NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, November 4, 2003

Á

1150

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

The Chair

Vice-Admiral Greg R. Maddison (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence)

Á

1155

Â

1200

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance)

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Â

1205

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Colonel J.A.G. Champagne (Director, Land Force Readiness, Department of National Defence)

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1210

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.)

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Â

1215

Ms. Anita Neville

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Ms. Anita Neville

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Robert Bertrand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Robert Bertrand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Â

1220

Mr. Robert Bertrand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Robert Bertrand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Claude Bachand

Col J.A.G. Champagne

Mr. Claude Bachand

Col J.A.G. Champagne

Mr. Claude Bachand

Â

1225

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Claude Bachand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

Â

1230

The Chair

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Â

1235

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Â

1240

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1245

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Col J.A.G. Champagne

Mr. Jay Hill

Col J.A.G. Champagne

Mr. Jay Hill

Col J.A.G. Champagne

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1250

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

Â

1255

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Robert Bertrand

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Col J.A.G. Champagne

The Chair

Col J.A.G. Champagne

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

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1300

The Chair

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

Mr. Jay Hill

VAdm Greg R. Maddison

Mr. Jay Hill

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 042

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Tuesday, November 4, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1150)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

    We are pleased to welcome today three witnesses, Colonel Champagne, Vice-Admiral Maddison, and Colonel Snell.

    Welcome, gentlemen. We have one item of business that we'd like to deal with before getting to your comments. That involves the report from the ombudsman with respect to unfair deductions from SISIP payments to former CF members.

    I have the motion here from the October 30 meeting. For the benefit of members, the motion reads as follows:

That SCONDVA receive the report of the Ombudsman on “Unfair Deductions from SISIP Payments to Former CF Members”, October 30, 2003 and that we implore the Defence Minister and government to accept and enact the recommendations forthwith.

    That's the motion. I think we pretty adequately dealt with these issues at the last meeting, so I think we can just call the vote on it.

    I think Miss Grey was moving it, seconded by Mr. Price.

    (Motion agreed to)

    The Chair: Thank you, members of the committee.

    Now to the task at hand, the study of Canada-U.S defence relations.

    Vice-Admiral Maddison, I would like to give you the floor right away. We've kept you waiting long enough.

    Vice-Admiral Greg R. Maddison (Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff, Department of National Defence): Thank you very much.

    Mr. Chairman, members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs, good morning. It's a real pleasure for me to be here today, accompanied by Colonel Mike Snell, from the policy shop, as well as Colonel Gerry Champagne from the army staff, to discuss with you the Canadian Forces mission in Afghanistan.

    I have some remarks, as you've said, Mr. Chairman, that I would like to offer to the committee, after which I would be delighted to answer your questions.

[Translation]

    As this is the first opportunity I've had to address you since the beginning of the Kabul mission, I would first like to give you an overview of the mission, emphasize the Canadian contribution and tell you what we've accomplished to date.

[English]

    As you know, the International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, was authorized by a UN Security Council resolution in December of 2001. The ISAF mission is to assist the political Afghan transitional authorities in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas so that both local and international authorities can operate in a secure environment. NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF mission from a German-Dutch led contingent in August of this year.

    The Canadian government's overarching goal in contributing to ISAF is to prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into a failed state that provides a safe haven for terrorists and terrorist organizations to operate at will. Working with other nations, our key short-term goals for Afghanistan are to support the central authority, to improve people's lives through enhanced security and aid, and to deny the resurgence of terrorist conditions that could give rise to another September 11.

    In doing so, the Canadian Forces are pursuing their work as part of a strategy that was and continues to be closely coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian International Development Agency, CIDA. We are united on diplomatic, development, and defence fronts--referred to as the “3-D” approach--to help foster growth and to help foster pluralism in Afghanistan.

[Translation]

    The present mission of the International Security Assistance Force is made up of some 5,300 troops from 31 different nations. Today, over 2,040 Canadian Forces troops are deployed there and account for some 40 per cent of the total force. Slightly more than 1700 people are posted in Kabul, the others being deployed at our support base outside of Afghanistan. The Canadian contingent is the biggest national contingent in Kabul.

[English]

    Let me touch briefly on our specific contributions to ISAF. Currently we provide selected key staff and leaders within the ISAF headquarters, including the deputy commander, Major-General Andy Leslie, who is also the overall commander in theatre for the Canadian contingent. We provide the Kabul multinational brigade headquarters staff, including its commander, Brigadier-General Peter Devlin, who has three battalion groups working for him, including a Canadian infantry battalion group comprised mostly of members of the 3rd Battalionof the Royal Canadian Regiment in Petawawa. The other two battalions come from France and Germany.

    The area of operation assigned to the Canadian battalion group is southwest of the city of Kabul, and covers close to 200 square kilometres, which is roughly the equivalent of the greater Ottawa area. Close to 800,000 people live in this sprawling Canadian sector. The sector patrolled by Canadians is part of the city but extends beyond the city limits into mountains and into the rural areas. The role of the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment consists of conducting security patrols, observing and monitoring the security situation, as well as assisting the Afghan national army and the local police in the course of their duties.

    Daily, up to 300 Canadian soldiers are involved in the conduct of routine operational patrols. These operations include foot and mounted patrols, day and night, using both light armoured and unarmoured vehicles. Canadian troops also occupy observation posts and conduct surveillance operations throughout their area of responsibility. Recently, Canada began to assist in training the Afghan army itself in basic infantry and artillery skills.

Á  (1155)  

[Translation]

    The Canadian operational force also includes many support elements such as military police, logistics experts, engineers and health service personnel. Finally, we also have an in-theatre support base providing supplementary logistical support for our troops as well as national transport elements which are Hercules airplanes in this case.

[English]

    This is a sizable military force. Deploying and bedding down this force in Kabul was no small task. The preparation of the theatre for the arrival of the Canadian troops was made possible, in large part, due to the initial deployment of what we call a “theatre activation team”. This specialist group, formed from elements of the joint operations group based in Kingston, deployed in late May to conduct all the pre-deployment activities to receive the main body.

    These tasks included a number of reconnaissance missions in and around Kabul to assess the best camp locations and to determine the support and logistics available in Kabul; to conduct negotiations with the ISAF headquarters and individual nations for the use of existing facilities such as the Kabul International Airport; to oversee contracts for the construction of the camp, which we have named “Camp Julien”, and for the provision of supplies, such as fuel and food and water; and to plan for and conduct the staging and reception of all the equipment and personnel in Afghanistan, equipment that was being shipped to Turkey from Canada and subsequently flown direct into Kabul.

    Having a specialized theatre activation team deployed ahead of the main elements of the Canadian task force allowed the main body contingent to literally hit the ground running without worrying about constructing a camp and without worrying about setting up all the logistical arrangements that are necessary. This new doctrine of theatre activation is clearly a success story from our point of view, and many of our NATO allies have expressed a strong, strong interest in our rather novel approach.

    While our main task in Kabul is clearly to assist the Afghani authorities in maintaining security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, our soldiers are also improving the lives of the Afghan people. As part of the Canadian contingent, we have a civil-military cooperation component, commonly referred to as CIMIC. The CIMIC teams are working within the Canadian area of responsibility to meet the most urgent needs of the local population. They are coordinating with non-governmental organizations, NGOs, for the construction and repair of schools. Through funding from CIDA, we are providing new water pumps, repairing infrastructure, and acquiring school and medical supplies.

    As a result of the team's efforts, existing wells are being repaired and new ones are being dug. Water is a key, key asset to the people of Kabul. In the health field, CIMIC teams are providing assessments to determine what is required. As one small example, our troops provided wheelchairs, supplied by an NGO, to those most in need.

    These are only a few examples of the many activities that go into winning the hearts and minds of Afghans.

[Translation]

    Moreover, in order to support local authorities, the Canadian Forces are supporting the training of the Afghan National Army in Kabul. This training is consistent with the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force and represents one more element in the multidimensional task that Canada is pursuing on this mission.

    From the security point of view, the situation in Afghanistan is precarious and this country is still a dangerous place. We had evidence of this again a few weeks ago with the death of two of our soldiers on patrol a few kilometres only from Camp Julien.

[English]

    There has been an increase in the number of extremists in the southern and eastern parts of Afghanistan. Whether this will manifest itself further in Kabul itself is still unclear. Our intelligence has shown that extremists are regularly planning attacks on westerners, on aid workers, and on Afghan government members in rural areas outside of Kabul and the rest of Afghanistan. And they are using a variety of techniques, including mines, roadside bombs, shootings, and rockets.

    Attacks in Kabul proper have so far been numerically limited, despite the bombing of a German bus in June, the September 11 rocket attacks on one of our ISAF camps in Kabul, and the early October mine strike, of course. These events confirmed a general overall threat assessment that we have had for some time.

    This threat and these recent incidents have reinforced our aim to do whatever we can to provide our troops with the best support possible. This is not simply a concern for those of us in uniform but for the entire defence team, both civilian and military.

    We've provided our people with some excellent equipment, including remotely piloted vehicles that allow Kabul to be surveyed from the air, and from which information can be used by the commander on the ground.We've provided them with target acquisition radars, which can detect incoming projectiles. They have new night vision equipment, new combat clothing, new laser sights and laser designators, as well as artillery and light armoured vehicles.

[Translation]

    Our soldiers were provided with excellent training before their deployment and have been provided with robust rules of engagement. They are some of the most dedicated soldiers, the most professional, in my opinion, and the most experienced in the world and they have enormous experience in this kind of demanding operation. They acquired this crucial experience in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and during other complex missions elsewhere in the world and we have learned important lessons that we are putting in practice every day in Afghanistan.

[English]

    Of particular note, we will assume command of the mission in February of this coming year, with a strong leadership presence marked by the designation of Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier as the ISAF V commander.

    Mr. Chairman, let me conclude by saying that I have no doubt that we will successfully carry out this important mission in Afghanistan. We have excellent soldiers, we have superb training, and we have the best leadership on the ground. We have a NATO general who recently said that, should Canada leave, he was unsure if anyone else in NATO could do as well as Canada has been doing in Afghanistan--high praise indeed. Canada is making a major contribution to the stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan, in my view.

    Thank you very much for your attention.

    Merci beaucoup.

  (1200)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Admiral, for your comments.

    Mr. Hill, would you like to start off the questioning.

    Mr. Jay Hill (Prince George—Peace River, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Thank you, Admiral, and your colleagues, for appearing today to throw some light on the developments in Afghanistan, in particular; obviously that's where you targeted your remarks this morning. It's appreciated.

    I wonder if I could ask a couple of general questions in regard to the equipment, first of all. You mentioned in your submission the equipment that our troops have on the ground in Afghanistan. Perhaps you could help me then understand the ratio and how that works in decision-making that would take place over there.

    Some of the criticism I've had...and I myself have been criticized as somehow wanting to be an armchair general, or to second-guess decisions taken by the commanders in the field. I want to assure you, right up front, that's not the case.

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Who said that?

    Mr. Jay Hill: Well, he'll have a chance to defend himself later, I'm sure.

    At any rate, I want to assure you that's not the case. I just want to try to better understand how decisions taken by the government, specifically on equipment purchases and what equipment our troops have for their use, could impact on the decision-making process.

    How many of these lightly armoured vehicles, like the LAV III and the Bison, do we have over there in relation to the Iltis? That would be my first question.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thanks very much, Mr. Hill, through you, Mr. Chairman.

    First of all, let me preface my answer by saying that an awful lot of study and analysis is done when one determines what one needs in a mission. We sent over both a strategic reconnaissance team and a tactical reconnaissance team into theatre to determine what we needed to be able to be successful. We obviously saw what our predecessors were using, and they were using similar equipment to what we are using now--different makes, but similar equipment--in terms of the mix that's required of light and armoured vehicles.

    Once that's done, we do an analysis with the army to determine whether or not something makes sense. We concluded that this mix was absolutely essential for us to be able to do our job--to not only have sufficient force, if required, but also to allow us the flexibility to actually get to win the hearts and minds of the folks in Afghanistan.

    When the theatre activation team went in to activate the camp and to prepare for the arrival of the troops, they reconfirmed that this mixture was exactly what we needed to have, because what we wanted to achieve was to make sure that, (a), we're visible, and (b), we can actually try to understand and deal with the locals in terms of what it is you really need. And it's very, very difficult, with just armoured vehicles, which travel at certain speeds and blow past people, to actually get to know the people.

    So you had to figure out what balance of vehicles was required--

  (1205)  

    Mr. Jay Hill: I'm going to interrupt, if I may, because time is of the essence. I have only a few minutes, and then it's a long time before I ever get a chance again, if I do.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Okay, sorry.

    Mr. Jay Hill: My question was more about the actual mix. I think there are roughly 100 Iltis versus 50 LAV III and Bison vehicles...?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: There were initially 90 or 92 Iltis vehicles in theatre. Then we realized that with the environment in which they're operating under, in terms of the dust and so on, the commander in theatre needed more flexibility in terms of having more Iltis. At any given time, about 7% or 8% of the Iltises are down for maintenance, so we put in another 30. So we now have about 120 to 125 Iltises in theatre, and we have 55 or 56 armoured vehicles in theatre at the moment. Another 10 or 11 are going in over the course of the next week to 10 days.

    So to answer your question, we have about 65 armoured and about 130 Iltis.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Do you know how many of them are in the personnel transportation configuration? Because my understanding is that some of these vehicles are configured for different tasks--for example, on ambulance duty or whatever.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: They are. Some vehicles are designed for administrative business in terms of moving people around at the airport, for example. Others are used in terms of reconnaissance, and others are used as command and control platforms as well.

    I don't have a specific percentage breakdown of the Iltis fleet in those three roles. Perhaps Colonel Champagne has that at his fingertips, but I don't have the exact breakdown, Mr. Hill.

    Do you have that, Gerry?

    Colonel J.A.G. Champagne (Director, Land Force Readiness, Department of National Defence): No, sir. We're only talking about the capability, and in theatre that's what we're using them for.

    Mr. Jay Hill: If you perhaps could find this out for us, I would be interested in knowing how many of the light armoured vehicles actually are in the configuration for carrying the personnel on patrol. In other words, they're configured for that task.

    I mean, obviously if it's a tow truck or if it's an ambulance it doesn't do the commander on the ground much good as far as trying to decide, based on his risk assessment on any given day, whether to use an Iltis or whether to use a LAV III. The LAV III would have to be in the right configuration to carry out the mission that day.

    At the end of your submission, I was interested...and first of all, I just want to state again that I think that we're all in agreement--to take partisan politics out of the equation--with the conclusion at the end of your submission today, that there's no doubt that we will be successful. I think all of us universally hold our armed forces in the highest possible regard. That's unquestioned.

    I was interested, just before you got to your summary in your submission a few moments ago, that you said, and I quote, “These events confirmed a general overall threat assessment that we had for some time.”

    Now, what we heard following the tragic incident of the mine that killed two of our troops was that the threat had changed at that moment. What I would ask you, I guess, in the little bit of time that I have remaining, is whether or not you would be able to address how it is the risk assessment is done. Walk me through how the equipment that would be at the disposal of commander on the ground could impact on his decision as to which equipment to use on any given day.

    You mentioned the high maintenance ratio for the Iltis. I'm assuming that the LAVs are a lot more dependable, but obviously they have to be maintained as well.

    You can rapidly see where I'm going with this line of questioning. Of the 55 to 65 light armoured vehicles that are at the disposal of General Leslie and his commanders to utilize on any given day, if only half of them are in the right configuration, and of those, if only a certain percentage are ready to be utilized on any given day, obviously that's going to impact on his decision as to which vehicle to use. And that's the concern that I have. How is that risk assessment done?

    And when you say “we had for some time” felt that the overall threat assessment was quite high, how long...?

  (1210)  

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Let me say, through you, Mr. Chairman--

    The Chair: Perhaps I can just interrupt for a second.

    Mr. Hill, you're well over your time right now, but because the question is of, I would say, high importance, we'll allow the admiral to respond fully.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: The first thing we did, obviously before we even deployed our forces, was an overall threat assessment as to what was the real threat to our people. And we were obviously well aware that there is, and has been for years, a significant mine threat in Afghanistan. Somewhere between 9 million and 11 million mines are estimated to be placed in Afghanistan.

    We were also aware that there are groups of people in Afghanistan who don't want to have any progress made with respect to the legitimacy of President Karzai and his government, or future governments, in Afghanistan, and were quite prepared to try to disrupt both the coalition activities as well as the ISAF activities in Afghanistan.

    In theatre we have a very robust intelligence cell. It's a national cell, but it also works with our coalition partners. And that cell is very responsible to try to determine if there are specifics that can be determined as to whether or not somebody is planning an actual operation against ISAF, against a particular nation, against the coalition that's run by the Americans outside of ISAF, etc.

    The assessment done by the commander on the ground was that in the area in which we were operating, yes, we knew that there were likely to be mines around there, but the roads had been travelled on, the engineers had done some mine-clearing operations, and about a dozen different vehicles had gone down that road. So in terms of managing risks, his assessment--obviously, we will have this further clarified when the board of inquiry results come in--was that given that there had not been an incident in this area, given that we had not seen anybody in terms of trying to do anything against the force, and given the fact that the vehicles had gone over there previously, we could go down there with an unarmed vehicle.

    That's a very, very difficult decision for a commander to make. He takes all those factors into consideration before he makes a rather sober decision as to when he should allow unarmoured vehicles to go and when he gets indicators that, yes, the threat in this particular area may be a little higher--and let's admit, that's in relative terms in Afghanistan--so that he would want to provide armoured vehicles to provide that additional level of protection to our troops.

    So quite a number of factors are taken into consideration by the commander--with his staff, as well, in terms of making those daily decisions.

    The Chair: I'm going to have to cut it off at this point, but there are some other issues that you raised, Mr. Hill, that I'm sure the admiral can address, especially in terms of the configurations of the vehicles, a little later on.

    Ms. Neville.

    Ms. Anita Neville (Winnipeg South Centre, Lib.): Thank you.

    I'm really interested in learning a little bit more about the theatre activation team. What difference does it make? How many people are part of the component? How does it compare with what's been done in the past? Is it a continuing unit that stays in place, and what role will it have in working with other countries in developing that...?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you very much for the question, through you, Mr. Chairman.

    This concept was initially thought about or commenced for our mission actually in Ethiopia and Eritrea. We decided to do this on a relatively modest basis then, and the success we had caused us to really look at this seriously for the mission in Afghanistan.

    Really what it does for you is this. In the past, the same people who were going to be executing the mission, and doing the patrols and so on, also at the same time had the responsibility to build the camp and to make all the logistical arrangements, which kind of detracted from the primary reason as to why they were in theatre. So we concluded that what we needed to have was a group of specialists who could go in and do all of that for them.

    A large number of these people are military, but quite a number of civilians are part and parcel of this team to provide a level of expertise to assist our people in doing so. In fact, there still are a number of civilians in Camp Julien in Afghanistan who are providing support in terms of feeding, of water management, of sewage treatment plants that we've got in place, some engineering support, support to communications. They've actually freed up about 80 to 100 of our own soldiers by having a civilian contingent support this.

    So this team went in, did the arrangements, built the camp, and were protected by a defence and security platoon from another battalion of the RCR, 2 RCR, to do this. We wowed our allies when we did this, because they were all doing it the old way. We had all sorts of people come in and take a look at what we were doing, and say, “This is a no-brainer; why haven't we thought of this before?”

    So there has been a fair bit of exchange of information being done between ourselves and the Americans, ourselves and the British, and the French, and the Dutch, etc., in terms of, “How did you do this, Canada? This is really rather clever.”

    I think that we will probably see that our allies will seriously, as they are at the moment, at the end of the day actually follow the same sort of approach in future missions.

  (1215)  

    Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Let me just also add, if I may, Mr. Chairman, that they belong to a group of folks who are in Kingston. They were about 250 folks who went into theatre, the same group that will go in when the mission's over to close down the camp. And that will be useful, because the main body won't have to do that.

    Ms. Anita Neville: Thank you. It does seem like a no-brainer, actually.

    The Chair: Thank you, Ms. Neville. You still have some time, so I'm going to give that time to Monsieur Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Merci beaucoup, monsieur le président.

    I have just a few questions for you, Admiral. Do we have any Coyote reconnaissance vehicles over there?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Yes, we do. We have the LAV III, we have the Coyote vehicles, which are part of the reconnaissance squadron.

    What's the exact number, Gerry, in terms of the Coyotes?

    I think it's about a dozen or so, Monsieur Bertrand. I don't have the exact number here. But to answer you, yes, we do.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Are they used extensively?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Very extensively. Of course, if I could put it in the context of that intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance capability that allows you to know what is going out further away from the camp and further from where your patrols are, they are literally your long-distance eyes and ears as to what is happening within your area of responsibility.

    There's no other contingent deployed in Afghanistan as part of ISAF who has that kind of capability, that quality of being able to monitor what's happening within our area and to feed that information back so that platoon sergeants, platoon commanding officers, and the commander himself can make the right decisions as to where to deploy people.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: I also have just a quick question on the mine-clearing capabilities on the roads. What is used to clear the roads of mines?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: To clear the roads, Mr. Chairman, it's a combination of a group of engineers in there who have some special equipment that allows them to actually detect mines. Then there's also a particular vehicle that has a number of sensors on board that one can use, and that is used quite extensively, to go out and clear the routes so that our folks can actually go down them. This is another capability that no one else in theatre has. So it's a very busy capability. It's called the ILDS, which, if I've got it correctly, is an acronym for the improved landmine detection system. This is a Canadian initiative that was implemented some years ago. It's a very good capability.

  (1220)  

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: And how many vehicles of that nature do we have?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: There's just the one vehicle that we have with that kind of capability.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: How many kilometres of roads would it have to clear, for instance?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Well, we're in an area, Mr. Chairman, of about 200 square kilometres that we're responsible for. Some of it is downtown Kabul, where, of course, there's traffic all the time, and therefore it's not used in the city itself. But some of the roads that we wanted to use and do use are in the rural areas and in the mountainous areas, so that particular capability is probably used almost constantly to continue to clear the routes and to “re-prove” the routes, to make sure as best we can that the roads are secure for our people to travel on.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Bertrand.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank the admiral for his presentation.

    Admiral, I'm from the Vandoos. I had the honour of training with the regiment and going to Bosnia where they were deployed. Knowing that they are next on the rotation list, my questions will deal essentially with that matter.

    First, I'd like to know if the training at Fort Drum is finished. I'd also like you to tell me when the regiment is scheduled for Sherbrooke. Could you explain what they're going to be doing in Sherbrooke—I imagine they're not going to be engaging in any assaults against the downtown area—and tell us if they're still at Fort Drum?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Chairman, I could ask Colonel Champagne to give you a more specific answer. In my opinion, the level of training at Fort Drum is appropriate for urban combat missions. They've reproduced a little village of the kind found in Afghanistan where our soldiers can get used to operating in that kind of environment.

    As for our rotation to Afghanistan, I'd like to point out that there was a little village like that in Petawawa, but we didn't have its equivalent at Valcartier. That's why the army decided to use the village at Fort Drum.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Are they still at Fort Drum?

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Mr. Chairman, they're winding up their training and they'll be going to Sherbrooke. To answer your question on their training in Sherbrooke, I'd say that in the context of a deployment in a theatre like that one there are different stages and the Sherbrooke one is specific to the theatre of operations. They will be using that sector to familiarize themselves with an urban environment, which is more appropriate. It won't be like the training at Fort Drum where all armament is deployed and the training is high intensity.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Are the soldiers going to be walking around with arms in downtown Sherbrooke? What are they going to be doing there? They can't start shooting off their weapons downtown.

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: No, sir. This training will be dealing with things like traffic control, for example.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Fine.

    Admiral, I get the impression that the operation zone in Afghanistan will be extended beyond Kabul. Is that so?

  (1225)  

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Chairman, at the present time, NATO is talking about possibly deploying outside the City of Kabul. We may decide to do that, but... I'd prefer to continue with my answer in English, if you don't mind.

[English]

    NATO has made a decision to have a trial in a city outside of Kabul. That city is Kunduz, where the Germans are planning to put in what is called a ”provincial reconstruction team” under the ISAF mandate. If that trial is successful, and if NATO can generate other forces, then in principle--because no decision has been taken--they may expand the ISAF mandate outside of Kabul.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: If the operation zone is extended, then we're talking about another kind of mission. By that I mean that we'll have to engage in another kind of reconnaissance. Earlier on, you said something about drones. Now, it seems to me that I have read that those vehicles, in an environment like Kabul, didn't have very many problems, but as soon as they are used in mountainous areas, they start facing problems.

    As for the materiel we have available, you said there were some 120 Iltis and about 65 armoured vehicles. Are we going to keep the same kind of equipment if we extend the operations zone? It seems to me that in such a case the mission is going to change. Those are the questions I have and I'd like you to try to answer.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you very much for your question. As we speak, there is no plan providing that Canadian soldiers will be engaged in operations outside the area they are now in. NATO, on the other hand, might choose later on to send forces there, but for the time being, considering the number of soldiers we have, we will be remaining in our sector near Kabul.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: If NATO were to decide to extend the operating zone and asked Canada to contribute to that effort, would it be possible for us to change the present mission in order to extend our patrols over a broader area? You'll agree with me that that is a change in mission which would require major adjustments to the next rotation. Isn't that so?

[English]

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, to expand the mission outside of Kabul, it's my estimate that you would need more forces to allow you to be successful to do that.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Is it possible to witness the training? As I was saying, I'm from the Vandoos and I'd like to know if it would be possible for me to go to Sherbrooke, for example, to see how things are done? Should I address that request to the minister or the parliamentary secretary?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: For yourself? The request should be addressed to me, not the slightest doubt about that.

[English]

    And for anybody else who wishes to go to Sherbrooke to view the training, we'd be delighted to show you that.

    The Chair: Thank you for that invitation, Admiral.

    Mr. LeBlanc, do you have a question? No?

    Mrs. Wayne.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Vice-Admiral, I had one of the members in uniform come to me, and they were worried about the Hercules.

  (1230)  

    The Chair: Mrs. Wayne, can I ask you to speak into the mike?

    An hon. member: Elsie, we can't hear you.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, somebody said that to me last night.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: I can certainly hear you.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's good.

    I spoke at another function last night, and my husband was there. He happened to say that they were all saying they couldn't hear me. He said, “Elsie, just speak to them the way you speak to me at home, dear, and they'll all hear you, that's for sure.”

    No, I don't holler at my husband.

    At any rate, it's when I was in Newfoundland that this gentleman came up to me and said, “Mrs. Wayne, we don't have the parts for our Hercules, and we don't have the money in the budget for the parts for our Hercules. Is there any way that you could help us? We have to have our Hercules parts or we have to have new ones, one or the other.”

    What is the situation over there with regard to the Hercules that you have?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Mr. Chairman, let me say that the real workhorse for us is actually the Hercules fleet. They do an incredible amount of work, and the people who fly them do an incredible amount of work, for us. They may be one of those components in the Canadian Forces that is least known in terms of where they operate and how successful they've been over the course of the last number of years. But there's no question that they are used a lot, and therefore the maintenance and the repair parts and so on are in great, great demand.

    We currently have a number of Hercules in theatre who are specifically tasked to support our mission in Afghanistan. There are a couple of projects in terms of both the search and rescue capability that the Hercs support domestically as well as the tactical airlift requirement that are currently being very much supported and analyzed and studied and so on within the headquarters. And the minister himself has basically said that there are three or four key capital areas of enhancement that he is really causing the leadership and everybody else to sharpen our pencils on and to really focus on.

    One of them, of course, is MHP, one is the whole army transformation issue, and the third one is the Herc replacement. So the materials ADM has been very, very active in terms of searching out there on the world market, if you will, to try to get more spare parts for the Herc fleet, because they are absolutely key to our success. They're trying to accelerate the maintenance cycles for the work on the Hercs. And then, of course, this work is being done in terms of the future as to how we replace this capability, which is so key to us.

    So it's a fundamental issue for all of us within the department to try to pursue as best we can.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Well, I just hope that we're going to be successful. As you were saying, you need the Hercs, and certainly you have great support from around this table on both sides, all of us, if you need funding in order to get the parts or whatever. We're there for you.

    In terms of our men and women in Afghanistan, how long are they there when they're deployed before they can come back home and are replaced?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: To answer your question, Mrs. Wayne, the deployment for the current group of soldiers in Afghanistan is for six months. And then they will be rotated by the Van Doos in February of next year.

    Now, that said, every single soldier will have an opportunity to get out of theatre for about two weeks and return to his or her family, or in fact to meet somewhere else in the world and actually get a chance to take a breather and to decompress and to relax before they go back into theatre. So at least once, they will have that opportunity to do that.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: They will.

    Is it the norm that when our men and women in uniform go on missions like this they're gone for six months? Is that the norm?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: If I may, Mr. Chairman, what we design and organize our missions for is to actually try to make sure that everybody is there no longer than six months. There are those occasions when onesies and twosies and the odds and sods may in fact, through very careful analysis, decide that we'll keep them for a longer period of time. No one, from my knowledge, in terms of Afghanistan, though, is going to be there longer than six months or six and a half months.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay.

    Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mrs. Wayne.

    Perhaps I can take the opportunity to ask a few questions myself, Admiral.

    On the service medal that will be awarded to the soldiers in theatre, that will be the Southwest Asia medal, will it? Or is there a special medal for Afghanistan?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Geez, I wish I could answer that question accurately, Mr. Chairman. I know that our human resource military folks who are responsible for honours and awards are looking at the issue as to how our people should be recognized in terms of what they're doing in Afghanistan. And I gather that two or three options are currently being looked at. I just don't know if there's been a decision taken on that, because it's not within my own purview.

    As Colonel Champagne just said, this has not yet been determined, I gather. As soon as that decision has been taken, we'll certainly be quite willing to let the committee know.

  (1235)  

    The Chair: Perhaps I could pick up on a line of questioning that was being pursued by Mr. Hill in relation to the issue of the configuration of the vehicles. I think, as you we're saying, some would be involved in, I guess, Medivac, and others as command and control platforms. I don't know what sort of other configurations you have.

    Can you tell us what proportion would be used as infantry troop carriers, for instance, versus these other uses? And can you satisfy the committee that the availability of these vehicles was such that within the theatre it was not an issue that these light-armoured vehicles or the Coyote were not available, but in fact it was a conscious decision that was being made with respect to using the Iltis at that time?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Yes, Mr. Chairman. It's certainly my understanding and belief that this wasn't an issue that we didn't have enough armoured vehicles to be able to conduct our missions. The bulk of the armoured vehicles are actually to be used for patrolling, for surveillance, for reconnaissance, and the like. This was an issue of managing the risk that was known at that time. The Iltis has been a vehicle that we've had now for 20-some years. We have operated throughout various missions around the world, and it has been very effective for us. For us to succeed in that mission in Afghanistan right now, the priority for us to do that is actually first by foot, in terms of how our people conduct their patrols; secondly, with the Iltis; thirdly, unless the threat changes, of course, or we get specific indicators that a particular route ought not to be used by Iltis, with the LAV III; and then, fourthly, with the Bison, which is an engineering armoured vehicle.

    But the vast bulk of our patrolling, and the results from the success we currently have, have been by foot patrols, supported subsequently by the unarmoured jeeps.

    The Chair: I'd like to ask another question, and it may be more detailed than you can handle. There seemed to be, at the time of the incident where the two soldiers were killed, various information flowing from in theatre and from Ottawa about the cause of the blast itself. I think there was a report that they were--I'll probably get this wrong--T-56s, old Soviet anti-tank mines, and that in fact some of them may have been stacked two or three together.

    I'm just wondering if you can shed any light on the accuracy of what caused the blast.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: In actual fact, I can't. The reason I can't is that we have to wait until the board has completed its inquiry, and that's not going to occur, or they're not going to be able to submit their report to General Leslie in theatre, until about a week from now. From that he will make his recommendations and send them to us. We will very carefully, obviously, go through this in terms of whatever recommendations and conclusions come out, and then make recommendations to the CDS and to the minister.

    That said, when one sees the reports that came in and talks to the commander himself, the size of the blast would lead one to conclude that this was at least one, if not two or even three, anti-tank mines that were deliberately placed on the track. That's an extraordinary amount of explosives, because one anti-tank mine is designed to cripple and kill a 70-tonne tank. Some of the anti-tank mines--and we don't know yet, or at least I don't know, but perhaps the board will conclude this in due course--actually have a shaped charge, which causes the explosive to go up from underneath into the tank to actually injure or kill people who are inside the tank.

    So our initial assessment, and we will obviously wait until the board completes its deliberations, was that this was one massive explosion. That can only happen if you've used something like an anti-tank mine or a couple of anti-tank mines.

  (1240)  

    The Chair: My time is running out here, so a very quick question with respect to the situation with the American forces in Iraq. Reading the New York Times over the weekend, I noticed that there have been criticisms of some of the commanders of the U.S. forces and of the logistics structure in terms of not providing enough bulletproof vests for soldiers in the field.

    There have also been criticisms of the Humvee in terms of it not having enough armour, because they seem to be encountering lots of situations where roadside-type bombs have gone off, I guess old artillery shells, and that sort of thing.

    What sort of information are you picking up in terms of how well the Americans are equipped for the job they have? Obviously there's a lot more of them in theatre than there are Canadians in Afghanistan. But it seems as though they're facing some pretty significant strains themselves, as far as logistics and supply are concerned.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Indeed, Mr. Chairman, and I will say that we monitor very closely what is happening with respect to the coalition in Iraq. One of the main reasons we do that, of course, is to determine if there are any lessons to be learned from how their operation is being conducted.

    Secondly, with respect to our Herc capability, based outside of Afghanistan, if there's any residual capability there in terms of the numbers of missions, we have authorized them to fly materials and goods into Iraq to support the coalition after the war over. So we want to pay very close attention in terms of what is the level of threat in terms of where they might be flying and so on.

    The Americans are going through a very tough time, there's absolutely no question about that. It seems to us that they are being specifically targeted by the extreme groups that currently continue to exist in Iraq. The extreme groups are being quite clever, apparently very much monitoring the different types of kit that they are using and trying to exploit whatever weaknesses they may or may not have. But the Americans have a very robust capability in theatre, very robust. However, they are being targeted. I find it really quite interesting to see what is happening to the Americans when, down in Basra, where the British forces are deployed, it's very quiet.

    I don't want to come to any conclusions here, per se, but I will just tell you that the hearts and minds campaign we use in Afghanistan is exactly the same type of thing the British do in their area of responsibility. We are very much closely linked with regard to how we conduct peace support operations, in terms of being successful.

    Perhaps there might be some lessons learned there for others who are part of the larger coalition in Iraq.

    The Chair: I don't want to take up any more of Mr. Hill's time, but my understanding is that the Americans are trying to do precisely the same thing. Now, I don't know if they use different techniques, or what the problem is, but perhaps we can come back to that.

    Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Admiral, I hope you can help me better understand your response to a question just posed by the chairman. If I understood you correctly, you just stated that there is no way that the number of lightly armoured vehicles available on the day of the tragedy could have impacted on the commander's decision as to what vehicles to use. And yet, in response to my question, you admitted that you don't even know how many of the 55 to 65 vehicles that are in theatre are in the configuration for carrying the personnel on such a mission.

    So in light of what would appear to me to be a bit of a conflict, I wonder how you can tell the committee that it couldn't possibly have impacted on the commander's decision on what vehicle to use, based on his risk assessment, if you don't know whether.... I mean, presumably they all could have been in the shop for service that day.

    Do you know how many were available that particular day?

  (1245)  

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: No, I don't know how many were available on that particular day, but the commander in the field certainly would know that. But neither he nor his staff have ever come to me or to my people and said, “We didn't have enough vehicles on that particular day, causing us to use only the Iltis.” We have...at that particular time, about 50 armoured vehicles, the bulk of which are used for patrolling, surveillance, reconnaissance. The exact number I don't have on my fingertips, but I do know that the bulk of them were used in that particular role.

    That said, after the accident...or after the deliberate attack occurred, clearly the specific threat to Canadians had changed in that we were being deliberately targeted. That caused the commander to say--and all of this wasn't a factor, because he never raised it with me, in terms of decisions to use what type of vehicle on that particular day--“I think I'd like to have more flexibility in terms of having an additional number of armoured vehicles that I can use at my disposal, because it's likely I'll now have to use them more often than I've used the Iltis.”

    As a result of that, he came with a request for about 15 more armoured vehicles, 11 LAV-IIIs and four Bisons, to be used by the engineers. As we speak, actually, they are being supplied to the force in Afghanistan. Five of them, I think, are already in theatre, and over the course of the next week or so the rest of them will be flown in.

    Does that answer your question?

    Mr. Jay Hill: Yes, thank you.

    In response to a question from, I think, Mr. Bertrand, with regard to a specialized mine-clearing vehicle that is deployed overseas, you say that we have one there. Do we have more in our inventory, more than just the one, somewhere else in the world--in Canada or whatever?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: I may ask Colonel Champagne to answer the details of this, but I think we have two in total in the inventory of the Canadian Forces.

    Gerry?

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Yes, sir, you're right. There are two.

    Mr. Jay Hill: And one of them is deployed there.

    Is there any concern, given the change in the risk assessment, that one of these specialized vehicles may not be enough to clear all of the roads that we're being asked to travel on?

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Sir, if I may, in this type of situation, the commander is asked to put priorities. You never have enough of those types of vehicles to do everything that is possibly required, so it's based on priorities and the level of risk. In this case here, the commander on the ground will evaluate the proper level of...I won't say “risk”, but clearance required, and based on that he will use that vehicle where it's needed.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Does the commander, in his communications with you, feel that one is sufficient, then? I'm assuming he does.

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Yes, sir.

    Mr. Jay Hill: He hasn't requested the other one, so I'm assuming he feels that one can do the job?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Absolutely right, Mr. Hill.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Okay.

    The other question I would have on this tragedy, which occurred outside of the city of Kabul, is that I think your earlier comment, Admiral, was that our forces are being required to patrol 200 square kilometres.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Square miles.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Okay, 200 square miles. And a considerable amount of that, I'm assuming, is outside the city of Kabul?

  (1250)  

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Yes.

    Mr. Jay Hill: We've been told by the minister and others, and it stands to reason, that the majority of the patrols inside the city, because of the restricted nature and all the rubble and the narrow streets and the people and stuff like that, either have to be done by foot, as you yourself said earlier, or with the Iltis, because of its small size. However, my interest lies with the patrols being conducted outside of the city, like the one that occurred on that fateful day.

    On the patrols now on the outskirts of the city, down those types of trails, is it my understanding that a lightly armoured vehicle is going in the ban of those patrols now?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: That depends. For some of their missions, that is exactly what is happening, based on their assessment of what is required for a particular patrol that day or that particular time period, and in others it's not.

    I don't want you to have the impression that outside of Kabul it is totally rural without people living out there, because there are very small settlements, small little villages, and small towns, where, given the assessment of the day by the commander, he may determine to actually send out unarmoured vehicles and patrols to go into these places to continue to build confidence amongst the people.

    I should tell you at least one story here in terms of the results we get from doing it this way. We had a situation where our folks were about to enter a particular building. Because of the relationship that had been developed by the sergeant in charge of one of the patrols, one of the local Afghanis said, “Don't go in there, this place was booby-trapped.” Subsequently, when they brought in the explosives experts, that's exactly what they did discover.

    So because of their ability to deal face to face with some of the Afghani folks, we actually were able to get a level of confidence where they told us things that we needed to know. It probably saved injuries, if not lives, as a result.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Do I have some time left?

    The Chair: Sure.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Some reports have been coming to me of concern on the part of the soldiers on the ground, that the maps they're using in foot patrols outside of the city have been found to be unreliable. Do you have any information you can share with us about that? Is it accurate? You always hear these kinds of things any time you have people deployed in harm's way.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: We have a very robust mapping and charting establishment that is actually part of my organization. We have supplied the battalion group and the commanders with some excellent products to allow them to conduct their operation. Not every single person has a GPS but certainly every vehicle or every patrol has a GPS to make sure they know exactly where they are and so on.

    We've not had any requests come up from the commanders on the ground saying we're missing something here, or we're lacking something there. And they do that quite often in the sense that they come up and say, “Gee, I wouldn't mind some additional equipment here”, or, “I wouldn't mind some additional rations”, or whatever it is. So they're not shy in terms of coming to us and saying, “You know, we thought we had it exactly right on this one, but we need some extra capability here.” But on this one, they have not actually come up with that sort of comment at all.

    Mr. Jay Hill: So there's been no request through the channels, as it were, from the troops in connection with...? For example, you mentioned GPS, global positioning satellite, receivers, in case a soldier gets detached from his squad. If the troop commander had a GPS and one of his troops patrolling somehow got detached from the remainder....

    Again, from my understanding, and I've had reports and seen it on television, the wives of some of the troops over there are purchasing this type of equipment to send over there. I'm assuming it's because their husbands have requested it of them. They wouldn't just do so on their own--unless it was a Christmas present or something.

    What I'm saying is, you did not get any sort of an unofficial request that came through the channels to provide that type of equipment for all our troops, rather than just for the troop commanders, or however they're apportioned?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Mr. Hill, I have not had any specific requests like that. It may very well be, though, that individual soldiers would just like to have their own GPS as they go about their business. But in terms of being able to achieve the mission, and each of the patrols having that capability and so on, the commander has said, “I've got what I need, and I don't need anything more.”

    Mr. Jay Hill: There again, there would be a risk assessment that would be done, and the risk assessment would state that, in the judgment of the commanders, it's not necessary to provide that type of equipment for every soldier?

  (1255)  

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Absolutely. I would also say that I would find it very hard to believe that our sergeants and our master corporals and our lieutenants would ever allow one of their soldiers to be out doing something on their own, without a buddy or some others with them. That's not how we operate. We don't send people out on their own like that, unless it's very, very special operations, which we're not actually doing in this particular mission, such as sniper-like operations. And even then they have buddies who are with them.

    Mr. Jay Hill: No, no, just in case you misunderstood me, Admiral, I wasn't implying that it would be an order to send someone out without that type of equipment. I was suggesting that there might be a scenario where you have a night patrol, or something like that, where someone inadvertently gets detached from the remainder of the troop and finds himself the next morning in no man's land.

    I don't know. I haven't been there. I'm just suggesting that it might be that type of concern that would lead a soldier to e-mail home to say that they would feel more comfortable if they had one of these devices on them just in case that scenario was ever to play out. I wasn't implying that it would be a conscious decision on anybody's part.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Okay.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Hill.

    Monsieur Bertrand.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I'm just interested, Admiral, in the NATO representative who praised Canadian know-how so much. Did you give us his name?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: If I may, Mr. Chairman, this is a bit of a sensitive one. If the nation of this general found out he said that, he might be in a bit of an awkward situation, because it actually says something about his own nation. So I would rather not provide you the name, if that's at all possible.

    The Chair: Thank you for that probing question, Monsieur Bertrand.

    Voices: Oh, oh!

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: I will say it's one of our closest allies, but I'll leave it at that.

    The Chair: I have a quick question for you, and that involves the composition of the French and German battalions that are operating with the Canadians in Kabul. Can you give us an idea of what their capabilities are in terms of armour and anti-armour?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for the question.

    First of all, there are two of them, the French and the German, as you said, but they're not all French and they're not all German in those two battalions. They actually have some other nations represented in their battalions. But they are both infantry battalions, so they have mostly light equipment. They have some armoured, but not as much as the Canadian battalion has.

    The Chair: Do they have heavy armour?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: In terms of tanks?

    The Chair: Yes.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: No. There are no tanks with ISAF, as part of this particular mission.

    Actually, some of them have conducted their patrols without fragmentation vests or ballistic protection. They haven't used the ballistic blankets, the Kevlar blankets, that we use when we go out operating with our Iltis, for example. In fact...and I don't wish to sort of use it this way, but I will say that there's a bit of a scramble from our partners as a result of the incident in October. They're now recognizing that what we had is something they should have had, and are out trying to acquire them.

    By and large, they have the kinds of capabilities that we have, but nowhere near the armoured capability that we have.

    The Chair: Just as a final question, some of us found it interesting that we have artillery in Kabul. So we have indirect fire but not anti-armour capability in terms of TOW missiles or ADATS. And do we have Carl-Gustaf in theatre?

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Yes, sir, and we have TOWs.

    The Chair: We do have TOWs?

    Col J.A.G. Champagne: Yes, sir.

    The Chair: Okay. But no ADATS.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: No.

    With respect to the artillery, there were two reasons why we decided to put that capability in there. The most important reason was actually as a deterrent. The presence of that artillery sends a message to those who might wish to do you harm. Secondly, of course, they can be used if we ever get a set of circumstances that would require us to use them. They're not much good for us back home if they're not deployed.

    So the primary reason was certainly deterrence, and also additional defensive capability. And we're the only contingent who has the guns there.

·  (1300)  

    The Chair: Presumably we have mortar as well.

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Yes.

    The Chair: Okay.

    Mr. Jay Hill: One final question?

    The Chair: Very briefly, because we're over our time.

    Mr. Jay Hill: It is a brief question.

    I think it was the chairman who asked you a question involving Iraq. Can you tell us whether or not there are any Canadian troops deployed in Iraq, and if so, what their role is?

    VAdm Greg R. Maddison: Thank you very much, Mr. Hill. We do have an exchange and liaison program, where we have Canadian soldiers, sailors, airmen, and airwomen who are on exchange with other militaries. That includes the United States and that includes Great Britain. We do have, at last count, four Canadians on an exchange with both the United States and the U.K. in Iraq. They are all in sort of headquarter functions, or military policemen, and so on.

    So yes, there is a handful of Canadians in Iraq.

    Mr. Jay Hill: Thank you.

    The Chair: Thank you.

    Admiral and Colonels, on behalf of the committee I'd like to thank you for being here today. It's been a very interesting session, and we look forward to your next visit.

    The meeting is adjourned.