I want to apologize for the absence of my colleague, Robert Roach, who was going to be here. He took ill from some weekend travelling in Winnipeg, so I'll be here by myself.
I'm pleased to have this opportunity. Senate reform has been an interest of mine since about 1973. It's been a longstanding interest of the Canada West Foundation, which I am associated with right now. I want to stress that this is not a Canada West Foundation position. As an organization we do not have a formal position on either the bill or Senate reform itself.
I also want to stress by way of preamble that I am a political scientist by training, not a constitutional lawyer. That doesn't mean I don't have constitutional opinions, but they are based more on political instincts than legal training.
My notes will be available to the committee once translation has been completed, perhaps by the end of the week. I will speak to them fairly briefly at this point, and of course will be happy to answer any questions.
Let me set the stage for my remarks by emphasizing the importance of context for . The context that's important to me is the Government of Canada's commitment to pursuing comprehensive Senate reform. It's only within that context that Bill C-20 makes sense, and I'll come back to this in the bulk of my comments.
In the written draft I go through the case for Senate reform in a general sense. I won't repeat the details of that, because these arguments will be well known to the committee. I'll just mention the three points that are highlighted. One is the need for more effective regional representation. The second is to have a counterweight to majority governments in the House of Commons. Parliamentary government tends to concentrate power, and the Senate provides at least the possibility of a counterweight, in a sense.
The third argument is really a democratic argument. The language I would use is that of environmentalism: that the Canadian Senate is not sustainable for the long run. I would stress that although my original interest in this topic came from failures in regional representation, to my mind now the most compelling argument for Senate reform is for democratic renewal. I think the arguments for regional representation are still important, but they're not as compelling to me as the need for democratic renewal.
Although the power of the arguments for Senate reform has grown over time, we've made no progress in reforming a 19th century institution so it can better take on the challenges of the 21st century. We are spinning our wheels while the world changes around us.
In thinking about this, it seems to me we're faced with two options. We can wait until the Senate implodes in some crisis of democratic legitimacy, some major conflict with the House of Commons; or we can try to re-engineer the Senate to bring it more into line with liberal, democratic values. To my mind at least, to do nothing only postpones the inevitable. We've passed down the status quo to our children and our grandchildren in an irresponsible fashion. The image of the Senate that comes to my mind is that of an institution cobbled together 141 years ago and now frozen in time like an insect trapped in amber.
So where does this lead me with respect to ? My comments here are pretty straightforward. I think Bill C-20 is a reasonable step forward. It's consistent with federal states, such as Australia and the United States. It's consistent with even the most rudimentary understanding of democratic government. It's consistent with recent public opinion polling and Canadian values.
I recognize that Bill C-20 does not take us very far along the path to comprehensive Senate reform, and you're aware of the things it doesn't touch. It doesn't touch a whole bunch of things about the Senate. So it's not a final destination, it's only a small first step, but it is a first step, and it does show that incremental reform is possible.
For years Canadians have been told that Senate reform may be desirable, but it must be approached comprehensively rather than incrementally. We're then told that comprehensive reform requires constitutional amendment, and that constitutional amendment is impossible, and therefore Senate reform is impossible.
So we have a neat and tidy circular argument from which the perfect becomes the enemy of the good. We're told that any incremental reform, even a small step, is to be shunned in case we are pushed onto the slippery slope of constitutional reform. To my mind this has fostered a somewhat dishonest public debate, because if everyone lines up in favour of Senate reform it just divides those people who say it's really desirable but can't be done from those people who argue for incremental reform, and I'm certainly in that latter group.
Concern has been raised that Bill might turn out to be the final destination, that it might not only be the first step but the last step, and therefore the election or selection of senators could lock into place the existing regional distribution of Senate seats and the legislative powers of the Senate. I think this concern rests on the assumption that newly elected senators would be even more resistant to change than the existing senators. I don't accept that argument. I think the existing senators have set the bar for resistance extremely high, and I can't imagine any combination of elected or appointed senators who would be more resistant than the status quo.
I do admit, and I think this is a critical point, that the changes proposed by Bill would leave us with a bit of a dog's breakfast in terms of the Senate. But I see this as a virtue of the bill rather than a fatal flaw. The bill would destabilize the status quo and therefore force Canadians to come to grips with the design of a modernized and democratic upper house. The process has to start somewhere, and Bill C-20 sets out a reasonable starting point. I do believe the modest changes today make it more likely that we'll be able to generate the political will to confront more substantive changes tomorrow. If we begin chipping away at the status quo, we can set in motion the political dynamics that will enable us to carry the process forward.
I recognize that Bill pushes the envelope of constitutionality, although the constitutional constraints are at best unknown in the context of a living-tree Constitution. We know the Constitution is unfolding over time. We know the courts are not bound by the black letter of the law. We saw this in the way in which courts have progressively expanded the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In any event, I stress I'm not a constitutional lawyer, but perhaps because of that I'm unwilling to dump the whole issue of Senate reform into the lap of courts, who, in my view, are not well equipped to deal with what is ultimately a political question. The democratization of parliamentary institutions and the design of an effective regional representation are not fundamentally legal questions; they are political questions.
In a similar fashion, some would argue we should not proceed without first securing provincial support. However, I'm reluctant to concede that the design of national parliamentary institutions should rest with provincial governments. I do not believe the federation should be decentralized to the point where provincial governments can, in their own interests, pre-empt the democratic reform of national parliamentary institutions. Nor do I believe the potential opposition in provincial governments to Senate reform necessarily reflects the desire of provincial populations, and it's those provincial populations we want to represent.
I'll just draw your attention to a useful analogy to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Many of the provincial governments were initially resistant to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Government of Canada proceeded, and it turned out the provincial populations were overwhelmingly in support of this and the provincial governments caved.
If gets the ball rolling with respect to Senate reform, what might the next steps be?
I'll end with this set of points. We are confronting a major problem. We don't have an acceptable model of what a comprehensively reformed Senate might look like. We simply don't have something we can pull off the shelves.
My organization has been associated with the triple-E model. I think the triple-E model is increasingly shopworn, and I think it now lacks relevance to the country we are becoming.
It's not a surprise to me that we don't have an acceptable or consensual model of what a reformed Senate might look like. We've devoted so much of our intellectual energy to blocking Senate reform that we've had very little left over to think through what a reformed Senate might look like.
If we're able to move forward, we have to figure out an appropriate form of election. If we don't get the election format right, we can dig ourselves into very serious trouble. We need a formula for regional representation that captures the complexity of this country and figures out how to deal with a very unequal distribution of population across provinces. We have to figure out how to work the sparsely populated northern territories into a reformed Senate.
We have to think through how we can have non-territorial representation in the Senate—how we can have an electoral system that ensures, for example, that the aboriginal population of Saskatchewan, the Acadians in New Brunswick, or the Liberals in Alberta are represented in some way within the Senate.
We haven't worked out what the impact of a reformed Senate might be on the House of Commons. I think Senate reform would set in motion some fairly fundamental reforms within the House of Commons, including a move to finally have full representation by population within the House of Commons.
I'm happy to discuss this at length, because you're the only group I can discuss it at length with. I believe that if we can get it right, we can create a Senate that will be a truly national legislature, reflecting not only regional diversity but also diversity within provincial communities. If we get the design details wrong, however, we could make a bad situation worse.
Some argue that we should stop until we have everything figured out, but past experience shows that Canadians will not even begin to tackle these critical design questions until the Senate reform train leaves the station. If we do not build on the momentum that will create, nothing will happen. There must be a stimulus to creative thought, and this is what provides.
To conclude, some would argue that we should be cautious, that we should wait for the premiers to fall into line or wait for the courts to chart a path forward. However, we have been cautious, excessively cautious, for generations, and nothing has happened. Nothing has happened for 141 years.
In quoting from the bill, I would argue that the Parliament of Canada has a primary responsibility to ensure “that Canada’s representative institutions, including the Senate, continue to evolve in accordance with the principles of modern democracy and the expectations of Canadians”. The abdication of this responsibility by Parliament will inflict serious damage on the very fabric of democratic political life in Canada.
Thank you. I'd be happy to respond to any questions you might have.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Gibbins.
There are several elements of Bill C-20 that not only bother me, but that for which I do not have an answer. There are also elements that do not seem to be dealt with in the Bill.
First of all, I have realized that in the Bill as tabled there does not seem to be a clause or a provision protecting minority groups, for example, francophones in Canada or anglophones in Quebec or other minority groups such as aboriginal peoples. There is nothing that applies to them. It seems to me that in this day and age, here in Canada in the 21st century, constitutional protection — although this is not tied to the Constitution —, legislative protection, in the structure of these groups, should be taken into account in a major, if not fundamental, manner. I would therefore like to hear your views on this with regard to voter consultation.
Secondly, I have a question that I have already asked, but to which I have yet to receive an answer. I imagine myself in the shoes of a candidate in an election — I will not use Quebec as an example, because the situation there is somewhat different — in Ontario, for example, where there is an important urban base, but also a broad rural base. It seems to me that if I were a candidate in a rural area, my chances of being elected would be rather slim because I would have to cover a very large territory in order to garner the same number of votes I might be able to attract in an urban area of just a few kilometres in length. It therefore seems to me that this voting structure for senators, as proposed in Bill C-20, would give a very distinct advantage to persons from urban communities and, therefore, persons from rural communities would be somewhat like the minorities I have just mentioned.
Would you have an answer to these questions? It is not exactly the same question, but nearly.
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I have a couple of responses, and they may seem a bit intemperate, but I don't mean them to be.
The first point is that I don't equate democracy with intergovernmentalism. I don't think agreements among governments are the only way to go forward in a democratic society.
Second, I do think that from time to time governments have an opportunity and even an obligation to destabilize the status quo. I'm thinking a little bit of Barack Obama's campaign in the U.S., which is all about change. No one in the U.S. primaries is saying “My message is that nothing will change, unless maybe we can bring all the state governments together, and if the states agree, then I'll do something”. You'd be dead in the water if that were your platform within the United States.
So my view is that in the long term, the consent of the provinces will be required, because of the eventual requirement for constitutional change. To me, that's unavoidable. But how do you even start that conversation? How do you even bring people to the table?
Well, you need something to create that action. If this government or any government simply said we've got an appointed house and it's not working very well, it's an increasingly partisan operation, but if people ever get around to coming together and talking about it, then we'll sit down at the table with the rest of you, I think that's.... Again, I don't want to seem intemperate here, but I see that as an abdication of responsibility from the Government of Canada.
So I don't see this as a way of getting around the provinces. It's a way of kick-starting that conversation, because you can only get around the provinces to a very limited degree, and then you run into that requirement down the road for provincial consent. That's an unavoidable constitutional necessity. That's the way the country has been structured. That's fair enough. But you get there by beginning that conversation first.
Maybe it craters in the long run, but I still think you have to begin that conversation.
That's all.
:
Let me back into a response by speaking from a very narrow Alberta perspective, but I think it goes to what you're saying.
There are two facts of life about politics in Alberta. One is that we have a tremendous concentration of power because there is no check to the majority government of the day. And we've had a majority government of the day since 1971, the same party, so there's no check on that. I worry then, in an analogous situation, about the House of Commons. It's hard to remember back to majority governments, but this may happen again. Our political system doesn't create very effective checks on majority governments. We have the courts, we have provincial governments, and I don't rule that out. But within Parliament those checks are not very great.
But to me, the more compelling reason that comes out of the Alberta experience is that we have electoral systems at the federal level and at the provincial level that fail in any way to capture the diversity of the population. We have a single party, federally and provincially, with different parties winning an overwhelming majority of the seats, even though the population is much more diverse--in a partisan sense, in an urban-rural sense, or whatever it is. The electoral system we have for the House of Commons tends to exaggerate the homogeneity. It projects a single Alberta personality onto the political stage, whereas the province is much more complex.
One of the reasons I support Senate reform is that if we can get it right, we can have an electoral system that reflects, through its elected representatives in the Senate, the diversity of the province. If we have an electoral system for the Senate that produces, say, ten Senators, and ten of them are always Conservatives, then we've simply replicated the representational flaws that exist within the House of Commons.
That's why I keep going back in my own mind to saying we have to get the electoral system right, or we'll dig ourselves into a hole on this.
:
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Thank you, Dr. Gibbins, for being here with us today.
I had a couple of things to go through. I wanted to ask you about the single transferable vote electoral system in particular, but before I get there I just wanted to make a comment, and you're free to comment on my comment after I'm done.
I'm really drawing a bit on Mr. Angus's observation about having a referendum on abolishing the Senate. This goes back to the discussions that have been suggested elsewhere, that we ought to engage in having.... I don't think we ought to engage in this kind of constitutional process of going to the provinces, because in Canada we don't have the option of dealing with our constitutional amendments by referendum.
We can add that on top of our formal constitutional amendment system, but we are very different from the Australians, the Swiss, as they amend their constitution. What happens in Australia, for example, is they have a requirement that you get the majority of voters in a majority of states voting in favour of a constitutional amendment, but the amendment is proposed in Parliament, voted on in Parliament, and the state premiers have no role.
In a very similar situation in Switzerland, and in the United States as well, you don't find a situation in which you engage in horse-trading--we'll give you your Senate changes if you'll give us a distinct society. Then once we get into that, we get the ever-expanding collection of different proposals from different groups that demand to be brought in until eventually you create a great cancerous growth like the Charlottetown Accord, which included absolutely everything, and ultimately was unfinished by the time it went off to the voters and mercifully was defeated in that informal referendum we had. That's the great fear: that you start with Senate reform and end up effectively going through some kind of Meech Lake, Charlottetown-type process.
My argument effectively is it's a very good reason to avoid trying to use the seven and fifty formula at all costs. Anyway, that was my observation.
With regard to the electoral system, the proposal here is for a single transferrable vote system. It bears a great deal of resemblance to the one in Australia. It's a little bit different. There's no party-list voting option; you have to vote for individual candidates. But it seems to me that this--and I guess I'm asking if you agree with me--achieves the goal of permitting minority representation that is absent from our first-past-the-post system.
As someone who was elected in Ontario as a Canadian Alliance candidate in 2000, I had the experience of being one of two members of my party to be elected under our first-past-the-post system out of the 103 seats in Ontario. My party won 25% of the vote. The Liberals won 50% of the vote, only twice as much, but were rewarded with 100 seats. This goes to the heart of the problem with first past the post.
There's been much talk of the need for electoral reform in the lower house. It seems to me this system achieves that to some degree in the upper house, particularly in large provinces like Ontario and Quebec, less well in a smaller province like P.E.I., with only four senators. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a real move toward getting a variety of representatives from different parts of the political spectrum, different parts of society, for those larger provinces.
The question I had in this vein is because we are talking in this committee of looking at potential amendments to the proposed legislation, should any effort be made to try to ensure that the elections have as many senators elected at the same time as possible, or should they be staggered in some way, as they are, for example, in the U.S. and Australia?
Mr. Gibbins, I think sometimes some of the things we're talking about here may or may not be appropriate. I don't know if you are aware that the only way the Prime Minister could set up these elections without actually contravening the Constitution would be to do what he did, which was to suggest that after the elections he would use the list, from which he would draw appointments. In other words, he might or might not and would not necessarily. In fact he could not be bound by the elections, because he would immediately violate the Constitution.
So at the end of the day, we're talking here about semantics or something that is meaningless, because if you're going to have elections--which you're going to proceed to ignore, and which are going to cost an enormous amount of money in the first place--and then you may or may not listen to them, first and foremost you've subverted democracy. Secondly, you have created a set-up by stealth, as I think my NDP colleague said, in which you are trying to get an answer to something. You're involving Elections Canada. You are doing all of these things, and yet you're not going to listen to what the people say.
So that's the first question I have, because for me that is at the heart of what bothers me about this bill. It is a stealthy move. It is a move that, as one of our witnesses said, cannot be made legally, so you're trying to do it by the back door. That's the first thing.
Second is the fact that by doing this, the has actually ignored and disrespected the provinces to the extent that he has not seen fit to sit down first and discuss with them some things that are of fundamental importance, when provinces have weighed in on them and said personally how they feel about them. That is again something that doesn't sit well with the idea of trying to get good input, of trying to get something done here that will work, of making sure that even if not everyone is onside, we've made sure that we have at least done the respectful thing by talking to the people who are involved.
So the idea that you can ensure diversity through an electoral system when in truth you are not really looking at an election is a moot point.
But having said all that, I'm back to the diversity issue. You said that an election is a better way to achieve diversity than are appointments, and you said that it depends on the Prime Minister. Would it not be a wiser thing to suggest that in fact you amend in some way the way you elect the Senate, not by changing the Constitution but by suggesting that the Prime Minister must make a list of appointments that reflect the diversity of Canada--linguistic, regional, or whatever--and be bound by that so that you look at the kind of formula for that? Then as Canada changes, that formula shifts with it, so you make sure the appointments are done.
I know that Mr. Chrétien, when he appointed, did something we've never been able to do through elections: he managed to get almost 50% of the Senate to be women. And he has aboriginal people who were never in the Senate before. And he has visible minority groups who were not in the Senate before, and linguistic groups who were not in the Senate before.
I think you could do it by appointment if you really wanted to. So I want to put that to you.
First and foremost is the question of when is an election an election when it's not an election? Second is the point about the disrespect for the provinces. And third is the point about seeking diversity through appointment.
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The small step is that the Prime Minister will now, under Bill , accept advice from the people of the provinces rather than from his own conscience, advisers, or whatever. To my mind, that's a very fundamental change.
The difficulty, and I think an area where this committee may well have an important role to play, is getting through a transition period. As I mentioned, I can think of electoral systems that would work very well for a lot of the concerns that have been expressed in this room, but in the short term it will be incomplete and messy.
Quebec, incidentally, poses a particular problem, and probably not in a bad way, because Senate constituencies are specifically defined in the Constitution, whereas they are not for the other provinces. Within Alberta you could have an election for all six Alberta senators at once, but it's not clear to me how this would take place within Quebec, with constitutionally defined senatorial districts. So for Quebec there is some hard work to be done.
Bill also provides an important olive branch to the provinces, in that it proposes, if I read it correctly, that the elections would be held either at the same time as a federal election or at the same time as a provincial election. There are supporters of the triple-E movement in my province who are very adamant that the elections should be held at the same time as provincial elections. Personally, I think that's the wrong way to go, but I can see us moving forward where we retain some of that distinction, where some of the elections are held nationally and some are held provincially.
As we work through how to make this sensible and sellable within Quebec, there are a series of design issues that I think offer some flexibility.
The last point.... I'm so hesitant to use terms like “back door” or “change by stealth” and so on, because it makes it seem illegitimate in some way. Yet I look at what has been a stalemate on Senate reform, with no movement, and I think there is an opportunity for some creativity here, some imagination, some ability to sort of get this discussion going.
I've been talking about Senate reform issues for 35 years as an academic, and I would like to think that before my death there will be some modest movement. I like to think that within my children's lifetime there would be some modest movement, but I'm not sure about this. If the Senate were working well, I wouldn't care, but I don't think it is working well, and therefore I do care.
I'm sorry, that's a long answer to your question.
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They came very close on the free trade legislation, the GST, and others.
In the back of my mind is the danger of us getting into that confrontation with the existing Senate, because we have such different partisan distributions in the two houses. So I think there are some real risks.
If I were king for a day, I would like to have a House of Commons elected on the basis of representation by population, and get rid of some of the distortions we have right now as we try to accommodate regional representation within the House. It gets awkward. I would like to have a tie-breaking mechanism that gives additional weight to the House of Commons, because I think it reflects the most crystal-clear expression of the democratic will of the people. You want to get that right.
It requires a change from the status quo. People assume now that the Senate doesn't have power and legitimacy. It doesn't have legitimacy, but it does have power. I'd like to strengthen the legitimacy of the Senate but constrain its power. I think that can be done. There are mechanisms for doing so. I don't shy away entirely from the notion of deadlocks, confrontations, and so on, because democratic government tends to be messy. It's not clear-cut, but we have to sort those things out.
I come back to the responsibilities of this committee, as I see them. The questions that have been asked today that I have confronted seem to be extraordinarily important and thoughtful ones. These are not trivial matters that have been raised by people. I would hate to see the discussions shut down at this point by the committee, rather than pushing us—Canadians, the government of the day, whoever—to begin addressing those questions in a thoughtful fashion.
How you do that as a matter of parliamentary procedure is something I don't know. But rather than slamming on the brakes, I would prefer to raise those hard questions and try to think through a mechanism by which they can be answered. Because they are important questions, and Canadians would feel you were negligent in your own responsibilities if you went ahead pell-mell, without raising those questions and thinking through a mechanism by which we might be able to answer them. All those answers won't be found in itself.