NDVA Committee Meeting

37th PARLIAMENT, 2nd SESSION

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Thursday, April 3, 2003

¿

0915

The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.))

Mr. James Harlick (Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Department of National Defence)

¿

0920

¿

0925

¿

0930

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance)

¿

0935

Mr. James Harlick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Harlick

¿

0940

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Harlick

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.)

¿

0945

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

¿

0950

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ)

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

¿

0955

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.)

À

1000

Mr. James Harlick

À

1005

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

À

1010

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. David Price

À

1015

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

À

1020

The Chair

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. Claude Bachand

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. Claude Bachand

À

1025

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

À

1030

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

À

1035

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

À

1040

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

Mr. James Harlick

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

À

1045

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. David Price

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

À

1050

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

À

1055

The Chair

Mrs. Cheryl Gallant

Mr. James Harlick

Á

1100

The Chair

Mr. James Harlick

The Chair

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CANADA

Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs

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NUMBER 019

l

2nd SESSION

l

37th PARLIAMENT

---

EVIDENCE

Thursday, April 3, 2003

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¿  (0915)  

[English]

    The Chair (Mr. David Pratt (Nepean—Carleton, Lib.)): Good morning. I want to call this meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs to order.

    Before us today are witnesses from the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness. Mr. James Harlick is the assistant deputy minister, and Mr. Bill de Laat is director general of external relations and public affairs.

    Gentlemen, welcome to the committee. We appreciate your attendance here. As you know, we're in the process of trying to conduct a study of Canada–U.S. defence relations, and your organization obviously forms a fairly critical part of that scenario.

    We're looking forward to getting your comments. I should let you know, though, that depending on which members are here toward the end of the meeting, we may be forced to cut our hearing a little bit short in order to deal with some committee business. I think we're going to have to play it by ear at this point and wait to see who arrives.

    On behalf of the committee, I'd like to extend a warm welcome to you. We're certainly very much looking forward to your comments.

    Mr. James Harlick (Assistant Deputy Minister, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness, Department of National Defence): Mr. Chair and members of the committee, I'd like to thank you for your invitation to appear before this committee today to speak to you about Canada–U.S. defence and security cooperation as it relates to our office. As noted, Mr. Bill de Laat, director general for external relations and public affairs, is with me today. He is our principal leader on the Canada–U.S. file for our office.

    My plan is to give you a brief overview of the several activities currently underway with the U.S. in our domain. I also want to touch on some of the historical antecedents that have brought us to where we are today. Maybe the question-and-answer part of the meeting will allow us to address areas that interest the committee or individual members.

[Translation]

    The Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness (OCIPEP) is a civilian organization located within the National Defence portfolio. Our interpretation of defence and security cooperation is more closely linked to preparedness, protection and response and is different from what you might hear or have heard from my Canadian Forces colleagues.

    Let me start out by saying that OCIPEP is in direct and frequent communication with its U.S. counterparts and is participating in a number of cooperative ventures with the U.S. on matters dealing with emergency management, critical infrastructure protection and cyber security. This occurs not only at the regional level, where Regional Emergency Management Advisory Councils address issues related to cross-border assistance and collaboration for emergency management, but also between the respective Headquarters.

    Relationships with the U.S. regarding emergency management predate the creation of OCIPEP and the Department of Homeland Security, or DHS, in the United States, when predecessor organizations in both countries, Emergency Preparedness Canada (EPC) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, in the United States, signed an agreement on cooperation and comprehensive civil emergency planning and management in Ottawa 17 years ago this month—in April 1986. Minor amendments were adopted by both parties in 1996, and the agreement remains in force to this day. At recent meetings in Washington, OCIPEP and FEMA (now part of DHS, Department of Homeland Security), agreed to focus on practical improvements in operational linkages between the two organizations, for example, 24/7 contacts, telecommunication links, etc.

¿  (0920)  

[English]

    The Canada–U.S. Smart Border Declaration signed by Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and then Governor Tom Ridge, head of the Office of Homeland Security in the U.S., along with the 30-point action plan, involved much more than assuring the movement of people and goods across the border between our two countries, although those are important issue areas in that accord, of course. In particular, action item 21 calls for cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, specifically as it relates to carrying out binational threat assessments on transborder infrastructure.

    Canada and the U.S. have created a binational critical infrastructure protection steering committee, which held its first meeting in Ottawa in August of last year and drafted a joint Canada–U.S. framework for cooperation. Eight working groups were established at that meeting, to examine the areas of energy, transportation, defence, telecommunications, and such functional areas as interdependencies, research and development, mapping, and information sharing. It was recommended that a ninth group on agriculture and food be created.

    The March 2003 steering committee meeting held in Washington two weeks ago formally established the agriculture and food working group. Agreement was also received to create a working group on cyber-security, which would provide guidance to the other working groups on cyber-security issues and challenges. Good progress has been made with respect to the development of terms of reference and work plans for these various working groups.

    Canada and the U.S. have drafted a memorandum of agreement on research and development as it relates to critical infrastructure protection. It focuses on both physical and cyber-infrastructure collaboration, especially concerning interdependencies. This MOA is designed to be as flexible and productive as possible. When officially signed, it will open a new chapter in cooperative cross-border Canada–U.S. critical infrastructure protection research and development.

    OCIPEP's collaboration with its counterparts has a practical side as well. Exercises conducted jointly by officials from both countries are an important tool in insuring critical infrastructure that serves or crosses both countries.

    Exercises provide an opportunity for emergency management officials and operational personnel to interact, to develop contacts with counterparts from the other country, and to identify issues for future collaboration. For example, the office participated in Thin Ice, a joint Canada–U.S. tabletop exercise that took place in February 2002. As well, OCIPEP co-sponsored and provided significant funding for an infrastructure interdependency exercise called Blue Cascades. Developed with the Pacific Northwest Economic Region, PNWER—which includes the Canadian provinces and territories of British Columbia, Alberta, and the Yukon, and the U.S. states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana—this exercise provided a forum for participants to discuss infrastructure interdependencies and protection, mitigation, and response and recovery activities across government agencies and the private sector. The scenario played out or simulated three physical attacks that destroyed or rendered electrical power distribution services inoperable during a prolonged cold snap in an early January period.

[Translation]

    OCIPEP regional staff participated in this exercise which involved a total of 150 representatives from 70 private and public sector organizations. Some of the key lessons learned were the need for coordinated release of information to the public and the need for a mechanism for cross-border sharing of Canada and U.S. threat-level information.

    Early in 2002, the U.S. invited Canada to participate inTOPOFF 2, a major U.S. exercise designed to provide training for federal, state and local top officials and responders and to demonstrate coordinated national crisis and consequence management capabilities in response to a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction. Canada accepted the invitation and the participation of 18 federal departments and agencies is being jointly coordinated by OCIPEP and the Department of the Solicitor General. The governments of British Columbia and Ontario are also participating in the exercise.

¿  (0925)  

[English]

    A cycle of TOPOFF2 activities of increasing complexity began in July 2002, with a range of issue-specific seminars hosted by the U.S. and attended by Canadian representatives. This seminar series will culminate in the full-scale exercise that takes place in May of this year. Without getting into too many specifics, the scenario will simulate the use of weapons of mass destruction near the northern U.S. border, having direct effects on U.S. jurisdictions and impacts on Canada. The exercise will test the readiness of emergency organizations and cross-border coordination between our two countries.

    In December 2002, Canada and the U.S. negotiated an agreement to establish the Binational Planning Group to enhance military cooperation for the protection of North America. The agreement is valid for two years and may be terminated by one or both nations under specified terms. This planning group will be composed of both military and civilian staff, and will significantly enhance the ability of our countries to respond to maritime and land-based attacks and threats to North America, terrorist or otherwise. The agreement provides for military support to civilian authorities on both sides of the border in the event of a disaster or other major event.

    I would like to be clear on this point. In the event that military forces from either country are required to help to respond to an emergency situation in the other, these forces would be under the operational control of the country in which the emergency has occurred, but a direct, national chain of command would be maintained with the dispatching country. In other words, Canada would retain control over its forces and their missions and activities at all times, as would the U.S.

    The Binational Planning Group will develop detailed contingency plans for defending against and responding to possible threats to Canada and the U.S. These threats could come in the form of natural disasters or potential terrorist threats. The group will also ensure coordination with relevant civilian agencies in both Canada and the U.S.

[Translation]

    OCIPEP will provide two officers to this Group, the first one by July 2003. The officers will provide advice and liaison to OCIPEP. OCIPEP will provide the link between the Group and federal civilian agencies and will be the point of contact between provinces/provincial stakeholders and the Bi-national Planning Group. The creation of the Bi-national Planning Group does not take away from existing Government of Canada emergency management support provided to provinces and territories. In fact, it allows the Government of Canada to enhance that support through better planning and relations with military resources in both Canada and the U.S. It also does not change the requirement for a province or territory to request federal assistance before the Government of Canada gets involved in response activities.

[English]

    In November 2002, the U.S. government began its largest public service reorganization since the creation of the Department of Defense some five decades ago. As you well know, this was the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, DHS. This department has five key directorates: corporate management; border and transportation security; science and technology; information analysis and infrastructure protection; and emergency preparedness and response. The latter two are of particular importance to OCIPEP's mission. DHS commenced operations as a department on March 1, 2003.

    Efforts to enhance contacts between DHS and OCIPEP are ongoing. In fact, members of the Department of Homeland Security's Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate and our own operations directorate are currently identifying procedures whereby round-the-clock contact and warning mechanisms will be put in place. In addition, the new Framework for Binational Cooperation in Critical Infrastructure Protection and its associated governance structures for the steering committee and working groups will serve to improve and strengthen our working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security.

    The amalgamation of 22 agencies and departments into the new U.S. Department of Homeland Security has provided Canada with a single point of contact for many cyber-security issues, as well as some of the key U.S. agencies that are now part of DHS. Canada has a good working relationship with the National Infrastructure Protection Center, or NIPC, as it's called. It's located in the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is the U.S. government's focal point for threat assessment, warning, and investigation, in response to threats or attacks against critical infrastructure. And we also have a good relationship with the National Communications System, or NCS. We are currently in the process of negotiating a memorandum of understanding governing our respective relations between OCIPEP and the Department of Homeland Security.

    Just as NIPC will be incorporated into DHS—in fact, it formally has been—the National Communications System will be too. The NCS assists the federal government in the U.S. in protecting its critical information infrastructure, and it collaborates with NIPC to plan infrastructure protection strategies. We have a close operational relationship with the NCS portion of the Department of Homeland Security, which has proven its effectiveness in recent months.

    It is important to point out that Canada is currently involved in a number of international cyber-security initiatives. This activity and our partnerships include not only bilateral cooperation with the U.S., but also with the United Kingdom, countries such as Australia and the Netherlands, and organizations such as the G-8, the Organization of American States, and the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

¿  (0930)  

[Translation]

    In closing, I would like to assure this Committee that OCIPEP is committed to building, nurturing and strengthening our working relationships with the Department of Homeland Security.

    In fact, I should point out that OCIPEP will be staffing a Senior Advisor at the Canadian embassy in Washington. This individual will liaise with key American contacts in the Department of Homeland Security, the White House Office of Homeland Security,

[English]

—that is, the White House Office of Homeland Security, which remains, as you know—

[Translation]

and other major American stakeholders. I expect that an announcement of the appointment will be made shortly.

    The work we have done, and continue to do, in the areas of the Smart Border Declaration, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Steering Committee, joint Canada-U.S. exercises, the Bi-national Planning Group and international cyber security provides concrete examples of the close working relationships between OCIPEP and its U.S. counterparts.

    I look forward, Mr. Chairman, to your questions and to providing you with any additional information you need to further your work in the area of Canada-U.S. defence and security cooperation. Also, we would be pleased to provide you future updates on our work with the U.S. as your work progresses.

    Thank you.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Harlick.

    We'll begin our questions with the Canadian Alliance.

    Mrs. Gallant, you have seven minutes.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Canadian Alliance): Mr. Harlick, the training facility at the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College located in Arnprior has been judged by its users from all across Canada and from many other countries as the best of its kind anywhere. This is due to its physical layout and its state-of-the-art training aids. It has been copied by many countries, such as the United States and the U.K. Its pastoral setting away from the maddening crowds lends to a greater ability for networking and working after hours. Why has this valuable resource been allowed to run down?

¿  (0935)  

    Mr. James Harlick: Let me start with a bit of a chapeau comment to Mrs. Gallant's question.

    It is indeed a well-recognized college for the training of emergency responders. In fact, about 700 Canadian first responders at the provincial and municipal levels pass through its doors each year, taking its courses. The college has been there for some time. In the past, as Madame Gallant knows—and perhaps many other members also know this—there have been some plans from time to time to try to ensure that the facility stayed up with the times from the point of view of the physical plant, etc. That has not occurred.

    I was not responsible for the college at that time, but I was in government. In particular, I was in the Treasury Board Secretariat during the time of program review, and I'm well aware of the fact that, in the era of declining resources that the Department of National Defence went through at that time, the department judged that there were higher priorities toward which it had to put its ever-diminishing amounts of money. Therefore, it was never able to allocate the funds that would have been required to keep up or maintain the facility to the level that one would like.

    Of course, it's a sad fact that today, as you also know, the facility at Arnprior is not a suitable facility either from a health and safety point of view or from a delivery point of view. Those factors laid a firm foundation for the minister's decision to relocate the college, and it was for that reason that the minister has decided to announce publicly a relocation of the college to the Federal Study Centre in south Ottawa.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: So the sad reality, then, is that national security training for the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness is not a priority.

    Mr. James Harlick: I didn't say that.

¿  (0940)  

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: But in the declining years of funding, that was basically what it amounted to.

    A reference was made to declining resources. After September 11, $396 million was specifically allocated to emergency preparedness, yet the support facilities were still torn down. Although a very attractive offer was initially put together in 1998 that would have meant no capital outlay to the taxpayers of Canada, the offer was completely rejected and the college progressed in being torn down.

    Why is it now being moved to a facility that was turned down over ten years ago, a facility that was judged fourth-rate and totally unacceptable from a training and accommodation standpoint, and one that every other agency has said they want no part of?

    Mr. James Harlick: The accommodation real property study that Public Works and Government Services Canada conducted for the office identified the Federal Study Centre as the best existing facility to meet the needs of the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College. That was a study that PWGSC initiated and managed. It did so via a reputable firm that does that sort of thing, and it is the advice that we took under consideration, took into account as the tenants of the building, when the decision was made, when recommendations were made to the minister, and when the minister made the decision to relocate the college. That decision has been made in 2002-03, in the current circumstance. It is not referring back to 1998 or 1948 for that purpose. Mrs. Gallant has mentioned the budget of December 10, 2001. That was obviously not relevant to decisions made in 1998.

    She also mentioned the figure of $300 million. I will confirm that the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection and Emergency Preparedness has received $95 million over five years—or just under $20 million a year in new money—via that budget to augment its base, which was a base inherited from Emergency Preparedness Canada. That figure in the budget comprises funds other than those that have come our way, certainly, so I think one really has to look at the more modest figure that we have received.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: The study that was referred to was done prior to September 11, and after September 11 everything changed. A few pages were inserted into the dated study, but that still did not address the threats that have been identified. In fact, the city of Ottawa, and the Parliament Buildings in particular, have been identified as one of the potential targets for terrorists. Yet instead of keeping the emergency preparedness office and the training facility outside ground zero, so to speak, it has been decided to move them closer to the target.

    It is also recognized that part of the reason for initially putting it outside the national capital was that it was outside the national capital's power grid. Should there be some sort of power outage as a result of terrorism, an ice storm, or some other natural disaster, it just makes sense to keep it where it is.

    We're at a point right now where we have a biological crisis. The exercises to which you refer are rather out of date right now, because the test is right now. We're living the exercise.

    I want you to tell us something today. Can you tell us that the country's plans are in place for this type of emergency, that it's being dealt with, and that Canadians should have absolutely no worry with respect to what your responsibility is in that?

    The Chair: Mr. Harlick, I'm going to have to ask you to give us a very short answer to this, because Mrs. Gallant is already well over her time at this point.

    Mr. James Harlick: Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    Let me just take the narrowest item that Mrs. Gallant spoke about, which is—

    The Chair: Cheryl will have time to get back to some of these issues later.

    Mr. James Harlick: Let me assure Mrs. Gallant, other members, and you, that in respect to our role in crises, we feel very confident that we have appropriate plans, well exercised, with trained personnel, to handle the kinds of roles, responsibilities, and challenges that OCIPEP will be called upon to perform.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    Mr. Price, for seven minutes.

    Mr. David Price (Compton—Stanstead, Lib.): Mr. Harlick, I would like to talk a little bit about the edge of the responsibilities of OCIPEP, so what I'll do is first give you an example of a personal experience that happened about ten years ago.

    I was mayor of a municipality with a major...actually, both of our national rail lines going through the town. We had a major derailment of propane cars coming from the States, because we sit right on the border. We had an emergency response plan that went into action immediately. In itself, it worked very well. The problem I did have to deal with, though, came first of all on the provincial level.

    We were in operation within twenty minutes. The province took about four hours before they responded. At the federal level, we asked for help from the reserves. On my team, I did have the commander of the reserves, but he couldn't get any permission at the federal level to operate as a reservist. Therefore, he still operated, but at the civilian level. He was able to pull in different people who were also reservists but who were working as civilians.

    Our plan went off very well. There was no problem, but I was still bothered by the fact that the only response we could get at the federal level was that of a federal rail inspector who showed up and basically tried to shut down the operation. Granted, I know that's not part of your operation.

    That was roughly ten years ago. I'm wondering how things have improved since then. What's the level of cooperation and communication with the civil authorities at the municipal level? You've been very clear about how things are going at the upper levels, and I think that's a good start. Where things actually happen when we do end up with disasters in our areas, though....

    And you didn't mention the rail systems. I think rail systems are critical infrastructure.

    I'd like your comments on those and how we've come along since then.

¿  (0945)  

    Mr. James Harlick: Thank you, sir.

    Yes, indeed, transportation systems are a critical infrastructure sector. You've raised an interesting point that is perennially with us, and one has seen this reported in the media from time to time. It comes down to what the federal government can do or what it should be doing in the eyes of municipalities for direct help in this area, as opposed to other areas. This is something we hear from municipalities, whether it's directly from the occasional municipality or via the Federation of Canadian Municipalities from time to time, either in program assistance terms or in operational response terms.

    The challenge we face in Canada at the federal level is twofold. Under the constitutional provisions of the country, municipalities are creatures of the provinces. That is something the federal government has to respect. Secondly, the basic principle subscribed to by all levels of government in Canada is that the appropriate approach to handling emergencies in Canada—and it's a long-standing approach—is that the lowest level of government where the problem is occurring responds first. When local resources are exhausted or overwhelmed or when they don't have particular skill sets, they go up to the next level, which is the province.

    We see this reflected in the fact that all provinces have emergency management organizations of varying sizes and strengths. In the Canadian system, however, the EMOs are the primary emergency response organization envelope in Canada, and they are resourced, well or less well, to do that. There's no way the federal government, in the vast majority of emergencies—95% of which are handled at the provincial or municipal level—can come riding in on a mythical white horse and solve the problem. It does not have the resources on site, its people don't know the local area, etc.

    What the federal government is there to do is to provide some leadership and coordination and to ensure that the best planning is occurring in Canada; that a degree of advanced training at the CEPC, the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College, is being delivered; that a degree of support both from a planning point of view and occasionally a cost-shared program point of view—we have one of those—ensures that municipal responders have some of the equipment, some of the training, and some of the planning needed to augment their skills so that they are in fact better prepared than they might otherwise be to do that; and that when the federal level is engaged, we have the ability, in the shortest possible time, to respond to requests by provinces for particular kinds of assistance. Those could be skill sets, coordination with foreign jurisdictions, or the Canadian Forces. Of course, we have seen the Canadian Forces directly on the ground in the Red River floods, in the Saguenay floods, in relocating people in the ice storm, and those kinds of things.

    Mr. David Price: What I'm getting at is that emergency response is almost instant. You have to move very quickly. I had to evacuate a third of the town. We had to have places to sleep and all that. The reserves had the equipment to set up beds and blankets, but they couldn't be touched. It was going to take a long process to do that. Luckily, we had a school and were able to set it up ourselves. That's why I'm wondering if things have improved on that level.

    The other level of it is that I had to deal directly with the owners of the cars and the trains and so on in the States, because this was an American train. There was no interaction between the governments. I should think that should be done more at a federal level or through some kind of interaction between the municipality and the federal level, because I was dealing directly with an outfit from completely out of the country.

¿  (0950)  

    Mr. James Harlick: I am surprised by that, certainly. May I ask you if this was the Mississauga derailment?

    Mr. David Price: No, this was in Lennoxville, Quebec.

    The Chair: Actually, Mr. Harlick, could I ask you to provide a really quick response—and I would again suggest that we can maybe come back to this line of questioning later.

    Mr. James Harlick: I would suggest that if it happened today, it would be the case that our regional representative, our regional director in Toronto, would be in the provincial emergency operations centre. He has very good regional contacts with his opposite number. For argument's sake, let's just assume it's the State of Michigan, since it's adjacent to Ontario. He would have an Ontario–federal component and an Ontario-to-Michigan quick connection at levels going down to the appropriate municipalities or authorities on the U.S. side, in order to be able to bridge that Canada–U.S. communications requirement in this train derailment. We can make that happen.

    And if somebody were to ask questions on the reserve aspect, I could come back to that.

    The Chair: I'm sure we'll have an opportunity for that.

[Translation]

    Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. Claude Bachand (Saint-Jean, BQ): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I have the impression you have quite a task, given the size and number of infrastructures. Here, in the backgrounder of the creation of your office, in February 2001, you say that :

Canada's critical infrastructure is found in the energy and utilities, communications services, transportation and safety and government sectors.

    Have you identified a list of the major infrastructures which, according to you, are critical to Canada? Do you have this list? Is it available to members?

    Mr. James Harlick: What we are doing with our provincial colleagues is furthering this issue under the umbrella of an initiative called the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program, or in French the Programme national de fiabilité des infrastructures essentielles. The goal is to further the collective work on what a key sector is, a critical infrastructure sector. How do we know whether an infrastructure is important, essential or not? How do we identify it? How do we collect data on it? How do we evaluate the relationships, the interdependence between this sector and another sector?

    To do so, it must be translated in a practical way, through physical things and computer systems and networks. So there is not in Canada a list of each thing that, globally, would total the national critical structure.

    Of course, there are also questions relating to this issue, i.e. : who can protect such a list? Such a list would certainly be very interesting for terrorists, etc. There is an ongoing debate on lists. Can we make them? Should we make them?

    Mr. Claude Bachand: The debate is ongoing. For my part, I would mention that I understand that these lists must not end up in the hands of terrorists, but I find that members, especially as regards national defence issues, are often excluded. We don't know exactly what is going on. In any case, if the discussion continues, I would like you to intervene to say that members are responsible enough not to give the list to terrorists. It is important, I think, that members have access to this list, especially to know whether this list contains certain infrastructures located in their ridings.

    Now, in the same backgrounder, it is said :

This Office will develop and implement a comprehensive approach to protecting Canada's critical infrastructure.

    Is this comprehensive approach complete? Is it available to members?

    Mr. James Harlick: As I briefly mentioned in my opening remarks, we are involved with other federal departments to create links, relationships with other countries, other organizations in the world. I mentioned the G-8, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, etc., countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, etc.

    We are able to, and are currently creating closer operational relationships to better address the challenges and threats that are rising in global areas outside Canada. The best example is that of viruses in the area of information technology. For example, a few month ago, the Slammer virus began to propagate in China, Korea, and it spread all over the world. So we are fully involved in this area.

¿  (0955)  

    Mr. Claude Bachand: I did not get an answer to the following question : will you implement a comprehensive approach? Will you develop one? Will it be submitted to us?

    The same question could apply to the national guidelines OCIPEP wants to define. You want to define national guidelines, and I want to know if it is also available.

    It is also said that you are responsible for emergency preparedness at the national level. I know it's a creation of the Prime Minister, and I also know how much he respects provincial jurisdictions, including Quebec's, but how does this fit, for example, in public security, which is of provincial jurisdiction in Quebec? The Sûreté du Québec also have an action plan for this protection.

    Are you duplicating? Can you ask, for example, that the Sûreté du Québec abide by national guidelines on certain issues?

    I am very concerned about the provincial jurisdiction issue in this case, especially for Quebec. So I would like you to give me an overview of how exactly this is integrated.

    Mr. James Harlick: On the last question, I would say that we have very close relations with the ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec. A Quebec representative even participated, in late February, in our annual meeting of provincial emergency management organization heads in Canada.

    As I explained in my answer to Mr. Price's question, the principles of emergency management are well known and applied in Canada, i.e. the province is the leader for responding to emergencies or threats. Our role, at the national level, is to assist them, support them, and closely cooperate on major issues, i.e. the direction and capacity of this case. But it is well known, and we acknowledge the fact that the provinces are on the front line for responding to emergencies, as they have been in the past and will be in the future.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick, Mr. Bachand.

    Mr. LeBlanc.

    Mr. Dominic LeBlanc (Beauséjour—Petitcodiac, Lib.): Gentlemen, thank you for coming this morning, and for your interesting presentation. I've been given some information on OCIPEP, and I think I'm visiting your offices next week. From what I've seen so far, you've been doing a lot of very good work with what were initially limited resources and are still limited resources, so congratulations, and thank you for what you're doing.

    Mr. Chairman, I wanted to follow up on two questions. One would be along the lines of what Monsieur Bachand was asking.

    On the process of designating critical infrastructure, every little community in New Brunswick would think their power system is critical infrastructure. Every little, rural border crossing would see their infrastructure as critical. Without going into details, I'm curious about the process by which your office, with provincial and other authorities, comes to a conclusion on what might be critical infrastructure. I can imagine that's not easy, and it's also a moving target in the sense that it's a process that must constantly evolve, constantly adjust to new information, and so on.

    I'm curious about how your office decides that this might be critical or that might not be, and about what consultations one does to determine that, particularly with your counterparts in the United States. You talked quite positively about the cooperation that you have and about your relationship with Homeland Security and other agencies. I'm curious how you and your American counterparts would designate or identify, on an ongoing basis, what might be critical infrastructure, certainly from a transborder perspective.

    And there's one other area on which I'm interested in hearing your comments. I was reassured and quite satisfied with your description of the exchange of information that you have with your American counterparts and colleagues. You talked about training and so on. From an operational perspective, are you satisfied that you're receiving the cooperation from the United States authorities that you need to do your work?

    And in terms of budget, you correctly pointed out that recent budgets have increased your base to some extent, but they are modest amounts. You were right to identify that it's not a huge amount of money at all over a five year period. If your office was given more money, would one of the things you would work on be better training, planning, and relationship-building with American authorities? In other words, if your budget was increased, would there be a direct benefit to that work from a Canada–U.S. perspective?

    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

À  (1000)  

    Mr. James Harlick: And I have seven minutes?

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

À  (1005)  

    Mr. James Harlick: Let me take the first question, which is the largest one.

    It is indeed a truism, but it is not unhelpful to say that each level of government in Canada, at all three levels, would have an interest in critical infrastructure and would think some of the stuff closest to it would be critical. The key challenge is to figure things out with respect to any given level of jurisdiction, in terms of what is critical to it in respect of its own responsibilities. No jurisdiction has really done this yet, because this is a new and evolving area. That's why this program called the national critical infrastructure assurance program—which I've referred to—is our initiative to look at national critical infrastructure.

    Obviously, some critical infrastructure is going to be more relevant to the province, even in the transportation world. Why? Because the province might be much more severely impacted by it. The scope of the impact might be confined to that province, and it might well be that in a given infrastructure, the province has the regulatory or legislative authority over it, whether it's to try to help prevent things or to pick up the pieces thereafter. And it's the same thing at the municipal level.

    One of the challenges all three levels of government face in Canada—and it's the same in other jurisdictions—is figuring out whose infrastructure is what, so to speak, from a responsibility and accountability point of view. The program that I've referred to is designed to provide a common platform or framework within which all three levels of government can address that kind of issue in a cooperative, upfront way, so that there is no overlap and duplication; so that a common definition is used for critical infrastructure sectors; so that common methodologies are developed and are then used to identify critical infrastructure and to look at their interdependencies. That, for example, is starting.

    If we were to pick the oil and gas sector in Alberta, Alberta has done some very good work on this in the aftermath of September 11. They have a very good feel for what is really important—nodes, locations, networks, etc.—in the oil and gas sector in Alberta, and that is, of course, a good, valuable base on which the federal government can rely in terms of understanding what is important there and what isn't; how Alberta has organized itself to ensure the protection of those things; and what the interdependencies are between those things and those that are dependent on them, like the U.S. gas market, for example. But it is a work in progress, and it is cutting-edge stuff that has to be done.

    On the Canada–U.S. front, let me indicate to you that we have enough resources to do what we have to do with the U.S. We are also actively pursuing these matters, although it is still early days with the new players in the DHS—and we can come back to that if you wish.

    Transborder or shared critical infrastructure with them is of obvious importance. That is reflected in item 21 of the Smart Border Declaration, and that is the platform and the chapeau under which all of our Canada–U.S. critical infrastructure protection and cyber-security activities are really being run. There, you do have that top political connection between Deputy Prime Minister Manley and Secretary Ridge to make all the other stuff under that chapeau work effectively. Contacts are built there and substantive work gets done.

    The Chair: Thank you very much, Mr. Harlick, Mr. LeBlanc.

    Mrs. Gallant, for five minutes.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Just to emphasize how important it is that the United States, for example, has confidence in our emergency preparedness, if the border were to shut down, that would mean the loss of $3.6 billion a day in trade. Just $1 billion dollars of trade a day translates into 14,000 jobs.

    You said you are confident that plans are in place to deal with any biological epidemic, yet the nation ran out of the proper face masks to wear to protect against severe acute respiratory syndrome in Toronto. An entire year's supply was gone in one day. As I understand it, planning for that type of thing is part of emergency preparedness under the auspices of Health Canada. It's part of their responsibility.

    Here we have a disease that kills 4% of the population. What would happen if, instead of an accidental disease, we had something intentionally introduced into Canada, such as smallpox, which wipes out 30% of its victims? I do not know how you can say with confidence that Canada's ability to respond is there. We're seeing it already in the international travel advisories warning people not to come to Canada. Obviously the international community has no confidence in our ability to deal with this sort of emergency either.

    I'm going to direct my questions now to Mr. de Laat, the director general of external relations.

    Mr. de Laat, I noticed that your media relations and public announcement guidelines—essentially a muzzling document for the employees—was commissioned after learning on October 10 that the Minister of National Defence did not even know of the existence of the Emergency Preparedness College, let alone that he had decided to close it.

    In this guideline that was distributed to the employees this January, it states—and I quote:

The revised Government of Canada Communications policy states that “the Government of Canada has a duty to inform citizens...and citizens have a right to such information. It is the policy of the government to provide information...that is accurate, complete, objective, timely, relevant and clear.”

...Canadians expect and deserve to know what OCIPEP does on their behalf.

...It is imperative that the information provided to the public by OCIPEP is accurate and up-to- date.

    That being the case, Mr. de Laat, if I had not asked the question in the House of Commons, when was it the intention of OCIPEP to tell the people of Arnprior that the Emergency Preparedness College in Arnprior was being shut down?

    The Chair: Mrs. Gallant, you've taken over half the time in terms of the questions you've asked, so I will be giving the witnesses a little bit more leeway to respond to your questions.

    Witnesses, please feel free to respond to any aspect of the question.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm just looking for the date.

    The Chair: Well, there was a lot there, Mrs. Gallant. In fairness, I think our witnesses should be allowed to respond to various aspects of what you asked.

    Mr. James Harlick: I will take the question, as I'm responsible for the file. It does not come under Mr. Gallant...I'm sorry...Mr. de Laat.

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

À  (1010)  

    Mr. James Harlick: He is gallant, but....

    Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

    Mr. James Harlick: The college reports to another director general in the office, so it would not be fair to Mr. de Laat to ask him to respond to Mrs. Gallant.

    Let me address the nub of the issue. This work on looking for or examining what one was going to do to ensure that the Canadian Emergency Preparedness College could continue to provide excellent training to its existing first responder class or grouping, so to speak, while continuing to be able to discharge effectively its new role—the creation of and delivery of part of the new CBRN training, or chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, training, which was funded by the December 2001 budget—raised questions immediately about the ability of the facility in Arnprior to continue to deliver as a physical plant for those programs. As is well known from material that is put out in public, the judgment was that it was not well suited to do that because of the current deterioration of the physical plant out there. That was our judgment as the user of the facility and the judgment of Public Works and Government Services as the owner of the facility at Arnprior

    An additional consideration was the fact that in the world of CBRN training, where one needs to engage a broad range of other federal players, such as the Solicitor General of Canada, Health Canada, the RCMP, and the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, those entities are located in Ottawa and their people are here. They want to work here. They do not want to have to commute to Arnprior to be able to develop and deliver these programs.

    Therefore, in taking options to the minister about what to do, based on program recommendations as well as on the Public Works and Government Services study of the existing facility and alternate facilities—the study I referred to—it was important for us to ensure that the minister was confident, clear, and comfortable about both of the options proposed and the possible decision he would take, such as the decision to relocate the college to a different facility.

    I think it's important to note that if one had in fact gone out and consulted widely before that, engendering the kind of reaction that we have seen today, for a decision that was perhaps not going to be taken, that would perhaps not have been the most effective way to go. The minister did in fact speak to the mayor, I attended a town hall meeting that Mrs. Gallant was at prior to the decision by the minister, and it was done in that sequence.

    What really caused the issue to rise quickly was the suggestion that appeared in public that the school was closing. I don't know who put it out, but two groups of people were immediately concerned by such a fallacious rumour or leak. One group would be the 18 people employed by the college who would immediately translate that as, “I'm losing my job.” The other would be the supervisors of the 700 people who go through the college each year, as in, “What? The government is not going to do any training? This is training that is required under the Emergency Preparedness Act.”

    In response to that, OCIPEP officials communicated with employees to indicate to them that it was not closing and that there was consideration underway for relocation. We did that to allay their fears and the fears of our training partners immediately.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: To continue from where we left off, Mr. Harlick, just to clear things up, I'm from the southern part of Quebec, and the town of Lennoxville, which is right next to Sherbrooke. The owner of the railway was in Bangor, Maine.

    Also, just in passing, we did have a lot of border communities, and particularly some on the Vermont border, asking to come across at that point to help out. A bilateral agreement is in place there between the border communities themselves for fire services and those types of things, but coming to Lennoxville would have been a much further trip. Granted, we never use them. A question on that is how it would have worked, whether it was possible to do it, and how we would have had to go about doing that.

    I'll ask you a couple of other questions before you answer.

    Just talking about the college, you said roughly 700 per year go through there. Roughly what percentages would be regular forces, civil people, and reserve people? Just give me an idea on that.

    I know Canada–U.S. training happens a lot at the regular forces level, and there's a good amount of training back and forth at the reserve level. On that training, however, do we do much in the way of exercises involved in emergency response plans in order to work together?

    I'll leave it at that.

À  (1015)  

    Mr. James Harlick: If I could get you to clarify your last question, do you mean on the Canadian side, between the forces and the civilian side, or...?

    Mr. David Price: No, between the Canadian and U.S. reserves. They do train a lot at the forces level, but I'm wondering what they're doing in emergency response types of operations, because much of our infrastructure is right along the border. Our major infrastructure is in fact within a strip of 100 klicks along the border of the whole country. That's where the major part of our populations is, along with an awful lot of our infrastructure.

    Mr. James Harlick: Let me take that last one first.

    There is a degree of what I'll call exercising—as opposed to training in the sense of training individuals—of a Canada–U.S. nature, but not as much as we'd like. That will be one of the things we'll be raising with the DHS Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate—which consists of the old Federal Emergency Management Agency people—to see if we cannot reinvigorate that. But there is some exercising done that way.

    In my opening remarks, I talked about the Blue Cascades exercise in the Pacific Northwest. There you had, at a regional level involving states, provinces, and lower levels of government, an exercise related to a disaster caused by the taking out of power stations. That is an example. We're looking to do one in the northeast, in the New England–Atlantic provinces capacity. So there are some things there.

    There have also recently been two exercises in Atlantic Canada itself, but not in the Canada–U.S. dimension. They were called Exercise Atlantic Guard and Exercise Atlantic Tour, and they exercised existing plans there. When one does that, the Canadian Forces are involved. The Canadian Forces' Land Forces Atlantic Area was intimately involved in those two, Atlantic Guard and Atlantic Tour.

    Your second question relates to regional cooperation. I don't have the exact date, but an agreement has been signed in recent years between the Atlantic provinces—or at least the maritime ones—and the adjacent New England states. It provides for emergency management planning and response cooperation between those adjacent entities. It includes Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, P.E.I., and the relevant states. The emergency measures organizations in Canada, the provincial ones, are quite pleased with that agreement. In an area where the resource you could get the fastest was across the Canada–U.S. border as opposed to being in the adjacent or proximate Canadian province, they would probably go immediately to the American resource, assuming availability and all that sort of stuff. That's a very good development.

    There are also what we call REMACs, regional emergency management advisory committees. They are federally initiated and sponsored organizations with provincial content, and these in fact traverse the entire Canada–U.S. border. There would be a prairie one, a Pacific one, a central one, etc. That's where a regionally based organization can pull in its respective federal entities—FEMA in the old days but DHS now, or EPC in the old days and ourselves now. So you have a couple of layers of institutional mechanisms to foster and deliver on that kind of cooperation.

    Your other question was related to the college. I couldn't answer that precisely, but I can get back to you.

À  (1020)  

    The Chair: Actually, Mr. Price's time has expired, so we'll go on to Monsieur Bachand.

[Translation]

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I imagine, Mr. Harlick, that like all departments and agencies in Ottawa, your budget goes from April 1^st to March 31.

    Mr. James Harlick: Yes.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Under the “What's New“ link in your Internet site, there are press releases that refer to a very large number of expenses in March. I sympathize with you because we members, too, are somewhat like that : when our budget draws to an end and we have a small envelope, we try not to return it to the Crown.

    But I will enumerate what I see here. On March 4, the Government of Canada announced a contribution of more than $130,000 for emergency preparedness in the Northwest Territories. Then, for the same purpose, they spent $13.3 million to enhance capacity in Canada. They spent $124,000 for Nova Scotia, $265,000 for Prince Edward Island, $184,000 for Newfoundland and Labrador, $85,000 for the Yukon, $152,000 for the Nunavut, $315,000 for Manitoba, $990,000 for British Columbia, $168,000 for New Brunswick, $141,000 for Alberta, $21,000 for Saskatchewan, and $2.2 million for Ontario.

    My question is very simple : is there a problem with Quebec?

    Mr. James Harlick: Allow me to explain what you are reading. These are announcements relating to expenses under the Joint Emergency Preparedness Program, a program that shares costs between the federal and provincial levels to maintain and enhance the capacity of provincial emergency management organizations. These announcements were made towards the end of the fiscal year simply to announce the provision of federal funds following an agreement with the provinces to enhance their emergency management capacity.

    Here, these are the cheques that were issued. The decision to award funds for these initiatives is usually made at the beginning of the fiscal year. I currently have on my desk some thirty requests that I must sign to award funds to each province and territory under this cost-sharing program. At the end of the year, we formalize the program, saying we issued cheques after obtaining proof that these funds were spent on what they were meant to be spent on.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: You did not explain to me why Quebec is not on that list. Is there a problem with Quebec?

    Mr. James Harlick: No. I can tell you that for the fiscal year that just ended, we gave $21.863 million to Quebec under this program. It may not have been indicated, and the cheque may not have been written at that time, but there were almost $22 million for Quebec.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: Twenty-two million dollars?

    Mr. James Harlick: Almost $22 million.

    I can give you this slip, on which are indicated all the amounts for each province and territory under this program and another program.

    Mr. Claude Bachand: You could give it to the clerk so that all committee members can see it.

    You have set up key initiatives. One of them is the National Critical Infrastructure Assurance Program, and the other is the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Activity in Canada. There is a section in there that says “Put our infrastructure house in order.“

    Am I to understand by this that if there are critical infrastructures such as, for example, a hydro-electric dam or a nuclear plant where a deficiency is noted, federal funds could be injected to repair the infrastructure itself?

À  (1025)  

    Mr. James Harlick: No, Mr. Bachand. There is an organization, Infrastructure Canada, whose responsible minister is Mr. Rock, which has programs to this effect.

    Here, we refer to the capacity of governments to agree on the need to keep critical infrastructures in good condition, and especially to protect them, and collaborate in a concerted effort in that direction. It is rather a coordination initiative, not a funding program.

[English]

    The Chair: Thank you, Monsieur Bachand.

    We'll go back to Mr. Price at this point.

    Mr. David Price: Thank you, Mr. Chair.

    One of the problems that I see in civil defence structures is the problem of keeping people there. People move, they change jobs, and so on, and we always have a hard time keeping the structures solid. I'd like to know if you've gotten any further in the way of solidifying those? I realize it's fairly easy at the top, but when you get down to the other levels, the people you have to deal with all the time change a lot. With that goes the fact that you have to put these people through the training college to try to keep them up to date.

    The other question is why we don't see MPs or MNAs in those structures. We don't see any politicians, except for those at the municipal level. At the municipal level, they're always there, but we don't see any of the provincial or federal politicians involved.

    Mr. James Harlick: A recent review that we led on behalf of a number of federal government departments in terms of emergency response and readiness identified the HR dimension, the human resource dimension, as one of the areas that needs to be worked on. It is sad to note, but it's one of those realities of life that, in the course of program review in the 1990s, when governments had to reduce their expenditures by a considerable amount, the areas of emergency preparedness in many federal government departments—and I think it's the same at the provincial level—tended to come in as a good share of the reductions. That hasn't meant that people have been leaving the profession, it's just that those who have remained have gotten greyer. It's now important to be able to rebuild that capacity.

    Governments generally—obviously the federal government, which I've talked about, but provincial governments as well—have been putting more resources into this area, really under the stimulus of September 11. You've perhaps seen this in the way they've renamed organizations and passed new legislation. If we were to look at Ontario, they have a bill that amended their act to call their organization Emergency Management Ontario. More resources are going into it, which means they will be able to hire more personnel and do so at the younger end and in the newer skill set area.

    So that is something we have to look at. In fact, as part of this work, we will be doing a more systematic review of the federal government's capacity in this area from an HR, person, full-time equivalent—whatever you want to call it—point of view, to determine whether this better-than-anecdotal but not statistical impression bears out, and then we'll be looking at some of the things that can perhaps be done about that. But it is certainly important to recognize that one needs skilled people who will stay in the area, keep their knowledge with them, build on it, and be able to pass it on to other people who come into the area and look at it. So we certainly do recognize that.

    On your point about politicians in the structure, I'm a bit confused. Do you mean in a kind of formal planning structure, or do you mean on the ground and interested in the issue?

    Mr. David Price: Both, actually. When the local structures are set up, they tend to be excluded. I don't know why.

À  (1030)  

    Mr. James Harlick: It may be that municipal-level politicians tend to turn up more in municipalities, either when disasters occur, as is indeed appropriate, or at council meetings that talk about the emergency plan of municipality x, as opposed to seeing the provincial minister responsible, who would tend to be caught in the capital a bit more or whatever. Of course, we only have one minister at the federal level who is really designated as the minister for emergency preparedness, although all ministers under the statute have responsibilities in it.

    If I were to again take Ontario as an example, you are seeing an increased profile at the senior official level. When you look at the SARS reports on television, you see the Chief Medical Officer of Health of Ontario, Dr. Colin D'Cunha, on one side, and then you see Dr. James Young, Ontario's Commissioner of Public Safety, a new, unique appointment that the Ontario government has made. He reports directly to Bob Runciman, the Minister of Public Safety and Security, so in the Ontario case, you could conceive of that appointment being directly related to making sure the minister is more directly served in the emergencies world, in the counter-terrorism world, and that sort of stuff. And he's a key player in that regime. He does not supplant other officials like the head of the emergency measures organization or the deputy solicitor general or whomever, but you do have that new kind of player who represents the political level's interest in what's happening.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Carrying on from last time, I'm sure the people of Ottawa are going to be comforted to know plans are underway to transfer chemical warfare agents to the city centre for CEPC exercises, as opposed to having them outside the city.

    Mr. de Laat was silenced from asking the question directed to him and under his purview, so I will direct another question to him.

    From the internal e-mails that I have from OCIPEP and from my initial enquiry in August 2002, it's obvious that your whole media relations strategy was one of crisis management or just plain damage control. By October, there was a sense of panic from your director of training and education, such that she could no longer bear the pressure of covering up the truth. The best your associate deputy minister could come up with was to shut the college immediately. That was stopped by the minister because it would have put him in contempt of Parliament, because he maintained the fiction that he made the decision in his department when the decision had in fact already been made.

    Considering that the actions of OCIPEP officials have destroyed the fifty-year reputation of the college—and of your office in the process—then in order to salvage that reputation in the eyes of all Canadians, will you now admit that there were no health and safety issues at the Arnprior site, that rather than there being an urgent need to relocate, the fact is that the safety of Canadians would be best served by expanding the Arnprior location and recognizing the superior transportation links of a four-lane highway and an airport located right beside the college?

    The Chair: Mrs. Gallant, I must say that in the preamble to your question, you were treading a very fine line in terms of some of the statements that were made.

    I want to remind all members that based on the Standing Orders, we are to treat witnesses with courtesy and fairness, as the Standing Orders say.

    I'm going to ask Mr. Harlick to respond at this point and to provide us with his comments.

    Mr. James Harlick: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

    I do not believe whatsoever that the college reputation has been impacted by the proposed move. In fact, we have had communications, both e-mail as well as oral, from provincial and municipal emergency management leaders who are saying it's about time we got serious, about time it got beefed up in terms of its physical plant capacity, and that twenty minutes from the Ottawa airport is better than two hours up the river to Arnprior.

    I think it's important to note that there are some very sound program reasons for why this decision was made. We have had good feedback from the people who primarily use it, and those are the people in the emergency management community in Canada. This has been done on a very thorough, business-case basis. Part of that business case clearly articulated and identified the health and safety issues at the current location. One doesn't pull down buildings just for the sake of it. They were falling down.

    So I think the relocation to the Federal Study Centre will achieve the business objectives set out in our minister's request to Public Works to engage in this and to develop options for the location of CEPC; and that the Federal Study Centre, from a location point of view, an infrastructure point of view, and particularly from a cost point of view, will prove to be a very effective and cost-efficient choice.

À  (1035)  

    The Chair: You have time for a very brief question, Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Questions have been raised about the environment around the college. We know that the actual chemicals are used in the exercises. Of course, since the 1940s, radiation has been part of the exercises as well. Our municipalities want to know what environmental assessments have been done on the property to ensure that if it is indeed abandoned by the Department of National Defence, no threats are posed to future purchasers or to the people of Arnprior themselves. Have any environmental assessments been done yet, and what would be the cost of those?

    Mr. James Harlick: I cannot answer that question specifically in terms of whether or not any have been done yet, but I can seek out information from Public Works, which is responsible for that. After all, I repeat that Public Works owns the buildings, not DND. We're a tenant under PWGSC.

    As I understand it, there is obviously an environmental aspect to the disposal or indeed the purchase of any piece of federal real property. It's an issue that falls within the jurisdiction and competence of Public Works, so I can only say it's their responsibility. Whether they have done so or whether they plan do so, I don't know, but if you want some further info on that, I can get it and pass it to the committee.

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    Mr. Price.

    Mr. David Price: I just have two short questions, Mr. Chair.

    Since our reserves tend to be an asset on the ground in many municipalities, is there any way at this point that municipalities can deal directly with the reserves? Are there any circumstances in which that could happen?

    And the other question goes back to the structures in which we don't see any federal or provincial politicians. Was there ever a directive of any kind saying they aren't wanted in the structures?

    Mr. James Harlick: On the latter point, I'm not aware of any. I guess my basic, bureaucratic reaction to that is that politicians—and in my case, ministers—do the roles that they do. They ensure that officials have plans, have exercised them and know what to do about them, and will be able to provide advice as required to ministers when ministers have to take ministerial-level decisions and the rest of the structure has officials taking official-level decisions. Obviously, in a crisis, one can envisage ministers being intimately involved in the management or supervision.

    Mr. David Price: I'm talking about the lower levels of structures, though.

    Mr. James Harlick: Intuitively, I would say I wouldn't see, or at least there traditionally would not appear to be a role in Canada for that. In emergency management or emergency situations, I think it makes sense for politicians to be on the political sidelines in order to bring to bear the kinds of questions and skills and requirements that they bring.

    Mr. David Price: But every time there is an emergency situation, the politicians are the first ones who get called. If they were in the structure—

À  (1040)  

    Mr. James Harlick: Yes, but they're called because they're politicians, and only for their political accountability. In addition, there would be officials with officials' accountability. If we're talking about the mayor or the premier or whoever, you do have structures on the official side of the line that are there to provide information to the political level and to get decisions from the political level when the political level has to make them and when it's appropriate for the political level to make them. So I don't see that you have to take the politicians and embed them in some way.

    Mr. David Price: I think it's just a question of them being more aware of what's going on, so that they can actually answer a question properly instead of skating around the issue, which is what they usually have to do.

    Mr. James Harlick: Indeed, and that is important. Except in crises, emergency planning, etc., is too often back of mind because there's more pressing stuff. It just so happens that, in the last couple of years—and you're all well aware of this—it has come to mind on a more consistent basis.

    On dealing directly with the reserves, a number of control regimes exist inside the Department of National Defence whereby the Canadian Forces are deployed or put in the field to assist civil authorities. I'm fairly familiar with them vis-à-vis the Canadian Forces, but I don't have the knowledge to extrapolate whether or not it is also the same way with the reserves. I can find out, though.

    Mr. David Price: I think that's the important part, particularly since the reserves are the people we really do have on the ground in the smaller municipalities. Our regular forces are just not there. They've been moved to the larger bases.

    Mr. James Harlick: I would imagine that down the chain of command, it hits the land force area and they can use whomever they have in their area.

    I would mention something that picks up on a point related to one of your earlier questions. Under the Land Force Reserve Restructure initiative of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces, work is being done now. It's headed by Major-General Ed Fitch, who is looking at additional roles for the reserves. One of those is in the emergency management/CBRN field. There's no conclusion yet, but the work is looking at certain facts.

    If one has reserves in 700 locations across Canada, should they and how could they best contribute to the local capacity to deal with emergency situations, threats, hazards, and more deliberate stuff, and actually help in response? That's something being worked out. There's no obvious answer to that, but some very serious work is being done to determine whether or not that would be an additional role taking advantage of the skill sets that they have or might be able to get through training, especially given their location. It is something underway, and I think it would play back to your interest in making the best use of the reserves.

    Mr. David Price: Yes, thank you.

    The Chair: Do you have anything further, Mr. Price? No?

    Well, there's still some time left on the clock, so maybe I can get a question in to Mr. Harlick myself.

    Mr. Harlick, as you know, there's a bit of an extra layer as far as the U.S. authorities go in connection with the National Guard. I'm wondering if you can tell us if you could foresee a cross-border situation in which, in terms of the chain of command or the levels of authority....

    Let's use the Ontario–Michigan scenario again. If a crisis occurred in Canada and it went up to the provincial authorities, if the provincial authorities contacted the State of Michigan, and if the State of Michigan deemed that the best response they could provide would be the National Guard without recourse to any federal involvement at that point, then under the existing arrangements, could we see uniformed American National Guardsmen in Canada without the knowledge of and/or sanction of our federal government?

    Mr. James Harlick: It's a difficult question for me to answer with complete assurance, because I don't know all the corners of that issue. My inclination would be that it would not happen. Because of the general kinds of arrangements that exist, any foreign armed forces personnel in Canada have to go through a whole approval process, whether you're sending people to Happy Valley–Goose Bay for air training, out to Cold Lake, or wherever. So in that respect, one would imagine not. And Mr. de Laat has mentioned to me that there is now a U.S. law that perhaps makes that impossible anyway.

    I was just wondering whether or not you were going to—

    The Chair: It would be helpful if you could perhaps go back within your organization to flesh that out a little bit further for us. I think we'd be very interested in knowing the answer to that.

À  (1045)  

    Mr. James Harlick: One of my colleagues has mentioned that the U.S. President has to approve any National Guard deployment outside of the U.S. One therefore sees the interface between the Canadian national authorities and the American ones. However, let us go back and actually produce for you, in a written fashion, some information on that. We'll have to ask DND.

    The Chair: Mr. Price has a quick supplementary question on that issue.

    Mr. David Price: It's not a question, it's just a little information on that. In actual fact, we see the problem every day with border guards, customs agents, and so on at the U.S. border. They cannot come across the border unless they remove their arms and leave them in the States. So there's already a blockage there. There's no way they can come across with their arms.

    The Chair: Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: I'm really looking forward to the response to the environmental assessment question. I did ask that question an hour down the road in Arnprior, when you spoke to council on November 29, and I'm still waiting for that answer.

    Based on the response to the reason given by the witness for tearing down the buildings and moving the college, if the same criteria were applied to military bases across the country, then with the exception of Valcartier, every other barracks would have to be torn down as well.

    The Auditor General has indicated that there is a problem with the $396 million provided in the 2001 budget to improve the overall level of infrastructure protection and emergency preparedness, and that an audit is underway. I might also add that the move was said to have cost a projected $1.9 million, which, by coincidence, is just under the amount in the rules whereby Treasury Board has to get involved with their guidelines.

    One of the reasons for the move was also that it would allow for year-round instruction at the Heron Road site because it had air conditioning. However, the day after that meeting, one of our intrepid reporters visited the site to see it first-hand and noticed that air conditioners were being installed at that time, after the directorate had said the site was already prepared. So we really have a lot of questions about the accuracy of this Public Works document, whose terms of reference were set by the Department of National Defence.

    I would like you to now acknowledge, through the chair, that the cost to relocate the Emergency Preparedness College to the Federal Study Centre will be more than the $1.9 million that was announced, and that the $19-million figure that was quoted for it to remain in Arnprior was purposely inflated by items such as the $7.8 million for a new residence and the $7.56 million for the new buildings, when a local proposal was on the table for both those items that would have meant for no capital outlay for the taxpayers of Canada.

    The Chair: Mrs. Gallant, we're getting close to the end of this meeting, but I do have to say that some of the questioning that you've offered up for us has a very tenuous connection with Canada–U.S. relations as they relate to emergency preparedness. I've let the questions proceed and I'm going to let them proceed again, but I think we have to remind members that the purpose of this study, at least as long as the study is going on, is Canada–U.S. defence and security cooperation.

    Mr. Harlick, you have the floor.

    Mr. James Harlick: Thank you, Mr. Pratt.

    Let me just address the first part of Mrs. Gallant's statement about the $396 million and her reference to the Office of the Auditor General. We are certainly aware, as are many government departments, that the Office of the Auditor General has launched an audit of all of the money in the budget of December 10, 2001, and will examine how that money will be spent to achieve the purposes set out in the budget. This is, of course, a laudable initiative on their part in order to be able to track, on behalf of the taxpayers of Canada, how the money allocated to our small world in the budget, and to eleven other federal government departments that got money for emergency preparedness and critical infrastructure protection, will be used.

    I'm certainly not aware of any “problem” around that. In fact, the representatives of the Office of the Auditor General have been talking to us and to others in recent time. They're gathering information and are at whatever stage they are at in the multi-stage process that they follow when they do an audit.

    With regard to costs in the Public Works document, this is a document on which we in the Department of National Defence and OCIPEP have based our recommendations to the minister. It's a document that PWGSC has used internally on its own side to brief its own minister on the relocation of the college. I have complete confidence in the real property management skills and capacities of the Department of Public Works. In fact, I rely on those estimates, and we will be budgeting our own funds based on the case that was chosen for the relocation to the Federal Study Centre.

À  (1050)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    I have a few questions of my own as well. I'd be very interested in knowing if you have any serving, uniformed members of the Canadian Forces within your organization, other than people who might be involved in liaison, for instance.

    Mr. James Harlick: No, we have none. We do have some people who have recently been in the Canadian Forces, but they are employees of ours and are in a civilian status.

    The Chair: Right.

    I'm going to ask you a very broad policy question as well. I note that, in large measure, many of the organizations that you deal with at the provincial level are attached to the offices of the provincial attorneys general. I'm just wondering if you have any thoughts or if you can offer up any comments with respect to whether or not your organization is essentially a civilian emergency preparedness organization. Should it be within the office of the federal Solicitor General? Has any thought or study been given to moving your reporting relationship to another minister?

    Mr. James Harlick: On the latter point, we'll clear that away. As you know, machinery of government issues, as they're called, are the purview of the Prime Minister and of the Privy Council Office. One walks on the other side of the street when dealing with those issues. So if they're thinking about things, I don't know and they wouldn't tell me. However, that's where the thinking would be done. In fact, that's where the thinking was done when it came to locating OCIPEP where it is today.

    The Chair: Would you say it's a perfect fit?

    Mr. James Harlick: It's a good fit. I would say there probably is no perfect fit. Part of that is because of the kinds of issues and the people we have to deal with particularly in the critical infrastructure protection side of our business.

    When consideration was being given to the creation of a critical infrastructure protection organization—we just called it the CIPO when we were writing the documents on that in the CIP task force—one looked at a range of possibilities. One could have thought of it being put in the Industry portfolio. Since 85% to 90% of all critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the private sector, one wants to make sure one gains the confidence of the private sector, as it's really an economic security issue, etc. So you can see some kind of argument in that field.

    You could equally make the argument—as it was made—that what really counts in critical infrastructure protection is not the technology failure that might well occur or whatever, it's the deliberate and malicious act that would attack and disrupt or destroy one of these critical service areas. And who does that? Bad guys and girls do, and those happen to be criminal acts. Therefore, why not put them with law enforcement and national security. To me, that would go to the Solicitor General in the federal system.

    One could equally say it has some linkages with the people who do emergency management in Canada today, those being the provincial emergency management organizations.

    If you ever need any heavy lifting to be done in responding to the failure of critical infrastructure, one would probably have recourse to the Canadian Forces. With those kinds of arguments, one could look at the National Defence portfolio, and that's in fact where we are.

    You mentioned the provincial case. In fact, I believe that out of thirteen jurisdictions, five are under the control of the solicitors general of the provinces. The others can be found under ministries of municipal affairs or otherwise, so this is one of the challenges we have at the senior levels in federal–provincial cooperation in our field. There's already an existing federal–provincial regime in which the solicitors general and the attorneys general meet. We're increasing the profile of this issue area of emergency management and CIP, with provincial deputies, etc. The question is how many meetings any of these people can ever go to. So we ally ourselves reasonably closely within that federal–provincial solicitor general context, but we bring to bear some distinctive things.

    One of the interesting challenges just shows you the complexity of the field. Like other national jurisdictions, we've had to struggle with the idea that if you have an attack on critical infrastructure, you have to determine which interest would be involved and which governmental interests would be treated in what way. If there's a malicious attack, who's after the attacker in the pursue-and-prosecute function? While the infrastructure is impeded, there could be significant impacts on people, property, and services. Who's doing that? That's us.

    The extra challenge presented post-September 11 is that you have to make sure you can coordinate the law enforcement and national security component, the infrastructure protection and recovery component, and possibly the Health Canada or Canadian Food Inspection Agency component—for the plant and animal health—when you're looking at weapons of mass destruction. That's a newer challenge, so where would you put our organization when the area of activity is that broad?

    So there is no perfect choice, and it has never happened in other jurisdictions that we've studied. I think ours is good, but I would mention one last point. Even in the U.S., with DHS, the Department of Defense is a separate agency; the Attorney General of the United States, with the FBI and the criminal, is separate; and there's also the CIA and the intelligence world, which are outside of that, of course.

À  (1055)  

    The Chair: Thank you very much for that.

    Mrs. Gallant.

    Mrs. Cheryl Gallant: Before asking a question related to the Emergency Preparedness College and the United States, I just wanted to mention that the people who are most affected by this move are the $7-an-hour people who are not unionized. The single mothers just trying to make ends meet are non-unionized, have no health care, and are not going to be able to afford to move to Ottawa. And we have also learned that the Heron Road site is just a temporary site, so that may affect the overall comparison cost that was done as well.

    We're still most concerned at this point about the possibility of the U.S.–Canada border closing as a result of a lack of confidence in the structure and planning that we have by way of emergency preparedness for biological threats. How willing will the U.S. be to come to our aid if this SARS epidemic spreads and if it seems that our emergency preparedness structure is in a state of flux? It almost appears that patronage is being put ahead of national security.

    Mr. James Harlick: Let me respond to a couple of those points.

    As you can well imagine, and as I imagine Mrs. Gallant knows, the workforce adjustment directive of the government does apply to, I believe, seven or eight employees who reside in the Arnprior area. They have the ability to elect to commute or to move. If they wish to remain in Arnprior, then the directive applies and those provisions for alternative employment or severance or whatever apply. In fact, DND human resources personnel and our own college people have met with employees a number of times already, and will continue to do so between now and the end of June, when that six-month election period comes to an end.

    On the second point, I don't know where the member's information comes from that the Federal Study Centre is a temporary site. I'm not thinking beyond it myself. I'm thinking of getting us firmly installed and going from there.

    Thirdly, on the broader issue of the Canada–U.S. border, I think there is a high degree of confidence, Canada–U.S., with respect to our respective emergency management capabilities. There has been long-standing cooperation between our organization and our predecessor organization with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, and that is being reaffirmed with the senior leadership of the Department of Homeland Security. In fact, I believe the media today are reporting that Mr. Manley and Mr. Ridge will be meeting in Washington on Monday on border security itself, which comprises a good number of the 30-plus issues under the Smart Border Declaration.

    I'm confident that the kind of meeting and exchange of information that occurs both at the level of those political leaders and at their senior levels is establishing, nurturing, and expanding the degree of contact needed so that the American side understands what the Canadian side is capable of, what its commitments are, and those kinds of things. That does cover emergency management areas as well as the movement of people, the movement of goods, and the cooperation on law enforcement and on national security, which is the fourth area of the Smart Border Declaration.

Á  (1100)  

    The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Harlick.

    We've reached the end of the allotted time for this committee's proceedings.

    Mr. Harlick and Mr. de Laat, I want to thank you for your presence here today. I think a lot of interesting questions have been asked, and your comments will certainly be very helpful in connection with our study of Canada–U.S. defence and security relations, and we look forward to getting the further information with respect to the role of the National Guard in the U.S.

    Were there any other—

    Mr. James Harlick: There were two others, Mr. Chair. One was Mr. Price's point about how municipalities can deal directly with the reserves, and the other was Mrs. Gallant's question about the environmental impact assessments vis-à-vis the college. We'll provide that information to the clerk.

    The Chair: It would be very helpful if you did.

    Again, on behalf of committee members, thank you for being here today. Who knows? We may see you soon.

    The committee is adjourned.