an extent. He is independent, yes, but that means that he is independent from the department and from the deputy solicitor general. He is not independent to the same extent that SIRC is because he is an integral part of the government.

    Why? Because we feel that it is important that the minister himself have access to information and advice within his own department, even if there is no involvement in daily operational decisions.

    I am sorry I cannot give you a clear-cut answer but that is the way Mr. Archdeacon—and I completely supported him in that regard—has interpreted his mandate. His predecessors, however, thought differently. His interpretation is not a comment on his predecessors' approach.

    I would like to say however, that his approach has worked very well in terms of our relationship with the information services and in terms of the nature of the information being provided to the minister.

º  (1615)  

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I understand that it is difficult to apply, and it is especially difficult for us on the outside to evaluate what it is you are providing to the solicitor or to CSIS. If we try to find out more, you will tell us that this is confidential or classified information. We won't be able to find out more.

    We are involved in a movement to modernize the public service, as I am certain you are, and we have been considering several types of structures--not only horizontal structures--to make the public service more efficient.

    I don't know who makes the appointments. Is it the minister?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman The governor in council.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: So once again these may be rather special or partisan appointments.

    I have a problem with some things, Mr. Chairman. We are not considering the issue of budgets today and I do not have the necessary documents. However, I think that there is a problem because of how the appointments are made and because we don't exactly know what they are doing.

    Thank you for your presentation, but I think that the committee should look at this structure more closely. We should assess how useful it really is.

    How many people are part of your organization?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: There are nine of us in the office.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Fine.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That includes Mr. Archdeacon. That is not his staff.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Since when has the position of inspector existed?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Since the service was established, in 1984.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Fine.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It may have been one year later, rather.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Was it the solicitor general who wanted that position or was it rather CSIS who requested an internal inspector who could serve as an adviser?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It was a legislative proposal made by the government at the time.

º  (1620)  

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: We have had discussions; I don't know if this was established by decree. Was it a regulation or a law?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It was an order in council.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: An order in council, so a regulation. Did officials themselves decide that they wanted this kind of internal inspection? Is that what this comes from? We should be able to find out why this position was created.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Throughout the legislative process, the government received advice from officials of the Department of Justice and other interested departments who make proposals. You know that better than I do.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: It is just that I was not here in 1984. I am asking you when this was created, upon whose request and why. It is not very complicated. I do not know if my question is clear.

    I understand that this was done by the governor in council, but in 1984, was the request made? Was it upon request of CSIS or the Solicitor General? Where did that request come from?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I cannot answer that question because I do not know the details.

[English]

    The Chair: I think I can.

    In 1984 Parliament passed the CSIS Act, and the CSIS Act itself provided for the establishment of both SIRC as an external review agency and the Office of the Inspector General, who would perform the review function for the Solicitor General and would annually produce certificates as to compliance by the service—CSIS—with the law.

    This may help you, Monsieur Lanctôt. When Parliament reviewed the CSIS Act in approximately 1990, it was the Deputy Solicitor General who said “Please don't take away our inspector general”. Even though it appears that from time to time the work of the inspector general might be redundant and similar to that of SIRC, the Deputy Solicitor General said he—they, the office—very much needed the inspector general to be their eyes on CSIS. That's a bit of the background historically.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you very much for giving that historic background. If what you say is true, that shows that your organization—and I am sorry about your positions—must be subjected to the public service modernization process. There must be things that are no longer useful and that could be cut, but we must not eliminate the eyes of the commission or the commissioner. The commission must have more money, more employees or more resources, be they human or monetary, to do the work that must be done, that is monitoring what CSIS does.

    This is what is going on at Public Works. Things are examined piecemeal and then we get an internal report. When we take a look at this, we see that it is enormous. A few months later, they prepare another internal report and it is even bigger. It is too bad for many members of this government because they are not involved in this. Every time, things are reported in dribs and drabs in an internal report. This leads me to believe that you draft internal reports and if the commissioner does not have enough resources, he looks at the report and sees that special things are happening. Because he has no resources, he takes the work that you are willing to give him.

    I think that in a free and democratic society, there must be organizations like SIRC. I do not necessarily think that your jobs must be within the department, because the fact that the Solicitor General pays you does not bother me one bit.

    Perhaps I did not read your documents carefully enough, but I think I read enough to form an accurate impression of the situation. It may be a good idea for the committee to review this, because we have not evaluated this since 1990, which means 13 years. It is not a matter of assessing the competence of individuals, but rather how your group of inspectors has been useful to society and to Canadian citizens.

    It may be better for you to be part of the department, and that the commissioner be given more resources to monitor what CSIS does. What you do is top secret. It would be interesting for us to know a little more.

º  (1625)  

[English]

    The Chair: We can see that Monsieur Lanctôt has developed a sharp knife over at Public Works and Government Services.

    Mr. Sorenson. We're back to five-minute rounds now.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: I don't think that Mr. Lanctôt has necessarily developed a sharp knife, other than maybe wanting to understand the responsibilities. I think that's a specific good request.

    Does SIRC ever ask you to do an investigation? Or does SIRC, when they are given a responsibility of holding CSIS to account or reviewing CSIS's activities, ever come to you and say they need help in this?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: The reason I'm hesitating is because of your comment about they need help in this. I don't know that they come to us and say they need help, but they certainly have come to us and asked us to do work on their behalf and to report back to them. Indeed, the CSIS Act provides exactly for that, for that committee to require some work to be done for it by the inspector general.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: Can you answer Mr. Lanctôt's question, why have an inspector general? He's answering to the Solicitor General or the Deputy Solicitor General, so why not just have that extra million bucks in the Solicitor General's department and let him...? This is all interdepartmental. We're talking about CSIS, which is part of his department. We're talking now about the inspector general, which becomes part of his department, or was removed from it but is somehow answerable to him. Why not just say to the Solicitor General, here's another $500,000, or here's another million dollars, or whatever you need, and make sure that you have that liaison, or that somebody who is keeping the deputy informed as to what's going on in your own department, in another arm of your own department? Why have another bureaucracy, or why have another level of some agency set up there? Isn't it all just Solicitor General resources?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: My answer, and my comment to what you've just said, is that there are people far better qualified than I am to express an opinion about that. You're going to really a public policy issue, which, as parliamentarians, you're in the best position to deal with, to debate.

    What I would mention is that I think it's important to look at the context. The chairman provided some of that context. It goes back even further, to the McDonald commission of inquiry into what existed before CSIS took over that role, and to what the experience was of the predecessor to CSIS.

    I'm really not in a good position to debate the advantages or disadvantages. All I'd simply like to do is say that there is a context, an historical context, that we as Canadians went through, that I think needs to be looked at as well.

    The Chair: Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. David Pratt: If I could maybe make a vain attempt to add to the discussion here, I think what Mr. Zeman is getting at is the fact that we did have a problem with the old RCMP Security Service, and as far as the Office of the Inspector General of CSIS goes, my sense is--and I don't want to put words in your mouth--that the issue is really, who guards the guards?

    It's really important, from the standpoint of public accountability, that this not just be sloughed off into the Solicitor General's department without any formality and without any amount of structure, because--

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: There is no accountability--

    Mr. David Pratt: There is accountability within the system. That's what I think we're getting at here. This accountability has to be formal, and it is formal within the system. It's set up by statute. There are specific estimates that have to be approved in terms of the Office of the Inspector General.

º  (1630)  

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: We don't know what they are.

    Mr. David Pratt: We have an idea, in terms of what we just mentioned, a budget of $1 million and nine staff persons. That is where the formality exists, because in a less structured environment where a few people were assigned to this function by the Solicitor General or by the Deputy Solicitor General, they could be subject--if it's not in the statute--to any cutbacks or administrative restructuring to essentially move them out of that function entirely unless it's set out by law, which is what it is.

    Again, I don't want to put words in your mouth, Mr. Zeman, but if it didn't exist, it would probably have to be invented in some respect, given the sensitive nature of the work that CSIS does. That's my impression.

    If I could get a question or two in as well, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to get a sense as to the nature of the certificate that's provided by the Office of the Inspector General in terms of what it contains by way of analysis and recommendations. Are we talking about a very thorough canvassing of the issues in these certificates, or are we talking more about broad brush strokes in terms of where CSIS has gone, what it's doing, and whether or not in the assessment of the inspector general it's meeting its mandate?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: We start very much with the whole purpose behind the certificate as stipulated in the act--namely, for the inspector general to indicate to the Solicitor General how satisfied he is with what the director of CSIS has said in his annual report.

    Our approach has been--and it's different from the previous offices of the inspector general over its twenty-some years of existence--that this is not our raison d'être to have this certificate, to say how much work we've done and where we've done it and what good people we are in doing it. Rather, what we believe the minister needs and wants is an independent sense of “Can I believe this? Is it working, or isn't it?”

    Furthermore, it doesn't do the minister very much good, or the system very much good, if we come along and say this isn't working and here's why it's not working. It doesn't do very much good simply because, one, practically that's one thing that SIRC does, and two, being part of the inner workings of the government, we have more of a responsibility than that. If we see something that isn't working, we deal with it right away with our counterparts at CSIS—the people we speak to, the people we obtain information from—and we try to work it out. First of all, if there's a misunderstanding, we clarify that. If it's factual, we try to clarify that. If there's still a difference of view, or a difference of opinion, we try to fashion something that will resolve it in such a way that they can get on with their work and we, in all good conscience at the end of the cycle of review, can say to the minister that things are working.

    We see our role as to give the minister solutions, not problems. It's very easy to go in and say you're not doing this right and let me look over your shoulder, and you're not doing that right and we got you—the policy says such-and-such and you goofed. At the end of the day, our view is that's not very helpful. There are other instances, like SIRC, that do that.

    Mr. David Pratt: Right, but presumably the reports would vary from year to year, depending on the service's activities, first of all. You must have had at some point, let's say over the last ten years, certain instances when the Office of the Inspector General may have been critical or highly critical of the service, and other instances when the certificate indicated satisfaction with what was coming out of the service. Can you comment on that?

º  (1635)  

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: When we do have criticism, we see our challenge as to address that right away, and not wait for the certificate—I'm sorry to sound like a broken record—but to work with CSIS officials to address what our criticism is and to be satisfied that steps are taken by CSIS such that our criticism no longer applies.

    Mr. David Pratt: I'd like to follow up on that, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: We can come back to you.

    Mr. Lanctôt, for five minutes.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I am getting a strange impression. Imagine the comptroller of a private company. Usually, this comptroller asks an external comptroller to help him and solve problems. However, many comptrollers do the opposite. They try to hide their problems from the external auditor. In the public sector, comptrollers have no choice; they must cooperate with external auditors who have a job to do. They conduct audits, not just review engagements.

    We get the impression that you can act as a comptroller. You are an inspector, but you have become someone who controls. You were telling us, Mr. Pratt, that someone has to control those who control or monitor those who must monitor. It must be up to SIRC to do that. It should not be done internally. You can write anything you want in a report, especially if you have things you want to hide. Then you will do anything to draft an internal report.

    I have to broach this issue of integrity because you are part of the same department and this is a file that is so top-secret. We are talking about an intelligence service. This audit must be done by SIRC. Incidentally, does SIRC have enough resources and how are appointments to SIRC made? I think this amounts to the same thing. There is always a lack of transparency that leads citizens to ask themselves certain questions.

    There is such a lack of transparency in your organization that I have difficulty trusting any of this. You are part of the department, of course. You do internal audits and there are auditors in every department. Conduct your audit, but do not have the gall to tell us that your internal report guarantees that we know what the Solicitor General or SIRC are doing with information.

    As you said, you are examining a problem and you are trying to give advice to the minister or the Solicitor General. You may also be tempted to say that the problem is so severe that it may be best to put it on ice and see whether SIRC will find it. It is really up to SIRC to do this work rather than an internal organization.

    That is part of the modernization of the public service. This is what parliamentarians must change. The people in place are not responsible, they have a good position, an interesting job, some might even say very interesting. Is that the best way of doing things? We must not give faulty definitions here. You are a comptroller. You are an internal inspector for the department and nothing else, really. Eventually, an assessment will be done on whether this part is necessary or if your work is simply duplication. Perhaps we should improve SIRC instead.

    Someone from SIRC has already been here, and we did not go into these things in depth. We are often told that it is a matter of lack of money and staff. Perhaps that is the problem. Perhaps we would get more information then and I am not trying to be critical of you in saying this. It is a job. The position exists and so much the better. I am sure you are very competent people. You might also be just as competent within SIRC, even though some people might prefer to remain on the inside.

    You have not convinced me. You had convinced me in 1984 and in 1990, but I would like to review all that. The subcommittee will decide whether it is appropriate to re-examine this if we are to report to the minister.

º  (1640)  

[English]

    The Chair: Any comments, Mr. Zeman?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: No.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Sorenson, then Mr. Pratt.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: When we saw CSIS go from 2,800 personnel to 2,000, would that have been something that would have been a concern to the inspector general? Is that something he would have brought to the Solicitor General?

    When we hear in the newspapers that there's a breakdown between the passing of information between CSIS and the RCMP, are these some of the inner workings such that the inspector general would then go to the Solicitor General or the Deputy Solicitor General and say, “Listen, here's the issue. It's in every paper across the country. Here's the issue from the angle that we see it while we're working there with CSIS. Something has to be corrected here.” Is that part of what you would do?

    Are we getting value for the dollar? Is the public getting value for the dollar, or is the Solicitor General getting value for the dollar? I don't think either answer would be necessarily wrong.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: With respect, I think you have to ask that of the government and ask that of the minister. I really can't add to that, one way or the other.

    The Chair: Yes. You're asking Mr. Zeman to self-assess his own organization, but the Deputy Solicitor General will be here next week. This inspector general function operates very close to the eyes and ears of the Deputy Solicitor General, so that question can certainly be put next week.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: But can you answer whether, in either of those situations--I'm not going to ask whether you did counsel the Solicitor General or the Deputy Solicitor General--is that the type of--

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Excuse me. Issues like those you've described are certainly of interest to us. But as I've tried to explain, we try to work with CSIS to look at areas of interest, to see whether there are any concerns--any concerns that we have--and then address them directly with CSIS.

    Mr. Kevin Sorenson: You're working together with CSIS. You're evaluating CSIS and then you're working to solve the problem within CSIS. Doesn't CSIS have people in positions who assess areas, like any business? I have a business. I'm a small-business owner. I'm constantly evaluating, assessing how I can be more efficient, how we can do business better. This is part of what any businessman does on a day-to-day basis. Here we have an outside organization or agency assessing CSIS, working with CSIS, trying to help CSIS become better. Is that what I've heard?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: With great respect, I would say I'm trying to describe what we do, and I really can't talk about whether we should or shouldn't or how we should or shouldn't. Those are not issues I can deal with. They're very much issues for you; I appreciate that. They're issues for you to deal with the government on, I would humbly say. But they're not issues I can respond to. I can really just tell you what we do. I can describe it. You're asking for a justification, yea or nay, and I'm just not in the position to provide that.

    The Chair: Just for the record, if it will place this in some context, there's a whole set of comprehensive ministerial directions under which CSIS operates. Compliance with those directions and operations in accordance with those directions is one of the measuring sticks that I believe the inspector general would be using in keeping an eye on the service--these are my words--guiding the service, if guidance is needed.

    Mr. Pratt, do you have additional questions?

º  (1645)  

    Mr. David Pratt: Yes. I want to go back to the issue of the relationship between CSIS and the Office of the Inspector General.

    I presume that you are able to resolve some of these difficulties that may arise periodically with CSIS on a very congenial basis, but I imagine there must have been, over the course of the history of the organization, some instances when there was simply a difference of view between the agency itself and the Office of the Inspector General. Under those circumstances, presumably, there must have been a measure of—I wouldn't say confrontation—a very serious difference of opinion as to the direction CSIS might have been going in, in terms of particular investigations, and the direction the Office of the Inspector General wanted to see them go in. Would that be safe to say?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I suppose it would, but I have to quickly add that I don't have direct knowledge. My direct knowledge is since September 1999. Perhaps going a bit out on the limb, I would say since the appointment of Maurice Archdeacon, he certainly reserves the right on a matter that he judges of such importance where there is a disagreement to do that—to go directly to the minister and say this is a serious problem. Going out on a bit of a limb, I'm not aware that this has happened since his appointment.

    Mr. David Pratt: Have you ever seen a circumstance where the inspector general and the director of CSIS would have been in the same room with the minister, arguing their side of a particular case?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Have I personally ever seen?

    Mr. David Pratt: Or has it happened, in your knowledge?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: No.

    Mr. David Pratt: Okay.

    Can you provide us with some information as to the extent to which CSIS is forthcoming on the requests for information and the timeliness with which you folks receive the information that you feel is needed to be able to do your work?

    I'd also like to get some opinion on the extent to which your not being able to have access to cabinet confidences affects your work.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: On that latter issue, that doesn't seem to affect our work at all.

    In terms of availability, in my experience, since Maurice Archdeacon's appointment, it's been very good. Timeliness--there's always room for improvement, but largely it's been very good.

    Mr. David Pratt: In terms of any types of reform processes that you're aware of, have any other security services adopted the SIRC and inspector general model, the internal-external review body model?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: There are a lot of models out there. The Canadian model is one of them. I think it's fairly unique, but so are all the other models. They seem to be a function of the particular country's history and tradition. The answer is no, I'm not aware of anybody following exactly that.

    I believe the South Africans have shown a good deal of interest. What they have actually done I can't speak to with any confidence. The Mexican authorities were also quite interested, but what has happened I really don't know.

    Mr. David Pratt: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    I'll go to Mr. McKay in a moment.

    I want to address an issue that perhaps came up as we dealt with the RCMP, and I realize the inspector general has very, very little to do with the RCMP.

    Within the intelligence-gathering network relied on so heavily these days by the Government of Canada are CSIS, CSE, and the RCMP. CSE has, if I could call it, an accountability mechanism called the commissioner, which now happily is in statute form. I can claim authorship of the House motion that put the commissioner in place in the first place. It seems like a long time ago. CSIS has the inspector general and SIRC.

    It appears to me that the RCMP doesn't have a review mechanism. It has a complaint body, but as an agency operating within the Solicitor General's department it doesn't have that structured review mechanism. When CSIS was created, if I could say this, the spy function was removed from the RCMP, although it was realized that the RCMP would continue to gather criminal intelligence.

    But now post-9/11 the RCMP has been re-resourced big-time. The RCMP appears to be gathering intelligence, looking an awful lot like the kind of intelligence it used to gather when it needed to do the job pre-1984. While there is pretty good evidence that CSIS and the RCMP are getting along pretty well—there is not too much duplication and there is not too much overlap—my concern has to do with civil liberties. I have absolutely no evidence that the Mounties have done anything wrong in this envelope, but I do raise it as an issue that one of the intelligence-gathering bodies the government is relying on heavily does not have a review mechanism targeted at civil liberties or compliance with procedures the way CSIS does, the way CSE does.

    I'm just wondering if the Office of the Inspector General in its work has noted the movement or a shift in focus or a new stream of intelligence data that comes from intelligence gathering coming from the RCMP, and whether or not it has been noted in a way that I, as a legislator, might want to hear something about.

º  (1650)  

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Well, I think the short answer to that question is no, it has not been noted in our work. We are aware of what you are talking about, though, and the issue you set out. We are aware of it in the same way you are aware of it, but not directly through our work.

    The Chair: If CSIS has to gather intelligence in relation to a terrorist threat, it does so within the ministerial directions and under whatever watchful eyes of the mechanisms that are there—the Federal Court, warrant process, SIRC, the inspector general. But the Mounties have none of that. I would have thought it would be a much quicker fix to simply get the Mounties to go and do it on the street, go and get the information from the street as quickly as they could with the help of CSIS. The Mounties seem so much less restricted structurally in knocking down valuable street information.

    I'll just leave that. You've made your comment that it hasn't come up as an issue.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think the only other comment of any use I could make very quickly is that the police in our system and in the British parliamentary system have had and continue to have different operating rules, a different context from the intelligence services. That's all I can say, really.

    The Chair: Mr. McKay, did you have a question?

    Mr. John McKay (Scarborough East, Lib.): Just a brief question, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being late. I haven't been schizophrenic in a long time, so I can only be in one place at one time.

    Security Intelligence Review Committee in the chart here on page 7 has some sort of a broken-line relationship between itself and the inspector general of CSIS. Then when you go to page 10, it says, “To conduct such reviews or specific CSIS activities as SIRC may direct”. I'm not quite sure what that makes you. It makes you look independent, but on the other hand it makes you look like an in-house arrangement.

º  (1655)  

    The Chair: I have to say, Mr. McKay, this precise issue was addressed by Mr. Zeman as he began his presentation, that they're somewhat schizophrenic in their view of themselves. They're not too sure whether they're in-house or outside the loop.

    In any event, go ahead and put the question.

    Mr. John McKay: Your function is that of a bipolar disorder.

    Can you give me an example of what SIRC would direct you to do? I can recall a few years ago that there was some concern that Kurds from Turkey were being interrogated by CSIS for reasons not having much to do with Canadian security and having more to do with possible other connections of helping out their international brothers in gathering intelligence information. That did come up from the SIRC representatives.

    Is that the kind of directive or mandate you would receive from SIRC, to inquire into something such as that?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It could be really anything, and it's really up to the SIRC committee themselves. The one example that I perhaps can give you over the time I've been in the office came out of newspaper reports of a former employee who made certain allegations about the use of the personal health files of employees. We were asked by SIRC to look at those allegations.

    Mr. John McKay: How often would SIRC actually ask you to conduct an investigation?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's the only example that I can recall in nearly four years.

    Mr. John McKay: This little line between you and SIRC is quite tenuous indeed.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: It's dotted, and you quoted from the act, and the word is “may”.

    Mr. John McKay: They haven't actually exercised this option?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Not since 1999. Of course, they have their own research staff.

    Mr. John McKay: Are you somewhat redundant, then?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: You're asking me for something I can't really give you. I can't give you an answer. I can only really describe what we do. I can't talk about whether we're justified or not justified. That's really for you in Parliament.

    Mr. John McKay: No, I was just curious, since you've only been used once in four years. What would be the circumstance or what would be the rationale for using your office, as opposed to doing their own internal investigation?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think you'd really have to ask SIRC that. Sometimes--and I think it was a case with the example I gave you--it's just their own particular priority. Something comes up that hasn't been anticipated. The committee may feel they want to have a look at it, and if the inspector general can do it, that frees up their resources to do other things.

    I don't want to leave anyone, though, with the impression that we're sitting around waiting for the phone to ring and SIRC to tell us what to do. That's a provision in the act that SIRC in its wisdom can use or not. In the meantime, there are other provisions in the act that govern what we do--the review of operational activities, the monitoring of compliance, and the preparation of the certificate for the minister.

    Mr. John McKay: Thank you.

    The Chair: I suppose the real question, and it comes up all the time, is how do the inspector general and SIRC avoid duplication between themselves when they do their review of CSIS? Perhaps the answer is obvious, but I'm sure you'll have a quick answer to that one.

»  (1700)  

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: The obvious answer is that we talk to each other a lot from the beginning of our respective review cycles on through. I have made the argument, though, that there is just a certain amount of overlap going to take place, and that's natural.

    We tried to indicate in Mr. Archdeacon's opening remarks that we do the same sorts of things—we review activities. SIRC has the additional responsibility of public complaints. Essentially, we're reviewing for compliance against the law, ministerial directives, CSIS operational policies, but we're doing it for different purposes, for different masters, if you will. In the case of SIRC, their master is Parliament. In the case of the office of the IG, our master is the Solicitor General.

    The Chair: Another question to keep the record up to date. Ministerial directions, do you see them? Do you review them? Do you comment on them?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Yes, no, and no. We see them; we don't review them or comment on them.

    Ministerial directions, like other matters, are policy questions. We don't deal with policy at all. Once the policy's established, we review against.

    The Chair: You use them as your measuring stick for the service. Okay.

    Ms. Jennings.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings (Notre-Dame-de-Grâce—Lachine)): I apologize for not having been here for your presentation. I was detained in the House for debate on the Public Safety Act, Bill C-17.

    I have reviewed the notes for your statement and the document here, which is “A Strategic Perspective for the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.” I want to just piggyback a little bit onto the question of the chair on the issue of whether you see ministerial direction. You said yes, but you don't comment on it, etc. But you do have to review CSIS compliance operationally once that ministerial direction has been given.

    Now, when you do your reports annually.... I've sat on review bodies in the past, and we generally come out with a statistical model that says, for instance, we conducted x number of investigations, a certain percentage of them were of this nature, others of this nature; that we produced a total number of x number of recommendations, and, as a novelty, we began reporting, as the Auditor General of Canada now does, how many of those recommendations are actually implemented in a subsequent report.

    Do your reports follow that model? Once you've done an investigation—you've reviewed compliance on the operational side, for instance, one year—do you go back at a later date to see if your recommendations, if indeed you make recommendations, have been followed up or not?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I guess the best way of answering that is this is something we are struggling to do.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): Why? Why is it that you're struggling to do it?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Because we're nine people.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): In other words, you don't have the resources? I'm saying it.

    If you're struggling to do it because you're nine people but you recognize the need to do that to be an effective internal oversight body, then it means that you're lacking resources somewhere.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think one could say that, and you have.

    We're working our way towards having a better internal management reporting system to understand precisely, with hard data, what kind of job we're doing. We're not quite there yet.

    Why haven't we done it up till now? The urgent has driven out the important.

»  (1705)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): The other question I have is there are in fact internal audit agencies, review agencies, that exist and existed before the Office of the Inspector General. Have you done any kind of outreach in terms of looking at the kinds of best practices that have been put into place by say the Auditor General of Canada in terms of the best practices for actual audits, for follow-up, for the kind of value-for-money reporting, etc.? Are these issues your office has been able to look at and, if you have the resources, implement, and if you don't have the resources, request those resources to implement?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: The short answer is yes.

    You mentioned the word “outreach”. With your permission, I would like our director of operations to perhaps talk a bit more about that.

    Ms. Joanne Lacroix (Director, Review, Office of the Inspector General of CSIS, Department of the Solicitor General): Thank you very much for raising that point, because during the last fiscal year we identified that certainly the internal audit and evaluation functions within the government are key for accountability. In fact, we took steps in the recent months to seek out other departments.

    We recently have conducted quite an interesting sharing of information with Industry Canada in their internal audit and evaluation group to do exactly what you said, to share best practices. We have identified a core group of clusters within what we call the security cluster, agencies and departments who conduct internal audit and evaluation, and we plan to meet with them to share best practices, to fine-tune what Mr. Zeman has mentioned in terms of creating greater efficiencies. When he's referring to struggling, it means that we're just at the beginning stages of that right now.

    It's something I'm glad you raised, because we've identified it as being important as well.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): Thank you, Ms. Lacroix. Thank you, Mr. Zeman. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Jennings.

    Monsieur Lanctôt, did you have additional questions? If you do, I'm going to ask Ms. Jennings to take the chair. Is that all right?

    Ms. Jennings, could you assume the chair?

    Monsieur Lanctôt.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Thank you.

    What was your budget before September 11 and what is it now?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I do not have the figures in front of me, but I think it is about the same.

    We can provide this data to the chairman of the committee later.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Do your nine employees work in the office or in the field?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: What do you mean by that?

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Are these employees administrators or do they do investigate in the field to see what is done?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: There are six employees in the field, as you would say.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: What kind of training do they get?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: They have a wide variety of backgrounds. Some have come from the CSE, the Communications Security Establishment. Once in a while we also get someone from the Privy Council Office. One of our current employees was a former intelligence agent with the intelligence service. We also have someone with a legal background. We don't only look for people who are good at analysis, but also people who have experience with conflict resolution.

»  (1710)  

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: So, these are people who only review what has been done.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Yes.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: These are not technicians who do electronic surveillance, for instance. Rather, they do the same thing as intelligence officers.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: No.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: These are people with a legal background or who come from within the Privy Council Office, but whose work is bureaucratic. They monitor what is being done and the reports which have been produced.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's correct.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: These people do not monitor the ones who do electronic surveillance to ensure that they are doing a good job and that they obtain the proper warrants. They simply go through the paperwork. They don't look into how the work was done.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's true up to a point. We review the files very closely, and we sometimes ask questions. When that happens, we ask for clarification from CSIS officials. It's not simply a matter of doing the paperwork, because we are also in direct contact with people who have direct knowledge of certain operations or investigations.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: But it's not a matter of monitoring those who do surveillance. No one goes to keep an eye on people in the field to make sure they're doing their job well.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's correct, and that's why I was trying to distinguish between oversight and review.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: That's what you do.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Yes.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I'd like to come back to your organizational chart. Mr. McKay asked almost every question I had intended to ask. Mr. McKay, you should have told me and I would not have come. You could have asked your questions and I could have read the transcription.

    However, there is one question with regard to the organizational chart which was not answered. Mr. Lee, our chairman, inadvertently talked about the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. He corrected himself and instead referred to the committee and the solicitor. You have a very close relationship with the director of CSIS, but this relationship is not indicated in the organizational chart. Why is it not there, when you give the solicitor advice? You also talked about solutions. If you have solutions, you will certainly share them with the director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service.

    Your little box should be located between the one with the Solicitor General and the one with the director of CSIS.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I would respectfully submit that that is not the case. From an organizational point of view, we really don't have anything to do with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. Despite the fact that my boss is CSIS's inspector, we are not part of that organization.

    We are also not with SIRC, but there is a legal provision giving SIRC the right to ask certain things of us.

»  (1715)  

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Such as executing a warrant.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: CSIS's director does not have that right.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: Does it work the same way with the RCMP Commissioner? Does the review committee mandate you to establish links with the RCMP Commissioner and review whether information gathered by the RCMP is related to security?

    The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings): Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.

    You may answer, Mr. Zeman.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think that it would be difficult for the SIRC to ask us to do something like that because, as far as I understand, the RCMP does not come under the SIRC's mandate.

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: So, there ought to be a dotted line between you and the review committee.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That is your perspective, but in my opinion, we do not have the same relationship with the SIRC as we do with our contacts or with employees of the service.

    The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings): Thank you, Mr. Lanctôt.

    Mr. McKay.

[English]

    Mr. John McKay: You have all kinds of time when you don't need it. Thank you, but I don't have any questions.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): You don't have any questions.

    Mr. John McKay: Can I save this for the justice committee?

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): Unfortunately, no.

    I just have one final question. Coming back to the issue, you talked about how you don't consider the inspector general to be an oversight body but rather to be a review body. You review after the fact. Well, part of the mandate of review bodies after the fact, whether they are internal or external, is to not just look at whether procedures were followed, but to look at the procedures themselves, because at times procedures can be followed, but the procedures themselves are faulty or sometimes the policy itself lends itself to what could be abuse or unacceptable behaviour.

    Within your mandate, do you see that as part of your mandate?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think Mr. Archdeacon, if he were here, would say no, that function is a function for the Deputy Solicitor General and her department.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): Why?

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: Because it goes to the desirability or the appropriateness of doing X or Y. The way Mr. Archdeacon sets out his approach is we take a given, whatever that given is, and we review against that. We are not there to give policy advice to the Solicitor General; we are there to provide a review. There already is a responsibility centre for providing policy advice on CSIS--namely, the department itself and the Deputy Solicitor General.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): I understand the difficulty in the sense that your primary role is not to provide policy advice. However, most review organizations at one point have been called upon and have had to, in order to do their job effectively, examine a policy, because the policy was at the root possibly of the difficulties the agency they were reviewing was experiencing.

    Given that part of your job is to report to the Deputy Solicitor General, for that Deputy Solicitor General to be able to do that policy review once it's been operationalized, it would seem to me that the review agency, which is located internally, would be a mechanism, not the only mechanism, but would be a mechanism or a tool for that Deputy Solicitor General in his or her policy review.

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's certainly a model.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): But it's not the model--

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: That's not what we do.

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): It's not the model that the current inspector general or Office of the Inspector General does, and it's not the model that is being used by the Deputy Solicitor General.

»  (1720)  

    Mr. Arnold Zeman: I think I can safely say that.

[Translation]

    The Vice-Chair (Ms. Marlene Jennings): Mr. Lanctôt, if you have no further questions, I will...

    Mr. Robert Lanctôt: I have more questions, but I am tired.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mrs. Marlene Jennings): Okay.

    Mr. Zeman, I thank you very much on behalf of the chair and the members of this committee, and Madame Lacroix as well. Thank you.

    This meeting stands adjourned.