Skip to main content
Start of content;


CHAPTER 3 - ENTRENCHING CIRCUMPOLAR INTERNATIONALISM: MAKING THE ARCTIC COUNCIL WORK


Canadians have been accused of living North and looking South. The foundation of the Arctic Council will, I hope, make Canadians look North, and realize, to the North, we belong to a region: the circumpolar region. . . . Let us, through the Arctic Council, affirm and implement our commitment to act as members of this circumpolar community.
The Hon. Lloyd Axworthy,
Address at the Inauguration of the Arctic Council,
Ottawa,19 September 1996

Context, Genesis and Establishment

As indicated in Chapter One, international cooperation within the Arctic region is not a new phenomenon. Historically, however, its scope has been narrow. Groups of Arctic states may have established particular arrangements among themselves, and states occasionally reached bilateral or multilateral agreements on Arctic matters for specific limited purposes (for example the 1973 pact for the conservation of polar bears). But there seemed to be no real possibility of having a permanent institutional mechanism for international political cooperation linking the circumpolar countries as a whole. Mikhail Gorbachev's 1987 call for pan-Arctic peaceful cooperation was therefore a revolutionary watershed which broke the ice in that regard. The Cold War's demise produced a wave of new interest in international organizations contributing to common Arctic aims (see Box 3). Above all, it revived long dormant Canadian hopes for a region-wide organization of all Arctic countries. The proposal for an international council made up of the eight Arctic states was officially advanced by Canada during a visit by Prime Minister Mulroney to northern Russia in 1989. The substance of the idea had actually come from Canadian Arctic policy advocates rather than from Government, and indeed in the next several years most of the work of fleshing out the features of such an organization was done by veteran nongovernmental activists and northern specialists (see the chronology outlined in Box 4). Also in 1989, a Finnish initiative led more concretely to consultations among the eight Arctic countries on circumpolar environmental cooperation. A conference in Rovaniemi in 1991 produced a consensus declaration among the eight and inaugurated a continuing process under the aegis of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS). Thus begun an incipient, if still rather limited, new stage of international Arctic activity conducted on a circumpolar basis.

Whereas the Nordic-led "Rovaniemi process" was able to establish itself and outline an agenda early on, the more ambitious Arctic Council proposal associated with Canada ran into obstacles and eventually languished, even though a draft declaration was drawn up in May 1993. These preliminary multilateral consultations had also established that, as in the AEPS, there would be a significant role for Arctic aboriginal peoples' organizations, and seemed to have overcome the Nordic countries' caveats about the Canadian designs for such a body based on the grounds that they did not want it to compete with the AEPS. The real stumbling block was U.S. resistance and lack of interest.56 Until that was overcome the Council's existence remained academic.

During 1994, a renewed push to revive the faltering initiative within Canada (notably from those associated with the nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel urging the new Liberal Government to act on its Arctic policy promises) coincided with an important review of U.S. Arctic policy by the new Clinton-Gore administration which signalled a more positive engagement with sustainable development issues and in international Arctic forums. In late 1994, Canada appointed Mary Simon, a leading aboriginal NGO advocate of the Council, to be the country's first Ambassador for Circumpolar Affairs. A few months later, at the Chrétien-Clinton summit in February 1995, it was announced that the U.S. would participate in formal negotiations towards creating the Council. Following initial discussions led by Ambassador Simon, Canada produced a detailed draft document in May 1995, to which the U.S. responded with its own discussion paper.57 At this stage a number of the elements of the Council were already apparent: it would build on but go beyond the AEPS to pursue and coordinate a broad range of sustainable development and cooperation objectives; it would have the eight Arctic states as founding voting members but would also grant "permanent participant" status to the three major indigenous peoples' organizations58 similarly recognized within the AEPS process; it would be a modest, consensus-based body established through a political declaration rather than a legally binding charter.


Box 3 - "The Growth of International Organizations with Arctic Concerns"

The Arctic Council established in 1996 is unique in terms of the broad political mandate given to it by the eight Arctic states and which includes the incorporation of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), a looser and more limited arrangement that is the only other fully circumpolar intergovernmental institution in existence to date. There are nevertheless, especially since 1989, a growing number of other bodies of an international nature addressing Arctic issues, which are relevant to Canadian interests in circumpolar cooperation. Some of these are nongovernmental and focussed on a particular set of issues (e.g. the International Union for Circumpolar Health). Others have been created by the region's indigenous peoples. At least one aims at promoting practical cooperation among regional governments below the national level. Several involve multilateral arrangements among some Arctic, and also in several cases non-Arctic, states. As Oran Young advised the Committee, the work of implementing the Arctic Council's mandate should consciously take into account activities related to Arctic cooperation already underway through these various channels. While these are referred to as appropriate at different points through the rest of this report, the following provides a brief initial guide to the range of organizational actors currently operating within the international Arctic arena.

Bodies relevant to Arctic cooperation established before 1989:

  • The Nordic Council - Established in 1952 to promote dialogue and joint action on regional issues, the Council brings together representatives from the parliaments and governments (an executive Nordic Council of Ministers was added in 1971) of the five Nordic states - Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Finland - and the three associated "home-rule" territories of Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Aaland Islands. There are several levels of membership, including observer status for the indigenous Saami peoples of Fenno-Scandinavia. The Council was not established for the purposes of Arctic cooperation. In recent years, however, it has become active in elaborating Nordic positions on Euro-Arctic interests at the multilateral level. The Council has also been instrumental in supporting the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (see below).

  • The Saami Council - The first transboundary organization of Arctic native peoples was established in 1952 to link the Saami minorities in the three Scandinavian countries. Russian Saami were only able to joint this body after 1989.

  • The Inuit Circumpolar Conference - Inaugurated in Barrow, Alaska, in 1977, the ICC built a common front among Inuit from Alaska, Canada and Greenland, particularly around resource development and self-determination issues. Russian Inuit were not able to attend until 1989 and only became full members in 1992. Canadians have been leaders in the evolution of the ICC movement and in its leading advocacy of sustainable development initiatives and the Arctic Council, in which both it and the Saami Council have now become founding "permanent participants."

  • The International Union for Circumpolar Health (IUCH) - Founded at a 1981 symposium in Denmark, the IUCH is a formal NGO with a secretariat based at the University of Alaska in Anchorage that works closely with the International Arctic Science Committee, the ICC, the AEPS Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program, and global bodies such as the World Health Organization and the International Council of Scientific Unions. The primary organizational members are the Canadian and American Societies for Circumpolar Health, the Nordic Council for Arctic Medical Research, and the Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences. In addition, there are a number of affiliated members, and a commitment has been made to ensure substantial aboriginal involvement from all circumpolar countries. The IUCH has many ongoing working groups and holds major triennial congresses, the last in May 1996.

    Bodies engaged in international Arctic cooperation and established since 1989:1

  • The Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.) - Founded in 1990 and constituted under its current name in 1993, the Association now represents over 30 of Russia's "small peoples." The Association is not strictly speaking an international body but it has achieved international recognition and a commensurate role as the third of the indigenous peoples' organizations to become founding "permanent participants" in the Arctic Council.

  • The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) - Founded in August 1990, the Committee is a nongovernmental organization made up of the representatives from national science organizations in the eight Arctic states and eight other countries with longstanding interests in Arctic research. While the IASC has quasi-official affiliations (e.g. the Canadian Polar Commission represents Canada), its members do not act on behalf of governments. However, this type of body should be distinguished from voluntary NGOs, such as the World Wildlife Fund, which are active in international Arctic advocacy and supporting research.

  • The Northern Forum - Following up a Northern Regions Conference held in Anchorage in 1990, the Forum was formally established in November 1991 to promote useful exchanges among subnational governments in these regions on issues of mutual interest (e.g. northern technologies, socio-economic development). The membership is expected to grow beyond the present 20, which includes 11 regional governments in Russia where the 1997 annual meeting will again be held. The Forum is at present both less and more than circumpolar: the Northwest Territories, northern Quebec, Labrador, and Greenland are not members; whereas there are members from China, Mongolia, Japan, and Korea is also a national observer.

  • The North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO) - Created under the terms of an agreement signed in April 1992, this is a mechanism which has been created by the participating governments - Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, with Canada, Russia, and Japan as observers - in order to promote the sustainable utilization of living marine resources and also to be a counterweight to certain actions by the International Whaling Commission. Its Arctic relevance to Canada relates to issues of sustainable renewable resource harvesting, especially by indigenous peoples.

  • The Council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Region (BEAR) - Created in January 1993 at a conference in Kirkenes, Norway, the Council brings together the five Nordic countries, the European Union and Russia with the overarching aim of helping to reintegrate Russia within Europe, and specifically to work on common environmental and sustainable development challenges in the Barents sea area. Canada and the U.S. are among several observer countries to this process. The last ministerial conference was hosted by Russia in Petrozavodsk in November 1996 while the Committee was in Russia. Sweden has since assumed the duties of chair. A significant innovation of the Council is that below the interstate level, it provides for a second-tier regional council which includes representation from seven high northern countries in Fenno-Scandinavia and Russia as well as from the region's indigenous populations.

  • The Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR) - Created following the first plenary conference of Arctic parliamentarians in Reykjavik, Iceland, in August 1993, the Committee began its activities as an organizing body in September 1994 with secretariat support which has continued since that time from the Nordic Council. The Committee includes representatives from the Nordic region, the other Arctic countries, the European Parliament, and from the ICC and Saami parliaments. Canadians participated actively in the first conference, and Canada hosted the second such gathering in Yellowknife in March 1996. The next is to be held in Russia in 1998.


    Box 4 - "The Arctic Council: From Idea to Inauguration"

  • 1944 - The idea of having a pan-Arctic regional arrangement is first broached by the United States Vice-President. The onset of the Cold War freezes any further consideration for decades.

  • 1970 - In the context of the Manhattan incident, the perceived threats to Canada's Arctic sovereignty and from marine pollution, law professor Maxwell Cohen proposes the creation of an "Arctic Basin Council."

  • 1987 - The idea of political cooperation among Arctic governments is promoted in a seminal paper on scientific cooperation co-authored by Canadian Fred Roots. Subsequently Gorbachev's famous Murmansk "Arctic zone of peace" speech breaks the geopolitical ice.

  • 1988 - The idea for an Arctic-region council is revived and fleshed out in an influential report, The North and Canada's International Relations, by the Working Group of the National Capital Branch of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs (CIIA) and the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee (CARC).

  • 1989 - Prime Minister Brian Mulroney embraces the concept and advances it abroad, declaring in a November address at the Arctic and Antarctic Institute in Leningrad(St. Petersburg): "And why not a council of Arctic countries eventually coming into existence to coordinate and promote cooperation among them?"

  • 1990 - An independent Arctic Council Panel, supported by the Gordon Foundation and co-chaired by Franklyn Griffiths and Rosemarie Kuptana (other members were then ICC president Mary Simon, John Amagoalik, Bill Erasmus, Cinday Gilday, Stephen Hazell, and John Lamb) began work developing the proposal and submitted a preliminary report to the Government which responded positively. Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark affirmed in November that: "Canada is willing to host a small secretariat for this Council and contribute to sustaining it from the outset."

  • 1991 - Encouraged by that the Panel completed its work. The comprehensive final result, To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report, was also published in the summer issue of the CARC periodical Northern Perspectives. The landmark study included a set of basic principles of pan-Arctic cooperation, founding articles of a council, and recommendations to both aboriginal peoples and the Canadian Government. Among the latter were for Canada to use the June 1991 Rovaniemi ministerial meeting (which led to the AEPS) to "seek convocation of a plenary preparatory conference, with direct aboriginal and other northern participation" and to "consider seeking an Arctic Council comprised of ten delegations representing the Arctic states, aboriginal peoples, and territorial governments. . .". The Council's agenda and decisions should be determined by consensus but "without prohibition of any matter judged to be of international arctic significance." Also in 1991, a CIIA working group on the Arctic environment reinforced the panel's case and attached to its report a proposal developed by law professor Donat Pharand for a "Draft Arctic Treaty" as the constitution for an Arctic Regional Council. 1

  • 1993 - The Canadian proposals had lost intergovernmental momentum despite this promising work. The Mulroney government's pursuit of the initiative was lukewarm. The U.S. was opposed and had decreed security issues to be off-limits. The Nordic countries were concentrating instead on the AEPS. However, with the election of the Chrétien Government there was a renewed Canadian commitment. The new Clinton administration also launched a major review of U.S. Arctic policy indicating receptivity to a broad non-military and multilateralist agenda of Arctic cooperation.

  • 1994 - Ministers Ouellet and Irwin announced at an April conference on northern foreign policy the Government's intention to appoint an ambassador for circumpolar affairs. Mary Simon, a member of the earlier Arctic Council Panel, was named to the new post in October. The initiative had been relaunched.

  • 1995 - At the February Chrétien-Clinton Summit in Ottawa, the U.S. finally agreed to take part in negotiations towards establishing an Arctic council. A detailed working paper elaborating the Canadian position was prepared within the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Indian Affairs and Northern Development. Ambassador Simon led Canadian efforts as negotiations began in earnest among senior Arctic officials from the eight prospective member states.

  • 1996 - Despite strong international political reinforcement from the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences, negotiations became bogged down and drawn out, notably over the nature of aboriginal representation in the council and the scope of its sustainable development mandate. Compromises were made and agreement finally reached in August on a the wording of a draft political declaration. On 19 September, representatives of the eight Arctic member states and the three aboriginal permanent participants formally signed the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council at an inauguration ceremony in Ottawa. Canada assumed the position of first chair and host of the Arctic Council secretariat located in Ottawa.

  • 1997 - Senior Arctic officials met again in March to prepare for the June ministerial conference of the AEPS, which under the terms of the Declaration is to be incorporated within the Council. However, concerns are raised about sustaining momentum so that the Council becomes fully operational and able to move forward on a substantial work program during the period of Canada's chairmanship.


    Despite this headstart, negotiations among the eight countries' Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) were protracted. The major Arctic meetings held in Yellowknife and Inuvik in March 1996 helped to sustain the momentum. Sticking points remained, however, notably over the inclusion of environmental protection and sustainable development goals within the Council's mission, and over the criteria for broadening aboriginal representation beyond the original three permanent participant organizations. (This was the focus of a northern aboriginal consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa in mid-April.) Following Ambassador Simon's appearance before the Committee on 30 April 1996, there were two further negotiating sessions of SAOs in Ottawa, in June and again on 5-6 August 1996, when the text of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council was finalized for ministerial approval. The Declaration was not made public until the signing ceremony and formal inauguration in Ottawa on 19 September 1996 (for the complete text, see Box 5), as announced by Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy on 14 August 1996. However, a "backgrounder" released by the Government stated in summary that:

    The Council, which will operate on the basis of consensus of its members, will meet at the ministerial level biannually. The Chair and the Secretariat of the Council will rotate concurrently every two years among the eight Arctic states, beginning with Canada in 1996. The main activities of the Council will focus on the existing programs established under the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and a new sustainable development program dealing with economic, social and cultural issues.
    The Ottawa location for the founding conference and headquarters of the secretariat until 1998 could give rise to a problem of perception. While this location may appear the most logical and practical for conducting international diplomacy, the Committee was repeatedly told in its travels in the Canadian Arctic that the Council should not be another "southern-based" institution. Two NWT communities, Inuvik in the West and Iqaluit (the future Nunavut capital) in the East, made strong pitches to serve as the site of the Council. Inuvik's Aurora Research Institute went so far as to prepare a formal proposal to the Government outlining its case to "play a substantial role in Canada's hosting of the Arctic Council." As its director confidently told the Committee: "Collectively, we have the research and international development experience to take on the responsibility of coordinating Arctic Council affairs from our headquarters here in Inuvik." The Inuvik proposal received support from several aboriginal organizations in the region as well as other Arctic research centres. The Gwich'in Renewable Resource Board argued that: "We do not need another southern-based organization with a northern issues mandate." The director of the Calgary-based Arctic Institute of North America agreed that: "A northern location will guarantee closer contact with northern realities, and further raise the profile of indigenous northern organizations in the national policy process."


    Box 5 - "Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council"

    The representatives of the Governments of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the Arctic States) meeting in Ottawa;

    Affirming our commitment to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Arctic, including recognition of the special relationship and unique contributions to the Arctic of indigenous people and their communities;

    Affirming our commitment to sustainable development in the Arctic region, including economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being;

    Affirming concurrently our commitment to the protection of the Arctic environment, including the health of Arctic ecosystems, maintenance of biodiversity in the Arctic region and conservation and sustainable use of natural resources;

    Recognizing the contributions of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy to these commitments;

    Recognizing the traditional knowledge of the indigenous people of the Arctic and their communities and taking note of its importance and that of Arctic science and research to the collective understanding of the circumpolar Arctic;

    Desiring further to provide a means for promoting cooperative activities to address Arctic issues requiring circumpolar cooperation, and to ensure full consultation with and the full involvement of indigenous people and their communities and other inhabitants of the Arctic in such activities;

    Recognizing the valuable contribution and support of the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, Saami Council, and the Association of the Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia, and the Far East of the Russian Federation in the development of the Arctic Council;

    Desiring to provide for regular intergovernmental consideration of and consultation on Arctic issues.

    The Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the Saami Council and the Association of Indigenous Minorites of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation are Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council. Permanent participation equally is open to other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples2 with majority Arctic indigenous constituency, representing:

    The determination that such an organization has met this criterion is to be made by decision of the Council. The number of Permanent Participants should at any time be less than the number of members.

    The category of Permanent Participation is created to provide for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council.

    Therefore, we, the undersigned representatives of our respective Governments, recognizing the Arctic Council's political significance and intending to promote its results, have signed this Declaration.

    Signed by the representatives of the Arctic States in Ottawa, this 19th day of September 1996.


    The counter to these arguments is that the Council must be cost-efficient (for example by benefiting from existing services within federal departments DFAIT, DIAND, and Environment) and able to operate effectively as an international organization made up of nation-states (for example through access to other capitals). Local rivalries (Inuvik versus Iqaluit) also complicate the case for an Arctic location. Nor will northerners' sense of grievance and suspicion of southern power centres be overcome simply through the symbolism of the site of a small secretariat.59 Nonetheless, it will be particularly important for Canada, during the two years of its chairmanship of the Council, to affirm the role of Arctic Canadians in its work and establish meaningful communications between the Ottawa headquarters and our northern communities. The Aurora institute's director complained that northerners had had very little contact to date with the Circumpolar Ambassador. With the negotiations phase completed, Ambassador Simon, as the senior Canadian official responsible for coordination and liaison with the Council, will need to reach out to these communities as much as possible to make them feel included in the process.

    The announcement that the Nunavut Secretariat office, which opened in Iqaluit on 30 November 1996, will house a "branch office" of the Arctic Council Secretariat is a positive step. We agree with Minister Axworthy's observation that: "Canada's work on the Council will benefit by its visibility in the Canadian Arctic."60 While the intent has been signalled, a concerted effort will be needed to accomplish it. It is important that residents in all parts of the Canadian Arctic begin to feel more "plugged in" to the Arctic Council process. Consultations should be pursued with northern governments and aboriginal organizations as to the most cost-effective way of achieving this, perhaps using other federal administrative offices in key territorial centres - e.g. Whitehorse for the Yukon, Inuvik and Yellowknife for the NWT, and Kuujjuaq for Nunavik (northern Quebec).

    Canada must also beware of being prematurely satisfied with the mere fact of the Council's inauguration. Along with general support, international as well as domestic, for the idea of the Council, the Committee also heard some incisive criticisms. Oran Young noted that the 19 September Declaration "contains very few, if any, substantive commitments on the part of the signatories to take concrete action" [40:3]. He also expressed disappointment at what he saw as the quite narrow and conservative, top-down nature of the organization, compared to the functional flexibility of European regional bodies, for example. Dr. Young wondered whether there might be something to the scepticism with which foreign ministries viewed the Council as a way to recapture some of the action on Arctic issues which has been generated by the AEPS process. There is a real danger that the Council will be driven and dominated by calculations of interstate diplomacy rather than grounded in Arctic realities:

    Although there is this provision for permanent participants, were I sitting in a small community in the Arctic and looking at this initiative, I'd be quite concerned, frankly, as to whether this initiative was going to be responsive or sensitive to the kinds of concerns uppermost in my mind. (. . .) A question in my mind is whether or not this Arctic Council process will be so dominated by foreign ministries with poor connections or relatively little experience in dealing with grassroots people that they will end up somewhat disenfranchised. [40:11, 17]
    Yet since the Council represents an opportunity that is "simply too good to be missed . . . we have to take this rather limited, cautious, conservative first step and really do something with it. Here, of course, is where Canada's role is likely to loom very large as the first chair of the council" [40:4].

    The extent of the challenge was indicated by the views of other international witnesses. Canada will have to manoeuvre very skillfully during the coming months when tackling a number of unsettled issues (for example, adding to the number of aboriginal permanent participants, observer roles, rules of procedure, integration of the AEPS within Council structures, and the nature of a sustainable development program). The United States may be a lukewarm joiner and lagging in its support for the AEPS, but clearly it can use its power to try to constrain and shape the agenda and process to its liking; Canada will have to work cooperatively to overcome this. Russian representatives will be looking for signs of material assistance to help them deal with their huge Arctic problems but funding commitments remain uncertain. Nordic country representatives have expressed concern that the Council should carefully carve out a useful niche that does not take anything away from their existing strong Arctic environmental initiatives. Norway in particular is sensitive as current chair of the AEPS process (due to be incorporated within that of the Council at the next ministerial meeting in June 1997 - see next section and Chapter Five).

    During meetings held at the Scott Polar Research Institute at Cambridge University,David Scrivener of Keele University (and Secretary of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Northern Waters and Arctic Study Group) offered a penetrating and frank perspective on what the Council founders face in this critical post-establishment period. He argued that there are still many tensions left over from some very difficult final negotiations last year, and that "intensive care" is required to bring the hopes for the Council to fruition in the transitional phase that Arctic cooperation has now entered. It remains an open question whether the Arctic Council will be able to add significant value to the work of existing circumpolar bodies such as the AEPS. As yet it is an empty vessel with no agreed program or working groups. David Scrivener advised that Canada should reassure Norway and others that it sees the Council structures as building organically on the forms of international cooperation that are already working reasonably well, and will not seek to reinvent them. If not, in his arresting phrase, the Council risks not being a "one-stop shop," but a "one-more stop shop" with little impact.

    In short, Canada's early leadership on Arctic Council consolidation faces at least a two-fold challenge. Domestically, it must stress that this is not just a matter for a few people operating through privileged foreign affairs channels, but is meant to engage public concerns, especially those of Canadians living in the Arctic. Multilaterally, it is equally important to emphasize that this is not just a Canadian-sponsored initiative, but one that is meant to enhance international partnerships in the circumpolar concerns shared by the peoples of all member countries.

    In light of these challenges:

    Mandate

    The nongovernmental Arctic Council Panel's seminal framework report of 1991 declared that: "the ultimate mandate of an Arctic council should be to make the circumpolar region a domain of enhanced civility - an area in which aboriginal peoples enjoy their full rights, and where the governments that speak for southern majorities accord progressively greater respect to the natural environment, to one another, and, in particular, to aboriginal peoples."61 This report put forward "principles of pan-Arctic cooperation" that were ambitiously comprehensive in scope - including longstanding demilitarization and common security objectives, with which we will deal in the next chapter. In the interest of consensus and U.S. acceptance, the contentious security elements have been withdrawn from subsequent versions of the Council's mandate. The Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council includes a caveat that in tackling common Arctic issues "the Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security" (emphasis added). The restrictiveness of this formulation is open to interpretation. With agreement of the parties, there should be nothing to prevent some security issues not directly of a military nature from being put on a future Council agenda under the rubric of promoting peaceful cooperation.

    In addition, notwithstanding U.S. and Russian national-security sensitivities, David Cox noted the close links that may exist between the cumulative impact of many years of military activities in the Arctic and important transboundary environmental issues such as the containment and cleanup of radioactive or other forms of contamination [21:9]. Oran Young's paper on "Arctic governance" prepared for the Yellowknife parliamentarians' conference had argued against trying to introduce ambiguous concepts such as "environmental security" into the Council agenda at this time. However, appearing before the Committee, Dr. Young conceded that "expanding the definition of security through notions of environmental security is probably the way to overcome the resistance of the United States, for example, to allowing security issues to be discussed in the council" [40:17]. Indeed, that appeared to be confirmed days earlier by the oral statement of the U.S. representative, Timothy Wirth, Undersecretary for Global Affairs, at the Council inauguration ceremony in Ottawa.

    Mr. Wirth's remarks also underlined the need to link the Council's activities with global issues affecting the environment and human well-being. Hence, "we need to ensure that [the] Arctic Council will be a mechanism open to other nations and organizations that have active programs in or knowledge and experience of the Arctic. We need to be able to draw upon all available technical and scientific resources if we are to be able to effectively respond to those issues requiring region-wide cooperation. This is especially true given our understanding of the relationship between the Arctic and our global environment. We all have a stake in what happens in the Arctic." Canada's Lloyd Axworthy agreed that:

    increasingly, Arctic issues are becoming global issues. The policies and practices of non-Arctic as well as Arctic governments directly affect the lives of northerners. Some of the pollution in the Arctic originates in countries that are far distant from it. And development in the Arctic has brought new international attention to the region. The Council must therefore be prepared to involve non-Arctic states and nongovernmental organizations in its deliberations and in its work.
    A number of our witnesses observed that many environmental issues affecting the Arctic (for example, long-range pollutants) are not confined, or specific, to that region; therefore, the Council can only be one piece of a larger international policy matrix. Even in regard to relations within the circumpolar regions, some worried that the Council could overshadow the less visible activities of more specialized bodies, both inter- and nongovernmental, which are already working on Arctic issues.62 We acknowledge these concerns and reservations. In Chapter Five we will deal with the contribution that circumpolar cooperation can make to action on the global environmental issues as part of a post-UNCED agenda. In Chapter Ten, we will come back to the issues of multilateral coordination among diverse international bodies with specific Arctic interests. At this point, it is most important to frame and entrench the position of the Council itself, which, uniquely among these institutional actors, exists to unite all the circumpolar nations in a partnership with Arctic aboriginal peoples' organizations around a common vision.

    Oran Young was persuasive in making the case to the Committee that:

    one of the most fundamental contributions the Arctic Council can make really falls under this generative heading: trying to raise consciousness, to develop a vocabulary, to articulate a vision, so the Arctic becomes a visible, well-defined, well-understood region in the world on a circumpolar basis and we have a sense of participating in a common enterprise, we know what it's about, we know the vocabulary, we understand how to deal with these issues and how to develop an agenda of more concrete Arctic questions. . . . I believe in the discourse of Arctic cooperation sustainable development is really the overarching question. . . . it's the basic program. . . . We should be developing a sustainable development architecture, or framework or structure, to which everything else could then be related or connected. [40:4-5]
    We believe that the Council's mandate, as well as its representative structures and processes (see next section), can accommodate the concerns of all parties under the rubric of environmentally sustainable human development. We note that Canada appears to have had some success in pushing for a relatively broad and open Council agenda. As was stated in the Government's press release of 14 August 1996 announcing the finalization of the Arctic Council Declaration, this accord will outline its "mandate to oversee a range of issues affecting the region, including environmental protection, economic and social development, improved health conditions and cultural well-being." Ambassador Simon was similarly expansive in describing to the Committee the Council's mission:

    . . . to bring political focus to addressing the urgent issues affecting the circumpolar North. These issues go well beyond those related to the protection of the environment and include the economic development of northern regions, the utilization of renewable and non-renewable resources, circumpolar trade, the improvement of transportation and communication systems, the health and welfare of northern residents, tourism development and cultural exchange. [15:2]
    It must be ackowledged, however, that it may be difficult to integrate goals of international environmental protection with those of northern economic development in defining the Council's mandate. Minister Axworthy stated in his address at the 19 September inauguration: "The major challenge for the Arctic Council lies in promoting sustainable development in the North. . . . At the same time, we recognize that sustainable development remains an elusive objective." It is worth noting that Ambassador Simon reports jointly to the Minister of Indian and Northern Development (DIAND) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and that both departments will jointly fund the first two years of the Council secretariat's operations. DIAND Assistant Deputy Minister Jack Stagg told the Committee's Arctic Council panel that, given the demographics of a young growing population in need of jobs, "The role of an Arctic council, if nothing else, should be to promote community economic development and wealth creation locally." He added that "an extremely important factor in achieving sustainable development in the circumpolar North is improvement in the socioeconomic conditions of the Russian North. Canada is in an excellent position to assist in this area" [15:6-7]. We will be addressing those specific economic dimensions of Arctic cooperation in Chapter Six and again in Part III.

    Of course, Canada's Department of the Environment, whose Minister has the leading Canadian role within the AEPS, is also crucially involved in the Council's mandate. Minister Marchi and Minister Irwin both made statements at the Council's inauguration and, together with Minister Axworthy, represented the Government of Canada's position. With respect to the continuation of the work of the AEPS and implementation of the commitments reached at its last ministerial meeting, hosted by Canada in March 1996, Ambassador Simon reassured the Committee that the Council "will incorporate it [the AEPS] as a cornerstone and reinforce its objectives" [15:3]. How this will be done, however, was unclear and our subsequent discussions with experts in England and the Scandinavian countries suggest that it remains so.

    A particular challenge is the appropriate bridge between the primary environmental protection goals and other elements of a comprehensive sustainable development agenda. Although the AEPS had created a "Task Force on Sustainable Development and Utilization" (TFSDU) in 1993, the Council was envisaged as adding its own new Arctic Sustainable Development Initiative (ASDI). Robert Huebert observes that the September 1996 Declaration omits mention of the TFSDU in mandating the Council to "oversee and coordinate" AEPS activities, while calling for an apparently separate, unspecified "sustainable development program."63 It might be asked whether the AEPS processes ought not logically be brought within an encompassing sustainable development framework (as Oran Young suggests), since, in the words of Ambassador Simon:

    Sustainable development is both a goal and integrating concept of the Arctic Council, to incorporate not only environmental protection but also the economic and social aspects of the Arctic agenda. (. . .) Sustainable development refers to planned development that is clearly within the carrying capacity of the Arctic and global ecosystems. Such development must contribute to a safe and healthy environment, as well as safeguard the cultures of indigenous people and respect their fundamental rights, values and priorities. [15:2-3]
    Notwithstanding such inclusive language, there may still be a problem of perception, as to whether the existence of the Council will shift the emphasis from the AEPS focus on protecting the Arctic environment to sustaining the utilization of Arctic resources for development. Prior to the Council's establishment, some worried that the perception of a two-track AEPS/ASDI approach would lead to such future misunderstandings and conflicts. David Scrivener noted that "U.S. environmentalist NGOs pressured Washington to ensure that Arctic cooperation's current focus [on the AEPS] would not be diluted in favour of economic development and sustainable utilization."64 Some concerns also surfaced during the Committee panel that heard from Canadian environmental groups working on Arctic issues. Would environmental considerations continue to predominate within the Council's mandate? Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund argued that the founding declaration should outline integrating mechanisms to "ensure that sustainable development is not treated separately from environmental protection. . . We must be confident that the council will strengthen and clarify ongoing circumpolar efforts, such as the AEPS, not weaken them. We must be assured that sustainable development means development that sustains the Arctic environment and its peoples" [27:10, 12].

    There is considerable work to be done in interpreting the real nature and scope of "sustainable development" as a mandate for the Council. In Chapter Five, we will be elaborating on this central concept and its applications for the purposes of circumpolar cooperation. At this point, what needs to be acknowledged is that tensions which emerged in the course of the negotiations on establishment will have to be dealt with.

    As recently acknowledged by Ambassador Simon:

    While the ``Arctic 8'' have agreed to establish the Council, many differences remain over its priorities and the pace of its work. Some countries want to forge ahead on establishing tight standards for environmental protection. Others see sustainable economic development as the priority. Forging a consensus on cooperation that does not merely reflect the lowest common denominator, the slowest ship in the convoy, will pose an ongoing challenge.65
    In general, Canada has pushed for a broad and open agenda, while the U.S. favours a more explicit definition of Council objectives. Indeed, at the first meeting of Senior Arctic Officials in Oslo following the inauguration, the United States jumped in with its own document outlining sustainable development terms of reference and rules of procedure. That manoeuvre seemed to backfire, however. Rather than sitting back and waiting to react, Oran Young expressed the hope to the Committee that "Canada could take the lead in initiating the process. . . of identifying, thrashing out and negotiating a framework of sustainable development principles for the Arctic with counterparts from other countries" [40:6]. We noted earlier that Russia and the Euro-Arctic countries have been generally receptive to Canadian positions, though the former has perhaps a greater interest in the prospects for economic cooperation and assistance, while the Nordic member states are intent on carrying forward their leadership on environmental issues. In the months ahead, it will be especially important to cooperate closely with Norway, the current chair of the AEPS, to ensure a smooth transition that preserves all of its elements within the working out of the Council's mandate.

    While arguments over institutional boundaries and mechanics, or over definitions of sustainable development, may quite legitimately preoccupy those involved in these international negotiations, there is a danger that this activity could become a substitute for action on the ground and that it might occupy officials while delaying getting down to business. Indeed, the visions of the Council's mandate that emerged from the Committee's travel in the Canadian Arctic had a markedly immediate and practical emphasis. There is, given the pressing needs and social problems of many northern residents, an understandable impatience with diplomatic initiatives unless they lead to direct, tangible benefits that will improve quality of life. Witnesses from aboriginal peoples' organizations, beginning with ICC President Rosemarie Kuptana, also stressed that the Council should give priority to issues affecting their rights and livelihoods. Indeed, in the international debate over environmentally sustainable development and resource utilization, indigenous groups have led the way in putting forward a substantive agenda for Arctic cooperation.66

    Ambassador Simon, herself an Inuk, nonetheless acknowledged in an early Ottawa panel that Inuit had repeatedly questioned how an international organization could benefit them at the community level [15:19]. She suggested one area could be in promoting shared learning about social and environmental assessment processes for northern development (a point subsequently raised during meetings in Kuujjuaq, northern Quebec, and in regard to the diamond mining proposals in the western and central Arctic.) During the same panel, Jack Stagg, of DIAND, had advised that the real challenge would be to get the Council "doing concrete things that quickly benefit those small communities. This is not to be some larger kind of international foreign policy forum. Those of us who worked towards it have seen it more as a practical forum and a tool that will mean something to people in small communities in the various circumpolar regions" [15:18]. Franklyn Griffiths agreed that the Council would need to focus in order to show some results early on.

    Oran Young, though advising that the Council should not attempt to start running existing programmatic activities like those of the AEPS working groups,67 told the Committee that it should help to initiate concrete projects in the sustainable development area: "We need to do tangible, focussed, identifiable, useful things so that the Arctic Council is not just some kind of talk shop, allowing for very broad, general kinds of discussions, but is actually seen to be doing useful things" [40:5]. Gary Pekeles, of McGill University's Baffin health project, nevertheless summed up northern "wait and see" scepticism by remarking that it would be important to "minimize [the Council's] uselessness" by curbing new bureaucratic/jurisdictional tendencies and instead stressing how it might support ongoing functional efforts to address Arctic problems.

    In a later panel, an environment NGO witness suggested that the Council should concentrate only on areas where there is a strong international environmental consensus, leaving out controversial issues like the utilization of marine mammals (e.g. the harvesting of seals); however, this was definitely not the impression the Committee received during its Arctic trips. Aboriginal witnesses especially hoped the Council could be helpful in resolving matters such as the European Union's regulations on wild fur imports, and other measures with extraterritorial effects which they regard as threatening their communities' economic base, and impeding their progress towards self-determination. As Milton Freeman, of the Canadian Circumpolar Institute, argued: "The Arctic Council should include in its activities addressing legal questions in respect to U.S./EU trade-restrictive actions, and the human rights implications of EU and U.S. actions that adversely affect the rights of Arctic peoples to self-determination and security of livelihood" [Submission of3 June 1996, p. 7].

    In short, the challenge of working out the Arctic Council's mandate reflects a complicated mixture of domestic and international considerations. It is essential that the conceptual framework be capable of accommodating the priority concerns of the entire circumpolar community, while reaching out to make global connections. We agree with Oran Young that Canada should lead here, and we think environmentally sustainable human development offers a sufficiently broad compass for orienting the Council's goals. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that these goals must be translated quickly into concrete activities with benefits visible to Canadians in the Arctic. The mandate, no matter how cleverly articulated, will not work if the Council comes to be seen as another externally based organization far removed from the human populations most directly affected by Arctic problems.

    Accordingly:

    In addition:

    Representative Structures and Process

    The aspect of the Arctic Council that has been most celebrated, perhaps prematurely, is its hybrid inter- and extra-governmental structure of representation, whereby, "permanent participant" status is accorded not only to the eight member states, but also to the three largest indigenous peoples' organizations in the circumpolar Arctic: the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.). Ambassador Simon told the Committee that: "This level of participation is unique in international fora, where such groups are ordinarily observers and not participants. In this way the Arctic Council breaks new ground in creating a framework that allows those who are directly affected by Government policies, particularly indigenous peoples, to participate in the discussions of the issues that affect them and to influence the decision-making process among the member states" [15:2]. Franklyn Griffiths affirmed: "This is not going to be states talking among themselves while the people whose interests they are deliberating on are far away. This is going to be an institution at which those people most directly affected and concerned will be at the table itself" [15:8]. Robert Huebert was equally strong in his endorsement.

    That optimism should be tempered, however. First, having an aboriginal presence in this intergovernmental organization is more of an elaboration than a total innovation, since the ICC, Saami Council and AKMNSSDV, R.F. were already participating in the working bodies of the AEPS, which, although weakly institutionalized, managed to create an indigenous peoples' secretariat in 1993. Denmark has provided for this secretariat ever since, though it is currently headed by a Canadian, Chester Reimer, with whom the Committee met in Copenhagen and who expressed a more general concern about the level of Canadian support. As for the secretariat itself, the Arctic Council Declaration acknowledges its continuation; however future material support among Council members seems somewhat unclear. It is worth pointing out as well that formal aboriginal representation has been entrenched in the regional council of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council linking the Nordic countries and Russia, one of the European bodies seen by Oran Young as having more creative flexibility in their operating structures. Dr. Young also observed that the chosen three founding aboriginal participants are themselves limited in their ability to speak for aboriginal interests: "They are high-level organizations that cover huge territories. They are manned, or staffed, by people who are often in the national capitals. It's very unclear to what extent these organizations are able successfully to reflect and represent the concerns of grassroots people" [40:18-19].

    The Arctic Council's two-tier structure of member states and "permanent participants" (who are not "members" per se - see the text of the Declaration, Box 5) is in fact considerably weaker than the option preferred by the original Canadian Arctic Council Panel which was co-chaired by Franklyn Griffiths (see Box 4). That scenario envisaged putting representative delegations from the Arctic aboriginal peoples and the territorial governments on a more equal footing with those from the eight national governments.68 Oran Young argued the merits of still trying to move closer to this model. As it stands, the Arctic Council will be run by the member governments, which alone have voting powers.

    Ambassador Simon acknowledged to the Committee that: "One weakness in the Arctic Council could be if we shut out the northern organizations too much, because governments ultimately have the right to hold their own meetings. So we will have to be careful in terms of when we have closed-door sessions without the northern peoples involved" [15:15]. The actual text of the September 1996 Declaration provides for active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council" (see Box 5, Clause 2). In a recent address, although contending that the Council represents a "solid step" in the direction of a "true partnership" between states and indigenous peoples, she concedes that "the issue of indigneous participation was very contentious, and to be honest, the final outcome was not completely satisfactory to the indigenous representatives at the negotiations. While they had hoped to gain as close to equal status as possible to member countries, there was resistance from some governments. The final results were, of course, a compromise."69

    Another key point delaying the Council's start up was the issue of broadening aboriginal representation beyond the original three recognized organizations. The U.S. in particular pushed the case of the Alaskan Athabascan and Aleut native communities,70 while in Canada, the ICC could not claim to speak for all northern native peoples. In mid-March 1996, the Dene Nation hosted a meeting which included representatives from Alaskan First Nations to discuss Arctic Council options. The Dene also prepared a summary report of the Northern Aboriginal Consultation on the Arctic Council held in Ottawa a month later, which stated: "The member countries have agreed in principle that equitable representation of indigenous peoples is necessary. The mechanism for admitting new permanent participants must now be developed." Ambassador Simon subsequently confirmed to the Committee that: "As other indigenous organizations in Alaska, the western Arctic and the Russian Federation that are not represented by the existing three permanent participants have also expressed a desire to be part of the council, provision will be made for additional permanent participant seats in the council to accommodate them" [15:2]. The Declaration opens the door to "other Arctic organizations of indigenous peoples with majority indigenous constituency, representing: (a) a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or (b) more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state."

    How this will work in practice remains to be seen. It is left to the Council to determine eligibility and accession (presumably by consensus), with the proviso that the number of such permanent participants should always be fewer than the number of state members. Committee members who travelled to the western and central Canadian Arctic were reminded by witnesses such as Chief Bill Erasmus of the Dene Nation of the complexities of aboriginal representation in that region. Professor Gurston Dacks of the University of Alberta stressed the importance of getting this issue right. Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation argued strongly for an expanded number of Council seats, and also for diverse aboriginal participation in Canada's national delegation, with an advisory role for senior officials and the resources made available to facilitate such meetings. The Committee later heard a strong presentation in Ottawa from the Grand Council of Crees of northern Quebec advancing their case for Arctic Council recognition. Their Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Ted Moses, declared further that: ``The establishment of the Arctic Council provides Canada and the indigenous peoples with an opportunity to begin a new relationship'' [41:13]. However, the Quebec Crees would not appear to meet the criteria in the Declaration cited above.

    The representation abroad of Canadian indigenous peoples could, moreover, be burdened by the legacy of unresolved "self-determination" claims.71 Indeed, it is probably no coincidence that the Arctic Council Declaration includes a caveat that: "The use of the term `peoples' in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law." Furthermore, it should not be assumed that aboriginal groups will necessarily share one view on key development issues. For example, with respect to the possible opening up parts of the U.S. Arctic wildlife refuge to hydrocarbon exploration, the Canadian Gwich'in are adamantly opposed to the idea, because of the threat they perceive to the Porcupine Caribou herd, while some Alaskan north slope native groups give it limited support.

    Of course, there are also powerful interests at stake for non-aboriginal residents. For example, both Alaska and the Yukon have large non-native majorities, yet their governments will not have any formal standing within the Arctic Council. This may be where the Northern Forum could help to fill a gap. This association of subnational regional governments now has members from 10 countries, including 11 regions in Russia, though from Canada only the Yukon and the Province of Alberta are members. Indeed there may be greater interest from the Russian side than we sometimes detected in the Canadian North. The Forum, at its last assembly in Khanty-Mansiysk in Russia, passed a resolution requesting the Arctic Council to "consider the question of participation of the Northern Forum in further activity of the Arctic Council as a permanent observer. We believe that it is impossible to solve region-wide problems of the Arctic and the North without consolidation of joint efforts." When the Forum's Alaska Executive Director Stephen Cowper appeared before the Committee, he added:

    We're finding now that there is an ongoing devolution of power in Government. . . Many of the decisions that were previously made at a federal level are being made, at least in part, by regional governments. That's a trend that probably is not going to stop. For that reason alone, we think it would be useful if the Arctic Council would allow the Northern Forum at least sufficient access to its proceedings to make our view known when it's necessary. [58:4]
    The Arctic Council Declaration would open general "observer status" to a potentially wide range of others (states, intergovernmental and interparliamentary organizations, NGOs) "that the Council determines can contribute to its work." But according to Stephen Cowper, "It's a passive kind of role. Our members feel that the nature of our organization merits a little more status there." At the same time, he admitted to being aware that the U.S. government is not yet on side: "there's some resistance to having a higher level of participation in the Arctic Council proceedings" [58:4-5].

    This example is just one indication that achieving "northern representation" will not be easy. Oran Young's governance background paper for the March 1996 Arctic Parliamentarians' Conference in Yellowknife contended that to be successful, the Arctic Council

    must find a way to combine the interests of disparate groups of stakeholders, including states or national governments with their concerns for developing the region's oil and gas reserves and preserving ecosystems of interest to tourists and scientists and local communities scattered throughout the Circumpolar North with their intense concerns for maintaining traditional cultural practices and subsistence lifestyles. . . Local residents show a marked tendency to view efforts to create multilateral regimes for the Arctic as irrelevant at best and as a source of serious threats to the viability of their way of life at worst.72
    A further challenge, in Dr. Young's view, "centers on the need to establish feedback mechanisms that will prevent the Far North from being treated as a sacrifice zone by actors located in the mid-latitudes who neither know nor care about the consequences of their actions in the Circumpolar North. The arrangements currently under consideration to allow non-Arctic actors to participate as observers in the work of the Arctic Council are wholly inadequate to deal with this problem." Dr. Young elaborated on this before the Committee, arguing that:

    There needs to be a mechanism - I'm not suggesting a legal mechanism like seats at some table for these organizations - such as a consultative process through which the users, the stakeholders, the identifiable human communities and groups that have long-term interests and stakes feel they have ready access to channels through which their concerns can be transmitted in a way in which they have confidence and trust. Given the structure that has emerged in the [Arctic Council] declaration, I see this as a very major challenge. [40:19]
    Not only is effective aboriginal and northern representation crucial for the Council's legitimacy, it ought also to offer channels for interaction with wider public constituencies in the member countries.73 In this regard, the role of elected representatives clearly needs further attention, and specifically that of the Standing Committee of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (SCPAR), which has been a strong advocate for the AEPS and Arctic Council initiatives, yet has no formal status in either process. In the joint meeting of our Committee and the Standing Committtee on Environment and Sustainable Development, held to follow up the results from the Yellowknife and Inuvik conferences, this point was addressed by both the former and current parliamentary secretaries to the Minister of the Environment, Clifford Lincoln and Karen Kraft Sloan. Mr. Lincoln, Canadian representative on SCPAR, underlined the urgency of giving a more solid base to this parliamentary body and making it part of the component structure of the Arctic Council at the time of establishment [18:4-6]. Mrs. Kraft Sloan agreed: "It's necessary that there is a formal recognition of the role of parliamentarians vis-à-vis the Arctic Council, because that then makes it clear that something has to be done and we get the resources we need" [18:20]. Given the importance for Canadian foreign policy of the issues to be adressed by the Council, we believe that an effort should also be made to have a member of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade included as part of a strong Canadian representation within the SCPAR (see also Chapter Seven).

    As noted in Chapter One, this parliamentary appeal exposed significant divergence, with ICC president Rosemarie Kuptana testifying in the same panel that, while a "close dialogue" with parliamentarians would be welcome, a formal status in the Council would not be appropriate: "I believe the interest of the general public can be met by the state representatives. There is also a category for observers, and perhaps this could be used by the standing committee if they wished to formally participate" [18:14]. Mr. Lincoln was unsatisfied with such a compromise, arguing that having a seat within the Council itself "would be a tremendous opportunity for the Arctic Council to get the support of parliamentarians from eight countries, who are . . . action-oriented, and who will be an independent voice in many ways. They'll be able to point out sometimes that the official policies may not really be what is best for the Arctic. At least it will add a little fire in what otherwise may be a very process-oriented council" [18:16]. Members from both committees spoke in favour of that approach, and the environment committee subsequently adopted a report in June 1996 which included recommendations to this effect.

    The September 1996 Arctic Council Declaration allows simply for an observer status for interparliamentary organizations of a global or regional nature, although an accompanying "Joint Communiqué" by member countries does affirm that "Ministers welcomed the attendance of the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region and looked forward to its future participation in the meetings of the Council." We believe that this limited opening needs to be widened and pursued further in the interest of the Council's own effective operation. As Oran Young pointedly advised the Committee:

    . . .these initiatives or international agreements, which are signed by foreign ministers, or whoever signs them, are likely to remain paper operations or dead letters unless some real foundation of public or popular support is injected into them through the electoral process. . . . I also think the parliamentary channel is one that can be important in making sure that certain voices that are often not heard very clearly in the more administrative hierarchy are heard. [40:24]
    During discussions with counterparts in the Nordic countries and Russia, the Committee heard considerable support for strengthening the parliamentary dimension of the Council's work. In particular, Brigitta Dahl, Speaker of the Swedish Parliament, who had attended the Yellowknife conference, stressed this point. She suggested that an independent associated parliamentary body should be set up, perhaps on the model of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. In Moscow, Speaker Likhachev of the Federation Council argued that organizations, such as the Northern Forum and SCPAR, linking diverse regions and parliamentarians from those regions were important vehicles for promoting Arctic dialogues and expressing the mutual interests of peoples, not just of national governments. He had ambitions for a Council that would be proactive in undertaking environmental cooperation and economic assistance, as well as performing analytical and coordinating functions. In Helsinki, Guy Lindstrom, Secretary to SCPAR and head of the Finnish delegation to the Nordic Council, contended that having only observer status for parliamentary groups in the Arctic Council reflected governments' continued "old-fashioned" attitude. Moreover, parliamentarians should keep pressing foreign ministries and working to strengthen and flesh out the rather minimal nature of the Arctic Council as established, especially with respect to substantive action on sustainable economic development.

    An earlier note of caution was raised with the Committee, however, by Milton Freeman of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, who observed:

    Arctic/northern people are a minority in each of the Arctic Council nations (except Iceland perhaps) and they are a very diverse citizenry even within a given jurisdiction. . . . Many well-funded special interest groups in such urban centres as, e.g. Stockholm, Toronto, Vancouver, or Helsinki, support agendas quite at odds with people in Cambridge Bay, Old Crow, Kuujjuaq or Iqaluit (and equivalent small communities in northern Norway, Greenland, Alaska, etc.) The problems that trappers and hunters in northern Canada and Greenland experience with the European Parliament or the International Whaling Commission (where urban interests predominate and parliamentary traditions prevail) should serve as a warning of what needs to be carefully thought through. [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 1]
    We agree that Arctic indigenous peoples need particular representative channels to ensure that their rights are respected and that their concerns receive prominent attention by the Arctic Council. However, the achievement of democratic approaches to the future development of the Arctic requires additional elements or representation in the public interest, an issue to which we will return to in Chapter Seven. As well, we believe that SCPAR representatives would prove to be sensitive to the perspectives of northern peoples - as was manifested by the Yellowknife conference in March 1996, in which aboriginal spokespersons participated actively - and would not come to the Council table seeking to impose a "southern" agenda on the North.

    Similarly, representatives of environmental NGOs who appeared before the Committee following its trips in northern Canada were very conscious of the need to bridge these barriers and past differences, referring to their efforts to work with aboriginal people. For Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund:

    It is essential that all interested aboriginal groups be able to participate in the deliberations and decision-making processes of the Arctic Council.
    With regard to observers, the declaration should establish criteria for observer status within the charter, and accreditation procedures should allow for the granting of permanent observer status to non-Arctic countries, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that provide meaningful and constructive contributions to the process. . . . all interests must be welcome in an open process. [27:9-10, 12]
    Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace made the point that "most of the environmental damage . . . [is] not caused by development in the Arctic itself. We have to start changing our behaviour here in the South to prevent that damage from occurring. . . . The Arctic Council has a unique role to play, because it's not only representing the North; it's also representing the South. . . . it's not only an organization that can represent the interests of an area that has been very much affected by global environmental destruction, but it's also made up of the very countries that are causing most of the problem''[27:15-17]. The sense of taking global responsibilities seriously in a circumpolar context was reflected at the Council inauguration in statements by Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy and U.S. Undersecretary of State Wirth.

    Another issue of representation is that the Council must take full account of the interests of all of the member countries (including the United States), so that all will remain equally committed to the process. The opportunity for early Canadian leadership does not imply the imposition of a Canadian agenda. North American, European and Russian perspectives will have to be balanced, a view that was reinforced during our overseas meetings. In Oslo, Committee members were advised by Norway's senior Arctic advisor, Ambassador Jon Bech, to keep a realistic perspective on the Council, which should focus on common objectives where it can do something differently and better than other bodies; it should not become a supranational entity that takes over from national jurisdictions or can be led by any one country.

    In an earlier Ottawa panel, Dr. Gerald Lock of Edmonton observed that the Euro-Nordic group of countries are a majority in the Arctic Council (five of the eight member governments) but together represent only about 25-30% of the Arctic area. As a result of his experience with the regional board of the International Arctic Science Committee, he suggested a tripartite structure in order to avoid any tendency to ``Eurocentrism'' and achieve balance: "For example, as we chair the Arctic Council, it might be prudent to appoint a vice-chair from Russia and a vice-chair from the Nordic countries and use that as an executive to ensure questions are dealt with in a fully circum-Arctic way before the agenda allows full discussions by the council" [20:4]. Borrowing from the inventive flexibility that Oran Young ascribed to European institutions, another suggestion would be to have a trio of countries involved in directing the Council's administration over time, similar to the ``troika'' structure of the European Union's rotating presidency. In other words, the immediate past and prospective chairing countries would share some of those responsibilities with the current chair.

    In addition, the Council will need to establish practical working relationships with other multilateral arrangements that have Arctic-relevant mandates. According to Ambassador Simon, "The Arctic Council is designed to be an umbrella organization with a strong coordinating function." It is supposed not to duplicate but rather "reinforce those initiatives and organizations that are already working to address and resolve Arctic issues and focus attention on areas where more cooperative efforts are needed" [15:3]. In carrying out this task, Oran Young suggested applying the principle of "subsidiarity," which is well known in the European context: ``That is to say, decisions about Arctic issues should be made at the lowest level at which the competence to make these decisions exists" [40:5]. Such a principle would no doubt be welcome by many regional governments and aboriginal groups in the circumpolar north, especially so as to avoid intrusion into their efforts to work out co-management arrangements for the sustainable development and utilization of Arctic resources based on locally determined values and needs.74

    The only way we will have any hope of success is if we can somehow find a way to integrate these various initiatives into a coherent whole, perhaps with the Arctic Council as a sort of overarching framework, as a body that gives coherence to or helps with the integration of all of these other initiatives. But if it tries to set itself up in competition with or as an alternative to these bodies in some new initiative, my sense is that it will go nowhere. [40:23]
    For example, in dealing with the critical issues of environmental contaminants in the North - a process that Dr. Jacques Grondin of Quebec's Public Health Centre described as being sometimes frustrated because of duplicated or poorly coordinated efforts within Canada [47:16-18] - the Arctic Council should not develop its own separate initiative. Rather, it should first examine existing work in this area and identify competencies and areas where additional research and policy responses are needed; only then should it bring the various communities, governments and other actors together in order to foster productive synergies. While other organizations are already working on Arctic contaminants, the Council, if properly constituted and directed, would uniquely be able to play a systemic, facilitating policy-related role, being the only comprehensive circumpolar body at the interstate level with a mandate to do so.

    In other words, the Arctic Council, no matter how nominally representative, must avoid being perceived as an uninvited superstructural body that spends scarce energies and resources inventing more processes yet ends up taking more decisions out of the hands of the Arctic people and those working with them on solving Arctic problems. Instead, the Council's aim as a circumpolar institution must be to try to create an environment that empowers and enables the peoples of the Arctic to realize their aspirations. It is fair to say that the Committee encountered some scepticism about this, which will be important for the Council to overcome in its initial phase. As well, as David Scrivener has observed, "for some, the Council's gestation itself raised the spectre of the proliferation of overlapping and competing institutions." It will be crucial therefore for the Council to prove early on the value that is added by its unique circumpolar structure and process. Certainly, as David Scrivener affirms, the purpose is a valid one: "The existence of an Arctic Council could generate more effective channels through which to nurture the ability of the Arctic states to coordinate and concert their policies on issues affecting the Arctic in international forums not confined to the region. . . . In these cost-conscious days governments are keen to maximize the impact and efficiency of the various cooperative processes in the Arctic."75

    In sum, beyond adequate representation of a broad range of Arctic interests, the Council will have to strive to achieve a functional coherence in implementing its mandate. Otherwise, it risks alienating the very constituencies it is supposed to help, while adding yet another layer of complexity to the existing jigsaw of organizations and transboundary arrangements within the Arctic region.

    Accordingly:

    Furthermore:

    Finally:

    Priority Objectives and Activities

    The Committee will be making recommendations in subsequent chapters on specific elements of circumpolar cooperation, including those possible through the Arctic Council. We think it is important, however, to signal the kinds of things on which the Council could work beyond matters of structure and process. As noted earlier, at our first Ottawa panel, witnesses stressed that the Council could not afford to be perceived as just another forum for endless talk among international officials; it would have to resolve to take action quickly on issues of direct concern to northern peoples.

    In her testimony, Rosemarie Kuptana, President of the ICC, which will occupy one of the Council's permanent participant seats, indicated that its agenda would be to maintain support for AEPS programs (e.g. research on contaminants affecting Inuit health) while beginning new work to promote sustainable development that might affect the future economic base of Arctic communities.

    ICC wishes to work on strategies for the revitalization of the Inuit sealing industry, its harvesting and marketing of marine mammal products in general. . . . The Arctic Council could also be an important forum for coordinating cultural exchanges and exchanging information and views on a wide range of social and economic issues. . . . [It] provides an opportunity for the circumpolar nations to establish a model of partnership and cooperation with indigenous peoples on the most vital northern policy issues." [18:27]
    Suggested areas in that regard included learning from models of resource co-management and native self-government and developing appropriate guidelines for northern development projects and for increased tourism.

    Other aboriginal spokespersons also emphasized issues affecting well-being and livelihood. For example, in Yellowknife, Gary Bohnet of the Metis Nation submitted that "the evolution of circumpolar relations and international cooperation requires that aboriginal trappers and commercial wildlife harvesters have free markets to support their traditional livelihoods and thereby maintain aboriginal cultural survival and obtain economic independence. The Arctic Council can promote the environmental importance of trapping as well as free international trade with other circumpolar countries." The Inuit of the eastern Arctic felt equally strongly about the importance of enhancing free movement of northern products and peoples. Kevin Knight of Unaaq International and Don Axford of the Canadian Inuit Business Development Council argued that current international trade agreements and regional blocs such as NAFTA and the European Union should be examined in this light [20:17-18]. Beyond that, Gerald Lock proposed that the Arctic Council "should explore an Arctic free trade agreement" [20:5]. David Malcolm of Inuvik's Aurora Research Institute advised that "Canada should use the Arctic Council opportunity to build circumpolar marketing networks, so that circumpolar northerners can easily trade with each other, without having to rely on southern products with inadequate specifications for northern conditions" [Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 4].

    Northern research institutes saw the Arctic Council as needing to become directly engaged in efforts promising clear benefits to northern residents, such as resource management; sustainable economic development and trade; environmental science and anti-pollution measures; applied research and development; health and education cooperation; and improved communications and transport networks. In Calgary, the Arctic Institute of North America put forward as four initial priority objectives: "circumpolar promotion of the process of co-management by regional land claims co-management boards" (possibly an annual conference to discuss practical issues of administration and delivery); "circumpolar action on air and water borne contaminants" (including promotion of international pollution standards); "circumpolar development of sustainable tourism guidelines that focus on the preservation of the traditional land-based economy. . ."; and "constructive circumpolar opposition to the European fur ban" (including support for efforts "to find humane trapping methods and to train a new generation of trappers") [Submission of Michael Robinson, 31 May 1996].

    In several Committee roundtables, northern studies experts from Laval University in Quebec City, McGill University and University of Montreal stressed the value of cooperative educational and scientific exchanges with those in other countries working on common Arctic problems. The Arctic Council could be of real service by supporting circumpolar progress in building up and disseminating relevant knowledge - not only technical but also more broadly social and cultural. In effect, how can the Council really assist those who are trying to build healthy, environmentally responsible and economically sustainable communities across the circumpolar region? Oran Young mentioned moving on items such as technical assistance, skills development, and resources for local investment, especially targeted to indigenous people, as well as giving consideration to more environmentally protected areas. He also advised that "we need to think carefully about fostering a dialogue between the world of research and the world of policy, the world of science and the world of practice. . . . [and] within the context of the Arctic Council, about how to make mutually beneficial links between the scientific or the reseach community, including those who are concerned with traditional ecological knowledge, and the world of policy" [40:5-6].

    Given that the AEPS is to be brought within the Arctic Council's mandate, environmental issues will obviously have a high priority, both short and long term. But there are numerous questions to be worked out. How, for example, will the Council, established through a non-binding political declaration, be able to move from simply acknowledging the problems to taking joint remedial actions, as a number of those we met in Russia and the Nordic countries hope? Is it feasible that the Council might eventually oversee compliance with multilateral standards? Robert Huebert observed that to date "the two major focusses of the AEPS have been on the examination of existing international cooperative measures and how bad the problem is. The question now that will be facing the Arctic Council is what steps will be taken?" He suggested that global trends towards deregulation and privatization could make it more difficult to negotiate an effective international environmental regime for the Arctic [15:13].

    However Stephen Cowper of the Northern Forum, argued that, from a practical business perspective, "It's important that there be a consistent set of environmental standards for development in the Arctic. It is not in anybody's interest to have a competitive resource development situation where the key variable . . . is that one of the countries doesn't have any environmental safeguards. . . . that is, I believe, one of the most important subjects to be tackled by the Arctic Council." He went on to highlight "the subject of the proper disposal of nuclear waste, much of which is in the Arctic region," as a priority activity for the Arctic Council [58:10].

    Clearly, the creation of an environmentally sustainable basis for circumpolar economic development must be a Canadian priority. The Committee was therefore pleased by Minister Irwin's statement at the September 1996 inauguration that "as a first activity of the Council, Canada proposes an international conference on Arctic Sustainable Development be held in 1997 . . . [that] would bring together a wide range of Arctic stakeholders from Government, nongovernmental organizations, and, in particular, practitioners of business development." At the same time, as already discussed, the approach should at all times integrate environmental protection into the sustainable development program.

    Ambassador Simon referred in her testimony to the AEPS-initiated "report card" on the state of the Arctic environment, due to be released in 1997, and indicated that follow-up action by the Council with respect to Arctic sustainable development "could be seen as a regional implementation of Agenda 21" (the UN program of action agreed to in 1992 at the Rio Conference on Environment and Development, but which did not specifically target the Arctic) [15:32]. Milton Freeman, of Edmonton's Circumpolar Institute, cautioned, however, against expecting the Council to evolve into a powerful enforcer of multilateral environmental standards: "In the present era of downsizing Government, the Arctic Council will likely have to be quite minimalist as an organization . . . and to fully respect national traditions and differences. . ." [Submission of 3 June 1996, p. 4]. He advised more modest steps such as replicating the successful model of the international polar bear treaty, or working through existing bodies like the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission.

    Witnesses representing environmental NGOs, on the other hand, wanted to see an Arctic Council backed up by the political resolve to address the Arctic environment in a comprehensive way. Kevin Jardine of Greenpeace outlined the many destructive effects of the release of greenhouse gases contributing to global warming (for example, forest fire and insect outbreaks, sea ice and shoreline erosion, and permafrost degradation). Louise Comeau of the Sierra Club urged fast action by the Council to have Arctic interests included in the global negotiations towards a framework convention on climate change: "If the Council waits until the Arctic monitoring and assessment program releases its state of the environment report in early 1997, it may be too late" [27:7]. Sarah Climenhaga of the World Wildlife Fund highlighted work on a circumpolar protected areas network; mechanisms for incorporating the traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and utilization of ``quality of life'' rather than more conventional economic indicators of development; adequate environmental assessment procedures (notably for mining, oil and gas, and forestry projects); circumpolar guidelines for eco-tourism; strengthening of international environmental laws (e.g. the marine pollution convention, MARPOL, "taking into account the increasing shipping traffic in the Arctic,"76 and implementation of the Law of the Sea provisions) [27:9-11].

    Clearly, there is no shortage of challenging items on the "menu." A 1995 Canadian Government position paper had foreseen the working groups of the Arctic Council tackling over the longer term, in addition to an expansive environmental protection agenda, a whole series of issues such as sustainable economic development, social and cultural development, emergency measures, and science and technology. Beyond continuing the current work of the AEPS, a long list of "substantive priorities for the Council's initial period" was also identified:

  • management and development of renewable resources;

  • promotion of circumpolar trade;

  • development of Arctic transportation and communications systems;

  • fostering of cultural exchanges among northerners, especially indigenous peoples;

  • improvement of social services, including circumpolar health care and housing;

  • management and development of non-renewable resources;

  • review of Arctic institutions and programs; and

  • consolidation and coordination of national and regional emergency preparedness and response systems77

    While all of the above can be seen as important to the Arctic quality of life, it is difficult to imagine a small organization dependent on goodwill and consensus simultaneously taking on so many of "priorities" at least without being very selective about where it would focus its energies. Even before an action agenda can be determined, the Arctic Council Ministers' "Joint Communiqué" of the September 1996 inauguration identified as the Council's "initial priority tasks" such basic matters as developing rules of procedure, terms of reference for its sustainable development program, and effective incorporation of the AEPS.

    In short, the Arctic Council will probably have to trim advocates' ambitions in order to be effective in making a difference on at least a few issues. We believe that Canada should be proactive in working to establish early consensus on a short list of key objectives and activities. Canada has a window of opportunity as the founding chair to make good on Oran Young's challenging affirmation to the Committee that "beyond the signing of the Declaration, Canada is in a unique position to work out a really well-defined proposal about the roles the Council can and should play" [40:6].

    Accordingly:

    In addition:

    Funding and Political Support

    Without significant resources and political commitments from the member governments, the Arctic Council could end up as a rather empty shell - periodically issuing fine declarations of intent but not actually able to do much for the well-being of the environment and peoples of the circumpolar region. The Council could inherit the weaknesses of the AEPS and its working groups, which depend on a patchwork of voluntary contributions and have had to weather several funding crises. The worry, as expressed by David Scrivener, is that the prospect of adding new Council mechanisms on to this "shoestring" operation has simply "reinforced the long-standing reluctance of governments to assume major financial commitments in Arctic environmental cooperation."78 More generally, a number of people told the Committee that, while resources for the Council's own organization did not have to be large, it would be desirable to put the Council's activities on a more substantial and secure foundation.

    The 1995 internal Canadian Government working paper on setting up the Council appropriately devoted considerable attention to funding issues. It recommended that the Council give priority to programs that "have received an offer from a Member to accept lead responsibility and for which necessary financial support has been identified; and are feasible within the available resource base and time frame." The paper accepted that "basic funding" of the Council secretariat would be the responsibility of the host country, while proposing a mix of voluntary contributions and "burden-sharing" arrangements for other activities. There would be established a "common fund, based on an agreed cost-sharing formula, to support common program initiatives." As well, functional components, such as the work of the indigenous peoples' secretariat, would be among "the most obvious candidates for cost-sharing."79 However, other countries did not demonstrate much enthusiasm in that direction, with David Scrivener observing that: "The idea of common funding was dropped in the face of U.S. opposition which masked a widely shared reluctance to assume new financial commitments."80 Indeed, as Ambassador Simon bluntly acknowledged in recent remarks:

    These days governments, including Canada's, are extremely reluctant to agree to setting up new bodies that will place demands on time and resources. . . The Council itself will not be endowed with more than a modest budget to operate a secretariat and other maintenance functions. It will be up to the member governments to commit to spending on agreed activities.81
    In earlier testimony to the Committee, Mary Simon, as Canada's Ambassador to the Council, had indicated that Canada's hosting of the secretariat through 1998 would entail a very modest commitment of resources from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Indian and Northern Affairs. In addition to providing a few core staff, DIAND would supply about $275,000 for operational and maintenance funding over the two years, and DFAIT would pick up office space and common user costs. An article in The Economist on the Council's Ottawa inauguration put the total cost to Canada at $900,000.82 That is not a large sum for an international organization whose members include three of the world's four largest countries; in fact it is rather less than what Canada alone has been spending on the little-known Canadian Polar Commission. (The latter's annual budget came in for some pointed criticism during the Committee's Arctic travels. Given the pressures on governments to get the best value for money, former GNWT leader Nellie Cournoyea even recommended in Inuvik that funding now allocated to the Commission "be redirected through the Arctic Council to [do] research in the North."83 We will return to the question of how best to utilize the Commission's role in Chapter Eight.)

    As previously noted, some witnesses were concerned about the low level of resources being devoted to the Office of the Circumpolar Ambassador and the functioning of the Arctic Council secretariat, given the size of their mandates and responsibilities. There was a feeling that their capacities should be strengthened, possibly through a consolidation of some existing Government spending on Arctic and circumpolar affairs. As well, aboriginal spokespersons sought assurance of adequate support for their full participation in Canadian foreign policy development and Arctic Council activities. None of this means that the advent of the Council should result in a circumpolar bureaucratic empire, only that it should be undertaken as a serious, if economical, operation.84

    Organization and funding are linked to political support. That is another reason why the first two years under Canada's chairmanship are so critical. If the Council can show enough early promise of being able to do an effective job on a few issues of importance to Canadians, and northern Canadians especially, it will have a strong case for increased and sustained Canadian funding. Of course, Canada cannot be just a one-man band; there will have to be a work program that convinces other Council partners, and perhaps in particular the U.S. - with whom we have the closest relationship of any Arctic Council country - that it is worth supporting materially and not merely on paper.

    The Council's inauguration, long sought by Canada, is an achievement in itself. But the first real test, under Canada's watch, will be whether the first substantive ministerial conference scheduled for 1998 can deliver on a clear action-oriented program that is backed by political resolve and solid funding from the Council's members.

    Accordingly:


    56
    For an excellent comparative insight into these evolving international perspectives see David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic: From Strategy to Council, The North Atlantic Committee, Security Policy Library No. 1/1996, Oslo.

    57
    Cf. Ibid., p. 22ff for a useful synopsis of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations.

    58
    These are the Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), the Saami Council, and the Association of Indigenous Minorities of the North, Siberia and the Far East of the Russian Federation (AKMNSSDV, R.F.). The three first gained participant standing within the AEPS, supported by an indigenous peoples' secretariat established in 1993.

    59
    Kenneth Coates has observed that "inter-town rivalries are legendary across the North," which also suffers from an ingrained "culture of opposition . . . [that] has distracted northern attention from the construction of internal and external networks of support. Instead of pulling together to capitalize on the availability of limited resources, northern regions tend to engage in internal contests and struggles that ultimately make it easier for southern authorities, be they corporate or governmental, to skirt northern expectations and to exploit divisions within the region" ("The Discovery of the North" (1994), p. 27, 42.)

    60
    "Nunavut Secretariat Office Opens in Iqaluit," Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development news release, Iqaluit, 30 November 1996, p. 2.

    61
    Cited in Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation (1996), p. 25.

    62
    Refer to Box 3; cf. also David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996).

    63
    Robert Huebert, ``The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance'' (1996), p. 8-9.

    64
    David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 24.

    65
    Mary Simon, ``Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 7.

    66
    Robert Huebert observes that: "while the ICC has limited resources, it, and not any of the Arctic governments, has been responsible for the introduction of the principles of sustainable development into a circumpolar context" (``The Arctic Council: Global and Domestic Governance'' (1996), p. 17). See also Chapters Five through Seven.

    67
    See Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 59.

    68
    Gerald Schmitz and James Lee, Canada and Circumpolar Cooperation (1996), p. 25.

    69
    Mary Simon, "Building Partnerships" (1996), p. 5.

    70
    David Scrivener points out that: "Although not organized transnationally, they exploit migratory species and live on both sides of the U.S. border with Canada and Russia, respectively." (Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 25)

    71
    For example, within the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. In addition to the testimony of the Crees, see that testimony of Rosemarie Kuptana [18:28-29]; also Russell Barsh, "The Aboriginal Issue in Canadian Foreign Policy, 1984-1994," International Journal of Canadian Studies, Fall 1995, p. 107-33. On "self-determination" principles as applied to Arctic indigenous peoples, see the paper prepared for the Committee by Joelle Martin, "Internal Self-Determination at International Law: Case Examples," May 1996.

    72
    Oran Young, "Arctic Governance: Meeting Challenges of Cooperation in the High Latitudes" (1996), p. 7 and 15.

    73
    The issue of public participation and process was emphasized in the original vision developed by the Canadian Arctic Council Panel, which had called upon Ottawa "to include Canadians, above all Canada's aboriginal peoples, in the formation of its negotiation position on an Arctic Council . . . [the creation of which] must from the start be an exercise in public diplomacy if it is to be done right." (To Establish an International Arctic Council: A Framework Report, Ottawa (1991), p. 16.) It can be argued that this broader public dimension remains an unfulfilled promise of the Council initiative.

    74
    On this question see also Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996),p. 31, and Chapter Ten.

    75
    David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 28.

    76
    Related to that prospect, former Canadian Coast Guard icebreaker captain Patrick Toomey told the Committee: "The Arctic nations . . . must be prepared to supervise and assist such polar ocean navigation by the harmonization of standards with competency in ice navigation for the navigators and by the standardization of ice classification for ships . . . There must be a means of enforcement of these international rules" [20:2]. On the Council's potential role in the application of international conventions to Arctic marine transportation, see also Oran Young, The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 57.

    77
    "The Arctic Council: Objectives, Structure and Program Priorities," Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, internal working document, Ottawa, May 1995, p. 15-16 and Annex C.

    78
    David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 17ff.

    79
    DFAIT and DIAND, "The Arctic Council" (1996), p. 12-15.

    80
    David Scrivener, Environmental Cooperation in the Arctic (1996), p. 24.

    81
    Mary Simon, ``Building Partnerships'' (1996), p. 2 and 7.

    82
    "Hands across the Ice," The Economist, 21 September 1996, p. 48.

    83
    Submission of 28 May 1996, p. 2. The Commission also seemed to have lost the support of the Dene Nation in the NWT. ("Dene Want Polar Panel Disbanded," Montreal Gazette, 19 September 1996.)

    84
    Oran Young argues that the Arctic Council should "not require a large or elaborate organizational apparatus of its own to administer its operations. Nonetheless, a modest permanent secretariat would serve the Council well. Experience in other areas has made it clear that small and efficient secretariats can play a variety of constructive roles in maintaining and enhancing international cooperation that go well beyond the technical tasks without overstepping the bounds of what is appropriate for administrative bodies," (The Arctic Council: Marking a New Era in International Relations (1996), p. 58-9).

  • ;