NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, September 25, 2003

Á

1105

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC)

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

The Chair

Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Retired) (Conference of Defence Associations)

Á

1110

Á

1115

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

LGen Richard Evraire

Colonel Howard Marsh (Retired) (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Col Howard Marsh

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Richard Evraire

Á

1120

Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retired) (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations)

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.))

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.)

LGen Richard Evraire

Á

1125

Mr. Robert Bertrand

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Mr. Robert Bertrand

Á

1130

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

Á

1135

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

LGen Richard Evraire

Á

1140

Mrs. Elsie Wayne

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Richard Evraire

Á

1145

Á

1150

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.)

Á

1155

LGen Richard Evraire

Mr. Ivan Grose

Â

1200

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Col Howard Marsh

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Richard Evraire

Â

1205

Col Howard Marsh

LGen Richard Evraire

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Richard Evraire

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Howard Marsh

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Col Howard Marsh

Â

1210

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Ivan Grose

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Richard Evraire

Â

1215

Col Alain Pellerin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Â

1220

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Howard Marsh

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Col Howard Marsh

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Col Howard Marsh

LGen Richard Evraire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Â

1225

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

LGen Richard Evraire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Ivan Grose

LGen Richard Evraire

Â

1230

Col Howard Marsh

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Mr. Claude Bachand

LGen Richard Evraire

Â

1235

Col Alain Pellerin

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

Â

1240

LGen Richard Evraire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen Richard Evraire

Col Alain Pellerin

Col Howard Marsh

Â

1245

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

LGen Richard Evraire

The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price)

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 035

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

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EVIDENCE

Thursday, September 25, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Á  (1105)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs.

    We have before us today some very familiar faces--at least they're very familiar to this committee--in terms of the Conference of Defence Associations' representatives, headed up by retired Lieutenant General Richard Evraire. With him are Colonel Alain Pellerin, retired, and Colonel Howard Marsh, retired.

    Welcome to all of you, gentlemen, on behalf of the committee.

    Before we get under way with your statement, General Evraire, I'd like to advise the committee that I've been asked to participate in an all-party news conference in relation to the situation of the special court in Sierra Leone. I'm going to have to leave the meeting after General Evraire gives his comments. I hope you'll excuse my absence. It's rather unavoidable under the circumstances. I certainly had hoped to be here for the entire exchange between representatives from the CDA.

    With that said, perhaps, General Evraire, you could take the floor and provide us with your comments.

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Mr. Chair, I also have to leave. I have to go to a meeting at Centre Block at quarter to twelve. I'm sorry.

    The Chair: Okay. I'm hoping we will certainly have enough folks around the table so that we can continue the questioning and get more information in connection with our study of Canada-U.S. defence relations.

    Yes, Monsieur Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Mr. Chair, I'll be staying. It's on the record.

    The Chair: Mr. Bachand, I think you have a reputation as one of the stalwart supporters of this committee and it has been dully noted again.

    Okay, General Evraire, unless there are any other interventions, you have the floor.

[Translation]

    Lieutenant-General Richard Evraire (Retired) (Conference of Defence Associations):

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Members of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans' Affairs, thank you for having asked me to contribute to your discussions on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship.

[English]

    The Conference of Defence Associations has, on previous occasions, informed this committee on the state of the Canadian Forces. This morning I would like to address the state of Canada's military once again and also deal with defence cooperation with the United States.

    Let me begin with three assertions. First, after the September 11 terrorist attack against the United States, Canada no longer can be considered a fireproof house. Second, national security risk will increase as a consequence of continued inadequate funding of the Canadian Forces. Third, the Canada-U.S. defence relationship is fundamental to Canada's three defence policy thrusts of national security, North American defence, and international stability.

[Translation]

    Canada's relationship with the United States is unique both in terms of its complexity and its scope. The two countries are linked by many issues of common interest ranging from free trade to defence to the environment. They also have similar interests in terms of economic and foreign policy as well as in the field of national security.

    Nevertheless, the two countries differ on certain policies, and these require our constant attention. Above all, the general concern amongst Canadians is the feeling that their sovereignty is at stake.

    Canada-U.S. trade relations are amongst the most noteworthy in the world. Daily bilateral trade stands in excess of $1 billion with some 87 per cent of Canada's exports and more than 70 per cent of its imports being with the United States. Canada is becoming increasingly dependent on exports to the United States for maintaining its prosperity and well-being.

[English]

    Canadian defence arrangements with the United States are more extensive than between any other two nations. The Permanent Joint Board on Defence provides policy level consultation on bilateral defence matters. There are over 250 individual bilateral agreements regarding matters ranging from Canada-U.S. naval, land, and air defence plans to mutual weapons test facilities and operations coordinations achieved through the military cooperation committee.

    On October 1, 2002, in response to the previous year's terrorist attacks, the United States constituted a new Northern Command. Its principal mission is to support civilian agencies in emergencies. It would also be responsible for coordination and cooperation with Canada and Mexico for military operations. In response to this change in continental defence, Canada has assigned a general-rank officer to Northern Command.

    If Canadians are not prepared to contribute in a meaningful and viable way to the defence of Canada, and a threat to our country is viewed by the United States as a threat to their territorial integrity, then the U.S. will defend their territory, as well as our own, in whatever way suits them. This, Mr. Chair, cannot but result in a severe loss of our sovereignty. Canada's cooperation on continental security on a matter such as ballistic defence is not, in our view, an abrogation of sovereignty but rather the exercising of sovereignty.

    A most important issue for Canada arising from changes in the U.S. command system is the merger of the U.S. Space Command with Strategic Command. Whereas in the past Canadian Forces members were employed in the space operations and planning functions of U.S. Space Command, as a result of the fact that U.S. space assets were under command of NORAD, Canadians no longer have access to the space assets now that they have been transferred to Strategic Command.

    At present, the Canadian Forces still have access to space surveillance assets, but given that surveillance assets are in the process of being networked to target acquisition assets, it is likely that Canadian Forces access to the space network will depend on Canada's participation in ballistic missile defence. Given that territorial surveillance of Canada is critical to national defence, this issue in particular needs to be considered in a full defence policy review.

    In addition to the U.S.-initiated change in command structure, the United States armed forces transformation agenda makes military-to-military cooperation more and more challenging. The United States armed forces are investing heavily in their future combat systems at a time when Canada's military resources can barely sustain current capabilities.

    As the United States invests in its use of force, a professional gap in future competencies is emerging. Canadian Forces members could find themselves excluded from peer-to-peer dialogue as the United States armed forces transform and modernize their doctrines, force structures, and equipment.

    What is quite obvious is that maintaining the ability to operate with the United States forces is a challenge for most NATO member countries. Should Canada wish to pursue the option of some day, with U.S. support, commanding an allied coalition, then modernization of Canadian command and control capabilities would certainly need to become a defence policy priority.

    The results of a wide ranging set of interviews that were conducted by the Conference of Defence Associations in Washington last year in preparation for our study A Nation at Risk indicate that Canada-U.S. relations are strained. Americans voiced strong concerns over the anti-American sentiments expressed in this country and over the perception that Canada is freeloading in matters of defence as a national policy. It may well be that the U.S. outlook on Canada is evolving from benign neglect to emerging hostility.

    The rundown of the Canadian Forces over the past 30 years weakens our ability to counter threats both at home and overseas. It has also squandered the enviable reputation that Canadians earned by their sacrifices in twentieth century wars and in the early days of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

    How does the U.S. deal with a friendly country that does not have effective defence capabilities, especially if that weakness impinges on U.S. security interests? There is frustration in the U.S. over Canadian reluctance to resolve that weakness.

Á  (1110)  

    Canadians should be concerned about how security issues negatively impact on Canada-U.S. trade relations. The U.S. perceives that Canada seems not to recognize a security problem, let alone assign adequate resources to resolve it. The U.S. bases its trade polices on balance; hence, greater effort in defence could help resolve some of the current trade problems.

    In this vein, the CDA is encouraged by comments made recently by the Honourable Paul Martin concerning security and defence issues, including the need for a more U.S.-friendly foreign policy; support for Canadian involvement with the U.S. in a missile defence program; the need to spend more on defence; the need to conduct a foreign and defence policy review; the need to establish a permanent cabinet committee on Canada-U.S. relations to monitor and manage all aspects of this vitally important relationship; and the need to establish a House of Commons committee on Canada-U.S. relations.

    In summary, Canada still benefits from a great number of bilateral arrangements that were established when Canada's military was more relevant. As the United States armed forces transform themselves, the opportunities for establishing new bilateral relations are likely to shrink unless Canada has sufficient research, doctrine, and experiences to share with its closest ally.

    Paul Martin's statements on strengthening Canada-U.S. relations heartened the Conference of Defence Associations. Early in that dialogue we believe the issue of security and defence will be tabled. Canada's options are limited at present in view of its rapidly disappearing core military capabilities.

    The Conference of Defence Associations strongly believes that Canada needs a defence policy review and a concomitant financial commitment to its armed forces if Canada hopes to restore credibility and relevance to its foreign and defence policies. Such a review, we believe, will have a positive impact on the Canada-U.S. defence relationship.

    Monsieur le président, mesdames et messieurs, merci.

Á  (1115)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much, General Evraire.

    Now we'll go to Mrs. Gallant for seven minutes.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    And thank you for your presentation. Towards the end you mentioned that a significant increase in budgetary allocation is necessary to be credible in the eyes of the United States and to patch up our relations. What level of funding would signal an earnest endeavour to put our national defence back on track to where it should be and to help improve relations with the United States?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I don't wish to avoid the question of providing a number. Let me say first of all that whatever money is allotted to the department should be based on a viable defence policy.

    Our first order of business is a defence policy review—not a program review and the other things that have been going on in the department in past years. Without a formal defence policy review, any amount of spending on major items of equipment may, in the long run, be spent inappropriately. There is currently a requirement to maintain existing equipment that is being used in operations and for other training purposes.

    If I may, I'll turn to my colleague, Colonel Marsh, who will provide an indication to you of the total bill that is required to maintain the current and in-use major equipment platforms.

    Colonel Howard Marsh (Retired) (Senior Defence Analyst, Conference of Defence Associations): Perhaps I'll be brief and answer the question directly.

    In order to maintain the current force structure of 60,000 people, to address the operational shortfalls, the training shortfalls, the fourth generation shortfalls, and all of the command capability shortfalls, it would require going to a budget of $18.5 billion a year. Should the government wish to expand the capability of the Canadian Forces so that it could handle the current level of operational activity, then the Canadian Forces should grow, in my mind, to about 75,000 to 80,000 persons per year. In that case, you would need a defence budget of about $23 billion a year.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: An increase of $23 billion.

    Col Howard Marsh: No, in the first case, to address current deficiencies, one would have to increase the current allocation of approximately $13 billion to $18.5 billion. That's a $5.5 billion increase. And should there need to be an expansion in order to maintain the current level of peace and international support operations, one would need to move somewhere to about 1.7% to 2% of GDP, or just over $20 billion a year, which is about a $10-billion-a-year increase.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you.

    With the total defence review, as you know, we have the 1994 white paper, and before it's been fully implemented it's already obsolete. Who do you see playing the major role in this review? And what parameters would you have put in place to ensure that it wasn't obsolete before we actually had a chance to implement it?

    LGen Richard Evraire: First of all, I think quite obviously it would be the minister and the department who, in the case of the latter, would be prepared to undertake such a review were it to be ordered. We would see this particular committee quite obviously as a major player in such a defence review. And as we have said repeatedly in the last number of years, if this defence review does not seriously reflect what Canadians at large believe Canada should be providing itself in terms of armed forces, then this review must be a very public one, and it would take time. We realize that. Certainly Parliament, quite obviously.... But those are the major elements to such a review.

    The parameters, quite honestly, would not change from past defence policy reviews. They have to look at what our foreign policy goals and aims are, and based on a statement of foreign policy, then an indication would have to come out of this defence review for what, from a defence point of view, Canada expects or needs to put in place in order to achieve those foreign policy aims and objectives.

    From that defence policy, then, falls out the structure and the equipment requirements. This is why we find it somewhat unfortunate that discussions about specific major platform changes or the setting aside of major pieces of equipment are being considered or contemplated on occasion. We find it difficult to respond to whether or not these things should happen, because we recognize that the 1994 white paper is not in fact in place. There are many shortcomings in terms of its application. And we believe that fiddling around the edges, as it were, about this or that piece of equipment or about this or that level of forces really misses the point about the requirement for a serious and thorough defence review to find out what Canada wants from its armed forces.

Á  (1120)  

    Colonel Alain Pellerin (Retired) (Executive Director, Conference of Defence Associations): Perhaps I could add a comment to that. I think the armed forces is in a dire situation now, and it's going to be in a worse state in the next 5, 10, 15 years. We're doing a lot of research on that. The new prime minister himself will have to take an active part in addressing the shortfalls of the armed forces, or the crisis he will be facing with the armed forces, and he should not be a spectator to the issue, as is the case now.

    I think a good example to follow would be Australia. You might recall that Australia was in the same sort of situation as we are now in the armed forces. It conducted a full defence policy review, with consultation across the nation, and the prime minister was involved personally. The document that came out, the white paper, was not just signed by the defence minister but also by the prime minister and the leader of the opposition and the finance minister. So there was a commitment by the government that these priorities would be addressed, and there was a 10-year commitment of $23 billion for capital acquisition. It's been in place for a few years, and they're following that now, and the prime minister gives his active attention to the armed forces and to the state of the armed forces.

    I think we should follow that example.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)): Thank you very much.

    Bob.

[Translation]

    Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

    I too would like to wish you a warm welcome and thank you for your testimony. General Evraire, I would like to ask you a few brief questions.

    You said that the government currently allocates around $13 billion a year to the Defence budget. You also said that, at a conservative estimate, the budget should be raised to $18.5 billion. Would that be over one, two or three years?

    Before getting into a discussion on finance, I would like to ask my second question. The 1994 White Paper has been mentioned. I was there when the study was carried out. Do you think that we ought to wait for another study to be undertaken before spending the money?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Thank you very much.

    With reference to your first question, we said that $5.5 billion are necessary to ensure the continued viability of the armed forces' current operational capability.

    We also recognize that even if the department were given all the money in the world, it would have huge difficulties spending it, given the personnel shortage in fields such as programs. Programs are managed by teams. There are not enough people, either in terms of number or skill level, to undertake all the work required to replace, repair or upgrade all pieces of major equipment.

    This means that it is quite difficult to decide on a deadline for this new money. If $5.5 billion are allocated, the department may well be able to spend it in a year, but I have my doubts.

    And as for the second question...

Á  (1125)  

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: We should perhaps wait until another study has been completed before spending the money.

    LGen Richard Evraire: The danger of suggesting an in-depth review of defence policy is exactly that which many people fear, it will bring everything to a halt. It would result in an awkward interruption and the decline would continue.

    In the study that we carried out last year, A Nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces, we recommended a two-pronged approach.

    Firstly, a certain amount of money has to be spent, I would say about two billion dollars, to stop the current hemorrhaging. This would allow the armed forces to operate at their current level, and no more, using existing equipment with new equipment only being bought where absolutely necessary. Secondly, we should undertake a review of defence policy. We cannot, as you implied, stop everything until the study has been completed.

    A two-part approach is required: stop the hemorrhage and undertake a policy review.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would like to add a comment.

    Even if a given government decided to prioritize defence and improve the situation, the situation is such that, in all likelihood, very little could be done over the next seven or eight years. There is the whole issue of personnel. For example, if the decision were made to purchase major equipment, it should be remembered that, historically, in Canada, such purchase takes 10 to 15 years. In the case of the Sea King, it took even longer.

    As things stand, due to all the operational tasks that the armed forces have, the very future is being sacrificed for current operational rules. We are mortgaging the armed forces. Even if the government wanted to make major decisions concerning the armed forces, and to do so now, it would be impossible.

    You have to understand that it is a long-term problem. There is no quick-fix solution and we are going to have to deal with the problem over the next five to ten years.

    Mr. Robert Bertrand: General, in your presentation you said that there is a certain anti-American feeling amongst Canadians these days.

    As you well know, and as everyone around this table knows, we have very close ties with the Americans. As a politician, I always try to put myself in the shoes of the average man on the street. I am aware of the problems that we have with softwood lumber and mad cow disease, particularly in my region of the country. Many farmers come to speak to me about these issues.

    I wonder if there is a way... If we could resolve those problems, while I would not go so far as to say that anti-American sentiment would disappear, I do believe that it would be less intense. Any help would be much appreciated. For example, you could speak with your colleagues during your visits to the United States, and explain to them that, in Canada, these issues are major, irritating problems.

    I would like you to comment on that.

Á  (1130)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased to hear that this committee plans to travel to the United States. I hope that will materialize. Everyone agrees that increasing exchanges and contacts can only improve our relations. I do not know whether the method used to resolve economic and trade disputes with the United States is a good way to resolve military differences or whether it is the other way around, but one thing that is certain is that the Americans truly value the viability of our armed forces; they have told us so. Obviously, they did not broadcast that; they told us during some private meetings. They wonder why Canada has reduced its support to the armed forces as much as it has.

    We know we will never be on a level playing field with the United States; that would be wishful thinking. No one could achieve that anyway. But it is clear that the Americans are generous to the point where if they see that a reasonable effort is being made and they are being supported in their statements—not all of them but when we are able to do so—the relations improve considerably.

    We see the link between military viability and the difficult economic situation you are talking about. Perhaps it is naive to do so, but in my view, it is so obvious that you can't deny it. We can't expect our neighbour to be nice to us if we spend our time ignoring him or not contributing to a joint effort. So I am nearly convinced that this committee's trip to Washington will be extremely important in eliminating the problem of their considerable disappointment in our armed forces.

    Col Alain Pellerin: Just to add to what the general just said, bear in mind that since September 11—he mentioned it at the outset— the top priority for the Americans has been national security. Therefore, if we don't accept that concept and we start talking about mad cow disease and such, national security nonetheless overrides all those other problems. If your committee can go to Washington and hear the views first-hand and if it can influence Canada's new Prime Minister, I think a report by the National Defence and Veterans' Affairs Committee that reflected the views of important people in Washington would be crucial for the future well-being of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you.

    I could tell you—this was agreed at the last meeting—that several members of Congress as well as the Secretary General of NATO will be visiting us. I had just invited the latter, but he returned my call to ask whether he could come with other members of Congress. So seven or eight congressmen will be coming to see the committee. They are showing increasing interest, especially since one of them is Joel Hefley, the congressman for Colorado Springs, where NORAD headquarters are situated. I just wanted to point that out.

    Mr. Bachand, is that...?

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Would it be possible, given my huge generosity, to let my colleague speak, because she has to leave.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): That is very kind of you. It is no problem.

[English]

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I just like him. He's always kind to me.

    With regard to the funding, as you know, the Senate committee looked at this with regard to the military, and I believe they recommended that $5 billion be added to the budget right away, because they saw the need. They understood it.

    I think the biggest problem we have is that men and women who are in uniform cannot come up on the Hill, as you know, and protest. It's people like yourselves and this committee here; it's their voices that have to be heard.

    I was so pleased when I saw the Senate recommendation, but it was totally ignored. I was really in shock.

    We have $800 million more in the budget, but now we have to find $200 million to give back.

    I was in Newfoundland just three weeks ago. On the last day of my meetings, when I came out of the hotel, there were three men waiting for me. One was an air force pilot and the other two were army gentlemen. The air force pilot said to me, “Mrs. Wayne, we need to have replacement parts for our Hercules and we don't have any money in our budget for it.”

    I'm really concerned. I truly am. Your voices and our voices have to be heard. How can we do that? How can we make our voices heard so that the government, whoever it is...?

    Well, in the States, those men and women in uniform don't have to worry about a thing because the military is a top priority in the United States. It doesn't matter about health care or the problem with the beef and SARS or anything else, the military are a top priority and they make sure of it in the budget. How can we go about trying to do the same here? Do you have any suggestions? Tell us if you think we can go out here and protest. That's what I'll have to do, I guess. I don't know.

    A voice: A hunger strike.

Á  (1135)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I might do that.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, certainly the work of this committee and the Senate committee is important. There is absolutely no doubt about that. I suspect that up to a point, despite the fact that it obviously is not the ideal solution, the squeaky wheel eventually does get greased, and I suspect that's precisely what motivates the Conference of Defence Associations, despite its lack of success over the years in turning things around in any very meaningful way, and why we continue to keep kicking at the door and why we delight in the fact that you do the same.

    What very unfortunate situation may soon be upon us is this. Given the state of the forces today, Canadians will find out about this unfortunate state in the worst way possible. We will end up with an inability to perform operational functions. Some of them are sliding away as we speak. We will find that some of our members of the Canadian Forces in an operational environment will fall prey to inadequate and insufficient equipment. We hope and pray this never happens, but it may. Even more so, given the current circumstances of the operational environment in which our servicemen and servicewomen find themselves, it is a much more dangerous environment than in many other instances in the past.

    What is troubling, in the same sense, is the difficulty of maintaining or sustaining those environments or those operational commitments. You have all heard that for 2,000 people in Afghanistan there are 2,000 preparing to go and 2,000 who are on their way back or who are back from other operations. So with a very large number committed to a particular set of operations, particularly in the army's case, we know we would be asking an impossible amount of effort on the part of the forces to sustain that commitment beyond the one year the government has indicated it would provide the forces in Afghanistan.

    Where do we go from there? We know there is considerable burnout. We know there are many other problems in the forces. There are many people leaving.

    So there we have it. Despite the repeated pleas to do something about this, the problem continues, and it will only get worse.

    We will continue our interest in bringing this forward and in participating and testifying in front of this committee and we will continue our attempt to keep putting defence issues before Canadians. We are delighted at the prospect of this particular committee doing just that.

Á  (1140)  

    Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll end with this, if I may. I spoke with three gentlemen from the armed forces, and one man said, “You know, Ms. Wayne, I've been in the army for 20 years. When I joined 20 years ago, I was looking forward to 20 years in the army. My son is in the army now, and he is not looking forward to 20 years, the way things are right now.” I think somehow we have to make them a top priority, and this committee has to find a way.

    I'm going to Colorado the week after next with the Minister of Defence. I'm not quite sure, but I will talk positively with the people of the United States. I have two brothers who are businessmen there, so I don't want them mad at me too.

    Anyway, I want to thank you very much.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Ivan, are you okay if we go to Claude right now and come back to you after?

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank our colleagues, who are very well known to us, for their excellent presentation. I might also mention to Robert that it is indeed a good idea because in the last report of the National Defence and Veterans Affairs Committee, the Bloc's dissenting opinion was that before making any further major investment in defence, we had to have a clear action plan. That is the topic I want to discuss with you.

    This week, we heard a presentation by Mr. Cohen. I found that even though his presentation was quite brief, it was very pertinent, because the Bloc Québécois has been asking for a new national defence policy for quite some time. But he seemed to go beyond national defence; we should have a new security policy. Some people, including myself, think that if we could establish a new security policy, we might be able to maintain the National Defence budget at its current level, because we might get a different idea of how to protect the country and fulfill our responsibilities toward our American neighbours.

    In the meantime, there is much talk about possibly arming our Coast Guard, for example. There are also many discussions on possibly arming our customs officers. There's much talk about reinforcing our Immigration Act and improving refugee protection. I think those are things the Americans would like to hear. I think we should go further than just saying we do not invest enough in national defence. I also think that the merit of a new security policy could stir things up.

    There's also the entire question of coordination. In fact, I asked Minister Manley about that when he appeared before the committee. Mr. Manley deals with the Secretary of State for Homeland Security in the United States, Tom Ridge, who has his own portfolio, his own department and has decision-making power. Mr. Manley does not have that same kind of decision-making power. He coordinates a set of departments whose ministers can say whether they refuse to go beyond a certain point and he cannot do anything about it.

    So do you agree that there is a concept that goes beyond a defence policy? It is not true that money must continuously be invested in national defence. It may be worth our while to look at a security policy that would include all departments, which would allow for a much more specific role for the army in terms of international relations and protection of the territory. That could also be compensated by developments in other departments with a view toward greater Canadian security and greater responsibility vis-à-vis our American neighbours.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, I thank the member for his question.

    It is clear that we are facing a cultural difference with respect to government and policy management in Canada. The idea of creating a national security committee has been raised at various times in various places here in Canada, and we know that on the constitutional level, given our parliamentary system, all those things are or have been complicated, difficult, not really welcomed by the various prime ministers and ministers who, as you have pointed out quite correctly, would lose a certain amount of independence if such a thing existed.

    So yes, this idea of a security umbrella, a comprehensive policy is an excellent one. At the same time—and this is why I mention the importance of a defence policy review within an even broader review—it is important not to reduce current military capacity, in case we have a need for that capacity.

    Regarding national security on the North American continent, it is clear that beyond what we have today we probably do not really need huge spending on the Canadian Armed Forces. We certainly need more military personnel to do the required tasks, but that is all I will say about the issue of continental security in cooperation with the Americans.

    If Canada is serious about wanting to contribute to world peace, the idea has been raised that it might want to limit its efforts to certain areas. That idea has been floating around in NATO since its creation, and it has always been rejected : countries did not want to end up depending on other countries for certain military capacities because they feared that these other countries might not be able to provide that capacity if the need arose. It is also possible that, if Canada chose to do one thing rather than another, and abandoned its capacity in various areas, the military capacity it did retain might not be useful or required in the end, depending on the needs of its alliances.

    I do not mean to suggest that we should be doing everything. That is what the current policy kind of tries to do. There are clearly choices that have to be made, but those choices need to be made carefully and based on an assessment of needs, which are constantly changing. So it is impossible to be absolutely certain that a given choice is the right one; there has to be a certain amount of flexibility. That means that some military capacity that is not needed every day or on a constant basis should be retained, since it is not possible to rebuild or develop instantly military capacity that has been lost or that does not exist.

    In short, I applaud the idea of a comprehensive security plan for Canada that would involve all departments. It is high time that this was undertaken. It cannot be done in a half-baked way or by bringing people together when a crisis occurs. In my opinion and in the opinion of many of our members, that is not a good approach: the response comes too slowly or not at all in those circumstances. The starting point would be a statement concerning an overall plan, which would obviously be based on Canada's foreign policy requirements, which in turn would be the basis for a defence policy.

    I will conclude on this point: as I have said before this committee and before the finance committee, and as Mr. Chrétien said at the United Nations, there is a connection between a country's foreign affairs capacity and its military capacity. If we provide funding, financial assistance to an African country, for example, and there is no peace in that country, not much will result from it. We should be able to help restore peace in that country or the region before expecting that the money will be used appropriately.

Á  (1145)  

    So this is the right order: overall policy, foreign policy, defence policy. And that will be the basis for deciding on military budgets for equipment, structures and personnel. That is what people are looking for, rather than little cuts here and there.

    Thank you.

Á  (1150)  

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Grose.

    Mr. Ivan Grose (Oshawa, Lib.): Let's inject a note of reality here. You're never going to get $5 billion or $10 billion additional for the armed forces. The Canadian people won't pay it. We tell them that what we're doing now we're doing very badly because our equipment is raggedy-tag. They say, “Well, it gets done anyway. I have my mortgage to pay and my son's hockey equipment to buy, and I don't want to pay any more taxes.”

    All we ever offer them is that we have to put more money into the military, or else. Or else what? Or else our allies will disrespect us? It doesn't ring a bell with the ordinary taxpayer. He doesn't care. He doesn't want to pay any more money so that our allies will respect us.

    We may say we won't be prepared if we're invaded. But they can't see an invasion. The history of the Canadian people is that we're never ready. We never think it's going to happen. When the huge wars start, then we contribute more than anyone else, but in between we won't.

    On this nebulous “or else” that we offer them, why doesn't anyone say, look, you're paying $13 billion a year now for national defence and it's not doing the job; we're not performing the way we should? Tell the Canadian people what they could buy for $13 billion. Maybe we should have an armed force of 25,000 people. We could afford to well equip them, well pay them, look after their married quarters, and so on. They would be a smart-looking outfit of 25,000 for $13 billion. Maybe 25,000 isn't a viable number. At 25,000, maybe we should just get out of the business altogether and save the $13 billion.

    Offering them this idea that we're not doing enough and if we don't do more, or else, something will happen doesn't sell. Why don't we say that for $13 billion--I wish you people could do it, and I don't know why you don't--here is what you should be doing? Here are the operations you should be covering. This is what you cannot do. Meanwhile, we would have a well-equipped, well-trained, well-looked-after force of 25,000. You tell us whether that's viable or not.

    But we're trying to get more than $13 billion, or else. You're never going to get more. No party, no individual, would ever get elected on a platform of $5 billion more for the armed forces.

    I don't give a diddley-damn about getting elected again. I'm on record as saying that. I come here to do the job that I think should be done. I also come here to present the Canadian taxpayer with viable options, not “or else”. That doesn't sell it.

    I'm not criticizing what you people are doing. I know what you're trying to do, and you're right. I agree with you, but that doesn't matter a damn. The Canadian taxpayer is the one who has to agree with you, and so far we haven't been able to impress him at all.

    I would like to get you your money. I would like to see $5 billion in the next budget, and I would be willing to pay, but my next-door neighbour wouldn't. It isn't going to happen, so we have to offer them an alternative. We can tell them that for $13 billion we'll have a light, small armed force and we'll lose all our prestige. We won't be able to do any peacekeeping or anything else. It will strictly be for civil disorder, or whatever. Tell them that's what they should get for $13 billion. You're telling them now--and we're doing it too--that for $13 billion we're not doing the job the way it should be done.

    I ran my own business for 30 years, and if you aren't doing the job right, don't do it. Save the money and do something else that you can do well.

    I'm presenting you with a conundrum here, but that's the situation. We can sit here and talk for hours and hours and forever and ever about what we should do, but it ain't going to get done unless we get those folks back home on our side. At the moment they don't get it.

Á  (1155)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, I'd really love to respond, and I will.

    What we're dealing with here is a problem of leadership. It isn't up to the armed forces to determine what capabilities they ought to have; they're responding to government missions. What we need is to inform that Canadian citizen about just exactly what the state of affairs is. This happens in bunches and off and on, but the average Canadian has absolutely no idea, first of all, what the money goes to and what we are doing without or the difficulty we are creating for the members of the forces performing the missions. One of our roles, by the way, is to try to entice the press and the media generally to talk about these things and to get the message out.

    What we're dealing with here is national sovereignty. Those are issues that are awfully difficult to discuss and to get across, simply because we are not doing it. This committee, as was noted earlier, quite often is ignored. The Senate committee's report was ignored, largely. If the issues are not being discussed constantly and by all of the important people in Parliament, then what hope is there of getting the average Canadian citizen interested in matters of defence?

    I haven't, in the last year—other than in a few statements in May by our next prime minister—heard issues of defence discussed when it wasn't a crisis about equipment or the death of military personnel or that sort of thing. Never is that issue brought forward. Every other issue—health, education, and all of those—is a front-burner issue, but defence hardly ever, if at all.

    This is why we offer ourselves up to this committee in supporting your efforts, in the hope that the defence issues will be discussed more broadly, not only in Parliament but in the country.

    What is needed is leadership, I started off by saying, and the demonstration of that concretely would be a defence policy. The average Canadian doesn't know where to start in determining what the requirements are. The government should and does, and that's where it should begin.

    I was in the military for forty-two and a half years, from 1954, and there's been a steady decline over all that time—in many instances for good reason, because the forces were over 100,000 and there was no requirement for that large a number. The Cold War ended, indeed, and cutbacks were ordered. But if we look at the situation now, the momentum of reductions has caused us to reach a stage where existing commitments are impossible to sustain. If the average Canadian doesn't know anything about this, it's not the armed forces' role to go and tell him. It's the role of our elected officials.

    Thank you.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: I agree with you completely: it's our job, not yours and not the armed forces', but you're here conceivably to advise us. To go back to something I said, why don't you go the other way for a change? You can tell us what we can do with another $5 billion or another $10 billion. Tell us what we should be able to do with $13 billion. That may embarrass the Canadian people, and finally they'll pay attention and say, “That's a poor image of my country.” But at the moment they expect us to do colossal things with $13 billion. Tell them exactly what we can do: maybe have 25,000, maybe 10,000. I don't know; I'm not a military expert. For once, try going the other way, because what we're doing at the moment isn't working.

    I belong to all kinds of military organizations—I was in the air force for a while after the war—and I'm lost. My words fall on deaf ears; they want to talk about today's problems, not next week's problems. If we told them what you should be getting for $13 billion, then I think I'd have a better argument. Actually, what we're doing is way beyond our means. Somehow the armed forces just seem to work the thing out. I wish they'd stop doing that. Maybe someone would then pay some attention.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

  (1200)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Cheryl.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Earlier you mentioned that because of the combination of Strategic Command and NASA, our space agency would be deprived of the use of assets. Is that theoretical, or are you aware of any assets the Canadian Space Agency is actually being denied access to?

    Col Howard Marsh: From discussion with senior officers that I know and we know, we are aware that for a long time we had access to space surveillance assets through NORAD, because space surveillance assets basically were under the command of NORAD. The Americans are currently grouping the space surveillance assets with their network-centric command called CINC-21 in order to be linked to target acquisition and destruction assets. That will be completed over the next three to five years.

    I would well imagine that if Canada is not part of North American ballistic missile defence, Strategic Command would not allow desk officers in National Defence Headquarters, on an hourly basis, to look at American tracks and the defence assets that are being activated. I just don't see Strategic Command allowing our country that access unless we are participating.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm going to jump to interoperability in different capabilities. As you're probably aware, there appears to be a phasing out of our tank corps in Canada. Are the Americans phasing theirs out as well with this new asymmetrical as opposed to conventional warfare, and if not, what are the dangers or risks we face in having a military that is not trained to fight with a tank corps in the mix?

    LGen Richard Evraire: There has been discussion about whether or not we would replace the tank. This is part of the problem I alluded to earlier in suggesting we could talk about these major pieces of equipment until we're blue in the face. Unless they're tied to a specific doctrine that comes out of defence policy, then I'm not sure we're discussing the right thing.

    Your example is nevertheless a very good one in terms of our ability to operate with the Americans. We have very few tanks anyway. I've forgotten what the number is.

  (1205)  

    Col Howard Marsh: It's 114.

    LGen Richard Evraire: It's 114 compared with many thousands for the Americans.

    The problem, of course, among other things, is one of maintenance and training. We haven't had very many major formation exercises for the longest time, as a consequence of which our ability to operate with the Americans in a high-intensity battlefield situation that requires armour—tanks, among other types of equipment—would certainly not be up to scratch.

    There are many other areas of potential and probably existing incompatibilities. We had a problem that in part still exists in regard to our ability to operate with their air force: an incompatibility in communications systems that made it impossible for our CF-18s to communicate. That problem is in the process of being resolved, but for a while there was no possibility of our operating with them, with the secure systems the Americans require.

    There are many other developments the Americans are into that we're not and that will eventually make it more and more difficult for us to be able to operate in the same battlefield area, the same military environment as them.

    This is a problem that will simply continue to grow, because as was mentioned earlier, we are spending money on today's operations at the expense of developing the army and the forces of tomorrow. We are lagging behind in technical development, and that will make it much more difficult as the years go by.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Given the hot points in the world today and what we can see as potential conflicts on the horizon, do you foresee actual conventional warfare on the horizon, or would it just be an air war and special troops coming in afterwards?

    LGen Richard Evraire: In fact, the Conference of Defence Associations is on record as saying that the spectrum of conflict from, if you will, relevantly benign peacekeeping all the way up to full conventional war is something that is possible in many parts of the world today. In fact, although we escaped and continue to escape the even more horrible thought of a nuclear exchange between Pakistan and India--thankfully those concerns are off the burner for the moment--the high-intensity conventional war, with tanks, artillery, bombers, the whole nine yards, is something we only recently saw in Iraq. The potential of wars breaking out there and elsewhere is very real.

    So the idea of saying conventional, high-intensity warfare is no longer possible, is I think very dangerous thinking. The likelihood of that happening anywhere in North America, of course, is next to zero.

    But if we wish to contribute to peace and security across the world, we will either have the equipment that allows us to participate in that sort of warfare or simply say, sorry, we can't participate because we don't have the equipment, the training, and the personnel experience required to do that.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So then simply saying we could fill some other niche would not be adequate?

    LGen Richard Evraire: No. I find that niche solutions are patently dangerous. Where does it start and end? If we say, well, right, we won't participate in high-intensity conflict, we'll only do peacekeeping or peace restoring...I think coming in and cleaning up after the real hard work gets done is hardly the sort of approach that Canada traditionally has been involved in over the years in peace and security matters. It would simply not be in keeping with our status as a G-8 nation, nor would it be in keeping with our philosophy of, among other things, trying to spread our own Canadian values to other parts of the world.

    Col Howard Marsh: Could I just interject for a second, please?

    The way war seems to be unfolding is that there is a high pulse of activity in the first 10 days or 100 days, characterized by bombing, lasers, and all of the things we've seen, and then it's followed by a very long peacekeeping or peace and stability operation. Now, ironically, the peace and stability operations need a much higher level of passive protection. So if you were to do a convoy in Africa and you had a HUMVEE with a machine gun on it, chances are the locals would take you on with a Toyota with a 20 mm canon on it and you'd likely lose the convoy.

    So, ironically, the trend in stability and peacekeeping operations is that you need more and more armour and greater fire power in order to bully your way through. And it's likely that in the future, as the world's population moves to urban centres and warfare is more centred in urban areas--as we're seeing in Israel--patrols will have to be done in armoured vehicles.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): We are also, as in Afghanistan, taking artillery along for peacekeeping. A lot of people are throwing their hands up and saying, what's this, but it's necessary.

    Col Howard Marsh: Yes, because it needs to reach out 20 kilometres to make sure someone doesn't start firing missiles at you from 20 kilometres away.

  (1210)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I just want to apologize for the lack of members around the table. It happens to be the luck of the draw. What happens is the times change for committees for different periods of the year. There's such a demand on committee rooms that our draw at this particular time, from now until Christmas, is this slot over the noon hour, and what happens, of course, is that a lot of members are caught up with other noon-hour duties. We're going to have to suffer through that. Hopefully the next time around we'll get a better time slot. The last one was a good slot.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: It's another indication of where the situation with the armed forces and defence sits.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): No, actually, others would suffer. I happen to sit on immigration, and it was sitting in this slot before. We've been through it.

    Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: General Evraire, I want to come back to a point you raised earlier; you said that whether we are talking about a security policy or a national defence policy, it should be based for once on needs.

    I read an interesting book the other day by someone named Bland, who is a military specialist, and he said that things have never worked that way. He said that military resources have always been a function of budgetary resources in the end. The needs may be huge, but if the financial resources cannot keep up, people try to find ways of basically saying that they will have to make due with that situation, that it is too bad but that is the way things are. I just wanted to raise that with you.

    Now I want to come back to another, more worrisome issue. To help defend the territory protected by the Canadian Forces, we have had NORAD, Northern Command, etc., and there may be a process under way to slowly shunt those officers aside, which might reduce Canada's participation. I am wondering how far the Americans are going to be able to go, since I do not believe that a traditional threat can come from the north or the south. When I say “threat”, I am just talking about an invasion. You yourself said earlier, I believe, that the threat of an invasion is non-existent. After all, Russia is not going to cross the Bering Straight and invade us.

    But there are two types of attacks that threaten national security in both Canada and the United States and that we need to take more seriously in the wake of September 11th. I am talking, of course, about terrorist attacks, on the one hand. On the other, there is the possibility of ballistic attacks, but I am wondering whether we are not being fed a line in this regard when we are told that North Korea might launch missiles against the United States. Personally, I do not believe that for one minute because it would be the end of North Korea.

    That said, there is a geographic reality that is extremely important here: a huge buffer zone lies between Washington and any ballistic attack, which would probably be sent over the Arctic. That buffer zone is Canada. So I am wondering to what extent the Americans are going to be able to say that we are not contributing, that we are not doing things to their satisfaction, and decide to exclude us, since any missiles may go over our territory.

    Do you agree with my analysis that if a ballistic attack occurred and a missile was launched toward Washington, in a doctrine of anti-ballistic missile defence, that the attack would happen above Canadian territory, and if so, Canadian officers should be involved for that reason in the whole planning process? Can Canada be completely shut out, given that it will have an important role to play, given the size of our territory, in intercepting any ballistic missile?

    LGen Richard Evraire: I quite agree with you, but what bothers me, when I hear you describe that hypothetical situation, is that as a Canadian I am a little bit too proud to want to be a guinea pig or a servant to the needs of the U.S., which wants to guarantee its own security. It seems to me that Canada, as a capable country, should also be able to develop a security and defence plan and contribute to something. After all, you cannot be part of an alliance without contributing in a significant way.

    The scenario that you have described may have existed already for quite some time. We had planes and command centres across Canada and the Americans were not bothered at all. The situation did not bother us either, since we were there and contributing to something viable. From there to saying that even though we are contributing absolutely nothing or very little, the Americans are going to use our territory anyway is a perfectly logical step, but I find it distasteful because I think that a country should show more backbone than that and contribute to defence in a positive way rather than—this is what I see in your description—a very negative way.

  (1215)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: Mr. Chairman, perhaps I could add two comments to that.

    I think that there are two aspects to the issue you have raised. First, we have the missile defence aspect. There is no doubt that the Americans see this as a priority and a need and they intend to go ahead, with or without Canada. We have de decide whether we want to be on board the train that is getting ready to leave the station. But there is no doubt that if the United States wants to protect itself against missiles that might be launched against it, they are going to want to do it as far as possible from American territory, whether it is in Canadian territory or in the Atlantic or the Pacific Ocean. So we have to be realistic and accept that this is the objective. It is one more reason to get on board the train and ensure that it does not happen over Canada, but somewhere else instead.

    The other aspect involves control over space in the 21^st century. The importance that the Americans are going to attach... All the great powers want to do the same thing because a modern war is controlled by satellites up in space. For example, the success of American air strikes depends on missiles controlled from space. For that reason, space and satellites have to be protected. That is yet another reason to be on board the train as it is leaving the station.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you, Mr. Bachand.

[English]

     I guess I'll take a little time. Claude opened up a door that is of particular interest to me, and that's the far north.

    I think Colonel Pellerin mentioned the fact that one of the big problems we've always had is long-term planning, long-term procurement, and all of that. At least ten years, in many cases, is not abnormal.

    We did have a NATO group over here and we were briefed on what's happening in the north, as far as the Northwest Passage. They're pretty clear that within ten years the Northwest Passage will be open through the full summer. It means we have a serious problem of how we're going to protect or do security on that area, which we do hardly any of right now.

    I've talked to the Danes too, as far as Greenland. They have exactly the same situation because they do two patrols a year. That's all they do for their far north. We're not far behind that.

    We have a serious problem that's coming up, ten years down the road. We have to start looking at it now. We haven't really put much in the way towards that.

    I know you've mentioned in your reports before about the small amount of surveillance we do in the far north. There again, it brings in our cooperation with the Americans because it has a huge value to them also. It has a huge value to our NATO partners because of the economic impact that the opening will have on all of Europe and certainly America on the American west coast.

    We still have not settled the problem as far as where the international waters are up there. It's a whole other thing that we still have to deal with. Once we've dealt with it, the whole area has to be patrolled.

    You mentioned satellite surveillance. We all know that in the far north it's difficult to be able to do that. We have rather a blank area up there.

    Do you have any suggestions?

  (1220)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

    As a general comment, that is an area that must receive considerable consideration in a defence review. We talk about our three oceans and then do precious little about that. Our ability to patrol with air and sea assets is down to next to nothing.

    May I turn to Colonel Marsh, who may add a few interesting aspects about the need to do that?

    Col Howard Marsh: Thank you very much.

    Yes, I agree. I am very much aware that in the last ten years, since 1992, the Arctic has lost 40% of its ice volume. Recently, two weeks ago, we lost 343 kilometres of the ice cap. I agree that by the year 2010 or 2015 it will be possible to use the Northwest Passage.

    Basically, there are three things that I think are going to happen in the Arctic, and then they would bear on defence.

    The first is that there are approximately 1,800 ships a day that go from Europe to Asia. Those 1,800 ships would find it 4,000 kilometres shorter by going through the Canadian north. First of all, we are going to have a huge traffic control problem.

    The second thing is that for a whole bunch of reasons the Arctic is very rich in nodules and minerals on the Arctic floor. We will possibly see pirating, or people claiming large chunks of the Arctic for mineral extraction, because it's a billion-dollar enterprise. People such as the Americans and the British, in that order, and the Japanese are likely to do it for us.

    The third thing is that it is a great place to empty your bilge tanks on the way out of European controls into Asian environmental control areas. We're going to have an environmental problem.

    It all boils down to this. I think our first priority is the need to be able to track the 1,800 ships a day. The only system that does it is the American system at the present time. We don't want to get too far away from the $10 billion worth of American surveillance assets that look at our Arctic every 90 minutes. As a nation, we're going to have to have an ability to do close-in surveillance with unmanned aerial vehicles in the Arctic. When the satellite gives us a warning that something is wrong or something untoward is going on, we will have to have detailed tactical surveillance. The detailed tactical surveillance would need to be backed up with a reconnaissance or military presence, with helicopters flying off the ships.

    It all comes back to the fact that, you're quite right, the problem was 10 to 15 years ago. It would take us 20 or 30 years to develop a ship capable of plying the Arctic waters for nine months of the year, with long-range helicopters and troops that can jump off helicopters onto the people who are doing bad things in the Arctic.

    I think that is where I will stop.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): It's one of those things. We're supposed to be thinking long term here. Surprisingly enough, it's an item that isn't that far ahead of us and we are not really taking it into consideration very much. Personally, I'm going to be pushing it very strongly.

    Col Howard Marsh: I think we are five years too late already.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): I agree. The thing is that it is very much a Canada-U.S. thing. Even though it is strictly Canadian territory, as you say, we can't afford to do it alone. It is to the Americans' interest, of course, to help us out on it.

    It is one of the things that we really haven't been discussing very much with them. It seems to be a bone of contention even with the fact that you start talking about it. They have claims. We have claims. That has to be settled first, I guess.

    Col Howard Marsh: Mr. Chairman, I would proffer that it is to the Americans' long-term advantage to see us not participate.

    LGen Richard Evraire: To go back to a point made earlier, we seem to be focusing on the armed forces to do these particular surveillance tasks. Indeed, if there is an umbrella concept that says no, we'll have it done by the coast guard or somebody else, fine. At least we'll know who's responsible for it and we'll know what limits are imposed on commitments to the armed forces as a consequence.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): There again, Northern Command now is taking on the role of having the coast guard work with them. We have to look very closely at how we handle it too.

    Yes, Cheryl.

  (1225)  

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I want to touch on a topic that Colonel Marsh mentioned toward the end of his response to my last question, and that is Israel. If the chair will bear with me, this is a defence question. It's just a little explanatory in the beginning.

    Canada is currently going to extremes to keep hatred and violence arising from hatred for certain groups. It's right now at the top of the agenda, to the point where even freedom of religion and freedom of expression is at risk. Given our complete commitment to intolerance of hatred of any form, we have a decision on the issue of the conflict in Israel at hand right now. The United States has brought forth a resolution condemning this hatred that is put into the school books, put on TV in commercials, put into children's stories, teen music--it's all programmed hatred.

    So given that Canadian values that are so opposed to such activity and the fact that when the resolution was put forth Canada chose to abstain, I'm wondering, given this contradiction, is it possible that this supervised neglect of our military, to the point where we have such limited capacity, means that the state of our military is now dictating our foreign policy to a certain extent?

    LGen Richard Evraire: De facto, we are limited in our ability to intervene and to participate given the state of our forces. As I mentioned earlier, yes, a viable armed forces does provide foreign policy options. If we reduce the viability and the capability of our forces, we reduce our foreign policy options. We might like to participate in this area, but we can't for numbers and capability reasons. So the short answer is, yes, foreign policy is diminished in its breadth and extent by the fact that our armed forces are reduced to the level they are today.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Mr. Grose.

    Mr. Ivan Grose: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    That last question puts me in mind of what someone said, that foreign policy comes out of the muzzle of a gun. It wasn't me who said it.

    This is something I haven't thought of before, but the thought has been passed to me. Do you see the ABCA--for those who don't know, and I didn't know until a moment ago, this is American, British, Canadian, and ANZAC--playing an increasing role in the achievement of standardization of equipment and doctrine between Canada's army and the other participating nations? What changes in our relationship with the ABCA would enhance its viability? This one really interests me. Expand the mandate of ABCA to include the air force and navy too. I find it rather odd that that hasn't already been done.

    On the standardizing of equipment between allies, I know in the Second World War it was appalling. The British and Americans were operating with different equipment, different frequencies, everything was different, and to a great degree we were too.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, a great deal of effort in NATO from its inception was spent on the whole idea of standardizing not only equipment in the three services, but also doctrinal matters so that participating allied nations could all understand what each other was about in terms of operational capabilities. There have been spinoffs of those efforts, and one of them is the ABCA construct, in which over the years--and I chaired an ABCA meeting some years back for the army--the intention was to discuss and come to agreement about doctrine, much less equipment. Certainly for the time I was there it was from a doctrinal point of view. I quite honestly don't know what the state of these exchanges are at the moment. Possibly Colonel Marsh, who was in the service more recently than either one of us next to him were, might open our eyes to that.

    The fact is that commonality of equipment and operational techniques were certainly the bread and butter of the air force and the navy for ages. They simply couldn't fly off into each other's bases and ports without that sort of commonality of equipment and training. The army had, to some degree, a greater amount of difficulty given the variety of provenances of allied types of equipment and doctrines, and that was one of the reasons the ABCA organization was put together, to try to eliminate these differences.

    I might ask Colonel Marsh now to give us an idea of whether or not these meetings do continue at the same pace and relevance.

  (1230)  

    Col Howard Marsh: The ABCA, or quadripartite, standardization groups do still meet, as do NATO standardization meetings. But both are being dominated or subsumed by two other standards.

    The first one is the IEEE standard, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers. Their standards now govern 80% to 90% of all electronics interfaces, switches, voltages, frequencies in the world. The second is the Society of Automotive Engineers, which is the standard for 43 automobile companies in the world, and they underpin virtually all transport metal fasteners.

    SAE and IEEE are ipso facto the new standard, and ABCA countries have large representations of those two societies in their general society. ABCA and NATO basically will fade as IEEE and SAE dominate.

    Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I want to come back to this issue of a negative vision, Mr. Evraire. Perhaps I should have prefaced my remarks with an excerpt from your document entitled A nation at Risk: The Decline of the Canadian Forces, where you say:

Overall, the U.S. view of Canada is moving from “benign neglect” to “emerging hostility.”

    I feel that this is a very negative reality as well, but it is a reality. That is why I wanted to say that the Americans are basically always trying to push us in the direction of their own interests, and I think that we should perhaps resist a little more at times. The Northern Command was raised earlier, as well as NORAD. We hear about Central Command. I do not believe that there are many Canadians who have a major influence at Central Command. In passing, we went to Tampa Bay to see the operations there.

    There is another area where I feel they are pushing us and I would like to have your opinion on it. I am talking about the Defence Authorization Bill. I do not know whether you have heard about that, but I have personally contacted CEOs of American companies with headquarters here in Canada, and they are basically pushing us out of the American industrial base, which is terrible because we have had unlimited access to the American market for the past century. It worked very well, but they are now telling us that they want to buy American products only, without taking into account free trade, etc. I would just like to read you a short excerpt from the letter that I sent:

[English]

In the past year, several U.S. ammunition companies have joined together to request that their Congressmen and Senators enact legislation that would restrict Canadian participation in the U.S. munitions market. This position is not supported by the U.S. Army or by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, which both recognize the Canadian industrial contribution to the U.S. ammunition program. Unfortunately, the House version of the 2004 Defense Authorization Bill...does contain language...that would eliminate Canada from the National Technology and Industrial Base.

[Translation]

    So do you share my opinion, even though it is somewhat negative, that the Americans are acting not only on the economic side by saying that they will restrict their market, but also on the military, government and legislative side by trying to teach Canada a lesson? Do you have that impression?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Yes, I share your interpretation to a certain degree. It is clear in some cases. We had the problem with ITAR, which completely blocked trade in American technology and equipment for nearly two years in areas such as satellite equipment and satellite launchers. We could not get information from them, etc. We were excluded until, not that long ago, there was some talk of allowing us to get back into that system, but on the same basis as all the other countries; we had that advantage, that access to the American military industry that dated back to the 1940s.

    There is not a lot we can do about it in the circumstances. The Americans have so much power over those things that if they want to exclude us, we lose out, unfortunately.

    But I want to come back to what I raised earlier. The only way I can see us getting back into favour with the Americans or becoming involved on the industrial side with them, in the military area especially, is really to make a significant contribution. If the Americans have the impression that Canada is becoming a consumer with respect to security and defence, why would they give us benefits?

    On the other hand—and I mentioned this in my remarks—if we were able to contribute on the research side or through concrete contributions of materiel or personnel to North American security and defence, I think that this could allow the Americans to decide to open up their doors to us. After all, we are next door and we have had favoured treatment over the years.

    Why did we have the door slammed in our face? I believe—and we keep saying this—that it was because our capacity to contribute to joint defence decreased markedly. And until we correct that situation, I believe that the Americans will continue to treat us much the same way as they have been.

  (1235)  

    Col Alain Pellerin: I would like to add a comment or two to that.

    To begin with, you have mentioned CENTCOM. We need to remember, in keeping with what the general mentioned, that our only contribution to the forces under that command is one ship, basically a frigate, the HCMS Calgary, which will be retired in October. So we must not be unrealistic when we talk about influence. If we are not contributing troops to Central Command, either in Irak or in Afghanistan... The troops in Afghanistan are not technically under the control of CENTCOM; they are now under NATO control. So we have lost that influence at CENTCOM without a doubt.

    With respect to the bill, which has only been introduced in the House of representatives, and which has not been voted on or given support by the Senate, the White House or the Pentagon, that is one more reason. If relations between Washington and Ottawa were better, I think that this type of misunderstanding would not get blown out of proportion like it has. The bill was introduced by the chairman of the U.S. defence committee. He is the one who introduced the bill and has pushed it. Or perhaps if your committee had the chance to go to Washington, you could have that type of discussion with him.

[English]

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Merci, Monsieur Bachand.

    Maybe just to finish up, we could talk a little bit about Afghanistan and our mission there, and what's going on with.... Well, our two major things are Bosnia and Afghanistan.

    Right now at NATO we're starting a study...or actually, it's been discussed for a long time, moving our troops out of there and the whole operation being taken over by Europeans. I think that's good news for a lot of our soldiers. Let's be honest, I think they're fed up with being there now, and they don't feel they're that occupied in doing the things they want to be able to do.

    The Afghanistan mission is a really interesting one, though. I did have the opportunity to visit there when they were setting up camp. We're well equipped there. I've talked to several of the solders there, and I think they're really into the job they had to do there. We carry an awful lot of credibility there, too, just from talking to the people there.

    The only thing I find a little unfortunate about it, and I'd kind of like your opinion on it, is that we're going to go in and do a change, and we'll have another group going in. They're staying there until next summer, and next summer is when they're supposed to have their elections. We have a great camp set up. It's in an ideal location. We're taking over command of the operation. We're second in command right now, but as of January 1, we take over command for NATO.

    So I'd kind of like your comments on what you think we should be doing there.

  (1240)  

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, is that in terms of possibly prolonging the mission as it exists today or of undertaking a broader mission?

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Well, in taking over command, we're kind of taking over a broader mission there anyway. Therefore, should we not be staying longer, of course considering that we're moving out of other areas?

    LGen Richard Evraire: Well, the problem with the prolongation of the mission, I think, is that given the number of available troops, from a sustainability point of view this would be devastating for the army. We recognize that the navy is currently taking or very soon will undertake a period of rest. The army would find itself much in the same boat.

    Yes, the mission in Bosnia is supposed to be reduced from 1,300 to 800 or so, but I'm not sure just exactly what the timetable is. I personally haven't heard that we would be eliminating the entire group there. That may be something being discussed, as I suspect all options are.

    A prolongation would continue the difficulty that exists today in making available a sufficient number of personnel to carry on the training that is required not only for the newly recruited members of the forces--there has been quite a thrust in recruiting, as you know--but also in continuation training requirements for those currently operationally employed members of the army and the other services.

    We discussed, and I'd mentioned in my own text here, the danger of mortgaging our ability to continue operating in the future because we are overtaxing our existing military personnel in current operations. For as long as we maintain that same operational tempo, then we'll continue to mortgage, and the mortgage will get bigger and bigger in terms of our ability to move to the army, the navy, and the air force of tomorrow.

    Therein lies the rub. We are at bare-bones capability levels currently, and that will only get worse unless there is a concerted effort to increase the number of trained personnel in the service. Obviously, that takes time as well as the money necessary to maintain the equipment these same people would be using.

    So finally, I don't see how it could be possible to prolong that mission beyond the originally indicated period of time.

    Col Alain Pellerin: I'll just add to what the general was saying. In terms of numbers, the army has maybe between 9,000 and 10,000 troops they can deploy in the field; that's the reality, although it's a force of 19,000. You're talking about maybe 95 or 100 bayonets. With the two commitments this year the whole of the army would to a large extent be committed over a one-year period, either getting ready, being there, or coming back.

    So if you extended that by another six months, it would mean that troops that are there or in Bosnia now could very well return to Afghanistan within six months. You know the policy of 12 months. That is the reality of the current situation.

    Col Howard Marsh: Mr. Chairman, if I could, I'll interject and put some colour to this.

    A voice: You always do.

    Col Howard Marsh: In order to sustain the current commitment to Afghanistan, the army has robbed 50% of its capability from the force generation system. It's taking 50% of the instructors, the equipment, and so on and so forth. As a result, when the soldiers return in 2004, the army's likely to be at 50% of its current strength because there are no trained corporals to replace the corporals who are going to retire on a normal basis. They can't replace the new soldiers who have had enough and are leaving. We did some calculations, and should the Afghanistan operation go to the year 2005, the army will be at 25% strength, and by 2007 it will basically stop.

  (1245)  

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): It's unfortunate that we've stretched ourselves so thin that now we'd probably get an ideal mission for us if we were up and running like we should be...to be able to run longer, and we're not going to be able to do it.

    I thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here. It's always very interesting. We could go on for a long time, I'm sure. There's a lot to discuss, and I'm sure you'll be back. Again, thank you very much.

    LGen Richard Evraire: Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the CDA, I thank you and the members of the committee for being so kind as to invite us to testify. We'd dearly love to do so at your beck and call.

    Thank you.

    The Vice-Chair (Mr. David Price): Thank you very much.