NDVA Committee Meeting

STANDING COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENCE AND VETERANS AFFAIRS

COMITÉ PERMANENT DE LA DÉFENSE NATIONALE ET DES ANCIENS COMBATTANTS

EVIDENCE

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

Thursday, May 11, 2000

• 0902

[English]

The Chairman (Mr. Pat O'Brien (London—Fanshawe, Lib.)): I'd like to call to order the meeting of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs for the purpose of continuing our hearings on the RMA, the revolution in military affairs. To assist us with that topic today, we're pleased to welcome Dr. John Leggat, who's the assistant deputy minister of science and technology at DND, and Dr. Ingar Olav Moen, director of science and technology policy, defence R and D Canada.

Gentlemen, thank you for joining us. Welcome. And who's going to start? Dr. Leggat.

Dr. John Leggat (Assistant Deputy Minister, Science and Technology, Department of National Defence): I have a short presentation of about twenty minutes, Mr. O'Brien, just to kind of get us up to speed on the subject, if you like.

[Translation]

I will give my presentation in English because I did not have an opportunity to prepare a text. I am quite prepared to answer your questions in the official language of your choice. It is easier for me to express myself in English when I talk about technical issues. And I speak more quickly in English.

[English]

The topic is the revolution in military affairs. I think this topic has been presented to the committee in various ways by others over the last little while. The definition is shown here. Fundamentally we're talking about a step change in war-fighting brought about by the innovative application of new technology. I think the underpinning principle here is that it creates a fundamental change in the way we carry out military operations.

On the next slide I'll talk a little bit about past RMAs. Here we're getting a feeling for what revolutions in military affairs are all about. I think it's fairly important. Some people have suggested that things such as the advent of the longbow or the machine gun or carrier operations represented a revolution in military affairs. I would say these were attributes perhaps of revolutions that were underway at the time.

• 0905

If we look at four significant events in terms of warfare, the creation and the effect of nation-state in the 17th century had a big impact on how military operations and warfare were conducted. At this time the military was brought very much into line with the aspirations and priorities of the state. Prior to that, one could say the military operated somewhat independently, somewhat in an anarchistic style.

The Swedes were the nation that really exploited this and as a result were able to exercise a fair military dominance in Europe for a period of time.

With the French Revolution we saw basically the harnessing of national spirit as a means of supporting military operations and military aspirations. This took place about the same time as the Industrial Revolution, which perhaps was the first major significant event in terms of the application of technology broadly to warfare.

Then we move into the First World War, where, again, the technology that was available as a result of the Industrial Revolution allowed military planners and military operators to carry out operations for the first time in a joint or combined context, so that the principle of synchronization of effort on the battlefield was brought to bear in an effective way for the first time.

It's been said that the military commanders who were in charge of battalions and regiments at the beginning of the First World War would not have understood the changes that would have taken place during that four-year time period to the extent that the military commanders at the end of the war were exercising operational concepts that were entirely different. Canada, indeed, was one of the leaders in this. Sir Arthur Currie and his contributions to operational concepts and the application of technology to warfare are well known.

Before we leave this slide, the point I'd like to make is that revolutions in military affairs are not necessarily entirely driven within the military. They're influenced to a great deal by what's happening in society in general. The French Revolution was not conceived by the military. The Industrial Revolution, certainly, was not something that was militarily driven. And while the First World War was military driven, there were many social aspects around the First World War that impacted on how that particular conflict was carried out. Indeed, those kinds of principles carried through until today.

Why do we have a revolution in military affairs now? There are a number of principles that I think come into play. One is globalization. I don't think I need to say too much about that. It impacts broadly. The information revolution, which has really taken hold in this past decade, since the 1990s, is another one.

I talk about stories in our labs in the research and development area in National Defence. When we were upgrading our computers in the mid-eighties, we paid a thousand dollars per kilobyte of disc space. When we upgraded our computers, we bought a 50-kilobyte disc, which was about the size of a small refrigerator. We thought it was great because we'd never fill it up. Now we have gigabytes of disc space on something that you can put in your brief case. Cell phones, Internet, and the rest of it—there's been a huge explosion in information technology, and this is having an impact on how we carry out military operations.

Single superpower—I think we've seen the attributes of that over the past decade, since the end of the Cold War. The United States has been a reluctant, if you like, global policeman. They have looked extensively, I would say, through the decade for people with whom they can share the burden of maintaining a stable global situation.

I talk about the echoes of the Vietnam War. The echoes are really our children. Canada was not involved in the Vietnam War, but the country to the south of us certainly was, and people my age in the United States have views of warfare brought about by their extensive participation in Vietnam. When we're talking about things like casualties and the way that war was carried out, there's a strong view in the United States that that sort of thing will not happen again. That is really influencing how military operations and how armies, if you like, are deployed presently in the U.S., and that extends throughout NATO.

As a result, there's a lack of tolerance for our own casualties. One can go back to the Somali incident where the American marine was dragged through the street, the impact that had back in the United States and the resulting actions that were taken following that.

• 0910

We also have budget considerations. Military budgets have been reduced considerably since 1990 and we're all faced with the prospect of being able to carry out military operations efficiently but at a lower cost. Certainly Canada has done quite a lot in that regard from the perspective of being able to maintain effective military capability in a regime of rather significant budget cuts.

Collateral damage issues came up in Kosovo—the bombing of the Chinese embassy, for example—and also in the Persian Gulf, when the communications node was bombed and there were quite a lot of civilians in that particular underground installation at the time. The collateral damage brings into force such principles as precision munitions and the ability to precisely understand where the targets are and deal with them in an effective manner.

The final thing is the emergence of new threats. We call these asymmetric threats. Because of technology, smaller nations can bring a great deal of damage or threat to a larger nation simply by applying technology in innovative ways. We're looking at things like information warfare or information operations, the prospect of the use of chemical and biological agents in a terrorist type of operation, and possibly the advent in the future of a poor man's ballistic missile or cruise missile capability.

The Chairman: I have a technical question. Is it fair to say that “collateral damage” might be a euphemism for civilian casualties, or is it something more than that?

Dr. John Leggat: I think it could be a euphemism for civilian casualties. I'm just trying think if that covers it all. It certainly covers a significant part of it. Basically it comes down to ensuring that you destroy the target you're aiming to destroy and not inadvertently do something else. It really comes back to that whole non-linearity that we face in warfare right now as a result of media reaction and media coverage. If you do inadvertently destroy civilian infrastructure that has no military value, perhaps that can play against one's aspirations in terms of global perspectives.

In terms of the emerging army, I'll give you a bit of history from my point of view as to how it came about. During the Israeli-Syrian conflict in the early 1980s, there was a battle known as the battle of the Bakka Valley. It was actually an air battle. It started off with the Syrians responding to an Israeli reconnaissance flight, but it actually ended up as the largest air battle since the Second World War. It pitted the Syrian MiGs against the Israeli F-16s. At the end of the day, the Israelis had shot down more than 70 Syrian MiGs using the Phoenix missile.

This created a big impression, in terms of the balance in the Cold War and how people viewed technology, that there could be such a dramatic advantage on one side and a significant battle brought about by one piece of technology, that being the F-16 equipped with the Phoenix missile.

Shortly after that, there was a concerted move in the United States, principally by President Reagan, to spin the Soviet Union out of the Cold War. It led to the defence build-up during the 1980s, where we saw a huge amount of investment in technology not only in the United States but in Canada and in the other NATO nations. At the end of the decade, there was an incredible amount of technology available for the conduct of military operations. Most of it had not been proven in the field.

During the 1980s, a Russian general by the name of Orgarkov postulated that there was a military technical revolution underway. We saw some evidence of that technical revolution in the Gulf War, with the preponderance of technology that was brought to bear in that war in the early 1990s.

Through the 1990s, we got into this whole business of systems and systems of systems. How do we link our various military systems together so that we can basically engage in a military operation from the perspective of total systems? Then there is the digitization of the battlefield, which we've seen more recently in the Balkans and the Kosovo conflict, where we see quite a high degree of integration of air, sea, land, and space assets, all being brought together to further the military intent. So things such as reconnaissance, precision strike, logistics, and interoperability all come into play and are indeed aided by technology.

• 0915

Now let's have a look at some of the RMA's principal characteristics: the joint battle space, or in other words, blurred distinctions between navy, army, and air force, looking at the theatre in its entirety from the point of view of how assets in that theatre can be brought to bear in the most effective manner; joint operations, navy, army, and air force working very closely together, sharing information, sharing operational plans or co-developing operational plans and the like; the preponderance of communications and information technology moving back and forth between let's say the command centres in Europe and North America and the area of operations, in this case, Kosovo; precision operations we talked about; and a high degree of organizational diversity.

I think Canada has been quite innovative in this respect. We send different-sized organizations to different operations. We mix and match in terms of the naval, army, and air force elements that go. So we're very much into the whole area of tailoring our forces to meet the specific needs of the operations.

To do that, you have to have a really good understanding at the outset of what the potential threats in that operational area might be, and to gain that understanding it's very important to have a high degree of access to information that we gather ourselves but that is also gathered by our allies.

The human aspect is really very important here. Because of the preponderance of technology, there is the possibility that the human may be taken out of the command loop and we may be in a situation where the human, because of technology, is no longer accountable.

In military operations the principle of command is very important, and it's very important that the technology actually helps the human in command and doesn't hinder the human in command either by providing too much information so that the human gets somewhat confused or by actually circumventing the responsibility that the commander has in a particular operation.

There's the idea of simultaneous operations, synchronization not only in terms of military operations but in terms of other things that are brought to bear as well.

For example, in the 19th century Clausewitz talked about the concentration of mass as a military principle. I think we saw in the 20th century a concentration of firepower. In the 21st century, I think we'll see concentration and synchronization of effect.

So to bring about true success in terms of military operations it will be necessary to ensure a high degree of synchronization between political, military, and other aspects that are brought to bear on a particular operation. I think this was particularly true in Kosovo, where to support the military operation there was pretty consistent, constant information being put out by NATO, which supported the particular aim in that operation.

Near real-time information to the commanders basically means that the commanders are able to pull in the information from various sensors, whether they be satellite sensors or ground-based sensors, in almost real time, so that they are able to maintain a constant understanding of what's going on in the area of operations—this so they're able to react and understand what's coming next.

The asymmetric threats are another characteristic of this RMA, where we're seeing that technology is really allowing countries that don't have huge military capability to potentially threaten larger countries or larger alliances.

The view of the RMA is given on the next slide, where we see the confluence, if you like, of precision force and battle space awareness. C⁴I is command, control, communications, computers, and information, basically that whole kind of computer and information and information technology construct, and at the overlap of the circles we see possibilities for the enhancement of knowledge about the battle space, assessment of what's happening in the battle space, and the perfection of mission assignments so that we're basically able to tailor the resources we need to the assignment that's taking place. That's kind of a view of what the present army is all about.

• 0920

I would say that the RMA we see today is, like the ones in the past, being driven by what's happening in society. Our society is becoming increasingly information-intensive and information-reliant, and one can expect that the military forces will become or they are becoming the same way as time goes on.

As a quick word about asymmetric threats, here we're talking about weapons of mass destruction. The present issue is chemical and biological substances, which are not particularly well contained within the world. We've seen the presence of them in various theatres of operation, some of which we've engaged in and some of which we've not been engaged in.

I would say the nuclear aspect is not a huge concern right now, but we have seen proliferation in nuclear weapons, and the nuclear testing that took place last year between India and Pakistan did not give us a great deal of comfort with respect to where all this is going in the future.

Regarding information operations, some of us were lucky not to have seen the “Iloveyou” virus last week, but that is a pretty good indication of how very simply a person or an organization can cause a fair amount of havoc in somebody else's information system. When we're talking about military operations, where there's a high degree of dependency on information systems, there also has to be a high degree of security in terms of protecting those information systems against that kind of threat.

Equally, when we look at the whole aspect of national security, the information security aspect is not just a military concern. It spreads broadly across the whole issue of national security.

In regard to attacks on the “homeland” directed against infrastructure or our national will or morale, I think that's something that's developing very much in the United States. We hear and read a lot about it these days. In Canada it's not as big an issue, but we do share North America with that big country to the south, and what happens south of the border sometimes causes attitudes to change here.

The last point would be guerrilla or terrorist attacks. It's not something we're necessarily anticipating here in Canada, but something our troops may run into periodically in terms of their operations.

Now I'd like to talk about some of the Canadian context. The next slide takes a little bit of time to work around, but it makes a few points.

I'll start off with the diagonal arrow between “Deterrence” and “Operations”. This kind of goes back to the Cold War era, when we maintained a strong operational capability, which was a conventional capability, and at the same time maintained strong deterrence as an alliance.

The deterrence had two aspects to it. It had a nuclear aspect, and it also had a conventional aspect. As some people told me in the 1980s, 50% of the reason for having the Canadian Forces was to deter any conventional aspirations the Soviet Union might have had in Europe.

That was pretty much the model we had for probably 45 years. It was a very convenient model in which to carry out research and development, because many of the parameters that determined what we did were well known. We knew who the adversary was, if you like, and we had a pretty good idea of where the adversary's technology was going. We could predict exactly what the threat might be in the future, and we tailored our research and development programs to bring capability to the Canadian Forces in time to meet those threats.

During that period as well, if we look at the operations and peace support arrow, Canada was very much a leader in terms of utilizing operational capability to support peace. We brought peacekeeping to the world, I would say, and very much created the art and established the principles and standards of peacekeeping, which we've shared throughout the world. But this started to expand the spectrum of operations.

Since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and all the rest of it, we've seen perhaps two or three things happening. One is that we've seen technology leak out of the deterrence box through the whole context of proliferation, producing some of these asymmetric threats we've talked about. So where the technology that surrounded weapons of mass destruction and the like was generally held by the two superpowers, because of a number of things that have happened since the collapse of the Berlin Wall, we've seen that technology proliferate more around the world, creating some of these asymmetric threats.

• 0925

This in turn plays back into how we position ourselves with respect to operations. There are a number of these technologies, if you like, a number of these threats, that we perhaps would not have faced in certain theatres, yet we are potentially faced with them now.

The other thing we see in terms of operations like Kosovo and the peace support operations in general is we seem to be seeing a situation where the western democracies are saying to those who would act in less than an appropriate manner, “If you beat up on your minorities, if you attack smaller neighbouring states, then the western democracies will not stand for this and will come in and do something about it”. Certainly that seems to be the message that was given in the Balkans. It's a question of whether that message is really being given in terms of other areas of the world.

I think the message here is that the spectrum of operations has definitely expanded over the past decade. We know that the tempo of operations has increased as well. But equally, to be able to do all of that one has to maintain a strong operational capability. If you do peace support only, then you're perhaps not able to deal with the rest of those quadrants. So maintaining strength in the lower right-hand quadrant is really important in terms of being able to respond to the eventualities this nation might be called upon to respond to in the future.

That's really the challenge for us, I would say, in terms of the revolution in military affairs: How do we maintain the strength of the Canadian Forces as a valued and relevant partner in any allied or coalition operations that we might see fit to be involved in in the future?

Some of the challenges I've referred to. In interoperability with allies, there's a big technology dimension there. The Americans are going great guns in terms of technology. They know that the rest of the world can't keep up with them, so there's a bit of a challenge for us. There's a challenge for them in that as well. How do they keep their allies close from a technological perspective?

In terms of the interaction with the civic sector, civil-military technology is blurring, but at the same time civil-military responsibilities are blurring. When we talk about the whole issue of protection against potential chemical and biological attack in Canada, it's not a military responsibility, not a Department of National Defence responsibility, it's a Health Canada responsibility. So we need to work together, basically, to ensure that the capability that we understand in terms of things like health, like information technology, and so on, is dealt with in a broad context within this country. These things cannot be looked upon only as threats the military might deal with.

Technology-driven warfare—I really think we've talked about that one enough.

Assessing new technology concepts I think is really something that comes to bear as we move forward. Technology concepts have two aspects: there are the technologies themselves, and then there are also the operational concepts. So how do the concepts and the technology work together? It really comes into this whole issue of linking doctrine, technology, and operational concepts—a big challenge.

When I talked about things like flying airplanes off aircraft carriers and saying it wasn't a revolution in military affairs, indeed it wasn't. But it did get into this whole issue of linking technology, doctrine, and operational concepts. Certainly being able to deliver air power from the deck of a ship was something that before WWII really was not thought of very much.

I would not have liked to have been the pilot who landed the first airplane on the deck of a ship. Equally, a lot of the concepts that we could conjure up today involve a certain amount of risk, danger, and the like. Today we have technology that allows us to do this—simulation technology, for example.

I don't know if any of you have had the opportunity to go to CAE in Montreal and fly their simulators, but you can get into a simulated helicopter, take off from the deck of a ship, fly around, get down close to the ocean, and when you come in next to the ship you feel the buffeting and all the rest of it. It's really quite an experience. We can explore a lot of these concepts through simulation, and that's one of the thrusts we're taking within the research and development organization within the Department of National Defence right now.

• 0930

I talked about the human dimension. Simulation also allows us to integrate the human dimension and allows us to understand how the human will react in fairly intense, fairly stressful environments without having to risk people's lives in the process of doing so. And the asymmetric threats, of course, we've already spent enough time on.

So the department's response, if you like, to this new environment is Defence Strategy 2020. I won't go through it in any detail because I think the committee has been briefed on this in the past, but I'll just say there are technology dimensions in each of those eight goals on that slide, and the research and development organization within National Defence is very much engaged in exploring the technology dimensions of each of those. We've talked about the human dimension; that fits very much into decisive leadership. Strategic partnerships is a key issue in terms of how we share technology with our allies, and what sort of international stance we take with respect to co-developing technology and understanding in an international context how technology impacts operations. So we can see there are rather significant technical aspects to each one of them.

Getting down to the science and technology challenge, those are some of the things we're dealing with. How do we deal with this revolution in military affairs? How do we anticipate where it's going? And how do we ensure the Canadian Forces are technologically prepared to deal with it? The information and knowledge revolution is not going to slow down. Somebody asked me a couple of weeks ago whether I thought we were at the end of this, and I told them no, I think we're just at the beginning. Web-years are three months. What's going to happen in the next 10 years—that's 40 web-years away—I don't know. And that's one of the real challenges we have to face.

The interoperability is a very big one. The United States clearly sets the standards in terms of interoperability, and our ability to operate with our allies, or within a coalition context, is very much tied to our ability to be able to share information and communicate, plan in a collaborative context and actually carry out operations in a collaborative context.

The last two elements I think are fairly clear.

Some of the technologies that are really driving the revolution in military affairs are shown here, and I'm not going to go through these in any detail, but you can see that it covers the spectrum from biomolecular engineering to wide bandwidth communications of networks, to something we call “knowledge management”, how do we deal with basically developing knowledge and storing knowledge, if you like, neuro-intelligence, human systems, nanotechnology. They basically break down into three areas: the material sciences, the information sciences, and the life sciences.

If I showed you a slide like this about twenty years ago, we would have seen things like explosives, propellants, aircraft, ships, and that kind of stuff. So we would have seen technologies that were very much in the military sphere. Most of these technologies are being driven by commercial or civil investment. Twenty years ago we would have had a very good understanding of where the technology was going, where the next breakthroughs might be, and what impact those breakthroughs might have had on military operations. Today we don't have that same understanding because a lot of these technologies are happening in the Microsofts, the Newbridges, and those kinds of companies. And the issue of basically understanding where technology is going and what impact it will have on military operations in the future is not as clear as it used to be. So I think that makes the point.

We've reconfigured the research and development program in National Defence. On April 1 we created a departmental agency called Defence R&D Canada, to house the research and development function. And we've basically configured the program into these defence R and D activities. Again, I won't go through them in any detail, but they probably break out into three key areas that we see as important for the future of military operations. One is the human systems, the human-in-command aspect that I talked about. The research and development activities will help that in terms of protection, medicine, behaviour, and decision support. Then there's the combat systems aspects.

• 0935

Ultimately, despite the fact that we talk about information technology, bits and bytes, and all the rest of it, you have to put the ordnance on the target, and that's a fact of military operations. You either have to be able to put in or make your adversary pretty sure that you have the capability to do so, so that the adversary will back down when called upon to do so.

So in the context of combat systems, there's materials, weapons systems, platforms, the whole issue of signature, the observables, the whole issue of stealth, and the chemical and biological aspects.

The biggest circle is where the biggest investment would be, the sensors and information technology, allowing us to gain an understanding in advance as to what's going on out there so that we can take the appropriate action, have the appropriate understanding, and be able to match response to the perceived threat.

The program delivery is broken down this way. I won't spend a lot of time on this, because it gets a little bit mechanical. I'll just say we contract out 50% of the program to Canadian industry. Canadian industry is very much an important part of defence R and D in Canada and has been for many years.

The program we have covers the spectrum from applied research through to advanced development. We've generally thought of the technology spectrum in a linear context: you do research, then applied research, then exploratory development, then advanced development, then engineering development, and finally you go into production. This linear process has generally resulted in lengthy acquisition cycles. When we're talking about web-years, and three months, and information technology, we have to come up with new ways of getting the technology into the hands of the operators more quickly. So some of these things we're talking about here, like technology demonstration, allow us to do that, where we configure a concept, take it into the field, allow the operators to work with it, get feedback from the operational types, and bring it back in the lab and do that cycle, and then insert the technology into the operational element.

So technology demonstration is new. The technology investment fund is really looking at new very different technologies that can be brought to bear on military requirements.

The technology watch aspect looks at that whole thing of what's happening out there in the civil sector and how we anticipate where the next breakthroughs are going to be.

The defence industrial research program is a shared 50-50 program we have with industry, where they bring us their ideas and we co-fund the research with them.

Making all that possible now and into the future will be increased emphasis on modelling and simulation, which I talked about, and concept development and experimentation. This is the whole business whereby the operational elements and the scientific elements work together to develop new concepts and bring those new concepts to bear in terms of military capability.

To conclude with some ideas as to what the future of military operations might be, first of all, the battle space will be variable in density, non-linear, and more dispersed. By non-linear, I mean that things that presumably in the past would have had little impact on the conduct of the military operation might in the future, or will in the future, have very significant impact.

One thing I think we can all relate to is the information provided by the media to the public and the impact that has on the public in the public conscience. Morality and morality issues and the like can have huge impacts on the conduct of military operations and how an adversary might exploit that, because an adversary will not attack you in your strengths; they will attack you in your weaknesses.

The technology advances are changing the nature of conflict, and therefore military strategy and operations. I think we've covered that.

Doctrine, organizations, and concepts will be dynamic and iterative, so things will continue to change, but they'll tend to build on themselves rather than go off and be entirely radical. Military operations, by nature, have to be conservative, so it would be an evolution, as opposed to a radical change.

• 0940

We talked about the human and organizational behaviour and the real importance of ensuring the human aspects continue to be engaged in this whole process.

A key role is played by information.

I haven't talked very much about space. Space will become increasingly important. Certainly some of the debate we've heard in recent months suggests information dominance and digitization will be the new high ground.

The most demanding environment will be urban, as we tend to carry out operations more in urban areas, and the challenges in urban areas are much greater than they are in non-urban areas.

Interoperability shortfalls—in other words, the gap between us and the single superpower—will continue to pose a challenge. As I mentioned earlier, it's not only a challenge for us, but it's a challenge for the United States as well.

Logistics drag is an issue. The Americans are putting a fair amount of effort right now into reconfiguring their force constructs so as to bring about considerable reductions in that logistics train that's required to support operations.

And asymmetric threats are more likely.

Some key implications for Canada are the following.

First of all, we need to experiment. This issue of concept development and experimentation is very important to where the Canadian Forces go in the future.

We need to engage our allies broadly. In Canada, from a technological perspective broadly, we produce less than 5% of world technology. On the military side it's probably less than 3%. If we want to engage the military technology that's out there, we also have to engage our allies broadly. That's certainly part of our strategy.

In terms of our own technology aspirations, we have to focus. We have to invest in key, or what we call niche, areas. And once we've decided what those niche areas are going to be, we have to be among the best in the world, because there's no such thing as second-class research and development these days. If you're not doing first-class R and D, your customer will go to where the first-class R and D is. There's a big issue there.

The quality of people is important, not only in the military but in our research labs as well. We have to be able to recruit and retain the best. We're not doing too badly, but I have to say it's a lot more challenging than it used to be.

Technology awareness is important. Hearings such as this are very important in raising the awareness of the importance of technology. Technology, for many people who are not engaged in technology, is often seen as mysterious and sometimes threatening. The more we can make people comfortable with where technology is taking us and how we shape that technology to meet the needs of our society, the better off we are.

And the last point I'd like to bring forward is the balance between understanding and responding. This really gets into the whole issue that when we're dealing with military operations, we need to have a very in-depth understanding of what's going on out there. When we look at the history of warfare, going back to our friend Clausewitz talking about the fog of war, understanding of what's actually going on out there has always been a challenge. Technology really allows us to enhance that understanding. We're not perfect, and we're not always right, but we're a lot better than we used to be.

So there needs to be a balance between that kind of investment in providing the ability to understand and responding in terms of actually having military forces in being that can do something. Needless to say, they're not two separate things. They're very much interrelated. When you actually do decide to respond, you still have to maintain that high level of understanding so that you have the agility and flexibility to react to situations as they develop.

Ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your patience in listening to me as I went through that presentation. I hope I did give you some idea of what the challenges are and how we in the Department of National Defence are responding to those challenges.

The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Leggat. That was a very interesting overview for our committee.

Dr. Moen, are you going to make any introductory comments?

Dr. Ingar Olav Moen (Director, Science and Technology Policy, Defence R&D Canada, Department of National Defence): No.

The Chairman: Okay. That's fine then.

Before we go to questions, just for clarification, in your conclusions, the first one you mention is the 2020 battle space, and you mention the media. Some of this committee travelled to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado Springs in January. I recall them referring to that as the CNN factor. Is that the commonly used nomenclature, or is there something else?

• 0945

Dr. John Leggat: Yes, I guess that's what they call it down there, the CNN factor.

The Chairman: The CBC factor here.

Dr. John Leggat: Yes. But it's not only the spin the media types may put on things. It's things like, for example... I don't like to get into the morbid aspects, but if the media happens to be there when a peacekeeper is shot in operations and captures it on camera, that is immediately shown around the world, including to the family of that peacekeeper. So there are real issues that are just fact, just the presentation of facts.

I wouldn't want to suggest anybody in the chain is interested in altering fact or anything else. It's just dealing with facts that are broadcast around the world in real time. How do you deal with that from the point of view of ensuring that they're not blown out of proportion or that the understanding is there, and that you deal with the real human aspects of the transmission of those facts?

Maybe a Canadian company gets engaged in a firefight and the media is right there. Of course everybody wants to know what's happening and who's doing what. What's the response of the government? What's the response of the department? What's the response of the military commander on the ground? All that has to be brought together very quickly, because the public demands instant response to those kinds of questions.

The Chairman: I remember it was Vietnam that really brought that home first, didn't it, on television?

Dr. John Leggat: Yes.

The Chairman: Okay. Thank you very much for your presentation. We'll start with questions.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, you have seven minutes.

Mr. René Laurin (Joliette, BQ): I would first like to congratulate Mr. Leggat on his wonderful presentation, which was clear and gave a good overview of the situation, even though it lasted 20 minutes. This is such a broad subject that he could have talked for hours.

My first question deals with the revolution in military affairs. That term brings to mind the major changes in the way war is conducted, in how war is waged. Should we not be talking about fundamental changes in the very definition of war?

Mr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: It seems to me that we cannot talk about war today the same way we did 15 or 20 years ago. When we talk about war, it is no longer the same as it used to be.

Mr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: Would it therefore not be reasonable to expect this to influence both the way war is carried out and how we look at the problem? If war has changed, the other things will also change, will they not?

Mr. John Leggat: That's right. Some people may have the impression that it is possible to take part in a war, in a global context, without having any casualties. They may have questions. Is this a virtual war or a real war? Is it possible to take part in operations without any casualties? Is it a sign of the times, when very powerful Western countries are involved in operations in countries like Kosovo and the Persian Gulf countries? Are we talking about real change, a change in the nature of war?

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Leggat, when we talk about war, is it realistic to think that there might be a world war rather than regional theatres?

Mr. John Leggat: I do not believe that there is a threat of world war, but rather regional wars, like the one that might break out between India and Pakistan. There are a number of hot spots in the world where a regional war could start. In my opinion, there is very little likelihood of a world war because there is only one world super power, the United States.

• 0950

Mr. René Laurin: Given this major revolution in the very definition of war and how it is waged, is Canada positioned to deal with this new situation? We know that Canada's defence policy was set out in 1994, when the government tabled its White Paper with its vision for national defence. In your opinion is that policy still appropriate or should it be thoroughly revised, given the very important changes that have taken place?

Mr. John Leggat: I believe that I can say that, in view of the operations we have been involved in and their scope, the 1994 policy seems to us to still be satisfactory. It gives us the flexibility we need to engage in peace keeping operations, like Kosovo at present, and also defend North America and Canada. The White Paper gives us that flexibility.

If we intend to maintain the major principles set out in the White Paper over the next few years, it would probably be worthwhile reviewing some of the aspects to ensure that they reflect the current aspirations of the Government of Canada.

Mr. René Laurin: I am not asking you for a political opinion, but a realistic assessment of things. Could you tell me which aspects of the White Paper on national defence would likely be the first to be outdated?

Mr. John Leggat: We are not talking about risk here, but rather about opportunity. If the White Paper were to contain a new aspect, I feel it should be the idea of consolidation so that we have one integrated force taking part in joint operations and not divided into an army, a navy and an air force. We should adopt a doctrine that we are one united Canadian force with a command structure, controls and processes to ensure that we can participate in operations as a single entity.

In the Department of National Defence, there is a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff responsible for command and control of joint operations. I think that we now need a new concept to ensure that we can continue to fully participate in operations with our allies.

[English]

The Chairman: Thank you.

Now to Mr. Clouthier, please.

Mr. Hec Clouthier (Renfrew—Nipissing—Pembroke, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Dr. Leggat, I listened with great interest to your presentation. You said a lot of these revolutions, be it the Industrial Revolution or the French Revolution or the First World War, were society-driven. I most certainly agree with you. With the new technology that seems to be fast-tracking itself in the last five, ten, or fifteen years, do you believe that a great threat could come from the military, not so much from one of the larger nations but now from say a smaller rogue state or even more nefariously from an individual?

The James Bond scenario used to be out there, and you thought you were dreaming in technicolour, but it doesn't seem to be without possibility that this could happen now. So if you believe that, do you have any idea where that threat could come from and whether it's a nation or whether it's an individual, and how would we protect ourselves against that?

• 0955

Dr. John Leggat: Let me start off by saying it's all very speculative. Let me also say that we don't want to overreact to that possibility, particularly given some of the hype that it gets south of the border.

I sometimes wonder whether some of the hype is in self-interest, but we have seen things that have happened around the world. The Tokyo subway incident, for example, did take place. People did die in that incident. It was perpetrated, as you say, by a group, not by a rogue state, that figured this was probably a thing to do in their interests.

So what are the possibilities of this happening? I think the possibilities are real. I wouldn't want to suggest there are a whole bunch of people out there scheming against Canada or NATO nations in general, but we are democratic states, we are fairly open, we do enjoy a high degree of freedom. The risk associated with that is we do leave ourselves open, basically, for the possibility of these actions taking place.

I don't think we want to clamp down on society and say we're going to put in all kinds of controls and surveillance systems and all the rest of it, but we do need to be prepared to deal with these things if and when they happen from the point of view of response. We have to understand what the art of the possible is, what kinds of things people might be able to do.

It's not very hard, quite frankly, to develop simple, mundane weapons that can be brought to bear against a population in a limited way and that may not cause a great deal of destruction but can certainly get a whole nation upset very quickly.

Perhaps Ingar wants to say a little about this from a technological side.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Considering the fact that there could be a possibility, and I don't know if you have the latitude to express an opinion upon it, what would your belief be in the contention with the United States that perhaps they're going to push forward with this MDS? Would you have any opinion on that, or are you privy to share that opinion with us?

Dr. John Leggat: It's difficult for me to express an opinion in this forum, let's put it that way, because it would be a personal opinion.

I can give you some technical dimensions. Technologically, it's very demanding. Technologically, I don't believe one could ever put an umbrella over North America that nothing would ever get through. Technologically, you'd be lucky if you get more than two, let's say, or perhaps more than three, if we're talking about a concerted attack against North America. So that's the technological issue.

Had the U.K. known there would have been an unmanned bomb threat to the country in 1925, buzz bombs, the V-1 and the V-2, would they have stood by and done nothing about it? I doubt it.

So there are some big issues here, and where Canada plays, of course, is a big question right now.

There are issues dealing with the security of North America from the point of view of the possibility of somebody actually being able to do that, and those possibilities are real, against the whole issue of deterrence, which is an environment we have lived in since the late forties. And deterrence has served us very well.

Would an actual missile defence erode deterrence, or would it strengthen it? That's a very academic debate and one I'm not qualified to engage in, quite frankly. And of course you don't know. So they're big questions. I'm not sure I can be much help beyond that.

• 1000

Mr. Hec Clouthier: I would just like to switch gears for one moment. You mentioned when you made your dissertation about the love bug... I am not a computer expert by any stretch of the imagination. Can you give a synopsis and just tell me in layman's language what happened there?

Dr. John Leggat: I have to admit I haven't studied this.

Do you know much about it?

Dr. Ingar Olav Moen: You go ahead.

Dr. John Leggat: What happens is that an e-mail comes into your computer. It comes in from somebody you know or some trusted source, if you like, and it has an attachment on it that says “I love you”. So you open that up and that executes a program that basically goes into your computer and immediately sends this same e-mail to everybody on your contact list in the computer. So it goes out to all your friends, if you like, so you've immediately lost all your friends.

The second thing it does is it starts to selectively shut down certain things in your computer. I'm not quite sure what the love bug actually shuts down in totality, but it does take all the Jpeg and the Mpeg files out, which are the pictures and the movies.

If you are one of these people, for example, who keeps their whole photo collection on their computer using a digital camera, you would have lost your photo collection. At least you would have to go back and reload it from the little disks that come out of the camera.

Mr. Hec Clouthier: It would have been built into that love bug virus.

Dr. John Leggat: That would have been built into the virus, but you could have put anything in there. It could have erased your C drive, it could have actually cleaned out your whole computer. So it raises this question. Could you not build something where you could open this bomb in a box, and if the bomb went off it would be contained in the box?

We have just started an information operations research and development program at our lab at the Defence Research Establishment in Ottawa that is looking at this whole issue of information security in that context. It's connected in with many of the other elements in the Canadian government working in this area. These are some of the questions we're looking at. How do you deal with really simple things like this that can cause billions of dollars of damage in a matter of minutes? It's really something.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Clouthier.

Now to Mr. Earle, please.

Mr. Gordon Earle (Halifax West, NDP): I want to thank you for your presentation on RMA. This is a topic that is very interesting for all of us, and it is a very complex topic, as you've indicated.

Under your slide where you talk about why the RMA now, one of the things you touched upon was a lack of tolerance for our own casualties. You cited as an example the U.S. Marine in Somalia who was dragged through the streets. Is there also another aspect to it where we should be concerned about the casualties of others, not just our own casualties? I also think about the young teenager in Somalia who was beaten to death by our own Canadian forces. Would that be a part of the consideration of RMA as well, not just a concern about our own casualties but generally speaking a concern about casualties worldwide?

Dr. John Leggat: I would say the concern for our own casualties is higher than for the casualties of a potential adversary. I'm not saying we don't care about these things. I think Michael Ignatieff wrote a book recently called Virtual War, suggesting that in the future, with information technology we might be able to carry out war in a virtual manner. I would tend to agree with some of his conclusions, but the fact of the matter is as soon as you drop the bomb or pull the trigger, you're talking about the death of a person or significant injury to a person.

We in the military, we in the Department of National Defence, and Canadians in general take that whole thing very seriously, whether we're talking about our own citizens or the citizens of another country. So while one generally tends to downplay the death of others, it comes into this collateral damage.

I recall going back to the Persian Gulf when the Americans bombed that communications node that was occupied by quite a number of civilians and a lot of people were killed. There was a fair amount of outrage around the world about that.

• 1005

So it comes back to this whole idea of whether you can carry out conflict without actually incurring casualties. Mr. Laurin sort of referred to that. Has the nature of warfare changed to the point where we can kind of carry out warfare without actually doing harm to another country's population or infrastructure? I don't believe so. I think that nasty aspect of war where people are actually killed will still be there, but at least in the western democracies, with our values, and maybe in other countries around the world, there will be a great reluctance to take that step.

I think we saw that in Kosovo, particularly in terms of the launching of the land campaign. The people didn't really want to do that because there was an understanding that the casualties would go up exponentially as soon as that happened.

Mr. Gordon Earle: That is what my next question was going to be. When we talk about collateral damage, if we think about the environmental damage that is done by a lot of this warfare, even though we talk about smart bombs and just hitting certain spots, it's the fallout afterwards and the devastation that comes when a mistake is made. So we end up having a lot of casualties, perhaps indirect or long-term casualties, that result from this.

I guess that was my next question, but you've already answered it. You don't believe the revolution in military affairs will actually terminate that kind of casualty.

Dr. John Leggat: What the army might do comes down to my last point on the balance between understanding what's going on out there and reacting. Reacting is pulling the trigger, in many respects. It might be building up, but with a greater understanding it might be possible in the future to engage diplomacy more effectively, without having to actually get into a military conflict.

I think one needs to have the muscle to back it up. As we've seen in the past, you have to be able to convince a state that is acting in an inappropriate manner that you mean business. That can perhaps be done through a combination of diplomacy and selective military strikes. That's kind of where we started off in Kosovo, but we didn't end up there, unfortunately.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Again, you touched upon one of my concerns. One of the points you raised was the understanding of what's happening out there. It seems to me that sometimes we enter into these conflicts, as either peacemakers or peacekeepers, without really fully understanding the situation and the dynamics of what's happening in that country. I think, for example, of Sierra Leone right now, and the fact that we can have peacekeepers taken hostage in that kind of situation.

Is that an area where, as we become more advanced in this RMA, we'll perhaps be able to have a better understanding of what's actually happening in a country, what kind of a situation we're sending peacekeepers into, and what the ramifications can be? It seems to me in that situation there has been a serious underestimation of the intensity of the conflict and the potential for people to come into harm in those situations.

Dr. John Leggat: Yes. I was speaking at a conference that the Atlantic Council of Canada put on last week, and Janet Stein gave a paper on the mandate means gap. In the United Nations there's a mandate, and you have to have the means to back up that mandate. If there's a gap there, it potentially puts the peacekeepers at risk, but it also potentially puts the people the peacekeepers are there to protect at risk, as well.

Whether we enter into these situations not fully knowing what the parameters are or not, I don't know. I would say sometimes we take a chance. We know what the parameters are, but we feel we must do something, and we do. But I would agree with you entirely that we need to use technology through our intelligence systems, our surveillance systems, and our international networks, to gain a full understanding of what the risks are when we go into one of these operations. But the operations will never be risk-free.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Just quickly on the interoperability with allies, again you talk about the human dimension, understanding the situation, and so forth. I'm coming back to the NMD concept, and it has been kind of indicated that if Canadians don't support this concept, it could ruin our whole relationship with NORAD.

Now, it seems to me a relationship ought not to be built upon one issue, but if we have a good working relationship, the same as a marriage or whatever, it doesn't revolve around the thing falling apart because of one issue at stake. So do we fully understand that situation, in terms of assessing our participation?

• 1010

Perhaps you're not in the situation to answer this, but is there really a threat that the NORAD arrangement can be put off the tracks just because of one aspect of it, even though we cooperate in so many other things through NORAD? Do we fully understand that situation, and is that more of a threat to push us into doing something, one way or the other?

Dr. John Leggatt: It's difficult for me to respond. I don't fully understand that situation from the political perspective, as to what the consequences of a decision one way or the other might be. It's perhaps inappropriate for me to express an opinion there. I'm not sure I can be of much help. There are probably others who could be of more help to you.

Mr. Gordon Earle: Thank you.

The Chairman: Thank you, Mr. Earle.

Mr. O'Reilly, please.

Mr. John O'Reilly (Haliburton—Victoria—Brock, Lib.): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you very much for your presentation. I found it very interesting and thought-provoking, because it leaves us with the question of whether our military is up to what we are requiring of it in this atmosphere. Are we to keep a military that's war-ready, or are we to keep a military for peacekeeping? What should Canada's role be? I think that's the question we're left with when you finish.

How do we recommend the direction for our military? Are we a military that requires tanks, artillery, air power, foot soldiers, and navy frigates? I know my colleague, the shipbuilder from the east coast, will certainly take that up. To a degree, our whole government now is intermixed as to whether the military should just stand alone, or whether it has to work in concert with health, industry, and technology. The military went from having a stand-alone role to being integrated with other departments. We find that sometimes that's an advantage and sometimes it's a disadvantage. I find that veterans don't respond to the heritage department running their affairs; they would sooner have the Minister of National Defence run their affairs.

When we start moving our military away from stand-alone and into the integrated government departments, we find that sometimes the programs are watered down, so I guess I'd like your comments on that.

Also, is technology ahead of our military planning, or is it your job to keep up with it? Is the military following technology, or is it leading in technology? The other feeling I get is that the upper command in the military, DND, feel threatened by technology. Maybe that's more of a political comment that you wouldn't necessarily comment on, but I'm sure you're aware of it.

When you talk about engaging our allies broadly, I think that fits into the missile defence program we're currently discussing—whether we are part of NORAD or not. The United States would like us to express our willingness to engage in the missile defence program, even though they haven't formally invited us yet. They haven't even decided if they're going to go ahead with it. But that certainly wasn't the feeling I got when we visited Cheyenne Mountain and Shriver Air Force Base. I think they are certainly going ahead with it. Even their slogan, which is kind of troubling sometimes, is “In your face from outer space”. It's kind of “We're coming, so get ready”. So I look for your comments on my observations.

Dr. John Leggat: Okay. There are a number of aspects to that question. I think your first question was on what sort of capability we need in the Canadian Forces and do we have it. It comes back to the question Mr. Laurin asked about whether the white paper is configured so we can continue to carry on.

• 1015

The white paper does tend to be slanted, not entirely, but perhaps in a traditional way, I guess, in terms of navy, army, and air force capability, which is the way we have traditionally looked at our forces. In the future, I think we have to look at capability in a more integrated sense, in terms of the capability to deploy, to interoperate, to mount precision operations, to deny information to an adversary, and to influence an adversary broadly. We have to move more towards a capability view of what we really need to do.

When we look at the Canadian Forces from a capability perspective, we're doing pretty well in some areas. I think there are other areas where we recognize, through documents like Strategy 2020, that we need to invest.

In the interoperability area, we're not too bad. The navy enjoys a high degree of interoperability with the United States and within NATO through the Standing Naval Force Atlantic. There's a very good degree in terms of communications such as the ability to exchange information and getting the information around within the fleet. Canadian elements are key elements within allied formations, so we're pretty good there.

In regard to the air force and the air force in Kosovo, Canada was one of a handful of nations, basically three or four nations, that were able to carry out flying operations in Kosovo through a variety of weather conditions. It wasn't all done without problems, I'll give you that; there's a lot of information that comes back through the after-action reports.

On the air force side, it's not bad on the communications interoperability, but there's a very important need for modernization, and I think that's brought out within the defence planning guidance and also within Strategy 2020 itself.

On the army side, things are definitely improving there, but they're starting from fairly far back in terms of the technological preparedness, the interoperability, and the adoption of information technology. The capabilities that we put into Kosovo actually indicated the leading edge, I guess, of this movement within the army to reinvest in technology and to deal with that.

On the mobility aspects, we do have some problems. There's no question about that. In terms of deploying large amounts of Canadians elsewhere in the world, we don't have a secured access to sealift, for example. Our airlift capability is good, but our sealift capability is not. The defence planning guidance talks about float logistics, sealift capability, which would allow us to deploy the vanguard within a specific period of time. So again, we're moving ahead on that one.

So in terms of capability I would say we don't have everything we need right now, but the plans are in place to deal with some of the gaps or shortfalls that we know exist. Needless to say, this will take investment in equipment and in capital, and the Canadian Forces needs to have that investment if it's going to be able to maintain its relevance as an ally into the future.

Okay. So that was that point. Just let me have a look here at a couple of...

Mr. John O'Reilly: I asked all my questions at once, because I know the chair gives you latitude—

Dr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mr. John O'Reilly: —but he'll cut me off, so that's why I asked them all at once—

[Editor's Note: Inaudible]

The Chairman: ...Dr. Leggat, so I'm going to give you another minute or so—

Dr. John Leggat: I think you talked about whether the upper command is technologically comfortable.

Mr. John O'Reilly: Yes.

Dr. John Leggat: I think this is a transition they're going through. Traditionally, there have been some... I wouldn't say they're not technologically aware, but technology is becoming increasingly part of the discussion in the department. The reason that my position, if you like, was created—ADM, science and technology—was to help in terms of bringing that technology dimension to the senior levels.

I don't think we could have had the level of technology sophistication that we have in the armed forces without a high degree of technological understanding in the senior command—and bear in mind that these people were not always senior commanders. Fifteen years ago they were majors, lieutenant-commanders, and whatever, commanding elements in the Canadian Forces, working with technology that in those days was perhaps not what we have today. Many of them were responsible for bringing the technology to bear in the department.

• 1020

Mr. John O'Reilly: Okay.

I'm not only being cut off, but they're taking my microphone away.

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

The Chairman: That'll teach him to ask long-winded questions. We're going to permanently turn his light out.

Did you want to comment at all on Mr. O'Reilly's point about whether the forces are—maybe you did—intimidated in any way by the RMA or suspicious of it? Or is that a bit of a loaded question?

Dr. John Leggat: No, I think it's a fair question. Is this something the forces are... I have to say that it's a difficult issue for us.

There are a number of dimensions, which I've talked about, one of the principal ones being that the people driving this RMA typically invest $50 million to $100 million a year in technology, depending on how you want to add it up. And we invest how much... Perhaps $2 billion, $3 billion, and that's not technology development. When we get to technology development, it's a lot less than that. So the scale of investment is somewhat intimidating and where you put your marbles is kind of important.

Those kinds of questions are difficult. They're not intimidating, but they're difficult. In the department, we've had a conference on the RMA—a year and a half ago. I think some of the members of this committee attended. A few weeks ago, we had the conference on concept development and experimentation. I think these are indications in the department of not only a willingness to understand what's going on here but a willingness to get on with doing something about it.

So my conclusion is that I don't see intimidation in the department. I see a fairly strong understanding in the department that we're not dealing with something simple here and that we have to approach it in a fairly holistic and structured manner.

The Chairman: Thank you very much.

Mrs. Wayne, please.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne (Saint John, PC): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I saw our colleague, Mr. O'Reilly, walk by, and he looked at all my notes, so that's where he got all his—

Some hon. members: Oh, oh!

Mr. Hec Clouthier: Somebody finally scooped her.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Dr. Leggat, I have to say that some of the major concerns I have are the same as those of my other colleagues. I noted that from 1994 to 1997 you directed a program that addressed radar systems, electronic warfare, and communications-in-space systems.

We've had a number of people before us to talk to us about ballistic missiles, the system that's being looked at down in the United States. When I was in Brussels not too long ago, I had an opportunity to have lunch with one of our Canadian admirals there. He says it'll be about five years down the road before the United States has completed what they are looking at when it comes to ballistic missiles.

I think we have a role to play. There is no question. We need to be there, because, as he explained to me, they could put out a missile that could be pointed right at Canada, and, as he said, “Someone needs to pick it up before it gets to Canada, Elsie.”

I think it's a very important issue. It really is, because when we see the United States going in that direction, we need to be working with them to make sure that we protect all of our people as well.

Dr. John Leggat: Yes. Would you like me to express a view on that statement?

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, I would.

Dr. John Leggat: Let me say that missile defence in itself is a fairly broad area. There are aspects of missile defence that I could talk about quite happily without getting into the political domain—

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right.

Dr. John Leggat: —which, quite frankly, I'm not an expert in, so I'd just as soon not get into that.

But if we're talking about theatre missile defence, for example, whereby we need to have a capability to protect our troops in the field against the possibility of attack from an adversary's missile system, yes, I think we need that. We need to be working on those kinds of capabilities, and certainly there are tactical systems in the United States that are being developed to do just that, to intercept a tactical or a short-range missile.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Right.

• 1025

Dr. John Leggat: Those things are easy to talk about, because they don't engage significant political questions the government needs to deal with. The national missile defence debate does not have a lot of technical dimensions. You can argue about the feasibility or non-feasibility and you can get into operations research studies as to, if so many missiles were fired, how many warheads would actually be destroyed before they landed in the United States or Canada? But those kinds of studies are really not very helpful to the political debate, I don't think, because it's really not an issue of how many you destroy or how pervious the umbrella is. It's a question of where this country stands with respect to the whole environment of deterrence, which has ruled the security of the world for so many years, and whether national missile defence indeed erodes deterrence or strengthens it. There are arguments on both sides.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: But I think you'll find the majority of us sitting around this table, no matter on which side of the table we sit... When it comes to defence, you will not find us a political group. We look at our men and women who are in the armed forces, and we want what is best for them as well as what's best for Canada. And we have worked that way, Dr. Leggat. I have found, with my colleagues here, all of us collectively have worked together that way. I just want you to know that.

Dr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: This one here I find is probably the most non-political group I've sat with. And that's good. That is good.

Mr. John O'Reilly: That's why we share notes.

Voices: Oh, oh!

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: That's right.

Dr. John Leggat: Let me just make myself clear on this as well. I share that sentiment, and I don't want to appear evasive here, but the national missile defence debate, in my mind, impacts on the whole country.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Yes, it does.

Dr. John Leggat: It's not just a Canadian Forces issue.

If we're talking about theatre missile defence, that's an issue by which troops in the field will be affected in one way or another, and I don't think there's any question, in terms of white paper or anything else, about our ability to deal in technologies around the whole theatre missile defence issue. In fact we're engaged in those kinds of discussions with our allies.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I noted that when you were speaking about your department and the role you play, you said there are contracts out that take about 50% of your operation. It's out into the Canadian industry, which is very good and something we should be pushing.

I don't know if we've resolved the ITAR situation or not, Pat, because ITAR, as you are aware—and we've had a number of the industries coming in to see us—has just been absolutely cancelled by the United States. We spoke about this. We were down in the United States and we spoke to the congressmen, who all seemed to be very naive and didn't even know it had happened, but we were hoping to get it straightened out.

One of the most important issues is this. I feel so badly for the military; I really do, because people in Canada... It's not a political issue. That's what I was saying before. Therefore they don't get the attention they require. With the number of people and the cutbacks that have come and the number of people we have in our military at the present time and in the reserves and so on...

I was just with them last week again back home and over at the HMCS Brunswicker that we have back home. It's hard. It's difficult. They don't understand why this is being cut back. Well, the reason it's being cut back is you don't have them up here marching with placards, because they have a uniform on. You just can't come with a placard or you won't have the uniform on tomorrow. So that's the way it is.

We have to be the strongest voices we can for our military, for our reserves, and so on. I really feel somehow we have to convince the government to increase the funding substantially for the Department of National Defence. They did increase it somewhat, but we have to increase it even more.

I have to say this, and I will say it. We should have had the bloody old EH-101s. We don't have them. I don't care whether they're EH-101s or what they are. If we don't ground all those bloody damned Sea Kings pretty soon—and I want you, Robert, to look after that for us and make sure that happens—

Voices: Oh, oh!

• 1030

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'm telling you, by God, every one of those ministers... Robert, when you have to go now on one of these little trips, we're going to put you in a Sea King. By God, they'll all be grounded within a week after that. You'll never fly again, honey, and none of the rest of them will. But I'm telling you right—

Mr. John O'Reilly: I've been in one.

Mr. Robert Bertrand (Pontiac—Gatineau—Labelle, Lib.): So have I.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Look, you have high technology, and my God, here we are with Sea Kings, for God's sake, that are so outdated it's pitiful. We just had another one grounded in the Atlantic region again.

So it's all of these things. It means so much. I know you're talking about the Internet and what's happening and so on, and everything's according to a wire up above that carries it from one point to another, but there are other things as well.

Dr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: You people have to do that as well, because high technology goes into the helicopters and the submarines. My God, I'm telling you, we buy used submarines and then we can't even float the damn things. Excuse me, but you can't.

Oh, we're not on TV, are we?

The Chairman: The bad news is we are, but the good news is that I have to ask you to stop anyway, Mrs. Wayne.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: Okay.

The Chairman: Thanks very much. Now your time is up.

I think Mrs. Wayne speaks for us all. We're all anxious, I know—including my friend, the parliamentary secretary—for the helicopter announcement.

We'll start a second round of questions, for five minutes each.

[Translation]

Mr. Laurin, I will give you five minutes.

Mr. René Laurin: Mr. Leggat, I would like to come back to Canada's role, which I touched on when I asked my first set of questions. Since Canada is one of the United States' allies, first and foremost, and also a member country of NATO and the United Nations, might it be asked to get involved in a foreign conflict outside the auspices of NATO and the UN? Is it possible that Canada might be asked to go and defend a country that is engaged in a regional theatre of war, because of our values and our desire to protect human rights, freedom and democracy? In your opinion, could Canada be called on to get involved in a theatre of war of that type?

Mr. John Leggat: Do you mean that it might be called on to act alone in a regional conflict?

Mr. René Laurin: Yes.

Mr. John Leggat: Although it is possible, I believe that our policy up to now has resulted in our participation in foreign operations as part of a coalition or alongside our allies, from a collective defence perspective. One of the basic elements of our defence policy is to participate in foreign operations collectively with others.

Mr. René Laurin: Am I given to understand that as long as our current policy is maintained, Canada will never play a leading role in resolving a conflict in the world, even a regional conflict?

Mr. John Leggat: I would not say that we cannot play a leading role, but we have chosen up to now to be involved alongside our allies, like we did when we went to Haiti. We assumed a leadership role, but there were other countries there with us.

Mr. René Laurin: You feel that it would be unthinkable for Canada to agree to play a role in Cuba if that country were attacked, or even in Haiti, which is also a good example.

Mr. John Leggat: That is hypothetical. You are asking me what we would do if that situation arose.

Mr. René Laurin: I am asking you that question because it seems to me that Canada's role today is different from what it was in the Second World War, when we followed our allies. Canada needed to be equipped to play a support role beside or behind its allies.

It seems to me that since war is different now and since war is defined differently these days, Canada could have a different role to play. If that is the case, Canada's equipment should not be the same.

• 1035

Mr. John Leggat: Yes.

Mr. René Laurin: That is where I am going with my question.

Mr. John Leggat: It all depends on the situation, but there is no reason that Canada could not play a leadership role in the international arena. As I said, if Canada was the leader, it would want other countries to work with it in these operations. I think it is the same in the case of the United States. Even though they have the capacity to carry out operations alone, they will look for support from other countries. Other countries need to be with the United States in these operations. It is important to use a collective rather than a unilateral approach to ensure world security.

Mr. René Laurin: I would like to ask a technical question relating to your presentation. On the page entitled "RMA Vision", one of the circles is marked C4I. What does that mean?

Mr. John Leggat: Command, control, computers, communications and information.

Mr. René Laurin: Those are the four Cs.

Mr. John Leggat: That's right.

Mr. René Laurin: Thank you.

[English]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): I'm sorry, you're out of time, Mr. Laurin.

Mr. Bertrand, five minutes please.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Before asking the witnesses my question, I would like to take a moment to tell my colleague for Saint John that

[English]

I took a number of rides on Sea Kings. I'm not afraid to fly in them. They do need a lot of maintenance, I'll be the first one to agree with that. Do we need the new ones? Yes, we do. But the Sea Kings that are flying are safe.

The helicopter that went down was not a Sea King. I believe it was a Bell 216, a fairly recent helicopter that National Defence had bought.

And regarding the four submarines we bought, I may be wrong on this, but I believe the fourth one, the last one we're getting, was in service for only about three or four months before it was mothballed by the British. So I agree, it's second-hand equipment, but it is very good equipment.

I hope this is not taken off my five minutes.

A voice: Oh, it is.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Just before we get into a debate, Mr. Bertrand, it is coming off your five minutes, but I'm sure you'll find time to ask a question of the witnesses and forget the debate with your colleague.

[Translation]

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Certainly, Mr. Chairman. My question is mainly on your budget. I imagine that the Department of National Defence fully funds Defence Canada's research and development activities.

Mr. John Leggat: Yes, although as an agency under the department, we are allowed to have other sources of income.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: What percentage of your budget comes from other sources?

Mr. John Leggat: A small percentage, about 5%.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Your answer brings me to my second question. Who funds the technology investment fund? Is it the department?

Mr. John Leggat: No, that fund is part of our own research and development program. We provide the funding.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: How is this money spent? Do the universities submit applications that you approve and then provide the funding for?

Mr. John Leggat: We sign contracts with industries. The universities can collaborate with a Canadian industry firm that submits a funding application. Usually these are partnerships involving industry, universities and our laboratories where the research and development is done.

• 1040

Mr. Robert Bertrand: On page 50 of your annual report, you deal with revenue-generating projects. You have given a list of programs that make money for the department, including the Valcartier Research Centre, which I knew a little about. If I understand correctly, the money brought in by these programs is part of the 5% that you mentioned earlier.

Mr. John Leggat: Yes. Our budget indicates that these programs should bring in $10 million. These are projects that we carry out for outside clients, clients other than the Department of National Defence. For example, we are working for Produits chimiques Expro inc. to produce...

Mr. Robert Bertrand: ...inflatable cushions.

Mr. John Leggat: Yes. That is an example of a civilian application of a technology created for defence purposes.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: When you talk about technological change driving the revolution in military affairs, you refer to materiel sciences and information sciences, which I understand quite well. You also mention life sciences, and that intrigues me. Could you clarify what you mean by genetic engineering and human systems?

Mr. John Leggat: In the area of biogenetic technology, there is genetic modification of substances, such as chemical or biological agents whose characteristics can be modified genetically. So the measures that we develop against various agents will not be effective if genetic modification has taken place.

The human aspects involve interaction between human beings and command and control systems that are driven to a greater or lesser extent by computers. We analyze this interaction and try to understand how computers can help us, among other things, with decision-making. We are studying the interaction between human beings and different types of hardware used by the Canadian Forces.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: Thank you very much.

[English]

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Mr. Bertrand, you are out of time. I've given you just a little extra time for that dissertation.

It's now the NDP's turn. Mr. Earle.

Mr. Gordon Earle: When we talk about the revolution in military affairs it becomes very clear that a lot of this focuses around technology and globalization and the importance of communication and so forth. You also do point out the importance of the human factor, that humans must remain in command. In your conclusion you talk about human and organizational behaviour being of greater importance.

I'm just wondering if this whole concept takes into consideration the kinds of problems that would affect humans, such as the quality of life issues for our soldiers, the question of spousal abuse, the question of sexual abuse, the question of equity and employment. Are those issues, in your opinion, being sacrificed on the altar of technology, as we move forward with the revolution in military affairs?

Dr. John Leggat: We have to bear in mind that you're talking to the technology guy in the department. You're going to get a certain perspective from me.

• 1045

We talked about the reserves a little while ago. I spent 33 years in the reserves. I've dealt with people from across this country as I've moved around in the reserves, and I have trained them and I have worked with them. I think I know the military very well.

You can't achieve one without the other. It all comes back to the people. You have to have good people. You have to have well-educated people, motivated people. So the environment doesn't support that. It doesn't matter how much technology you have, you're just not going to get the most out of your technology.

So a big element of our program is human systems. One of our programs in that human systems area is what we call “psychological performance”. It deals with the whole issue of command, decision-making, attributes of leadership that are going to be required in the future, not only in a new technical environment, but also, entirely likely, in new societies... different values, perhaps, or evolved values, or whatever.

It really deals with that whole issue of the human in the technology environment. It also deals with the human dealing with the human aspects of command, leadership, ethics, values, with maintaining the very positive and attractive work environment that we need to have broadly in the Canadian Forces and in the department to ensure that we can continue to attract and retain the really good people we need.

Mr. Gordon Earle: I want to follow up a little on that, because you did emphasize in your presentation the quality of people as one of the key implications of Canada that we should be focusing on.

I would be the first to say that I'm impressed with the quality of people in the Canadian Forces, particularly in the reserves. I had the pleasure of attending a reserve day in Nova Scotia just recently and to talk to many of the reserves there and look at their exhibits. When you look at the young people you see their pride in being a part of that whole movement.

There seems to be a tendency afoot right now, though, on the part of the government to want to cut the reserves and to take certain militias out of action and to reduce. To me it seems that this whole concept goes contrary to having a good RMA concept, because if you're going to have a revolution in military affairs, as you say, you need the people. So I would just like your comment on that in terms of what you see the role of the reserves as being. How important is that role in this process?

Secondly, how do we compare with other countries, not necessarily the U.S.A., because we know they are a superpower, but with Britain, France, and other countries in terms of this whole concept of RMA?

Dr. John Leggat: Starting off with the role of the reserves, I'm not aware of any plans to cut the reserves. Certainly I'm aware of plans to perhaps look at new roles for the reserves.

As I said, I joined the reserves in 1967. I went through the period until 1990, when we were basically part of that “Forces in Being” thing. I think the best thing that ever happened to the reserves, from my perspective, was when they started sending reserves on peacekeeping missions. The first ones were sent to Cyprus. The impact that had on the reserves in terms of the morale was quite phenomenal. People were finally using us for something useful.

In terms of where we are now, since 1990 we've used reserves increasingly not only in peacekeeping operations but also in peace enforcement operations. So the reserves are very much closer to the action than they were in the past. This means a lot in terms of how we viewed reserves in the past compared to how we view them today. The level of training has to be higher. The quality of individuals has to be higher. We have to make sure they're prepared before we send them away. I think we've done a lot of this.

We have to look at the roles as well. Are the roles appropriate? Are the roles 40 years ago the same as the roles they need to be today? The role for me as a scientist today is very different from what it was 40 years ago. We all wore thick glasses and white lab coats 40 years ago. Today we have combat boots and helmets on and we're in the field with the forces. So the role's changed.

If we're going to maintain a viable force... We're not talking about the European concept of reserves here, where they put the uniform on once a year and they are reservists. We're talking about reservists who are in the armoury twice, three times a week, two weekends a month, three weeks in the summertime. So it's a different paradigm right now. I think the roles need to be looked at.

We don't want to get rid of the combat capability in the reserves, because basically when we send people overseas it's the combat capability we augment with the reserves. The combat capability may have to change.

That's my comment on the reserves.

• 1050

The second point was how we compare with other nations in terms of how we're faring with the RMA.

I think the Americans are moving toward three trusted allies by the looks of things. They'll work with anybody, but in terms of who they really trust with their information, there's ourselves, the U.K., and Australia.

In terms of how we match up with respect to them, I would say we're not as far along as the U.K. We're probably about neck and neck with the Australians. Sometimes it's hard to compare Canada and Australia, because we work a little differently. They invest about twice as much in research and development as we do, but we have a much better industrial base than they do. So it's hard to say whether they're ahead of us, or vice versa.

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Thank you very much, Mr. Earle. You're out of time.

Mr. Peric.

I want to remind the committee that there's another committee coming in here at 11 o'clock, and I still have Ms. Wayne and Mr. O'Brien.

Mr. Janko Peric (Cambridge, Lib.): So I have my five minutes?

The Acting Chairman (Mr. John O'Reilly): Yes, sir.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you, Mr. Chair. You're so kind.

Dr. Leggat, your vision is so impressive. Could you elaborate a little? You're expanding your activities and your cooperation with universities. I see you're planning to develop more chairs, to prepare the future scientists... and your cooperation with the private sector.

Since we have new NATO members from the former East Bloc, I have some concerns. How secure is the information? How secure is our technology? Specifically, since you have to cooperate with new members, how much information do you give to them, and how valuable is that information to them to advance their technology? Is there a potential for technology to fall into the wrong hands? As we know, in the past terrorists have stolen military equipment and they have used it.

Dr. John Leggat: That's a big question. Let me start off by saying I'm very satisfied with our ability to protect our technology, both in terms of the national security aspects and the intellectual property aspects. We have a good awareness, good practices within our organization on how to deal with the security aspects of our technology. Quite frankly, the intellectual property that we generate belongs to the Government of Canada.

How we share that technology of course plays into that. We will share technology with the countries we believe provide that technology with the same degree of protection that we provide here in Canada. The agreements we enter into with other countries, whether they be bilateral agreements or multilateral agreements, have very clear clauses in them with respect to how this technology needs to be protected and the like.

I think all countries have preferences, if you like, on whom they share technology with. And those preferences are basically built on the track record of a particular nation in terms of how they protect technology. So when it comes to those sorts of things we look at countries' track records. We're comfortable in dealing with the countries that are able to protect the technology we've given them or that have demonstrated this over the past.

All of that being said, a small percentage of what we do is actually classified. I'm not quite sure what percentage it is, but it's probably less than 20%. A high quantity of what we do has value as intellectual property.

• 1055

We talked about revenue generation. One of the strategies we will follow in terms of generating revenue is to ensure that we get some return for the intellectual property we generate as we transfer it to industry.

Mr. Janko Peric: Thank you.

The Chairman: Mr. Peric, thank you very much.

Mrs. Wayne, please.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: I'll be very quick.

I just want to say that I'm so glad that Mr. Bertrand wasn't in East Timor when they couldn't fly the Sea King and they had to go borrow a helicopter from Australia. Anyway, that's all right. No, he's not getting any more clips. We're going to get replacements for the Sea Kings no matter what, and darling, I don't even want to see your little butt in one. Now that's it.

With regard to this, Dr. Leggat, are you looking at a long-range program? Do you do this through your research and development? Whether it's submarines or helicopters, the need for the military is out there. We had a contract for the frigates, but then all of a sudden twenty years down the road all the frigates will have to be replaced at the same time, because the contract went out for a large number. Do you look at it and say this year this should be replaced, and five years down the road something else should be replaced, so that everything doesn't become outdated at the same time for our military?

Dr. John Leggat: Yes. One of the principles we try to invoke in research and development is stable funding so that you're able to make some of those long-term projections. When you get into a situation where budgets are going up or down, particularly down, it's difficult to achieve a long-term, stable program.

The same holds true for investment in defence in general, I would say. It's very important to have stable, long-term investment so that the plans that are put in place can come to fruition. We do have long-term plans that address bringing to the fore the capabilities the Canadian Forces need. The science and technology programs of the department are integrated or woven into that strategy. But to make that strategy happen—because it's not a short-term issue, this is a five- to ten-year issue—there has to be stable funding and a commitment, if you like, to make that happen.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: My last question has to do with the number of peacekeepers we have. We have not been able to fulfil some of the requests that have been made by the troubled countries around the world when it comes to having enough people in our reserves to go out to do the peacekeeping that needs to be done. There have been tremendous cuts. There really have. We see it back home. We really and truly do. I think that is something all of us collectively, including your department, should show, that there is that need out there, and we have to address that need. We truly do. We have a role to play around this world, Canada does.

Dr. John Leggat: I agree. The question is, how much do we as a nation invest in this? There's a direct relationship between how much you can do and how much you're willing to pay.

Mrs. Elsie Wayne: The only thing I'll say to that very quickly is that if we have them in the reserves, if we have them in the military, then you would see a change of lifestyle, just turned right around in this whole country in a positive fashion. There are a lot of highly educated young people out there today who need jobs. They haven't got the jobs, but if they went into the military they could play a real positive role. That's what we should be doing, opening the door for them. I think all of us should speak out for that.

The Chairman: Bob, did you have a quick question? Oh, you want to make a comment.

Mr. Robert Bertrand: I have one last comment regarding what Mrs. Wayne said.

With regard to the Sea King that was used for the CDS in East Timor, there was no mechanical problem. Why he couldn't use it was because of the altitude restriction. Where he was going they had to cross over certain mountains, and the Sea King was not made to go over these mountains. There were no mechanical problems at all. I just wanted to make that perfectly clear for my colleague from Saint John.

The Chairman: Thank you.

You can see that we have some good banter here in a non-partisan way.

Dr. Leggat, I'm going to leave a question and a comment with you and ask you to drop the committee a note, if you could. It relates to this idea of RMA and Canada having a niche. Are our allies, particularly the United States, content to let us do that? Will we have a significant role to play with that approach?

• 1100

My other question is about troop levels. There's a concern among some members of the CF that the RMA will mean that we continue to slash troop levels. I hope that's wrong. I believe that's wrong, but I'd like to hear what you can share with us on that.

I want to thank you very much for what I think we all regard as an outstanding presentation. Thank you both very much for being here today.

Dr. John Leggat: Thanks, Mr. Chairman. We appreciate the opportunity.

The Chairman: Colleagues, we pick up the procurement study next Wednesday, but we have Professor Bland on Tuesday. Thank you very much.

The committee is adjourned.