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Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today. Having watched some of the testimony from this committee on the issue of IMVE, I have decided I will not speak to the nature of the threat – which has been well covered in the remarks of previous speakers. Instead, I would like to make four recommendations to the Committee that focus on what Parliament can do to counter this rising threat.

First, Parliament urgently needs to modernize the authorities of the security and intelligence community. The changing nature of technology, and the evolution of violent extremism (from groups to broader movements) means that there is a great level of uncertainty as to how these threats can be investigated. For example, as has been pointed out on many occasions, many of CSIS investigatory powers are based on the technology of 1984 – when the most advanced devices were fax machines. An era of online, diffuse, networked and movement driven extremism poses obvious challenges to this legislative framework. We need to be able to respond to evolving threats faster than we currently do.

I want to be as clear as possible here: modernizing authorities does not mean giving the national security community every power it asks for. Instead, it is about Parliament clarifying the powers it would like the national security and intelligence community to have in the face of evolving threats and new technologies, and the requirements to use them. For example, under what circumstances does Parliament think that CSIS should have the power to go into online spaces to investigate violent extremist threats? Or request basic subscriber information? Should the least intrusive means have the same requirements as the most intrusive means?

Parliament’s general lack of interest in national security legislation is unfortunate. Our allies regularly update authorities to deal with changes in both terms of both threats and technology. Australia, for example, usually introduces legislation to update its national security laws every two years. By contrast, Canada updates its national security legislation around once per decade, usually in omnibus legislation and often in the wake of a scandal (such as the RCMP “dirty tricks” campaign or crisis, such as 9/11 and the October 2014 attacks in St. Jean sur Richelieu and Parliament Hill). Canada needs to normalize the regular updating of its national security legislation to not only grant powers, but to set limits on them as well. Providing this statutory certainty will make the parameters for our security services clearer. This will not cause red tape, or a “free for all”, but enable investigations without our security services second guessing themselves as to where the lines are, causing delay or neglect.

Second, we need to augment our capacity to prosecute IMVE threats. I believe that one of the biggest problem Canada faces is the outdated RCMP model for both national security investigations and provincial policing. In the face of increasingly complex threats, driven by technology, the RCMP continues to employ an outdated generalist model, rather than specialized, trained investigators. There is something deeply flawed with a system where an
RCMP officer can be handling murder investigations in rural Newfoundland one week – and the very next week be assigned to IMVE investigations, with no training or specialization required.

Overhaul, reform and even replacement of the RCMP policing model in Canada is beyond the scope of this committee. In this sense, I suggest that it investigates what kinds of training on IMVE the RCMP provides, how many officers receive that training, who provides the training and the content of that training.

Third, building on the testimony given to this committee by Jessica Davis, steps need to be taken to build capacity to prosecute the financing of violent extremism. Canada has been largely unsuccessful in prosecuting terrorism financing charges, despite very broad and inclusive definitions of what constitutes financing. According to research by Ms Davis, despite over 4,600 disclosures by FINTRAC to several different partners relating to terrorist financing, there has only been two terrorist financing convictions in Canada. This seems shockingly low (although, to be fair, this number does not include the number of potential threats that were disrupted). Given that our laws in this area are even more vague (or non-existent) when it comes to IMVE or profiting off of hate speech, it suggests that Canada has a serious gap in its ability to counter financial threats in this area. The Financial Crimes Agency proposed by the government is a positive step forward – but much depends on the government’s willingness to develop the capacity to investigate and prosecute in this area. I understand new legislation in this area has been introduced, but here I am more concerned with our capacity gap – laws will solve little if our law enforcement is unable or unwilling to use them.

Finally, IMVE (and the Convoy) demonstrates the need for much greater federal and provincial cooperation on national security issues, as well as intelligence sharing. At present Canada lacks an integrated policy framework setting out roles and expectations for federal, provincial, and local governments, and for the private sector when it comes to intelligence and information sharing. As I am sure this committee is aware, much of Canada’s critical infrastructure – a target for many violent extremist groups across the political spectrum – is controlled outside of federal jurisdiction.

Because there is no framework, statutory support does not exist, or is a barrier to cooperation. Often, provincial police (the RCMP in most provinces) are not required to and may be legally restricted from briefing policy makers on the threats they are gathering evidence on. CSIS will brief provincial authorities, but often at the unclassified or low classification level. While much can be done with open-source information, some of the granularity of information can be lost.

As such, Canada has a system which limits information sharing to and between levels of government. While the federal government may have a deep understanding of the threat, provinces have a deeper understanding of their critical infrastructure, and associated risks. Yet, without information sharing, policymakers may not be able to understand how to prepare for threats or engage in effective operational responses to incidents like the Convoy.
These four recommendations are a start. The issues they speak to all pre-date the Convoy, but that event and the IMVE threat generally highlight their importance. We need more legislation, and we need Parliament to take a greater interest in national security to make its will known to enable a balanced approach to the challenges you have been researching. Thank you.