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37th PARLIAMENT, 3rd SESSION

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

EVIDENCE

CONTENTS

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

1535

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.))

Mr. Marc Lortie (Assistant Deputy Minister (Americas), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade)

1540

The Chair

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski (Vice-President, Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency)

1545

1550

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.))

Commodore Jacques Gauvin (Chief of Staff J3, Department of National Defence)

1555

1600

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC)

Mr. Marc Lortie

1605

1610

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ)

Mr. Marc Lortie

1615

Ms. Francine Lalonde

Mr. Marc Lortie

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski

1620

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.)

Mr. Marc Lortie

1625

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

Mr. Marc Lortie

1630

Cmdre Jacques Gauvin

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP)

1635

Mr. Marc Lortie

1640

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski

1645

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC)

Mr. Marc Lortie

1650

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Raymond Simard (Saint Boniface, Lib.)

1655

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski

Mr. Raymond Simard

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.)

Mr. Marc Lortie

1700

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mrs. Diane Vermette (Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Division, Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Leo Adler (Director of National Affairs, Friends of the Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies)

1710

1715

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Stockwell Day

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Francine Lalonde

1720

Mr. Leo Adler

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.)

Mr. Leo Adler

1725

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Ms. Alexa McDonough

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin

1730

Mr. Raymond Simard

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

Mr. Leo Adler

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau)

CANADA

Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade

NUMBER 009

3rd SESSION

37th PARLIAMENT

EVIDENCE

Tuesday, March 30, 2004

[Recorded by Electronic Apparatus]

¹ (1535)

[English]

The Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.)): The orders of the day are pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), a study of the situation in Haiti.

We have as witnesses this afternoon,

[Translation]

from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Mr. Marc Lortie, Assistant Deputy Minister (Americas), and Mr. Christian Lapointe, Director, Caribbean and Central America Division.

[English]

From the Canadian International Development Agency we have Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski, vice-president of the Americas branch; and Madam Diane Vermette,

[Translation]

Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Division, Americas Branch.

[English]

We also have, from the Department of National Defence, Mr. Jacques Gauvin, Chief of Staff.

We're going to start with Mr. Marc Lortie.

[Translation]

You may begin, Mr. Lortie.

Mr. Marc Lortie (Assistant Deputy Minister (Americas), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I welcome the opportunity to meet with the members of your committee. Haiti is indeed the focus of much of our attention of late, as I'm sure it has been and continues to be the focus of your attention as well. I see that Ms. Marleau is present. She dealt with the Haiti situation for many years when she was the Minister responsible for CIDA.

I along with my colleagues will be making presentations and I will be giving you a summary. I realize, Mr. Chairman, that you have other commitments, so I would like my presentation to be consigned to the minutes of these proceedings. The situation is a concern of ours, and indeed has been for many years. At this time, I would like to give you a three-point summary of the actions taken by the Canadian government with respect to Haiti.

Ever since President Aristide came to power in May of 2000, we have worked closely with his government to ensure that political conditions are consistent with the country's new democratic regime. Democracy has long been the driving force behind the Canadian government's contribution in this country, particularly since the return of President Aristide in 1994. This was true in the late 1990s and later during presidential elections preceded by rather catastrophic legislative elections.

For three and a half years, we worked with other members of the international community, primarily with the Organization of American States, to ensure that political conditions were such that a culture of democracy would take root in Haiti.

Tensions have escalated since December 5 last. Unrest among university students caused political tension in the country to rise and this tension spilled over into the streets and elsewhere in Haiti, culminating with the departure of President Aristide last February 29.

The Canadian government's first concern was for the safety of Canadians. In the final days of the Aristide regime, we deployed Canadian soldiers to oversee the voluntary evacuation of Canadians from the country. Our focus then shifted to the United Nations. The departure of President Aristide led to the passage of a UN Security Council resolution, resolution 1529, establishing a provisional multilateral force in Haiti with a specific mandate to restore some stability to this nation.

Since then, we have been hard at work on the diplomatic front, along with our friends from CARICOM with whom we devised in late 2003 and early 2004 an action plan to establish certain necessary political conditions in Haiti. Our diplomatic efforts with other Caribbean nations continue. Last week, these nations held a summit meeting and seemed very reluctant to accept President Aristide's departure and to turn a new page in their relationship with Haiti.

At present, the Canadian government, along with other friendly Caribbean nations, is focusing its attention on diplomatic efforts.

A second specific area of concern involves the United Nations and the OAS. What steps must be taken, given the present circumstances, to ensure that the United Nations and the OAS play a clear, constructive and complementary role in Haiti?

The third issue—and my colleagues from CIDA can address the question in greater detail—is the international community's role in providing humanitarian aid and assisting with reconstruction efforts over the middle and long term.

Finally, in terms of re-establishing a Canadian presence in Haiti, this week, we sent back to the country Canadian diplomats who had been evacuated in late February. Their dependents returned to the country as well. Slowly, Canadian nationals are returning to their jobs in Haiti.

The political situation is tenuous at the present time. The country has an interim president, an interim prime minister and an interim government. It's something we must contend with on a day-to-day basis. Canada is committed, along with the international community, to working with this new government and to strengthening democracy in Haiti.

The Prime Minister has reiterated Canada's commitment to playing a leading role in Haiti and has met with members of Montreal's Haitian community. As some of you may have heard, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has also reiterated in the House of Commons on several occasions the Canadian government's commitment to this cause. Mr. Coderre, the Minister responsible for Francophone Affairs, also voiced Canada's support for the Francophone community and its efforts in the rebuilding of Haiti when former President Diouf was in Montreal.

The task ahead is a formidable one. However, the Government of Canada and its various departments are doubly determined to see that this time around, our efforts and investments produce positive, concrete results for the people of Haiti.

I'll conclude on that note. Perhaps I can provide additional details during the round of questions.

¹ (1540)

[English]

The Chair: Merci beaucoup.

Before I pass la parole to Mr. Rishchynski, I just want to inform the committee that I see a quorum. The clerk has just told me that this morning he sent an e-mail to all committee members to inform you that following our debate last Thursday on suicide bombers, Mr. Day contacted Mr. Leo Adler of the Simon Wiesenthal Center to ask him to address our committee. Mr. Adler is an international law expert on the question, and he will probably be available this afternoon at 5:15 to speak to our committee for 15 minutes at the end of this meeting. I just wanted to let you know and to see if everyone agreed on this.

Some hon. members: Agreed.

The Chair: Thank you.

Now, Mr. Rishchynski, please.

[Translation]

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski (Vice-President, Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, thank you for inviting us to share our experience and vision of Haiti with you. I would like to take this opportunity to outline the lessons Canadian cooperation has learned in Haiti, and the new strategic approach we have developed as a result of this assessment.

Moreover, the rapid succession of events in recent years has shown how well the proposed approach is suited to Haiti's present crisis situation. We have been able to respond fairly quickly to the needs of the people of Haiti and at the same time, to learn from our programming efforts first undertaken in Haiti in the late 1960s.

In 1994, Jean-Bertrand Aristide's return offered a glimmer of hope for the people of Haiti and the international community. The hope was that Haiti was finally entering a new era of democracy and that sustainable development would follow.

In response to the situation at that time, CIDA began by funding food aid programs and labour-intensive infrastructure building. Then, to support the return of constitutional rule, we supported initiatives aimed at democracy and good governance, especially through institution building of government mechanisms. Disappointing results in this sector, and the volatile political situation, prompted us to adopt selective programming of new initiatives. We also set up locally managed, decentralized funds to respond to opportunities and to manage risks better.

Between 1994 and 2002, Canada contributed $273 million: approximately $77 million for basic humanitarian aid, $62 million for human rights and governance initiatives, $72 million in support of locally managed initiatives and $7 million in support of private sector development.

However, in 2001-2002 Canada and several other donors found the going rough in Haiti because of the political situation in the country.

¹ (1545)

[English]

At that time in 2001-2002, Canada and other donors, including the World Bank, decided to re-evaluate their contribution in Haiti over the previous eight years since the return of constitutional government and President Aristide. The lessons learned from this eight-year period of work by the international community in Haiti in support of the constitutional order gave rise to approximately seven conclusions, which began to impact on long-term thinking here in Canada with respect to our programming in the country.

We recognized that a strategy for development cooperation in Haiti had to be based on a solid knowledge of the country's history and socio-political culture, because the reality, members of the committee, is that in 1994 we all thought that Haiti was entering into a democratic transition, while in fact the ongoing crisis in the country was deepening.

We recognized that for Canada's contribution in Haiti to be successful, it needed to be based on a whole government approach, working closely with colleagues from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, and also with members of the RCMP, the Office of the Solicitor General, and many other ministries in Canada that were involved in efforts towards development in Haiti.

We recognized that our contribution needed to be focused, but at the same time flexible enough to use all of the opportunities to support structural change in the country, because the donor community, Haitian civil society, and the Government of Haiti need to reach a consensus on a broad policy and governance framework to guide developmental interventions in Haiti if they are to be successful. Clearly, between 1994 and 2002, that consensus broke down.

It is also clear to us that in a country as difficult as Haiti, sustainable results can only be achieved over the very long term. Over such a long term, there is a great risk of mistakes and the risk of failure is indeed very high. We also recognize that the fundamental underpinning to development cooperation in Haiti is the need to create a strong institutional base over the long term, because in the absence of a strong institutional base, we demonstrated that results can really be only of a humanitarian nature.

This re-evaluation in 2001-2002 resulted in the development of a new strategic approach for Canada's contributions in Haiti, to guide our programming over the course of the next fifteen years. This new strategy was based on flexibility and dialogue, and on identifying advocates for change and alternative development, particularly with our partners in civil society, the private sector, and in levels of government. The strategy aimed to achieve short-term progress while at the same time building long-term capacity. This approach was an answer to a crisis situation where the priority was to limit negative effects and prevent the situation from deteriorating. In fact, the situation in Haiti was a crisis long before the events of the last three months.

In this sense, our programming in Haiti focused on maintaining what had been achieved—in a sense, damage control—and to invest in such achievements when they constituted change in terms of our medium- and longer-term development strategies.

We are also trying to work effectively on preventing and reducing tension among and within the opposing groups in Haiti, of which there are myriad, and also on supporting the emergence of a social consensus at every level, which includes supporting international mediation activities.

¹ (1550)

[Translation]

The events of recent months in Haiti allowed us to see that this approach could be adapted to the present crisis situation. First, because there is a solid network of local partners in the field, CIDA was able to keep its current projects going at the height of the crisis. We then built on the capacities and resources of our local funds to meet the needs of the people of Haiti.

Canada has been quick to respond to the crisis and it has already disbursed nearly $13 million to assist the people of Haiti.

[English]

We have contributed $1.9 million in humanitarian assistance directly from Canada, $5 million in contributions to humanitarian assistance to be delivered by United Nations organizations, $5 million to strengthen the special mission of the Organization of American States, and $1 million to the Francophonie international organization as a means of supporting democratic institutions in Haiti.

What is next?

[Translation]

Troops are now on site in Haiti to restore order, route humanitarian assistance and begin to disarm groups of all persuasions.

[English]

Support from the international community, including the Caribbean, to the reconstruction and long-term redevelopment of Haiti must also now begin in parallel.

In two weeks' time we will find ourselves with other members of the international community in Port-au-Prince to begin discussions with the Government of Haiti on the structure of international cooperation for stabilization and reconstruction. With our Haitian interlocutors we will among other things be focusing on the nature of the structure and the sequence of development assistance efforts to assist Haiti in moving forward.

In May the international community will undertake a detailed three-week needs assessment in Haiti to define the priorities of the short term for the next two years as well as the cost in potential resources available in response to those conditions, while at the same time beginning long-term planning for an engagement we anticipate will be greater than a decade in terms of meeting long-term Haitian needs.

Following this mission, which is expected to conclude at the end of May, sometime during the summer there is the possibility of an international conference on the reconstruction of Haiti that will bring forward the conclusion of these missions and have members of the international community sit in consideration of them and receive their pledges in supporting Haitian affairs.

[Translation]

I would like to emphasize that as far as the Canadian government is concerned, the two main components of our strategy in Haiti for the foreseeable future are the structure and sequence of activities that we wish to undertake with the help of the international community and Haitian authorities. We will be working very closely with the United Nations, the OAS and other stakeholders, in particular international financial institutions that have a very important role to play in Haiti.

[English]

We have a strategy for the long term, an engagement that will in all probability see us in Haiti for the next 10 to 20 years, with long-term development strategies to assist the Haitian people to establish the new national consensus necessary to underpin their development. It is a tall order. There will be setbacks, but we believe only through a concerted effort on a long-term basis by the international community will we be able to meet the needs of the Haitian people at this particular time and not fail them in such an hour of need.

Merci beaucoup.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau (Sudbury, Lib.)): Thank you, Mr. Rishchynski.

We will now hear from Commodore Jacques Gauvin from the Department of National Defence.

[English]

Commodore Jacques Gauvin (Chief of Staff J3, Department of National Defence): Bonjour. Good afternoon.

As indicated, I'm Commodore Jacques Gauvin. I am the Chief of Staff of Joint Operations at National Defence. As such, I am responsible for the planning and conduct of all Canadian Forces operations. It is my great pleasure to be here this afternoon to articulate for you the activities of the Canadian Forces over approximately the past month in Haiti.

Although the Department of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the safety and security of Canadian citizens abroad, including evacuation in crisis situations, the Canadian Forces maintain contingency plans in the event that military support is requested by DFA. In military jargon, these evacuations are referred to as non-combatant evacuation operations, or NEO.

The prolonged deterioration of public support for President Aristide since the failed elections in 2000 finally resulted in rebellion by Haiti's numerous armed factions and the seizure of the country's third-largest city, Gonaïves, on February 5.

As gangs began to terrorize local populations, the rebel forces quickly gained control of the northern and western portions of the country, and by February 18 rebel leaders began to threaten to enter Port-au-Prince to openly engage Aristide's security forces.

As is the case with most offshore crisis situations, emergency planners in both the Department of National Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs began monitoring the deteriorating situation very closely in early February. By mid-February the Department of Foreign Affairs had updated its travel advisories, and the embassy staff in Port-au-Prince were revising the consular contingency plan. Confirmation of the embassy's register of Canadians abroad indicated that there were as many as 896 persons in Haiti who would be entitled to be evacuated if required.

By this time, military planning staff were in regular contact with Emergency Services, the DFA organization responsible for planning evacuations. Emergency Services was advised by DND that options for assistance ranged from the conduct of a full-scale NEO to planning assistance for embassy staff and/or the provision of special forces to conduct reconnaissance, to provide close protection for the ambassador, or to provide increased security at the embassy itself.

¹ (1555)

[Translation]

On February 23, DFA, DND and the Ambassador agreed that it would be prudent if military planners were deployed to review the Consular Contingency Plan. This resulted in a five-person team being deployed on February 24.

On February 24, the situation in Port-au-Prince was assessed as dire and caused the OAS to invite an international intervention. In response to DFA indications that the requirement to conduct a NEO appeared imminent, DND issued a warning to the Air Force and the Second Battalion of the Royal Canadian Regiment in Gagetown, New Brunswick to be prepared to deploy.

On February 26, rebel forces in Haiti announced that they had infiltrated Port-au-Prince and were prepared to enter the city in force. After further consultation between DFA and the Embassy, DND anticipated an imminent NEO and responded with the deployment of a team of seven personnel who were to prepare the airport of Santa Domingo, Dominican Republic to serve as the evacuation site.

However, on February 28, after the Ambassador indicated that it would not be prudent for him to direct citizens to make the difficult and dangerous trip to the Port- au-Prince airport, it became apparent that the operation would have to be more deliberate. In essence, it would no longer be a NEO, but an evacuation assistance operation.

This change in concept required the generation of a force equipped to operate for a longer period and robust enough to operate beyond the airport perimeter. As a result, a robust security force was mobilized that same day and arrived in Port-au-Prince early on February 29.

[English]

The arrival of the two Canadian Forces aircraft and the security force on February 29 resulted in the evacuation of more than 300 citizens of various nations over the next four days. No other nation conducted evacuation operations.

In the interim, and as public statements by government officials in response to the evolving situation in Haiti increasingly indicated that the Canadian Forces were likely to be committed to the multinational interim force, DND planned for the deployment of a modest but capable and self-sustaining commitment.

To a large extent, the final composition of the 500-plus person contingent, a largely self-sustaining infantry company and a six-aircraft helicopter detachment, was based on an assessment of the resources the Canadian Forces were capable of generating, mitigated by the fact that the short deployment, under austere conditions, minimizes resource requirements, as well as the expressed expectations and needs of the multinational interim forces lead nation.

The actual deployment of the Canadian contribution was planned and conducted as follows. Commencing on March 5, warning was issued to the designated units. On March 7, the reconnaissance team deployed to conduct initial liaison within theatre forces. On March 9, the theatre activation team deployed to construct a basic camp, and they deployed with the advance elements of the land contribution. By March 17, the last elements of the infantry company and the command element arrived. On March 21, the task force declared itself operationally ready. Today, the last elements of the task force arrived in theatre.

The U.S.-led multinational interim force is currently comprised of approximately 500 Canadian troops, 1,720 American troops, 525 French troops, and 330 Chileans, for a total of over 3,100 troops.

The UN Security Council mandated the immediate deployment of a multinational interim force for a period of three months in order to maintain public safety and law and order, to promote and protect human rights, to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and the access of international humanitarian workers, and to facilitate the provision of international assistance to Haitian police forces and the coast guard.

The framework tasks that were assigned to the Canadian task force include: the conduct of patrols by day and night; the conduct of traffic control checkpoints; liaison assistance and joint patrolling with the Haitian police forces; assistance in the form of a safe and secure environment for NGOs delivering humanitarian aid; the provision of security to persons and property with designated status; and assistance in the disarming of belligerence in the form of coordinate search operations, checkpoints, roadblocks, and movement control.

º (1600)

[Translation]

Recognizing that the roots of Haiti's problems lie in the lack of good governance, poverty, corruption and the absence of Rule of Law, the UNSCR also declared the UN's intent to deploy a follow-on force that is expected to be comprised of police and civil/humanitarian agencies. The CF anticipated repatriating the Task Force in early June 2004.

In conclusion, although the CF commitment to Haiti was a significant challenge, it also represented several major successes for the Canadian Forces. These included the planning and execution of what essentially amounted to several different operations over a compressed time period. This highlighted the professionalism, flexibility and “can do” attitudes of the men, women and units of the Forces to respond to a crisis with little warning.

[English]

That completes my statement.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much.

We'll now go to questions and answers.

We'll start with Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day (Okanagan—Coquihalla, CPC): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I know that some of this may be subjective, but to help us, I have a situation where a democratic process was followed, a president was elected, there was a lot of concern about that, and finally, there was the evacuation, if we can call it that. Do you have any suggestions on what Canada could do at a certain point?

Of course, we've seen not one hundred percent similar but some mirror images of a similar situation in Taiwan. You have democracies, especially troubled ones, which may be getting the message that if the opposition creates enough turmoil, it could lead to a regime change assisted by other countries.

I'm speaking as an opposition member who likes to create turmoil, but I wouldn't expect that I could create so much that other countries would finally come in and relieve my Liberal colleagues of their seats.

Can you give us some reflection on this? Are there things that Canada should be careful of when they're involved in any way like this? Should we have been more aggressive?

Mr. Marc Lortie: It is a very important question you are raising in the context of the hemisphere. I will speak more about the Americas than about other parts of the world.

Haiti is a situation where, when you see a democratically elected leader such as President Aristide resigning after turmoil in the street, it is indeed a bad precedent and a preoccupation for the entire hemisphere. What have we done in the last four years to prevent such an attitude? It's not a new problem in the context of Haiti.

First of all, there were very strong messages emerging immediately at the time of the election of President Aristide. You will remember that President Aristide was contested as soon as he was elected because the opposition decided not to participate in his election. Therefore there was immediate tension in the political process four years ago.

What have we done to improve things? Well, the international community decided to constantly remind the Haitian government to create the conditions to restore a full-fledged democratic nature in Haiti. In Quebec City in April 2001, three years ago, the chair of the summit, the then Prime Minister, issued, on behalf of all the 34 countries of the hemisphere, a very firm statement to President Aristide that if he was not going to restore his society from within, the democratic nature of his regime was going to have a problem. It was a very severe message sent to him, a very freshly elected president.

We moved the agenda in the context of the OAS. The Organization of American States focused on Haiti in every single month for the last three and a half years. Two major resolutions, 806 and 822, were a pathway to help the Haitian government indeed to restore the confidence within Haitian society. Then the international community went there to try to convince civil society representatives, the opposition leaders, churches and church leaders, and President Aristide and the government to arrive at that solution. There was a democratic charter that the OAS, in the context of our relations with the hemisphere, negotiated between all the countries, which remains an important tool to promote democracy in the hemisphere. President Aristide refused to invoke the democratic charter, despite the fact that we invited the President to embrace the democratic charter. He refused to do it, and he always said, “If I do it, it will be a sign of weakness to my opposition leaders; therefore I will not do it”.

At the end of all those steps, to avoid bloodshed, as he said in his letter of resignation, he decided to quit; he decided to resign. It was on that basis that the UN Security Council acted on the night of the 24th.

Therefore, it is indeed a long process to promote and defend democracy. We have certain tools in our toolbox. We have international forums such as the OAS or the United Nations. We use those forums, including the Summit of the Americas. There is a plan of action to promote and defend the democratic nature in the hemisphere, but sometimes a political solution is just not achievable, and that is very sad.

Everybody in the international community is very sad about what happened. It has been a long-term investment, as my colleagues have said in their statements, for everybody to put Haiti on the road to democracy.

º (1605)

Therefore, it was very sad to witness what happened on February 29, 2004, because it was like going right back to where we were in 1994, and even, I would say, to where we were in 1990.

For the last 15 years there has been a tremendous effort, but despite that, I have to say we remain convinced that we have to draw lessons from the past and engage with our friends from Haiti, engage them on the road map for democracy on the island, which will also serve as an example for the rest of the hemisphere.

But your question is very much with us. It was a long answer. It is difficult, it is with us, but how do we prevent that?

I have to say, to conclude, that what you have mentioned in the case of Haiti we could have said the same vis-à-vis Bolivia, and that happened not too long ago. The nature of what is taking place at this very moment in Venezuela is problematic as well.

Therefore, how do we do it without imposing on a society an outside will? It's through instruments like the one we have built. I would say that President Aristide, in retrospect, would have been well advised to use the democratic charter, which is an agreed tool in our toolbox to promote democracy.

º (1610)

Mr. Stockwell Day: Thank you, Madam Chair, for the question. I'll let you move on.

I just might add for the record that I did appreciate getting information, especially in the unfolding days of this crisis, from the opposition point of view. In those times, if we can have questions answered without asking them publicly, it's very helpful. So I appreciated that.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde (Mercier, BQ): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you to all of the witnesses.

Last week, we welcomed to the committee representatives of Quebec NGOs who made some recommendations concerning priorities. Without wanting to take up too much time, I would like to emphasize that disarmament was identified as the top priority. Reference was made to the events of 1994 further to which no efforts were made to bring about disarmament or reintegration. It's well known that during the time leading up to Jean-Bertrand Aristide's departure, rebel units played a pivotal role. We all know what happened.

Establishing constitutional rule and restoring law and order to Haiti means involving judges and the courts. Mention has been made of identifying competent, honest individuals. I'm not sure how that could be done. Witnesses to the unrest have emphasized the importance of putting an end to the prevailing state of lawlessness.

They have also stressed that Canada should not become a haven for persons who have been convicted of crimes in Haiti and who may hold either Canadian citizenship or a Canadian visa. In essence, they talk about the need for justice. Another witness stressed the importance of achieving a consensus of sorts. I realize that people have many questions, but I'm interesting in getting your comments.

Mention was also made of the need to provide humanitarian aid in the form of medical supplies. Moreover, I was pleased to hear you talk about this and I'd like to hear more on the subject. As Kofi Annan noted as well, a long-term commitment in this area is critically important.

Later, I'd like to discuss the failure of the 24 OAS rounds. The same thing could happen elsewhere. From my perspective, the most pressing problem is to decide how we can help the people of Haiti right now and what steps we can take in this regard.

Mr. Marc Lortie: Thank you very much. I'll let my colleagues field the question about humanitarian aid, but I will respond to your query concerning disarmament. Disarmament is indeed a critical step in our quest to stabilize the situation in Haiti. The Security Council resolution authorizing the international force to intervene in Haiti makes no specific mention of disarmament. The subject is only referred to in very general terms.

º (1615)

Ms. Francine Lalonde: As one of the conditions for stability.

Mr. Marc Lortie: The resolution does not instruct the military, as part of its rules of engagement, to proceed with disarmament. The resolution in question was hastily drafted the early hours of February 29. However, the Security Council is slated to receive a first report from the international mission next week and disarmament has become a key consideration. On that score, we are on the same page as members of civil society who have stressed to this committee the importance of making a very clear commitment to disarmament . This subject will certainly need to be addressed at the next meeting of the Security Council where the focus will be on the establishment of a stabilization force, and hence, on disarmament.

One of the concerns that we have also expressed to the new authorities in Haiti is the need to punish the guilty parties. At the same time, we must be very careful not to advocate reconciliation either. The Canadian government has certainly understood this particular message.

On the subject of establishing constitutional rule, we are working with the international community to bring this about. Our efforts in this area are ongoing and together with the OAS, we can share the best ways of helping the Haitian government and Haitian institutions to build a strong constitutional state in the country.

We've stressed to our CARICOM friends that this is the one area in which they can work with us to make a difference.The democratic and legal traditions and rules of law embraced by our CARICOM friends are fundamentally important to Haiti and have a very important role to play at this juncture.

Lastly, we must avoid a situation where Canada, our country, becomes a haven, even a temporary one, for Haitian criminals. Very great care is taken to ensure that such individuals are not allowed in Canada. For example, a few weeks ago, there was an incident in Toronto where the Chief of Security of former President Aristide attempted to enter the country and was detained. He subsequently decided to go to the United States. So, Canada is exercising great vigilance in this area.

Finally, on the question of humanitarian aid, I'll let my colleague Mr. Rishchynski comment further. Let me just say, however, that with respect to humanitarian aid, Canada is working with the entire community of donor countries as well as with international institutions like the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other health and food organizations, such as the World Food Program, to ensure that not only is a humanitarian crisis averted, but that a long-term program is developed as well.

Mr. Rishchynski.

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski: Just to add to what you said, you're quite right that disarmament is a fundamental priority if we are to achieve security and development. Without security, development is virtually impossible. For example, at this point in time in Haiti, armed convoys are needed to deliver humanitarian aid and food from Port-au-Prince to Gonaïves and Cap-Haitien. Security is a fundamental requirement if we are to establish an improved aid distribution network.

At CIDA, humanitarian aid flows from two sources: first, through multilateral channels, that is through our UN colleagues working on site who have the necessary resources to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid on a large scale. Canada relies on a local funds locally managed by our embassy and on a network of partners comprised mostly of Quebec NGOs working on site directly with the people of Haiti. We support these efforts on an ongoing daily basis with a view to ensuring that health care and food aid is delivered directly to needy Haitians.

In view of the needs identified for NGOs and the structures and sequence of future activities, we at CIDA hope that following the talks scheduled for Port-au-Prince from April 14 to 16, we will be able to sit down with NGO representatives in Canada in late April to discuss the situation and get their views before we undertake the needs assessment process in the first week of May.

As for establishing constitutional rule, this is a fundamental objective. Quite frankly, Haiti is today a lawless nation. During the unrest, the prisons were emptied and police officers abandoned their posts. We will need to proceed with extreme caution and patience. Because 15 years of work have been wiped out, we will need to start over again and take steps to establish a constitutional state that can truly function. During the 1990s, Canada trained many police officers and spent a considerable amount of money on the training of law enforcement officers. However, there is an important lesson to be learned from this. If ultimately the justice system fails, if the prison system fails, any investment in this area will be lost, as will any positive results over the medium and long term.

We are very mindful of this reality and I can assure you today that CIDA will be working closely with Canadian NGOS in Haiti. They have the expertise and knowledge to understand the needs and day-to-day reality of the people of Haiti. I hope that our programs and those of the international community will address these needs effectively.

º (1620)

[English]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Mr. Macklin.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin (Northumberland, Lib.): Thank you very much.

I would like to get clarification about the role of CARICOM in this process. The only time I've actually heard CARICOM mentioned has been in a negative way toward the removal of Aristide. I would like to get some sense of CARICOM's role in that area. Do they have a positive role to play in the process we're engaged in at the moment?

Mr. Marc Lortie: The short answer is yes. On the role played by CARICOM--and if you have detected a negative tone in my remarks on CARICOM, I'm very sorry--CARICOM was key and is key in trying to find a political solution in Haiti.

Why was it key? First of all, Haiti is the most recent member of CARICOM. All the 15 islands of the Caribbean are together and they are planning basically, under CARICOM, their economic integration, their economic growth, but on the basis of a democratic regime in CARICOM. Therefore, CARICOM, given the challenge it was facing in Haiti, decided to develop a plan of action to relaunch the democratic process in Haiti. And we attended CARICOM's meetings, at its invitation, at the end of 2003 and in 2004. The Prime Minister met with all the leaders of CARICOM when he was in Monterrey, Mexico, on January 12 of this year and he gave his engagement that Canada was going to accompany them.

CARICOM sent its foreign ministers to Port-au-Prince. It invited the leaders of the opposition to Nassau. It invited President Aristide to come to Kingston, Jamaica, and they developed, together, a plan of action to move forward: the creation of a tripartite council, the creation of a wise persons' committee, the appointment of a coalition government. All those ideas that you see today taking place emerged from the CARICOM plan. But CARICOM reacted very negatively when President Aristide left and resigned because this was not its plan. Its plan was to ensure that it would be able to accompany--like the rest of us--the President in relaunching, and it did not work. Therefore it is very unhappy about the fact that that did not work.

It had a special summit this past weekend in St. Kitts. The members all met together for 12 hours, with only the leaders together discussing the situation. They did not like what happened, and they are still waiting until their session on July 4 to see how CARICOM is going to re-engage in Haitian solutions.

In the meantime, Haiti remains a member of CARICOM but was not invited to the special summit in St. Kitts.

Prime Minister Patterson of Jamaica is travelling to Canada next week. We are going to engage with him. He is the leader. He has been given the mandate by the other countries.

Why CARICOM is essential is that, first of all, some of them speak Creole. Haiti is a full member of the organization, and they don't want to have a situation in their region that is going to create a major migration problem. This is the case in the Bahamas. This is the case in Jamaica and other small islands in the region. The boat people leaving Haiti because of a difficult, unstable situation tend to go to those islands and create a problem in their regions. Therefore, we are convinced that CARICOM has to play a central role in the reconstruction of Haiti.

º (1625)

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: Thank you.

Is there any time left?

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Yes, you have about four minutes left.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: I'd like to go to another area. When one looks at the situation in the concept of a post mortem, we spent a great deal of time and effort, as was mentioned, in creating a police force and training a police force. That was seen at least as a means of stabilization within the country with the enforcement of law and the maintenance of order, and yet under the circumstances that developed here, the word that was given to us through the media was that in fact the police abandoned their posts and left their facilities because they were not trained in any way to deal with this type of civil disobedience. Did we miss the mark in terms of our goal in training the police? Can you give us some sense of whether that should be an area that we examine for future redevelopment?

Mr. Marc Lortie: I think it is a fundamental point to study very closely what we did last time--we did not do it alone--with the rest of the members of the international community in terms of training the police. It was a major effort and it yielded some results.

Unfortunately, in the institution per se--because don't forget that our police left Haiti in the year 2000, four years ago. The Haitian National Police had a problem with the leadership of the police. It was one of the conditions right from the start from the international community in the OAS that indeed at the level of the director of the police, we did not have confidence that he was able to bring an honest police force to Haiti. In 2001, and it was repeated in 2002...there was a new leadership in 2003 and a new leadership in 2004; therefore there was a constant change at the top of the Haitian National Police. That is one lesson to be learned.

The second is the type of pay the police have, the type of training, the type of equipment, the type of rules of engagement as such. There was a major deterioration in the activities and the actions of the police. They felt they would not be able to confront the rebels in the last six to eight months of the Aristide regime and they left the force. At one point we had 7,000 police officers in Haiti. Today it is fewer than 1,000. We need to regroup. We need to draw the lessons. We need to engage them.

But having said that, when they were trained here in Canada our police officers were saying, yes, there are some very good elements, but they need to be encouraged. If suddenly you have corruption at the top in the police directorship, that is a major problem for engaging the rule of law and to ensure that indeed there is no impunity, that the police are able to accomplish their work. But it is crucial in re-engaging in the stabilization of Haiti that we draw on the lessons of the past on this very important question.

My colleague may wish to add something.

º (1630)

Cmdre Jacques Gauvin: I would simply add that it's not clear to me exactly what the date was, but it was about 10 years ago that in fact the Haitian armed forces were disbanded and the army was dispersed. There were very many disaffected members in that army obviously, many of whom form the elements of the gangs and the criminal elements that now run rampant through Haiti.

Therefore, the forces that the police are there to try to deal with are in fact former members of the military, who were obviously trained to a certain degree and equipped to deal at a military level with certain situations. I think that as these gangs grew in size and in prestige, if you want, it may have had an impact on the psyche of the police in terms of their ability to actually be able to stand up to them.

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski: Perhaps to add one point, an issue we have not raised with you, but I think is a fact of life in Haiti that impacts on the whole issue of security and policing, is that the drug trade in Haiti is extremely active in terms of financing the armed gangs and the purchase of arms.

When our police worked in Haiti, I think to a man and woman they thought they were making a contribution, and in fact what they saw was the politicization of candidates being selected and the manipulation of those who were entering the police force. The decision to leave in 2001 was an extremely difficult one. We did it with great concern about what was being left behind and the nature of the investment that had been made.

But we simply could not continue to operate in that environment in the absence, as Monsieur Lortie has pointed out, of command and control at the top that was working in the best interests of Haiti and trying to root out corruption and linkages to drug trafficking and other issues that were out there. It just became an impossible task, and it was with great regret that the program was wound down.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. McDonough.

Ms. Alexa McDonough (Halifax, NDP): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I have three things I'd like to ask for some further expansion or discussion about. One is that it was acknowledged that this is a really difficult precedent. It seems quite clear that relations are very strained with CARICOM at this point...that Jamaican President Patterson is coming to Canada.

I wonder if I could just ask you to talk a little bit further about that in terms of how we're going to rebuild any kind of trust, because it seems quite clear that while we're all concerned, they're much more immediately affected by the situation there. Certainly, Jamaica does not appear to be speaking on its own or for its own sake, but on behalf of CARICOM. I wonder if you could comment on that a little bit, whether that in fact is the case.

Secondly, in the testimony of the NGOs who appeared last week, which I assume you had some opportunity to read or be aware of, it was quite startling to myself—perhaps because I'm not nearly as knowledgeable of the situation—to hear the assertion made that not only were senior officials in Aristide's government involved quite possibly in drug trafficking, and needing to be prosecuted, but also that Aristide himself may in fact have been implicated directly. I had not heard that assertion made, and I wonder if you could comment further on that.

The third thing is a more general question. There's been a common theme here of needing to learn the lessons of the past, but I, for one, am having a really hard time picturing exactly what the application of those lessons are that are now going to lead us to a new place. It just sounds like utter chaos to me. I'm not seeing clearly what it is.

I know there was a bit of discussion last week. I know Mr. Clark spoke very much about the need for a really major consensus-building exercise, which is easy to talk about but not so easy to bring about. I wonder if you could talk a little bit further about that.

º (1635)

Mr. Marc Lortie: On your first point, indeed it is a sad situation and a difficult precedent, and it should not be a precedent. It is a sui generis case in Haiti.

The relationship with CARICOM is one to which we attach a lot of importance. The Prime Minister has been engaged with the CARICOM leaders on almost a non-stop basis since January. Minister Graham has also been in constant contact, especially with the three foreign ministers who have been extremely active on the Haitian file: Minister Fred Mitchell of the Bahamas, Minister K.D. Knight of Jamaica; and Minister Gift of Trinidad and Tobago, who have played a useful role. I have to add also External Affairs Minister Julian Hunte from St. Lucia, who is currently president of the United Nations General Assembly and who is also very involved in the file. We are talking at the level of foreign ministers almost on a daily basis to plan the steps forward, to exchange views, and to see how we can be helpful.

CARICOM is not represented in Port-au-Prince. They had one ambassador, the ambassador of the Bahamas, who left the last week of February and has yet to return. Therefore, the Bahamas would like us to look after their interests. Indeed, we have taken this role on board, especially to inform some of the CARICOM countries about what is taking place at this moment, the type of dialogue we have with the new authorities, and so on and so forth. We will continue this effort to engage CARICOM and especially to ensure that they re-engage themselves in the reconstruction of Haiti. This is absolutely fundamental.

On the question of the NGOs and the drug trafficking, when we say that things are related in the hemisphere, all the drug trafficking starts from Colombia. They always find a market somewhere, especially un port d'entreé. The drug traffickers are trying the weak regimes, the failing states, in the region. I will not name any countries, but Haiti was quickly identified, not in the 1980s but in the second part of the 1990s, after 1995, as a good place for drug trafficking. What did it do? It amplified the state of a failing state, and it brought the corruption of customs officers, police officers, judges, and the society. At the same time that we were trying to reinforce the democratic nature of some institutions, you had this competing force, with a lot of money arriving and corrupting. This is a reality we're also facing in other places in the hemisphere because of the major drug trafficking craze starting in the forests of Colombia.

With regard to the entourage of President Aristide and the President himself, there were some trials of some individuals in U.S. courts during which the President and people around him were named. Having said that, I have never had evidence that the President was involved in such trafficking. Therefore, I will limit my comments there. Those accusations had been floating around in various milieus in Port-au-Prince and Haiti, but it's always difficult to have the proof until justice has rendered a judgment on that.

º (1640)

Lessons of the past? Well, lessons of the past are very much on our minds, not only vis-à-vis Haiti but vis-à-vis various other situations. We are working with people who have been involved in Kosovo, people who have been involved in other situations, people who have been involved in East Timor and trying to restore democratic governance. Lessons of the past must guide our actions of today. It is in that spirit that we have entered our discussions with the other donor communities, the other international institutions. Were there any mistakes we made in the past that should not be repeated?

But it goes both ways, and I would say on that that we need a little luck. Under President Aristide we did not have any luck. At the same time as we were moving along, the corrupt practices really spoiled the very weak institutions we were trying to bring up.

Thank you.

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski: If I could just add from the perspective of development cooperation, clearly I think the lessons learned since 1994, in our meeting last week in Washington with other donors and the international financial institutions, have sobered all of us.

When Mr. Aristide returned to power in 1994, the international community invested, in the first couple of years of his administration, in excess of $600 million in development assistance. We perhaps could have coordinated much better, created a much better and more viable structure to manage that cooperation, but frankly, there was a dispersal of effort across many sectors, across many parts of the country, that at the end lacked the central cohesion necessary, and perhaps most importantly, the full engagement and cooperation of the Haitian authorities, given the environment existing in the country, to allow that to succeed.

The two words that keep coming back over and over again as we look at where we go from here are “structure” and “sequence”. We have to get a structure right, and someone has to be in charge locally in terms of coordinating international efforts, working closely with the Haitian interim government in respect of the plans of action that are developed. That's why we are going to Port-au-Prince for this initial consultation with the government, to try to establish the terms of reference and parameters of what that looks like.

Subsequent to that is sequence. Clearly, in the short term, the key issue we must address is the humanitarian question--the issues of everyday life, of health, water, sanitation, education. All these things have to be foremost in our planning, and we have to take our time in designing the appropriate kinds of structures as to how we're going to work in the justice sector, in the correctional sector, and with the police. That might not happen right away, because we will have to do things brick by brick in terms of creating a structure that is not only viable but about which the Haitians are in agreement with us and to which other members of the international community are prepared to respond on a long-term basis.

The issue of Haiti fatigue was a real one in the international community by the end of the 1990s. As the situation began to disassemble itself politically, a lot of donors either got out or simply reduced their levels of financing in the country to the point that the money that had been put in in 1994 seemed like an entirely different situation. We must have that long-term commitment of the community of 10 to 20 years at least, and probably longer, if this is going to really work.

We have to have a comprehensive approach of dealing with issues of financial viability of Haiti with respect to its relationship with international financial institutions, because only the Inter-American Development Bank is currently active in Haiti. The World Bank must come back. We must find ways of helping Haiti deal with issues of arrears that it has with respect to debt. It has to be a comprehensive approach.

It's going to take a while to get this organized, hence this long-term needs assessment that will be done through the month of May, and then the engagement of the international community after they've had a chance to digest that to see where we go from here, who is going to do what, and how we are going to coordinate our efforts to ensure that we're not duplicating and in essence falling all over each other, which at times has happened in Haiti in the past.

º (1645)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Mr. Clark.

Right Hon. Joe Clark (Calgary Centre, PC): Thank you very much, Madam Chair.

The more we hear about this, the more aware we become of just how complex it is, and there are unquestionably abundant reasons for caution and probably for pessimism as we go forward. I couldn't help but thinking, as Mr. Rishchynski was speaking, that one of the dilemmas here is that national sovereignty entails a veto. So if the Haitian authorities, whatever their legitimacy, do not go along, that can undercut what is done.

That's really what I want to pursue.

Marc Lortie raised the issue in answer to Mr. Day's question, I thought, in a very interesting way. He said the question was, how do we deal with these fundamental issues--and I hope I'm quoting him correctly--without imposing on a society an outside will?

That's the issue, and that's an issue here and we've dealt with it before.

There has been reference in this committee hearing and elsewhere to East Timor. The Prime Minister in the debate referred, I thought, positively to some of the elements involved in the East Timor situation.

In Bosnia it's worth remembering that international organizations were able to transfer some of the government functions in a way that was set out in the Dayton Accords. Now, it took the Dayton Accords and it took the various and quite unique processes that led to that, but do we reject outright the idea of something like an East Timor approach or a Dayton Accords approach? Should we be looking at some equivalence? Is the government looking at some equivalence?

One of the questions that of course faces Canada is, if we do that, who is Dayton? We're probably Dayton in the circumstances. So this is not a casual suggestion that we can put forward without a full examination of its consequences. We have to ask ourselves this in that context. Is Haiti now, particularly with the drug trade and other implications, less serious or less dangerous than Bosnia was at the time of the Dayton Accords? Does it require some kind of extraordinary effort?

I fully understand and applaud the degree to which Canada and other countries are mobilizing the normal responses. There are needs assessments. There are meetings of the kind talked about at Port-au-Prince. The question is whether a normal response will work. It hasn't worked in the past.

The other question is whether there's an abnormal response that will work. I don't know that, but I'd be interested in knowing whether that is being seriously examined and whether it is the considered assessment of officials that this, for various reasons, is just not a time to try to undertake an initiative of that kind in this hemisphere, in a pre-election period in the United States, which is a reality one can't dismiss or ignore.

I'd welcome comments on the question of the possibility or need of some extraordinary action.

Mr. Marc Lortie: Well, the situation, Mr. Clark, in Haiti is very different from the other example you use. Fortunately, we're not facing ethnic cleansing, we're not facing a genocide, and we're not facing a very tragic turmoil, where civilians are being killed and where we have to intervene. This situation is fragile on security grounds, but it is not as tragic as the other situation. That is number one.

Haiti has been an independent country for 200 years, celebrating this year the bicentennial of Haiti, the oldest democracy in our hemisphere. Therefore, in terms of institutions, it could not be compared--and I hate to make a comparison--to East Timor, which never had those traditions and never had such institutions.

We have a tradition of governing in Haiti. We liked it or we didn't like it. It was a dictatorship for too long, but it was an independent country that had 200 years of tradition and a country with leaders as brilliant as leaders that we had in Canada, in the United States, or in other places.

Therefore, how could we do it? We're trying to deal with those questions that you have put on the table. You have not used the words, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, but if the international community should think, à la Dayton, about trusteeship and move forward, well, the answer on that is we believe it will not work.

We need to bring about a political solution. I have to say that we were very close to a political solution in Haiti.

We had 18 more months of President Aristide. President Aristide was not planning to stay longer than November 2005. That was the end of his mandate. Suddenly it was moving forward and it was derailed.

We have to ensure that we're putting back on the rail what we have put together.

We need a little luck on that, but we also need leadership, Mr. Clark. We need leadership that will emerge from Haiti itself. It could be Mr. Latortue, belonging to the diaspora. Perhaps he will inspire other members of the diaspora to go back. Some people will go back and the international community will accompany them, but the fact that Haiti has been a country for 200 years, I think, is a very important factor.

You mention the elections in the United States. I would say it is a factor. It is very important. Florida is key in those elections, and that is next door to Haiti.

I read with a lot of interest last week a piece by Governor Bush of Florida about the importance for the United States and the international community to help out Haiti in the circumstances, notwithstanding the elections, because they also have a large Haitian community in Florida and it is important.

Therefore, it is, I believe, an important message emerging from the Governor of Florida, and there is a strong disposition in the United States to remain engaged in it. Are we going to need, at one point, an important meeting where all the leaders and the ministers from the region, including the Haitian ministers, meet and design a game plan? I would say yes.

º (1650)

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): I would like to go to Mr. Simard.

Mr. Raymond Simard (Saint Boniface, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Welcome, guests.

CIDA has an excellent reputation around the world for developing government structures, for institution building and capacity building. I'm assuming since 1994 that must have been one of our priorities there, given the frailty of the election and the whole system.

I'm wondering if Aristide was one of the major roadblocks. I'm assuming again that we probably didn't have a lot of success in governance building. I want to know if Aristide was one of the major roadblocks to this lack of success and I'd like to know how we plan on acting in governance building now to obtain different results.

Secondly, we talk about the reconstruction of Haiti. I'm wondering if we're starting basically from ground zero or whether there are structures in place and people in place that we can build on.

º (1655)

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski: Both questions are interrelated, and if I could, I'd like to treat them as an ensemble, as it were. You're correct that governance was a main feature of our programming. In fact, between 1994 and 2002, about 27% of our total expenditure was directed in areas of governance.

I would say that more than an individual being a blockage, the lack of political consensus in the country was the blockage point--the fact that you could not have divergent points of view at the table to deal with issues of the rule of law. They became hostage to a particular political frame of mind of one side or the other, making it impossible to build a consensus so that the work we were doing and the institutions we were trying to support really were functioning in the country. There was an attempt inevitably to try to dominate institutions for the personal or almost group need of one over another, and it made it extremely difficult. The election situation was extremely complicated because the opposition chose not to participate, both presidentially and legislatively.

I would say to you, in response to your second question, that there is hope in Haiti. There are an enormous number of people who we work with and that partners in the NGO community work with who are really dedicated and committed, but they are also scared to death. They're scared to death of coming forward because of the violence, because of the gangs. If you create an environment where they feel secure enough to be able to assert themselves, they will react in a fashion consistent with moving things in a different kind of direction.

For me, the most instructive point of the troubles over the course of the last two months was to watch the situation that developed in the town of Jackmel, in the southern part of Haiti. Jackmel is the only city in Haiti that has electricity 24 hours a day, seven days a week, thanks in large part to projects done with CIDA financing and Canadian engineering. When the troubles began and looting could have begun in that town, the community itself came forward and put the gangs on notice that they would not tolerate--and this is a town of 40,000 people--the destruction of something that worked. That demonstrates to me, and I think to all of us in CIDA, that there are people there who will come forward. The diaspora can also be a major player in that respect.

So it is not without hope, but in the absence of a structure where people feel they are protected from the kind of gross violence that Haiti has been subjected to for so long, they will remain underground and simply continue in an act of survival, which I would argue for the majority of the eight million Haitians today is the way they view their life: simply as an act of survival. If that does not change, then we will fail. But if we are able to inculcate a culture that is somehow different, that gives people hope again, that their society has a chance, then I think over the long term there is the possibility of success. Will it be easy? Boy, this is as tough as it gets, I think.

Mr. Clark has raised some of the very, very fundamental issues we need to address. Hence, I think this is why the international community is moving very soberly, very patiently, and I think step by step before we create something and a level of expectation that perhaps can't be met because we haven't done the front-end work to prepare the ground adequately.

Mr. Raymond Simard: Thank you.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau):

Ms. Redman.

Mrs. Karen Redman (Kitchener Centre, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

I really appreciate the perspective you've brought to this whole issue. I actually have two questions. The first one may seem somewhat simplistic, but what are the natural strengths of the people in Haiti? Clearly it seems like a country that's gone terribly wrong. Are there natural strengths there that we haven't identified in this conversation?

Mr. Marc Lortie: Well, they have a lot of natural strengths. I don't know if you've ever had the opportunity to go Port-au-Prince or to any cities in Haiti, but you will find a people extremely engaged in trying to find a proper way to develop their society: economically, politically, and socially. It is a country where as foreigners, when we deal with the Haitians, be it in all the international forums, in la Francophonie or in the United Nations or the OAS, we always relate very easily to the Haitians. When you travel there you will see the contribution of the Haitian community in Canada. Therefore, yes, there are a lot of strengths.

We need to reinforce their education system, to give them a chance to embark on education, and because of that I remain optimistic for the future.

» (1700)

Mr. Guillermo Rishchynski: I would add, Madam, that from our perspective there are two characteristics of the Haitians that stand out in the work we do in development. One is their creativity; Haitians are the artists of the Caribbean, the poets. They are extremely engaging with respect to the arts and the application of creativity in a pretty difficult environment. They are also a nation of entrepreneurs; that's how they survive. The remittances from the diaspora communities in Canada and the United States that go back to Haitian communities in Haiti are really the money that allows people to go into small businesses on street corners and eke out an existence that is more than just marginal.

One of the things we've noted in the education sector, for example, is the insistence by parents in Haiti that their kids go to school. This is a country where the literacy rate is around 50%. I think there is a recognition on the part of Haitian parents that education is the only way for their children to be in a different place perhaps from what determinism might have dictated.

There are an enormous number of energies and talents that can be tapped, and I think the Haitian community abroad is really a key dimension in this because it is so large. Just in Canada it's about 125,000; in the United States, in places like Miami, New York, and Boston, there are very significant communities. Many of these people, given a set of circumstances in Haiti that are workable, would seek to engage and try to do what they could to move things forward.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much.

I'm going to use the prerogative of the chair ask a question no one has asked yet. It has to do with the importance of agriculture. What can you do to help facilitate that livelihood? I believe, from the figures I've seen, about 60% to 70% of the population survives on agriculture.

Mrs. Diane Vermette (Director, Haiti, Cuba and Dominican Republic Division, Americas Branch, Canadian International Development Agency): Thank you, Madam.

We are involved in agriculture, mainly through an approach of local, rural development.

[Translation]

We are working in three regions of the country. We combine our efforts in the fields of environmental protection and agriculture and ultimately, this affords the people an opportunity to earn an income. A single action produces three-fold results. Our efforts are in keeping with our means and we work a great deal with the European Union and the UNDP in this area, particularly in very remote regions that are home to the poorest of the poor.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much for your presentation.

[English]

I want to thank you for the time you've taken to come and speak to us on this very important issue.

We wish you well, especially CIDA, in your work there. I have to believe that some of the good work that has been done there remains, and when things become more stable we will benefit from a lot of that past good work. Thank you.

Before the members leave, I'll remind you that we have an invited guest, Mr. Leo Adler, director of national affairs, Friends of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, who will be addressing the committee for the last 15 minutes.

We will take a few minutes' break; I don't want us to lose the committee before the next important guest speaks.

» (1704)

» (1707)

Mr. Leo Adler (Director of National Affairs, Friends of the Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies): Thank you.

I'd like to thank the members. This certainly puts the lie to any notion that politicians finish at 5 o'clock, and I thank you. I also want to thank you even for the 15 minutes; it helps me focus in.

Let me start with something that may be obvious but I think has to be said. It is that suicide bombings influence societies--and by “societies”, I mean societies around the world--in many ways. They instill fear in nations that are accustomed to openness and freedom. They influence elections without these people ever voting or participating in the electoral politics. They provoke and promote death, mayhem, and sorrow where there was life, order, and joy. They create cultures of violence and death within their supporters and their home territories, thereby dooming any hope for democracy, peace, and normalcy for generations. They affect every aspect of our daily lives even though we cannot see them or even know they are actually present among us until it's too late.

In my submission, suicide bombers span the globe, yet their legal status remains somewhat of an enigma as it is not yet comprehensively and specifically recognized in law. Canada has a unique opportunity to lead the way in seeing to it that the full spotlight of world condemnation, international renunciation, and universal prosecution falls upon those who espouse, condone, assist, recruit, encourage, finance, train, arm, transport, or in any way promote suicide bombings or suicide bombers and that this spotlight is cast without equivocation, without doubt, and without exception.

The goal is to see to it that those who are in any way involved in suicide bombings are left with no legal escape route. I am not a legal draftsman, but I am, when I don't do the work for the Simon Wiesenthal Center, a criminal defence lawyer. As such, I can tell you I know how legislative vagueness, drafting uncertainties, and interpretation difficulties can lead to acquittals for those who are without a doubt guilty.

The reason we look to Canada for leadership is precisely because this country has come a long way in enacting laws that reflect Canada's revulsion for acts of terror and terrorism in general, legislation that is strong and necessary yet conforms with our Charter of Rights and Freedoms and emerging international standards. However, there is room for improvement in order to tighten the noose around suicide bombers and the whole of the suicide bombing industry. That is why we're asking that suicide bombing be made a specific crime within Canada's laws. That is also why we are requesting that Canada lead the way internationally for a similar specificity.

As an aside, I have to tell you there is currently an online petition that is unrelated to our efforts, by a group called Scholars for Peace in the Middle East and led by Dr. Edward Beck, for the UN to do precisely what we are proposing. I have materials in my computer I'll be forwarding to the clerk that will be going out to you, members of the committee. Some of them include the remarks of Anne McLellan, and I say this without being political, because what she said about the need to always assess, re-evaluate, and amend our laws still stands. Her remarks to that effect in October of 2001, about the need for new laws to deal with the new reality of terrorism and Canada's obligation, stand.

There is in existence the UN International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which was adopted in 1997. There are, however, possible difficulties with certain of those articles. There is, for example, no mention of suicide bombing. The whole thrust of that convention is to deal with the person who transports, places, and otherwise deals with the explosive. The insinuation is clear that this person is a terrorist bomber in what I can call the old-fashioned way: you place a bomb and then you leave. It doesn't specifically deal with suicide bombing.

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In addition, the UN does have an ongoing global program that acknowledges the need to always upgrade and strengthen laws and legislative language. Canada needs to lead that way.

The International Criminal Court, under article 7, talks about a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts. In other words, it has to be more than one. Crime against humanity is defined under that code as any act “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population”. Under that definition, unfortunately, it would exclude the suicide bombing and those who were involved in the suicide bombing that killed the Canadian soldier in Afghanistan, because it is one act; it is not multiple acts.

Similarly, while Canada's current legislation--whether it be the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, the Anti-Terrorism Act, or our own Criminal Code--ties our laws specifically to the International Criminal Court and to international standards of what is currently a crime against humanity, and that can lead to misinterpretations and vagueness.

Human Rights Watch, in a report entitled Erased In A Moment: Suicide Bombing Attacks Against Israeli Civilians, especially chapter IV, which deals with legal standards, also deals with suicide bombing and describes it as a crime against humanity and a war crime, but only in terms of it being an ongoing pattern, targeting civilians.

I don't have to tell this committee the difficulties that can occur in interpretation of what is ongoing, what is a pattern, what is a civilian. For that matter, under Canadian law, simply to take an example, if you commit a double murder--that is, two murders--it is considered as one occurrence. It is not considered a pattern. That's the way Canadian courts have defined the word “occurrence”, which appears in the Criminal Code.

It is for that reason--to take away any type of defence to that end--that we need the specificity of a suicide bombing, not linking it to any type of ongoing pattern.

You undoubtedly have many questions, and I would be delighted to respond at any time, either orally or in writing. But let me deal quickly with three other possible questions or issues.

First, are there any other jurisdictions that are doing what we are proposing? The answer, quite frankly, is that I'm not certain, but we have taken our campaign literally around the world. The Pope has been spoken to. The head of the European Union has been spoken to. Turkish foreign officials have been spoken to. Even the head of the Sudan has been spoken to.

There are many nations that see this as an issue, that see this as a country that has to be dealt with. Someone has to lead the way. I suggest that Canada is in the best position.

Would this language that I propose, namely specificity, enhance the ability to prosecute? Absolutely. Those of you who have had any dealings with criminal law know the difficulties in dealing not so much with the person who committed the offence, who in this case would be dead and not available for prosecution, but the problems of parties and conspiracies. By specifying this crime, by specifying that it can be committed in any way--financing, promoting, encouraging, recruiting, supplying, etc.--you avoid these difficulties.

What effect will this have on the international scene? The answer is clarity and leadership, and a very clear statement of denunciation on the part of the world community.

The important point is to not leave suicide bombing within the catch-all phrase of “terrorism” or even “terrorist bombing”.

I thank you, and I might point out that if you ever wish to see a human face to suicide bombing, I would be more than pleased to convene a meeting of survivors and of the families of victims who didn't survive suicide bombing.

I appreciate the timeframe.

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The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): I think we'll open it up to very short questions and answers. If we could get at least one turn around it would be helpful, and we don't have much time.

Mr. Day.

Mr. Stockwell Day: I'll just thank Mr. Adler for coming. It was mainly other colleagues who had questions, so I'm going to pass the time to them.

[Translation]

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. Lalonde.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thank you for clarifying that national and international laws do not contain specific provisions about suicide bombings as such.

I've read a little on the subject. I'm not an expert like you, but when the members of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs take a stand on an issue, there are political repercussions. We are not legal experts intent on furthering international law. Of course we want international law to evolve, just as we want the same for our national laws. However, at present, suicide bombings occur within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I realize that such bombings occur elsewhere too, but for now, I'll confine my remarks to this particular conflict. The fact that Palestinians accepts this type of horrific death and crime is an indication that the process has failed.

What can we do to reduce the number of such incidents? We can focus on conflict resolution. By adopting the stand that you're advocating, that is by denying this reality, without directly confronting these acts that violate international law and conventions—witness the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—we would not be doing anything to reduce the number of suicide bombings. As I see it, the Foreign Affairs Committee must adopt a balanced position.

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[English]

Mr. Leo Adler: Thank you Madam.

The balanced approach this committee wants to take is a balance between terror and non-terror. It is absolutely clear that any and every conflict should be resolved and ought to be resolved, and if it can be resolved it ought be resolved around a conference table such as this.

But we're not talking about one specific conflict here. We're talking about a worldwide epidemic. Whether it takes place in Russia, in Europe, in New York, wherever it takes place, it is an act of terror that is so specific, that creates a type of fear around the world, that it cannot be linked to only one particular conflict.

So with great respect, I think the efforts to deal with the conflict, whether it be in the Middle East between Israel and Palestine, in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Russia--all of those efforts obviously are important, but this is a specific type of crime, and I might point out that there are numerous other specific crimes that are part of international law that have arisen out of conflicts.

It is precisely this that creates international law, because--forgetting about who is more at fault or less at fault; that's not important--we see something that arises out of that milieu that is a crime that spreads around the world and that the international community has to deal with.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Mr. Adler, can I turn to one of my colleagues who has a question as well? I'd like to ask Mr. McTeague.

Let's try to keep the questions short and the answers shorter.

Hon. Dan McTeague (Pickering—Ajax—Uxbridge, Lib.): Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mr. Adler, thank you for being here, and I'll try to be as brief as I can.

I guess my concern very much reflects the issue or imbroglio raised by Ms. Lalonde on the subject of the international regime supporting a position that would have us believe that there are different or variant forms of terrorism. In Canada, of course, we experienced one of the greatest acts of terrorism with Air India. It's not the kind of suicide bombing that has been aptly described in your presentation.

I'm wondering how a committee, let alone a country, can grapple with the notion that suicide bombers kill themselves and therefore that we go after the individuals who are around them. The international regime, I believe, does support this as a consequence, that we go after those who fund this and are responsible for this. Perhaps to varying degrees it is not as successful as one would want it to be, but how do you get around the dilemma of the moral equivalency of one act of terrorism being suicidal versus other forms of terrorism?

Mr. Leo Adler: There is no getting around moral terrorism. Terrorism and bombing terrorism, as it was called, and as it's currently called, is a crime; it's an international crime. What we're seeking is simply to plug in the loophole that is there, to include suicide bombing, because suicide bombing isn't covered in quite the precise way it should be. What we're seeking is to clarify that, because of its impact and the way it just decimates societies. This is not to take away from any other forms of terrorism, which are already on the books as being international. This is simply to plug....

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The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Ms. McDonough had her hand up, and then we'll go to.... What I'd like is for colleagues to ask their questions and for you to wrap it up. That way, everybody will get their questions in and you'll be able to answer.

We'll start with Ms. McDonough, and then we'll go on to Mr. Macklin and Mr. Simard. I think those are the three who have questions at this point.

Ms. Alexa McDonough: First of all, I thank Mr. Adler for his very precise comments, and I would say at the outset that suicide bombing simply has to be condemned as an utterly perverse, heinous, hideous crime. It is one that is worthy of condemnation, for sure, and for that reason I welcome the all-party initiative to speak out with one voice about needing to do that.

I have to say, however, that perhaps even more as a result of your presentation than might otherwise have been the case, I think various questions have arisen that we need to have some further clear understanding of, to ensure that we know exactly what the implications are of what wording is selected and of what process we're talking about. I just say this because, as you probably know, the international human rights subcommittee of this committee is not functioning at the moment, and I think they ought to have the opportunity to speak about this in a knowledgeable way.

There are two committees to which this general proposition has been directed. One is this committee and the other is the justice committee. From your discussion about the importance of legal precision and the importance of understanding exactly the implications of what we're doing, it seems to me, or I would just suggest to this committee, that we ought to look at having a joint session, if not a joint undertaking, with the justice committee to really talk in that kind of detail, with the deeper understanding of exactly what the implications are of what we're doing, before we formally commit to an action.

I think it was significant that you mentioned that everybody from the Pope to the European Union to the head of Sudan, for example, has been spoken to. I think it indicates how broad the concern is. I know you invited us to consider the human face of suicide bombing, and I have to say that I've done that in Israel and Palestine, where one can't even begin to imagine the agonies involved among survivors, or for that matter the unbelievable human despair that would ever cause someone to be exploited in such a way as to engage in such an act.

But I think because there are very specific legal implications, and legal language or legal precision needed in terms of our understanding of what we're doing, it seems to me we should consider having some kind of further joint consideration with the justice committee of exactly what the implications are.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you, Ms. McDonough.

We will now go to Mr. Macklin and then Mr. Simard, before we go back to Mr. Adler.

Mr. Macklin.

Mr. Paul Harold Macklin: Thank you very much.

I have just taken a few moments to glance at the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, and it appears that our Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act uses that at least as a basis for going forward in terms of creating this concept of crimes against humanity.

As I look at both the Rome Statute and our act, it appears that the basic crime that one is trying to deal with here is murder. I guess if I follow your thought process in this, you're concerned not about the fact that murder is committed against a civilian population, but that it is the add-on according to customary international law or conventional international law that you find problematic. To me, murder is murder, no matter how I execute that process.

So if that's the question, can you help me understand what it is we would need to bring forward to deal with changing customary international law? To me that sounds like a rather massive enterprise for us to approach, but I'd like to get some concept as to how we would go forward with that.

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Mr. Raymond Simard: Yes, very quickly, this may be a technical question, Mr. Adler. If we identify an act as a crime against humanity, does this provide us with different or stronger legal powers to prosecute the people who are connected to it, the people who have financed it and all that, or is it basically the same as any other murder?

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Mr. Adler, you now have the last word.

Mr. Leo Adler: Thank you very much.

Let me begin by saying what we're looking for here is more a statement of principle. I'm not the draftsman. I'm not the legislator. So it's a matter of principle to be propounded both domestically and internationally.

Second, with international law and the interpretation you deal with, the problem is, the way the ICC deals with it, suicide bombing has to be part of a widespread or systematic pattern. The problem is if you have one act and it's outside Canada, because we're linked to the international definition, the person who is outside Canada may not be able to be prosecuted, especially if he's in a country that we don't have extradition with. It leads to complications.

This really deals with the third issue as well, but if we simply define it, if we categorize it in all the ways in which it can be done, you have the genesis of a crime that you cannot escape with through any type of machination. Furthermore, obviously if you redefine it within Canada, if you catch the perpetrator inside Canada, it makes no difference what the international law is because we can prosecute them as murderers over here.

So it's more for the purpose of a Canadian who is outside of Canada. How do we prosecute if it otherwise doesn't fall within section 7?

Thank you for the last word.

The Vice-Chair (Hon. Diane Marleau): Thank you very much.

The meeting is adjourned.